Myanmar Air Force Shaanxi Y-8 (photo: Wiki)
SIPRI kembali mengeluarkan laporan mengenai transfer persenjataan dunia, berikut disampaikan data order dan pengiriman persenjataan selama kurun waktu 2025.
Untuk negara Myanmar, order dan pengiriman persenjataan serta ekspor selama tahun 2025 adalah sebagai berikut ini.
(SIPRI)
Mantap ada isi myanmar haha!👍👍👍
BalasHapusSipti TIM ELIT Selaluw ada isi,
BalasHapussedangkan SIPRI geng pembual kl, KOSONK Lagiiiii haha!🤥🤣🤥
SIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
BalasHapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________
1. Inefficient and Opaque Procurement
The most significant problem facing the Malaydesh military is its procurement system. It's often criticized for a lack of transparency and a reliance on middlemen or agents, which leads to inflated prices and projects that fail to meet the military's actual needs.
• Cost Overruns and Delays: Projects, most notably the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, have been plagued by severe delays and massive cost overruns. None of the six ships have been delivered, despite significant payments. This has left the Royal Malaydesh Navy (RMN) with an aging fleet, as many of its vessels are over 40 years old.
• "Middlemen" and Corruption: King Sultan Ibrahim has publicly criticized the involvement of agents and salesmen in defense deals, stating that these practices lead to "unreasonable" prices and purchases that don't fit the military's needs. This has raised concerns about corruption and inefficiency within the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF).
________________________________________
2. An Aging Fleet and Logistical Challenges
The Malaydesh Armed Forces (MAF) operates a mixed fleet of military assets from a wide range of international suppliers. This lack of standardization creates a logistical nightmare.
• Fragmentation of Supply Chains: The military has equipment from various countries, including Russia, the United States, Poland, and China. Each platform requires different spare parts, tools, and maintenance expertise.
• Low Operational Readiness: Many of the Navy's vessels and Air Force's combat jets are well past their service life, leading to higher maintenance costs and a lower operational readiness rate.
• Reliance on Foreign Support: Due to a lack of local expertise, Malaydesh is highly dependent on foreign suppliers for critical maintenance and spare parts, making the military vulnerable to supply chain disruptions, such as international sanctions.
________________________________________
3. Capability Gaps and Lack of Specialization
The MAF has key capability gaps in crucial areas due to its historical focus on counter-insurgency and a lack of a unified doctrine.
• No Dedicated Marine Corps: Malaydesh lacks a dedicated Marine Corps. Its amphibious capabilities are fragmented and distributed between the Army and Navy. This creates coordination problems and limits the ability to rapidly project power and respond to maritime threats, a significant vulnerability for an archipelagic nation.
• Limited Tank Fleet: The Army's tank force is limited to approximately 48 PT-91M Pendekar tanks. This small number restricts their strategic deployment and makes them less effective in a large-scale land conflict compared to neighbors with larger tank fleets.
• COIN Aircraft Gap: The Air Force lacks a dedicated fleet of Counter-Insurgency (COIN) aircraft. It's forced to use expensive multi-role fighter jets for low-intensity conflicts, which is inefficient. While a new batch of FA-50M light combat aircraft is on order, deliveries are not expected for several years.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
BalasHapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________
THE MALAYDESH MILITARY HAS A SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY GAP IN ITS COUNTER-INSURGENCY (COIN) AIRCRAFT FLEET, PRIMARILY DUE TO THE AGING AND LIMITED NUMBER OF LIGHT COMBAT AND SURVEILLANCE PLATFORMS SUITABLE FOR THIS TYPE OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE.
1. Lack of Dedicated COIN Aircraft
Unlike a dedicated air force built for large-scale conventional warfare, a successful COIN force requires aircraft optimized for a unique set of missions:
• Low and Slow: COIN operations often occur in dense jungle or urban environments where fast jets are ineffective. They require aircraft that can fly low and slow to provide close air support and accurate surveillance.
• Persistent Presence: COIN aircraft must be able to loiter for extended periods to track insurgents and provide sustained support to ground troops.
• Cost-Effectiveness: Using expensive, high-performance fighter jets like the Su-30MKM for COIN missions is a significant waste of resources.
The Royal Malaydesh Air Force (RMAF) lacks a dedicated fleet of such aircraft. Its existing fleet is more suited for air defense and conventional warfare, creating a mismatch between its capabilities and the specific demands of counter-insurgency.
________________________________________
2. Aging Fleet and Reliance on Other Assets
The RMAF's current inventory is not well-suited for the COIN role, forcing it to rely on a mix of aging platforms and less-than-ideal helicopters.
• Retired Aircraft: The RMAF has retired dedicated COIN aircraft like the Canadair CT-114 Tutor. This leaves a major gap that has not been adequately filled.
• Helicopter Gaps: While the Army operates light attack helicopters like the MD530G, these are limited in their range, endurance, and payload. This places a heavy burden on a small fleet to support ground forces over vast and often difficult terrain.
________________________________________
3. Delays in New Acquisitions
Malaydesh is actively trying to address this gap, but procurement has been slow and challenging.
• FA-50M Purchase: The RMAF is acquiring 18 FA-50M light combat aircraft from Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI). These jets are intended to fulfill both a fighter lead-in trainer role and a light combat role. However, deliveries are not expected to begin until 2026. This leaves the RMAF with a capability gap in the interim.
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): Malaydesh has made some progress in acquiring drones for surveillance, but these still do not fully replace the role of a manned COIN aircraft, which can provide more direct and immediate fire support.
Myanmar lebih hebat dari malasya
BalasHapusPsssttttt..... negara INDIANESIA SIPRInya hanya SELEMBAR guys.....HAHAHAHHAHA
BalasHapusSIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________
THE MALAYDESH MILITARY HAS A SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY GAP IN ITS COUNTER-INSURGENCY (COIN) AIRCRAFT FLEET, PRIMARILY DUE TO THE AGING AND LIMITED NUMBER OF LIGHT COMBAT AND SURVEILLANCE PLATFORMS SUITABLE FOR THIS TYPE OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE.
1. Lack of Dedicated COIN Aircraft
Unlike a dedicated air force built for large-scale conventional warfare, a successful COIN force requires aircraft optimized for a unique set of missions:
• Low and Slow: COIN operations often occur in dense jungle or urban environments where fast jets are ineffective. They require aircraft that can fly low and slow to provide close air support and accurate surveillance.
• Persistent Presence: COIN aircraft must be able to loiter for extended periods to track insurgents and provide sustained support to ground troops.
• Cost-Effectiveness: Using expensive, high-performance fighter jets like the Su-30MKM for COIN missions is a significant waste of resources.
The Royal Malaydesh Air Force (RMAF) lacks a dedicated fleet of such aircraft. Its existing fleet is more suited for air defense and conventional warfare, creating a mismatch between its capabilities and the specific demands of counter-insurgency.
________________________________________
2. Aging Fleet and Reliance on Other Assets
The RMAF's current inventory is not well-suited for the COIN role, forcing it to rely on a mix of aging platforms and less-than-ideal helicopters.
• Retired Aircraft: The RMAF has retired dedicated COIN aircraft like the Canadair CT-114 Tutor. This leaves a major gap that has not been adequately filled.
• Helicopter Gaps: While the Army operates light attack helicopters like the MD530G, these are limited in their range, endurance, and payload. This places a heavy burden on a small fleet to support ground forces over vast and often difficult terrain.
________________________________________
3. Delays in New Acquisitions
Malaydesh is actively trying to address this gap, but procurement has been slow and challenging.
• FA-50M Purchase: The RMAF is acquiring 18 FA-50M light combat aircraft from Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI). These jets are intended to fulfill both a fighter lead-in trainer role and a light combat role. However, deliveries are not expected to begin until 2026. This leaves the RMAF with a capability gap in the interim.
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): Malaydesh has made some progress in acquiring drones for surveillance, but these still do not fully replace the role of a manned COIN aircraft, which can provide more direct and immediate fire support.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
Indonesia – Peringkat 13 Dunia (Skor: 0,2582)
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Malaydesh – Peringkat 42 Dunia (Skor: 0,7379)
________________________________________
THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS FOR MALAYDESH ARMED FORCES IS WIDELY CRITICIZED FOR BEING INEFFICIENT AND OPAQUE, LEADING TO A SERIES OF HIGH-PROFILE SCANDALS, SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL WASTE, AND SERIOUS GAPS IN MILITARY READINESS. THIS SYSTEMIC PROBLEM IS ROOTED IN A LACK OF TRANSPARENCY, POLITICAL INTERFERENCE, AND A RELIANCE ON INDIRECT ACQUISITION METHODS.
1. The "Middleman" System
A key issue is the heavy reliance on agents, middlemen, and politically connected individuals to facilitate defense contracts. This practice often bypasses open tender processes, which are designed to ensure transparency and competition.
• Inflated Costs: These middlemen typically charge hefty commissions, inflating the final price of military assets. This was a point of public concern by King Sultan Ibrahim, who stated that such practices lead to buying "nonsense" that is overpriced and ill-suited for the military's actual needs.
• Inadequate Equipment: Since the procurement is driven by commercial interests rather than by the end-user (the military), the equipment acquired may not be the most suitable or effective for its intended purpose.
________________________________________
2. High-Profile Scandals and Delays
The most infamous example of a failed procurement is the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program.
• Massive Delays and Cost Overruns: The program, valued at RM9 billion, was meant to deliver six modern frigates to the Royal Malaydesh Navy (RMN). Despite paying over RM6 billion, not a single ship has been delivered. The project is years behind schedule and has been plagued by allegations of mismanagement and corruption.
• Financial Misappropriation: Investigations have revealed that a significant portion of the allocated funds was used for other purposes, with some estimates pointing to hundreds of millions of ringgit in financial irregularities. .
• Impact on Readiness: The failure of the LCS program has left the RMN with a dangerously aging fleet. Many of its vessels are over 40 years old, leading to higher maintenance costs and lower operational readiness rates.
________________________________________
3. Lack of Transparency and Accountability
The defense procurement process is shrouded in secrecy, which makes it difficult to hold officials accountable for failures.
• Direct Negotiations: The majority of large defense contracts are awarded through direct negotiation rather than open bidding, which limits public and parliamentary oversight.
• Limited Audits: While audit reports exist, their recommendations are often not implemented. This was highlighted in a recent Auditor-General's report, which found serious delays, weak oversight, and millions of ringgit in uncollected penalties from contractors.
