The Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) held an induction ceremony for eight Beechcraft AT-6TH Wolverine attack aircraft at Squadron 411, Wing 41, Chiang Mai, on September 4, 2025, completing a project that began with the signing of the procurement contract on November 14, 2021.
The ceremony began with an AT-6TH attack aircraft escorting a ransport aircraft Airbus A320-214CJ, from Squadron 602, Wing 6, Don Mueang, which was accompanied by the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Air Force, Air Chief Marshal Panpakdee Pattanakul, U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, Mr. Robert Frank Godec, representatives of Thai government agencies, Thai and foreign private sectors, and the media. They landed at Wing 41 in Chiang Mai Province.
Since the delivery of 8 AT-6TH Wolverine attack aircraft under the contract that includes the transfer of technology to the Thai aviation industry around June 2025 , which has had combat-ready pilot training, and continuous training in various mission operations including participation in the joint exercise AIR THAISING 2025 with the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) between 14-25 July 2025 at Wing 1 Korat, which is the first joint exercise with a friendly country, and followed by the joint training ENDURING PARTNERS 2025 with the United States Air Force (USAF) between 18-29 August 2025 at Wing 1 Korat as well.
In an interview with the media during the ceremony for commissioning the AT-6TH attack aircraft, the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Air Force, Air Chief Marshal Panphakdi Phatthanakun, confirmed that the AT-6TH attack aircraft took part in clashes along the Thai-Cambodian border in late July 2015. Although no details were provided, the RTAF commander added that the aircraft's ability to transmit real-time battlefield imagery is one of its capabilities. It is economical, quiet and highly accurate from a long range, suitable for strike missions supporting ground forces if heavier armed fighters are not required.
In addition to the procurement project for 12 Saab Gripen E/F fighter aircraft for Squadron 102, Wing 1, the procurement project according to the RTAF White Paper 2025 may need to be amended in the future after the latest clash with the Cambodian army. This also includes replacing the Lockheed Martin F-16AM/BM EMLU fighter aircraft of Squadron 403, Wing 4, Takhli, with fifth-generation fighter aircraft, the Northrop F-5E/F TH Super Tigris fighter aircraft of Squadron 211, Wing 21, Ubon Ratchathani, and the Alpha Jet TH attack aircraft of Squadron 231, Wing 23, Udon Thani, with unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV).
(AAG)
THE ABSENCE OF A DEDICATED MARINE CORPS
BalasHapus1. Gaps in Amphibious and Expeditionary Capabilities
• Lack of a Cohesive Force: A dedicated Marine Corps is designed to be a self-contained, rapidly deployable expeditionary force. It integrates naval support, ground combat, and aviation assets into a single cohesive unit. In Malondesh case, these capabilities are spread across different services (the Army's 10th Parachute Brigade, the Navy's PASKAL, and various naval ships). This fragmented approach can lead to coordination problems, "turf wars" between services, and a lack of unified command during complex amphibious operations.
• Limited Rapid Response: A Marine Corps is structured for immediate, decisive action in littoral environments. Without such a force, Malondeshmay face delays in deploying troops to respond to threats in its vast maritime domain, particularly in remote areas of the South China Sea or the eastern coast of Sabah. The 2013 Lahad Datu incursion, for instance, highlighted the need for a more agile and specialized maritime security force.
• Lack of Dedicated Amphibious Assets: A Marine Corps comes with its own fleet of specialized assets, such as amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs), hovercraft, and landing craft. While the MalondeshArmy is acquiring some hovercraft, these acquisitions are often piecemeal and not part of a larger, dedicated force structure. This can limit the scale and scope of amphibious operations.
2. Slower Military Modernization
• Outdated Doctrine: The MalondeshArmed Forces (MAF) doctrine has historically been shaped by its counter-insurgency and land-centric experience. While the 2019 Defense White Paper has acknowledged the need for amphibious capabilities, the absence of a dedicated Marine Corps suggests a slower pace in fully embracing a modern, multi-domain warfare doctrine that is crucial for a maritime nation.
• Budgetary and Bureaucratic Hurdles: The creation of a new military branch requires significant political will and a long-term financial commitment. Due to a history of fluctuating defense budgets and administrative complexities, proposals to establish a MalondeshMarine Corps have repeatedly been put on the back burner. This has led to a situation where critical capabilities, like those needed for amphibious warfare, are not fully developed or funded.
3. Vulnerability in Maritime Disputes
• Inadequate Deterrence: Malondeshis a claimant state in the South China Sea and faces increasing assertiveness from China. As noted by some military analysts, the Royal MalondeshNavy's (RMN) naval vessels are in some cases smaller and less capable than the Chinese coast guard ships that operate in Malondesh Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). A robust Marine Corps could serve as a powerful deterrent, signaling Malondesh resolve to protect its maritime claims and remote outposts.
• Challenges in Defending Remote Outposts: Malondeshmaintains a presence on several reefs and islands in the disputed waters. Reinforcing these remote garrisons requires significant air and sea-lift capabilities, which can be challenging and slow without a dedicated, integrated amphibious force.
4. Limitations in Joint Operations and Interoperability
• Fragmented Training: While the Royal MalondeshArmy trains with foreign marine forces (e.g., the U.S. Marine Corps) in exercises like CARAT, this training is often ad-hoc and focuses on specific, limited scenarios. It does not replace the continuous, integrated, and large-scale training that a dedicated Marine Corps undergoes to achieve seamless interoperability between sea and land forces.
• Reduced Effectiveness in Multinational Operations: In a combined operation with a country that has a Marine Corps, Malondesh lack of a similar force can hinder a seamless integration of its assets. This can create communication and procedural gaps that reduce overall operational effectiveness in joint exercises or real-world coalition efforts.
THE WEAKNESSES OF THE MALONDESHMILITARY'S TANK FORCE ARE PRIMARILY CENTERED ON QUANTITY, AGE, AND LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES. THE ROYAL ARMOURED CORPS OPERATES A SMALL FLEET OF MAIN BATTLE TANKS (MBTS), WHICH LIMITS ITS CAPABILITIES IN COMPARISON TO OTHER REGIONAL POWERS.
BalasHapus1. Limited Number of Tanks
Malondesh main battle tank fleet consists of a small number of PT-91M Pendekar tanks. The exact number varies in reports, but it is generally cited as around 48 units. This number is significantly lower than neighboring countries like Indonesia, which has a much larger tank fleet. This limited quantity can be a major disadvantage in a large-scale land conflict, as it restricts the ability to deploy tanks across different operational theaters and provides less strategic depth.
2. Obsolescence and Maintenance Issues
The PT-91M, while a capable tank, is a modernized variant of the T-72, a design that dates back to the Soviet era. While the Malondeshversion has been upgraded with a new engine, fire control system, and reactive armor, it still faces challenges related to its older design.
• Reliance on a Single Supplier: The PT-91M was purchased from Poland. This creates a dependency on a single foreign supplier for spare parts and maintenance, a problem that has been highlighted with the PT-91M. The Polish manufacturer has ceased production of some key components, which has led to a proposed Life Extension Program (LEP) to ensure the tanks remain operational. This program will rely on local expertise, which can be a slow and expensive process.
• Vulnerability to Modern Threats: The PT-91M, like many older tank designs, can be vulnerable to modern anti-tank weapons and drone attacks. While it is equipped with ERAWA-2 explosive reactive armor to protect against shaped-charge projectiles, it may be less effective against modern kinetic energy penetrators.
3. Logistical and Operational Constraints
Malondesh tank force also faces logistical challenges that can hinder its effectiveness.
• Mobility: While the PT-91M's weight (48.5 tonnes) makes it suitable for Malondesh often soft and uneven terrain, it may still face difficulties with older infrastructure, such as bridges with lower weight limits.
• Readiness: The small number of tanks and maintenance issues can impact the readiness of the fleet. Breakdowns have been reported in the past, underscoring the challenges of keeping a small fleet of specialized vehicles operational.
Ultimately, the main weakness of Malondesh tank force is not necessarily the quality of the PT-91M itself, but rather the small size of the fleet and the long-term logistical challenges of maintaining an aging and specialized inventory.
1. MASALAH PERAWATAN DAN KESIAPAN OPERASIONAL 🚧
BalasHapusIni adalah kelemahan yang paling sering disorot dan menjadi viral di media sosial.
• Insiden Mogok di Jalan Umum: Tank PT-91M Pendekar pernah beberapa kali mogok di tengah jalan raya, bahkan saat sedang dalam perjalanan untuk acara parade Hari Kemerdekaan. Insiden ini menimbulkan pertanyaan serius dari masyarakat dan parlemen tentang standar perawatan aset militer.
• Kurangnya Suku Cadang: Masalah ini adalah inti dari inefisiensi. Penghentian produksi suku cadang oleh produsen aslinya, Bumar Labedy, memaksa Malondesh untuk mencari solusi alternatif. Upaya ini termasuk menggunakan tenaga ahli lokal untuk memproduksi komponen tertentu, tetapi ini menunjukkan ketergantungan yang rapuh pada produsen eksternal dan kurangnya jaminan rantai pasokan.
• Kurva Pembelajaran yang Curam: Sebagai negara pertama di Asia Tenggara yang mengoperasikan MBT modern, Malondesh menghadapi tantangan dalam mengembangkan basis pengetahuan, keahlian, dan infrastruktur untuk perawatan tank tersebut. Hal ini berbeda dengan negara-negara yang sudah memiliki pengalaman lebih lama dalam mengelola aset militer yang kompleks.
________________________________________
2. Keterbatasan Teknis dan Operasional ⚙️
Meskipun PT-91M adalah versi yang ditingkatkan dari T-72, beberapa keterbatasan masih ada.
• Desain Lama dan Kerentanan: PT-91M merupakan turunan dari T-72, yang memiliki desain kokpit dan penyimpanan amunisi yang terkenal rentan. Dalam pertempuran modern, ini bisa menjadi kelemahan fatal jika dibandingkan dengan tank-tank tempur utama lain yang lebih baru dengan desain yang lebih aman.
• Kemampuan Serangan Terbatas: Dibandingkan dengan tank tempur utama modern yang dimiliki oleh negara tetangga, seperti Leopard 2A4 milik Singapura dan Indonesia, PT-91M Pendekar dianggap memiliki sistem kendali tembak dan perlindungan yang kurang unggul. Meskipun dilengkapi dengan Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA), perlindungan ini mungkin tidak cukup untuk menahan serangan dari amunisi anti-tank terbaru.
________________________________________
3. Masalah Pengadaan dan Jumlah yang Tidak Memadai 💰
• Skandal dan Inefisiensi: Sama seperti proyek kapal LCS, skandal pengadaan dan inefisiensi juga terjadi dalam program tank. Laporan menunjukkan adanya masalah tata kelola yang buruk dalam manajemen kontrak, yang menyebabkan aset tidak dapat digunakan secara maksimal.
• Jumlah yang Sedikit: Malondesh hanya memiliki 48 unit tank PT-91M Pendekar. Jumlah ini dianggap sangat tidak memadai untuk kebutuhan pertahanan negara, terutama jika dibandingkan dengan negara tetangga yang memiliki jumlah armada lapis baja yang jauh lebih besar.
😲HAH , TEKNISI PT PAL BELAJAR LAS DI NAVAL . !
BalasHapus🤭HIHI.....HI ,
LUCU SUDAH BISA BUAT SUB MARINE NAGAPASA SEKARANG KOK ,
BELAJAR NGELAS LAGI ,
PADAHAL DARI PENILAIAN AUDITOR INTERNASIONAL , LEMBAGA PENILAI PEKERJAAN SUB MARINE DUNIA ,HASIL KERJA PEMBUATAN SUB MARINE NAGAPASA KATEGORI TERBAIK DUNIA ,
HALLO PT PAL SURABAYA BUMN RI APA²AN INI ? ,
DISURUH NGELAWAK YA G BOHONG OLEH KEMHAN RI ATAU MENHAN RI ?
MUNGKIN BIAR TAMBAH EXPERT OM, JANGAN NEGATIF THINKING DULU 😁
HapusYang lucu itu komen lu yang kayak bocil.
HapusSertifikasi las pas Nagapasa level apa? Mereka merakit blok-per-blok yang didatangkan dari Korsel.
Pengerjaan Scorpene nanti kek gimana, situ sudah tau/belum?
Lah kalau sudah merasa berarti sombong itu namanya, ibaratnya kita sudah bisa cara hitung perkalian, dan apakah cuma seperti itu cara perkalian?, ternyata tidak,,,cara dan rumus banyak sekali, begitu pula dengan kapal selam kapal namanya sama tapi cara dan teknik membuatnya tidak sama, smoga kang @seto paham 😁👍
HapusLah kalau sudah merasa berarti sombong itu namanya, ibaratnya kita sudah bisa cara hitung perkalian, dan apakah cuma seperti itu cara perkalian?, ternyata tidak,,,cara dan rumus banyak sekali, begitu pula dengan kapal selam kapal namanya sama tapi cara dan teknik membuatnya tidak sama, smoga kang @seto paham 😁👍
HapusTank Amphibi RONGSOK SEDEKAH dari Korea.... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusIndonesia Terima Hibah 10 Unit Tank Amphibi dari Korea Selatan
http://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2009/11/indonesia-terima-hibah-10-unit-tank.html?m=1
IRI bilang pur
Hapus🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣
1. MASALAH PERAWATAN DAN KESIAPAN OPERASIONAL 🚧
HapusIni adalah kelemahan yang paling sering disorot dan menjadi viral di media sosial.
• Insiden Mogok di Jalan Umum: Tank PT-91M Pendekar pernah beberapa kali mogok di tengah jalan raya, bahkan saat sedang dalam perjalanan untuk acara parade Hari Kemerdekaan. Insiden ini menimbulkan pertanyaan serius dari masyarakat dan parlemen tentang standar perawatan aset militer.
• Kurangnya Suku Cadang: Masalah ini adalah inti dari inefisiensi. Penghentian produksi suku cadang oleh produsen aslinya, Bumar Labedy, memaksa Malondesh untuk mencari solusi alternatif. Upaya ini termasuk menggunakan tenaga ahli lokal untuk memproduksi komponen tertentu, tetapi ini menunjukkan ketergantungan yang rapuh pada produsen eksternal dan kurangnya jaminan rantai pasokan.
• Kurva Pembelajaran yang Curam: Sebagai negara pertama di Asia Tenggara yang mengoperasikan MBT modern, Malondesh menghadapi tantangan dalam mengembangkan basis pengetahuan, keahlian, dan infrastruktur untuk perawatan tank tersebut. Hal ini berbeda dengan negara-negara yang sudah memiliki pengalaman lebih lama dalam mengelola aset militer yang kompleks.
________________________________________
2. Keterbatasan Teknis dan Operasional ⚙️
Meskipun PT-91M adalah versi yang ditingkatkan dari T-72, beberapa keterbatasan masih ada.
• Desain Lama dan Kerentanan: PT-91M merupakan turunan dari T-72, yang memiliki desain kokpit dan penyimpanan amunisi yang terkenal rentan. Dalam pertempuran modern, ini bisa menjadi kelemahan fatal jika dibandingkan dengan tank-tank tempur utama lain yang lebih baru dengan desain yang lebih aman.
• Kemampuan Serangan Terbatas: Dibandingkan dengan tank tempur utama modern yang dimiliki oleh negara tetangga, seperti Leopard 2A4 milik Singapura dan Indonesia, PT-91M Pendekar dianggap memiliki sistem kendali tembak dan perlindungan yang kurang unggul. Meskipun dilengkapi dengan Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA), perlindungan ini mungkin tidak cukup untuk menahan serangan dari amunisi anti-tank terbaru.
________________________________________
3. Masalah Pengadaan dan Jumlah yang Tidak Memadai 💰
• Skandal dan Inefisiensi: Sama seperti proyek kapal LCS, skandal pengadaan dan inefisiensi juga terjadi dalam program tank. Laporan menunjukkan adanya masalah tata kelola yang buruk dalam manajemen kontrak, yang menyebabkan aset tidak dapat digunakan secara maksimal.
• Jumlah yang Sedikit: Malondesh hanya memiliki 48 unit tank PT-91M Pendekar. Jumlah ini dianggap sangat tidak memadai untuk kebutuhan pertahanan negara, terutama jika dibandingkan dengan negara tetangga yang memiliki jumlah armada lapis baja yang jauh lebih besar.
1. MASALAH PERAWATAN DAN KESIAPAN OPERASIONAL 🚧
HapusIni adalah kelemahan yang paling sering disorot dan menjadi viral di media sosial.
• Insiden Mogok di Jalan Umum: Tank PT-91M Pendekar pernah beberapa kali mogok di tengah jalan raya, bahkan saat sedang dalam perjalanan untuk acara parade Hari Kemerdekaan. Insiden ini menimbulkan pertanyaan serius dari masyarakat dan parlemen tentang standar perawatan aset militer.
• Kurangnya Suku Cadang: Masalah ini adalah inti dari inefisiensi. Penghentian produksi suku cadang oleh produsen aslinya, Bumar Labedy, memaksa Malondesh untuk mencari solusi alternatif. Upaya ini termasuk menggunakan tenaga ahli lokal untuk memproduksi komponen tertentu, tetapi ini menunjukkan ketergantungan yang rapuh pada produsen eksternal dan kurangnya jaminan rantai pasokan.
