Myanmar Air Force Shaanxi Y-8 (photo: Wiki)
SIPRI kembali mengeluarkan laporan mengenai transfer persenjataan dunia, berikut disampaikan data order dan pengiriman persenjataan selama kurun waktu 2025.
Untuk negara Myanmar, order dan pengiriman persenjataan serta ekspor selama tahun 2025 adalah sebagai berikut ini.
(SIPRI)
Mantap ada isi myanmar haha!👍👍👍
BalasHapusSipti TIM ELIT Selaluw ada isi,
BalasHapussedangkan SIPRI geng pembual kl, KOSONK Lagiiiii haha!🤥🤣🤥
SIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
BalasHapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________
1. Inefficient and Opaque Procurement
The most significant problem facing the Malaydesh military is its procurement system. It's often criticized for a lack of transparency and a reliance on middlemen or agents, which leads to inflated prices and projects that fail to meet the military's actual needs.
• Cost Overruns and Delays: Projects, most notably the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, have been plagued by severe delays and massive cost overruns. None of the six ships have been delivered, despite significant payments. This has left the Royal Malaydesh Navy (RMN) with an aging fleet, as many of its vessels are over 40 years old.
• "Middlemen" and Corruption: King Sultan Ibrahim has publicly criticized the involvement of agents and salesmen in defense deals, stating that these practices lead to "unreasonable" prices and purchases that don't fit the military's needs. This has raised concerns about corruption and inefficiency within the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF).
________________________________________
2. An Aging Fleet and Logistical Challenges
The Malaydesh Armed Forces (MAF) operates a mixed fleet of military assets from a wide range of international suppliers. This lack of standardization creates a logistical nightmare.
• Fragmentation of Supply Chains: The military has equipment from various countries, including Russia, the United States, Poland, and China. Each platform requires different spare parts, tools, and maintenance expertise.
• Low Operational Readiness: Many of the Navy's vessels and Air Force's combat jets are well past their service life, leading to higher maintenance costs and a lower operational readiness rate.
• Reliance on Foreign Support: Due to a lack of local expertise, Malaydesh is highly dependent on foreign suppliers for critical maintenance and spare parts, making the military vulnerable to supply chain disruptions, such as international sanctions.
________________________________________
3. Capability Gaps and Lack of Specialization
The MAF has key capability gaps in crucial areas due to its historical focus on counter-insurgency and a lack of a unified doctrine.
• No Dedicated Marine Corps: Malaydesh lacks a dedicated Marine Corps. Its amphibious capabilities are fragmented and distributed between the Army and Navy. This creates coordination problems and limits the ability to rapidly project power and respond to maritime threats, a significant vulnerability for an archipelagic nation.
• Limited Tank Fleet: The Army's tank force is limited to approximately 48 PT-91M Pendekar tanks. This small number restricts their strategic deployment and makes them less effective in a large-scale land conflict compared to neighbors with larger tank fleets.
• COIN Aircraft Gap: The Air Force lacks a dedicated fleet of Counter-Insurgency (COIN) aircraft. It's forced to use expensive multi-role fighter jets for low-intensity conflicts, which is inefficient. While a new batch of FA-50M light combat aircraft is on order, deliveries are not expected for several years.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
BalasHapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________
THE MALAYDESH MILITARY HAS A SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY GAP IN ITS COUNTER-INSURGENCY (COIN) AIRCRAFT FLEET, PRIMARILY DUE TO THE AGING AND LIMITED NUMBER OF LIGHT COMBAT AND SURVEILLANCE PLATFORMS SUITABLE FOR THIS TYPE OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE.
1. Lack of Dedicated COIN Aircraft
Unlike a dedicated air force built for large-scale conventional warfare, a successful COIN force requires aircraft optimized for a unique set of missions:
• Low and Slow: COIN operations often occur in dense jungle or urban environments where fast jets are ineffective. They require aircraft that can fly low and slow to provide close air support and accurate surveillance.
• Persistent Presence: COIN aircraft must be able to loiter for extended periods to track insurgents and provide sustained support to ground troops.
• Cost-Effectiveness: Using expensive, high-performance fighter jets like the Su-30MKM for COIN missions is a significant waste of resources.
The Royal Malaydesh Air Force (RMAF) lacks a dedicated fleet of such aircraft. Its existing fleet is more suited for air defense and conventional warfare, creating a mismatch between its capabilities and the specific demands of counter-insurgency.