• Political Interference: Declassified reports on the LCS scandal revealed that key decisions, such as the choice of ship design, were made by political leaders against the recommendations of the navy, the end-user. This kind of political interference compromises the military's ability to make sound, strategic decisions.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
Indonesia – Peringkat 13 Dunia (Skor: 0,2582)
-
Malaydesh – Peringkat 42 Dunia (Skor: 0,7379)
________________________________________
⚔️ Key Problems of the Malaydesh n Armed Forces
________________________________________
1. Outdated Equipment → Modernization Delayed for Decades
• Air Force (RMAF):
o Retired MiG-29s in 2017 due to high costs.
o Current frontline jets: Su-30MKM (2007) and F/A-18D Hornet (1997) — small fleet, aging, and expensive to maintain.
o Still waiting for FA-50 light combat aircraft, deliveries only starting in 2026.
o Weak surveillance capability → lacks modern maritime patrol aircraft and AWACS.
• Navy (RMN):
o Many ships date from the 1980s–90s (Lekiu-class frigates, Kasturi-class corvettes).
o Only 2 Scorpène submarines, insufficient to cover Malaydesh vast waters.
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal froze modernization — billions spent, no ships delivered.
• Army:
o Still operates Condor APCs from the 1980s.
o AV8 Gempita is modern but only partially deployed.
o Lacks modern long-range artillery and medium/long-range air defense systems.
Impact: The MAF has been stuck with aging platforms, while neighbors upgrade to Rafales, F-35s, Gripens, modern submarines, and frigates. Malaydesh risks being outclassed in any regional confrontation.
________________________________________
2. Low Defense Budget → Insufficient for High-Tech Upgrades
• Malaydesh spends only 1.0–1.5% of GDP on defense.
o Singapore spends ~3%, Vietnam ~2.3%, Thailand ~1.5%.
• Of this budget, more than half goes to salaries, pensions, and operations → leaving little for modernization.
• Modern assets (jets, ships, submarines) require long-term investment, but Malaydesh often cuts or delays purchases due to economic pressures.
• Example: MRCA fighter program (to replace MiG-29s) has been delayed for over a decade.
Impact: Malaydesh cannot keep pace with regional military spending. Modernization becomes piecemeal, leaving gaps in readiness and deterrence.
________________________________________
3. Maritime Security Challenges → China & Piracy Overstretch the Navy
• South China Sea (SCS):
o China’s Coast Guard and Navy frequently intrude into Malaydesh EEZ, especially around Luconia Shoals.
o Malaydesh has overlapping maritime claims with China, Vietnam, and the Philippines.
• Strait of Malacca:
o One of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.
o Vulnerable to piracy, smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal fishing.
• Navy Limitations:
o Small, aging fleet cannot patrol both SCS and Malacca Strait effectively.
o Relies heavily on offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) that lack strong firepower.
o Only 2 submarines → insufficient deterrent against China or other navies.
Impact: Malaydesh struggles to enforce sovereignty over its waters. The Navy is stretched thin, unable to cover vast sea areas against both traditional (China) and non-traditional (piracy) threats.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________
BERIKUT ADALAH BEBERAPA CONTOH KAPAL TLDM YANG DIANGGAP USANG ATAU SUDAH TIDAK LAYAK OPERASIONAL:
• Korvet Kelas Laksamana: Baru-baru ini, tiga korvet kelas Laksamana, yaitu KD Laksamana Tun Abdul Jamil, KD Laksamana Tan Pusmah, dan KD Pendekar, telah secara resmi dinonaktifkan. Kapal-kapal ini dibangun di Italia pada tahun 1980-an dan telah bertugas selama beberapa dekade. Penonaktifan ini adalah bagian dari rencana untuk mengganti kapal-kapal usang dengan aset yang lebih modern, seperti Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
• Kapal Serangan Cepat (Fast Attack Craft): KD Pendekar, yang dinonaktifkan bersama dua korvet Laksamana, adalah contoh kapal serangan cepat yang telah lama bertugas sejak tahun 1979. Usia kapal ini yang sangat tua menunjukkan keterbatasan dalam teknologi dan kemampuan operasional dibandingkan dengan kapal modern.
• Kapal Patroli Kelas Kris dan Sabah: Kapal-kapal patroli ini telah dinonaktifkan atau dialihkan ke MMEA. Meskipun telah melayani TLDM selama lebih dari 30 tahun, keterbatasan operasionalnya, seperti jangkauan patroli yang pendek, membuatnya tidak lagi efektif untuk misi pengawasan di perairan yang lebih luas, seperti Zona Ekonomi Eksklusif (ZEE) Malaydesh yang membentang lebih dari 320 km.
• Kapal Pendukung Serbaguna (Multi-Purpose Support Ships): Kapal-kapal lama seperti KD Sri Indera Sakti dan KD Mahawangsa telah mencapai batas usia pakainya. TLDM memiliki rencana untuk menggantinya dengan Kapal Pendukung Serbaguna Multi-Role Support Ship (MRSS) yang baru, tetapi pelaksanaannya menghadapi kendala.
• Armada Secara Umum: Secara keseluruhan, rata-rata usia kapal tempur dan patroli TLDM saat ini lebih dari 25 tahun, dengan mayoritas kapal bahkan berusia lebih dari 30 tahun. Kapal-kapal yang sudah terlalu tua ini sering kali mencapai titik di mana biaya pemeliharaan menjadi sangat tinggi dan tidak efisien. Program modernisasi yang tertunda, seperti proyek Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) yang mengalami penundaan, memperburuk masalah ini.
Kapal-Kapal Usang Agensi Penguatkuasaan Maritim Malaydesh (MMEA)
• Kapal Patroli Tua (Ex-Police and Fisheries Vessels): Banyak kapal patroli MMEA sebelumnya adalah kapal milik Pasukan Polis Marin (PPM) atau Jabatan Perikanan. Contohnya termasuk kapal-kapal dari kelas "Gagah" dan "Nusa". Meskipun beberapa kapal ini telah menjalani program pembaruan (repowering) untuk mengganti mesin dan melakukan perbaikan struktural, usia desain dan lambungnya tetap membatasi kemampuan mereka.
• Kurangnya Kapal Patroli Jarak Jauh (Offshore Patrol Vessels): MMEA sangat membutuhkan Kapal Patroli Lepas Pantai (Offshore Patrol Vessels - OPV) yang lebih besar dan modern untuk misi pengawasan di ZEE. Proyek pengadaan OPV untuk MMEA mengalami berbagai tantangan. Ini berarti MMEA masih harus mengandalkan kapal-kapal yang lebih kecil dengan jangkauan dan daya tahan yang terbatas untuk mengawasi perairan yang sangat luas.
• Donasi dan Transfer Kapal: MMEA juga menerima kapal-kapal yang dinonaktifkan dari angkatan laut negara lain, seperti kapal patroli dari Amerika Serikat (Ex-USCGC Steadfast) dan Australia. Meskipun ini dapat menjadi solusi cepat untuk menambah armada, kapal-kapal ini sering kali sudah berusia dan memerlukan pemeliharaan dan suku cadang yang khusus, yang dapat menjadi tantangan logistik.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________
GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
1. Indonesia – Peringkat 13
-
2. Vietnam – Peringkat 23
-
3. Thailand – Peringkat 24
-
4. Singapura – Peringkat 29
-
5. Myanmar – Peringkat 35
-
6. Filipina – Peringkat 41
-
7. Malaydesh – Peringkat 42
-
8. Kamboja – Peringkat 83
-
9. Laos – Peringkat 125
________________________________________
THE PRIMARY WEAKNESS OF THE MALAYDESH MILITARY'S AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITIES IS THE LACK OF A DEDICATED MARINE CORPS. INSTEAD OF A SINGLE, specialized branch, Malaydesh amphibious forces are fragmented and distributed among different services, which creates several significant gaps.
1. Fragmentation of Command and Control
Without a unified Marine Corps, the various units responsible for amphibious operations—such as the Army's 10th Parachute Brigade and the Navy's PASKAL—must coordinate their efforts during a mission. This lack of a single, dedicated command structure can lead to:
• Slower Response Times: The time required to coordinate and deploy different units from separate services can delay a rapid response to maritime threats or humanitarian crises.
• Interoperability Issues: Despite joint exercises, the different services have distinct doctrines, equipment, and training, which can lead to communication and operational gaps in a real-world scenario.
2. Limited Dedicated Assets
A dedicated Marine Corps typically possesses its own fleet of specialized equipment designed for amphibious operations, such as amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs) and large landing craft. The Malaydesh Armed Forces (MAF) lack a similar inventory, relying on a more limited and general-purpose set of assets.
• Reliance on Older or Less Capable Platforms: While the Malaydesh Navy is modernizing, its current fleet may not be sufficient for large-scale amphibious operations. The absence of a dedicated fleet of landing ships and AAVs limits the force's ability to transport troops and heavy equipment from sea to shore efficiently.
3. Reduced Deterrence and Strategic Projection
In a region with growing maritime disputes, a dedicated amphibious force serves as a powerful deterrent. Its existence signals a nation's ability and resolve to project power and defend its territorial claims.
• Vulnerability in Maritime Disputes: Malaydesh is a claimant in the South China Sea, and the lack of a dedicated Marine Corps may be perceived as a strategic weakness when dealing with more assertive neighbors. The 2013 Lahad Datu incursion, for example, exposed a gap in the military's ability to swiftly and decisively respond to a maritime-based threat.
4. Constraints on Training and Expertise
While Malaydesh forces regularly train with foreign partners like the U.S. Marine Corps, this exposure is not a substitute for having a fully integrated, self-sustaining force.
• Knowledge Gaps: Without a dedicated Marine Corps, the continuous development of a specialized doctrine and expertise in amphibious warfare is hindered. This can lead to a reliance on foreign partners for high-end amphibious training, rather than being able to conduct such training internally and on a large scale
SIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________
GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
1. Indonesia – Peringkat 13
-
2. Vietnam – Peringkat 23
-
3. Thailand – Peringkat 24
-
4. Singapura – Peringkat 29
-
5. Myanmar – Peringkat 35
-
6. Filipina – Peringkat 41
-
7. Malaydesh – Peringkat 42
-
8. Kamboja – Peringkat 83
-
9. Laos – Peringkat 125
________________________________________
A primary issue for the MAF is its aging and obsolete equipment. The country's defense spending has historically been low, and while recent budgets have seen increases, they are often insufficient to cover the extensive modernization needs.
• Financial Constraints: The 1997 Asian financial crisis had a lasting impact, forcing a de-prioritization of defense spending. Despite recent budget increases, competing priorities like healthcare and education often limit the funds available for military upgrades.
• Corruption and Inefficiency: Past procurement projects, such as the Littoral Combat Ship program, have been plagued by delays, cost overruns, and allegations of corruption, which have wasted funds and resulted in a lack of operational assets.
• Aging Inventory: The MAF relies on a mix of equipment from various countries, making maintenance difficult. For example, the Royal Malaydesh n Air Force (RMAF) has struggled to maintain its Russian-made Sukhoi Su-30MKM fighter jets due to sanctions and a lack of spare parts. The country also retired its MiG-29s without a timely replacement, creating a significant capability gap.
