24 Februari 2026
Dispen Kormar TNI Angkatan Laut (Pulau Sekatung) Guna memastikan kedaulatan dan integritas wilayah Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia tetap terjaga, Prajurit Petarung Korps Marinir dari Satuan Tugas Pengamanan Pulau Tidak Berpenduduk (Satgas PAM Puter) melaksanakan patroli darat dan pesisir pantai di Pulau Sekatung. Kabupaten Natuna, Provinsi Kepulauan Riau. Jumat (20/02/2026).
Pulau Sekatung merupakan salah satu pulau terluar Indonesia yang berada di wilayah administratif Kabupaten Natuna, Provinsi Kepulauan Riau, dengan luas kurang lebih sekitar 1,5 kilometer persegi. Pulau ini tidak berpenduduk tetap dan secara geografis berbatasan langsung dengan perairan negara Vietnam, sehingga memiliki posisi yang sangat strategis dalam menjaga kedaulatan dan keutuhan wilayah Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia di perbatasan utara.
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Kegiatan patroli di dipimpin langsung Lettu Marinir Suharyanto selaku Danpos. Dengan perlengkapan lengkap dan pola gerak taktis yang terukur, para Prajurit Marinir melaksanakan pengamatan dan pemeriksaan di sejumlah titik strategis guna memastikan tidak terdapat aktivitas ilegal, pelanggaran wilayah, maupun pergerakan kapal asing yang mencurigakan di sekitar perairan.
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Meski bertugas di pulau yang tidak berpenghuni dengan sarana terbatas serta jauh dari keluarga, para prajurit tetap menunjukkan disiplin, loyalitas, dan dedikasi tinggi dalam menjaga stabilitas keamanan serta kedaulatan wilayah perbatasan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia.
Mantap
BalasHapusAmankan dari PEMBUAL dan TUKANG NYAMPAH
BalasHapusFAKTA.... Hanya dalam tempoh 2 Bulan... PENDATANG HARAM BERJAYA DITANGKAP.... PATI INDIANESIA TERTINGGI..... π₯π₯π€£π€£π€£
BalasHapus7,043 PATI ditangkap Imigresen, warga Indonesia tertinggi
https://www.utusan.com.my/nasional/2026/02/7043-pati-ditangkap-imigresen-warga-indonesia-tertinggi/
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
1. Keterbatasan Jumlah dan Kualitas
• Jumlah yang Tidak Memadai: Dibandingkan dengan negara-negara lain di kawasan, terutama Indonesia, jumlah kendaraan lapis baja yang dimiliki Malaydesh relatif sedikit. Misalnya, perbandingan kekuatan darat menunjukkan Indonesia memiliki sekitar 20.440 kendaraan lapis baja, sementara Malaydesh hanya memiliki sekitar 13.506 unit. Angka ini juga menunjukkan Indonesia memiliki lebih banyak tank tempur (331 unit) dibandingkan Malaydesh (48 unit). Keterbatasan ini memengaruhi kemampuan Malaydesh dalam menjalankan operasi darat berskala besar.
• Ketergantungan pada Model Lama: Meskipun memiliki beberapa unit modern seperti AV8 Gempita, Angkatan Darat Malaydesh masih mengoperasikan kendaraan lapis baja tua yang sudah usang. Hal ini menciptakan tantangan logistik yang besar dan membuat kekuatan darat kurang homogen.
2. Masalah Kesiapan Operasional dan Pemeliharaan
Ini adalah salah satu kelemahan paling signifikan dan sering disorot.
• Sering Mogok: Kendaraan lapis baja Malaydesh , termasuk tank, seringkali dilaporkan mogok di jalan raya atau saat latihan. Insiden ini tidak hanya menjadi bahan ejekan publik tetapi juga mengindikasikan kurangnya perawatan rutin dan pemeliharaan yang memadai.
• Kurangnya Suku Cadang: Masalah ini terkait dengan keragaman jenis kendaraan yang dimiliki Malaydesh . Karena mereka membeli kendaraan dari berbagai negara produsen, pasokan suku cadang sering kali tidak terjamin, menyebabkan unit-unit tidak dapat beroperasi dalam jangka waktu lama.
• Skandal dan Korupsi: Seperti yang terjadi pada proyek kapal LCS, skandal pengadaan dan pemeliharaan juga terjadi pada kendaraan lapis baja. Laporan menyebutkan adanya masalah tata kelola dan korupsi dalam industri pertahanan yang berdampak langsung pada kesiapan kendaraan tempur.
3. Kelemahan Teknis pada Model Utama (Studi Kasus: AV8 Gempita)
AV8 Gempita adalah andalan utama kendaraan lapis baja Malaydesh . Meskipun merupakan produk lokal yang dikembangkan dari platform FNSS Pars Turki, kendaraan ini juga memiliki beberapa kelemahan:
• Penurunan Kemampuan Amfibi: Varian-varian yang memiliki berat lebih besar, seperti varian antitank dengan turret LCT30, kehilangan kemampuan amfibinya. Hal ini membatasi fleksibilitas operasional kendaraan di medan dengan banyak sungai atau perairan. Bahkan pada varian yang dirancang untuk amfibi, penambahan lapisan pelindung membuat kecepatannya di air menurun.
• Perlindungan yang Memadai Namun Tidak Unggul: Kendaraan lapis baja seperti Tarantula HMAV dan AV8 Gempita dirancang dengan standar perlindungan NATO STANAG 4569. Namun, tingkat perlindungan ini (level 2A/2B) dianggap memadai untuk ancaman ranjau dan IED, tetapi mungkin tidak cukup untuk menghadapi serangan anti-tank atau ancaman yang lebih berat dari kendaraan lapis baja modern lainnya.
• Persenjataan dan Varian yang Berbeda: Meskipun memiliki banyak varian, ada masalah dengan sistem senjata yang digunakan. Sebagai contoh, varian antitank AV8 Gempita dengan rudal anti-tank belum terbukti sepenuhnya efektif atau tersedia dalam jumlah yang cukup.
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• 2025 : RM1.73 trillion, or 85.8% of GDP GDP
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
π 1. Malaydesh Defence White Paper (DWP) 2019
a. Objective
• The DWP 2019 was intended as Malaydesh ’s first long-term defense roadmap.
• Goals:
o Identify threats and security priorities (maritime security, terrorism, cyber, regional tensions).
o Outline modernization plans for Navy, Air Force, and Army through 2030.
o Provide guidance for procurement, O&M, and capability building.
b. Proposed Approach
• 10-year horizon (2021–2030) for modernization.
• Emphasis on:
o Upgrading aging ships, aircraft, and armored vehicles.
o Strengthening maritime and air defense.
o Developing cyber, UAV, and special operations capabilities.
c. Failure Reasons
1. Political Collapse
o Pakatan Harapan government fell in 2020.
o DWP implementation depended on continuity of political support, which disappeared.
2. No Legal/Institutional Backing
o Unlike Singapore or Indonesia, Malaydesh has no law forcing successive governments to follow the plan.
3. Short-Term Budgeting
o Malaydesh still allocates budgets year-by-year, leaving little certainty for multi-year projects.
4. Budget Constraints
o Small overall defense budget (~1% of GDP) → most plans remained aspirational.
5. Result
o Modernization projects delayed or cancelled.
o Navy still waits for LCS ships, Air Force stuck with aging jets, Army using 1980s APCs.
π DWP became a paper plan with little real impact.
________________________________________
π 2. Indonesia Minimum Essential Force (MEF)
a. Objective
• MEF (Minimum Essential Force) is Indonesia’s long-term military modernization plan, started in 2004.
• Goals:
o Achieve a minimum level of capability to defend the country.
o Develop integrated capabilities across Army, Navy, Air Force.
o Plan modernization in phases over decades.
b. Implementation Approach
• Multi-phase program:
o MEF I (2004–2009): Procurement of basic platforms, focus on territorial defense.
o MEF II (2010–2014): Expand fleet, improve air defense.
o MEF III (2015–2024): Focus on advanced assets (fighters, submarines, naval combatants).
• Legally recognized: MEF has multi-year funding plans, independent of short-term political changes.
• Result:
o Indonesian Navy expanded with new frigates, corvettes, submarines.
o Air Force replaced aging fighters and increased UAV capabilities.
o Army received modern APCs, artillery, and transport vehicles.
=============
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
2025 : RM1.73 trillion, or 85.8% of GDP GDP
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
π 1. Malaydesh Defence White Paper (DWP) 2019
a. Objective
• The DWP 2019 was intended as Malaydesh ’s first long-term defense roadmap.
• Goals:
o Identify threats and security priorities (maritime security, terrorism, cyber, regional tensions).
o Outline modernization plans for Navy, Air Force, and Army through 2030.
o Provide guidance for procurement, O&M, and capability building.
b. Proposed Approach
• 10-year horizon (2021–2030) for modernization.
• Emphasis on:
o Upgrading aging ships, aircraft, and armored vehicles.
o Strengthening maritime and air defense.
o Developing cyber, UAV, and special operations capabilities.
c. Failure Reasons
1. Political Collapse
o Pakatan Harapan government fell in 2020.
o DWP implementation depended on continuity of political support, which disappeared.
2. No Legal/Institutional Backing
o Unlike Singapore or Indonesia, Malaydesh has no law forcing successive governments to follow the plan.
3. Short-Term Budgeting
o Malaydesh still allocates budgets year-by-year, leaving little certainty for multi-year projects.
4. Budget Constraints
o Small overall defense budget (~1% of GDP) → most plans remained aspirational.
5. Result
o Modernization projects delayed or cancelled.
o Navy still waits for LCS ships, Air Force stuck with aging jets, Army using 1980s APCs.