• Kurva Pembelajaran yang Curam: Sebagai negara pertama di Asia Tenggara yang mengoperasikan MBT modern, Malondesh menghadapi tantangan dalam mengembangkan basis pengetahuan, keahlian, dan infrastruktur untuk perawatan tank tersebut. Hal ini berbeda dengan negara-negara yang sudah memiliki pengalaman lebih lama dalam mengelola aset militer yang kompleks.
________________________________________
2. Keterbatasan Teknis dan Operasional ⚙️
Meskipun PT-91M adalah versi yang ditingkatkan dari T-72, beberapa keterbatasan masih ada.
• Desain Lama dan Kerentanan: PT-91M merupakan turunan dari T-72, yang memiliki desain kokpit dan penyimpanan amunisi yang terkenal rentan. Dalam pertempuran modern, ini bisa menjadi kelemahan fatal jika dibandingkan dengan tank-tank tempur utama lain yang lebih baru dengan desain yang lebih aman.
• Kemampuan Serangan Terbatas: Dibandingkan dengan tank tempur utama modern yang dimiliki oleh negara tetangga, seperti Leopard 2A4 milik Singapura dan Indonesia, PT-91M Pendekar dianggap memiliki sistem kendali tembak dan perlindungan yang kurang unggul. Meskipun dilengkapi dengan Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA), perlindungan ini mungkin tidak cukup untuk menahan serangan dari amunisi anti-tank terbaru.
________________________________________
3. Masalah Pengadaan dan Jumlah yang Tidak Memadai 💰
• Skandal dan Inefisiensi: Sama seperti proyek kapal LCS, skandal pengadaan dan inefisiensi juga terjadi dalam program tank. Laporan menunjukkan adanya masalah tata kelola yang buruk dalam manajemen kontrak, yang menyebabkan aset tidak dapat digunakan secara maksimal.
• Jumlah yang Sedikit: Malondesh hanya memiliki 48 unit tank PT-91M Pendekar. Jumlah ini dianggap sangat tidak memadai untuk kebutuhan pertahanan negara, terutama jika dibandingkan dengan negara tetangga yang memiliki jumlah armada lapis baja yang jauh lebih besar.
KEY FACTORS CAUSING INEFFICIENCY AND DELAYS
Hapus• Political Interference and Weak Governance: The defense procurement process is often influenced by political agendas rather than strategic military needs. Contracts are frequently awarded through direct negotiation to politically connected companies, bypassing competitive bidding. This practice can lead to the selection of unqualified contractors who lack the technical expertise to complete the projects.
• Lack of Project Management: Many defense projects suffer from poor administration, insufficient oversight, and a lack of a clear, single-point of accountability. This results in a breakdown of communication between the Ministry of Defence, the contractors, and the military end-users. The National Audit Department has consistently highlighted these weaknesses, citing issues such as improper planning and inconsistent monitoring in its reports on public projects.
• Financial Mismanagement: Projects are often plagued by budget overruns due to poor financial estimation from the beginning. Inaccurate cost calculations and the inclusion of unnecessary "agent fees" can inflate project costs significantly, leading to a financial shortfall that causes further delays or requires additional government bailouts.
Case Studies of Gross Inefficiency and Delays
1. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Project 🚢
The LCS project is the most prominent example of military procurement failure in Malondesh.
• Delay: The project, to build six ships for the Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN) at a cost of RM9 billion, has been severely delayed. Not a single ship has been delivered, despite the project being over a decade behind its original timeline.
• Cost Overrun: Over RM6 billion has been paid to the contractor, yet the first ship is still incomplete. This massive budget overrun is a direct result of poor management and alleged financial misappropriation. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) found that funds were used for purposes other than the project itself.
• Disregard for User Needs: The Royal Malondeshn Navy's preference for a specific ship design was ignored in favor of a different, unproven design chosen by the politically appointed contractor. This decision led to further technical complications and delays.
2. The Skyhawk Jets Fiasco ✈️
This is a historical but still relevant example of poor decision-making. In the 1980s, Malondesh purchased 88 second-hand Douglas A-4C and A-4L Skyhawk jets from the United States.
• Inefficiency: Despite the seemingly "cost-effective" nature of the deal, only a small fraction of the aircraft (40 out of 88) ever became operational with the Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF). The remainder were left in storage, a complete waste of public funds. The King of Malondesh has recently referenced this historical "flying coffin" mistake as a warning against similar procurement failures.
3. General Infrastructure and Construction Projects
The inefficiency is not limited to major hardware. Even smaller projects, such as military housing and training facilities, are affected. The King of Malondesh has publicly expressed frustration over a delayed combat diving pool at a Special Operations Group (GGK) camp that was supposed to be completed in 2022 but remains unfinished. This highlights that poor project management and delays are not isolated to large, complex projects but are a pervasive issue across the board.
These systemic inefficiencies and delays have a direct impact on the military's operational readiness and morale. Obsolete and non-operational equipment, coupled with poorly maintained infrastructure, undermines the MAF's ability to effectively respond to modern security threats, particularly in a complex regional environment like the South China Sea.
SYSTEMIC ISSUES
HapusSeveral factors contribute to this entrenched problem:
• Lack of Transparency and Oversight: Defense procurement is often conducted through direct negotiations rather than open tenders, which makes the process opaque and susceptible to abuse. Transparency International's Government Defence Integrity Index has consistently rated Malondesh as having a high risk of corruption in its defense sector due to weak parliamentary oversight and limited financial scrutiny.
• The Role of Middlemen and Agents: A key feature of the Malondeshn system is the reliance on middlemen, or "agents," who are often politically connected. These individuals or firms insert themselves into deals between the government and foreign arms manufacturers, adding unnecessary commissions and inflating the final price of the assets. As Malondesh's King Sultan Ibrahim recently pointed out, this system allows agents to profit at the expense of national defense.
• Political Influence and Cronyism: The awarding of contracts is frequently influenced by political interests rather than the actual needs of the military. Projects are often given to politically connected firms, some of which have no prior experience in defense manufacturing. This leads to a vicious cycle where a lack of capability and experience results in project delays and failures.
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal: A Case Study
The LCS scandal is a prime example of the deep-seated issues within Malondeshn defense procurement. The project, intended to build six ships for the Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN) at a cost of RM9 billion, has been a complete failure.
• Misappropriation of Funds: The government has already paid over RM6 billion, but not a single ship has been delivered. Forensic audits and a Public Accounts Committee (PAC) report revealed that funds were allegedly misappropriated, with payments made for "fake services" and a significant portion of the money disappearing without a trace.
• Ignoring User Needs: The scandal also highlighted a critical breakdown in communication and a disregard for military expertise. The RMN initially recommended a Dutch-made design (Sigma class), but the Ministry of Defence, under the advice of the main contractor, Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS), chose a different, unproven French design (Gowind class) instead. This decision was made without the navy's consultation.
• Gross Inefficiency and Delays: The project has been plagued by delays due to BNS's poor financial management, lack of skilled labor, and failure to follow design specifications. The company, which is a subsidiary of a conglomerate with close ties to the Armed Forces Pension Fund, was in a "weak and critical" financial state, yet was still awarded the massive contract. This showcases a complete breakdown of due diligence and project management.
Other Notable Scandals and Issues
The LCS scandal is just one of many that have plagued the MAF.
• Submarine Procurement: A previous submarine deal was also marred by allegations of corruption, with reports of exorbitant commissions paid to local agents.
• Aircraft and Patrol Boats: The MAF has a history of acquiring assets that are either not fully operational upon delivery or are poorly maintained due to a lack of spare parts and technical expertise. This has led to a high number of non-flying aircraft and inoperable patrol boats, essentially leaving the military with expensive, but useless, equipment.
• Lack of Accountability: Despite multiple scandals and reports from the Auditor-General and PAC, there has been a notable lack of accountability. Few, if any, senior politicians or high-ranking military officials have been held responsible for the failures and financial losses. This has fostered a culture where such misconduct is tolerated, and a cynical public has grown desensitized to the issue.
The Malondeshn military, also known as the Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF), faces several significant challenges, which can be categorized into three main areas: procurement and modernization, human resources, and defense policy.
HapusProcurement and Modernization 💰
A primary issue for the MAF is its aging and obsolete equipment. The country's defense spending has historically been low, and while recent budgets have seen increases, they are often insufficient to cover the extensive modernization needs.
• Financial Constraints: The 1997 Asian financial crisis had a lasting impact, forcing a de-prioritization of defense spending. Despite recent budget increases, competing priorities like healthcare and education often limit the funds available for military upgrades.
• Corruption and Inefficiency: Past procurement projects, such as the Littoral Combat Ship program, have been plagued by delays, cost overruns, and allegations of corruption, which have wasted funds and resulted in a lack of operational assets.
• Aging Inventory: The MAF relies on a mix of equipment from various countries, making maintenance difficult. For example, the Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF) has struggled to maintain its Russian-made Sukhoi Su-30MKM fighter jets due to sanctions and a lack of spare parts. The country also retired its MiG-29s without a timely replacement, creating a significant capability gap.
Human Resources 🧍
Recruitment and personnel issues are another major problem for the MAF, affecting its overall readiness and capability.
• Recruitment Challenges: The military has difficulty attracting and retaining high-quality personnel. This is partly due to low wages and poor living conditions. The quality of candidates has been a concern, with a declining pool of eligible recruits.
• Ethnic Imbalance: There is a significant ethnic disparity in the armed forces, with a very low percentage of non-Malay recruits. This could affect national unity and the military's ability to represent the country's diverse population.
• Personnel Well-being: There are ongoing concerns about the well-being and welfare of military personnel, including work-life balance issues and the need for better mental health support.
Defense Policy and Strategic Challenges 🗺️
The MAF operates in a complex regional environment with evolving security threats.
• South China Sea Disputes: Malondesh has overlapping territorial claims with China in the South China Sea. China's increasingly aggressive "grey-zone" tactics—using coast guard vessels and fishing militia to assert its claims—are a major challenge that the MAF is not fully equipped to handle.
• Non-Traditional Threats: While traditionally an army-centric force due to a history of internal counter-insurgency, the MAF must now pivot to address maritime and cyber threats. This requires a re-calibration of its force structure and a focus on new technologies like drones, cyber warfare, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
• Political Instability: Frequent changes in government have led to a lack of continuity in defense policy and the slow implementation of key reforms outlined in the country's first Defence White Paper. This political instability can stall long-term projects and strategic planning.
KEY FACTORS
Hapus1. Direct Negotiation and Lack of Open Tenders
A major problem is the frequent use of direct negotiation instead of open and competitive tenders. This practice, often justified under the pretext of national security, limits competition and reduces transparency. By bypassing the tender process, the government loses the ability to secure the best value for money, and it creates a fertile ground for corruption.
• Example: The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal is a prime example. The multi-billion ringgit contract was awarded through direct negotiation, with a parliamentary inquiry later revealing that the decision ignored the navy's preference for a different ship design.
________________________________________
2. The Role of Middlemen and Agents
The procurement process is often riddled with intermediaries or agents who act as go-betweens for the military and foreign contractors. These middlemen, often with political connections or being former military personnel, add significant markups to the cost of equipment. This practice inflates prices, wastes public funds, and has been a major source of controversy. The King of Malondesh himself has publicly criticized this issue, warning against the influence of "agents and salesmen" in the Defence Ministry.
________________________________________
3. Financial Mismanagement and Weak Oversight
Government audits have consistently revealed systemic financial mismanagement.
• Failure to Collect Penalties: Audit reports have shown that the government failed to impose and collect penalties for delayed deliveries from contractors. In one case, a contractor for armored vehicles did not face a penalty of over RM160 million despite significant delays.
• Contract Splitting: To avoid the scrutiny of larger contracts, some projects are broken down into smaller ones, a practice known as "contract splitting." This allows them to bypass the open tender threshold and be awarded through less rigorous methods, raising concerns about accountability.
• Misappropriation of Funds: In the LCS scandal, a significant portion of the project's funds were allegedly used to pay off debts from old, unrelated naval projects, showcasing a severe lack of financial discipline.
THE MALONDESH MILITARY HAS A SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY GAP IN ITS COUNTER-INSURGENCY (COIN) AIRCRAFT FLEET, PRIMARILY DUE TO THE AGING AND LIMITED NUMBER OF LIGHT COMBAT AND SURVEILLANCE PLATFORMS SUITABLE FOR THIS TYPE OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE.
Hapus1. Lack of Dedicated COIN Aircraft
Unlike a dedicated air force built for large-scale conventional warfare, a successful COIN force requires aircraft optimized for a unique set of missions:
• Low and Slow: COIN operations often occur in dense jungle or urban environments where fast jets are ineffective. They require aircraft that can fly low and slow to provide close air support and accurate surveillance.
• Persistent Presence: COIN aircraft must be able to loiter for extended periods to track insurgents and provide sustained support to ground troops.
• Cost-Effectiveness: Using expensive, high-performance fighter jets like the Su-30MKM for COIN missions is a significant waste of resources.
The Royal MalondeshAir Force (RMAF) lacks a dedicated fleet of such aircraft. Its existing fleet is more suited for air defense and conventional warfare, creating a mismatch between its capabilities and the specific demands of counter-insurgency.
________________________________________
2. Aging Fleet and Reliance on Other Assets
The RMAF's current inventory is not well-suited for the COIN role, forcing it to rely on a mix of aging platforms and less-than-ideal helicopters.
• Retired Aircraft: The RMAF has retired dedicated COIN aircraft like the Canadair CT-114 Tutor. This leaves a major gap that has not been adequately filled.
• Helicopter Gaps: While the Army operates light attack helicopters like the MD530G, these are limited in their range, endurance, and payload. This places a heavy burden on a small fleet to support ground forces over vast and often difficult terrain.
________________________________________
3. Delays in New Acquisitions
Malondeshis actively trying to address this gap, but procurement has been slow and challenging.
• FA-50M Purchase: The RMAF is acquiring 18 FA-50M light combat aircraft from Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI). These jets are intended to fulfill both a fighter lead-in trainer role and a light combat role. However, deliveries are not expected to begin until 2026. This leaves the RMAF with a capability gap in the interim.
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): Malondeshhas made some progress in acquiring drones for surveillance, but these still do not fully replace the role of a manned COIN aircraft, which can provide more direct and immediate fire support.
THE MALONDESH MILITARY FACES SEVERAL CRUCIAL, INTERRELATED PROBLEMS THAT AFFECT ITS OVERALL READINESS AND CAPABILITY. THESE ISSUES STEM FROM A COMBINATION OF CHRONIC UNDERFUNDING, A COMPLICATED PROCUREMENT PROCESS, AND A FRAGMENTED APPROACH TO MILITARY DEVELOPMENT.
Hapus1. Inefficient and Opaque Procurement
The most significant problem facing the Malondesh military is its procurement system. It's often criticized for a lack of transparency and a reliance on middlemen or agents, which leads to inflated prices and projects that fail to meet the military's actual needs.
• Cost Overruns and Delays: Projects, most notably the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, have been plagued by severe delays and massive cost overruns. None of the six ships have been delivered, despite significant payments. This has left the Royal Malondesh Navy (RMN) with an aging fleet, as many of its vessels are over 40 years old.
• "Middlemen" and Corruption: King Sultan Ibrahim has publicly criticized the involvement of agents and salesmen in defense deals, stating that these practices lead to "unreasonable" prices and purchases that don't fit the military's needs. This has raised concerns about corruption and inefficiency within the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF).
________________________________________
2. An Aging Fleet and Logistical Challenges
The Malondesh Armed Forces (MAF) operates a mixed fleet of military assets from a wide range of international suppliers. This lack of standardization creates a logistical nightmare.
• Fragmentation of Supply Chains: The military has equipment from various countries, including Russia, the United States, Poland, and China. Each platform requires different spare parts, tools, and maintenance expertise.
• Low Operational Readiness: Many of the Navy's vessels and Air Force's combat jets are well past their service life, leading to higher maintenance costs and a lower operational readiness rate.
• Reliance on Foreign Support: Due to a lack of local expertise, Malondesh is highly dependent on foreign suppliers for critical maintenance and spare parts, making the military vulnerable to supply chain disruptions, such as international sanctions.
________________________________________
3. Capability Gaps and Lack of Specialization
The MAF has key capability gaps in crucial areas due to its historical focus on counter-insurgency and a lack of a unified doctrine.
• No Dedicated Marine Corps: Malondesh lacks a dedicated Marine Corps. Its amphibious capabilities are fragmented and distributed between the Army and Navy. This creates coordination problems and limits the ability to rapidly project power and respond to maritime threats, a significant vulnerability for an archipelagic nation.
• Limited Tank Fleet: The Army's tank force is limited to approximately 48 PT-91M Pendekar tanks. This small number restricts their strategic deployment and makes them less effective in a large-scale land conflict compared to neighbors with larger tank fleets.
• COIN Aircraft Gap: The Air Force lacks a dedicated fleet of Counter-Insurgency (COIN) aircraft. It's forced to use expensive multi-role fighter jets for low-intensity conflicts, which is inefficient. While a new batch of FA-50M light combat aircraft is on order, deliveries are not expected for several years.
THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS FOR MALONDESH ARMED FORCES IS WIDELY CRITICIZED FOR BEING INEFFICIENT AND OPAQUE, LEADING TO A SERIES OF HIGH-PROFILE SCANDALS, SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL WASTE, AND SERIOUS GAPS IN MILITARY READINESS. THIS SYSTEMIC PROBLEM IS ROOTED IN A LACK OF TRANSPARENCY, POLITICAL INTERFERENCE, AND A RELIANCE ON INDIRECT ACQUISITION METHODS.
Hapus1. The "Middleman" System
A key issue is the heavy reliance on agents, middlemen, and politically connected individuals to facilitate defense contracts. This practice often bypasses open tender processes, which are designed to ensure transparency and competition.
• Inflated Costs: These middlemen typically charge hefty commissions, inflating the final price of military assets. This was a point of public concern by King Sultan Ibrahim, who stated that such practices lead to buying "nonsense" that is overpriced and ill-suited for the military's actual needs.
• Inadequate Equipment: Since the procurement is driven by commercial interests rather than by the end-user (the military), the equipment acquired may not be the most suitable or effective for its intended purpose.
________________________________________
2. High-Profile Scandals and Delays
The most infamous example of a failed procurement is the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program.
• Massive Delays and Cost Overruns: The program, valued at RM9 billion, was meant to deliver six modern frigates to the Royal Malondesh Navy (RMN). Despite paying over RM6 billion, not a single ship has been delivered. The project is years behind schedule and has been plagued by allegations of mismanagement and corruption.
• Financial Misappropriation: Investigations have revealed that a significant portion of the allocated funds was used for other purposes, with some estimates pointing to hundreds of millions of ringgit in financial irregularities. .
• Impact on Readiness: The failure of the LCS program has left the RMN with a dangerously aging fleet. Many of its vessels are over 40 years old, leading to higher maintenance costs and lower operational readiness rates.
________________________________________
3. Lack of Transparency and Accountability
The defense procurement process is shrouded in secrecy, which makes it difficult to hold officials accountable for failures.
• Direct Negotiations: The majority of large defense contracts are awarded through direct negotiation rather than open bidding, which limits public and parliamentary oversight.
• Limited Audits: While audit reports exist, their recommendations are often not implemented. This was highlighted in a recent Auditor-General's report, which found serious delays, weak oversight, and millions of ringgit in uncollected penalties from contractors.
• Political Interference: Declassified reports on the LCS scandal revealed that key decisions, such as the choice of ship design, were made by political leaders against the recommendations of the navy, the end-user. This kind of political interference compromises the military's ability to make sound, strategic decisions.
________________________________________
4. Broader Systemic Failures
The problems in procurement are part of a larger systemic issue within Malondesh defense framework.
• No Cohesive Strategy: The absence of a clear, long-term defense policy has led to ad-hoc, fragmented procurement decisions. This has resulted in a mixed fleet of assets from various countries, creating a logistical nightmare for maintenance and supply chains.
• Inadequate Penalties: When projects are delayed or fail, penalties on contractors are often not enforced, and new contracts are sometimes awarded to the same companies, perpetuating a cycle of inefficiency and poor performance
1. FINANCIAL AND BUDGETARY REASONS
HapusOne of the most common reasons for cancellation is a lack of funds. The Malondeshn defense budget has historically been inconsistent and insufficient to support major, multi-year projects. When budgets are cut or not allocated as planned, the military is forced to scrap projects it can no longer afford.
• Impact on Acquisitions: This has led to the cancellation of proposed acquisitions, such as the plan to buy Kuwait's F/A-18C/D Hornet fighter jets. The decision was based on concerns about the high costs of upgrading and integrating the older jets, which were deemed to not provide sufficient "value for money."
• Inability to Pay: In some cases, the government or contractors may simply lack the funds to continue a project. This was a contributing factor to the failures of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project, where a contractor struggled with financial solvency.
________________________________________
2. Poor Governance and Lack of Transparency
Many cancellations stem from fundamental issues in how contracts are awarded and managed.
• Direct Negotiation vs. Open Tenders: The use of direct negotiation instead of open tenders is a major weakness. It limits competition and can result in contracts being awarded to politically connected companies, even if they lack the expertise or financial capability to complete the project.
• Mismanagement and Corruption: Projects are often canceled due to evidence of financial mismanagement, overspending, or corruption. The LCS scandal is the most infamous example, where a parliamentary inquiry found evidence of funds being misused and payments made to unverified subcontractors.
________________________________________
3. Lack of Operational Feasibility
Sometimes, a project is canceled because the proposed asset is not suitable for the military's needs or poses a risk to personnel.
• Obsolete Technology: The recent cancellation of the deal to lease four Black Hawk helicopters is a clear example. Malondesh King Sultan Ibrahim ordered the deal to be scrapped, publicly criticizing the acquisition of old, over 30-year-old aircraft that he called "flying coffins." He noted that such acquisitions endanger the lives of pilots and do not provide the military with a necessary capability.
1. Lack of Transparency and Accountability 🕵️♀️
HapusDefense procurement in Malondesh frequently operates with a high degree of secrecy, often justified under the guise of national security. This lack of public scrutiny makes the process vulnerable to mismanagement and corruption.
• Direct Negotiation: A common practice is direct negotiation instead of open tenders, which limits competition and can lead to inflated costs. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim himself has stated the need to end the old practice of involving "too many agents" who profit from commissions.
• Role of Middlemen: The use of intermediaries and agents in defense contracts is a long-standing issue. These middlemen often add significant markups, leading to the government paying far more than the actual value of the equipment.
________________________________________
2. High-Profile Scandals and Financial Mismanagement
Several major defense projects have been mired in controversy, serving as stark examples of procurement failures.
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal: This is the most notorious case. The project to build six naval vessels for the Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN) has been plagued by delays and cost overruns. Despite the government having paid a substantial portion of the RM9 billion contract, not a single ship has been delivered. A parliamentary report revealed that the contract was awarded through direct negotiation and that hundreds of millions of ringgit were paid to dubious companies.
• Auditor-General's Reports: Reports from the Auditor-General's Department have repeatedly exposed financial irregularities. For example, a recent audit on the army's armored vehicle project found that the government failed to collect RM162.75 million in penalties from contractors for delayed deliveries. The report also highlighted instances of "contract splitting," where large contracts were broken into smaller ones to bypass proper tender procedures.
________________________________________
3. Consequences on Military Readiness
The inefficient and opaque procurement process has tangible negative consequences for the Malondeshn Armed Forces' operational capabilities.
• Obsolete Equipment: The inability to acquire new assets in a timely and cost-effective manner forces the military to rely on an aging inventory. This leads to high maintenance costs, low operational readiness, and a diminished capacity to respond to modern threats.
• Erosion of Public Trust: Scandals and mismanagement erode public trust in government institutions and the armed forces. It also raises questions about whether taxpayer money is being used effectively to ensure national security.
BUKTI TEMPEL STICKER PARS 8x8 =
Hapus1. DESIGNED FNSS PARS 8×8
2. DEVELOPED WITH FNSS TECHNOLOGY
3. VEHICLE BASED ON THE TECHNOLOGY OF FNSS
The DefTech AV8 Gempita, an 8×8 armored vehicle based on the techNOLogy of FNSS-designed FNSS Pars 8×8 developed with FNSS techNOLogy, has been in service with the MALONDESH Army since 2014.
----
TEMPEL STICKER HIZIR TURKI
KASIAN TIADA KEMAMPUAN UJI BALISTIK
1. UJI BALISTIK DI THAILAND
2. UJI BALISTIK DI AFRIKA SELATAN
Selain itu, 2 ujian balistik telah dilakukan iaitu Ujian balistik Tembakan yang dilaksanakan di The Defence TechNOLogy Institute, Bangkok, Thailand dan Ujian Balistik Letupan (Mine/Underbelly Test) di Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, Pretoria, Afrika Selatan.
----
171 ASET USANG 33 TAHUN =
108 TDM
29 TUDM
34 TLDM
"The total number of MALONDESH Armed Forces (ATM) assets exceeding 30 years in service comprises 108 units for the Army, 29 units for the Royal MALONDESH Air Force (RMAF), and 34 units for the Royal MALONDESH Navy (RMN)," the MALONDESH Defence Minister.
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GEMPITA MOGOK BERASAP =
https://www.facebook.com/share/r/PqZohdg9uSdvFc5o/?mibextid=0VwfS7
PT91M MOGOK = The MALONDESH Army has apologised after a military vehicle broke down along a road in Kuala Lumpur on Saturday (Aug 27), a day after a tank malfunctioned and blocked traffic
MONUMEN MIG29 = Sudah tentu, pemindahan MiG-29N sebagai monumen akan menutup pelbagai spekulasi alam maya berhubung masa depan pesawat tersebut
RETIRED SCORPION = Scorpions to be retired. The Army has recommended that it’s fleet of Scorpion light tanks be retired due to the high cost of maintenance and obsolescence issues.
RETIRED CONDOR SIBMAS = Condor armoured 4X4 and Sibmas armoured recovery vehicle as retired from service as off January 1, 2023.
RETIRED V150 = . It was used by the MALONDESH Army in Second Malayan Emergency (NOw retired)
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PLAT TIPIS = The hull of the original Pars consisted of a composite aluminium and steel armour that provides protection for the crew and infantry against firing of small arms 7.62 mm armour-piercing attack through a full 360°
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2024 GEMPITA MOGOK BERASAP =
https://www.facebook.com/share/r/PqZohdg9uSdvFc5o/?mibextid=0VwfS7
-------
2022 PT91M MOGOK
The MALONDESH Army has apologised after a military vehicle broke down along a road in Kuala Lumpur on Saturday (Aug 27), a day after a tank malfunctioned and blocked traffic
------
PT91 DISCONTINUING THE PRODUCTION
According to Hisham, this decision raises questions because the Polish original equipment manufacturer Bumar Laberdy has stopped producing spare parts for Twardy.discontinuing the production of some main MBT components.
Lupa yaa Pur.. Maritim Malaydesh dapat sedekah Kapal Rongsokan th. 1957 dari US Coast Guard.... miskin sekali......🇲🇾🤡🤡🤡
HapusKata gempur pesawat ww2
BalasHapus🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣
F33 THN dpan di produksi di🇮🇩🇮🇩🇮🇩💪💪💪
BalasHapusTHE PROCUREMENT PROCESS FOR MALONDESH ARMED FORCES IS WIDELY CRITICIZED FOR BEING INEFFICIENT AND OPAQUE, LEADING TO A SERIES OF HIGH-PROFILE SCANDALS, SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL WASTE, AND SERIOUS GAPS IN MILITARY READINESS. THIS SYSTEMIC PROBLEM IS ROOTED IN A LACK OF TRANSPARENCY, POLITICAL INTERFERENCE, AND A RELIANCE ON INDIRECT ACQUISITION METHODS.
BalasHapus1. The "Middleman" System
A key issue is the heavy reliance on agents, middlemen, and politically connected individuals to facilitate defense contracts. This practice often bypasses open tender processes, which are designed to ensure transparency and competition.
• Inflated Costs: These middlemen typically charge hefty commissions, inflating the final price of military assets. This was a point of public concern by King Sultan Ibrahim, who stated that such practices lead to buying "nonsense" that is overpriced and ill-suited for the military's actual needs.
• Inadequate Equipment: Since the procurement is driven by commercial interests rather than by the end-user (the military), the equipment acquired may not be the most suitable or effective for its intended purpose.
________________________________________
2. High-Profile Scandals and Delays
The most infamous example of a failed procurement is the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program.
• Massive Delays and Cost Overruns: The program, valued at RM9 billion, was meant to deliver six modern frigates to the Royal Malondesh Navy (RMN). Despite paying over RM6 billion, not a single ship has been delivered. The project is years behind schedule and has been plagued by allegations of mismanagement and corruption.
• Financial Misappropriation: Investigations have revealed that a significant portion of the allocated funds was used for other purposes, with some estimates pointing to hundreds of millions of ringgit in financial irregularities. .
• Impact on Readiness: The failure of the LCS program has left the RMN with a dangerously aging fleet. Many of its vessels are over 40 years old, leading to higher maintenance costs and lower operational readiness rates.
________________________________________
3. Lack of Transparency and Accountability
The defense procurement process is shrouded in secrecy, which makes it difficult to hold officials accountable for failures.
• Direct Negotiations: The majority of large defense contracts are awarded through direct negotiation rather than open bidding, which limits public and parliamentary oversight.
• Limited Audits: While audit reports exist, their recommendations are often not implemented. This was highlighted in a recent Auditor-General's report, which found serious delays, weak oversight, and millions of ringgit in uncollected penalties from contractors.
• Political Interference: Declassified reports on the LCS scandal revealed that key decisions, such as the choice of ship design, were made by political leaders against the recommendations of the navy, the end-user. This kind of political interference compromises the military's ability to make sound, strategic decisions.
________________________________________
4. Broader Systemic Failures
The problems in procurement are part of a larger systemic issue within Malondesh defense framework.
• No Cohesive Strategy: The absence of a clear, long-term defense policy has led to ad-hoc, fragmented procurement decisions. This has resulted in a mixed fleet of assets from various countries, creating a logistical nightmare for maintenance and supply chains.
• Inadequate Penalties: When projects are delayed or fail, penalties on contractors are often not enforced, and new contracts are sometimes awarded to the same companies, perpetuating a cycle of inefficiency and poor performance
GEMPURWIRA7 September 2025 pukul 11.59
BalasHapusTank Amphibi RONGSOK SEDEKAH dari Korea.... 🤣🤣🤣
Indonesia Terima Hibah 10 Unit Tank Amphibi dari Korea Selatan
http://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2009/11/indonesia-terima-hibah-10-unit-tank.html?m=1
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Ada Malondesh TANTRUM KEPANASAN sambil Loncat Loncat kesana kemari karena IRI DENGKI dan SAKIT HATI kepada Indonesia yang mendapatkan Hibah LVT-7 ex-Korea selatan
Yg tak punya marinir tak usah cakap. Hanya menunjukkan ke tololannya aja
BalasHapusItu baru Tupoksi KORPS MARINIR TNI AL menjalankan Operasi Amfibi dengan Tank Amfibi dan Panser Amfibi menuju daratan Pantai sasaran.
BalasHapusKasihan dech Malondesh yang TIDAK PUNYA MARINE KORPS tapi berlagak HEBAT dan KAYA... ternyata MISKIN dan LEMAH.
Netizen Indonesia tertawa terbahak-bahak dong
WKWKWKWK
HAHAHAHA
Sekadar TANK Amphibia RONGSOK SEDEKAH KOREA tak payah MEMBUAL la.... Buat MALU je... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusLEBIH MALU LAGI YANG TA PUNYA 🤣🤣🤣
HapusBUAT MALONDESH MEMBUAL NO.1 🤣🤣🤣
1. Lack of Transparency and Accountability 🕵️♀️
HapusDefense procurement in Malondesh frequently operates with a high degree of secrecy, often justified under the guise of national security. This lack of public scrutiny makes the process vulnerable to mismanagement and corruption.
• Direct Negotiation: A common practice is direct negotiation instead of open tenders, which limits competition and can lead to inflated costs. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim himself has stated the need to end the old practice of involving "too many agents" who profit from commissions.
• Role of Middlemen: The use of intermediaries and agents in defense contracts is a long-standing issue. These middlemen often add significant markups, leading to the government paying far more than the actual value of the equipment.
________________________________________
2. High-Profile Scandals and Financial Mismanagement
Several major defense projects have been mired in controversy, serving as stark examples of procurement failures.
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal: This is the most notorious case. The project to build six naval vessels for the Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN) has been plagued by delays and cost overruns. Despite the government having paid a substantial portion of the RM9 billion contract, not a single ship has been delivered. A parliamentary report revealed that the contract was awarded through direct negotiation and that hundreds of millions of ringgit were paid to dubious companies.
• Auditor-General's Reports: Reports from the Auditor-General's Department have repeatedly exposed financial irregularities. For example, a recent audit on the army's armored vehicle project found that the government failed to collect RM162.75 million in penalties from contractors for delayed deliveries. The report also highlighted instances of "contract splitting," where large contracts were broken into smaller ones to bypass proper tender procedures.
________________________________________
3. Consequences on Military Readiness
The inefficient and opaque procurement process has tangible negative consequences for the Malondeshn Armed Forces' operational capabilities.
• Obsolete Equipment: The inability to acquire new assets in a timely and cost-effective manner forces the military to rely on an aging inventory. This leads to high maintenance costs, low operational readiness, and a diminished capacity to respond to modern threats.
• Erosion of Public Trust: Scandals and mismanagement erode public trust in government institutions and the armed forces. It also raises questions about whether taxpayer money is being used effectively to ensure national security.
The Malondeshn military faces significant challenges in its modernization and readiness due to budgetary and procurement constraints. These issues are not new but have become more pronounced in recent years, impacting its ability to acquire new equipment and maintain existing assets.
Hapus1. Limited and Inconsistent Budget Allocation
The defense budget in Malondesh is often constrained by competing national priorities such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure development. While recent budgets have shown slight increases, the overall allocation remains small compared to the country's defense needs and the spending of some of its regional counterparts. This limited funding forces the military to prioritize between acquiring new assets and maintaining its current aging fleet, often leading to a compromise on both.