Human Resources 🧍
Recruitment and personnel issues are another major problem for the MAF, affecting its overall readiness and capability.
• Recruitment Challenges: The military has difficulty attracting and retaining high-quality personnel. This is partly due to low wages and poor living conditions. The quality of candidates has been a concern, with a declining pool of eligible recruits.
• Ethnic Imbalance: There is a significant ethnic disparity in the armed forces, with a very low percentage of non-Malay recruits. This could affect national unity and the military's ability to represent the country's diverse population.
• Personnel Well-being: There are ongoing concerns about the well-being and welfare of military personnel, including work-life balance issues and the need for better mental health support.
Defense Policy and Strategic Challenges 🗺️
The MAF operates in a complex regional environment with evolving security threats.
• South China Sea Disputes: Malaydesh has overlapping territorial claims with China in the South China Sea. China's increasingly aggressive "grey-zone" tactics—using coast guard vessels and fishing militia to assert its claims—are a major challenge that the MAF is not fully equipped to handle.
• Non-Traditional Threats: While traditionally an army-centric force due to a history of internal counter-insurgency, the MAF must now pivot to address maritime and cyber threats. This requires a re-calibration of its force structure and a focus on new technologies like drones, cyber warfare, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
• Political Instability: Frequent changes in government have led to a lack of continuity in defense policy and the slow implementation of key reforms outlined in the country's first Defence White Paper. This political instability can stall long-term projects and strategic planning.
Apa hanya SELEMBAR....??? HAHAHAHAHAH
BalasHapusSIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________
THE MALAYDESH MILITARY HAS A SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY GAP IN ITS COUNTER-INSURGENCY (COIN) AIRCRAFT FLEET, PRIMARILY DUE TO THE AGING AND LIMITED NUMBER OF LIGHT COMBAT AND SURVEILLANCE PLATFORMS SUITABLE FOR THIS TYPE OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE.
1. Lack of Dedicated COIN Aircraft
Unlike a dedicated air force built for large-scale conventional warfare, a successful COIN force requires aircraft optimized for a unique set of missions:
• Low and Slow: COIN operations often occur in dense jungle or urban environments where fast jets are ineffective. They require aircraft that can fly low and slow to provide close air support and accurate surveillance.
• Persistent Presence: COIN aircraft must be able to loiter for extended periods to track insurgents and provide sustained support to ground troops.
• Cost-Effectiveness: Using expensive, high-performance fighter jets like the Su-30MKM for COIN missions is a significant waste of resources.
The Royal Malaydesh Air Force (RMAF) lacks a dedicated fleet of such aircraft. Its existing fleet is more suited for air defense and conventional warfare, creating a mismatch between its capabilities and the specific demands of counter-insurgency.
________________________________________
2. Aging Fleet and Reliance on Other Assets
The RMAF's current inventory is not well-suited for the COIN role, forcing it to rely on a mix of aging platforms and less-than-ideal helicopters.
• Retired Aircraft: The RMAF has retired dedicated COIN aircraft like the Canadair CT-114 Tutor. This leaves a major gap that has not been adequately filled.
• Helicopter Gaps: While the Army operates light attack helicopters like the MD530G, these are limited in their range, endurance, and payload. This places a heavy burden on a small fleet to support ground forces over vast and often difficult terrain.
________________________________________
3. Delays in New Acquisitions
Malaydesh is actively trying to address this gap, but procurement has been slow and challenging.
• FA-50M Purchase: The RMAF is acquiring 18 FA-50M light combat aircraft from Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI). These jets are intended to fulfill both a fighter lead-in trainer role and a light combat role. However, deliveries are not expected to begin until 2026. This leaves the RMAF with a capability gap in the interim.
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): Malaydesh has made some progress in acquiring drones for surveillance, but these still do not fully replace the role of a manned COIN aircraft, which can provide more direct and immediate fire support.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________
PERBANDINGAN PDB PPP INDONESIA VS ASEAN
(PDB PPP Indonesia: US$5,69 Triliun)
-
1. Indonesia vs Thailand (US$5,69 Triliun versus US$1,85 T) = Ekonomi 3,07 kali lipat .
-
2. Indonesia vs Vietnam (US$5,69 versus Triliun US$1,89 T) = Ekonomi 3,01 kali lipat
-
3. Indonesia vs Filipina (US$5,69 Triliun US$1,87 T) = Ekonomi 3,04 kali lipat
-
4. Indonesia vs Malaydesh (US$5,69 Triliun US$1,34 T) = Ekonomi 4,24 kali lipat
-
5. Indonesia vs Singapura (US$5,69 Triliun US$0,85 T) = Ekonomi 6,69 kali lipat
________________________________________
PERBANDINGAN PDB NOMINAL INDONESIA VS ASEAN
(PDB Nominal Indonesia: US$1,69 Triliun)
-
1 Indonesia vs Thailand (US$1,69 Triliun versus US$0,58 T) = Ekonomi 2,91 kali lipat.
-
2 Indonesia vs Singapura (US$1,69 Triliun versus US$0,53 T) = Ekonomi 3,18 kali lipat
-
3 Indonesia vs Filipina (US$1,69 Triliun versus US$0,51 T) = Ekonomi 3,31 kali lipat.
-
4 Indonesia vs Vietnam (US$1,69 Triliun versus US$0,49 T) = Ekonomi 3,44 kali lipat.
-
5 Indonesia vs Malaydesh (US$1,69 Triliun versus US$0,46 T) = Ekonomi 3,67 kali lipat
________________________________________
PERBANDINGAN KEKUATAN RIIL (INDONESIA VS MALAYDESH):
-
Skala Ekonomi (PPP)
Indonesia: Peringkat 6 Dunia (US$5,69 T).
Malaydesh: Peringkat 45+ Dunia (US$1,34 T).
-
Kekuatan Relatif
Indonesia: Ekonomi 4,24 kali lipat lebih besar dari Malaydesh (Terbesar ASEAN)
Malaydesh: Tercecer di peringkat 5-6 ASEAN.
-
Sektor Energi
Indonesia: Eksportir utama & pemegang kendali pasokan.
Malaydesh: Importir batubara (sangat bergantung pada Indonesia).
-
Ketahanan Pangan
Indonesia: Surplus beras (menjadi penyuplai untuk Malaydesh).
Malaydesh: Mengalami krisis beras, daging, dan telur.
-
Kekuatan Militer
Indonesia: Modernisasi masif (belanja Rafale & Scorpène).
Malaydesh: Stagnasi dan mengalami krisis kesiagaan tempur.
-
Status Finansial
Indonesia: Kreditur (posisi menagih utang gas ke Petronas).
Malaydesh: Debitur (beban utang tinggi & gagal bayar denda).
SIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________
PERSENTASE IMPOR SENJATA
SIPRI PERIODE 2021–2025
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs_2603_at_2025.pdf
-
INDONESIA (1,5%)
STATUS: URUTAN PERTAMA PENERIMA SENJATA TERBESAR DI ASIA TENGGARA.
Fokus: Modernisasi besar-besaran (Jet tempur Rafale,, Kapal Selam Scorpène, dan Kapal PPA).
-
MALAYDESH (0,3%)
STATUS: URUTAN KELIMA DI KAWASAN.
Fokus: Modernisasi terbatas seperti pengadaan 18 unit pesawat tempur ringan FA-50 dari Korea Selatan
________________________________________
HUTANG & LIABILITAS MALAYDESH 2010–2026
2010: RM 407,1 Miliar
2011: RM 456,1 Miliar
2012: RM 501,6 Miliar
2013: RM 547,7 Miliar
2014: RM 582,8 Miliar
2015: RM 630,5 Miliar
2016: RM 648,5 Miliar
2017: RM 686,8 Miliar
2018: RM 1,19 Triliun
2019: RM 1,25 Triliun
2020: RM 1,32 Triliun
2021: RM 1,38 Triliun
2022: RM 1,45 Triliun
2023: RM 1,53 Triliun
2024: RM 1,63 Triliun
2025: RM 1,71 Triliun
2026: RM 1,79 Triliun
-
Ringkasan Sumber Berita & Referensi:
Bloomberg & Reuters (2018–2019): Laporan mengenai total utang yang melampaui RM 1 triliun setelah memasukkan komitmen jaminan dan liabilitas 1MDB.
-
CNA & The Star (2020): Analisis kenaikan plafon utang untuk pendanaan Kumpulan Wang COVID-19 (KWC).
-
The Edge Malaydesh (2021–2022): Catatan akumulasi utang federal yang mencapai ambang batas baru pasca-pandemi.
-
MOF Portal & Bernama (2023–2024): Pernyataan PM Anwar Ibrahim mengenai beban utang RM 1,5 triliun untuk reformasi fiskal.
-
Kementerian Kewangan (MOF) Malaydesh (2025–2026): Data proyeksi melalui dokumen Belanjawan 2026 dan strategi fiskal jangka menengah
________________________________________
BUKTI HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
--
Daftar tren "Hutang Bayar Hutang" Malaydesh dari tahun 2018 hingga proyeksi 2025 berdasarkan data Kementerian Kewangan Malaydesh (MOF) dan Jabatan Audit Negara:
-
2018: FASE "OPEN DONASI"
Pemerintah meluncurkan Tabung Harapan Malaydesh untuk mengumpulkan sumbangan rakyat guna membantu membayar utang negara yang menembus angka RM1 triliun (80% dari PDB).
-
2019: 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Laporan Ketua Audit Negara mengungkapkan bahwa 59% dari pinjaman baru digunakan hanya untuk melunasi utang yang sudah ada (gali lubang tutup lubang).
-
2020: 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Ketergantungan meningkat; hampir 60% pinjaman baru dialokasikan untuk membayar utang lama, memicu kekhawatiran karena anggaran pembangunan semakin terhimpit.
-
2021: 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Dari total pinjaman baru sebesar RM194,55 miliar, sebanyak RM98,05 miliar digunakan untuk pembayaran kembali prinsipal utang yang telah matang.
-
2022: 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Realisasi pembayaran prinsipal mencapai RM113,7 miliar. Total pinjaman meningkat 11,6% dibandingkan tahun sebelumnya akibat pemulihan pascapandemi.
-
2023: 64,3% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Persentase tertinggi dalam periode ini. Dari total pinjaman kasar RM226,6 miliar, sebesar RM145,8 miliar lari ke pembayaran utang lama.
-
2024: 58,9% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Pemerintah mulai melakukan konsolidasi. Pinjaman digunakan untuk melunasi utang matang sebesar RM121,3 miliar dari total pinjaman RM206 miliar.
-
2025: 58% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Berdasarkan Tinjauan Fiskal 2025, pemerintah memproyeksikan pinjaman kasar sebesar RM184 miliar, di mana RM106,8 miliar disiapkan untuk membayar prinsipal utang matang.