________________________________________
2. Aging Fleet and Reliance on Other Assets
The RMAF's current inventory is not well-suited for the COIN role, forcing it to rely on a mix of aging platforms and less-than-ideal helicopters.
• Retired Aircraft: The RMAF has retired dedicated COIN aircraft like the Canadair CT-114 Tutor. This leaves a major gap that has not been adequately filled.
• Helicopter Gaps: While the Army operates light attack helicopters like the MD530G, these are limited in their range, endurance, and payload. This places a heavy burden on a small fleet to support ground forces over vast and often difficult terrain.
________________________________________
3. Delays in New Acquisitions
Malaydesh is actively trying to address this gap, but procurement has been slow and challenging.
• FA-50M Purchase: The RMAF is acquiring 18 FA-50M light combat aircraft from Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI). These jets are intended to fulfill both a fighter lead-in trainer role and a light combat role. However, deliveries are not expected to begin until 2026. This leaves the RMAF with a capability gap in the interim.
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): Malaydesh has made some progress in acquiring drones for surveillance, but these still do not fully replace the role of a manned COIN aircraft, which can provide more direct and immediate fire support.
Myanmar lebih hebat dari malasya
BalasHapusPsssttttt..... negara INDIANESIA SIPRInya hanya SELEMBAR guys.....HAHAHAHHAHA
BalasHapusSIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________
THE MALAYDESH MILITARY HAS A SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY GAP IN ITS COUNTER-INSURGENCY (COIN) AIRCRAFT FLEET, PRIMARILY DUE TO THE AGING AND LIMITED NUMBER OF LIGHT COMBAT AND SURVEILLANCE PLATFORMS SUITABLE FOR THIS TYPE OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE.
1. Lack of Dedicated COIN Aircraft
Unlike a dedicated air force built for large-scale conventional warfare, a successful COIN force requires aircraft optimized for a unique set of missions:
• Low and Slow: COIN operations often occur in dense jungle or urban environments where fast jets are ineffective. They require aircraft that can fly low and slow to provide close air support and accurate surveillance.
• Persistent Presence: COIN aircraft must be able to loiter for extended periods to track insurgents and provide sustained support to ground troops.
• Cost-Effectiveness: Using expensive, high-performance fighter jets like the Su-30MKM for COIN missions is a significant waste of resources.
The Royal Malaydesh Air Force (RMAF) lacks a dedicated fleet of such aircraft. Its existing fleet is more suited for air defense and conventional warfare, creating a mismatch between its capabilities and the specific demands of counter-insurgency.
________________________________________
2. Aging Fleet and Reliance on Other Assets
The RMAF's current inventory is not well-suited for the COIN role, forcing it to rely on a mix of aging platforms and less-than-ideal helicopters.
• Retired Aircraft: The RMAF has retired dedicated COIN aircraft like the Canadair CT-114 Tutor. This leaves a major gap that has not been adequately filled.
• Helicopter Gaps: While the Army operates light attack helicopters like the MD530G, these are limited in their range, endurance, and payload. This places a heavy burden on a small fleet to support ground forces over vast and often difficult terrain.
________________________________________
3. Delays in New Acquisitions
Malaydesh is actively trying to address this gap, but procurement has been slow and challenging.
• FA-50M Purchase: The RMAF is acquiring 18 FA-50M light combat aircraft from Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI). These jets are intended to fulfill both a fighter lead-in trainer role and a light combat role. However, deliveries are not expected to begin until 2026. This leaves the RMAF with a capability gap in the interim.
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): Malaydesh has made some progress in acquiring drones for surveillance, but these still do not fully replace the role of a manned COIN aircraft, which can provide more direct and immediate fire support.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
Indonesia – Peringkat 13 Dunia (Skor: 0,2582)
-
Malaydesh – Peringkat 42 Dunia (Skor: 0,7379)
________________________________________
THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS FOR MALAYDESH ARMED FORCES IS WIDELY CRITICIZED FOR BEING INEFFICIENT AND OPAQUE, LEADING TO A SERIES OF HIGH-PROFILE SCANDALS, SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL WASTE, AND SERIOUS GAPS IN MILITARY READINESS. THIS SYSTEMIC PROBLEM IS ROOTED IN A LACK OF TRANSPARENCY, POLITICAL INTERFERENCE, AND A RELIANCE ON INDIRECT ACQUISITION METHODS.