π DWP became a paper plan with little real impact.
________________________________________
π 2. Indonesia Minimum Essential Force (MEF)
a. Objective
• MEF (Minimum Essential Force) is Indonesia’s long-term military modernization plan, started in 2004.
• Goals:
o Achieve a minimum level of capability to defend the country.
o Develop integrated capabilities across Army, Navy, Air Force.
o Plan modernization in phases over decades.
b. Implementation Approach
• Multi-phase program:
o MEF I (2004–2009): Procurement of basic platforms, focus on territorial defense.
o MEF II (2010–2014): Expand fleet, improve air defense.
o MEF III (2015–2024): Focus on advanced assets (fighters, submarines, naval combatants).
• Legally recognized: MEF has multi-year funding plans, independent of short-term political changes.
• Result:
o Indonesian Navy expanded with new frigates, corvettes, submarines.
o Air Force replaced aging fighters and increased UAV capabilities.
o Army received modern APCs, artillery, and transport vehicles.
=============
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
2025 : RM1.73 trillion, or 85.8% of GDP GDP
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
π 1. Malaydesh Defence White Paper (DWP) 2019
a. Objective
• The DWP 2019 was intended as Malaydesh ’s first long-term defense roadmap.
• Goals:
o Identify threats and security priorities (maritime security, terrorism, cyber, regional tensions).
o Outline modernization plans for Navy, Air Force, and Army through 2030.
o Provide guidance for procurement, O&M, and capability building.
b. Proposed Approach
• 10-year horizon (2021–2030) for modernization.
• Emphasis on:
o Upgrading aging ships, aircraft, and armored vehicles.
o Strengthening maritime and air defense.
o Developing cyber, UAV, and special operations capabilities.
c. Failure Reasons
1. Political Collapse
o Pakatan Harapan government fell in 2020.
o DWP implementation depended on continuity of political support, which disappeared.
2. No Legal/Institutional Backing
o Unlike Singapore or Indonesia, Malaydesh has no law forcing successive governments to follow the plan.
3. Short-Term Budgeting
o Malaydesh still allocates budgets year-by-year, leaving little certainty for multi-year projects.
4. Budget Constraints
o Small overall defense budget (~1% of GDP) → most plans remained aspirational.
5. Result
o Modernization projects delayed or cancelled.
o Navy still waits for LCS ships, Air Force stuck with aging jets, Army using 1980s APCs.
π DWP became a paper plan with little real impact.
________________________________________
π 2. Indonesia Minimum Essential Force (MEF)
a. Objective
• MEF (Minimum Essential Force) is Indonesia’s long-term military modernization plan, started in 2004.
• Goals:
o Achieve a minimum level of capability to defend the country.
o Develop integrated capabilities across Army, Navy, Air Force.
o Plan modernization in phases over decades.
b. Implementation Approach
• Multi-phase program:
o MEF I (2004–2009): Procurement of basic platforms, focus on territorial defense.
o MEF II (2010–2014): Expand fleet, improve air defense.
o MEF III (2015–2024): Focus on advanced assets (fighters, submarines, naval combatants).
• Legally recognized: MEF has multi-year funding plans, independent of short-term political changes.
• Result:
o Indonesian Navy expanded with new frigates, corvettes, submarines.
o Air Force replaced aging fighters and increased UAV capabilities.
o Army received modern APCs, artillery, and transport vehicles.
=============
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
2025 : RM1.73 trillion, or 85.8% of GDP GDP
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
π 1. Procurement Overview
• Malaydesh ’s defense procurement is piecemeal, delayed, and often politically influenced.
• Limited modernization is the result of:
1. Small defense budget (~1% of GDP)
2. High personnel costs (~60% of budget)
3. Political short-termism and procurement scandals
________________________________________
π 2. Major Modernization Programs and Delays
a. Air Force (RMAF)
• MRCA Fighter Replacement: Intended to replace MiG-29s (retired 2017).
o Candidates: Rafale, Typhoon, Gripen, F/A-18
o Program delayed repeatedly due to budget constraints, political changes, and procurement indecision.
o Result: RMAF relies on aging Su-30MKM, F/A-18D, and Hawk trainers, with limited readiness.
• Helicopters: Sikorsky S-70, AW139s delivered slowly; fleet size insufficient for operational needs.
b. Navy (RMN)
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Project
o Contract 2011, RM9 billion for 6 ships
o No operational ships as of 2025 due to construction delays, cost overruns, and political mismanagement
o Navy relies on Kedah-class corvettes (2006–2010) and older 1980s vessels
• Submarines: Two ScorpΓ¨ne-class delivered mid-2000s
o High maintenance costs and limited operational use
o Spare parts delays reduce readiness
c. Army (TDM)
• Armored vehicles: Condor APCs (1980s) still in service
• AV-8 Gempita (Turkey-Malaydesh joint project) production delayed and expensive
• Artillery & support systems: Many systems remain outdated due to insufficient procurement funding
________________________________________
π 3. Reasons for Limited Procurement
1. Small Defense Budget
o Only ~15–18 billion RM per year
o Majority spent on salaries → little left for big-ticket items
2. Stop-Go Procurement Cycle
o Projects start, then delayed or scaled down due to political or budget issues
o Example: LCS, MRCA, Army modernization programs
3. Political Interference & Corruption
o Contracts awarded based on political connections, not operational priority
o Leads to mismanagement, cost overruns, and delayed delivery
4. Dependence on Foreign Suppliers
o Many systems must be imported → costly and sensitive to geopolitical issues
5. Weak Multi-Year Planning
o No binding long-term plan → programs cannot be executed consistently
________________________________________
π 4. Consequences of Limited Modernization
Area Effect
Air Force Aging jets; low operational readiness (~30–40%)
Navy Old corvettes/patrol ships in use; LCS delayed
Army Old APCs and artillery; partial vehicle upgrades only
Training Fewer exercises due to limited functional equipment
Regional capability Military capability lags behind neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam)
Strategic posture Limited deterrence and inability to sustain high-intensity operations
________________________________________
π 5. Cumulative Effect
• Limited procurement + weak O&M + small budget + political short-termism = military stagnation
• Equipment remains obsolete, readiness is low, and modernization programs are repeatedly delayed or cancelled.
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
π 1. What O&M Covers
Operations & Maintenance (O&M) includes:
• Fuel and consumables for aircraft, ships, and vehicles
• Spare parts for planes, ships, and vehicles
• Repairs and overhauls (preventive and corrective maintenance)
• Training exercises for personnel
• Operational readiness support (e.g., simulation, logistics)
Weak O&M means all of these areas are underfunded or poorly managed.
________________________________________
π 2. Budget Constraints
• Only 20–25% of Malaydesh ’s small defense budget (~1% GDP) goes to O&M.
• Consequences:
o Aircraft grounded due to lack of fuel or spare parts
o Ships docked for extended periods awaiting repairs
o Vehicles idle in depots because they cannot be maintained
Example:
• RMAF Su-30MKM: at one point, only 4 of 18 fighters were airworthy due to spare parts shortages.
• Navy corvettes & patrol vessels from the 1980s continue in service because LCS delays mean there’s no replacement.
________________________________________
π 3. Impact on Training
• O&M limitations reduce training opportunities:
o Pilots get fewer flight hours → degrade skills
o Naval crews sail less → operational proficiency drops
o Soldiers train less with heavy vehicles and artillery → less effective combat units
• Training shortfalls compound the readiness problem, even if equipment is technically available.
________________________________________
π 4. Maintenance Culture Issues
• Maintenance is often reactive, not preventive:
o Equipment is used until breakdown, then repaired.
o Preventive maintenance (regular inspections, part replacements) is skipped to save costs.
• Consequence: equipment wears out faster, reducing lifespan and readiness.
________________________________________
π 5. Spare Parts Shortages
• Many Malaydesh n military systems are imported: Russia, France, US, Turkey.
• Budget shortfalls and procurement delays cause spare parts shortages, resulting in:
o Aircraft grounded
o Ships unable to sail
o Armored vehicles idle
• Some old platforms have parts no longer manufactured, forcing cannibalization of other units.
________________________________________
π 6. Effects on Operational Readiness
Effect Example
Low aircraft readiness Only ~30–40% of fighter jets flyable
Naval limitations Fewer patrols; reliance on 1980s ships
Army mobility problems APCs, artillery under-maintained
Reduced training Crews and soldiers less combat-ready
Accelerated obsolescence Old equipment fails faster, forcing prolonged use
________________________________________
π 7. Systemic Causes
1. Small overall budget → O&M underfunded
2. Salary-heavy allocation → majority of funds go to personnel
3. Political short-termism → O&M often deprioritized for visible projects
4. Procurement delays & scandals → new assets delayed, old ones overused
5. Limited local defense industry → spare parts must be imported, increasing cost & delays
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
π 1. Definition of Readiness
• Military readiness is the ability of armed forces to deploy, fight, and sustain operations effectively.