• Impact: The lack of consistent, long-term funding prevents the Ministry of Defence from undertaking large-scale, multi-year procurement projects with confidence. This results in piecemeal acquisitions and an inability to execute a comprehensive, long-term modernization plan.
________________________________________
2. Inefficient and Opaque Procurement Process
The procurement process itself is a major source of weakness, often criticized for a lack of transparency and for being susceptible to inefficiencies. Reports from the Auditor-General have repeatedly highlighted critical issues.
• Delayed and Uncollected Penalties: A recent Auditor-General's report revealed significant weaknesses in the contract and procurement management for the army's armored vehicles. It found that the government failed to collect RM162.75 million in penalties for delayed deliveries and did not impose another RM1.42 million in penalties for late maintenance services.
• Contract Splitting: The audit also found instances of contract splitting, where a large contract was broken down into smaller ones to circumvent open tender regulations. This practice, amounting to RM107.54 million in one instance, opens the door to irregularities and undermines fair competition.
• Reliance on Agents: There are often concerns that procurement decisions are influenced by agents rather than being based on the military's genuine operational needs and market prices. This can lead to the acquisition of unsuitable or overpriced equipment.
________________________________________
3. Delays and Failures in Major Projects
The combination of budget constraints and procurement inefficiencies has led to high-profile failures and delays in major defense projects.
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal: This is a prominent example. The project to build six naval vessels was plagued by massive cost overruns and significant delays, despite the government having paid a substantial portion of the contract value. As a result, not a single ship has been delivered.
• Delayed Deliveries: Other projects, such as the acquisition of armored vehicles, have also faced extensive delays, with some vehicles delivered years behind schedule. This directly impacts the operational readiness of the armed forces and their ability to fulfill their missions.
1. Budgetary and Procurement Constraints
HapusThe MAF's modernization efforts are consistently hampered by limited defense budgets. For many years, defense spending has not been a top government priority, leading to a slow and often delayed acquisition of new assets. This has a direct impact on the military's ability to replace aging platforms and acquire advanced technology.
• Procurement Inefficiency: The process of acquiring new assets is often criticized for a lack of transparency and efficiency. There have been instances of project delays, inflated prices due to middlemen, and even non-delivery of equipment, as highlighted in public reports. This not only wastes taxpayer money but also prevents the MAF from obtaining the assets they need in a timely manner.
2. Aging and Obsolescent Equipment
A significant portion of the MAF's inventory is old and in urgent need of replacement. This is a critical weakness that affects all three branches of the military.
• Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN): Many of the RMN's ships have been in service for decades. This leads to high maintenance costs, frequent breakdowns, and reduced operational availability, which hinders their ability to effectively patrol and defend Malondesh's vast maritime territory.
• Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF): The RMAF operates an aging fleet of helicopters and fighter jets. The use of outdated aircraft not only poses safety risks to personnel but also limits their capacity to perform modern missions, such as air combat and surveillance, especially against more technologically advanced neighbors.
• Malondeshn Army (MA): While the army has seen some recent modernization, it still faces challenges with older armored vehicles and a need for more modern self-propelled artillery and surveillance systems to meet contemporary threats.
3. Limited Self-Reliance
Malondesh has a nascent defense industry and is heavily reliant on foreign suppliers for its military hardware. This dependence creates several problems:
• High Costs: Purchasing from foreign manufacturers is expensive, and without a strong domestic industry, Malondesh has limited leverage for price negotiation or technology transfer.
• Maintenance and Spares: Relying on foreign suppliers for spare parts and maintenance services can be slow and costly, further exacerbating the issue of low operational readiness for key assets.
4. Human Resources Challenges
Beyond hardware, the MAF also faces challenges in personnel management. Issues such as low morale, poor living conditions in some barracks, and difficulty in recruiting and retaining skilled personnel have been noted. These factors can affect the overall professionalism and readiness of the armed forces.
In summary, the MAF's weaknesses are intertwined: limited budgets lead to slow procurement, which results in an aging inventory. This aging equipment then drives up maintenance costs and lowers operational readiness, creating a cycle of challenges that impacts the MAF's ability to effectively protect national sovereignty and interests.
🚄 What Is the ECRL?
Hapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
😝ECRL = BRI CHINA = DEBT AND FINANCIAL CONCERNS CHINA😝
MALONDESH PUNYA PASUKAN BANGLAMARINE KONON LEBIH HEBAT DARI MARINIR 🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusGEMPURWIRA7 September 2025 pukul 14.12
BalasHapusSekadar TANK Amphibia RONGSOK SEDEKAH KOREA tak payah MEMBUAL la.... Buat MALU je... 🤣🤣🤣
============
Ciee.... cieeee..... Malondesh yang TANTRUM KEPANASAN sambil Loncat Loncat kesana kemari karena IRI DENGKI dan SAKIT HATI kepada INDONESIA yang punya KORPS MARINIR TNI AL
Fakta adalah Malondesh yang berkomentar diatas sangat berharap HIBAH POHANG Class ex-NAVY RoK - Korea Selatan
Netizen Indonesia tertawa terbahak-bahak dong
WKWKWKWK
🚄 Case Study 1: East Coast Rail Link (ECRL)
BalasHapus• Originally valued at RM65.5 billion (US$20 billion), funded by Export-Import Bank of China.
• Suspended in 2018 due to cost concerns and renegotiated in 2019 to RM44 billion.
• Although the loan terms were softened, Malondesh still bears long-term repayment obligations, with interest payments exceeding RM500 million annually.
Critics feared a debt trap, but Malondesh retained control over the project and renegotiated terms to reduce strategic risk
🧨 Case Study 2: 1MDB Scandal and Chinese Bailout Allegations
• 1Malondesh Development Berhad (1MDB) was a state investment fund launched in 2009.
• It became the center of a global corruption scandal, with over US$4.5 billion allegedly misappropriated.
• Investigative reports and whistleblower accounts suggest that Chinese state-linked firms were involved in inflated contracts and backdoor bailouts to cover 1MDB’s debts.
• Example: Two pipeline projects worth RM9.4 billion were paid upfront, but only 13% of the work was completed—raising suspicions that the funds were diverted to settle 1MDB obligations..
🏗️ Other BRI Projects with Financial Exposure
Project Estimated Value Issues Raised
Melaka Gateway Port RM43 billion Suspended; concerns over transparency
Kuantan Industrial Park RM3.5 billion Joint venture; strategic location
Pipeline Projects RM9.4 billion Linked to 1MDB bailout allegations
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
GEMPURWIRA7 September 2025 pukul 14.12
BalasHapusSekadar TANK Amphibia RONGSOK SEDEKAH KOREA tak payah MEMBUAL la.... Buat MALU je... 🤣🤣🤣
============
Ciee.... cieeee..... Malondesh yang TANTRUM KEPANASAN sambil Loncat Loncat kesana kemari karena IRI DENGKI dan SAKIT HATI kepada INDONESIA yang punya KORPS MARINIR TNI AL
Fakta adalah Malondesh yang berkomentar diatas sangat berharap HIBAH POHANG Class ex-NAVY RoK - Korea Selatan dengan janji menjadi pengikut setia K-POP
Netizen Indonesia tertawa terbahak-bahak dong
WKWKWKWK
Sekadar ada Marinir tapi GAGAL KALAHKAN pejuang OPM... Tak payah MEMBUAL la... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapus🚄 Case Study 1: East Coast Rail Link (ECRL)
Hapus• Originally valued at RM65.5 billion (US$20 billion), funded by Export-Import Bank of China.
• Suspended in 2018 due to cost concerns and renegotiated in 2019 to RM44 billion.
• Although the loan terms were softened, Malondesh still bears long-term repayment obligations, with interest payments exceeding RM500 million annually.
Critics feared a debt trap, but Malondesh retained control over the project and renegotiated terms to reduce strategic risk
🧨 Case Study 2: 1MDB Scandal and Chinese Bailout Allegations
• 1Malondesh Development Berhad (1MDB) was a state investment fund launched in 2009.
• It became the center of a global corruption scandal, with over US$4.5 billion allegedly misappropriated.
• Investigative reports and whistleblower accounts suggest that Chinese state-linked firms were involved in inflated contracts and backdoor bailouts to cover 1MDB’s debts.
• Example: Two pipeline projects worth RM9.4 billion were paid upfront, but only 13% of the work was completed—raising suspicions that the funds were diverted to settle 1MDB obligations..
🏗️ Other BRI Projects with Financial Exposure
Project Estimated Value Issues Raised
Melaka Gateway Port RM43 billion Suspended; concerns over transparency
Kuantan Industrial Park RM3.5 billion Joint venture; strategic location
Pipeline Projects RM9.4 billion Linked to 1MDB bailout allegations
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
🚄 Case Study 1: East Coast Rail Link (ECRL)
Hapus• Originally valued at RM65.5 billion (US$20 billion), funded by Export-Import Bank of China.
• Suspended in 2018 due to cost concerns and renegotiated in 2019 to RM44 billion.
• Although the loan terms were softened, Malondesh still bears long-term repayment obligations, with interest payments exceeding RM500 million annually.
Critics feared a debt trap, but Malondesh retained control over the project and renegotiated terms to reduce strategic risk
🧨 Case Study 2: 1MDB Scandal and Chinese Bailout Allegations
• 1Malondesh Development Berhad (1MDB) was a state investment fund launched in 2009.
• It became the center of a global corruption scandal, with over US$4.5 billion allegedly misappropriated.
• Investigative reports and whistleblower accounts suggest that Chinese state-linked firms were involved in inflated contracts and backdoor bailouts to cover 1MDB’s debts.
• Example: Two pipeline projects worth RM9.4 billion were paid upfront, but only 13% of the work was completed—raising suspicions that the funds were diverted to settle 1MDB obligations..
🏗️ Other BRI Projects with Financial Exposure
Project Estimated Value Issues Raised
Melaka Gateway Port RM43 billion Suspended; concerns over transparency
Kuantan Industrial Park RM3.5 billion Joint venture; strategic location
Pipeline Projects RM9.4 billion Linked to 1MDB bailout allegations
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
⚔️ Key Problems of the Malondeshn Armed Forces
Hapus________________________________________
1. Outdated Equipment → Modernization Delayed for Decades
• Air Force (RMAF):
o Retired MiG-29s in 2017 due to high costs.
o Current frontline jets: Su-30MKM (2007) and F/A-18D Hornet (1997) — small fleet, aging, and expensive to maintain.
o Still waiting for FA-50 light combat aircraft, deliveries only starting in 2026.
o Weak surveillance capability → lacks modern maritime patrol aircraft and AWACS.
• Navy (RMN):
o Many ships date from the 1980s–90s (Lekiu-class frigates, Kasturi-class corvettes).
o Only 2 Scorpène submarines, insufficient to cover Malondesh vast waters.
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal froze modernization — billions spent, no ships delivered.
• Army:
o Still operates Condor APCs from the 1980s.
o AV8 Gempita is modern but only partially deployed.
o Lacks modern long-range artillery and medium/long-range air defense systems.
Impact: The MAF has been stuck with aging platforms, while neighbors upgrade to Rafales, F-35s, Gripens, modern submarines, and frigates. Malondesh risks being outclassed in any regional confrontation.
________________________________________
2. Low Defense Budget → Insufficient for High-Tech Upgrades
• Malondesh spends only 1.0–1.5% of GDP on defense.
o Singapore spends ~3%, Vietnam ~2.3%, Thailand ~1.5%.
• Of this budget, more than half goes to salaries, pensions, and operations → leaving little for modernization.
• Modern assets (jets, ships, submarines) require long-term investment, but Malondesh often cuts or delays purchases due to economic pressures.
• Example: MRCA fighter program (to replace MiG-29s) has been delayed for over a decade.
Impact: Malondesh cannot keep pace with regional military spending. Modernization becomes piecemeal, leaving gaps in readiness and deterrence.
________________________________________
3. Maritime Security Challenges → China & Piracy Overstretch the Navy
• South China Sea (SCS):
o China’s Coast Guard and Navy frequently intrude into Malondesh EEZ, especially around Luconia Shoals.
o Malondesh has overlapping maritime claims with China, Vietnam, and the Philippines.
• Strait of Malacca:
o One of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.
o Vulnerable to piracy, smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal fishing.
• Navy Limitations:
o Small, aging fleet cannot patrol both SCS and Malacca Strait effectively.
o Relies heavily on offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) that lack strong firepower.
o Only 2 submarines → insufficient deterrent against China or other navies.
Impact: Malondesh struggles to enforce sovereignty over its waters. The Navy is stretched thin, unable to cover vast sea areas against both traditional (China) and non-traditional (piracy) threats.
________________________________________
✅ Summary / Conclusion
The Malondeshn Armed Forces face three interconnected problems:
1. Outdated Equipment: Modernization stalled for decades, leaving MAF dependent on aging jets, ships, and vehicles.
2. Low Defense Budget: Limited funding prevents the acquisition of high-tech assets, keeping Malondesh behind regional peers.
3. Maritime Security Challenges: A small, overstretched Navy struggles to protect Malondesh EEZ in the South China Sea and secure the Strait of Malacca.
📌 Conclusion: Unless Malondesh increases defense spending, reforms procurement, and accelerates modernization, the MAF risks becoming a force capable only of low-intensity domestic missions, not one prepared to defend national sovereignty against regional powers like China or match its Southeast Asian neighbors.
⚔️ Key Problems of the Malondeshn Armed Forces
Hapus________________________________________
1. Outdated Equipment → Modernization Delayed for Decades
• Air Force (RMAF):
o Retired MiG-29s in 2017 due to high costs.
o Current frontline jets: Su-30MKM (2007) and F/A-18D Hornet (1997) — small fleet, aging, and expensive to maintain.
o Still waiting for FA-50 light combat aircraft, deliveries only starting in 2026.
o Weak surveillance capability → lacks modern maritime patrol aircraft and AWACS.
• Navy (RMN):
o Many ships date from the 1980s–90s (Lekiu-class frigates, Kasturi-class corvettes).
o Only 2 Scorpène submarines, insufficient to cover Malondesh vast waters.
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal froze modernization — billions spent, no ships delivered.
• Army:
o Still operates Condor APCs from the 1980s.
o AV8 Gempita is modern but only partially deployed.
o Lacks modern long-range artillery and medium/long-range air defense systems.
Impact: The MAF has been stuck with aging platforms, while neighbors upgrade to Rafales, F-35s, Gripens, modern submarines, and frigates. Malondesh risks being outclassed in any regional confrontation.
________________________________________
2. Low Defense Budget → Insufficient for High-Tech Upgrades
• Malondesh spends only 1.0–1.5% of GDP on defense.
o Singapore spends ~3%, Vietnam ~2.3%, Thailand ~1.5%.
• Of this budget, more than half goes to salaries, pensions, and operations → leaving little for modernization.
• Modern assets (jets, ships, submarines) require long-term investment, but Malondesh often cuts or delays purchases due to economic pressures.
• Example: MRCA fighter program (to replace MiG-29s) has been delayed for over a decade.
Impact: Malondesh cannot keep pace with regional military spending. Modernization becomes piecemeal, leaving gaps in readiness and deterrence.
________________________________________
3. Maritime Security Challenges → China & Piracy Overstretch the Navy
• South China Sea (SCS):
o China’s Coast Guard and Navy frequently intrude into Malondesh EEZ, especially around Luconia Shoals.
o Malondesh has overlapping maritime claims with China, Vietnam, and the Philippines.
• Strait of Malacca:
o One of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.
o Vulnerable to piracy, smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal fishing.
• Navy Limitations:
o Small, aging fleet cannot patrol both SCS and Malacca Strait effectively.
o Relies heavily on offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) that lack strong firepower.
o Only 2 submarines → insufficient deterrent against China or other navies.
Impact: Malondesh struggles to enforce sovereignty over its waters. The Navy is stretched thin, unable to cover vast sea areas against both traditional (China) and non-traditional (piracy) threats.
________________________________________
✅ Summary / Conclusion
The Malondeshn Armed Forces face three interconnected problems:
1. Outdated Equipment: Modernization stalled for decades, leaving MAF dependent on aging jets, ships, and vehicles.
2. Low Defense Budget: Limited funding prevents the acquisition of high-tech assets, keeping Malondesh behind regional peers.
3. Maritime Security Challenges: A small, overstretched Navy struggles to protect Malondesh EEZ in the South China Sea and secure the Strait of Malacca.
📌 Conclusion: Unless Malondesh increases defense spending, reforms procurement, and accelerates modernization, the MAF risks becoming a force capable only of low-intensity domestic missions, not one prepared to defend national sovereignty against regional powers like China or match its Southeast Asian neighbors.
Dependence on Foreign Defense Suppliers
Hapus• Malondesh imports nearly all high-tech defense equipment:
o Jets from Russia, U.S., South Korea.
o Submarines & ships from France.
o Armored vehicles in partnership with Turkey.
• Spare parts and upgrades depend on foreign suppliers, making maintenance costly and vulnerable to sanctions or political disputes.
• Example: MiG-29s retired early due to lack of spare parts.
• Result: Malondesh has limited strategic autonomy in defense.
________________________________________
Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities
• Malondesh faces cyber threats from state actors, hackers, and extremist groups.