1. The "Middleman" System
A key issue is the heavy reliance on agents, middlemen, and politically connected individuals to facilitate defense contracts. This practice often bypasses open tender processes, which are designed to ensure transparency and competition.
• Inflated Costs: These middlemen typically charge hefty commissions, inflating the final price of military assets. This was a point of public concern by King Sultan Ibrahim, who stated that such practices lead to buying "nonsense" that is overpriced and ill-suited for the military's actual needs.
• Inadequate Equipment: Since the procurement is driven by commercial interests rather than by the end-user (the military), the equipment acquired may not be the most suitable or effective for its intended purpose.
________________________________________
2. High-Profile Scandals and Delays
The most infamous example of a failed procurement is the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program.
• Massive Delays and Cost Overruns: The program, valued at RM9 billion, was meant to deliver six modern frigates to the Royal Malaydesh Navy (RMN). Despite paying over RM6 billion, not a single ship has been delivered. The project is years behind schedule and has been plagued by allegations of mismanagement and corruption.
• Financial Misappropriation: Investigations have revealed that a significant portion of the allocated funds was used for other purposes, with some estimates pointing to hundreds of millions of ringgit in financial irregularities. .
• Impact on Readiness: The failure of the LCS program has left the RMN with a dangerously aging fleet. Many of its vessels are over 40 years old, leading to higher maintenance costs and lower operational readiness rates.
________________________________________
3. Lack of Transparency and Accountability
The defense procurement process is shrouded in secrecy, which makes it difficult to hold officials accountable for failures.
• Direct Negotiations: The majority of large defense contracts are awarded through direct negotiation rather than open bidding, which limits public and parliamentary oversight.
• Limited Audits: While audit reports exist, their recommendations are often not implemented. This was highlighted in a recent Auditor-General's report, which found serious delays, weak oversight, and millions of ringgit in uncollected penalties from contractors.
• Political Interference: Declassified reports on the LCS scandal revealed that key decisions, such as the choice of ship design, were made by political leaders against the recommendations of the navy, the end-user. This kind of political interference compromises the military's ability to make sound, strategic decisions.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
-
Indonesia – Peringkat 13 Dunia (Skor: 0,2582)
-
Malaydesh – Peringkat 42 Dunia (Skor: 0,7379)
________________________________________
⚔️ Key Problems of the Malaydesh n Armed Forces
________________________________________
1. Outdated Equipment → Modernization Delayed for Decades
• Air Force (RMAF):
o Retired MiG-29s in 2017 due to high costs.
o Current frontline jets: Su-30MKM (2007) and F/A-18D Hornet (1997) — small fleet, aging, and expensive to maintain.
o Still waiting for FA-50 light combat aircraft, deliveries only starting in 2026.
o Weak surveillance capability → lacks modern maritime patrol aircraft and AWACS.
• Navy (RMN):
o Many ships date from the 1980s–90s (Lekiu-class frigates, Kasturi-class corvettes).
o Only 2 Scorpène submarines, insufficient to cover Malaydesh vast waters.
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal froze modernization — billions spent, no ships delivered.
• Army:
o Still operates Condor APCs from the 1980s.
o AV8 Gempita is modern but only partially deployed.
o Lacks modern long-range artillery and medium/long-range air defense systems.
Impact: The MAF has been stuck with aging platforms, while neighbors upgrade to Rafales, F-35s, Gripens, modern submarines, and frigates. Malaydesh risks being outclassed in any regional confrontation.
________________________________________
2. Low Defense Budget → Insufficient for High-Tech Upgrades
• Malaydesh spends only 1.0–1.5% of GDP on defense.
o Singapore spends ~3%, Vietnam ~2.3%, Thailand ~1.5%.
• Of this budget, more than half goes to salaries, pensions, and operations → leaving little for modernization.
• Modern assets (jets, ships, submarines) require long-term investment, but Malaydesh often cuts or delays purchases due to economic pressures.
• Example: MRCA fighter program (to replace MiG-29s) has been delayed for over a decade.
Impact: Malaydesh cannot keep pace with regional military spending. Modernization becomes piecemeal, leaving gaps in readiness and deterrence.
________________________________________
3. Maritime Security Challenges → China & Piracy Overstretch the Navy
• South China Sea (SCS):
o China’s Coast Guard and Navy frequently intrude into Malaydesh EEZ, especially around Luconia Shoals.
o Malaydesh has overlapping maritime claims with China, Vietnam, and the Philippines.