-
2026 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Dokumen Resmi Pemerintah (Kementerian Kewangan Malaydesh - MOF) Laporan Tinjauan Fiskal 2025 & 2026: Memuat angka proyeksi pinjaman kasar (gross borrowing) dan alokasi pembayaran kembali prinsipal utang yang matang.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________
PERSENTASE IMPOR SENJATA = SIPRI PERIODE 2021–2025
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs_2603_at_2025.pdf
-
SIPRI PERIODE 2021–2025:
SIPRI PERIODE 2021–2025:
SIPRI PERIODE 2021–2025:
-
INDONESIA (1,5%)
STATUS: URUTAN PERTAMA PENERIMA SENJATA TERBESAR DI ASIA TENGGARA.
Fokus: Modernisasi besar-besaran (Jet tempur Rafale,, Kapal Selam Scorpène, dan Kapal PPA).
-
MALAYDESH (0,3%)
STATUS: URUTAN KELIMA DI KAWASAN.
Fokus: Modernisasi terbatas seperti pengadaan 18 unit pesawat tempur ringan FA-50 dari Korea Selatan
________________________________________
GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
1. Indonesia – Peringkat 13 Dunia (Skor: 0,2582)
-
2. Vietnam – Peringkat 23 Dunia (Skor: 0,4066)
-
3. Thailand – Peringkat 24 Dunia (Skor: 0,4458)
-
4. Singapura – Peringkat 29 Dunia (Skor: 0,5272)
-
5. Myanmar – Peringkat 35 Dunia (Skor: 0,6265)
-
6. Filipina – Peringkat 41 Dunia (Skor: 0,6993)
-
7. Malaydesh – Peringkat 42 Dunia (Skor: 0,7379)
-
8. Kamboja – Peringkat 83 Dunia (Skor: 1,8434)
-
9. Laos – Peringkat 125 Dunia (Skor: 2,8672)
________________________________________
BEBAN HUTANG = BAYAR HUTANG
-
Eskalasi Nominal: Utang melonjak tajam dari RM 407 Miliar (2010) hingga diproyeksi menyentuh RM 1,79 Triliun (2026), dipicu skandal 1MDB dan belanja pasca-pandemi.
-
Rasio PDB Kritis: Semula stabil di ~50%, kini melampaui batas disiplin fiskal hingga mencapai puncak 70,4% (2024).
-
Beban Bunga Berat: Biaya cicilan bunga saja mencapai RM 54,7 Miliar/tahun, menciptakan siklus "hutang bayar hutang" untuk menutupi defisit.
-
Validitas Data: Seluruh data bersumber dari otoritas resmi (BNM/MOF) dan lembaga internasional (World Bank/IMF).
SIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________
GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
1. Indonesia – Peringkat 13
-
2. Vietnam – Peringkat 23
-
3. Thailand – Peringkat 24
-
4. Singapura – Peringkat 29
-
5. Myanmar – Peringkat 35
-
6. Filipina – Peringkat 41
-
7. Malaydesh – Peringkat 42
-
8. Kamboja – Peringkat 83
-
9. Laos – Peringkat 125
________________________________________
HERE ARE THE KEY ASEAN NATIONS WITH A DEDICATED MARINE CORPS:
________________________________________
Indonesia 🇮🇩
Indonesia's Korps Marinir Republik Indonesia (KORMAR RI) is a highly capable and well-established Marine Corps that is a core component of the Indonesian Navy (TNI AL).
• Geographical Imperative: As the world's largest archipelagic state with over 17,000 islands, Indonesia requires a force that can project power across its vast maritime domain. KORMAR's primary role is to conduct amphibious operations, secure strategic coastal areas, and defend remote islands.
• Size and Capabilities: KORMAR is a substantial force with its own armor, artillery, and specialized units. It can operate independently or as a key part of a larger naval task force, making it essential for a nation with such a dispersed territory.
• Historical Context: The Korps Marinir was formed in 1945 during the Indonesian National Revolution, giving it a long history and a firm place in the country's military structure. Its missions have included counter-insurgency and securing the nation's borders.
________________________________________
Philippines 🇵🇭
The Philippine Marine Corps (PMC) is the naval infantry force of the Philippine Navy.
• Archipelagic Defense: Like Indonesia, the Philippines is an archipelago, making a dedicated Marine Corps vital for internal and external security. The PMC's role is to conduct amphibious, expeditionary, and special operations missions to defend the country's extensive coastline and numerous islands.
• Missions: The PMC is heavily involved in operations against communist insurgents and extremist groups. It has also been instrumental in securing disputed areas, such as the Spratly Islands, and in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts, a critical role given the Philippines' vulnerability to natural disasters.
• U.S. Influence: The Philippine Marine Corps was formed with assistance from the U.S. Marine Corps and shares many of its traditions, including its rank system and some ceremonial practices.
________________________________________
Thailand 🇹🇭
The Royal Thai Marine Corps (RTMC) is a specialized amphibious force that is part of the Royal Thai Navy.
• Historical Ties: The RTMC has a long history, with its origins tracing back to the early 20th century, and it was significantly developed with the assistance of the U.S. Marine Corps.
• Missions: The RTMC's responsibilities include coastal defense, amphibious operations, and internal security, particularly in the country's southern provinces. They have also been involved in counter-insurgency operations on the Malaydesh border and in peacekeeping missions.
• Modernization: The RTMC has been modernizing its forces, acquiring specialized equipment like amphibious assault vehicles to enhance its capability for power projection from the sea to the shore.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________
GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
1. Indonesia – Peringkat 13
-
2. Vietnam – Peringkat 23
-
3. Thailand – Peringkat 24
-
4. Singapura – Peringkat 29
-
5. Myanmar – Peringkat 35
-
6. Filipina – Peringkat 41
-
7. Malaydesh – Peringkat 42
-
8. Kamboja – Peringkat 83
-
9. Laos – Peringkat 125
________________________________________
1. MASALAH PERAWATAN DAN KESIAPAN OPERASIONAL 🚧
Ini adalah kelemahan yang paling sering disorot dan menjadi viral di media sosial.
• Insiden Mogok di Jalan Umum: Tank PT-91M Pendekar pernah beberapa kali mogok di tengah jalan raya, bahkan saat sedang dalam perjalanan untuk acara parade Hari Kemerdekaan. Insiden ini menimbulkan pertanyaan serius dari masyarakat dan parlemen tentang standar perawatan aset militer.
• Kurangnya Suku Cadang: Masalah ini adalah inti dari inefisiensi. Penghentian produksi suku cadang oleh produsen aslinya, Bumar Labedy, memaksa Malaydesh untuk mencari solusi alternatif. Upaya ini termasuk menggunakan tenaga ahli lokal untuk memproduksi komponen tertentu, tetapi ini menunjukkan ketergantungan yang rapuh pada produsen eksternal dan kurangnya jaminan rantai pasokan.
• Kurva Pembelajaran yang Curam: Sebagai negara pertama di Asia Tenggara yang mengoperasikan MBT modern, Malaydesh menghadapi tantangan dalam mengembangkan basis pengetahuan, keahlian, dan infrastruktur untuk perawatan tank tersebut. Hal ini berbeda dengan negara-negara yang sudah memiliki pengalaman lebih lama dalam mengelola aset militer yang kompleks.
________________________________________
2. Keterbatasan Teknis dan Operasional ⚙️
Meskipun PT-91M adalah versi yang ditingkatkan dari T-72, beberapa keterbatasan masih ada.
• Desain Lama dan Kerentanan: PT-91M merupakan turunan dari T-72, yang memiliki desain kokpit dan penyimpanan amunisi yang terkenal rentan. Dalam pertempuran modern, ini bisa menjadi kelemahan fatal jika dibandingkan dengan tank-tank tempur utama lain yang lebih baru dengan desain yang lebih aman.
• Kemampuan Serangan Terbatas: Dibandingkan dengan tank tempur utama modern yang dimiliki oleh negara tetangga, seperti Leopard 2A4 milik Singapura dan Indonesia, PT-91M Pendekar dianggap memiliki sistem kendali tembak dan perlindungan yang kurang unggul. Meskipun dilengkapi dengan Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA), perlindungan ini mungkin tidak cukup untuk menahan serangan dari amunisi anti-tank terbaru.
________________________________________
3. Masalah Pengadaan dan Jumlah yang Tidak Memadai 💰
• Skandal dan Inefisiensi: Sama seperti proyek kapal LCS, skandal pengadaan dan inefisiensi juga terjadi dalam program tank. Laporan menunjukkan adanya masalah tata kelola yang buruk dalam manajemen kontrak, yang menyebabkan aset tidak dapat digunakan secara maksimal.
• Jumlah yang Sedikit: Malaydesh hanya memiliki 48 unit tank PT-91M Pendekar. Jumlah ini dianggap sangat tidak memadai untuk kebutuhan pertahanan negara, terutama jika dibandingkan dengan negara tetangga yang memiliki jumlah armada lapis baja yang jauh lebih besar.
Malon malah kagak ada🤣🤣🤣🤪😝😜
BalasHapusKrisis di malon takjil baju lebaran kagak ke beli😜😝🤪😁😁😁🤭🤭🤭
BalasHapusYg makmur,kaya warga malon itu yg keturunan cina..Melayu..kisminnn..🤪😝😜😁😁😁🤭🤭🤭gak kbelu takjil Ama baju lebaran
BalasHapusKri Conopous..Kri Prabu Siliwangi..On the Way..purrr..jgn pengsan ya..merenung je Kat jamban always..wkwkwk 😜😝🤪😁😁😁🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusSIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
BalasHapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________
GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
1. Indonesia – Peringkat 13
-
2. Vietnam – Peringkat 23
-
3. Thailand – Peringkat 24
-
4. Singapura – Peringkat 29
-
5. Myanmar – Peringkat 35
-
6. Filipina – Peringkat 41
-
7. Malaydesh – Peringkat 42
-
8. Kamboja – Peringkat 83
-
9. Laos – Peringkat 125
________________________________________
KEY FACTORS
1. Direct Negotiation and Lack of Open Tenders
A major problem is the frequent use of direct negotiation instead of open and competitive tenders. This practice, often justified under the pretext of national security, limits competition and reduces transparency. By bypassing the tender process, the government loses the ability to secure the best value for money, and it creates a fertile ground for corruption.
• Example: The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal is a prime example. The multi-billion ringgit contract was awarded through direct negotiation, with a parliamentary inquiry later revealing that the decision ignored the navy's preference for a different ship design.
________________________________________
2. The Role of Middlemen and Agents
The procurement process is often riddled with intermediaries or agents who act as go-betweens for the military and foreign contractors. These middlemen, often with political connections or being former military personnel, add significant markups to the cost of equipment. This practice inflates prices, wastes public funds, and has been a major source of controversy. The King of Malaydesh himself has publicly criticized this issue, warning against the influence of "agents and salesmen" in the Defence Ministry.