• Weaknesses:
o Limited investment in cyber defense.
o Few trained cyber specialists.
o Weak integration of cyber defense with traditional military operations.
• Rising threat of hybrid warfare (information warfare, disinformation, espionage) in South China Sea disputes.
• Result: Malondesh risks having its critical systems disrupted in a conflict.
________________________________________
Corruption & Procurement Scandals
• Defense procurement plagued by corruption and mismanagement:
o Scorpène Submarine Deal (2002): RM 500 million in commissions.
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal (2011–present): RM 9 billion spent, no ships delivered as of 2025.
• Middlemen and commissions inflate costs, reduce the number of assets purchased.
• Political interference often overrides military requirements.
• Result: Billions wasted, modernization delayed, public trust eroded.
________________________________________
Overstretch Due to Non-Traditional Roles
• MAF frequently tasked with:
o Disaster relief (floods, earthquakes).
o Border control (illegal migrants, smuggling).
o Counterterrorism (Abu Sayyaf threat in Sabah).
o Pandemic support (COVID-19 operations).
• These tasks divert focus and resources from conventional defense.
• With limited assets, balancing both traditional and non-traditional roles is difficult.
• Result: Military readiness for external threats is weakened.
________________________________________
✅ Summary
The Malondeshn Armed Forces face nine interconnected problems:
1. Outdated equipment → modernization delayed for decades.
2. Low defense budget → insufficient for high-tech upgrades.
3. Maritime security challenges → China & piracy overstretch Navy.
4. Recruitment & retention issues → talent drain in technical fields.
5. Weak inter-service integration → poor joint operations capability.
6. Dependence on foreign suppliers → costly, politically risky.
7. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities → exposed to hybrid threats.
8. Corruption & scandals → billions wasted, modernization crippled.
9. Overstretch from non-traditional roles → weak focus on external defense.
BADUT BERUK SEWA ASET MILITER =
HapusSEWA = HUTANG 84.3% DARI GDP
1. SEWA 28 HELI
2. SEWA L39 ITCC
3. SEWA EC120B
4. SEWA Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD)
5. SEWA 1 unit Sistem Simulator EC120B
6. SEWA HOVERCRAFT
7. SEWA AW139
8. SEWA Fast Interceptor Boat (FIB)
9. SEWA Utility Boat
10. SEWA Rigid Hull Fender Boat (RHFB)
11. SEWA Rover Fiber Glass (Rover)
12. SEWA MV Aishah AIM 4
13. SEWA BMW R1250RT
14. SEWA 4x4 VECHICLE
15. SEWA VSHORAD
16. SEWA TRUCK
17. SEWA HONDA CIVIC
18. SEWA PATROL BOATS
19. SEWA OUTBOARD MOTORS
20. SEWA TRAILERS
21. SEWA SUPERBIKES
22. SEWA SIMULATOR MKM
23. SEWA 12 AW149 TUDM
24. SEWA 4 AW139 TUDM
25. SEWA 5 EC120B TUDM
26. SEWA 2 AW159 TLDM
27. SEWA 4 UH-60A TDM
28. SEWA 12 AW149 TDM
29. SEWA 4 AW139 BOMBA
30. SEWA 2 AW159 MMEA
31. SEWA 7 BELL429 POLIS
32. SEWA MOTOR POLIS
===================
MALONDESH's military procurement has several weaknesses, including:
• Corruption: The defense sector is vulnerable to corruption, and there is a high risk of corruption.
• Weak parliamentary oversight: Parliamentary oversight is weak, and financial scrutiny is limited by excessive secrecy.
• External influences: Decisions are often influenced by vendors and are against strategic interests. For example, MALONDESH sometimes procures hardware in exchange for palm oil.
• Mixing and matching equipment: The MALONDESH military sources weapons systems and platforms from a large variety of foreign suppliers. This makes it difficult to find personnel to manage the equipment.
• Budgetary uncertainty: There is budgetary uncertainty in defense procurement.
• Opaque decision making: Decision making in defense procurement is opaque.
• Shifting priorities: Priorities in defense procurement shift.
• Sustainability: There are issues with sustaining logistics support during an operation.
Voting system: The voting system for contractors has issues, such as not considering the value of the jobs
==========
MALONDESH has faced several crises, including political, financial, and economic crises:
• Political crisis
From 2020–2022, MALONDESH experienced a political crisis that led to the resignation of two Prime Ministers and the collapse of two coalition governments. The crisis was caused by political infighting, party switching, and the refusal of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad to transition power to Anwar Ibrahim. The crisis ended in 2022 with a snap general election and the formation of a coalition government.
• Financial crisis
MALONDESH experienced a financial crisis when the country's economic fundamentals appeared strong, but the crisis came suddenly. The government's initial response was to increase interest rates and tighten fiscal policy, but this was not enough to correct the external imbalances.
• Economic crisis
MALONDESH's economy has faced challenges due to weak global demand and a dependence on exports. In 2020, MALONDESH's economy shrank by the most since the Asian crisis. In 2023, weak global demand for electronics and a decline in energy prices weighed on the economy.
• Household DEBT crisis
As of the end of 2023, MALONDESH's household DEBT-to-GDP ratio was 84.3%, with household DEBT reaching RM1.53 trillion
• MALONDESH has faced several rice crises in the past, including in 1973–1975, the 1980s, 1997–1998, 2008, and 2023. These crises are often caused by price hikes, which are driven by supply and demand, as well as market player behavior
\.==========
MISKIN = MARCH 2025 .....
RM1. 65 TRILLION = 84.3% OF GDP
RM1. 65 TRILLION = 84.3% OF GDP
RM1. 65 TRILLION = 84.3% OF GDP
MARCH 2025 — deputy finance minister. KUALA LUMPUR (Aug 13): Malondesh's household debt stood at RM1. 65 trillion as of end-March 2025, equivalent to 84.3% of gross domestic product (GDP) as at end-March 2025, a level that remains elevated but is balanced by strong household assets.
BADUT BERUK SEWA ASET MILITER =
HapusSEWA = HUTANG 84.3% DARI GDP
1. SEWA 28 HELI
2. SEWA L39 ITCC
3. SEWA EC120B
4. SEWA Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD)
5. SEWA 1 unit Sistem Simulator EC120B
6. SEWA HOVERCRAFT
7. SEWA AW139
8. SEWA Fast Interceptor Boat (FIB)
9. SEWA Utility Boat
10. SEWA Rigid Hull Fender Boat (RHFB)
11. SEWA Rover Fiber Glass (Rover)
12. SEWA MV Aishah AIM 4
13. SEWA BMW R1250RT
14. SEWA 4x4 VECHICLE
15. SEWA VSHORAD
16. SEWA TRUCK
17. SEWA HONDA CIVIC
18. SEWA PATROL BOATS
19. SEWA OUTBOARD MOTORS
20. SEWA TRAILERS
21. SEWA SUPERBIKES
22. SEWA SIMULATOR MKM
23. SEWA 12 AW149 TUDM
24. SEWA 4 AW139 TUDM
25. SEWA 5 EC120B TUDM
26. SEWA 2 AW159 TLDM
27. SEWA 4 UH-60A TDM
28. SEWA 12 AW149 TDM
29. SEWA 4 AW139 BOMBA
30. SEWA 2 AW159 MMEA
31. SEWA 7 BELL429 POLIS
32. SEWA MOTOR POLIS
===================
LCS 2024-2011 = 15 TAHUN
15 TAHUN MANGKRAK
15 TAHUN MANGKRAK
LCS DIPAY 6 RM 12.4 BILLION NOT YET DELIVERED = The cost of the project is now RM12.4 billion. This is because Ocean Sunshine Bhd (OSB) – the government owned company set up to take over BNS will be paying the BHIC and LTAT (the previous owner of BNS) some RM1.2 billion in liabilities and DEBT.
-----
NGPVs PAY DEBT LCS = seperti didedahkan Jawatankuasa Kira-kira Wang Negara (PAC) dan CEO LTAT, syarikat BNS menggunakan RM400 juta daripada PAYan pendahuluan bagi projek LCS untuk menjelaskan DEBT lapuk bagi projek NGPV," syarikat PSC-Naval Dockyard pada Disember 2005 sebelum dijenaMALONDESH semula menjadi syarikat Boustead Naval Dockyard Sdn Bhd
-----
17 KREDITUR = Besides MTU Services, others include Contraves Sdn Bhd, Axima Concept SA, Contraves Advanced Devices Sdn Bhd, Contraves Electrodynamics Sdn Bhd and Tyco Fire, Security & Services MALONDESH Sdn Bhd, as well as iXblue SAS, iXblue Sdn Bhd and Protank Mission Systems Sdn Bhd. Also included are Bank Pembangunan MALONDESH Bhd, AmBank Islamic Bhd, AmBank (M) Bhd, MTU Services, Affin Hwang Investment Bank Bhd, Bank Muamalat MALONDESH Bhd, Affin Bank Bhd, Bank Kerjasama Rakyat MALONDESH Bhd, Malayan Banking Bhd (Maybank) and KUWAIT FINANCE HOUSE (MALONDESH) BHD.
.==========
MISKIN = MARCH 2025 .....
RM1. 65 TRILLION = 84.3% OF GDP
RM1. 65 TRILLION = 84.3% OF GDP
RM1. 65 TRILLION = 84.3% OF GDP
MARCH 2025 — deputy finance minister. KUALA LUMPUR (Aug 13): Malondesh's household debt stood at RM1. 65 trillion as of end-March 2025, equivalent to 84.3% of gross domestic product (GDP) as at end-March 2025, a level that remains elevated but is balanced by strong household assets.
BADUT ASEAN NGEMIS =
BalasHapusNGEMIS POHANG
NGEMIS POHANG
NGEMIS POHANG
Asrizal Rusli Beli LCA F/A-50 18 buah, percuma Pohang-class 2 buah..kalau jadi kenyataan aku janji akan meminati K-Pop termasuk drama dan band-nya..aku juga akan sertai army BTS untuk melengkapkan lagi sokongan aku kepada produk Korea Selatan.
---------------
1.RASIO HUTANG 84.3% DARI GDP
2. HUTANG NEGARA RM 1,65 TRLLIUN
3. HUTANG 1MDB RM 18,2 BILLION
4. TUNGGAKAN SEWA SABAH USD 15 BILLION
5. HUTANG KERAJAAN PERSEKUTUAN 60.4%
6. SEWA SIMULATOR MKM
7. PESAWAT MIG GROUNDED
8. SEWA MOTOR POLIS
9. PESAWAT MB339CM GROUNDED
10. NURI GROUNDED SEWA BLACKHAWK
11. FIVE PROCUREMENT CANCELLED
12. 48 PESAWAT SKYHAWK HILANG
13. MESIN JET 2 BUAH HILANG
14. NO MARINIR NO AMPHIBIOUS NAVAL PLATFORM
15. NO LST
16. NO LPD – NGEMIS LPD USA
17. NO TANKER
18. NO KCR
19. MONUMEN MIG29M UNTUK JIMAT KOS
20. NO SPH
21. SUBMARINE DEFACT MEMBUNUH WANITA HAMIL
22. NO HELLFIRE
23. NO MPA ATR72 DELAYED
24. NO HIDRO-OSEANOGRAFI SEWA KAPAL HIDRO
25. NO HELI HEAVY ATTACK NGEMIS AH1Z
26. NO M3 AMPHIBIUS RIG
27. LCS MANGKRAK KARATAN
28. OPV MANGKRAK
29. TANK MOGOK STOP SPARE PARTS
30. CN 235 MSA VERSI MSI USA
31. SEWA MOTOR MILITARY POLICE
32. RADAR GIFTED PAID USA
33. 84% NO SAVING EVERY MONTH
34. SEWA VVSHORAD
35. SEWA TRUK 3 TON
36. 4X4 SEWA 6X6 CANCELLED
37. C130H DIGANTI 2045
38. TEMBAK GRANAT BOM PASUKAN SEMDIRI
39. NO DRONE UCAV – ANKA ISR OMPONG
40. SEWA BLACKHAWK SEWA AW159
41. NO TRACKED SPH
42. SEWA SIMULATOR HELI
43. SPH CANCELLED
44. SCORPION V150 CONDOR SIMBAS RETIRED
45. NO PESAWAT COIN
46. PILATUS MK II KARATAN
47. PENCEROBOHAN 43X BTA 316 HARI
48. SEWA AW139 SEWA COLIBRI
49. MRSS LMS B2 UAV ANKA HELI MENUNGGU 2026-2030
50. OPV DIBAYAR 3 JADI 1 SEWA BOAT
51. LYNX GROUNDED
52. MRCA CANCELLED SEWA PESAWAT ITTC
53. MICA CANCELLED NSM CANCELLED
54. NO LRAD NO MRAD JUST VSHORAD
55. PRANK UN PRANK TURKEY PRANK PERANCIS PRANK SLOVAKIA
56. 4X NGEMIS F18 KUWAIT
57. MENUNGGU 2050 KAPAL SELAM
58. NO TANK AMPHIBI AV8 MOGOK BERASAP
59. 84% NO SAVING EVERY MONTH
60. OVER LIMIT DEBT 65,6% (LIMIT DEBT 65%)
61. MKM BARTER PALM OIL
62. MIG29N BARTER PALM OIL
63. A400M PEMBAYARAN BERPERINGKAT (HUTANG)
64. SCORPENE BARTER PALM OIL
65. PT91M BARTER PALM OIL RUBBER
67. FA50M BARTER PALM OIL
===================
SEWA = HUTANG 84.3% DARI GDP
1. SEWA 28 HELI
2. SEWA L39 ITCC
3. SEWA EC120B
4. SEWA FLIGHT SIMULATION TRAINING DEVICE (FSTD)
5. SEWA 1 UNIT SISTEM SIMULATOR EC120B
6. SEWA HOVERCRAFT
7. SEWA AW139
8. SEWA FAST INTERCEPTOR BOAT (FIB)
9. SEWA UTILITY BOAT
10. SEWA RIGID HULL FENDER BOAT (RHFB)
11. SEWA ROVER FIBER GLASS (ROVER)
12. SEWA MV AISHAH AIM 4
13. SEWA BMW R1250RT
14. SEWA 4x4 VECHICLE
15. SEWA VSHORAD
16. SEWA TRUCK
17. SEWA HONDA CIVIC
18. SEWA PATROL BOATS
19. SEWA OUTBOARD MOTORS
20. SEWA TRAILERS
21. SEWA SUPERBIKES
22. SEWA SIMULATOR MKM
23. SEWA 12 AW149 TUDM
24. SEWA 4 AW139 TUDM
25. SEWA 5 EC120B TUDM
26. SEWA 2 AW159 TLDM
27. SEWA 4 UH-60A TDM
28. SEWA 12 AW149 TDM
29. SEWA 4 AW139 BOMBA
30. SEWA 2 AW159 MMEA
31. SEWA 7 BELL429 POLIS
32. SEWA MOTOR POLIS
BADUT ASEAN NGEMIS =
BalasHapusNGEMIS KAPAL 1967
NGEMIS KAPAL 1967
The post stated that among his achievements in the MMEA were that he was the team leader for a suitability study on absorbing the US Coast Guard cutter – USCG Decisive. Checks on the US Coast Guard website showed that Decisive– a Reliance class cutter – was laid in 1967 and commissioned in 1968
-----
NGEMIS KAPAL 1968
NGEMIS KAPAL 1968
NGEMIS KAPAL 1968
USCGC Steadfast (WMEC-623) was a United States Coast Guard medium endurance cutter in commission for 56 years. Commissioned in 1968, Steadfast was home ported in St. Petersburg, Florida for her first 24 years of service...