• Strait of Malacca:
o One of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.
o Vulnerable to piracy, smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal fishing.
• Navy Limitations:
o Small, aging fleet cannot patrol both SCS and Malacca Strait effectively.
o Relies heavily on offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) that lack strong firepower.
o Only 2 submarines → insufficient deterrent against China or other navies.
Impact: Malaydesh struggles to enforce sovereignty over its waters. The Navy is stretched thin, unable to cover vast sea areas against both traditional (China) and non-traditional (piracy) threats.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________
BERIKUT ADALAH BEBERAPA CONTOH KAPAL TLDM YANG DIANGGAP USANG ATAU SUDAH TIDAK LAYAK OPERASIONAL:
• Korvet Kelas Laksamana: Baru-baru ini, tiga korvet kelas Laksamana, yaitu KD Laksamana Tun Abdul Jamil, KD Laksamana Tan Pusmah, dan KD Pendekar, telah secara resmi dinonaktifkan. Kapal-kapal ini dibangun di Italia pada tahun 1980-an dan telah bertugas selama beberapa dekade. Penonaktifan ini adalah bagian dari rencana untuk mengganti kapal-kapal usang dengan aset yang lebih modern, seperti Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
• Kapal Serangan Cepat (Fast Attack Craft): KD Pendekar, yang dinonaktifkan bersama dua korvet Laksamana, adalah contoh kapal serangan cepat yang telah lama bertugas sejak tahun 1979. Usia kapal ini yang sangat tua menunjukkan keterbatasan dalam teknologi dan kemampuan operasional dibandingkan dengan kapal modern.
• Kapal Patroli Kelas Kris dan Sabah: Kapal-kapal patroli ini telah dinonaktifkan atau dialihkan ke MMEA. Meskipun telah melayani TLDM selama lebih dari 30 tahun, keterbatasan operasionalnya, seperti jangkauan patroli yang pendek, membuatnya tidak lagi efektif untuk misi pengawasan di perairan yang lebih luas, seperti Zona Ekonomi Eksklusif (ZEE) Malaydesh yang membentang lebih dari 320 km.
• Kapal Pendukung Serbaguna (Multi-Purpose Support Ships): Kapal-kapal lama seperti KD Sri Indera Sakti dan KD Mahawangsa telah mencapai batas usia pakainya. TLDM memiliki rencana untuk menggantinya dengan Kapal Pendukung Serbaguna Multi-Role Support Ship (MRSS) yang baru, tetapi pelaksanaannya menghadapi kendala.
• Armada Secara Umum: Secara keseluruhan, rata-rata usia kapal tempur dan patroli TLDM saat ini lebih dari 25 tahun, dengan mayoritas kapal bahkan berusia lebih dari 30 tahun. Kapal-kapal yang sudah terlalu tua ini sering kali mencapai titik di mana biaya pemeliharaan menjadi sangat tinggi dan tidak efisien. Program modernisasi yang tertunda, seperti proyek Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) yang mengalami penundaan, memperburuk masalah ini.
Kapal-Kapal Usang Agensi Penguatkuasaan Maritim Malaydesh (MMEA)
• Kapal Patroli Tua (Ex-Police and Fisheries Vessels): Banyak kapal patroli MMEA sebelumnya adalah kapal milik Pasukan Polis Marin (PPM) atau Jabatan Perikanan. Contohnya termasuk kapal-kapal dari kelas "Gagah" dan "Nusa". Meskipun beberapa kapal ini telah menjalani program pembaruan (repowering) untuk mengganti mesin dan melakukan perbaikan struktural, usia desain dan lambungnya tetap membatasi kemampuan mereka.
• Kurangnya Kapal Patroli Jarak Jauh (Offshore Patrol Vessels): MMEA sangat membutuhkan Kapal Patroli Lepas Pantai (Offshore Patrol Vessels - OPV) yang lebih besar dan modern untuk misi pengawasan di ZEE. Proyek pengadaan OPV untuk MMEA mengalami berbagai tantangan. Ini berarti MMEA masih harus mengandalkan kapal-kapal yang lebih kecil dengan jangkauan dan daya tahan yang terbatas untuk mengawasi perairan yang sangat luas.
