Prancis membawa pesawat CN235 dalam Latma Super Garuda Shield 2025 yang telah dipakai penerjunan sebelumnya bersama pasukan multinasional (photo: Armée de l'air et de l'espace)
TNI AL -- Dispen Kormar, Pasmar 1 (Lingga). Prajurit Detasemen Intai Para Amfibi 1 Marinir (Denipam 1 Mar) melaksanakan terjun tempur dalam rangkaian Latihan Super Garuda Shield (SGS) Tahun 2025, bertempat di Bandar Udara Dabo Singkep, Kab. Lingga, Minggu (31/08/2025).
Kegiatan diawali dengan Apel pagi, kemudian dilanjutkan pergeseran personel dan material dari Lanal Dabo Singkep menuju Bandara. Sebelum penerjunan, setiap peterjun menjalani pemeriksaan kesehatan, lalu jumping master memberikan pengarahan mengenai teknik dan taktik terjun tempur dengan penekanan pada aspek keamanan dan keselamatan prajurit.
.webp)
.webp)
Di tempat terpisah, Dandenipam 1 Mar, Letkol Marinir Romanimbun Butarbutar, M.Tr.Hanla., menyampaikan bahwa terjun tempur merupakan salah satu metode infiltrasi udara yang bertujuan menyusup ke wilayah musuh tanpa terdeteksi.
.webp)
(Pasmar 1)
. Scorpène Submarine Scandal (2002 Onward)
BalasHapus• Malaysia procured two Scorpène-class submarines and one Agosta-class submarine for RM4.5 billion via Perimekar Sdn Bhd, a company with no track record, tied to defense analyst Abdul Razak Baginda. Perimekar received RM510 million in commissions—around 11% of the deal value
• French investigators implicated key figures, including members of DCNS/Naval Group, in bribery and misuse of corporate assets
• This case also interwove with a tragic murder: Altantuyaa Shaariibuugiin, a translator allegedly involved in the deal, was murdered amid claims she demanded a commission. Baginda was acquitted of the conspiracy charges in Malaysia, but French courts later charged him with corruption and misappropriation
________________________________________
2. Little Bird (MD530G) Helicopter Contract (2016)
• A RM321 million deal for six light attack helicopters collapsed due to delivery failures and substandard adherence to specifications.
• After a MACC probe, the Attorney General’s Chambers opted not to prosecute, prompting public outrage.
“No further action will be taken… typical. Corruption from top to bottom.”
________________________________________
3. New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) Scandal (1990s–2000s)
• The project aimed to replace aging patrol crafts with 27 Meko 100-designed ships. PSC-ND, a politically linked company, secured the contract.
• Only six vessels were completed, and delays and financial mismanagement ballooned costs from RM5.35 billion to RM6.75 billion.
• PSC-ND fell into debt and was absorbed by Boustead Holdings, becoming Boustead Naval Shipyard
________________________________________
4. Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) Fiasco
• In the late 1990s, an UMNO-linked firm was contracted for six OPVs at RM4.9 billion. Only two were delivered, fraught with defects.
• Payments reached RM4.26 billion for merely RM2.87 billion worth of work completed—a 48% overpayment. Late penalties were waived by government directive.
________________________________________
5. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal (2011–Present)
• Valued at RM9 billion, the LCS project delivered zero ships despite over RM6 billion disbursed
• The Royal Malaysian Navy preferred the Dutch-designed Sigma class, but the decision was overridden to adopt the French Gowind class—aligned with Boustead’s interests
• MACC investigations revealed shell companies were used to siphon off at least RM23 million for fake technical services, linked to high-ranking officials
• There were also allegations of circular flow of funds benefitting a core network of political and contractor cronies
• PAC uncovered RM1.4 billion in cost overruns, and RM400 million was used to repay liabilities from past failed projects
• The public and parliament now clamour for a Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI) to fully investigate the scandal
• Commentary reflects deep frustration:
“Before everyone gets their pitchforks out… First 2 ships supposed to deliver in 2020. Now none delivered… How much go into pocket of officials?”
________________________________________
6. Public Accountability & Civil Society Response
• The Consumers’ Association of Penang (CAP) has urged the establishment of an RCI, warning that these scandals jeopardize national security and sovereignty
• The patterns underscore systemic failure—from opaque deals, lack of accountability, and misuse of public funds.
• In August 2025, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim called for "graft-free procurement" in defense, emphasizing transparency and favoring G2G (government-to-government) deals over intermediaries ________________________________________
Summary Table: High-Impact Scandals
Scandal Key Issues
Scorpène Submarine Deal Commissions, corruption, murder linked to procurement
MD530G Helicopters Failed deliveries, no legal accountability
NGPV Program Delays, cost overruns, company collapse
OPV Deal Defective deliveries, huge financial losses
LCS Project No deliveries, massive overspending, shell companies
1. Cronyism & Middleman Influence in Defence Deals
BalasHapus• Middlemen & Agents
Analysts and civil society highlight how defence procurement often involves politically connected intermediaries—sometimes retired military officers—who earn hefty commissions and influence decisions. These agents contribute to inflated costs and undermine transparency.
• Lack of Open Competition
Fewer than one-third of major defence contracts are awarded through open competition, creating a system that favors these intermediaries and their affiliated firms
________________________________________
2. High-Profile Procurement Scandals
a) Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Project
• Awarded via direct negotiation, ignoring naval preference. Despite RM6 billion disbursed, zero ships delivered. Cost ballooned to RM11.2 billion.
• Investigations revealed overlapping key figures implicated previously in the Scorpene submarine scandal—suggesting systemic manipulation.c
• Critics say accountability remains elusive, even as oversight committees were formed.
b) Scorpene Submarine Deal (2002)
• A massive RM4.5 billion deal saw RM510 million paid as commissions to politically linked intermediaries. Ship performance issues followed.
c) New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) Program
• Awarded to a firm tied to political cronies; suffered major delays, cost overruns, and unpaid contractors. PAC uncovered corruption, leading to institutional restructuring.
d) Little Bird Helicopters (MD530G)
• A RM321 million contract in 2016 failed to deliver timely. Procurement bypassed technical benchmarks, lacked military specs, and ended with no prosecutions despite MACC scrutiny.
• Public frustration is palpable:
“No further action will be taken over alleged corruption… typical. Corruption from top to bottom.”
e) SIBMAS Armoured Vehicles (1980s)
• Tender allegedly rigged to favor SIBMAS despite failure to meet specs; final product was heavier, underpowered, and underutilized.
f) Missing Jet Engines (2007)
• Two F-5E jet engines were stolen from RMAF stores; individually linked to procurement corruption during Najib’s tenure. They surfaced in Uruguay later.