---------------
1.RASIO HUTANG 84.3% DARI GDP
2. HUTANG NEGARA RM 1,65 TRLLIUN
3. HUTANG 1MDB RM 18,2 BILLION
4. TUNGGAKAN SEWA SABAH USD 15 BILLION
5. HUTANG KERAJAAN PERSEKUTUAN 60.4%
6. SEWA SIMULATOR MKM
7. PESAWAT MIG GROUNDED
8. SEWA MOTOR POLIS
9. PESAWAT MB339CM GROUNDED
10. NURI GROUNDED SEWA BLACKHAWK
11. FIVE PROCUREMENT CANCELLED
12. 48 PESAWAT SKYHAWK HILANG
13. MESIN JET 2 BUAH HILANG
14. NO MARINIR NO AMPHIBIOUS NAVAL PLATFORM
15. NO LST
16. NO LPD – NGEMIS LPD USA
17. NO TANKER
18. NO KCR
19. MONUMEN MIG29M UNTUK JIMAT KOS
20. NO SPH
21. SUBMARINE DEFACT MEMBUNUH WANITA HAMIL
22. NO HELLFIRE
23. NO MPA ATR72 DELAYED
24. NO HIDRO-OSEANOGRAFI SEWA KAPAL HIDRO
25. NO HELI HEAVY ATTACK NGEMIS AH1Z
26. NO M3 AMPHIBIUS RIG
27. LCS MANGKRAK KARATAN
28. OPV MANGKRAK
29. TANK MOGOK STOP SPARE PARTS
30. CN 235 MSA VERSI MSI USA
31. SEWA MOTOR MILITARY POLICE
32. RADAR GIFTED PAID USA
33. 84% NO SAVING EVERY MONTH
34. SEWA VVSHORAD
35. SEWA TRUK 3 TON
36. 4X4 SEWA 6X6 CANCELLED
37. C130H DIGANTI 2045
38. TEMBAK GRANAT BOM PASUKAN SEMDIRI
39. NO DRONE UCAV – ANKA ISR OMPONG
40. SEWA BLACKHAWK SEWA AW159
41. NO TRACKED SPH
42. SEWA SIMULATOR HELI
43. SPH CANCELLED
44. SCORPION V150 CONDOR SIMBAS RETIRED
45. NO PESAWAT COIN
46. PILATUS MK II KARATAN
47. PENCEROBOHAN 43X BTA 316 HARI
48. SEWA AW139 SEWA COLIBRI
49. MRSS LMS B2 UAV ANKA HELI MENUNGGU 2026-2030
50. OPV DIBAYAR 3 JADI 1 SEWA BOAT
51. LYNX GROUNDED
52. MRCA CANCELLED SEWA PESAWAT ITTC
53. MICA CANCELLED NSM CANCELLED
54. NO LRAD NO MRAD JUST VSHORAD
55. PRANK UN PRANK TURKEY PRANK PERANCIS PRANK SLOVAKIA
56. 4X NGEMIS F18 KUWAIT
57. MENUNGGU 2050 KAPAL SELAM
58. NO TANK AMPHIBI AV8 MOGOK BERASAP
59. 84% NO SAVING EVERY MONTH
60. OVER LIMIT DEBT 65,6% (LIMIT DEBT 65%)
61. MKM BARTER PALM OIL
62. MIG29N BARTER PALM OIL
63. A400M PEMBAYARAN BERPERINGKAT (HUTANG)
64. SCORPENE BARTER PALM OIL
65. PT91M BARTER PALM OIL RUBBER
67. FA50M BARTER PALM OIL
===================
SEWA = HUTANG 84.3% DARI GDP
1. SEWA 28 HELI
2. SEWA L39 ITCC
3. SEWA EC120B
4. SEWA FLIGHT SIMULATION TRAINING DEVICE (FSTD)
5. SEWA 1 UNIT SISTEM SIMULATOR EC120B
6. SEWA HOVERCRAFT
7. SEWA AW139
8. SEWA FAST INTERCEPTOR BOAT (FIB)
9. SEWA UTILITY BOAT
10. SEWA RIGID HULL FENDER BOAT (RHFB)
11. SEWA ROVER FIBER GLASS (ROVER)
12. SEWA MV AISHAH AIM 4
13. SEWA BMW R1250RT
14. SEWA 4x4 VECHICLE
15. SEWA VSHORAD
16. SEWA TRUCK
17. SEWA HONDA CIVIC
18. SEWA PATROL BOATS
19. SEWA OUTBOARD MOTORS
20. SEWA TRAILERS
21. SEWA SUPERBIKES
22. SEWA SIMULATOR MKM
23. SEWA 12 AW149 TUDM
24. SEWA 4 AW139 TUDM
GEMPURWIRA7 September 2025 pukul 14.12
BalasHapusSekadar TANK Amphibia RONGSOK SEDEKAH KOREA tak payah MEMBUAL la.... Buat MALU je... 🤣🤣🤣
============
Ciee.... cieeee..... Malondesh yang TANTRUM KEPANASAN sambil Loncat Loncat kesana kemari karena IRI DENGKI dan SAKIT HATI kepada INDONESIA yang punya KORPS MARINIR TNI AL
Fakta adalah Malondesh yang berkomentar diatas sangat berharap HIBAH POHANG Class ex-NAVY RoK - Korea Selatan dengan janji menjadi pengikut setia K-POP
Netizen Indonesia tertawa terbahak-bahak dong
WKWKWKWK
https://youtu.be/JptcYh0Pw2M?si=TOWI42gF83EBAhwk
BalasHapusYa ampun.... saudaranya Malondesh dilumpuhkan oleh TNI
Lanjutkan pemburuan TERORIS OPM PAPUA!!!
BADUT BERUK SEWA ASET MILITER =
BalasHapusSEWA = HUTANG 84.3% DARI GDP
1. SEWA 28 HELI
2. SEWA L39 ITCC
3. SEWA EC120B
4. SEWA Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD)
5. SEWA 1 unit Sistem Simulator EC120B
6. SEWA HOVERCRAFT
7. SEWA AW139
8. SEWA Fast Interceptor Boat (FIB)
9. SEWA Utility Boat
10. SEWA Rigid Hull Fender Boat (RHFB)
11. SEWA Rover Fiber Glass (Rover)
12. SEWA MV Aishah AIM 4
13. SEWA BMW R1250RT
14. SEWA 4x4 VECHICLE
15. SEWA VSHORAD
16. SEWA TRUCK
17. SEWA HONDA CIVIC
18. SEWA PATROL BOATS
19. SEWA OUTBOARD MOTORS
20. SEWA TRAILERS
21. SEWA SUPERBIKES
22. SEWA SIMULATOR MKM
23. SEWA 12 AW149 TUDM
24. SEWA 4 AW139 TUDM
25. SEWA 5 EC120B TUDM
26. SEWA 2 AW159 TLDM
27. SEWA 4 UH-60A TDM
28. SEWA 12 AW149 TDM
29. SEWA 4 AW139 BOMBA
30. SEWA 2 AW159 MMEA
31. SEWA 7 BELL429 POLIS
32. SEWA MOTOR POLIS
===================
The MALONDESH Armed Forces (MAF) faces many challenges with its equipment and capabilities, including a lack of budget, an aging equipment inventory, and a lack of modern assets.
Budget
The MAF has faced budget constraints for decades, which have limited its ability to purchase new equipment and upgrade existing assets
The government has been unwilling to cut spending elsewhere to fund defense
Aging equipment
The MAF's equipment is aging, and some assets are over 50 years old
The MAF's air force lost its MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter aircraft in 2017, and is struggling to keep its Su-30MKM Flanker fighter aircraft operational
Lack of modern assets
The MAF lacks modern military assets, which exposes it to internal and external threats
The MAF has had issues with the serviceability of its assets due to a lack of budget
Outsourcing
The MAF has outsourced the maintenance of its assets, but this has led to challenges such as undertraining of staff and underperforming contractors
Procurement
The procurement process can be lengthy, which can lead to outdated pricing
The MAF has acquired advanced weapon systems from different countries, which can lead to technical and logistical problems
Maintenance: Maintaining a large fleet of aging aircraft can be costly and burdensome.
Operational capabilities: Aging assets can limit the operational capabilities of the MAF.
Budget constraints: The MAF may not have enough budget to replace aging assets.
Procurement system: The MAF's procurement system may need to be restructured to avoid political interference and excessive commissions.
Scandals: The MAF has been involved in scandals involving fighter jets, submarines, and other equipment.
Logistics: The MAF may have issues with delivering spares to soldiers in time.
===================
The MALONDESH army has several weaknesses, including:
• Limited defense budgeting: The MALONDESH government has been unwilling to fund defense by cutting other government spending or reducing the size of the armed forces.
• Outdated equipment: Most of the MALONDESH Army's equipment was purchased between the 1970s and 1990s, and the government is unable to provide modern equipment.
• Corruption: The MALONDESH military has been plagued by corruption.
• Political interference: Political leaders have interfered in procurement.
• Lack of authority: The armed forces are generally given authority to assist relevant authorities, such as the police, in dealing with non-traditional security challenges.
• Low ranking in military capability: According to the Lowy Institute Asia Power Index, MALONDESH ranks 16th in military capability in Southeast Asia.
Other challenges include:
• The need to replace the Nuri helicopter fleet, which has seen 14 crashes with many fatalities
• The need for the Navy and Maritime Enforcement Agency to patrol the country's maritime expanse to combat piracy, human trafficking, and smuggling
https://youtu.be/Ow9f3B5K9QQ?si=lmgPdZVk1e7Kqdtw
BalasHapusYa ampuuun.... saudaranya Malondesh ditembak MATI oleh TNI
Lanjutkan dan perbanyak hasil buruannya!!!
https://www.youtube.com/live/oYDshSqwd9A?si=iY2a-xIBoO168ibp
BalasHapusYa ampuuun.... saudaranya Malondesh TERORIS OPM PAPUA ditembak MATI oleh TNI
Lanjutkan terus sampai ke akar-akarnya !!!!
SEKEDAR CUMA BISA BUAT KONDOM UNISEX TA PAYAH MEMBUAL LULUSAN TOP UNIVERSITY 🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusUNIBERSITY KELAS BERUK TERNYATA 🤣🤣🤣🤣
DEBT MARCH 2025 = RM 1.65 TRILLION
BalasHapusDEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
MARCH 2025 — deputy finance minister. KUALA LUMPUR (Aug 13): Malondesh's household debt stood at RM1. 65 trillion as of end-March 2025, equivalent to 84.3% of gross domestic product (GDP) as at end-March 2025, a level that remains elevated but is balanced by strong household assets.
-
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said.
------
BNM = HOUSEHOLD DEBT IS ONE OF THE HIGHEST IN THE ASEAN ......
MALONDESH household DEBT is one of the highest in the ASEAN region. Against this backdrop, Bank Negara MALONDESH (BNM) safeguards financial stability by monitoring and regulating the lending activity of all financial institutions in MALONDESH, among other things.
===================
The MALONDESH Armed Forces (MAF) face several challenges that affect their readiness, including a lack of funding, outdated assets, and a need for more training.
Funding
• Insufficient funding
The MAF's combat readiness is affected by a lack of funding, which can impact training, techNOLogy, and morale.
• Delayed projects
The LCS project has faced delays and cost overruns, which has delayed the delivery of new equipment to the MAF.
Outdated assets
• Lack of modern assets
The MAF lacks modern military assets, which can expose them to internal and external threats.
• Technical issues
The MAF has faced technical issues with assets like the KD Rahman submarine, which was unable to submerge in 2010.
Training
• Lack of disaster relief training
While the MAF is well-trained in combat, they have not received specific training in disaster relief.
• Knowledge and skills
Problems with military personnel's knowledge, skills, and abilities can compromise their performance in complex situations.
Other challenges
===================
The MALONDESH Armed Forces (MAF) has faced problems with spare parts for a number of reasons, including:
• Outdated inventory
The MAF has had trouble keeping its older equipment operational, such as the MiG-29 fighter aircraft and the Su-30MKM ground-attack aircraft.
• Budgetary constraints
The MAF has faced funding shortages, which have limited its ability to purchase new equipment and spare parts.
• Lack of research and development
The MAF has had minimal research and development (R&D) activities, which has made it difficult to develop new equipment and spare parts.
• Imported equipment
The MAF has sourced most of its equipment from outside the country, which has made it difficult to find spare parts.
• Sanctions
Sanctions against Russia have made it difficult for MALONDESH to buy spare parts for Russian-made equipment.
Negara mau HANCUR BUBAR lagi mau menghina negara jiran... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusTOLOL GORILLA MISKIN... 🤣🤣🤣
DAFTAR PENGADAAN ALUTSISTA ON PROGRESS
Hapus2 KRI Frigate Brawijaya Class dari Italia
2 KRI Frigate Merah Putih dari PT PAL
2 KRI Frigate Istif Class dari Turkiye
1 KRI Rigel Class dari Palindo/Jerman
2 KRI Kapal Cepat Rudal dari Turkiye
1 KRI Kapal Cepat Rudal dari Tesco Bekasi
2 KS Scorpene dari Perancis & PT PAL
1 Kapal Induk Giribaldi dari Italia (Opsi)
1 Kapal LHD Helikopter dari PT PAL (Opsi)
42 Jet Tempur Rafale dari Perancis
48 Jet Tempur IFX kerjasama Korsel RI
48 Jet Tempur KHAAN dari Turkiye
6 Jet Tempur T50 dari Korsel
2 Pesawat angkut A400M dari Spanyol
13 Radar GCI dari Thales Perancis
12 Radar Retia dari Ceko
3 Baterai Rudal Balistik KHAN Turkiye
3 Baterai Rudal ADS Trisula dari Turkiye
22 Helikopter Blackhawk dari AS
12 Drone Anka dari Turkiye
60 Drone Bayraktar TB3 dari Turkiye
45 Rudal anti kapal Atmaca dari Turkiye
=============
1. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract five units C130J Hercules
2. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract two unit Frankethal class Countermine vessels (Pulau Fani class)
3. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract four units KCR 60 Fast missiles boats PT PAL
4. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 9 units Bell 412 EPI
5. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 8 additional H225 M
6. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 2 units Bell 429 Global Ranger
7. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 18 Medium weight tank Harimau
8. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 22 Pandur II IFV
9. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract two unit Hospital Ships
10. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract one unit Command and control variant C295
11. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract one unit CN235 MPA
12. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 7 Badak FSV, 26 ANOa apc and 10 additional Komodo recce vehicles in 2022
13. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 4 AS 550 Fennec and 8 AS565 MBE, in 2024
14. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract five NC212i in 2023
15. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract one Leonardo RAT 31 DL/M
16. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract five C130H ordered from Australia in 2013 (finished in 2020) after received Grant of 4 C130H
17. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 9 Teluk Bintuni class LST
18. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract six CH4B UCAV ordered in 2019
19. real contract t and process building of Abeking & Rasmussen design ocean Hydrography ship
20. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building two AH140 AAW Frigate
21. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building two OPV 90 ASW patrol vessels
22. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building 42 Dassault Rafale F4 fighter
23. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building two A400M heavy cargo aircraft
24. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract M3 Amphibious bridging system
25. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 3 KT1 Wong Bee ordered in 2018 along with radar and spares for T/A50
26. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building 13 GM 403 GCI radar from Thales
27. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building 12 ANKA S UCAV
28. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building additional CH4B UCAV
29. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Slingshot Satcom system
30. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Falcon 8X aircraft
31. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Thales Alenia earth observation satelite
32. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 22 S70M Blackhawk
33. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 6 N219 aircraft
34. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 3 CN235 for Army
35. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 2 PPA patrol Frigate
36. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 2 Scorpene Subs
37. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Khan Short Range ballistic missiles from Turki
38. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Trisula Air defense system
39. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 6 T50i aircraft
40. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Oiler and replenishment ship
41. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract several Tug Harbor ships
42. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Submarine rescue vessels and system
43. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract two Large LCU for army
44. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 45 Atmaca
45. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 48 KAAN
DAFTAR PENGADAAN ALUTSISTA ON PROGRESS
Hapus2 KRI Frigate Brawijaya Class dari Italia
2 KRI Frigate Merah Putih dari PT PAL
2 KRI Frigate Istif Class dari Turkiye
1 KRI Rigel Class dari Palindo/Jerman
2 KRI Kapal Cepat Rudal dari Turkiye
1 KRI Kapal Cepat Rudal dari Tesco Bekasi
2 KS Scorpene dari Perancis & PT PAL
1 Kapal Induk Giribaldi dari Italia (Opsi)
1 Kapal LHD Helikopter dari PT PAL (Opsi)
42 Jet Tempur Rafale dari Perancis
48 Jet Tempur IFX kerjasama Korsel RI
48 Jet Tempur KHAAN dari Turkiye
6 Jet Tempur T50 dari Korsel
2 Pesawat angkut A400M dari Spanyol
13 Radar GCI dari Thales Perancis
12 Radar Retia dari Ceko
3 Baterai Rudal Balistik KHAN Turkiye
3 Baterai Rudal ADS Trisula dari Turkiye
22 Helikopter Blackhawk dari AS
12 Drone Anka dari Turkiye
60 Drone Bayraktar TB3 dari Turkiye
45 Rudal anti kapal Atmaca dari Turkiye
=============
1. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract five units C130J Hercules
2. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract two unit Frankethal class Countermine vessels (Pulau Fani class)
3. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract four units KCR 60 Fast missiles boats PT PAL
4. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 9 units Bell 412 EPI
5. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 8 additional H225 M
6. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 2 units Bell 429 Global Ranger
7. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 18 Medium weight tank Harimau
8. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 22 Pandur II IFV
9. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract two unit Hospital Ships
10. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract one unit Command and control variant C295
11. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract one unit CN235 MPA
12. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 7 Badak FSV, 26 ANOa apc and 10 additional Komodo recce vehicles in 2022
13. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 4 AS 550 Fennec and 8 AS565 MBE, in 2024
14. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract five NC212i in 2023
15. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract one Leonardo RAT 31 DL/M
16. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract five C130H ordered from Australia in 2013 (finished in 2020) after received Grant of 4 C130H
17. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 9 Teluk Bintuni class LST
18. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract six CH4B UCAV ordered in 2019
19. real contract t and process building of Abeking & Rasmussen design ocean Hydrography ship
20. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building two AH140 AAW Frigate
21. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building two OPV 90 ASW patrol vessels
22. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building 42 Dassault Rafale F4 fighter
23. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building two A400M heavy cargo aircraft
24. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract M3 Amphibious bridging system
25. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 3 KT1 Wong Bee ordered in 2018 along with radar and spares for T/A50
26. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building 13 GM 403 GCI radar from Thales
27. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building 12 ANKA S UCAV
28. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building additional CH4B UCAV
29. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Slingshot Satcom system
30. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Falcon 8X aircraft
31. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Thales Alenia earth observation satelite
32. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 22 S70M Blackhawk
33. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 6 N219 aircraft
34. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 3 CN235 for Army
35. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 2 PPA patrol Frigate
36. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 2 Scorpene Subs
37. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Khan Short Range ballistic missiles from Turki
38. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Trisula Air defense system
39. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 6 T50i aircraft
40. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Oiler and replenishment ship
41. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract several Tug Harbor ships
42. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Submarine rescue vessels and system
43. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract two Large LCU for army
44. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 45 Atmaca
45. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 48 KAAN
DEBT MARCH 2025 = RM 1.65 TRILLION
HapusDEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
MARCH 2025 — deputy finance minister. KUALA LUMPUR (Aug 13): Malondesh's household debt stood at RM1. 65 trillion as of end-March 2025, equivalent to 84.3% of gross domestic product (GDP) as at end-March 2025, a level that remains elevated but is balanced by strong household assets.