• Donasi dan Transfer Kapal: MMEA juga menerima kapal-kapal yang dinonaktifkan dari angkatan laut negara lain, seperti kapal patroli dari Amerika Serikat (Ex-USCGC Steadfast) dan Australia. Meskipun ini dapat menjadi solusi cepat untuk menambah armada, kapal-kapal ini sering kali sudah berusia dan memerlukan pemeliharaan dan suku cadang yang khusus, yang dapat menjadi tantangan logistik.
Apa hanya SELEMBAR....??? HAHAHAHAHAH
BalasHapusSIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________
THE MALAYDESH MILITARY HAS A SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY GAP IN ITS COUNTER-INSURGENCY (COIN) AIRCRAFT FLEET, PRIMARILY DUE TO THE AGING AND LIMITED NUMBER OF LIGHT COMBAT AND SURVEILLANCE PLATFORMS SUITABLE FOR THIS TYPE OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE.
1. Lack of Dedicated COIN Aircraft
Unlike a dedicated air force built for large-scale conventional warfare, a successful COIN force requires aircraft optimized for a unique set of missions:
• Low and Slow: COIN operations often occur in dense jungle or urban environments where fast jets are ineffective. They require aircraft that can fly low and slow to provide close air support and accurate surveillance.
• Persistent Presence: COIN aircraft must be able to loiter for extended periods to track insurgents and provide sustained support to ground troops.
• Cost-Effectiveness: Using expensive, high-performance fighter jets like the Su-30MKM for COIN missions is a significant waste of resources.
The Royal Malaydesh Air Force (RMAF) lacks a dedicated fleet of such aircraft. Its existing fleet is more suited for air defense and conventional warfare, creating a mismatch between its capabilities and the specific demands of counter-insurgency.
________________________________________
2. Aging Fleet and Reliance on Other Assets
The RMAF's current inventory is not well-suited for the COIN role, forcing it to rely on a mix of aging platforms and less-than-ideal helicopters.
• Retired Aircraft: The RMAF has retired dedicated COIN aircraft like the Canadair CT-114 Tutor. This leaves a major gap that has not been adequately filled.
• Helicopter Gaps: While the Army operates light attack helicopters like the MD530G, these are limited in their range, endurance, and payload. This places a heavy burden on a small fleet to support ground forces over vast and often difficult terrain.
________________________________________
3. Delays in New Acquisitions
Malaydesh is actively trying to address this gap, but procurement has been slow and challenging.
• FA-50M Purchase: The RMAF is acquiring 18 FA-50M light combat aircraft from Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI). These jets are intended to fulfill both a fighter lead-in trainer role and a light combat role. However, deliveries are not expected to begin until 2026. This leaves the RMAF with a capability gap in the interim.
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): Malaydesh has made some progress in acquiring drones for surveillance, but these still do not fully replace the role of a manned COIN aircraft, which can provide more direct and immediate fire support.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________
PERBANDINGAN PDB PPP INDONESIA VS ASEAN
(PDB PPP Indonesia: US$5,69 Triliun)
-
1. Indonesia vs Thailand (US$5,69 Triliun versus US$1,85 T) = Ekonomi 3,07 kali lipat .
-
2. Indonesia vs Vietnam (US$5,69 versus Triliun US$1,89 T) = Ekonomi 3,01 kali lipat
-
3. Indonesia vs Filipina (US$5,69 Triliun US$1,87 T) = Ekonomi 3,04 kali lipat
-
4. Indonesia vs Malaydesh (US$5,69 Triliun US$1,34 T) = Ekonomi 4,24 kali lipat
-
5. Indonesia vs Singapura (US$5,69 Triliun US$0,85 T) = Ekonomi 6,69 kali lipat
________________________________________
PERBANDINGAN PDB NOMINAL INDONESIA VS ASEAN
(PDB Nominal Indonesia: US$1,69 Triliun)
-
1 Indonesia vs Thailand (US$1,69 Triliun versus US$0,58 T) = Ekonomi 2,91 kali lipat.
-
2 Indonesia vs Singapura (US$1,69 Triliun versus US$0,53 T) = Ekonomi 3,18 kali lipat
-
3 Indonesia vs Filipina (US$1,69 Triliun versus US$0,51 T) = Ekonomi 3,31 kali lipat.
-
4 Indonesia vs Vietnam (US$1,69 Triliun versus US$0,49 T) = Ekonomi 3,44 kali lipat.
-
5 Indonesia vs Malaydesh (US$1,69 Triliun versus US$0,46 T) = Ekonomi 3,67 kali lipat
________________________________________
PERBANDINGAN KEKUATAN RIIL (INDONESIA VS MALAYDESH):
-
Skala Ekonomi (PPP)
Indonesia: Peringkat 6 Dunia (US$5,69 T).