________________________________________
3. Mismanagement & Systemic Procurement Failures
• Audit Findings on Gempita Armoured Vehicles
RM162.75 million in penalties for late delivery went unclaimed; maintenance contracts worth RM107 million were fragmented to evade procurement controls.
• Wasted Naval Spare Parts
Auditor-General reported RM384 million worth of unused spare parts for the navy. Public reaction via Reddit reflects widespread disillusionment:
“So much for that expense is kickbacks? 90 percent?”
________________________________________
4. Institutional Weaknesses & Reform Efforts
• The Consumers Association of Penang (CAP) has advocated for a Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI) to address 40 years of defence procurement scandals and institutional failures.
• Transparency International Malaysia (TI-M) has criticized recurrent procurement irregularities (e.g., poor contract evaluation, bypassed controls, fragmented tenders) as symptoms of systemic governance breakdown.
• In August 2025, Parliament passed the Government Procurement Bill, aiming to standardize procedures, penalize wrongdoing, and reduce rent-seeking—yet civil society warns about potential loopholes giving ministers excessive power.
• Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has emphasized a "graft-free" defence procurement approach, advocating Government-to-Government (G2G) deals over intermediated ones to reduce corruption and improve transparency.
________________________________________
Summary Overview
Issue Manifestation
Cronyism & Agent Influence Backdoor deals, inflated costs, sidelined military preferences
Scandals LCS, Scorpene, NGPV, MD530G, SIBMAS, missing jet engines
Mismanagement & Waste Unclaimed penalties, unused assets, botched delivery
Institutional Weakness Weak oversight, fragmented tenders, audit warnings disregarded
Reform Initiatives PAC scrutiny, RCI advocacy, new Procurement Bill, push for G2G
bagus lagi TNI bertugas amankan DEMO yang makin MEMBURUK....HAHAHHAHA
BalasHapus1. UH-60A Black Hawk Helicopter Lease (May 2023 – November 2024)
Hapus• Background: In May 2023, Malondesh’s Ministry of Defence signed a five-year RM187 million lease deal for four UH-60A Black Hawk helicopters with Aerotree Defence and Services
• Delays & Contract Issues: The first helicopter, initially due in November 2023, was repeatedly delayed—extended to April 2024, then to October 30
• Cancellation: After the October deadline passed without delivery, the contract was officially cancelled in November 2024
• Royal Intervention: Sultan Ibrahim publicly opposed the deal, warning against “flying coffins”—over 30-year-old helicopters unsuitable for service
• Aftermath: A fresh tender for leasing alternative helicopters was launched in August 2025. The Ministry will evaluate proposals and consider factors such as helicopter type, age, leasing cost; the tender closes in September
________________________________________
2. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Project (2011–Present)
• Project Overview: Awarded in 2011, the RM9.13 billion LCS contract with Boustead Naval Shipyard aimed to deliver six warships. However, by August 2022, none had been delivered despite two-thirds of payment being made (~RM6 billion)
• Delays & Cost Overruns: As of mid-2025, completion was at 72.9% against a target of 76.1% The total cost ballooned to approximately RM11.2 billion under revised agreements
• Scrutiny and Reforms: The project drew heavy criticism from Malondesh’s parliamentary PAC and triggered calls for a Royal Commission of Inquiry A project oversight committee was later set up to improve delivery and accountability
________________________________________
3. Multiple Smaller Contract Cancellations (Early 2023)
• Measure for Transparency: In January 2023, the Defence Ministry cancelled five procurement contracts—spanning supplies, services, and infrastructure—to combat potential financial leakage and align with government emphasis on open tenders and value for money
________________________________________
4. Armoured Vehicle Procurement Irregularities (Mid-2025)
• Delivery Penalties & Contract Splits: The Auditor-General’s report uncovered major delays in claiming RM162.75 million in penalties for late Gempita armoured vehicle deliveries. It also flagged contract splitting worth RM107.54 million and late service penalties of RM1.42 million left unclaimed
________________________________________
5. Expert Insights on Procurement Failures
• Cronyism & Mismanagement: Analysts point to cronyism, financial mismanagement, and lack of expertise behind repeated procurement delays and cancellations—including the offshore patrol vessel and Black Hawk contracts
________________________________________
6. Leadership Response & Reforms
• King’s Reprimand: Sultan Ibrahim’s public condemnation of “nonsensical and unacceptable” procurement deals marks an unusually active supervisory stance by the monarch
• Prime Minister’s Push for Transparency: PM Anwar Ibrahim has emphasized transparency, discouraging dependence on agents, and favoring government-to-government arrangements. He cited the LCS debacle as calling for procurement reform
• Procurement Bill: In August 2025, a Government Procurement Bill was tabled, making violations of tender laws prosecutable and aiming to institutionalize transparency across government procurement—while still exempting defense procurements requiring confidentiality
📌 1. What “Deterrence” Means
Hapus• Deterrence = convincing a potential adversary that attacking you will be too costly.
• Effective deterrence requires:
1. Credible combat power (modern weapons, trained forces).
2. Readiness (forces operational at short notice).
3. Clear strategy (political will to use military force).
👉 Malondesh lacks all three.
________________________________________
📌 2. Small & Obsolete Armed Forces
• Army (TDM): Still uses 1980s-era armored vehicles and artillery. No long-range rockets or modern air defense.
• Navy (TLDM):
o Only 2 Scorpène submarines (limited readiness).
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal left Malondesh without new ships for over a decade.
o Fleet shrinking as old ships decommission faster than new ones arrive.
• Air Force (RMAF/TUDM):
o Only ~26 combat jets (Su-30MKM + F/A-18D), many often grounded.
o No long-range SAMs, tankers, or AWACS.
o Pilots have low training hours.
👉 Malondesh cannot credibly threaten retaliation if attacked.
________________________________________
📌 3. China in the South China Sea
• Chinese Coast Guard & Navy regularly enter Malondesh’s EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone).
• Malondesh responds only with diplomatic protests & small patrols.
• No credible deterrence:
o No modern MPAs (maritime patrol aircraft).
o Weak naval presence.
o No anti-ship missile coverage to deter Chinese fleets.
👉 China does not take Malondesh’s military seriously.
________________________________________
📌 4. Budget Too Small
• Malondesh spends ~1% of GDP on defense — one of the lowest in ASEAN.
• More than half goes to salaries & pensions, not weapons or readiness.
• Modernization projects delayed or cancelled (LCS, MRCA fighter replacement, Nuri helicopter replacement).
👉 Military cannot modernize fast enough to maintain deterrence.
________________________________________
📌 5. Weak Defense Industry
• Malondesh cannot produce its own modern fighters, warships, or missiles.
• Dependent on imports → delays, corruption, and cost overruns.
• Example: Boustead LCS scandal wasted billions, leaving Navy with no new ships.
👉 Without a strong local industry, deterrence = permanently dependent on foreign suppliers.