-
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said.
------
BNM = HOUSEHOLD DEBT IS ONE OF THE HIGHEST IN THE ASEAN ......
MALONDESH household DEBT is one of the highest in the ASEAN region. Against this backdrop, Bank Negara MALONDESH (BNM) safeguards financial stability by monitoring and regulating the lending activity of all financial institutions in MALONDESH, among other things.
===================
THE MALONDESH LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) PROGRAM HAS FACED A NUMBER OF ISSUES, INCLUDING:
• Delayed delivery
The original plan was to deliver the first ship, the LCS 1 Maharaja Lela, in 2019, and all six ships by 2023. However, the program was mangkrak in 2019 due to financial issues at Boustead Naval Shipbuilding. The program was restarted in 2023, with the first ship scheduled for delivery in 2026 and the remaining four by 2029.
• Design issues
The Royal MALONDESH Navy (RMN) did not get to choose the design of the ship, and the detailed design was not completed until after 66.64% of the budget had been paid.
• Financial issues
Boustead Naval Shipbuilding was in a critical financial state, and a middleman increased the project cost by up to four times.
============
MALONDESH's combat equipment has several weaknesses, including:
Ageing equipment: The MALONDESH military's equipment is aging due to small procurement budgets over the past 25 years.
Lack of modern assets: The MALONDESH Armed Forces (MAF) lacks modern military assets, which puts them at risk from both internal and external threats.
Russian-made weapons: MALONDESH has been struggling to keep its Russian-made Su-30MKM ground-attack aircraft operational. The country is also wary of Russian-made weapons due to sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine.
Local production: The MAF is reluctant to use locally produced products. Local companies have produced prototypes of pistols and rifles, but none have materialized.
Procurement system: The MALONDESH procurement system needs reform.
Political interference and corruption: Political interference and corruption are undermining combat readiness.
=========
The MALONDESH Army's readiness is affected by a number of factors, including corruption, poor planning, and inadequate funding.
Factors affecting readiness
• Corruption: The MALONDESH military has been affected by corruption.
• Poor planning: The MALONDESH military has been affected by poor planning.
• Political interference: Political leaders have interfered in the procurement process.
• Inadequate funding: The MALONDESH military has not received adequate funding.
• Unsuitable equipment: The MALONDESH military has been affected by unsuitable equipment and weapons.
• Logistical problems: The MALONDESH military has been affected by logistical problems.
DAFTAR PENGADAAN ALUTSISTA ON PROGRESS
Hapus2 KRI Frigate Brawijaya Class dari Italia
2 KRI Frigate Merah Putih dari PT PAL
2 KRI Frigate Istif Class dari Turkiye
1 KRI Rigel Class dari Palindo/Jerman
2 KRI Kapal Cepat Rudal dari Turkiye
1 KRI Kapal Cepat Rudal dari Tesco Bekasi
2 KS Scorpene dari Perancis & PT PAL
1 Kapal Induk Giribaldi dari Italia (Opsi)
1 Kapal LHD Helikopter dari PT PAL (Opsi)
42 Jet Tempur Rafale dari Perancis
48 Jet Tempur IFX kerjasama Korsel RI
48 Jet Tempur KHAAN dari Turkiye
6 Jet Tempur T50 dari Korsel
2 Pesawat angkut A400M dari Spanyol
13 Radar GCI dari Thales Perancis
12 Radar Retia dari Ceko
3 Baterai Rudal Balistik KHAN Turkiye
3 Baterai Rudal ADS Trisula dari Turkiye
22 Helikopter Blackhawk dari AS
12 Drone Anka dari Turkiye
60 Drone Bayraktar TB3 dari Turkiye
45 Rudal anti kapal Atmaca dari Turkiye
=============
=============
SEWA 28 HELIKOPTER
The government signed an agreement with Weststar Aviation Sdn Bhd to SEWA 28 helicopters for use by ministries and other government agencies.
SEWA VVSHORAD CINA = 30 YEARS
SEWA VVSHORAD CINA = 30 YEARS
SEWA TRUK CINA 3 TON = 30 YEARS
The Madani government announced that it had struck a deal with China to SEWA 62 new train sets for KTM Bhd. The estimated cost for the deal is RM10.7 billion and it will be covered in installments over a 30-year SEWA period. The approved leasing deal for KTMB may tip the scale in favour of the truck and VVSHORAD proposals. There is also the massive leasing deals for helicopters for all the services to think about.
SEWA PESAWAT
ITTC is currently providing Fighter Lead-In Training (FLIT) to the Royal MALONDESH Air Force in London, Ontario. ITTC operates a fleet of Aero Vodochody L-39 featuring upgraded avionics for the FLIT programme
SEWA SIMULATOR MKM TAHUN
Five-year contract for Sukhoi’s simulators. Publicly listed HeiTech Padu Bhd has announced that it had been awarded a RM67 million, five-year contract to operate and maintain the Su-30MKM flight simulators at the RMAF airbase in Gong Kedak
SEWA HELI SEWA SIMULATOR
Kerajaan sebelum ini pernah menyewa Helikopter Latihan Airbus EC120B dan Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) Untuk Kegunaan Kursus Asas Juruterbang Helikopter TUDM. Selain itu, kerajaan turut pernah menyewa 5 unit Helikopter EC120B; 1 unit Sistem Simulator
SEWA HELI
4 buah Helikopter Leonardo AW 139 yang diperolehi secara SEWAan ini adalah untuk kegunaan Tentera Udara Diraja MALONDESH (TUDM) yang akan ditempatkan di NO.3 Skuadron, Pangkalan Udara Butterworth
SEWA BOAT
SEWAan Bot Op Pasir merangkumi 10 unit Fast Interceptor Boat (FIB); 10 unit Utility Boat; 10 unit Rigid Hull Fender Boat (RHFB); 10 unit Rover Fiber Glass (Rover).
SEWA HIDROGRAFI
tugas pemetaan data batimetri bagi kawasan perairan negara akan dilakukan oleh sebuah kapal hidrografi moden, MV Aishah AIM 4, yang diperoleh menerusi kontrak SEWAan dari syarikat Breitlink Engineering Services Sdn Bhd (BESSB)
SEWA MOTOR
The Royal Military Police Corp (KPTD) celebrated the SEWA of 40 brand-new BMW R1250RT Superbikes for the Enforcement Motorcycle Squad on December 22nd, 2022
SEWA PATROL BOATS : SEWA OUTBOARD MOTORS : SEWA TRAILERS
Meanwhile, the division also published a tender for eleven glass reinforced plastic patrol boats together outboard motors, trailers and associated equipment. The tender was published on February 28 and closes on March 29. The estimated cost of the tender is RM4.6 million..
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS ARMORED ASSETS
The Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF), while possessing a range of armored assets, face several challenges and limitations in their tank and armored warfare capabilities. These weaknesses can be categorized into strategic, operational, and technical areas:
________________________________________
1. Limited Number of Main Battle Tanks (MBTs)
• Inventory: Malondesh operates around 48 PT-91M Pendekar tanks, which are modernized Polish versions of the Soviet T-72.
• Weakness: This number is small by regional standards, limiting Malondesh’s ability to deploy heavy armor across multiple fronts or sustain prolonged high-intensity operations.
________________________________________
2. Aging Platforms and Modernization Issues
• The PT-91M, while upgraded, is based on an older Soviet-era design (T-72). It lacks some of the survivability and firepower features found in newer MBTs like the Leopard 2A7 or K2 Black Panther.
• Upgrades: Modernization has been slow, and budget constraints have hampered efforts to acquire more advanced armor.
________________________________________
3. Lack of Indigenous Tank Production
• Malondesh relies on foreign suppliers (notably Poland and previously Russia) for tanks and spare parts, which can pose logistical and geopolitical vulnerabilities.
• Indigenous development is mostly limited to light armored vehicles and support platforms.
________________________________________
4. Limited Combined Arms Capability
• The integration of tanks with mechanized infantry, artillery, and air support is not as well developed as in more advanced militaries.
• Training and joint operations involving armor are less frequent, affecting real combat readiness.
________________________________________
5. Terrain Limitations
• Much of Malondesh’s terrain (jungle, swamp, mountains) is not favorable to tank operations, which limits the strategic value of tanks.
• Tanks can be vulnerable to ambushes in such environments, particularly from well-equipped irregular forces.
________________________________________
6. Logistical Constraints
• Supporting MBTs in Malondesh’s tropical, humid climate requires robust logistics, including maintenance, spare parts, and fuel. This poses a strain during prolonged deployments or in remote areas.
________________________________________
7. Budgetary Constraints
• Defense spending is relatively low, hovering around 1–1.5% of GDP.
• Competing national priorities have limited Malondesh's ability to expand or upgrade its armored force substantially.
________________________________________
8. No Active Anti-Tank Doctrine or Systems
• Malondesh lacks a robust network of modern anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) or active protection systems (APS) for its tanks, making them vulnerable to modern threats like drones, ATGMs, and loitering munitions.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS ARMORED ASSETS
The Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF), while possessing a range of armored assets, face several challenges and limitations in their tank and armored warfare capabilities. These weaknesses can be categorized into strategic, operational, and technical areas:
________________________________________
1. Limited Number of Main Battle Tanks (MBTs)
• Inventory: Malondesh operates around 48 PT-91M Pendekar tanks, which are modernized Polish versions of the Soviet T-72.
• Weakness: This number is small by regional standards, limiting Malondesh’s ability to deploy heavy armor across multiple fronts or sustain prolonged high-intensity operations.
________________________________________
2. Aging Platforms and Modernization Issues
• The PT-91M, while upgraded, is based on an older Soviet-era design (T-72). It lacks some of the survivability and firepower features found in newer MBTs like the Leopard 2A7 or K2 Black Panther.
• Upgrades: Modernization has been slow, and budget constraints have hampered efforts to acquire more advanced armor.
________________________________________
3. Lack of Indigenous Tank Production
• Malondesh relies on foreign suppliers (notably Poland and previously Russia) for tanks and spare parts, which can pose logistical and geopolitical vulnerabilities.
• Indigenous development is mostly limited to light armored vehicles and support platforms.
________________________________________
4. Limited Combined Arms Capability
• The integration of tanks with mechanized infantry, artillery, and air support is not as well developed as in more advanced militaries.
• Training and joint operations involving armor are less frequent, affecting real combat readiness.
________________________________________
5. Terrain Limitations
• Much of Malondesh’s terrain (jungle, swamp, mountains) is not favorable to tank operations, which limits the strategic value of tanks.
• Tanks can be vulnerable to ambushes in such environments, particularly from well-equipped irregular forces.
________________________________________
6. Logistical Constraints
• Supporting MBTs in Malondesh’s tropical, humid climate requires robust logistics, including maintenance, spare parts, and fuel. This poses a strain during prolonged deployments or in remote areas.
________________________________________
7. Budgetary Constraints
• Defense spending is relatively low, hovering around 1–1.5% of GDP.
• Competing national priorities have limited Malondesh's ability to expand or upgrade its armored force substantially.
________________________________________
8. No Active Anti-Tank Doctrine or Systems
• Malondesh lacks a robust network of modern anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) or active protection systems (APS) for its tanks, making them vulnerable to modern threats like drones, ATGMs, and loitering munitions.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS VESSELS
Here are the key weaknesses of Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN) vessels and procurement efforts, based on recent audits, expert commentary, and community insights:
________________________________________
Structural & Material Weaknesses
1. Aging fleet & hull fragility
Roughly half of RMN’s fleet comprises vessels over 30 years old, many operating beyond their designed service life
A stark example: KD Pendekar, a Handalan-class fast-attack craft commissioned in 1979, hit an underwater object and sank in August 2024. Its ageing, weakened hull allowed flooding to rapidly spread, overwhelming compartmentalization systems
2. Underarmed patrol vessels
The Kedah-class Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) are configured as “fitted for but not with” missile systems—so despite structural readiness, they lack the actual armament due to budget constraints.
________________________________________
Procurement & Shipbuilding Issues
1. Systemic delays & cost overruns
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project, intended to deliver six Maharaja Lela-class frigates, has suffered severe delays—initial delivery in 2019 was missed, with realistic commissioning now pushed to 2026–2029.