Malaydesh: Peringkat 45+ Dunia (US$1,34 T).
-
Kekuatan Relatif
Indonesia: Ekonomi 4,24 kali lipat lebih besar dari Malaydesh (Terbesar ASEAN)
Malaydesh: Tercecer di peringkat 5-6 ASEAN.
-
Sektor Energi
Indonesia: Eksportir utama & pemegang kendali pasokan.
Malaydesh: Importir batubara (sangat bergantung pada Indonesia).
-
Ketahanan Pangan
Indonesia: Surplus beras (menjadi penyuplai untuk Malaydesh).
Malaydesh: Mengalami krisis beras, daging, dan telur.
-
Kekuatan Militer
Indonesia: Modernisasi masif (belanja Rafale & Scorpène).
Malaydesh: Stagnasi dan mengalami krisis kesiagaan tempur.
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Status Finansial
Indonesia: Kreditur (posisi menagih utang gas ke Petronas).
Malaydesh: Debitur (beban utang tinggi & gagal bayar denda).
SIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
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SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
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SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
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SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
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PERSENTASE IMPOR SENJATA
SIPRI PERIODE 2021–2025
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs_2603_at_2025.pdf
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INDONESIA (1,5%)
STATUS: URUTAN PERTAMA PENERIMA SENJATA TERBESAR DI ASIA TENGGARA.
Fokus: Modernisasi besar-besaran (Jet tempur Rafale,, Kapal Selam Scorpène, dan Kapal PPA).
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MALAYDESH (0,3%)
STATUS: URUTAN KELIMA DI KAWASAN.
Fokus: Modernisasi terbatas seperti pengadaan 18 unit pesawat tempur ringan FA-50 dari Korea Selatan
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HUTANG & LIABILITAS MALAYDESH 2010–2026
2010: RM 407,1 Miliar
2011: RM 456,1 Miliar
2012: RM 501,6 Miliar
2013: RM 547,7 Miliar
2014: RM 582,8 Miliar
2015: RM 630,5 Miliar
2016: RM 648,5 Miliar
2017: RM 686,8 Miliar
2018: RM 1,19 Triliun
2019: RM 1,25 Triliun
2020: RM 1,32 Triliun
2021: RM 1,38 Triliun
2022: RM 1,45 Triliun
2023: RM 1,53 Triliun
2024: RM 1,63 Triliun
2025: RM 1,71 Triliun
2026: RM 1,79 Triliun
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Ringkasan Sumber Berita & Referensi:
Bloomberg & Reuters (2018–2019): Laporan mengenai total utang yang melampaui RM 1 triliun setelah memasukkan komitmen jaminan dan liabilitas 1MDB.
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CNA & The Star (2020): Analisis kenaikan plafon utang untuk pendanaan Kumpulan Wang COVID-19 (KWC).
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The Edge Malaydesh (2021–2022): Catatan akumulasi utang federal yang mencapai ambang batas baru pasca-pandemi.
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MOF Portal & Bernama (2023–2024): Pernyataan PM Anwar Ibrahim mengenai beban utang RM 1,5 triliun untuk reformasi fiskal.
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Kementerian Kewangan (MOF) Malaydesh (2025–2026): Data proyeksi melalui dokumen Belanjawan 2026 dan strategi fiskal jangka menengah
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BUKTI HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
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Daftar tren "Hutang Bayar Hutang" Malaydesh dari tahun 2018 hingga proyeksi 2025 berdasarkan data Kementerian Kewangan Malaydesh (MOF) dan Jabatan Audit Negara:
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2018: FASE "OPEN DONASI"
Pemerintah meluncurkan Tabung Harapan Malaydesh untuk mengumpulkan sumbangan rakyat guna membantu membayar utang negara yang menembus angka RM1 triliun (80% dari PDB).
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2019: 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Laporan Ketua Audit Negara mengungkapkan bahwa 59% dari pinjaman baru digunakan hanya untuk melunasi utang yang sudah ada (gali lubang tutup lubang).