________________________________________
📌 6. Low Training & Readiness
• Pilots fly ~100 hours/year or less (NATO standard = 180+).
• Ships sail less due to fuel and maintenance limits.
• Army does limited joint/combined exercises because of budget.
• Many assets grounded for lack of spare parts.
👉 Even if weapons exist, they cannot be deployed effectively.
________________________________________
📌 7. No Strategic Doctrine
• Malondesh’s 2019 Defense White Paper acknowledged threats but failed to provide long-term funding or a clear modernization path.
• Governments keep flip-flopping procurement plans (MiG-29 replacement delayed >10 years).
• Political leaders avoid strong defense postures → prefer diplomacy.
👉 Adversaries know Malondesh lacks willpower to escalate militarily.
________________________________________
📌 8. Comparison with Neighbors
• Singapore: Credible deterrence with 100+ modern fighters, Leopard 2 tanks, advanced submarines, long-range SAMs.
• Vietnam: Deterrence against China with large Su-30 fleet, strong coastal missile defenses.
• Indonesia: Expanding deterrence with Rafales, F-15EX, submarines.
• Malondesh: Stuck with old equipment, no long-range strike capability.
👉 Neighbors can deter aggression. Malondesh cannot.
________________________________________
📌 9. Consequences of No Deterrence
1. China ignores Malondesh’s protests in South China Sea.
2. Piracy & illegal fishing remain constant in Malondeshn waters.
3. Dependence on allies (US, Australia, Singapore) for exercises, surveillance, and training.
4. Strategic vulnerability: If a conflict breaks out, Malondesh risks losing Sabah/Sarawak or control of EEZ.
5. Loss of credibility: Regional powers see Malondesh as the “soft” military of ASEAN.
📌 1. Air Force (RMAF)
Hapusa. MiG-29 Replacement / MRCA Program
• Planned: Since 2007, Malondesh has sought replacements for its aging MiG-29 Fulcrums.
• Options considered: Rafale (France), Eurofighter Typhoon (UK), Gripen (Sweden), F/A-18 (US).
• Status: Repeatedly delayed, suspended, and re-announced due to budget constraints and changing governments.
• Impact:
o MiG-29 retired in 2017 → fighter gap remains.
o RMAF left relying on only 18 Su-30MKM and 8 F/A-18D, both aging.
o MRCA “shelved” and replaced with smaller Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) plan (FA-50 from South Korea, delivery starting 2026).
________________________________________
b. Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA)
• Planned: Requirement identified since early 2000s to monitor South China Sea and piracy.
• Status: Delayed nearly 20 years.
• Only in 2023 was the Leonardo ATR-72 MPA selected (delivery by 2026).
• Impact:
o Malondesh had no dedicated MPA fleet for decades, relying on converted transport aircraft and UAVs.
o Limited maritime surveillance → weakness in South China Sea patrols.
________________________________________
📌 2. Navy (RMN)
a. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
• Planned: 2011, RM9 billion for 6 Gowind-class ships (local build by Boustead Naval Shipyard).
• Status: By 2025, zero ships delivered.
o Design changes, corruption, mismanagement, and cost overruns stalled the project.
• Impact:
o Navy still depends on old Kedah-class (2006) and even older corvettes from the 1980s.
o Weakens ability to secure South China Sea claims.
________________________________________
b. Multi-Role Support Ship (MRSS)
• Planned: Amphibious ship program since 2000s.
• Status: Cancelled/postponed multiple times due to budget.
• Impact:
o RMN has no large amphibious lift → limited ability to move troops/equipment in regional crises.
________________________________________
c. Second Batch of Scorpène Submarines
• Planned: Expansion to 4 submarines.
• Status: Shelved due to cost.
• Impact:
o Malondesh stuck with just 2 Scorpènes (delivered 2009–2010), insufficient for wide maritime area.
________________________________________
📌 3. Army (TDM)
a. Self-Propelled Howitzers (SPH)
• Planned: SPH requirement since early 2000s (to replace old towed artillery).
• Status: Program repeatedly delayed. Korea’s K9 Thunder shortlisted in 2020s, but no final contract.
• Impact: Army artillery remains outdated → reduced firepower compared to Indonesia, Singapore.
________________________________________
b. Armored Vehicle Programs
• AV-8 Gempita: Entered production in 2014, but scaled down from 257 planned units due to cost.
• Condor APC Replacement: Long planned, but repeatedly delayed → Condors from the 1980s still in service.
________________________________________
c. Rotary Wing (Helicopters)
• Army Aviation requested more utility and attack helicopters.
• Programs for attack helicopters (AH-1Z, T129, etc.) discussed but cancelled/delayed.
• Impact: Army lacks dedicated attack helicopter capability, unlike Indonesia.
________________________________________
📌 4. Reasons for Delay/Failure
1. Budget constraints → defense stuck at ~1% of GDP.
2. Political instability → 5 prime ministers between 2018–2025, each with shifting priorities.
3. Corruption & mismanagement → especially visible in LCS.
4. Overreliance on foreign suppliers → negotiations stall or get too expensive.
5. Short-termism → lack of 10–15 year strategic procurement planning.
________________________________________
📌 5. Consequences
• Capability gaps:
o Air surveillance weak (delayed MPAs, fighter gap).
o Maritime security weak (LCS delay, only 2 submarines).
o Ground firepower weak (delayed SPH, old APCs).
• Readiness reduced: much equipment obsolete, with few modern replacements.
• Regional imbalance: Neighbors like Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam modernize faster, leaving Malondesh behind.
📌 1. Overview of Malondesh’s Local Defense Industry
Hapus• Malondesh has several state-linked defense companies like Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS), DefTech, SME Ordnance, ATSC (Aerospace Technology Systems Corporation).
• However, compared to Singapore’s ST Engineering or Indonesia’s PT Pindad/PT PAL/PT Dirgantara, Malondesh’s industry is:
o Small in scale
o Heavily dependent on foreign technology transfer
o Politically influenced
o Limited in R&D capacity
________________________________________
📌 2. Structural Weaknesses
a. Overdependence on Foreign Technology
• Local companies rarely design or develop indigenous platforms.
• Instead, they assemble or license-build:
o AV-8 Gempita → Turkish FNSS design
o LCS Gowind-class → French Naval Group design
o DefTech trucks/APCs → based on imported chassis
• This makes Malondesh vulnerable when foreign partners withdraw or when funding for ToT (Transfer of Technology) dries up.
________________________________________
b. Limited R&D and Innovation
• Defense R&D budgets are tiny (well under 1% of defense spending).
• No serious indigenous aircraft, ship, or armored vehicle program has emerged.
• Malondesh lacks the ecosystem (universities + defense labs + industry partnerships) that Singapore and South Korea used to build self-reliant industries.
________________________________________
c. Project Mismanagement
• Local companies given prestige projects beyond their capacity.