________________________________________
3. Financial Mismanagement and Weak Oversight
Government audits have consistently revealed systemic financial mismanagement.
• Failure to Collect Penalties: Audit reports have shown that the government failed to impose and collect penalties for delayed deliveries from contractors. In one case, a contractor for armored vehicles did not face a penalty of over RM160 million despite significant delays.
• Contract Splitting: To avoid the scrutiny of larger contracts, some projects are broken down into smaller ones, a practice known as "contract splitting." This allows them to bypass the open tender threshold and be awarded through less rigorous methods, raising concerns about accountability.
• Misappropriation of Funds: In the LCS scandal, a significant portion of the project's funds were allegedly used to pay off debts from old, unrelated naval projects, showcasing a severe lack of financial discipline
SIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
BalasHapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
--------------------------------------------------
GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
1. Indonesia – Peringkat 13
-
2. Vietnam – Peringkat 23
-
3. Thailand – Peringkat 24
-
4. Singapura – Peringkat 29
-
5. Myanmar – Peringkat 35
-
6. Filipina – Peringkat 41
-
7. Malaydesh – Peringkat 42
-
8. Kamboja – Peringkat 83
-
9. Laos – Peringkat 125
--------------------------------------------------
⚓ NAVAL WEAKNESS
MALAYDESH FACES SERIOUS MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND STRAIT OF MALACCA, BUT ITS NAVY (RMN) IS UNDER-EQUIPPED.
Current Situation
• Major combatants:
o 2 Lekiu-class frigates (1990s).
o 2 Kasturi-class corvettes (1980s).
o 6 Kedah-class offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) — lightly armed.
• Submarines: Only 2 Scorpène-class (delivered 2009).
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: RM 9 billion spent since 2011, but 0 ships delivered as of 2025 due to corruption scandal.
• Patrol assets: Insufficient to cover Malaydesh ’s huge EEZ (exclusive economic zone).
Problems
• Aging fleet; many ships near obsolescence.
• Insufficient firepower against regional navies.
• Small submarine force with limited availability.
• LCS scandal delayed modernization by more than a decade.
Regional Comparison
• Singapore: Formidable-class stealth frigates, modern OPVs, strong missile capability, and expanding submarine fleet.
• Indonesia: Expanding fleet with SIGMA-class frigates, Nagapasa submarines, and new OPVs.
• Vietnam: 6 modern Kilo-class submarines from Russia + upgraded frigates.
• China (in South China Sea): Deploys coast guard and navy ships near Malaydesh ’s EEZ regularly.
👉 Malaydesh ’s Risk: Cannot effectively protect its EEZ against Chinese incursions, illegal fishing, or smuggling. Lacks deterrence against neighbors with stronger navies.
Pssstttt...... Hanya SELEMBAR..... 🤡🤡🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusSIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
---------------------------------------------------
GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
1. Indonesia – Peringkat 13
-
2. Vietnam – Peringkat 23
-
3. Thailand – Peringkat 24
-
4. Singapura – Peringkat 29
-
5. Myanmar – Peringkat 35
-
6. Filipina – Peringkat 41
-
7. Malaydesh – Peringkat 42
-
8. Kamboja – Peringkat 83
-
9. Laos – Peringkat 125
--------------------------------------------------
💸 1. POTENTIALLY HIGHER LONG-TERM COSTS
• Critics argue that leasing may cost more than outright purchase over time.
• For example, Poland purchased 32 AW149 helicopters for USUSD1.83 billion, while Malaydesh is leasing 28 helicopters for RM16.5 billion (~USUSD3.5 billion) over 15 years.
• Leasing includes bundled services (maintenance, training, insurance), but the total cost may exceed the value of the helicopters themselves.
🕵️♂️ 2. Transparency & Procurement Concerns
• The deal was signed with Weststar Aviation, a private firm owned by a prominent businessman, raising questions about middlemen and lobbying.
• Past scandals in Malaydesh defense procurement—like the LCS and MD530G helicopter failures—have made the public wary of opaque contracts and lack of competitive bidding.
🛠️ 3. Limited Sovereignty Over Assets
• Leased helicopters are not fully owned until the end of the contract, which may limit:
o Upgrades or modifications
o Deployment flexibility
o Integration with other military systems
• This could hinder Malaydesh ability to adapt the fleet to evolving threats or mission needs.
🧭 4. Missed Opportunity for Local Industry Growth
• Purchasing helicopters could have supported local assembly, maintenance, and technology transfer, boosting Malaydesh defense industry.
• Leasing centralizes operations under a private provider, reducing opportunities for domestic capability development.
⚠️ 5. Risk of Contractual Disputes or Service Interruptions
• If the leasing company fails to meet service-level agreements (e.g., 85% fleet availability), Malaydesh may face operational gaps.
• Legal or financial disputes could delay missions or compromise national security.
🗣️ Public & Political Backlash
• Opposition leaders and defense experts have called the deal overpriced and strategically flawed, urging a review of procurement practices.
• The Prime Minister defended the lease as a way to avoid maintenance burdens, but critics say it reflects short-term budgeting over long-term planning.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
---------------------------------------------------
💸 1. LONG-TERM FINANCIAL BURDEN
• Malaydesh RM16.5 billion lease for 28 helicopters over 15 years may cost more than outright purchase.
• For comparison, Poland bought 32 AW149 helicopters for USUSD1.83 billion, while Malaydesh is leasing fewer units for nearly double the price.
• Critics argue that bundled services (maintenance, training, insurance) inflate the cost, creating a hidden financial strain over time.
🛠️ 2. Limited Control Over Assets
• Leased helicopters are not fully owned until the end of the contract.
• This restricts Malaydesh ability to:
o Upgrade systems
o Reconfigure for new missions
o Integrate with other platforms
• Strategic flexibility is compromised, especially in emergencies or regional conflicts.
🧭 3. Missed Opportunity for Local Industry Growth
• Leasing bypasses local manufacturing, assembly, and maintenance, which could have boosted Malaydesh defense industry.
• No significant technology transfer or job creation occurs under private leasing arrangements.
• This weakens Malaydesh long-term goal of defense self-reliance.
🕵️♂️ 4. Procurement Transparency Risks
• The deal was awarded to Weststar Aviation, a private firm, raising concerns about middlemen and lobbying.
• Past scandals (e.g., LCS and MD530G) have made the public wary of opaque procurement processes.
• Leasing may reduce upfront corruption risks, but it doesn’t eliminate contractual opacity.
⚠️ 5. Strategic Dependency
• Malaydesh becomes dependent on private contractors for asset readiness and maintenance.
• If the contractor fails to meet service-level agreements (e.g., 85% fleet availability), national security could be compromised.
• Legal or financial disputes could delay operations or ground critical assets.
🗣️ Political & Public Backlash
• Opposition leaders and defense experts have criticized the lease as overpriced and strategically flawed.
• The government defends it as a way to avoid upfront costs and ensure faster deployment, but the debate continues in Parliament and among analysts
SIPRI 2 TAHUN (2024 - 2025) = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
--------------------------------------------------
🔑 CRUCIAL PROBLEMS OF THE MALAYDESH N ARMED FORCES (MAF)
1. Aging Equipment & Modernization Gap
• Many core assets of the Malaydesh n Army, Navy, and Air Force are decades old.
o The Air Force still relies heavily on older aircraft (MiG-29s were retired, Su-30MKM and F/A-18D are still key but aging).
o The Navy faces delays in the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, leaving maritime security compromised.
o The Army’s armored vehicles and artillery are in need of modernization.
• Problem: Modernization plans exist (e.g., "Force 2055" blueprint), but budget cuts, procurement delays, and political interference hinder progress.
________________________________________
2. Budget Constraints
• Defense spending in Malaydesh is below 1.5% of GDP, lower than regional peers like Singapore (~3%) or Thailand (~1.5%).
• This budget is insufficient to support modernization, training, and maintenance.
• High dependency on imports for major assets (submarines, jets, ships) increases costs.
• Problem: MAF struggles to maintain a balance between modernization and day-to-day operational readiness.
________________________________________
3. Maritime Security Challenges
• Malaydesh has one of the world’s busiest sea lanes — the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea (SCS).
• Issues:
o Chinese encroachment in Malaydesh Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (especially near Luconia Shoals).
o Piracy, illegal fishing, and smuggling in the Strait of Malacca.
o Territorial overlap with neighbors (Philippines and Indonesia).
• Problem: Navy and Coast Guard (MMEA) assets are overstretched, with insufficient ships and patrol capabilities.
________________________________________
4. Manpower & Recruitment Issues
• Malaydesh has a relatively small professional force (~110,000 active personnel).
• Recruitment faces challenges due to:
o Low pay and benefits compared to private sector jobs.
o Limited career development opportunities.
o Younger generations less interested in military careers.
• Problem: Difficulty in retaining skilled personnel (especially pilots, engineers, cyber specialists).
________________________________________
5. Inter-Service Coordination
• The three branches (Army, Navy, Air Force) often operate independently, with limited joint operations capability.
• The lack of integrated command structures reduces operational efficiency in complex missions (counter-insurgency, disaster relief, maritime disputes).
• Problem: Modern warfare demands jointness (land, sea, air, cyber, space), which MAF is still developing.
________________________________________
6. Dependence on Foreign Technology & Maintenance
• Malaydesh lacks a strong domestic defense industry.
• Heavy reliance on imports (France for submarines, Russia for jets, South Korea for ships, etc.) makes maintenance costly and vulnerable to supplier politics.
• Example: Spare parts for MiG-29s were hard to source, leading to their retirement.
• Problem: Limited self-reliance in defense production.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN (2024 - 2025) = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
--------------------------------------------------
GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
1. Indonesia – Peringkat 13
-
2. Vietnam – Peringkat 23
-
3. Thailand – Peringkat 24
-
4. Singapura – Peringkat 29
-
5. Myanmar – Peringkat 35
-
6. Filipina – Peringkat 41
-
7. Malaydesh – Peringkat 42
-
8. Kamboja – Peringkat 83
-
9. Laos – Peringkat 125
--------------------------------------------------
Structural Causes of Modernization Delays
Why does modernization lag behind?
1. Budget Constraints
o Defense budget is below 1.5% of GDP.
o Modern jets, ships, and tanks are expensive, and Malaydesh must prioritize social and economic programs.
2. Procurement Scandals & Mismanagement
o The LCS scandal is the biggest example: billions spent, no ships delivered.
o Procurement decisions often influenced by politics instead of operational needs.
3. Over-Reliance on Foreign Suppliers
o Lack of a strong domestic defense industry means Malaydesh must import equipment.
o Currency fluctuations and sanctions (e.g., Russia) complicate maintenance.