• It depends on:
o Personnel training and morale
o Equipment availability and functionality
o Supply chains, spare parts, and logistics
o Command, control, and operational planning
________________________________________
π 2. Factors Reducing Readiness in Malaydesh
a. Aging Equipment
• Many systems are decades old:
o Army: Condor APCs (1980s), aging artillery
o Air Force: Hawks, F/A-18D, Su-30MKM maintenance-dependent
o Navy: Corvettes and patrol ships from the 1980s and 1990s
• Aging equipment is less reliable and requires more maintenance, reducing operational availability.
b. Weak Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
• Underfunded O&M (~20–25% of defense budget) leads to:
o Aircraft grounded for spare parts or repairs
o Ships docked for extended periods
o Vehicles in depots awaiting maintenance
• Result: Even available personnel cannot train on or deploy operational equipment.
c. Limited Procurement & Modernization
• Programs like LCS, MRCA, and AV-8 Gempita delayed or scaled down → old platforms overused
• Delayed modernization keeps capabilities obsolete, reducing effective combat power
d. Personnel vs Equipment Imbalance
• ~60% of the budget goes to salaries → large manpower, small equipment share
• Large number of soldiers and pilots, but few operational assets to use → readiness suffers
e. Short Training Hours
• Reduced O&M funds → limited exercises, flight hours, and sea days
• Consequences:
o Pilots lose proficiency
o Sailors have fewer operational patrols
o Soldiers have limited live-fire or armored vehicle training
f. Political Interference & Short-Termism
• Stop-go projects and annual budgeting → unpredictable availability of equipment
• Forces cannot plan for sustained readiness when budgets, programs, and leadership priorities keep changing
________________________________________
π 3. Operational Examples
Branch Issue Readiness Effect
Air Force Su-30MKM grounded due to spares Only ~4 of 18 aircraft airworthy at one point
Navy LCS delayed; old Kedah-class ships overused Limited patrol capability; aging ships prone to breakdown
Army Condor APCs and artillery aging Many vehicles inoperable; reduced mechanized mobility
Training Fuel, spare parts, and O&M cuts Reduced exercise frequency and quality
Overall Combined issues Forces cannot sustain high-intensity or prolonged operations
________________________________________
π 4. Strategic Implications
• Malaydesh can maintain territorial defense against minor threats, but:
o Limited ability to project force regionally
o Low deterrence credibility
o Vulnerability in maritime security (South China Sea, Sulu Sea piracy)
o Reliance on diplomacy and alliances rather than strong self-reliant military
________________________________________
π 5. Cycle of Low Readiness
1. Small budget → underfunded O&M
2. Old equipment overused → more breakdowns
3. Limited procurement → no modern replacements
4. Training reduced → skill atrophy
5. Operational readiness declines → forces cannot execute missions
6. Aging equipment further stressed → cycle repeats
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
1. Overview of Malaydesh ’s Military Budget
Malaydesh ’s armed forces are collectively called Angkatan Tentera Malaydesh (ATM), which includes:
• Tentera Darat (Army)
• Tentera Laut (Navy)
• Tentera Udara (Air Force)
The military budget comes from the national budget, which is approved annually by the government. Historically, Malaydesh allocates around 1.5% to 2% of its GDP to defense, which is lower than regional neighbors like Singapore (~3% of GDP) or Thailand (~2.5% of GDP).
________________________________________
2. Reasons for Budgetary Constraints
Several factors contribute to limits on Malaydesh ’s military spending:
1. Economic Priorities
o Malaydesh has competing priorities like infrastructure, healthcare, education, and social programs.
o Defense often has to share funding with these critical sectors, especially during economic slowdowns or crises like the COVID-19 pandemic.
2. Low GDP Proportion Allocation
o Defense spending is not a large share of GDP, meaning ATM must operate efficiently with limited resources.
3. Cost of Modernization
o Modern weapons systems (jets, naval ships, missile defense) are very expensive.
o Limited budgets often force Malaydesh to prioritize maintenance over new acquisitions.
4. Debt and Fiscal Policy Constraints
o The government manages national debt levels and budget deficits, which restricts discretionary spending, including military upgrades.
5. Regional Security Assessment
o Malaydesh generally faces lower direct military threats compared to neighbors like the Philippines or Singapore, so it may choose cost-effective defense rather than high-tech military expansion.
________________________________________
3. Impact of Budgetary Constraints
Budget limits have several practical effects on Malaydesh ’s armed forces:
1. Delayed Modernization
o Acquisition of advanced aircraft, naval ships, and weapon systems may be postponed or scaled down.
o Example: Procurement of new fighter jets or submarines can take decades from planning to delivery.
2. Maintenance Challenges
o Aging equipment sometimes cannot be replaced, leading to higher maintenance costs and operational limitations.
o Some aircraft or naval vessels may be grounded due to lack of spare parts or funding.
3. Operational Readiness
o Limited funds can affect training exercises, personnel numbers, and military readiness.
o The military may focus on territorial defense and counter-insurgency, rather than high-tech, long-range capabilities.
4. Dependence on Foreign Suppliers
o Malaydesh often relies on imports of military hardware, which can be costly and subject to international politics.
________________________________________
4. Examples of Budget-Related Decisions
• Air Force: Delays in acquiring modern fighter jets due to high costs; focus on upgrading older MiG-29s and Sukhoi Su-30s.
• Navy: Limited new ship acquisitions; focus on patrol vessels for maritime security instead of expensive frigates.
• Army: Equipment modernization is gradual; focus on light arms, armored vehicles, and special forces rather than full mechanized upgrades.
________________________________________
5. Conclusion
Malaydesh ’s military faces budgetary constraints due to a combination of economic priorities, limited GDP allocation, modernization costs, and debt management. While ATM remains capable for regional defense and internal security, high-end modernization and rapid expansion are restricted, requiring strategic prioritization of resources.
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
π§ Strategic and Policy Challenges
• Lack of Clear Long-Term Vision: Malaydesh ’s defence budgeting process often lacks transparency and predictability, making it difficult for the armed forces to plan long-term procurement and modernization programs.
• Frequent Political Changes: Since 2018, Malaydesh has seen multiple changes in government, which has disrupted continuity in defence planning and policy execution.
π° Budgetary Constraints
• Limited Procurement Funding: Although the defence budget has increased to RM19.73 billion in 2024, over 40% is allocated to salaries and allowances, leaving relatively little for equipment upgrades and procurement.
• Currency Depreciation: Malaydesh relies heavily on foreign defence suppliers. The weakening ringgit reduces purchasing power, making imported equipment more expensive.
⚙️ Operational and Equipment Issues
• Aging Equipment: Many platforms, such as the Condor Armoured Personnel Carriers, are outdated. Replacement plans are slow due to budget and bureaucratic hurdles.
• Dependence on Foreign OEMs: Domestic defence manufacturing is still heavily reliant on foreign original equipment manufacturers, limiting self-reliance.
π§ͺ Technological and Industrial Limitations
• Underdeveloped Defence Industry: Malaydesh ’s local defence industry lacks the capacity to produce advanced systems independently, which hampers modernization efforts.
• Low R&D Investment: There’s insufficient investment in defence science and technology, which affects innovation and indigenous capability development.
π€ Civil-Military Integration Issues
• Misunderstanding of HANRUH Concept: The “Comprehensive Defence” (HANRUH) strategy is often misinterpreted as a purely military doctrine, rather than a whole-of-nation approach involving civil sectors.
• Weak Civil-Military Collaboration: The fading spirit of civil-military synergy, once strong during the Malayan Emergency, has weakened over time.
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
1. Overview
Malaydesh armed forces, Angkatan Tentera Malaydesh (ATM), operate under limited budgets. Over the decades, this has led to prolonged use of older military equipment and delays in modernizing their forces. These challenges impact operational readiness, capabilities, and strategic deterrence.
________________________________________
2. Ageing Equipment
“Ageing equipment” refers to military hardware that has outlived its intended operational lifespan or requires extensive maintenance to remain functional.
Examples in Malaydesh :
1. Air Force (TUDM / Tentera Udara Diraja Malaydesh )
o MiG-29s and F-5E Tiger IIs: Some aircraft are over 30 years old.
o Maintenance costs increase with age, and spare parts become harder to source.
o Operational readiness is reduced; fewer aircraft are available for exercises or patrols.
2. Navy (TLDM / Tentera Laut Diraja Malaydesh )
o Kasturi-class frigates and older Perdana-class patrol vessels are decades old.
o Ships need constant upkeep; older vessels have limited combat capabilities compared to modern ships.
3. Army (TDM / Tentera Darat Malaydesh )
o Condor armored vehicles and old artillery systems are still in service.
o Modern threats like asymmetric warfare or rapid deployment require more advanced, mobile systems.
Consequences of Ageing Equipment
• Higher maintenance costs: More resources go into keeping old hardware operational.
• Reduced combat effectiveness: Outdated technology may be inferior to neighboring militaries’ systems.
• Operational limitations: Older platforms may be slower, less reliable, or incompatible with modern communication and weapon systems.
________________________________________
3. Delayed Modernization
“Delayed modernization” occurs when planned upgrades or new acquisitions are postponed, usually due to budget constraints, bureaucratic issues, or changing priorities.
Examples in Malaydesh :
1. Air Force
o Replacement of aging fighters like MiG-29s and F-5E has been delayed.
o New acquisitions like the Su-30MKM and M346 trainers are fewer than initially planned.
2. Navy
o Plans for new frigates, submarines, and multi-role combat ships are often slow-moving or downscaled.
o Patrol vessels are prioritized over high-end warships due to cost constraints.
3. Army
o Modern armored vehicles and artillery acquisition programs face delays, affecting mobility and firepower.
o Emphasis is placed on upgrading existing equipment rather than full-scale replacement.
Causes of Delayed Modernization
• Limited defense budget: Malaydesh allocates ~1.5–2% of GDP to defense. High-cost projects compete with other national priorities.
• Procurement bureaucracy: Complex procurement processes slow down acquisition.
• Foreign dependence: Reliance on imported equipment leads to delays in deliveries.
• Strategic threat assessment: Malaydesh relatively low external threat level reduces urgency for rapid modernization.
________________________________________
4. Impacts
1. Operational Readiness
o Fewer active platforms are available due to maintenance of old systems.