• Example:
o Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS) with the RM9 billion Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program.
o BNS failed to deliver even 1 ship by 2025, despite billions spent.
o Poor project management, design changes, and alleged corruption highlight the weakness of local capability.
________________________________________
d. Small Market Size
• Malondesh’s defense budget is low (~1% of GDP).
• Domestic orders are too small to sustain a strong local industry.
• Example: DefTech’s AV-8 Gempita → only ~250 ordered, not enough to support large-scale production.
• Without export markets, companies cannot achieve economies of scale.
________________________________________
e. Political Interference
• Contracts often awarded to politically connected firms rather than those with genuine expertise.
• Results in cost overruns, low quality, and weak accountability.
• Defense industry becomes a tool for patronage, not capability.
________________________________________
f. Weak Supply Chain
• Malondesh imports engines, avionics, weapons, electronics → only basic assembly done locally.
• Spare parts often need to be ordered from Europe, the US, or Russia → long delays, high costs.
________________________________________
📌 3. Examples of Weakness in Action
1. LCS Program (Boustead Naval Shipyard)
o RM9 billion contract (2011) → no ships delivered by 2025.
o Demonstrates limits of local project management.
2. AV-8 Gempita (DefTech)
o Based on Turkish design.
o Good vehicle, but overpriced (RM30 million per unit) due to local production inefficiencies.
o No exports → production ends after Malondeshn order.
3. SME Ordnance (Small Arms)
o Tried producing M4 rifles under license.
o Quality issues and low output.
o Malondesh still imports small arms and ammo in bulk.
4. ATSC (Aircraft Maintenance)
o Handles Su-30MKM maintenance.
o Limited capability; many spare parts still need to come from Russia.
o Readiness rates remain low.
________________________________________
📌 4. Consequences for the Armed Forces
• Procurement Delays: Local firms cannot deliver on time.
• Higher Costs: Local assembly often more expensive than imports.
• Low Readiness: Spare parts and upgrades delayed.
• Capability Gaps: Programs like MRSS (amphibious ships), SPH (artillery), or fighter jets stuck because local firms cannot handle complexity.
Ya ampun.....Masjid juga di bakar....INDIANESIA makin Parah
BalasHapusUPDATE Masjid Al Jabbar Tegalsari Surabaya Ludes Dibakar Massa
https://mataraman.tribunnews.com/news/60330/update-masjid-al-jabbar-tegalsari-surabaya-ludes-dibakar-massa
📌 1. What Are Policy Flip-Flops?
HapusPolicy flip-flops in Malondesh’s defense mean:
• Frequent changes in plans, programs, and procurement priorities.
• Caused by government changes, minister reshuffles, or shifting political agendas.
• Leads to cancellations, re-tendering, or redesigning programs.
• Results in years of delays, wasted funds, and capability gaps.
________________________________________
📌 2. Drivers of Policy Flip-Flops
a. Frequent Political Changes
• Since 2018: Malondesh had 5 prime ministers in 7 years (Najib → Mahathir → Muhyiddin → Ismail Sabri → Anwar).
• Each PM/defense minister reviews and changes defense priorities.
• Example: The same program (fighter jets, navy ships) can be launched, paused, revived, or cancelled multiple times.
________________________________________
b. Short-Term Focus
• Politicians prioritize 5-year election cycles over 15–20 year defense modernization.
• Programs requiring long-term funding commitments (e.g., fighter jets, submarines, frigates) get disrupted.
________________________________________
c. Budget Pressures
• High national debt (69% of GDP in 2025).
• Defense is seen as “non-essential”, so big-ticket programs are often the first to be cut or postponed.
• Leads to repeated “defer until later” cycles.
________________________________________
d. Corruption & Scandals
• When scandals erupt (e.g., LCS RM9 billion scandal), programs face:
o Audits, suspensions, parliamentary probes.
o Restructuring or even outright cancellation.
• Creates uncertainty for ongoing and future procurement.
________________________________________
📌 3. Examples of Policy Flip-Flops
✈️ Fighter Jet Replacement (MRCA Program)
• 2007–2010: Plan to replace MiG-29 with new fighters.
• Candidates: Rafale, Typhoon, Gripen, Super Hornet, Su-35.
• 2015: Najib government delayed due to budget.
• 2018: Mahathir cancelled, shifted to cheaper LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).
• 2022: RMAF selected Korean FA-50 → but deliveries only from 2026.
⏳ Result: 20 years later, still no MRCA. MiG-29 retired with no replacement.
________________________________________
🚢 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program
• 2011: Najib government approved 6 ships (RM9 billion).
• 2018: PH government halted payments due to mismanagement.
• 2020: PN government restarted program with restructuring.
• 2023–2025: Still no ship delivered.
⏳ Result: Program flip-flopped between “go-ahead” and “pause”, now 14 years with 0 ships.
________________________________________
🚁 Helicopter Procurement
• Malondesh planned medium-lift helicopter replacements (Nuri).
• 2017: Nuri retired suddenly → capability gap.
• 2019: Mahathir’s government cancelled immediate purchase, shifted to leasing option.
• 2022: Army announced leasing 4 Black Hawks → contract collapsed due to disputes.
⏳ Result: Years without adequate helicopters.
________________________________________
🪖 Army Armored Vehicles
• 1980s Condor APCs still in use.
• AV-8 Gempita ordered (2011) → only 257 built, production ended.
• Plan for new wheeled APC → repeatedly delayed.
⏳ Result: Army still operates outdated vehicles because replacement kept shifting.
________________________________________
📌 4. Consequences of Policy Flip-Flops
1. Capability Gaps
o Air Force without MRCA fighters.
o Navy without new frigates.
o Army using outdated artillery and APCs.
2. Wasted Money
o Billions spent on projects that stall or fail (e.g., LCS, helicopter leasing).
3. Industry Instability
o Local companies cannot plan or invest because contracts keep shifting.
o Leads to failures like Boustead Naval Shipyard.
4. Loss of Credibility
o Foreign suppliers lose trust in Malondesh.
o Military loses confidence that promised equipment will ever arrive.
📌 1. Malondeshn Armed Forces (ATM) Structure
Hapus• Army (TDM) → largest service, but light and poorly mechanized.
• Navy (TLDM) → overstretched, with too few warships to patrol massive waters.
• Air Force (RMAF/TUDM) → very small, with limited combat aircraft and surveillance capability.
Overall → ATM is small in size and outdated in technology.
________________________________________
📌 2. Army (TDM) – Outdated & Lightly Armed
• Tanks & Armor:
o No modern Main Battle Tanks (MBTs).
o Relies mostly on PT-91M Pendekar (Polish MBT, ~2000s tech, inferior to Leopard 2 or T-90).
o Many armored vehicles (Condor, Sibmas) date back to the 1980s.