4. Shifting Political Priorities
o Every new government tends to change defense priorities.
o Long-term projects (like the MRCA) get delayed or canceled.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN (2024 - 2025) = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
--------------------------------------------------
GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
1. Indonesia – Peringkat 13
-
2. Vietnam – Peringkat 23
-
3. Thailand – Peringkat 24
-
4. Singapura – Peringkat 29
-
5. Myanmar – Peringkat 35
-
6. Filipina – Peringkat 41
-
7. Malaydesh – Peringkat 42
-
8. Kamboja – Peringkat 83
-
9. Laos – Peringkat 125
--------------------------------------------------
Royal Malaydesh n Navy (RMN)
The Navy faces serious modernization delays despite being tasked with defending one of the busiest and most contested waters in the world.
• Surface Combatants
o The Navy’s main combat ships (frigates and corvettes) are old:
Kasturi-class corvettes (built in the 1980s).
Lekiu-class frigates (commissioned in the 1990s).
o Malaydesh planned 6 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) under the Gowind-class project, but the program is stuck in scandal and delay.
As of 2025, none have been delivered, despite being launched in 2017.
This has left the Navy with capability gaps in modern surface warfare.
• Submarines
o Two Scorpène-class submarines (delivered 2009) are modern but represent a very small force.
o Limited availability due to high operational costs and technical issues.
• Patrol Assets
o Coastal patrol relies on smaller, aging ships.
o With Chinese ships regularly entering Malaydesh EEZ, current assets are insufficient to cover vast maritime zones.
Summary:
The RMN is overstretched, with modernization paralyzed by the LCS scandal, leaving Malaydesh with too few modern ships to secure its waters.
________________________________________
Malaydesh n Army
The Army is somewhat better equipped than the Navy and Air Force, but still faces delays in modernization.
• Armored Vehicles
o Still relies on Condor armored personnel carriers (German origin, from 1980s).
o The newer AV8 Gempita (local production with Turkish FNSS partnership) is being delivered, but the rollout is slow and numbers are limited.
• Artillery
o Mix of old towed artillery pieces and some modern self-propelled systems.
o Procurement of new artillery systems has been repeatedly delayed.
• Air Defense
o Malaydesh air defense is very limited (mainly short-range MANPADS like Igla).
o No medium or long-range air defense system has been acquired, leaving the country vulnerable to modern air threats
SIPRI 2 TAHUN (2024 - 2025) = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
---------------------------------------------------
GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
1. Indonesia – Peringkat 13
-
2. Vietnam – Peringkat 23
-
3. Thailand – Peringkat 24
-
4. Singapura – Peringkat 29
-
5. Myanmar – Peringkat 35
-
6. Filipina – Peringkat 41
-
7. Malaydesh – Peringkat 42
-
8. Kamboja – Peringkat 83
-
9. Laos – Peringkat 125
--------------------------------------------------
1. Budgetary and Procurement Constraints
The MAF's modernization efforts are consistently hampered by limited defense budgets. For many years, defense spending has not been a top government priority, leading to a slow and often delayed acquisition of new assets. This has a direct impact on the military's ability to replace aging platforms and acquire advanced technology.
• Procurement Inefficiency: The process of acquiring new assets is often criticized for a lack of transparency and efficiency. There have been instances of project delays, inflated prices due to middlemen, and even non-delivery of equipment, as highlighted in public reports. This not only wastes taxpayer money but also prevents the MAF from obtaining the assets they need in a timely manner.
2. Aging and Obsolescent Equipment
A significant portion of the MAF's inventory is old and in urgent need of replacement. This is a critical weakness that affects all three branches of the military.
• Royal Malaydesh n Navy (RMN): Many of the RMN's ships have been in service for decades. This leads to high maintenance costs, frequent breakdowns, and reduced operational availability, which hinders their ability to effectively patrol and defend Malaydesh 's vast maritime territory.
• Royal Malaydesh n Air Force (RMAF): The RMAF operates an aging fleet of helicopters and fighter jets. The use of outdated aircraft not only poses safety risks to personnel but also limits their capacity to perform modern missions, such as air combat and surveillance, especially against more technologically advanced neighbors.
• Malaydesh n Army (MA): While the army has seen some recent modernization, it still faces challenges with older armored vehicles and a need for more modern self-propelled artillery and surveillance systems to meet contemporary threats.
3. Limited Self-Reliance
Malaydesh has a nascent defense industry and is heavily reliant on foreign suppliers for its military hardware. This dependence creates several problems:
• High Costs: Purchasing from foreign manufacturers is expensive, and without a strong domestic industry, Malaydesh has limited leverage for price negotiation or technology transfer.
• Maintenance and Spares: Relying on foreign suppliers for spare parts and maintenance services can be slow and costly, further exacerbating the issue of low operational readiness for key assets.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN (2024 - 2025) = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
---------------------------------------------------
GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
1. Indonesia – Peringkat 13
-
2. Vietnam – Peringkat 23
-
3. Thailand – Peringkat 24
-
4. Singapura – Peringkat 29
-
5. Myanmar – Peringkat 35
-
6. Filipina – Peringkat 41
-
7. Malaydesh – Peringkat 42
-
8. Kamboja – Peringkat 83
-
9. Laos – Peringkat 125
--------------------------------------------------
KELEMAHAN AIR FORCE
Berikut beberapa kelemahan utama yang kerap disorot pada Angkatan Udara Diraja Malaydesh (RMAF):
1. Keterbatasan Anggaran dan Modernisasi Tertunda
Sejak dekade 2010-an, porsi belanja pertahanan Malaydesh menurun dari 1,5 % PDB pada 2010 menjadi sekitar 1 % pada 2020. Akibatnya, banyak program modernisasi—termasuk pengadaan MRCA (Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) lanjutan dan sistem AWACS—sering tertunda atau dibekukan karena kekurangan dana
2. Armada Tempur dan Pemeliharaan yang Usang
• Su-30MKM: Pasokan suku cadang terbatas—terutama di tengah gangguan rantai pasok Rusia pasca-invasi Ukraina—mengakibatkan kesiapan terbang yang menurun drastis.
• MiG-29 & F-5: Pesawat veteran ini sudah melewati jam terbang optimal dan menuntut pemeliharaan intensif; banyak insiden di akhir 1990-an dan awal 2000-an yang menunjukkan kerentanan teknis
3. Tantangan Lingkungan Tropis
Iklim tropis dengan kelembapan tinggi mempercepat korosi pada struktur pesawat—terutama yang berbahan aluminium seri 2024—sehingga fatigue life menurun dan risiko kegagalan material meningkat
4. Kapasitas Pengawasan dan Transportasi Udara Terbatas
• AWACS & Radar: RMAF belum memiliki platform AWACS sendiri, bergantung pada radar ground-based yang baru mulai ditingkatkan sejak 2019–2025, sehingga cakupan AWACS masih sangat terbatas
• Pengangkut A400M: Meski sudah ada, jumlahnya (empat unit) masih relatif kecil untuk mendukung proyeksi kekuatan dan bantuan kemanusiaan di wilayah luas Malaydesh .
5. Kualitas Pelatihan dan Tenaga Terampil
.prasangka umum dalam analisis militerAnggaran yang ketat berdampak pada frekuensi latihan tempur dan jam terbang pilot. Ini berpotensi menurunkan kesiapan operasional dan kemampuan manuver taktis dalam skenario peperangan modern
6. Interferensi Politik dan Isu Korupsi
Beberapa laporan menyinggung intervensi politik dalam proses pengadaan dan dugaan praktik korupsi, yang dapat memperlambat atau mempersulit realisasi program vital RMAF
SIPRI 2 TAHUN (2024 - 2025) = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
---------------------------------------------------
GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
1. Indonesia – Peringkat 13
-
2. Vietnam – Peringkat 23
-
3. Thailand – Peringkat 24
-
4. Singapura – Peringkat 29
-
5. Myanmar – Peringkat 35
-
6. Filipina – Peringkat 41
-
7. Malaydesh – Peringkat 42
-
8. Kamboja – Peringkat 83
-
9. Laos – Peringkat 125
--------------------------------------------------
KELEMAHAN NAVY..
Kelemahan Angkatan Laut Malaydesh (Tentera Laut Diraja Malaydesh /TLDM) dapat dianalisis dari beberapa aspek strategis, operasional, dan teknis. Berikut adalah beberapa poin yang umum dibahas oleh para pengamat pertahanan:
________________________________________
1. Keterbatasan Anggaran
• Anggaran pertahanan Malaydesh relatif kecil dibanding negara tetangga seperti Singapura atau Indonesia.
• Proyek-proyek besar, seperti program kapal tempur pesisir Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), mengalami penundaan dan pembengkakan biaya.
________________________________________
2. Ketergantungan pada Alutsista Lama
• Beberapa kapal perang TLDM sudah tua, seperti kelas Kasturi dan Laksamana, yang dibangun sejak tahun 1980-an dan 1990-an.
• Meskipun ada program modernisasi, penggantian tidak selalu berjalan lancar.
________________________________________
3. Kapasitas Industri Pertahanan Domestik Terbatas
• Industri galangan kapal domestik, seperti Boustead Naval Shipyard, menghadapi masalah manajemen dan efisiensi.
• Program LCS menjadi contoh kegagalan manajemen proyek domestik.
________________________________________
4. Keterbatasan Kapal Selam
• TLDM hanya memiliki 2 kapal selam Scorpène, yaitu KD Tunku Abdul Rahman dan KD Tun Razak. Jumlah ini dianggap minim untuk negara maritim seperti Malaydesh .
• Kapal selam tersebut juga menghadapi masalah pemeliharaan dan kesiapan operasional.
________________________________________
5. Personel Terbatas
• Rekrutmen dan retensi personel terampil masih menjadi tantangan, terutama untuk pengoperasian sistem canggih dan kapal selam.
• Kurangnya pengalaman tempur nyata juga menjadi perhatian dalam kesiapan operasional.
________________________________________
6. Cakupan Wilayah yang Luas
• Malaydesh harus mengawasi wilayah maritim yang sangat luas, termasuk perairan strategis di Selat Melaka, Laut China Selatan, dan wilayah Sabah/Sarawak.
• Jumlah armada yang terbatas membuat pengawasan laut kurang optimal, terutama dalam menghadapi pelanggaran wilayah atau aktivitas ilegal.
________________________________________
7. Tantangan Geopolitik
• Ketegangan di Laut China Selatan menuntut Malaydesh untuk lebih siap secara militer, tetapi keterbatasan sumber daya membuat responsnya kurang gesit dibanding negara seperti Vietnam atau Filipina.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN (2024 - 2025) = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
---------------------------------------------------
GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
1. Indonesia – Peringkat 13
-
2. Vietnam – Peringkat 23
-
3. Thailand – Peringkat 24
-
4. Singapura – Peringkat 29
-
5. Myanmar – Peringkat 35
-
6. Filipina – Peringkat 41
-
7. Malaydesh – Peringkat 42
-
8. Kamboja – Peringkat 83
-
9. Laos – Peringkat 125
--------------------------------------------------
WEAKNESS ARMORED ASSETS
The Malaydesh n Armed Forces (MAF), while possessing a range of armored assets, face several challenges and limitations in their tank and armored warfare capabilities. These weaknesses can be categorized into strategic, operational, and technical areas:
________________________________________
1. Limited Number of Main Battle Tanks (MBTs)
• Inventory: Malaydesh operates around 48 PT-91M Pendekar tanks, which are modernized Polish versions of the Soviet T-72.