2. Capability Gap
o Aging systems may lack advanced radar, missile systems, or networked command capabilities.
3. Regional Competitiveness
o Malaydesh may lag behind neighbors like Singapore or Thailand in modern warfare technology.
4. Financial Burden
o Continuous repair and patching of old equipment may ultimately cost more than timely modernization
Ternyata PATI INDIANESIA... π€£π€£π€£π€£
BalasHapus7,043 PATI ditahan imigresen, Indonesia, Myanmar paling tinggi
https://www.kosmo.com.my/2026/02/24/7043-pati-ditahan-imigresen-indonesia-myanmar-paling-tinggi/
Maklum KUALADHAKA MALAYDESH
Hapusπ€£π€£π€£π€£
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
π 1. Procurement Weaknesses
a. Stop–Go Procurement
• Major projects (fighters, ships, armored vehicles) are often announced, delayed, or cancelled depending on which government is in power.
• No stable multi-year defense budget → contractors cannot plan effectively → delays & cost escalation.
Example:
• MRCA fighter replacement: in discussion since 2009, but never finalized → MiG-29s retired in 2017 without replacement.
________________________________________
b. Political Interference
• Contracts sometimes awarded to politically connected companies rather than the most capable suppliers.
• Domestic firms given contracts they cannot deliver on, leading to project mismanagement.
Example:
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal: RM9 billion allocated in 2011 for 6 ships. As of 2025, none are delivered, funds mismanaged, and Navy stuck with 1980s-era ships.
________________________________________
c. Corruption & Lack of Transparency
• Defense procurement in Malaydesh has often been opaque, with corruption scandals undermining delivery.
• This creates mistrust in both local industry and international partners.
________________________________________
π 2. Supply Chain Weaknesses
a. Heavy Foreign Dependence
• Malaydesh imports almost all high-end systems:
o Fighters → Russia, US, UK
o Ships → France, Germany, locally assembled with foreign parts
o Vehicles → Turkey, South Korea
• Spare parts must come from abroad, which is expensive, slow, and vulnerable to geopolitical disruptions.
________________________________________
b. Poor Local Industrial Capacity
• Local defense industry (Boustead, DefTech, etc.) has limited expertise.
• They rely on foreign designs and technology transfer.
• When local firms are given contracts they cannot handle → projects stall or quality suffers.
________________________________________
c. Spare Parts Shortages
• Weak procurement planning → parts not stockpiled properly.
• Old systems (MiG-29s, Condors, etc.) → parts no longer manufactured.
• This leads to “cannibalization”, where one aircraft or vehicle is stripped to keep others running.
________________________________________
d. Weak Logistics & Sustainment Planning
• Malaydesh tends to focus on buying platforms, not sustainment packages.
• Lifecycle support (20–30 years of maintenance, training, spares) is often underfunded or ignored.
• Platforms quickly become unusable once warranty/support packages expire.
________________________________________
π 3. Consequences for the Armed Forces
Problem Consequence
Procurement delays (LCS, MRCA) Old equipment kept in service → capability gap
Foreign dependence Vulnerable to sanctions, export restrictions, and currency fluctuations
Local industry weakness Projects mismanaged, delays, low confidence in local defense manufacturing
Spare parts shortages Low aircraft/ship/vehicle readiness; many platforms grounded
Poor sustainment planning Equipment lifespan shortened; readiness cycle worsens
PEKANBARU - KL : 291 KM
HapusPONTIANAK - SERAWAK : 498 KM
--------------------------
1. RAFALE ± 1852 KM
2. KF-21 Boramae ± 1.000–1.100 km
3. F-16C/D Block 50/52 ± 1.000–1.300 km
4. KAAN ± 1.100–1.400 km
--------------------------
GORILA PANAS LOA M346FA .....
-
LOA M346F
LOA M346F
LOA M346F
LOA M346F
-
https://www.indomiliter.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Photo_Signing-Ceremony_Letter-of-Award_Indonesia_Leonardo_M-346F.jpg
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https://img-s-msn-com.akamaized.net/tenant/amp/entityid/AA1VIflp.img?w=768&h=432&m=6&x=395&y=259&s=215&d=76
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https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiM_xCoQ3XFRdymrLVwgcKBAjWnMy_8pl7m4Gmyk9T4hEteLXwgKlita-YflWudvDvkNqAe53qX3BNhze7VlNiCH5EoEWknHL7ZqC-p2bFZUUj8X3PoHNMchCnDDJ37nNrGS0FkoXeCPQp8jB_O3K7Q7FME9YNkbk62rsuauglHS6C1x374Zt7foRRirU1x/s567/Photo_Signing%20Ceremony_Letter%20of%20Award_Indonesia_Leonardo_M-346F.jpeg
---------------------------
KONTRAK ISTIF 2 UNIT =
-
https://blue.kumparan.com/image/upload/fl_progressive,fl_lossy,c_fill,f_auto,q_auto:best,w_640/v1634025439/01k1dyx5b2pge5amnd1jfn43yj.jpg
-
https://aset.indonesiadefense.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sjafrie-Sjamsoeddin-5.webp
-
https://scontent.fcgk47-1.fna.fbcdn.net/v/t39.30808-6/522960039_1205302044965251_7011373141499545462_n.jpg?_nc_cat=101&ccb=1-7&_nc_sid=127cfc&_nc_ohc=sWQ5x_qmqdUQ7kNvwEgapDL&_nc_oc=AdmvCLM6XY7WfSUPzL_FdL2u5aED6Shm0xqFF7sOujMn6ChrFr-mLtf1_bEIBflRWfs&_nc_zt=23&_nc_ht=scontent.fcgk47-1.fna&_nc_gid=yto5m-Ecq6QDEI4NjmYf7g&oh=00_AfsAe2WsbxaDqxA-sfhT-bYRfYnZwyYSEbAECeLpzqB6ZA&oe=699758B2
-
https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiIYqcLPgQaHNqubfwNen7Snb-9YoHdSeagm6slrnD2nwKSy6lue9ckAi0GHYH2jgzq_3UGbVefodOL1qAguX_cDecpZ_nyJBL8GkQAopqOOqz4vsyofIe1nYCvTuQy9LMerfHVmT5rGiYp9eiZaYI_atnLMQXF3sjdwhGTu-Go_TQWg85z43HPP6LVNGL_/s1600/Gwx9v83WAAAV_UY.jpeg
---------------------------
KONTRAK KAAN =
-
https://www.indomiliter.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Gwx4UFQW4AAHLqg.jpg
-
https://static.republika.co.id/uploads/images/inpicture_slide/_250726191324-889.png
---------------------------
USD 20 MILIAR versus
2025 TAI DAN KEMENHAN RI =
48 KAAN GEN 5
48 KAAN GEN 5
48 KAAN GEN 5
11 Haziran 2025 tarihinde Endonezya Savunma BakanlΔ±ΔΔ± ile imzaladΔ±ΔΔ±mΔ±z ve toplamda 48 adet KAAN uΓ§aΔΔ±na yΓΆnelik iΕ birliΔini kapsayan “Devletten Devlete (G2G) Tedarik AnlaΕmasΔ±” doΔrultusunda; bu anlaΕmanΔ±n tΓΌm detaylarΔ±nΔ± ve teknik eklerini iΓ§eren ticari sΓΆzleΕmenin imza tΓΆrenini bugΓΌn itibarΔ±yla gerΓ§ekleΕtirdik.
--------------------------
42 RAFALE RESMI DASSAULT GEN 4.5
42 RAFALE RESMI DASSAULT GEN 4.5
42 RAFALE RESMI DASSAULT GEN 4.5
42 RAFALE RESMI DASSAULT GEN 4.5
6 RAFALE SEPTEMBER 2022
18 RAFALE AGUSTUS 2023
18 RAFALE JANUARI 2024
DASSAULT AVIATION = 42 RAFALE
(Saint-Cloud, le 8 Janvier 2024) – La derniΓ¨re tranche de 18 Rafale pour l’IndonΓ©sie est entrΓ©e en vigueur ce jour. Elle fait suite Γ l’entrΓ©e en vigueur, en septembre 2022 et en aoΓ»t 2023, de la premiΓ¨re et de la deuxiΓ¨me tranche de 6 et 18 Rafale, et vient ainsi complΓ©ter le NOmbre d’avions en commande pour l’IndonΓ©sie dans le cadre du contrat signΓ© en fΓ©vrier 2022 pour l’acquisition de 42 Rafale.
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
π 1. Chronic Budget Allocation Problem
• Malaydesh ’s defense budget is small (~1% of GDP, RM15–18 billion/year).
• Of that, ~60% goes to salaries and pensions.
• Only 20–25% is left for operations & maintenance (O&M), and even less for procurement.
π This leaves little funding to buy spare parts, conduct regular overhauls, or invest in preventive maintenance.
________________________________________
π 2. Air Force (RMAF) Problems
Su-30MKM (delivered 2007)
• Flagship fighter jets, but plagued by low availability.
• At one point (2018), reports said only 4 of 18 Su-30MKMs were airworthy, the rest grounded due to lack of spare parts and servicing delays.
• Malaydesh had difficulties sourcing Russian spare parts after sanctions and because of budget shortfalls.
MiG-29N
• Retired in 2017 mainly due to high maintenance costs and poor availability (many were grounded).
Hawk 108/208
• Used since the 1990s, many are aging trainers with frequent technical issues.
• Maintenance consumes resources but still leaves many aircraft unfit for combat roles.
π Overall, RMAF has far fewer combat-ready aircraft than its official fleet size suggests.