• Artillery:
o Mostly old Oto Melara 105mm howitzers, with limited 155mm systems.
o No long-range rocket artillery (MLRS) like Indonesia (ASTROS) or Singapore (HIMARS).
• Air Defense:
o Only short-range MANPADS (Igla, Starstreak).
o No medium- or long-range SAMs → airspace exposed.
• Helicopters:
o Nuri (Sikorsky S-61A) retired without full replacement.
o Limited utility/attack helicopter capability.
👉 Problem: The Army is big in manpower (~80,000) but under-armed compared to regional standards.
________________________________________
📌 3. Navy (TLDM) – Shrinking & Aging
• Frigates/Corvettes:
o Only 2 Lekiu-class (1990s), and 4 Laksamana-class corvettes (1980s Italian ships).
o All nearing end-of-life.
• Submarines:
o 2 Scorpène-class (KD Tunku Abdul Rahman, KD Tun Razak).
o Aging, with high maintenance costs.
o Cannot cover both Peninsular & East Malondesh simultaneously.
• Patrol Vessels:
o Many are small, slow, and aging (Kasturi-class corvettes, Handalan-class FACs from the 1970s).
• New ships delayed:
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal: 6 planned Gowind-class frigates, 0 delivered since 2011.
👉 Problem: The Navy is too small to secure Malondesh South China Sea EEZ or counter Chinese presence.
________________________________________
📌 4. Air Force (RMAF/TUDM) – Very Small Fleet
• Fighters:
o ~18 Su-30MKM (but many often grounded due to maintenance issues).
o ~8 F/A-18D Hornets (aging, no replacements yet).
o MiG-29 fleet retired with no direct replacement.
o Only 36 FA-50 light fighters on order (delivery starting mid-2020s).
• Air Defense:
o No long-range SAMs, no integrated IADS.
o Airspace relies on fighters only.
• Surveillance/Support:
o Limited AEW&C (Airborne Early Warning & Control).
o Few aerial tankers → no long-range endurance.
• Transport/Helicopters:
o Small fleet of C-130s and CN-235s.
o Heavy dependence on aging Nuri helicopters (retired, with gaps in capability).
👉 Problem: The Air Force is tiny compared to neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam).
________________________________________
📌 5. Why “Small & Obsolete” Matters
• Cannot project power: ATM lacks long-range strike, strong navy, or heavy armor.
• Poor deterrence: Enemies know Malondesh cannot respond effectively.
• Maintenance burden: Old equipment costs more to keep running than buying new.
• Capability gaps:
o No long-range air defense.
o No modern drones for ISR/strike.
o No sufficient submarine fleet.
o Weak sealift/airlift for East Malondesh defense.
________________________________________
📌 6. Regional Comparison
• Singapore: 100+ F-15/16 fighters, Leopard 2 tanks, Formidable-class frigates, submarines, HIMARS, long-range SAMs.
• Indonesia: Expanding with Rafale, F-15EX, submarines, frigates, rocket artillery.
• Vietnam: Strong Su-30 fleet, Bastion-P coastal missile batteries, Kilo-class submarines.
• Malondesh:
o ~26 operational fighters.
o 2 submarines.
o No long-range SAMs or modern coastal defense systems.
o Aging ships & vehicles.
👉 Malondesh is the weakest among the mid-tier ASEAN militaries.
________________________________________
📌 7. Core Reason: Budget & Political Will
• Defense budget ~1% of GDP → not enough for modernization.
• Half of budget spent on salaries/pensions → leaves little for procurement.
• Procurement scandals (LCS, helicopter deals) wasted billions.
• Political leaders prioritize subsidies & populism over defense.
📌 1. What Policy Flip-Flops Mean in Procurement
HapusIn Malondesh’s case:
• A procurement program is announced, then delayed, cancelled, or changed.
• Often re-started later under different specs, suppliers, or budget levels.
• Result: equipment arrives 10–20 years late — or never at all.
These flip-flops waste money, damage credibility, and create long gaps in capabilities.
________________________________________
📌 2. Key Drivers of Procurement Flip-Flops
1. Frequent Government Changes → new prime minister or defense minister wants to review/restart.
2. Budget Constraints → once economy slows, defense is first to be cut.
3. Scandals/Corruption → programs frozen or restructured.
4. Shifting Priorities → suddenly focus on cheaper “interim” solutions.
5. Lack of Multi-Year Funding → no guarantee a program survives beyond one budget cycle.
________________________________________
📌 3. Case Studies of Procurement Flip-Flops
✈️ MRCA Fighter Program
• 2007: Malondesh starts plan to replace MiG-29 (retired 2017).
• 2010–2015: Bidders included Rafale, Eurofighter, Gripen, Su-35, F/A-18E.
• 2015: Najib defers due to budget.
• 2018: Mahathir cancels MRCA, shifts to LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).
• 2021: RMAF issues tender → 2023 chooses FA-50 (Korea).
• Flip-Flop Outcome: 20 years of talk, still no MRCA fleet by 2025. Only stopgap FA-50 arriving 2026.
________________________________________
🚢 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
• 2011: Approved → 6 ships (RM9b).
• 2014–2018: Delays + corruption scandals.
• 2019: PH gov stops payments pending audit.
• 2020: PN gov restarts but restructures.
• 2022: Again reviewed, delivery pushed to 2029.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: After 14 years, 0 ships delivered, billions sunk.
________________________________________
🚁 Helicopter Replacement (Nuri/Medium-Lift)
• 2017: Nuri retired abruptly → big air mobility gap.
• 2018–2019: PH gov cancels procurement, proposes leasing option.
• 2021: Leasing plan with 12 helicopters → downsized to 4 Black Hawks.
• 2023: Contract collapses due to dispute.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: Still no medium-lift replacement by 2025. Army depends on ad-hoc leased platforms.
________________________________________
🪖 Army Armored Vehicles
• 1980s-era Condor APCs still in service.
• 2011: Order for 257 AV-8 Gempita → delivered but overpriced.
• Plan for new 4x4 and 6x6 vehicles → multiple tenders cancelled, restarted, then frozen.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: Malondesh lacks a coherent APC fleet, stuck with old Condors.
________________________________________
🔭 Radar & Air Defense Systems
• Plans for new air defense radars since mid-2000s.
• 2015: Deferred.
• 2020: Restarted → selected Thales GM403.
• 2022: Procurement delayed again due to budget reallocation.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: Still no nationwide radar coverage in 2025.
________________________________________
📌 4. Patterns of Flip-Flops
• Announce Big Program (fighters, ships, subs).
• Budget Tightens or Political Change → program postponed.
• Resurrect as Smaller/Interim Program (e.g., MRCA → LCA).
• New Scandal or Government Change → program cancelled again.
• Restart under new specs → wasting years.