• Weakness: This number is small by regional standards, limiting Malaydesh ’s ability to deploy heavy armor across multiple fronts or sustain prolonged high-intensity operations.
________________________________________
2. Aging Platforms and Modernization Issues
• The PT-91M, while upgraded, is based on an older Soviet-era design (T-72). It lacks some of the survivability and firepower features found in newer MBTs like the Leopard 2A7 or K2 Black Panther.
• Upgrades: Modernization has been slow, and budget constraints have hampered efforts to acquire more advanced armor.
________________________________________
3. Lack of Indigenous Tank Production
• Malaydesh relies on foreign suppliers (notably Poland and previously Russia) for tanks and spare parts, which can pose logistical and geopolitical vulnerabilities.
• Indigenous development is mostly limited to light armored vehicles and support platforms.
________________________________________
4. Logistical Constraints
• Supporting MBTs in Malaydesh ’s tropical, humid climate requires robust logistics, including maintenance, spare parts, and fuel. This poses a strain during prolonged deployments or in remote areas.
________________________________________
5. Budgetary Constraints
• Defense spending is relatively low, hovering around 1–1.5% of GDP.
• Competing national priorities have limited Malaydesh 's ability to expand or upgrade its armored force substantially.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN (2024 - 2025) = KOSONG
BalasHapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
--------------------------------------------------
📣 1. PROCUREMENT SCANDALS FUEL PUBLIC DISTRUST
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
• The RM9 billion LCS project became a lightning rod for criticism when no ships were delivered despite billions spent.
• Media outlets and the Public Accounts Committee exposed mismanagement, cost overruns, and non-compliance, triggering public outrage and parliamentary scrutiny.
MD530G Helicopter Failure
• Malaydesh paid RM112 million upfront for six helicopters that were never delivered on time.
• The media labeled it a “ghost fleet,” and citizens questioned the lack of accountability.
👑 2. Royal Intervention Amplifies Criticism
• King Sultan Ibrahim, also Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, publicly condemned the procurement of 35-year-old Black Hawk helicopters, calling them “flying coffins.”
• His rebuke—“If you don’t know the price, ask me first”—went viral, reinforcing public frustration over opaque and overpriced deals.
🕵️♂️ 3. Smuggling Conspiracy Exposes Internal Corruption
• In Operation Sohor (2025), MACC arrested military intelligence officers for leaking classified data to smugglers.
• Media reports revealed the syndicate earned RM5 million monthly, with officers receiving RM30,000–RM50,000 per trip.
• The scandal was widely covered, with headlines like “Civil Service Corruption Crisis” and “Where is Akmal Saleh?” fueling public anger.
🧑⚖️ 4. Abuse Cases at Military Institutions
• A 2024 bullying case at Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaydesh (UPNM) reignited outrage when a cadet suffered multiple fractures after being stomped by a senior.
• Media coverage highlighted a pattern of hazing and abuse, prompting demands for institutional reform and stricter oversight.
📱 5. Social Media & Grassroots Pressure
• Platforms like Twitter and TikTok have become battlegrounds for public discourse, with hashtags like #ReformATM and #MilitaryTransparency trending during major scandals.
• Independent media and citizen journalists have played a key role in exposing misconduct, bypassing traditional gatekeepers.
🛠️ Impact on Policy & Reform
• The backlash has led to:
o Cancellation of controversial deals
o Promises of procurement reform
o Greater scrutiny of defense budgets and contractor relationships
• However, many Malaydesh ns remain skeptical, citing deep-rooted patronage networks and slow institutional change
SIPRI 2 TAHUN (2024 - 2025) = KOSONG
BalasHapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
--------------------------------------------------
GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
1. Indonesia – Peringkat 13
-
2. Vietnam – Peringkat 23
-
3. Thailand – Peringkat 24
-
4. Singapura – Peringkat 29
-
5. Myanmar – Peringkat 35
-
6. Filipina – Peringkat 41
-
7. Malaydesh – Peringkat 42
-
8. Kamboja – Peringkat 83
-
9. Laos – Peringkat 125
--------------------------------------------------
⚔️ OUTDATED EQUIPMENT & MODERNIZATION Delays in the Malaydesh n Armed Forces
Royal Malaydesh n Air Force (RMAF)
The Air Force is the most affected branch in terms of aging assets.
• Fighter Jets
o Malaydesh retired its MiG-29 Fulcrums in 2017 due to high maintenance costs and lack of spare parts.
o Current frontline fighters:
Sukhoi Su-30MKM (18 units, delivered 2007–2009): Still capable, but availability is low because of expensive maintenance and reliance on Russian parts.
F/A-18D Hornet (8 units, delivered 1997): Effective but old; parts are harder to obtain.
o Planned Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) program (replacement fighters) has been delayed for more than a decade due to budget constraints and political indecision.
• Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Gap
o Malaydesh needs cheaper jets for training and patrols.
o After years of delay, Malaydesh finally selected the FA-50 light combat aircraft from South Korea in 2023, with deliveries only expected from 2026 onward.
o Until then, there is a serious capability gap.
• Transport & Surveillance Aircraft
o C-130 Hercules (operational since 1970s–80s) still serve as the backbone for transport, though some have been refurbished.
o Maritime patrol aircraft are lacking — Malaydesh depends on small Beechcraft King Air planes, which are outdated and limited in range.
Summary:
The RMAF struggles with a shrinking and aging fighter fleet, slow replacement programs, and gaps in maritime surveillance.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN (2024 - 2025) = KOSONG
BalasHapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
---------------------------------------------------
GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
1. Indonesia – Peringkat 13
-
2. Vietnam – Peringkat 23
-
3. Thailand – Peringkat 24
-
4. Singapura – Peringkat 29
-
5. Myanmar – Peringkat 35
-
6. Filipina – Peringkat 41
-
7. Malaydesh – Peringkat 42
-
8. Kamboja – Peringkat 83
-
9. Laos – Peringkat 125
--------------------------------------------------⚠️ KEY FACTORS BEHIND MALAYDESH LOSS OF Strategic Credibility
1. Inconsistent Defense Procurement
• Malaydesh defense acquisitions have been plagued by delays, cancellations, and reversals.
• The MRCA program, for example, has seen years of indecision, with no clear outcome despite urgent need.
• Interest in second-hand jets like Kuwait’s F/A-18C/D Hornets signals a lack of long-term planning, contrasting with regional trends toward cutting-edge platforms.
2. Opaque and Corrupt Procurement Practices
• Analysts have described Malaydesh defense procurement as “messy, opaque and corrupt”, often involving middlemen and lacking transparency.
• This undermines trust among defense partners and suppliers, making collaboration and technology transfer more difficult.
3. Underfunded and Misallocated Budgets
• A large portion of Malaydesh defense budget goes to salaries and maintenance, leaving little for modernization.
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project, for instance, has been marred by delays and scandals, further damaging Malaydesh reputation for defense reliability.
4. Neglect of Strategic Assets
• The retirement of MiG-29N jets without timely replacement left a critical gap in air defense.
• Malaydesh reliance on diplomacy over hard power in the South China Sea has exposed vulnerabilities, especially as China increases its maritime presence.
🌏 Regional Implications
Malaydesh strategic credibility is especially important in Southeast Asia, where:
• China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea demands robust defense postures.
• Neighbors like Vietnam and the Philippines are rapidly modernizing and deepening ties with the U.S., Japan, and Australia.
• Malaydesh slow response and outdated assets make it appear underprepared and reactive, rather than proactive.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN (2024 - 2025) = KOSONG
BalasHapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
---------------------------------------------------
GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
1. Indonesia – Peringkat 13
-
2. Vietnam – Peringkat 23
-
3. Thailand – Peringkat 24
-
4. Singapura – Peringkat 29
-
5. Myanmar – Peringkat 35
-
6. Filipina – Peringkat 41
-
7. Malaydesh – Peringkat 42
-
8. Kamboja – Peringkat 83
-
9. Laos – Peringkat 125
--------------------------------------------------
1. Budgetary and Procurement Constraints
The MAF's modernization efforts are consistently hampered by limited defense budgets. For many years, defense spending has not been a top government priority, leading to a slow and often delayed acquisition of new assets. This has a direct impact on the military's ability to replace aging platforms and acquire advanced technology.
• Procurement Inefficiency: The process of acquiring new assets is often criticized for a lack of transparency and efficiency. There have been instances of project delays, inflated prices due to middlemen, and even non-delivery of equipment, as highlighted in public reports. This not only wastes taxpayer money but also prevents the MAF from obtaining the assets they need in a timely manner.
2. Aging and Obsolescent Equipment
A significant portion of the MAF's inventory is old and in urgent need of replacement. This is a critical weakness that affects all three branches of the military.
• Royal Malaydesh n Navy (RMN): Many of the RMN's ships have been in service for decades. This leads to high maintenance costs, frequent breakdowns, and reduced operational availability, which hinders their ability to effectively patrol and defend Malaydesh 's vast maritime territory.
• Royal Malaydesh n Air Force (RMAF): The RMAF operates an aging fleet of helicopters and fighter jets. The use of outdated aircraft not only poses safety risks to personnel but also limits their capacity to perform modern missions, such as air combat and surveillance, especially against more technologically advanced neighbors.
• Malaydesh n Army (MA): While the army has seen some recent modernization, it still faces challenges with older armored vehicles and a need for more modern self-propelled artillery and surveillance systems to meet contemporary threats.
3. Limited Self-Reliance
Malaydesh has a nascent defense industry and is heavily reliant on foreign suppliers for its military hardware. This dependence creates several problems:
• High Costs: Purchasing from foreign manufacturers is expensive, and without a strong domestic industry, Malaydesh has limited leverage for price negotiation or technology transfer.
• Maintenance and Spares: Relying on foreign suppliers for spare parts and maintenance services can be slow and costly, further exacerbating the issue of low operational readiness for key assets.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN (2024 - 2025) = KOSONG
BalasHapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
---------------------------------------------------
GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
1. Indonesia – Peringkat 13
-
2. Vietnam – Peringkat 23
-
3. Thailand – Peringkat 24
-
4. Singapura – Peringkat 29
-
5. Myanmar – Peringkat 35
-
6. Filipina – Peringkat 41
-
7. Malaydesh – Peringkat 42
-
8. Kamboja – Peringkat 83
-
9. Laos – Peringkat 125
--------------------------------------------------
WEAKNESS MALAYDESH ARMED FORCES
The Malaydesh n Armed Forces (MAF), like any military organization, faces a variety of challenges and weaknesses. These issues span across strategic, structural, logistical, and operational dimensions. Below are some of the commonly cited weaknesses and trouble areas faced by the MAF:
------------
1. Budget Constraints
• Limited Defense Spending: Malaydesh maintains a relatively modest defense budget compared to regional powers like Singapore, Indonesia, or Thailand.