________________________________________
π 3. Navy (RMN) Problems
Old Vessels
• Many ships (patrol craft, corvettes) date from the 1970s–80s.
• Spare parts are often obsolete or no longer manufactured, forcing RMN to cannibalize parts from one ship to keep another running.
Submarines (Scorpène class)
• Maintenance is expensive.
• At times, only one of two submarines was operational due to refit or repair delays.
• Budget cuts make it hard to sustain long-term contracts with foreign suppliers.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Delay
• Because the LCS program is stalled, RMN must overuse old Kedah-class vessels.
• Heavy usage without enough maintenance accelerates wear and reduces readiness.
________________________________________
π 4. Army Problems
• The Army still operates Condor APCs from the 1980s, which break down frequently.
• Spare parts for these German-made vehicles are scarce.
• Even newer AV-8 Gempita vehicles have been criticized for high operating costs and inconsistent spare parts supply.
π Result: Many vehicles sit idle in depots, reducing combat mobility.
________________________________________
π 5. Procurement & Supply Chain Weakness
• Malaydesh ’s defense relies heavily on foreign suppliers (Russia, France, UK, US, Turkey).
• Spare parts supply gets disrupted due to:
o Currency weakness (RM depreciation) → parts become more expensive.
o Geopolitical issues (e.g., Russian sanctions).
o Late payments to suppliers because of domestic budget delays.
• Local defense industry lacks capacity to produce spare parts domestically, unlike Singapore.
________________________________________
π 6. Maintenance Culture & Planning Weakness
• Maintenance is often reactive, not preventive. Assets are used until breakdown, then repaired — instead of scheduled servicing.
• Poor planning and weak oversight → funds meant for maintenance sometimes diverted or delayed.
• Technical staff shortages also affect readiness (brain drain, low morale due to pay gaps vs private sector).
________________________________________
π 7. Impact on Readiness
• Aircraft: Fleet numbers look good on paper, but only ~30–50% are mission-ready.
• Navy: Too many ships in dry dock or awaiting spare parts.
• Army: Many vehicles and artillery pieces are non-operational, reducing mobility and firepower.
• Training: Pilots and crews get fewer flight hours or sea days because aircraft/ships are not serviceable → reduces skill level.
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
π 1. Frequent Change of Governments
• Since 2018, Malaydesh has gone through five prime ministers (Najib → Mahathir → Muhyiddin → Ismail Sabri → Anwar).
• Each new administration brings in new defense ministers, new priorities, and new reviews of procurement plans.
• Defense programs often get shelved, re-tendered, or cancelled, even if already in progress.
π Example: The MRCA (fighter jet replacement) program was delayed repeatedly as every government pushed it aside to focus on other political promises.
________________________________________
π 2. Short-Term Political Goals vs. Long-Term Defense Needs
• Politicians often treat the defense budget as a political tool, not a national strategy.
• Instead of investing in long-term modernization (ships, jets, systems that take 10–20 years), governments focus on populist measures like subsidies and cash transfers.
• Defense ends up being underfunded because it doesn’t bring quick electoral returns.
π Result: Modernization plans are written on paper (e.g., Malaydesh Defence White Paper 2019) but rarely implemented.
________________________________________
π 3. Procurement Decisions Driven by Politics
• Major defense deals are often influenced by political patronage and corruption instead of operational needs.
• Contracts are awarded to companies with political links, regardless of whether they can deliver.
π Example: The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project was handed to Boustead Naval Shipyard (linked to UMNO interests), leading to billions spent without a single ship delivered by 2025.
________________________________________
π 4. Policy Flip-Flops
• Projects often get reversed or changed midway because of political shifts.
• Example:
o NGPV (New Generation Patrol Vessel) plan was for 27 ships. After political scandals and leadership changes, only 6 were built.
o MRCA Program (to replace MiG-29s) has been “top priority” since 2010, but each government postponed it → leaving RMAF with a shrinking fleet.
• This creates a stop-go cycle where billions are wasted and no consistent progress is made.
________________________________________
π 5. Lack of Bipartisan Consensus on Defense
• Unlike Singapore (where defense is a non-political, bipartisan national priority), in Malaydesh defense policy shifts with each ruling coalition.
• No stable long-term vision: every government reopens old debates instead of following through on past commitments.
π The 2019 Defence White Paper was a good roadmap, but after Pakatan Harapan fell in 2020, it was quietly shelved.
________________________________________
π 6. Overemphasis on Local Industry & Patronage
• Malaydesh insists on local build requirements to create domestic defense jobs.
• In principle this is good, but in practice it often serves political interests and patronage networks.
• Without strong oversight, projects like LCS or AV-8 Gempita become political cash cows, plagued by cost overruns and delays.
=============
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
2025 : RM1.73 trillion, or 85.8% of GDP GDP
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
--
1. Economic Pressures
• Declining oil revenues: Malaydesh ’s traditional income from oil has shrunk, reducing government revenue.
• Depreciation of the ringgit: A weaker currency increases the cost of importing military equipment, especially from Western and Korean suppliers.
• Competing national priorities: Funds are diverted to healthcare, education, and subsidies, limiting defense allocations.
2. Budget Allocation Breakdown (2024)
Category Amount (RM) % of Total Budget
Total Defense Budget RM19.73 billion 100%
Salaries & Allowances RM8.2 billion ~41%
Procurement RM5.71 billion ~29%
Operations & Logistics RM5.82 billion ~30%
Over 40% of the budget goes to personnel costs, leaving limited room for modernization.
3. Procurement Challenges
• Most procurement funds are tied to progressive payments for existing contracts (e.g. FA-50 jets, A400M upgrades).
• New acquisitions are often delayed or scaled down due to lack of multi-year funding commitments.
• Domestic defense industry is dependent on foreign OEMs, limiting cost control and self-reliance.
4. Political Reluctance
• Successive governments have avoided cutting other sectors to boost defense spending.
• No major reforms to reduce manpower or restructure the armed forces for efficiency.
• Defense budgeting lacks long-term strategic planning, making modernization reactive rather than proactive.
5. Operational Cost Burden
• Malaydesh ’s military assets (e.g. Su-30MKM, ScorpΓ¨ne submarines) are expensive to maintain.
• Fuel, spares, housing, and logistics consume a large portion of the budget, limiting capital investment.
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
1. High Personnel Costs vs. Limited Modernization
• A large share of Malaydesh defense budget goes to salaries, pensions, and welfare for military personnel.
• This leaves limited funds for modernization programs, equipment procurement, or advanced training.
• For example, more than half of the annual defense allocation is often consumed by operating and personnel expenditures.
________________________________________
2. Underfunded Procurement & Maintenance
• With so much spent on personnel, Malaydesh struggles to allocate enough for:
o New acquisitions (fighter jets, naval vessels, surveillance systems).
o Maintenance of existing platforms, many of which are already aging.
• This imbalance leads to a growing capability gap compared to regional peers.
________________________________________
3. Skewed Distribution Across Services
• The Army traditionally receives a larger share of the defense budget compared to the Navy and Air Force.
• Yet, Malaydesh main security challenges are maritime-based (South China Sea, Strait of Malacca, Sulu Sea).
• This creates a mismatch between budget priorities and strategic needs.
________________________________________
4. Reactive Rather than Strategic Spending
• Defense spending often reacts to short-term needs (e.g., counterterrorism, piracy, or disaster relief) instead of long-term modernization.
• This results in fragmented, stop-start procurement projects — for example, delays in fighter jet replacements or naval shipbuilding programs.
________________________________________
5. Dependence on Imports & High Costs
• Malaydesh relies on imported defense technology, which is expensive.
• Budget constraints mean Malaydesh often buys small numbers of different platforms from multiple countries.
• This creates inefficiencies in logistics, training, and maintenance, further straining limited funds.
===========
GOV + PEOPLE HOBI HUTANG = OVERLIMIT DEBT
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• 2025 : RM1.73 trillion, or 85.8% of GDP GDP
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
π 1. Chronic Budget Constraints
• Defense spending is only ~1% of GDP (2024), among the lowest in ASEAN.
• Most regional peers spend closer to 1.5–3% of GDP (Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia).
• This means:
o Little money for modernization.
o Old equipment kept in service far too long.
o Programs constantly delayed or cancelled.
π Core issue: Malaydesh cannot fund a modern military with such a small envelope.
________________________________________
π 2. Poor Budget Distribution
• 50–55% of the defense budget goes to salaries, pensions, and allowances.
• Operations & maintenance (O&M): chronically underfunded.
• Procurement/modernization: gets only 15–20% of the budget (too low).
π Result: Malaydesh pays for people, not capability. Troops are numerous but poorly equipped.
________________________________________
π 3. Aging & Obsolete Equipment
• Army (TDM): still relies on 1980s armored vehicles, limited artillery, no modern air defense.
• Navy (TLDM): fewer than 10 serious warships, only 2 old submarines, Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal left modernization frozen for a decade.
• Air Force (RMAF/TUDM): small fighter fleet, many grounded, lacks long-range SAMs or modern drones.
π Malaydesh platforms are outdated compared to Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam.
________________________________________
π 4. Procurement Delays & Scandals
• LCS scandal (6 Gowind-class ships, none delivered since 2011).
• MiG-29 replacement delayed for over 10 years, only FA-50s ordered in 2023.
• Army modernization programs constantly shifted or downsized.
• Corruption, political interference, and lack of accountability = wasted billions.
π Loss of trust: Even inside ATM, officers see procurement as politically driven.
________________________________________
π 5. Political Interference & Short-Termism
• Every change of government resets priorities.
• Projects canceled or reshaped based on politics, not strategy.