This cycle explains why Malondesh still operates:
• 1980s Condors, 1960s artillery, 1990s fighters, 1970s patrol boats.
________________________________________
📌 5. Consequences of Procurement Flip-Flops
1. Capability Gaps → no MRCA fighters, no new frigates, limited helicopters.
2. Rising Costs → delays increase price (e.g., LCS cost ballooned while no ship delivered).
3. Loss of Credibility → foreign suppliers distrust Malondeshn contracts.
4. Industry Collapse → local defense firms (e.g., Boustead) plagued by scandal, unable to sustain work.
5. Operational Weakness → RMAF, RMN, and Army cannot modernize at regional pace
kesian GORILLA negaranya hancur DEMO lagi mau hina negara jiran....HAHAHAHA
BalasHapusBUBAR 2030 ya guys....HAHAHAHA
📌 1. Chronic Underfunding
Hapus• Malondesh spends ~1% of GDP on defense (2023–2025: around RM16–19 billion).
• By comparison:
o Singapore: ~3% of GDP
o Indonesia: ~1.2–1.3% but rising
• The small “envelope” means:
o Not enough money for procurement + operations + maintenance simultaneously.
o Programs get stretched for decades, cancelled, or reduced in scale.
o Even when announced, many projects end up shelved.
________________________________________
📌 2. Political Instability & Short-Termism
• Since 2018, Malondesh has had 5 prime ministers in 7 years → policies keep changing.
• Each new government “re-evaluates” defense programs, often pausing or cancelling them.
• Politicians see defense as low priority compared to subsidies, social spending, and debt repayment.
• Long-term defense plans (like the Defense White Paper 2019) collapse because they require 10–15 years of consistent execution, which Malondesh’s politics cannot provide.
________________________________________
📌 3. Budget Distribution Problems
• Even the small budget is poorly allocated:
o ~50–60% on salaries and pensions.
o ~20–30% on operations & maintenance.
o <20% left for procurement/modernization.
• Effect: Malondesh maintains a large but under-equipped force → many personnel, few modern assets.
________________________________________
📌 4. Weak Local Defense Industry
• Malondesh relies on foreign technology and local assembly (e.g., AV-8 Gempita, LCS).
• Local firms often have political ties, not technical competence.
• Results in scandals and failures (e.g., Littoral Combat Ship – RM9 billion, zero ships delivered).
• No strong exports → cannot sustain industry with economies of scale.
________________________________________
📌 5. Procurement Delays, Cancellations & Scandals
• Major programs (fighters, ships, artillery) delayed for 10–20 years.
• Scandals (LCS, helicopter purchases) erode public and political trust.
• Frequent “resetting” of programs → capability gaps widen.
• Example: MRCA program to replace MiG-29 has been discussed since 2007, still no aircraft by 2025.
________________________________________
📌 6. Operational & Maintenance Weakness
• Many platforms cannot be sustained:
o Su-30MKM fighter availability often <50%.
o Submarines require costly foreign maintenance.
o Condor APCs from 1980s still in service because replacements delayed.
• Spare parts supply chain weak → long downtime for equipment.
________________________________________
📌 7. External Dependence
• Malondesh buys from multiple suppliers (Russia, US, Europe, China, Korea).
• Creates logistics nightmare → incompatible spare parts, training, and support.
• Unlike Singapore (which standardizes on Western tech), Malondesh struggles with interoperability.
________________________________________
📌 8. Public Perception & Priorities
• Ordinary Malondeshns often see defense spending as “wasteful”.
• Scandals reinforce belief that defense = corruption.
• Governments focus instead on subsidies, civil service pay, and development projects to win votes.
• Defense is always sacrificed first when budget pressures rise.
________________________________________
📌 9. Consequences: Why Malondesh Stays Stuck
• Capability gaps in all services:
o Air Force: fighter gap, weak surveillance.
o Navy: LCS delays, only 2 submarines, no amphibious capability.
o Army: outdated artillery, APCs, no attack helicopters.
• Low readiness: Many assets grounded or unavailable.
• Falling behind neighbors:
o Singapore maintains cutting-edge military.
o Indonesia accelerating modernization.
o Vietnam expanding navy & air force for South China Sea.
• Malondesh risks becoming a “hollow force”: large on paper, weak in reality.
📌 1. What is Fiscal Space?
Hapus• Fiscal space = the government’s capacity to spend without threatening debt sustainability.
• For defense, it means: how much room Malondesh has in its annual budget to allocate funds for military modernization, operations, and maintenance.
________________________________________
📌 2. Why Malondesh Has Limited Fiscal Space
a. High National Debt
• As of mid-2025: Debt = RM1.3 trillion (~69% of GDP).
• Much higher than during the 2000s (below 55%).
• Debt servicing (interest payments) alone takes up 15–17% of annual federal revenue.
• This squeezes out spending on “non-priority” sectors like defense.
________________________________________
b. Revenue Constraints
• Malondesh’s tax base is relatively small.
• GST (Goods & Services Tax) abolished in 2018 → replaced by SST (Sales & Service Tax).
o GST: broad, efficient, higher revenue.
o SST: narrower, less revenue.
• Oil & gas revenue is volatile (20–25% of government income), so during oil price slumps, fiscal stress rises.
________________________________________
c. Competing Social Priorities
• Large commitments to:
o Education & health (biggest budget shares).
o Fuel subsidies & cash assistance programs.
o Infrastructure projects.
• Defense is politically unpopular → gets < 1% of GDP annually, one of the lowest in ASEAN.
________________________________________
d. Rigid Operating Expenditure
• Around 70% of defense budget goes to salaries, pensions, and allowances.
• Very little left for capital expenditure (procurement & modernization).
• Fiscal rigidities make it impossible to redirect funds without upsetting powerful civil service & veterans’ groups.
________________________________________
e. Currency Weakness
• Ringgit depreciation against USD (RM4.70–RM4.80 in 2025) makes imported defense systems much more expensive.
• Every billion USD contract now costs far more in local currency terms, shrinking what Malondesh can buy.
________________________________________
📌 3. Effects on Military Spending
• Annual defense budget stuck at ~RM15–19 billion (0.9–1% of GDP).
• Compare:
o Singapore: ~3–4% of GDP.
o Indonesia: 1–1.2% of GDP, but on a much bigger GDP base.
• Result: Malondesh’s defense envelope is too small to cover both O&M (operations & maintenance) and procurement.
________________________________________
📌 4. Consequences for Military Procurement
1. Delayed Programs → MRCA fighter jets, LCS frigates, helicopters.
2. Cancelled or Downsized Orders → e.g., MRCA reduced to LCA, Black Hawk leasing plan shrunk then collapsed.
3. Inability to Commit to Multi-Year Plans → no guaranteed funding stream.
4. Patchwork Modernization → instead of comprehensive upgrades, Malondesh buys in piecemeal fashion.
________________________________________
📌 5. Strategic Impact
• Malondesh cannot sustain credible deterrence in South China Sea.