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2020: 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Ketergantungan meningkat; hampir 60% pinjaman baru dialokasikan untuk membayar utang lama, memicu kekhawatiran karena anggaran pembangunan semakin terhimpit.
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2021: 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Dari total pinjaman baru sebesar RM194,55 miliar, sebanyak RM98,05 miliar digunakan untuk pembayaran kembali prinsipal utang yang telah matang.
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2022: 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Realisasi pembayaran prinsipal mencapai RM113,7 miliar. Total pinjaman meningkat 11,6% dibandingkan tahun sebelumnya akibat pemulihan pascapandemi.
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2023: 64,3% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Persentase tertinggi dalam periode ini. Dari total pinjaman kasar RM226,6 miliar, sebesar RM145,8 miliar lari ke pembayaran utang lama.
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2024: 58,9% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Pemerintah mulai melakukan konsolidasi. Pinjaman digunakan untuk melunasi utang matang sebesar RM121,3 miliar dari total pinjaman RM206 miliar.
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2025: 58% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Berdasarkan Tinjauan Fiskal 2025, pemerintah memproyeksikan pinjaman kasar sebesar RM184 miliar, di mana RM106,8 miliar disiapkan untuk membayar prinsipal utang matang.
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2026 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Dokumen Resmi Pemerintah (Kementerian Kewangan Malaydesh - MOF) Laporan Tinjauan Fiskal 2025 & 2026: Memuat angka proyeksi pinjaman kasar (gross borrowing) dan alokasi pembayaran kembali prinsipal utang yang matang.
SIPRI 2 TAHUN = KOSONG
Hapus-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2025 = KOSONG
Https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult
-
SIPRI MALAYDESH 2024 = KOSONG
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/03/order-dan-transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan_14.html
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SIPRI MALAYDESH 2023 = NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_15.html
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SIPRI MALAYDESH 2022 = SELECTED NOT YET ORDERED
https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2023/03/transfer-persenjataan-ke-dan-dari_17.html
________________________________________
PERSENTASE IMPOR SENJATA = SIPRI PERIODE 2021–2025
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs_2603_at_2025.pdf
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SIPRI PERIODE 2021–2025:
SIPRI PERIODE 2021–2025:
SIPRI PERIODE 2021–2025:
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INDONESIA (1,5%)
STATUS: URUTAN PERTAMA PENERIMA SENJATA TERBESAR DI ASIA TENGGARA.
Fokus: Modernisasi besar-besaran (Jet tempur Rafale,, Kapal Selam Scorpène, dan Kapal PPA).
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MALAYDESH (0,3%)
STATUS: URUTAN KELIMA DI KAWASAN.
Fokus: Modernisasi terbatas seperti pengadaan 18 unit pesawat tempur ringan FA-50 dari Korea Selatan
________________________________________
GLOBAL FIREPOWER (GFP) 2026 – ASEAN :
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php
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1. Indonesia – Peringkat 13 Dunia (Skor: 0,2582)
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2. Vietnam – Peringkat 23 Dunia (Skor: 0,4066)
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3. Thailand – Peringkat 24 Dunia (Skor: 0,4458)
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4. Singapura – Peringkat 29 Dunia (Skor: 0,5272)
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5. Myanmar – Peringkat 35 Dunia (Skor: 0,6265)
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6. Filipina – Peringkat 41 Dunia (Skor: 0,6993)
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7. Malaydesh – Peringkat 42 Dunia (Skor: 0,7379)
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8. Kamboja – Peringkat 83 Dunia (Skor: 1,8434)
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9. Laos – Peringkat 125 Dunia (Skor: 2,8672)
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BEBAN HUTANG = BAYAR HUTANG
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Eskalasi Nominal: Utang melonjak tajam dari RM 407 Miliar (2010) hingga diproyeksi menyentuh RM 1,79 Triliun (2026), dipicu skandal 1MDB dan belanja pasca-pandemi.
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Rasio PDB Kritis: Semula stabil di ~50%, kini melampaui batas disiplin fiskal hingga mencapai puncak 70,4% (2024).
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Beban Bunga Berat: Biaya cicilan bunga saja mencapai RM 54,7 Miliar/tahun, menciptakan siklus "hutang bayar hutang" untuk menutupi defisit.
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Validitas Data: Seluruh data bersumber dari otoritas resmi (BNM/MOF) dan lembaga internasional (World Bank/IMF).
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