• Defense White Paper (2019) promised long-term stability, but ignored due to COVID and fiscal crisis.
π ATM never gets consistent 10–20 year planning like Singapore’s MINDEF.
________________________________________
π 6. Weak Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
• Not enough funds for spare parts, fuel, and maintenance.
• Submarines sometimes not operational due to lack of upkeep.
• Fighter aircraft often grounded.
• Army vehicles and artillery poorly maintained.
π Readiness is much lower than it looks on paper.
________________________________________
π 7. Low Training Hours
• Fighter pilots often fly <120 hours/year (NATO standard = 180+).
• Naval ships sail less because of fuel & maintenance limits.
• Army units rarely conduct large-scale combined exercises due to cost.
π Troops lack real combat training experience.
________________________________________
π 8. Weak Doctrine & Planning
• ATM doctrine is outdated and fragmented.
• Malaydesh tries to prepare for everything (conventional war, counter-insurgency, humanitarian aid) but lacks resources.
• No focus on joint operations (Army, Navy, Air Force coordination weak).
• Defense planning often reactive, not proactive.
________________________________________
π 9. Limited Defense Industry
• Malaydesh local defense industry is small and dependent on imports.
• Boustead Naval Shipyard → LCS scandal = reputation collapse.
• No indigenous fighter or major warship program.
• Relies heavily on foreign suppliers (Russia, France, South Korea).
π Weak local industry = high costs, dependence, and vulnerability.
________________________________________
π 10. Corruption & Mismanagement
• Defense procurement often linked to patronage networks.
• Examples: LCS, ScorpΓ¨ne submarines (2002 scandal), helicopter programs.
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
⚓ 1. Aging Fleet and Maintenance Burden
• Over 60% of RMN vessels are past their intended service life, with many exceeding 40 years of operation.
• Older ships like the KD Lekiu and KD Kasturi class corvettes require frequent maintenance, which drains resources and reduces operational availability.
• These aging platforms lack modern combat systems, sensors, and propulsion technologies, making them less effective in maritime security operations.
π° 2. Budgetary Constraints
• Malaydesh ’s defence budget is modest compared to regional powers like Singapore or Indonesia. This limits the ability to procure new vessels or upgrade existing ones.
• The 15-to-5 Transformation Programme, aimed at streamlining the fleet from 15 classes to 5, has faced delays due to funding shortfalls and procurement bottlenecks.
π ️ 3. Procurement and Project Delays
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal is a major setback: six ships were ordered, but none have been delivered as of 2025 due to mismanagement and cost overruns.
• This delay has left a critical gap in Malaydesh ’s ability to patrol its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and respond to maritime threats.
π 4. Strategic Maritime Challenges
• Malaydesh has 4,700 km of coastline and is a claimant in the South China Sea dispute, requiring a robust naval presence.
• The current fleet lacks sufficient blue-water capability to project power or maintain sustained operations in contested waters.
π 5. Limited Indigenous Shipbuilding Capability
• While Malaydesh has domestic shipbuilders like Boustead Naval Shipyard, they still rely heavily on foreign technology and expertise, which slows down production and increases costs.
• The lack of a mature defence industrial base means Malaydesh cannot quickly replace or upgrade its fleet without external support.
π§ 6. Policy and Planning Gaps
• The Royal Malaydesh n Navy’s previous strategies were based on outdated frameworks like the Maritime Defence Strategy (2009) and National Defence Policy (2010).
• Although the Defence White Paper (2020) and National Military Strategy 2.0 (2022) introduced new concepts like Concentric Deterrence, implementation has been slow.
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
⚙️ Aging Equipment Across All Branches
• Over 30 Years in Service: A total of 171 military assets have exceeded 30 years of service:
o Malaydesh n Army: 108 units
o Royal Malaydesh n Air Force (RMAF): 29 units
o Royal Malaydesh n Navy (RMN): 34 units2
• Maintenance Burden: These aging platforms require more frequent and costly maintenance, often with diminishing returns in performance and reliability.
• Obsolete Technology: Many systems are technologically outdated, making them less effective in modern combat scenarios and harder to integrate with newer platforms.
π’ Naval Fleet Limitations
• RMN Vessels Past Lifespan: Of the 53 ships operated by the RMN, 34 have exceeded their intended service life, with 28 vessels over 40 years old2.
• Capability Gaps: These older ships lack modern sensors, weapons systems, and propulsion technologies, reducing Malaydesh ability to patrol and secure its vast maritime zones.
• Urgent Replacement Needs: The Navy has highlighted the need to replace these vessels to maintain operational readiness and maritime security.
✈️ Procurement and Oversight Issues
• Middlemen and Inflated Costs: Defence procurement has been criticized for relying on intermediaries, often retired military officers, which can lead to inflated prices and questionable deals.
• “Flying Coffins” Controversy: Malaydesh King recently ordered the cancellation of a deal involving 30-year-old Black Hawk helicopters, calling them “flying coffins” and condemning the use of outdated assets.
• Limited Open Competition: Only 20–30% of major defence contracts are awarded through open tenders, reducing transparency and value for money.
π§ Operational Readiness Challenges
• Training vs. Technology Gap: Troops often train on platforms that are no longer representative of modern battlefield conditions, limiting their tactical preparedness.
• Interoperability Issues: Malaydesh mix of Western, Russian, and local systems creates integration challenges, especially in joint operations or multinational exercises.
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
1. Major Examples
a. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Project
• Budget: Initially RM9 billion for 6 ships.
• Actual Spending: Over RM11 billion and only partial completion (first ship expected in 2026).
• Reasons:
o Poor project planning.
o Technical challenges and redesigns.
o Use of shell companies and opaque contracts.
• Impact: Reduced naval capability and wasted taxpayer money.
b. New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) Program
• Initial Budget: RM5.35 billion for 27 vessels.
• Final Cost: RM6.75 billion for only a portion of the ships.
• Causes: Delays, quality issues, and mismanagement.
c. Scorpène Submarine Procurement
• Original Cost: RM4.3 billion for 2 submarines.
• Overrun Factors: Bribery allegations, use of intermediaries, and additional unforeseen costs in logistics and training.
d. Light Helicopters & MD530G
• Contracts were canceled after payment, or delivery failures caused financial losses.
• Resulted in extra spending for replacements or alternative solutions.
________________________________________
2. Causes of Cost Overruns
1. Poor Planning & Project Management
o Unrealistic timelines.
o Underestimation of technical and operational complexities.
2. Political Interference
o Decisions often influenced by political connections rather than operational requirements.
o Preference for certain contractors can inflate costs.
3. Corruption & Cronyism
o Inflated contract values due to intermediaries or bribes.
o Shell companies and indirect payments increase total expenditure.
4. Technological & Operational Challenges
o Acquisition of outdated or incompatible equipment requires modifications.
o Training and infrastructure costs escalate unexpectedly.
5. Weak Oversight & Transparency
o Limited parliamentary supervision.
o Use of Official Secrets Act to hide financial irregularities.
________________________________________
3. Consequences
• Operational Impact: Delays in delivery reduce combat readiness.
• Financial Loss: Taxpayer money is wasted, limiting funds for other essential projects.
• Public Trust Erosion: Perception of mismanagement and corruption undermines confidence in the military and government.
• Long-term Strategic Weakness: Dependence on foreign suppliers increases vulnerability.
________________________________________
4. Conclusion
Cost overruns in Malaydesh military procurement are systemic, caused by a mix of poor planning, political interference, corruption, and lack of transparency.
They reduce operational effectiveness, inflate defense spending, and erode public trust.
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
BalasHapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
π 1. Fighter Fleet Problems
Current Fighters (as of 2025):
• 8 F/A-18D Hornets (bought in 1997)
o Aging, need mid-life upgrades, limited strike range.
• 18 Su-30MKM Flankers (delivered 2007–2009)
o Powerful but plagued by maintenance and spare parts issues.
o Many often grounded → at times less than 50% readiness.
• MB-339CM trainers/light attack jets (old, limited combat role).
π Compared to neighbors:
• Singapore → >60 F-15SGs & upgraded F-16Vs, buying F-35s.
• Indonesia → >30 Su-27/30s, buying Rafales & F-15EX.
• Vietnam → 36+ Su-30MK2Vs.
π Malaydesh ’s fighter fleet is tiny and partially unserviceable, limiting air superiority.
________________________________________
π 2. The MiG-29 Failure
• Malaydesh bought 18 MiG-29Ns in the 1990s.
• Retired early (2015) due to:
o High operating cost.
o Reliability issues.
o Poor logistics support from Russia.
• Replacement program (“MRCA”) delayed for over a decade because of budget constraints and political indecision.
π Result: Fighter numbers dropped sharply → “air power gap” still not fixed.
________________________________________
π 3. Transport & Airlift
• C-130 Hercules fleet (14 units) → old but reliable, used for logistics & disaster relief.
• A400M Atlas (4 units, delivered 2015–2017)
• Gap: Malaydesh lacks enough airlift to rapidly reinforce East Malaydesh (Sabah & Sarawak).
________________________________________
π 4. Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) Weakness
• Currently uses Beechcraft King Air B200Ts → outdated and limited range.
• Malaydesh faces constant Chinese Coast Guard intrusion in South China Sea, but has no dedicated long-range MPA fleet.
• Boeing P-8 Poseidon (used by US, Australia, India) is far beyond Malaydesh ’s budget.
π Weak maritime domain awareness → navy operations suffer too.
________________________________________
π 5. Helicopter Fleet
• Nuri helicopters (Sikorsky S-61) retired in 2019 due to age.
• Replacement delayed — Army and Air Force face lift helicopter shortage.