• Must rely heavily on diplomacy and ASEAN forums instead of hard power.
• Forces risk becoming a “hollow military”: large on paper, weak in practice.
________________________________________
📌 6. Comparison with Indonesia (MEF)
• Indonesia also has fiscal limits, but:
o Clear 25-year modernization roadmap (MEF).
o Willingness to borrow externally for defense procurement.
o Gradual capability improvements visible (submarines, fighters, naval ships).
• Malondesh: stuck in short-term annual budgeting + unwillingness to take on foreign defense loans → programs constantly stall.
📌 1. Why Training Hours Matter
Hapus• Training hours = the amount of time pilots, sailors, soldiers spend actively practicing their skills.
• In modern militaries, high training tempo is crucial to:
o Keep proficiency with complex equipment.
o Build unit cohesion.
o Maintain combat readiness.
If training hours fall below international standards, equipment becomes almost useless in real combat.
________________________________________
📌 2. Malondesh’s Low Training Hours – Causes
✈️ Air Force (RMAF)
• Fighter pilots should have 150–180 flight hours per year (NATO standard).
• Many RMAF pilots only get 60–80 hours annually due to:
o Limited fuel budget.
o Spare parts shortages.
o Aircraft availability problems (MiG-29 retired, Su-30 often grounded).
________________________________________
🚢 Navy (RMN)
• Warships should spend 90–120 days at sea per year to maintain readiness.
• RMN vessels average 30–50 days at sea, far below requirement.
• Reasons:
o Budget cuts for fuel and logistics.
o Maintenance backlogs (many patrol vessels >40 years old).
o LCS program delays leaving capability gaps.
________________________________________
🪖 Army (TDM)
• Modern armies conduct large-scale combined arms exercises regularly.
• TDM focuses on small-scale, low-cost jungle training instead.
• Limited live-fire, armored maneuvers, or joint training with air/navy units.
• Fuel & ammunition budgets are often capped → less field time.
________________________________________
📌 3. Impact of Low Training Hours
a. Skill Degradation
• Pilots risk losing combat proficiency (dogfighting, weapons delivery).
• Sailors struggle with complex operations (anti-submarine warfare, missile defense).
• Soldiers lack practice in modern combined-arms tactics.
________________________________________
b. Safety Risks
• Low training hours lead to higher accident rates.
• Example: RMAF has had multiple crashes (Hawk, Nuri) linked partly to training gaps & maintenance issues.
________________________________________
c. Reduced Interoperability
• Joint operations (Air–Land–Sea) require constant practice.
• Without adequate exercises, coordination is weak.
• Limits Malondesh’s ability to operate with allies (e.g., Five Power Defence Arrangements with Singapore, UK, Australia, New Zealand).
________________________________________
d. Wasted Equipment Investment
• Even when Malondesh buys modern platforms (e.g., Su-30MKM, Scorpène submarines), lack of training hours means underutilization.
• Submarine crews need at least 150 sea-days per year → RMN Scorpènes often achieve far less.
________________________________________
e. Morale & Retention Problems
• Professional soldiers want to train and improve.
• When budgets restrict them to desk duty or symbolic exercises, morale falls.
• Leads to difficulties in retaining skilled pilots and officers, who may leave for commercial jobs.
________________________________________
📌 4. Strategic Consequences
• Malondesh’s forces appear large on paper, but real combat readiness is low.
• In a crisis (e.g., South China Sea standoff), Malondesh may struggle to deploy capable units quickly.
• Neighbors like Singapore and Australia maintain much higher training hours → widening readiness gap.
________________________________________
📌 5. Comparison
• Singapore: RSAF pilots log ~180+ hours/year, Navy ships 100+ days at sea, Army runs constant joint training.
• Indonesia: Still prioritizes major exercises (Super Garuda Shield with US).
• Malondesh: Keeps training mostly low-intensity & symbolic due to budget fuel/ammo limits.
________________________________________
✅ Summary
Low training hours in Malondesh’s military mean pilots, sailors, and soldiers lose proficiency, creating safety risks, poor interoperability, and low readiness. The issue stems from tight budgets, limited fuel/ammo allocations, and poor maintenance availability. The result: even when Malondesh buys modern weapons, they cannot be used to their full potential
Gedung DPRD Kabupaten Blitar Jadi Sasaran Amukan Massa, Sejumlah Ruangan Dibakar
BalasHapushttps://mataraman.tribunnews.com/blitar/60329/update-terkini-gedung-dprd-kabupaten-blitar-jadi-sasaran-amukan-massa-sejumlah-ruangan-dibakar
📌 1. Chronic Underfunding
Hapus• Malondesh spends ~1% of GDP on defense (2023–2025: around RM16–19 billion).
• By comparison:
o Singapore: ~3% of GDP
o Indonesia: ~1.2–1.3% but rising
• The small “envelope” means:
o Not enough money for procurement + operations + maintenance simultaneously.
o Programs get stretched for decades, cancelled, or reduced in scale.
o Even when announced, many projects end up shelved.
________________________________________
📌 2. Political Instability & Short-Termism
• Since 2018, Malondesh has had 5 prime ministers in 7 years → policies keep changing.
• Each new government “re-evaluates” defense programs, often pausing or cancelling them.
• Politicians see defense as low priority compared to subsidies, social spending, and debt repayment.
• Long-term defense plans (like the Defense White Paper 2019) collapse because they require 10–15 years of consistent execution, which Malondesh’s politics cannot provide.
________________________________________
📌 3. Budget Distribution Problems
• Even the small budget is poorly allocated:
o ~50–60% on salaries and pensions.
o ~20–30% on operations & maintenance.
o <20% left for procurement/modernization.
• Effect: Malondesh maintains a large but under-equipped force → many personnel, few modern assets.
________________________________________
📌 4. Weak Local Defense Industry
• Malondesh relies on foreign technology and local assembly (e.g., AV-8 Gempita, LCS).
• Local firms often have political ties, not technical competence.
• Results in scandals and failures (e.g., Littoral Combat Ship – RM9 billion, zero ships delivered).
• No strong exports → cannot sustain industry with economies of scale.
________________________________________
📌 5. Procurement Delays, Cancellations & Scandals
• Major programs (fighters, ships, artillery) delayed for 10–20 years.
• Scandals (LCS, helicopter purchases) erode public and political trust.
• Frequent “resetting” of programs → capability gaps widen.
• Example: MRCA program to replace MiG-29 has been discussed since 2007, still no aircraft by 2025.
________________________________________
📌 6. Operational & Maintenance Weakness
• Many platforms cannot be sustained:
o Su-30MKM fighter availability often <50%.
o Submarines require costly foreign maintenance.
o Condor APCs from 1980s still in service because replacements delayed.