Costs have ballooned from an estimated RM 9 billion to over RM 11 billion, with about RM 1.4 billion alleged to have been misappropriated
2. Limited shipyard capability
Malondeshn yards (e.g., Boustead Naval Shipyard and PSC-Naval Dockyard) have a history of subpar management, poor governance, and lack of scale—producing very few large combatants over decades
________________________________________
Broader Capability & Strategic Gaps
1. Underfunded modernization
Defence spending has consistently stayed well below regional benchmarks (e.g., under 1 % of GDP), with procurement systems marred by political influence and weak oversight
2. Limited deterrent posture
With only a handful of capable frigates and corvettes, and too many lightly outfitted patrol boats, RMN's fleet lacks power projection over its vast EEZ (~600,000 km²)—especially along strategic chokepoints like the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
3. Small submarine & amphibious support capacity
RMN’s submarine force is limited to just two Scorpène-class boats, reducing tactical depth compared to neighbors like Vietnam. Plans for a Multi-Role Support Ship (MRSS) to improve amphibious and sealift capability remain pending or delayed
________________________________________
Snapshot: RMN Weaknesses Overview
Aging fleet = Many vessels >30 years old; hull degradation
Undeveloped armament = OPVs lack missiles; fast craft under armed
Procurement delays = LCS frigates behind schedule, cost escalations
Industrial limitations = Shipyards lack scale, enduring reputation of poor quality
Underfunding = Low defense budget, systemic corruption, lack of transparency
Strategic shortfall = Small submarine fleet; gap in amphibious and logistic support vessels
MISKIN...... 🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusIndonesia Terima Hibah 10 Unit Tank Amphibi dari Korea Selatan
http://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2009/11/indonesia-terima-hibah-10-unit-tank.html?m=1
DAFTAR PENGADAAN ALUTSISTA ON PROGRESS
Hapus2 KRI Frigate Brawijaya Class dari Italia
2 KRI Frigate Merah Putih dari PT PAL
2 KRI Frigate Istif Class dari Turkiye
1 KRI Rigel Class dari Palindo/Jerman
2 KRI Kapal Cepat Rudal dari Turkiye
1 KRI Kapal Cepat Rudal dari Tesco Bekasi
2 KS Scorpene dari Perancis & PT PAL
1 Kapal Induk Giribaldi dari Italia (Opsi)
1 Kapal LHD Helikopter dari PT PAL (Opsi)
42 Jet Tempur Rafale dari Perancis
48 Jet Tempur IFX kerjasama Korsel RI
48 Jet Tempur KHAAN dari Turkiye
6 Jet Tempur T50 dari Korsel
2 Pesawat angkut A400M dari Spanyol
13 Radar GCI dari Thales Perancis
12 Radar Retia dari Ceko
3 Baterai Rudal Balistik KHAN Turkiye
3 Baterai Rudal ADS Trisula dari Turkiye
22 Helikopter Blackhawk dari AS
12 Drone Anka dari Turkiye
60 Drone Bayraktar TB3 dari Turkiye
45 Rudal anti kapal Atmaca dari Turkiye
=============
1. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract five units C130J Hercules
2. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract two unit Frankethal class Countermine vessels (Pulau Fani class)
3. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract four units KCR 60 Fast missiles boats PT PAL
4. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 9 units Bell 412 EPI
5. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 8 additional H225 M
6. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 2 units Bell 429 Global Ranger
7. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 18 Medium weight tank Harimau
8. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 22 Pandur II IFV
9. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract two unit Hospital Ships
10. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract one unit Command and control variant C295
11. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract one unit CN235 MPA
12. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 7 Badak FSV, 26 ANOa apc and 10 additional Komodo recce vehicles in 2022
13. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 4 AS 550 Fennec and 8 AS565 MBE, in 2024
14. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract five NC212i in 2023
15. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract one Leonardo RAT 31 DL/M
16. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract five C130H ordered from Australia in 2013 (finished in 2020) after received Grant of 4 C130H
17. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 9 Teluk Bintuni class LST
18. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract six CH4B UCAV ordered in 2019
19. real contract t and process building of Abeking & Rasmussen design ocean Hydrography ship
20. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building two AH140 AAW Frigate
21. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building two OPV 90 ASW patrol vessels
22. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building 42 Dassault Rafale F4 fighter
23. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building two A400M heavy cargo aircraft
24. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract M3 Amphibious bridging system
25. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 3 KT1 Wong Bee ordered in 2018 along with radar and spares for T/A50
26. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building 13 GM 403 GCI radar from Thales
27. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building 12 ANKA S UCAV
28. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building additional CH4B UCAV
29. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Slingshot Satcom system
30. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Falcon 8X aircraft
31. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Thales Alenia earth observation satelite
32. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 22 S70M Blackhawk
33. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 6 N219 aircraft
34. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 3 CN235 for Army
35. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 2 PPA patrol Frigate
36. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 2 Scorpene Subs
37. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Khan Short Range ballistic missiles from Turki
38. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Trisula Air defense system
39. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 6 T50i aircraft
40. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Oiler and replenishment ship
41. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract several Tug Harbor ships
42. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Submarine rescue vessels and system
43. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract two Large LCU for army
44. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 45 Atmaca
45. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 48 KAAN
SEWA = HUTANG 84.3% DARI GDP
Hapus1. SEWA 28 HELI
2. SEWA L39 ITCC
3. SEWA EC120B
4. SEWA Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD)
5. SEWA 1 unit Sistem Simulator EC120B
6. SEWA HOVERCRAFT
7. SEWA AW139
8. SEWA Fast Interceptor Boat (FIB)
9. SEWA Utility Boat
10. SEWA Rigid Hull Fender Boat (RHFB)
11. SEWA Rover Fiber Glass (Rover)
12. SEWA MV Aishah AIM 4
13. SEWA BMW R1250RT
14. SEWA 4x4 VECHICLE
15. SEWA VSHORAD
16. SEWA TRUCK
17. SEWA HONDA CIVIC
18. SEWA PATROL BOATS
19. SEWA OUTBOARD MOTORS
20. SEWA TRAILERS
21. SEWA SUPERBIKES
22. SEWA SIMULATOR MKM
23. SEWA 12 AW149 TUDM
24. SEWA 4 AW139 TUDM
25. SEWA 5 EC120B TUDM
26. SEWA 2 AW159 TLDM
27. SEWA 4 UH-60A TDM
28. SEWA 12 AW149 TDM
29. SEWA 4 AW139 BOMBA
30. SEWA 2 AW159 MMEA
31. SEWA 7 BELL429 POLIS
32. SEWA MOTOR POLIS
=============
=============
1. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract five units C130J Hercules
2. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract two unit Frankethal class Countermine vessels (Pulau Fani class)
3. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract four units KCR 60 Fast missiles boats PT PAL
4. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 9 units Bell 412 EPI
5. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 8 additional H225 M
6. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 2 units Bell 429 Global Ranger
7. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 18 Medium weight tank Harimau
8. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 22 Pandur II IFV
9. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract two unit Hospital Ships
10. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract one unit Command and control variant C295
11. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract one unit CN235 MPA
12. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 7 Badak FSV, 26 ANOa apc and 10 additional Komodo recce vehicles in 2022
13. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 4 AS 550 Fennec and 8 AS565 MBE, in 2024
14. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract five NC212i in 2023
15. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract one Leonardo RAT 31 DL/M
16. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract five C130H ordered from Australia in 2013 (finished in 2020) after received Grant of 4 C130H
17. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 9 Teluk Bintuni class LST
18. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract six CH4B UCAV ordered in 2019
19. real contract t and process building of Abeking & Rasmussen design ocean Hydrography ship
20. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building two AH140 AAW Frigate
21. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building two OPV 90 ASW patrol vessels
22. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building 42 Dassault Rafale F4 fighter
23. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building two A400M heavy cargo aircraft
24. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract M3 Amphibious bridging system
25. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 3 KT1 Wong Bee ordered in 2018 along with radar and spares for T/A50
26. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building 13 GM 403 GCI radar from Thales
27. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building 12 ANKA S UCAV
28. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract building additional CH4B UCAV
29. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Slingshot Satcom system
30. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Falcon 8X aircraft
31. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Thales Alenia earth observation satelite
32. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 22 S70M Blackhawk
33. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 6 N219 aircraft
34. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 3 CN235 for Army
35. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 2 PPA patrol Frigate
36. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 2 Scorpene Subs
37. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Khan Short Range ballistic missiles from Turki
38. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Trisula Air defense system
39. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 6 T50i aircraft
40. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Oiler and replenishment ship
41. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract several Tug Harbor ships
42. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract Submarine rescue vessels and system
43. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract two Large LCU for army
44. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 45 Atmaca
45. BERUK KLAIM GHOIB = real contract 48 KAAN
DAFTAR PENGADAAN ALUTSISTA ON PROGRESS
Hapus2 KRI Frigate Brawijaya Class dari Italia
2 KRI Frigate Merah Putih dari PT PAL
2 KRI Frigate Istif Class dari Turkiye
1 KRI Rigel Class dari Palindo/Jerman
2 KRI Kapal Cepat Rudal dari Turkiye
1 KRI Kapal Cepat Rudal dari Tesco Bekasi
2 KS Scorpene dari Perancis & PT PAL
1 Kapal Induk Giribaldi dari Italia (Opsi)
1 Kapal LHD Helikopter dari PT PAL (Opsi)
42 Jet Tempur Rafale dari Perancis
48 Jet Tempur IFX kerjasama Korsel RI
48 Jet Tempur KHAAN dari Turkiye
6 Jet Tempur T50 dari Korsel
2 Pesawat angkut A400M dari Spanyol
13 Radar GCI dari Thales Perancis
12 Radar Retia dari Ceko
3 Baterai Rudal Balistik KHAN Turkiye
3 Baterai Rudal ADS Trisula dari Turkiye
22 Helikopter Blackhawk dari AS
12 Drone Anka dari Turkiye
60 Drone Bayraktar TB3 dari Turkiye
45 Rudal anti kapal Atmaca dari Turkiye
----------------
GDP INDONESIA 2024 X 1.5% = BUDGET DEFENSE
USD 1492 BILLION X 0.015 = USD 22 BILLION
USD 1492 BILLION X 0.015 = USD 22 BILLION
USD 1492 BILLION X 0.015 = USD 22 BILLION
Indonesia's Ministry of Defense aims to gradually increase the defense budget from 0.8 percent to 1.5 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) to enhance defense capabilities
=============
=============
MISKIN = MARCH 2025 .....
RM1. 65 TRILLION = 84.3% OF GDP
RM1. 65 TRILLION = 84.3% OF GDP
RM1. 65 TRILLION = 84.3% OF GDP
MARCH 2025 — deputy finance minister. KUALA LUMPUR (Aug 13): Malondesh's household debt stood at RM1. 65 trillion as of end-March 2025, equivalent to 84.3% of gross domestic product (GDP) as at end-March 2025, a level that remains elevated but is balanced by strong household assets.
----------------
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = RM 1.65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said.
----------------
2025 $1.3 BILLION MINDEF =
MAINTENANCE
REPAIRS
ASSETS.
(SEWA, SEWA AND SEWA)
In 2025, MALONDESH Ministry of Defense (MINDEF) was allocated $4.8 billion to protect the country's sovereignty.
This budget included $1.3 billion for maintenance, repairs, and new military assets...
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS LMS B1
WEAKNESS LMS B2
Here are some of the key weaknesses and limitations associated with the LMS Batch 2 (LMSB2) vessels of the Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN), as they relate to their design, acquisition, and operational capability:
________________________________________
Background: LMS Batch 1 Issues
The previous Batch 1 Keris class LMS ships, built in China and commissioned between 2020–2022, encountered significant problems:
• Combat system and sensor deficiencies: Chinese supplied subsystems—radar, electro optical trackers, ESM, combat management systems—underperformed during operational use
• Under armed and limited combat roles: Armed only with a 30 mm cannon and twin heavy machine guns, offering minimal surface or air defense capability
• Poor seakeeping and small size: At ~68 m, they had low endurance and were not seaworthy enough in bad weather
• Reliability concerns: The navy expressed dissatisfaction with the quality and dependability of these vessels
These issues prompted a shift in LMSB2 specifications toward larger, more capable corvettes.
________________________________________
LMS Batch 2: Emerging Weaknesses
1. Lack of Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) Capability
Despite being based on the Turkish Ada class corvette, LMSB2 reportedly will not include sonar or torpedoes, effectively removing ASW capability from its operational profile
2. Compromise on Combat Capability to Cut Costs
Sources suggest LMSB2 is likely a "cheaper variant"—selecting less advanced sensors and weapons to lower system costs. This economic trade off could impact future upgradeability and mission effectiveness
3. Still Limited Weapon Loadout (Compared to Full Corvette)
While new specs include a 57 mm gun, anti ship missiles, twin 30 mm systems, and potential air defense missiles, LMSB2 lacks full three dimensional warfare capability or ASW sensors—meaning it still falls short of high intensity combat expectations
4. Larger Size May Undermine Littoral Agility
Batch 2 vessels will be around 95 m and ~2,000–2,500 t, significantly larger than Batch 1, which can affect maneuverability in confined littoral zones and carry higher operating costs. Critics argue these should be categorized as OPVs rather than "mission specific LMS"
5. Fleet Maintenance Complexity
Selecting foreign designs (Ada, Sigma, FCX, C92, HDC 2000) may increase heterogeneity of fleet platforms—creating logistical and training challenges and defeating ambitions of fleet standardization under the 15 to 5 transformation plan
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS MISSILES ASSETS
Missiles are a critical part of modern military capability, and the Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF) have invested in a variety of missile systems across their army, navy, and air force. However, there are some notable weaknesses and limitations in Malondesh's missile capabilities when compared to regional powers like China, Singapore, or even Vietnam.
Key Weaknesses in Malondeshn Missile Capabilities:
1. Limited Indigenous Missile Development
• Malondesh relies heavily on foreign suppliers (e.g., Russia, China, France, and the U.S.) for its missile systems.
• This makes the country vulnerable to supply chain disruptions, technology embargoes, or political shifts.
2. Short to Medium Range Focus
• Most of Malondesh’s missile systems are short- to medium-range, such as:
o Exocet MM40 Block 2/3 (anti-ship)
o Starstreak (short-range air defense)
o Jernas (Rapier) (short-range air defense)
o Seawolf (naval short-range SAM, older generation)
• There is no long-range missile deterrence, either in the form of:
o Ballistic Missiles
o Cruise Missiles with strategic reach
o Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)
3. Limited Air Defense Coverage
• The Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF) lacks a layered and integrated air defense network.
• No medium- or long-range SAM systems like:
o S-300/S-400 (Russia)
o Patriot (USA)
o Aster 30 (Europe)
• Vulnerable to saturation missile or drone attacks.
4. Naval Missile Gaps
• Some Malondeshn Navy ships still operate with older missile systems or have missile slots not fully equipped.
• Ships like the Laksamana-class corvettes are aging and face missile system obsolescence.
• Lack of vertical launch system (VLS) on many platforms limits multi-role missile capabilities.
5. No Strategic Missile Deterrent
• Unlike some neighbors, Malondesh does not possess:
o Land-attack cruise missiles (LACM)
o Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) missiles
o Submarine-launched missiles
• This limits Malondesh’s ability to deter or respond to strategic threats beyond its immediate borders.
6. Dependence on Multinational Exercises and Alliances
• While Malondesh participates in exercises like CARAT, RIMPAC, and FPDA, its missile doctrine is still defensive and reactive, not designed for power projection.
MISKIN = MARCH 2025 .....
BalasHapusRM1. 65 TRILLION = 84.3% OF GDP
RM1. 65 TRILLION = 84.3% OF GDP
RM1. 65 TRILLION = 84.3% OF GDP
MARCH 2025 — deputy finance minister. KUALA LUMPUR (Aug 13): Malondesh's household debt stood at RM1. 65 trillion as of end-March 2025, equivalent to 84.3% of gross domestic product (GDP) as at end-March 2025, a level that remains elevated but is balanced by strong household assets.
32. SEWA MOTOR POLIS
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CORRUPTION MILITARY PROCUREMENT
Here’s a summary of the most notable corruption scandals involving Malondesh’s military procurement programs over the past four decades:
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1. Scorpène Submarine Deal (2002)
• Malondesh contracted with DCNS/Naval Group (France) and Navantia (Spain) to acquire two Scorpène submarines and one used Agosta-class submarine for approximately €1 billion
• Commission payments totaled at least €114 million to Perimekar (a firm tied to Abdul Razak Baginda) and another €30 million reportedly paid directly to Baginda
• The scandal became globally notorious after the murder of translator Altantuyaa Shaaribuu, who had demanded a commission and was allegedly killed by police linked to then Defence Minister Najib Razak’s entourage
• French prosecutors later charged DCNS, Thales executives, and Baginda with corruption-related offences
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2. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Project – RM9 billion contract (initiated 2011/2013)
• In 2011, the Defence Ministry awarded a RM9 billion contract through direct negotiations, bypassing the Navy’s preferred Sigma-class design and opting instead for the French Gowind design—a move linked to political influence by former Acting Defence Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi
• By 2022, RM6.08 billion (≈67%) had been paid, yet not a single ship was ready for delivery
• The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) audit exposed RM1.4 billion in cost overruns, mismanagement, flawed contract terms, and obsolete inventory write-offs & budget misuse
• Former naval chief and Boustead managing director Ahmad Ramli Mohd Nor was charged with three counts of criminal breach of trust for approving RM21 million in unauthorized payments to third parties, though in March 2025 he was deemed medically unfit to stand trial, resulting in a discharge not amounting to acquittal
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3. Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) / New Generation Patrol Vessels (NGPV)
• A 1998 contract to build six OPVs was awarded to PSC Naval Dockyard, a politically connected company. The deal, expected by 2006, suffered severe delays and overpayments. The ministry paid RM4.26 billion, though only RM2.87 billion worth of work was completed—nearly 48% overpayment
• By 2007 the project cost ballooned to RM6.75 billion. The company defaulted on payments to subcontractors and obligations such as EPF contributions. The scandal led to its takeover by Boustead Heavy Industries.
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4. MD530G Light Combat Helicopter Deal (approx. RM321 million, 2015)
• In 2015, Malondesh ordered six MD530G lightweight helicopters. Delivery was delayed for years. Despite a probe by the Malondeshn Anti Corruption Commission (MACC), the Attorney General’s Chamber declined to prosecute
• Law Minister Wan Junaidi confirmed that no action would be taken, even though significant funds had changed hands without resolution
________________________________________
5. SIBMAS Armoured Vehicle Tender Controversy (1980s)
• In 1981 Malondesh acquired 186 SIBMAS vehicles. Allegations surfaced that the tender specifications were tailored to favor SIBMAS, forcing a later re tender after national investigations.
• The vehicles did not meet performance expectations and were criticized for poor value over time
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
==============
WEAKNESS SHIPYARDS
Malondeshn shipyards—especially Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS) and its predecessors—have faced notable challenges in building naval vessels for the Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN). Here's an overview of key weaknesses:
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Major Weaknesses in Malondeshn Naval Shipbuilding
1. Persistent Delays & Cost Overruns
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, contracted in 2013 for six modern frigates (Maharaja Lela-class), has seen zero completed ships by mid-2025, despite RM 6.08 billion paid. The initial first delivery target of 2019 is now postponed to 2026, and the total cost is projected to rise from RM 9 billion to over RM 11 billion
2. Financial Mismanagement & Irregularities
• A forensic audit revealed about RM 1 billion unaccounted for, with RM 1.7 billion worth of equipment, 15% of which had already become obsolete, looted funds, and contracts with inflated intermediaries
• Former BHIC Managing Director was charged with criminal breach of trust for misappropriating RM 13m+ contracts without board approval
3. Engineering & Quality Shortcomings
• Ship quality issues have surfaced, including substandard fabrication, technical flaws in design (e.g., hull or gear issues), outdated materials, and poor workmanship leading to extensive reworks and cost escalation
• As noted:
“Local shipyards have poor record building big ships… BNS… only had contract to build 12 warships in its existence.… learning is one thing, tolerating ‘still learning’ after 20 plus years is not good enough.”
4. Limited Industrial Capacity & Small Tonnage
• Malondeshn yards generally lack the capacity for large, complex vessels. Their history of constructing small patrol craft, OSVs, or leisure ships limits scalability and technical maturity needed for modern warships
• The tonnage of ships built remains very low compared to regional peers like Indonesia or Singapore
5. Supply Chain & Workforce Constraints
• Disruptions due to COVID-19 and global events have caused delays in materials and skilled labor shortages, exacerbating schedule slippage and quality issues
• The workforce is aging with few young recruits entering shipbuilding trades, contributing to resource gaps in the industry
6. Poor Governance & Procurement Oversight
• Formal RMN input was sidelined in choosing ship designs—initial preference for the Sigma design was overridden by ministry decisions to adopt the Gowind design without proper consultation, undermining project alignment
• Contracts were awarded via direct negotiation, not open tender, creating space for opaque decision-making and vendor favoritism
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Public & Industry Sentiment
• Reddit commentary captures public frustration:
“After RM 6 billion spent, BNS missed the 2019 deadline... none of the vessels has progressed beyond the 50 percent mark.”
“The ship is already rusting, with sign of abandonment…”