• Only a few AW139 and EC725 Cougar are available, limiting troop transport and search & rescue (SAR).
________________________________________
π 6. Air Defense & Radar
• Malaydesh has no long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
• Relies only on short-range man-portable systems (MANPADS) and some older gun-based defenses.
• Radar coverage is patchy, especially over the South China Sea.
π Meaning: Malaydesh n airspace is vulnerable to intrusion by modern air forces.
________________________________________
π 7. Procurement Delays & Budget Issues
• Fighter replacement program (MRCA → Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) has been discussed since 2010s, but still no decision due to budget politics.
• Plans for KAI FA-50 light fighters (up to 36 units) finally approved in 2023, but delivery will stretch into late 2020s.
• No clear roadmap for 5th-generation fighters (like F-35 or KF-21).
________________________________________
π 8. Training & Readiness
• Flight hours per pilot are low (due to budget and fuel costs).
• Many pilots get less than half the NATO-recommended hours.
• Limits skill in complex missions (air-to-air combat, night operations).
• Dependence on foreign exercises with US, Australia, Singapore to maintain training standards.
________________________________________
π 9. Structural Weakness
• Too many bases spread across Peninsular and East Malaydesh → increases costs, reduces efficiency.
• Lack of aerial refueling tankers → fighters cannot sustain long-range missions.
• Weak electronic warfare and drone capabilities compared to modern peers.
lebih baik jadi pati di negara orang,daripada jadi maling ikan ,penjual dadah dan teroris di negara jiran πππ, seperti kelakuan para melayu keling malaydesh di Indonesia π π π
BalasHapusBagus, sementara malaydesh sibuk urusi imigran & penceroboh, CCG China rileks menjarah EEZ Malaydesh..
Hapusπππ€£π€ͺππ
Amin
HapusNgeri guys π€£π€£π€£, malondesh semakin nyata πππ₯π₯π₯
BalasHapus________
GEGER‼️ PERNIKAHAN WANITA MELAYU & PRIA BANGLADESH MENINGKAT, SUARA KEMBALIKAN TKI MENGUAT
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=UqAHS1esk84
Ngeri guys π€£π€£π€£, malondesh semakin nyata πππ₯π₯π₯
BalasHapus________
GEGER‼️ PERNIKAHAN WANITA MELAYU & PRIA BANGLADESH MENINGKAT, SUARA KEMBALIKAN TKI MENGUAT
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=UqAHS1esk84
MALONDESH NEGERI BOTOL DAN MISKIN BEGITU MUDAHNYA DICEROBOH PENDATANG π€£π€£π€£π€£π€£π€£
BalasHapusTernyata PATI INDIANESIA paling ramai guys......psstttt...GORILLA klaim ahli G20 dengan BRICS.... π€£π€£π€£π€£
BalasHapus7,043 PATI ditahan imigresen, Indonesia, Myanmar paling tinggi
https://www.kosmo.com.my/2026/02/24/7043-pati-ditahan-imigresen-indonesia-myanmar-paling-tinggi/
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
π 1. Chronic Budget Allocation Problem
• Malaydesh ’s defense budget is small (~1% of GDP, RM15–18 billion/year).
• Of that, ~60% goes to salaries and pensions.
• Only 20–25% is left for operations & maintenance (O&M), and even less for procurement.
π This leaves little funding to buy spare parts, conduct regular overhauls, or invest in preventive maintenance.
________________________________________
π 2. Air Force (RMAF) Problems
Su-30MKM (delivered 2007)
• Flagship fighter jets, but plagued by low availability.
• At one point (2018), reports said only 4 of 18 Su-30MKMs were airworthy, the rest grounded due to lack of spare parts and servicing delays.
• Malaydesh had difficulties sourcing Russian spare parts after sanctions and because of budget shortfalls.
MiG-29N
• Retired in 2017 mainly due to high maintenance costs and poor availability (many were grounded).
Hawk 108/208
• Used since the 1990s, many are aging trainers with frequent technical issues.
• Maintenance consumes resources but still leaves many aircraft unfit for combat roles.
π Overall, RMAF has far fewer combat-ready aircraft than its official fleet size suggests.
________________________________________
π 3. Navy (RMN) Problems
Old Vessels
• Many ships (patrol craft, corvettes) date from the 1970s–80s.
• Spare parts are often obsolete or no longer manufactured, forcing RMN to cannibalize parts from one ship to keep another running.
Submarines (Scorpène class)
• Maintenance is expensive.
• At times, only one of two submarines was operational due to refit or repair delays.
• Budget cuts make it hard to sustain long-term contracts with foreign suppliers.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Delay
• Because the LCS program is stalled, RMN must overuse old Kedah-class vessels.
• Heavy usage without enough maintenance accelerates wear and reduces readiness.
________________________________________
π 4. Army Problems
• The Army still operates Condor APCs from the 1980s, which break down frequently.
• Spare parts for these German-made vehicles are scarce.
• Even newer AV-8 Gempita vehicles have been criticized for high operating costs and inconsistent spare parts supply.
π Result: Many vehicles sit idle in depots, reducing combat mobility.
________________________________________
π 5. Procurement & Supply Chain Weakness
• Malaydesh ’s defense relies heavily on foreign suppliers (Russia, France, UK, US, Turkey).
• Spare parts supply gets disrupted due to:
o Currency weakness (RM depreciation) → parts become more expensive.
o Geopolitical issues (e.g., Russian sanctions).
o Late payments to suppliers because of domestic budget delays.
• Local defense industry lacks capacity to produce spare parts domestically, unlike Singapore.
________________________________________
π 6. Maintenance Culture & Planning Weakness
• Maintenance is often reactive, not preventive. Assets are used until breakdown, then repaired — instead of scheduled servicing.
• Poor planning and weak oversight → funds meant for maintenance sometimes diverted or delayed.
• Technical staff shortages also affect readiness (brain drain, low morale due to pay gaps vs private sector).
________________________________________
π 7. Impact on Readiness
• Aircraft: Fleet numbers look good on paper, but only ~30–50% are mission-ready.
• Navy: Too many ships in dry dock or awaiting spare parts.
• Army: Many vehicles and artillery pieces are non-operational, reducing mobility and firepower.
• Training: Pilots and crews get fewer flight hours or sea days because aircraft/ships are not serviceable → reduces skill level.
OUTSTANDING BORDER PROBLEMS (OPB) TAMBAH WILAYAH .....
HapusINDONESIA 5.207 Hektar (52,07 Kilometer Persegi)
MALAYDESH 780 Hektar (7,8 Kilometer Persegi)
-
OPB Sungai Sinapad-Sesai:
Wilayah Indonesia: Hasil pengukuran dan rundingan sejak 1977 hingga 2023 menetapkan 5.207 hektar di sektor tersebut adalah wilayah Indonesia yang sah.
-
Tambahan Wilayah Malaysia: Berdasarkan penyesuaian terbaru, Malaysia mendapatkan kepastian kedaulatan (tambahan) seluas 780 hektar di area OBP (Outstanding Boundary Problems) tersebut.
-
Dasar Hukum: Penentuan ini merujuk pada konvensi internasional 1891, 1915, dan 1928, bukan timbal balik atau kompensasi politik.
-
MALING TERIAK MALING =
MALING PASIR = 97% SEA SAND FROM MALONDESH
MALING PASIR = 97% SEA SAND FROM MALONDESH
MALING PASIR = 97% SEA SAND FROM MALONDESH
Singapore is the world's largest importer of sea sand, and relies on the material for land reclamation projects. In 2018, Singapore imported around $350 million worth of sand from MALONDESH, which was 97% of the country's total sand imports
=========
MALONDESH KELING = MALING
MALING SAPI
MALING SAPI
MALING SAPI
Two soldiers were arrested for attempting to steal cattle from a livestock pen in Simpang Bekoh here.
Jasin OCPD Supt Mohamad Rusli Mat said the two confessed to investigation officers that they tried to steal in a bid to sell the animals during the upcoming Hari Raya Aidiladha celebration next month.
"The duo's botched attempt took place at 1am on Saturday (May 24) and was discovered by the owner of the cattle and goat pen after being alerted by a friend
=========
MALING TERIAK MALING =
48 SKYHAWK DISAPPEARED
48 SKYHAWK DISAPPEARED
48 SKYHAWK DISAPPEARED
The Tentera Udara Diraja MALONDESH (TUDM, or Royal MALONDESH Air Force) ordered 88 A-4s (25 A-4Cs and 63 A-4Ls), Only 40 PTM Skyhawks, 34 single seat versions and six two-seat trainers, were delivered.....
=========
MALING TERIAK MALING =
F 5 TIGERS ENGINES DISAPPEARED
F 5 TIGERS ENGINES DISAPPEARED
F 5 TIGERS ENGINES DISAPPEARED
The MALONDESH government is facing a fresh corruption crisis after officials admitted that two US-made fighter jet engines had disappeared from an air force base after apparently being illicitly sold by military officers to a South American arms dealer...
=========
MALING TERIAK MALING =
SALE F 5 TIGERS
SALE F 5 TIGERS
SALE F 5 TIGERS
This announcement was in response to posts, photos, and videos circulating on certain local social media platforms that purportedly depict an F-5 fighter jet allegedly belonging to MALONDESH at one of the country’s ports.
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• 2025 : RM1.73 trillion, or 85.8% of GDP GDP
PATI INDIANESIA paling ramai guys... π€£π€£π€£π€£
BalasHapusINDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
π 1. Chronic Budget Allocation Problem
• Malaydesh ’s defense budget is small (~1% of GDP, RM15–18 billion/year).