• Delayed Procurement: Budget limitations often delay the acquisition of new platforms, weapons systems, and modernization efforts.
• Maintenance Issues: Older equipment may not be properly maintained due to funding gaps.
------------
2. Aging and Outdated Equipment
• Obsolete Platforms: Much of the Malaydesh n Army, Navy (RMN), and Air Force (RMAF) still use aging equipment, such as old tanks, fighter jets (e.g., MiG-29s, which have been retired), and naval vessels.
• Logistical Support: Difficulties in securing parts and support for legacy systems affect readiness and operational capabilities.
------------
3. Capability Gaps
• Air Power Deficiencies: Limited numbers of combat aircraft, AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), and aerial refueling capabilities hamper the RMAF’s operational reach.
• Naval Shortcomings: The RMN faces challenges in maritime domain awareness and anti-submarine warfare, crucial in the South China Sea context.
• Cyber and EW (Electronic Warfare): Malaydesh is still developing capabilities in cyber defense and electronic warfare compared to more advanced militaries.
------------
4. Interoperability and Joint Operations
• Lack of Integration: While efforts are underway to improve jointness among the Army, Navy, and Air Force, coordination and interoperability remain inconsistent.
• Command Structure: Differences in doctrine and training among services sometimes hinder joint operational effectiveness.
------------
5. Human Resource Challenges
• Recruitment and Retention: Difficulty in attracting high-quality recruits and retaining skilled personnel due to better civilian career opportunities.
• Training Limitations: Budget restrictions can limit training frequency, scope, and international exercises.
------------
6. Procurement and Corruption Concerns
• Lack of Transparency: Past procurement deals have faced allegations of mismanagement or corruption, such as the Scorpène submarine scandal.
• Inefficiency: Poor planning or inconsistent defense procurement policies sometimes result in incompatible or unnecessary systems.
KHUSUS BUAT MALONDESH MISKIN BIN BOTOL ISINYA KONDOM UNISEX DAN SLANG TINJA 😂😂😂😂😂
BalasHapusSIPRI 2 TAHUN (2024 - 2025) = KOSONG
BalasHapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
---------------------------------------------------
GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
1. Indonesia – Peringkat 13
-
2. Vietnam – Peringkat 23
-
3. Thailand – Peringkat 24
-
4. Singapura – Peringkat 29
-
5. Myanmar – Peringkat 35
-
6. Filipina – Peringkat 41
-
7. Malaydesh – Peringkat 42
-
8. Kamboja – Peringkat 83
-
9. Laos – Peringkat 125
--------------------------------------------------
TIMELINE SKANDAL "PRANK"....:
-
2004 - 2007: ERA AWAL JANJI MANIS (PRANK CHINA & PRANCIS) =
-
Januari 2004 (TIPU CHINA - KS-1A): Najib Razak menyatakan setuju secara prinsip membeli rudal jarak menengah KS-1A dari China dengan imbalan transfer teknologi. Hasil: Tidak pernah terealisasi.
-
Mei 2007 (TIPU PRANCIS - DASSAULT): Negosiasi pembelian 18 jet tempur Rafale senilai USD 2 miliar dimulai. Hasil: Hanya berakhir sebagai wacana bertahun-tahun tanpa kontrak efektif.
________________________________________
2016 - 2017: PUNCAK MANIPULASI ALUTSISTA (PRANK NEXTER & PSIM FAKE)
-
April 2016 (TIPU PRANCIS - NEXTER): Penandatanganan Letter of Intent (LoI) di DSA 2016 untuk 20 unit artileri Caesar 155mm. Hasil: Batal/Prank.
-
Agustus 2017 (TIPU SULTAN - PSIM FAKE): Peluncuran kapal LCS pertama. Sidang PAC mengungkapkan bahwa modul PSIM (Integrated Mast) yang dipasang saat seremoni adalah palsu/dummy. Modul dilepas segera setelah acara selesai untuk pemasangan hanggar.
________________________________________
2019 - 2021: KEGADUHAN JET TEMPUR (PRANK PAKISTAN, INDIA, & SLOVAKIA)
-
Maret 2019 (TIPU PAKISTAN - JF-17): Pejabat pertahanan Pakistan mengklaim minat serius Malaydesh pada JF-17 Thunder saat kunjungan PM Mahathir. Hasil: Dibantah/Tidak difinalisasi.
-
Oktober 2021 (TIPU INDIA - TEJAS): Laporan negosiasi tingkat lanjut untuk mengganti MiG-29 dengan Tejas buatan India. Hasil: Kandas, kontrak akhirnya jatuh ke FA-50 Korea Selatan.
-
2021 (TIPU SLOVAKIA - KDS): Rencana pembelian artileri EVA 155mm dari Slovakia mencuat ke publik. Hasil: Menguap tanpa kejelasan.
________________________________________
2022 - 2024: PRANK REGIONAL & KONTRAK GANTUNG (TURKI & INDONESIA)
-
Juni 2022 (TIPU INDONESIA - PT PAL): Janji penandatanganan kontrak kapal MRSS pada bulan Agustus. Hasil: Hingga kini kontrak tersebut tidak pernah ditandatangani ("Gantung").
-
Juli 2024 (TIPU TURKI - YAVUZ): Kementerian Pertahanan meninjau ulang rencana akuisisi Yavuz 155mm dari MKE Turki. Hasil: Menambah daftar panjang alutsista yang "hampir" dibeli namun batal.
________________________________________
2025 - 2026: SKANDAL GLOBAL & "GAME OVER" (FIFA & CAS)
-
Juni 2025 (AWAL TIPU NATURALISASI): Klaim residensi 10 tahun dan dokumen garis keturunan untuk 7 pemain naturalisasi diajukan ke FIFA.
-
5-6 Maret 2026 (TIPU FIFA - GAGAL BANDING CAS): Puncak Kehancuran. CAS menolak banding FAM. Terbukti secara hukum melakukan manipulasi data terorganisir dan pemalsuan dokumen kakek/nenek pemain.
Status: "Game Over". Sanksi denda 350rb CHF, skorsing 1 tahun bagi pemain, dan pengurangan poin kualifikasi.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN (2024 - 2025) = KOSONG
BalasHapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
---------------------------------------------------
GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
1. Indonesia – Peringkat 13
-
2. Vietnam – Peringkat 23
-
3. Thailand – Peringkat 24
-
4. Singapura – Peringkat 29
-
5. Myanmar – Peringkat 35
-
6. Filipina – Peringkat 41
-
7. Malaydesh – Peringkat 42
-
8. Kamboja – Peringkat 83
-
9. Laos – Peringkat 125
--------------------------------------------------
HUTANG & LIABILITAS MALAYDESH 2010–2026
2010: RM 407,1 Miliar
2011: RM 456,1 Miliar
2012: RM 501,6 Miliar
2013: RM 547,7 Miliar
2014: RM 582,8 Miliar
2015: RM 630,5 Miliar
2016: RM 648,5 Miliar
2017: RM 686,8 Miliar
2018: RM 1,19 Triliun
2019: RM 1,25 Triliun
2020: RM 1,32 Triliun
2021: RM 1,38 Triliun
2022: RM 1,45 Triliun
2023: RM 1,53 Triliun
2024: RM 1,63 Triliun
2025: RM 1,71 Triliun
2026: RM 1,79 Triliun
________________________________________
Ringkasan Sumber Berita & Referensi:
Bloomberg & Reuters (2018–2019): Laporan mengenai total utang yang melampaui RM 1 triliun setelah memasukkan komitmen jaminan dan liabilitas 1MDB.
-
CNA & The Star (2020): Analisis kenaikan plafon utang untuk pendanaan Kumpulan Wang COVID-19 (KWC).
-
The Edge Malaydesh (2021–2022): Catatan akumulasi utang federal yang mencapai ambang batas baru pasca-pandemi.
-
MOF Portal & Bernama (2023–2024): Pernyataan PM Anwar Ibrahim mengenai beban utang RM 1,5 triliun untuk reformasi fiskal.
-
Kementerian Kewangan (MOF) Malaydesh (2025–2026): Data proyeksi melalui dokumen Belanjawan 2026 dan strategi fiskal jangka menengah.
________________________________________
GAME OVER = CAS TOLAK BANDING FAM
GAME OVER = CAS TOLAK BANDING FAM
GAME OVER = CAS TOLAK BANDING FAM
________________________________________
Berdasarkan keputusan terbaru dari Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) yang diumumkan pada 5-6 Maret 2026, banding yang diajukan oleh Federasi Sepak Bola Malaydesh (FAM) terkait sanksi FIFA terhadap tujuh pemain naturalisasi telah ditolak.
Berikut adalah poin-poin utama hasil keputusan tersebut:
Status Pemain: CAS tetap menyatakan bahwa tujuh pemain naturalisasi timnas Malaydesh tersebut ilegal dan terbukti menggunakan dokumen yang tidak sah.
Sanksi Larangan Bermain: Hukuman larangan beraktivitas di dunia sepak bola selama 12 bulan (1 tahun) bagi ketujuh pemain tersebut tetap berlaku.
Denda Finansial: FAM tetap diwajibkan membayar denda sebesar 350.000 CHF (sekitar Rp7,2 - 7,6 miliar) sesuai keputusan FIFA sebelumnya.
Pengurangan Poin: Upaya FAM untuk membatalkan sanksi pengurangan poin di Kualifikasi Piala Asia 2027 juga dilaporkan gagal/ditolak.
________________________________________
Sumber Berita Internasional & Malaydesh
The Star (Malaydesh): Menjelaskan bahwa meskipun hukuman larangan bertanding di laga resmi tetap berlaku, CAS memberikan keringanan bagi pemain untuk tetap bisa berlatih bersama klub mereka.
VnExpress (Vietnam): Melaporkan bahwa CAS menolak banding Malaydesh dalam skandal pemalsuan dokumen pemain naturalisasi tersebut.
Vietnam.vn: Memberitakan dampak buruk hasil sidang bagi masa depan sepak bola Malaydesh, termasuk potensi kekalahan WO 0-3 di kualifikasi mendatang.
Scoop.my: Merinci bahwa panel arbiter yang diketuai Lars Hilliger mengonfirmasi adanya pelanggaran Kode Disiplin FIFA.
ASEAN Football: Melalui kanal media sosialnya, mereka mengonfirmasi bahwa FAM telah menerima keputusan resmi dari CAS terkait penolakan banding tersebut.