• Of that, ~60% goes to salaries and pensions.
• Only 20–25% is left for operations & maintenance (O&M), and even less for procurement.
π This leaves little funding to buy spare parts, conduct regular overhauls, or invest in preventive maintenance.
________________________________________
π 2. Air Force (RMAF) Problems
Su-30MKM (delivered 2007)
• Flagship fighter jets, but plagued by low availability.
• At one point (2018), reports said only 4 of 18 Su-30MKMs were airworthy, the rest grounded due to lack of spare parts and servicing delays.
• Malaydesh had difficulties sourcing Russian spare parts after sanctions and because of budget shortfalls.
MiG-29N
• Retired in 2017 mainly due to high maintenance costs and poor availability (many were grounded).
Hawk 108/208
• Used since the 1990s, many are aging trainers with frequent technical issues.
• Maintenance consumes resources but still leaves many aircraft unfit for combat roles.
π Overall, RMAF has far fewer combat-ready aircraft than its official fleet size suggests.
________________________________________
π 3. Navy (RMN) Problems
Old Vessels
• Many ships (patrol craft, corvettes) date from the 1970s–80s.
• Spare parts are often obsolete or no longer manufactured, forcing RMN to cannibalize parts from one ship to keep another running.
Submarines (Scorpène class)
• Maintenance is expensive.
• At times, only one of two submarines was operational due to refit or repair delays.
• Budget cuts make it hard to sustain long-term contracts with foreign suppliers.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Delay
• Because the LCS program is stalled, RMN must overuse old Kedah-class vessels.
• Heavy usage without enough maintenance accelerates wear and reduces readiness.
________________________________________
π 4. Army Problems
• The Army still operates Condor APCs from the 1980s, which break down frequently.
• Spare parts for these German-made vehicles are scarce.
• Even newer AV-8 Gempita vehicles have been criticized for high operating costs and inconsistent spare parts supply.
π Result: Many vehicles sit idle in depots, reducing combat mobility.
________________________________________
π 5. Procurement & Supply Chain Weakness
• Malaydesh ’s defense relies heavily on foreign suppliers (Russia, France, UK, US, Turkey).
• Spare parts supply gets disrupted due to:
o Currency weakness (RM depreciation) → parts become more expensive.
o Geopolitical issues (e.g., Russian sanctions).
o Late payments to suppliers because of domestic budget delays.
• Local defense industry lacks capacity to produce spare parts domestically, unlike Singapore.
________________________________________
π 6. Maintenance Culture & Planning Weakness
• Maintenance is often reactive, not preventive. Assets are used until breakdown, then repaired — instead of scheduled servicing.
• Poor planning and weak oversight → funds meant for maintenance sometimes diverted or delayed.
• Technical staff shortages also affect readiness (brain drain, low morale due to pay gaps vs private sector).
________________________________________
π 7. Impact on Readiness
• Aircraft: Fleet numbers look good on paper, but only ~30–50% are mission-ready.
• Navy: Too many ships in dry dock or awaiting spare parts.
• Army: Many vehicles and artillery pieces are non-operational, reducing mobility and firepower.
• Training: Pilots and crews get fewer flight hours or sea days because aircraft/ships are not serviceable → reduces skill level.
EKSODUS 97.000 ORANG + ART UNTUNG USA
Hapus-
Kondisi ekonomi dan pertahanan Malaydesh saat ini berada dalam titik nadir akibat ketidakstabilan politik yang ekstrem—ditandai dengan pergantian berkali-kali posisi Perdana Menteri dan Menteri—yang memicu kegagalan total (zonk) pada berbagai proyek alutsista strategis seperti MRCA, LCS, SPH, dan MRSS serta pembekuan pengadaan barang hingga 2026. Beban utang yang mencapai 84,3% terhadap PDB dan fenomena eksodus massal 97.000 warga memperparah krisis "gali lubang tutup lubang", yang diperburuk oleh perjanjian ART yang dinilai sangat merugikan karena memaksa Malaydesh membuka pasar bagi AS tanpa timbal balik tarif yang setara, mewajibkan pasokan mineral kritis, serta mengikat kedaulatan politik-ekonomi negara di bawah ancaman sanksi dan terminasi sepihak oleh Amerika Serikat.
________________________________________
Kedaulatan Ekonomi dan Penguasaan Aset
-
Indonesia: Mengukuhkan kedaulatan sumber daya dengan penguasaan 63,23% saham PT Freeport Indonesia. Keberhasilan mendapatkan tambahan 12% saham secara gratis menunjukkan posisi tawar yang sangat kuat dalam negosiasi tanpa membebani keuangan negara.
-
Malaydesh: Menghadapi risiko kedaulatan melalui "Klausul Pemutusan Sepihak" oleh AS. Kebijakan luar negeri Malaydesh menjadi terbatas karena ketergantungan pada restu geopolitik AS terhadap mitra dagang pihak ketiga (seperti China/Rusia).
________________________________________
2. Efisiensi Biaya dan Pemanfaatan Devisa
-
Indonesia: Sangat efisien dengan komitmen hanya US$ 22,7 Miliar untuk akses 1.819 pos produk tarif 0%. Fokus pada hilirisasi memastikan modal tetap berputar di dalam negeri untuk membangun industri manufaktur.
-
Malaydesh: Mengalami kerugian ekonomi ganda (double loss) dengan membayar US$ 242 Miliar (10 kali lipat lebih mahal) untuk jumlah produk yang lebih sedikit (1.711 pos). Dana tersebut dialokasikan untuk konsumsi produk jadi AS (Boeing & LNG), yang merupakan bentuk transfer kekayaan kembali ke negara maju.
________________________________________
3. Kedaulatan Data dan Standarisasi Regulasi
-
Indonesia: Memegang kendali penuh melalui UU PDP. Pertukaran data lintas batas hanya berlaku untuk Data Komersial, bukan data kependudukan pribadi, sehingga privasi warga negara tetap terlindungi.
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Malaydesh: Terpaksa mengadopsi standar regulasi dan keamanan nasional AS (Imperialisme Regulasi). Kewajiban memfasilitasi transfer data dan larangan membatasi layanan digital AS berpotensi menghambat inovasi dan kemandirian teknologi lokal.
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4. Ketahanan Fiskal dan Orientasi Masa Depan
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Indonesia: Memiliki ruang fiskal yang sehat (utang ~40% GDP) dan fokus pada pembangunan basis produksi serta energi hijau melalui hilirisasi.
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Malaydesh: Berada dalam tekanan krisis utang (69% GDP) dengan pola ekonomi yang cenderung konsumtif terhadap produk Barat demi mengamankan posisi politik.
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
HapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
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=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
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GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• 2025 : RM1.73 trillion, or 85.8% of GDP GDP
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
BalasHapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
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1. Penguasaan Aset & Sumber Daya Strategis
Dominasi Freeport: Indonesia sukses meningkatkan kepemilikan saham di PT Freeport Indonesia menjadi 63,23%.
Efisiensi Biaya: Tambahan 12% saham diperoleh secara gratis melalui MoU Washington 2026, memperkuat kontrol atas hilirisasi mineral nasional.
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2. Efisiensi Komitmen Perdagangan
Rasio Biaya Tinggi: Indonesia hanya berkomitmen US$ 22,7 Miliar untuk 1.819 pos produk (tarif 0%).
Perbandingan Kontras: Malaydesh harus membayar US$ 242 Miliar (10x lipat lebih mahal) namun hanya mendapatkan akses untuk 1.711 pos produk.
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3. Kedaulatan Politik & Data Digital
Kedaulatan Data: Pertukaran data bersifat komersial murni (bukan identitas pribadi) dan dilindungi oleh UU Pelindungan Data Pribadi (UU PDP).
Otonomi Kebijakan: Indonesia bertindak sebagai Rule-Maker dengan prinsip Bebas Aktif, sedangkan Malaydesh cenderung menjadi Rule-Taker yang terikat klausul intervensi pihak ketiga.
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4. Ketahanan Ekonomi & Fiskal
Stabilitas Utang: Rasio utang Indonesia aman di angka 40% PDB, jauh di bawah Malaydesh yang mencapai 69% PDB (melewati batas risiko).
Beban Rumah Tangga: Utang masyarakat Indonesia rendah (16% PDB), berbanding terbalik dengan Malaydesh (84,3% PDB) yang berisiko krisis finansial.
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5. Transformasi Industri (Hilirisasi vs Konsumsi)
Fokus Indonesia: Investasi diarahkan pada pembangunan pabrik, energi hijau, dan pengolahan nikel untuk menciptakan lapangan kerja.
Model Malaydesh: Komitmen lebih banyak berupa pembelian produk jadi (pesawat/LNG), yang merupakan transfer kekayaan kembali ke negara maju.
INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
BalasHapusGOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 2,9%
GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
=============
=============
MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
DEFISIT : 3,8%
GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
-
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• 2025 : RM1.73 trillion, or 85.8% of GDP GDP
BalasHapusTERNYATA PALING RAMAI PATI INDIANESIA guys.... π₯π₯π€£π€£π€£
Warga Indonesia paling ramai diusir keluar Malaysia – Menteri Dalam Negeri
https://www.airtimes.my/2025/02/18/warga-indonesia-paling-ramai-diusir-keluar-malaysia-menteri-dalam-negeri/
Bukan puluhan orang ya guys.. Tapi RIBUAN orang INDIANESIA ... π₯π₯π€£π€£π€£π€£
BalasHapusPATI dari Indonesia paling ramai dihantar pulang
https://www.utusan.com.my/nasional/2025/02/pati-dari-indonesia-paling-ramai-dihantar-pulang/