• Spare parts supply chain weak → long downtime for equipment.
________________________________________
📌 7. External Dependence
• Malondesh buys from multiple suppliers (Russia, US, Europe, China, Korea).
• Creates logistics nightmare → incompatible spare parts, training, and support.
• Unlike Singapore (which standardizes on Western tech), Malondesh struggles with interoperability.
________________________________________
📌 8. Public Perception & Priorities
• Ordinary Malondeshns often see defense spending as “wasteful”.
• Scandals reinforce belief that defense = corruption.
• Governments focus instead on subsidies, civil service pay, and development projects to win votes.
• Defense is always sacrificed first when budget pressures rise.
________________________________________
📌 9. Consequences: Why Malondesh Stays Stuck
• Capability gaps in all services:
o Air Force: fighter gap, weak surveillance.
o Navy: LCS delays, only 2 submarines, no amphibious capability.
o Army: outdated artillery, APCs, no attack helicopters.
• Low readiness: Many assets grounded or unavailable.
• Falling behind neighbors:
o Singapore maintains cutting-edge military.
o Indonesia accelerating modernization.
o Vietnam expanding navy & air force for South China Sea.
• Malondesh risks becoming a “hollow force”: large on paper, weak in reality.
📌 1. Why Training Hours Matter
Hapus• Training hours = the amount of time pilots, sailors, soldiers spend actively practicing their skills.
• In modern militaries, high training tempo is crucial to:
o Keep proficiency with complex equipment.
o Build unit cohesion.
o Maintain combat readiness.
If training hours fall below international standards, equipment becomes almost useless in real combat.
________________________________________
📌 2. Malondesh’s Low Training Hours – Causes
✈️ Air Force (RMAF)
• Fighter pilots should have 150–180 flight hours per year (NATO standard).
• Many RMAF pilots only get 60–80 hours annually due to:
o Limited fuel budget.
o Spare parts shortages.
o Aircraft availability problems (MiG-29 retired, Su-30 often grounded).
________________________________________
🚢 Navy (RMN)
• Warships should spend 90–120 days at sea per year to maintain readiness.
• RMN vessels average 30–50 days at sea, far below requirement.
• Reasons:
o Budget cuts for fuel and logistics.
o Maintenance backlogs (many patrol vessels >40 years old).
o LCS program delays leaving capability gaps.
________________________________________
🪖 Army (TDM)
• Modern armies conduct large-scale combined arms exercises regularly.
• TDM focuses on small-scale, low-cost jungle training instead.
• Limited live-fire, armored maneuvers, or joint training with air/navy units.
• Fuel & ammunition budgets are often capped → less field time.
________________________________________
📌 3. Impact of Low Training Hours
a. Skill Degradation
• Pilots risk losing combat proficiency (dogfighting, weapons delivery).
• Sailors struggle with complex operations (anti-submarine warfare, missile defense).
• Soldiers lack practice in modern combined-arms tactics.
________________________________________
b. Safety Risks
• Low training hours lead to higher accident rates.
• Example: RMAF has had multiple crashes (Hawk, Nuri) linked partly to training gaps & maintenance issues.
________________________________________
c. Reduced Interoperability
• Joint operations (Air–Land–Sea) require constant practice.
• Without adequate exercises, coordination is weak.
• Limits Malondesh’s ability to operate with allies (e.g., Five Power Defence Arrangements with Singapore, UK, Australia, New Zealand).
________________________________________
d. Wasted Equipment Investment
• Even when Malondesh buys modern platforms (e.g., Su-30MKM, Scorpène submarines), lack of training hours means underutilization.
• Submarine crews need at least 150 sea-days per year → RMN Scorpènes often achieve far less.
________________________________________
e. Morale & Retention Problems
• Professional soldiers want to train and improve.
• When budgets restrict them to desk duty or symbolic exercises, morale falls.
• Leads to difficulties in retaining skilled pilots and officers, who may leave for commercial jobs.
________________________________________
📌 4. Strategic Consequences
• Malondesh’s forces appear large on paper, but real combat readiness is low.
• In a crisis (e.g., South China Sea standoff), Malondesh may struggle to deploy capable units quickly.
• Neighbors like Singapore and Australia maintain much higher training hours → widening readiness gap.
________________________________________
📌 5. Comparison
• Singapore: RSAF pilots log ~180+ hours/year, Navy ships 100+ days at sea, Army runs constant joint training.
• Indonesia: Still prioritizes major exercises (Super Garuda Shield with US).
• Malondesh: Keeps training mostly low-intensity & symbolic due to budget fuel/ammo limits.
________________________________________
✅ Summary
Low training hours in Malondesh’s military mean pilots, sailors, and soldiers lose proficiency, creating safety risks, poor interoperability, and low readiness. The issue stems from tight budgets, limited fuel/ammo allocations, and poor maintenance availability. The result: even when Malondesh buys modern weapons, they cannot be used to their full potential
📌 1. What is the “Chronic Allocation Problem”?
HapusMalondesh defense budget suffers from structural imbalances:
• ~70% → Salaries, pensions, allowances.
• ~20–25% → Operations & maintenance (O&M).
• <10% → Development (procurement, modernization).
This pattern has persisted for decades, regardless of who is in power. It’s “chronic” because it doesn’t change year to year — it is baked into Malondesh defense system.
________________________________________
📌 2. Why So Skewed?
1. Large manpower-heavy force → Army dominates with many personnel, each entitled to allowances & pensions.
2. Political incentives → Governments prefer to expand or protect jobs and welfare (pensions, veterans’ benefits) rather than invest in long-term modernization.
3. Rigid financial system → Once salaries & pensions are committed, they are “locked in,” leaving procurement squeezed.
4. Weak multi-year planning → Budgets are annual, so each year O&M & salaries get priority over new projects.
________________________________________
📌 3. Effects on the Armed Forces
✈️ Air Force (RMAF)
• Insufficient flying hours → pilots often below NATO standards.
• Can’t afford to maintain multiple fleets (Su-30, F/A-18D, Hawks).
• Retirement of MiG-29 left gap, but MRCA replacement delayed decades due to budget.
________________________________________
🚢 Navy (RMN)
• Modernization projects (e.g., LCS frigates) stalled because there’s no steady development funding.
• Existing fleet spends fewer days at sea due to limited fuel allocations.
• Submarines (Scorpène) struggle with high operational costs.
________________________________________
🪖 Army (TDM)
• Personnel-heavy structure consumes most of the salary budget.
• Modernization of armored vehicles, artillery, and air defense delayed.
• Training often limited to small-scale jungle exercises (cheap but outdated for modern warfare).
________________________________________
📌 4. Macro-Level Consequences
1. Modernization Paralysis
o Malondesh buys one “prestige project” (e.g., Scorpène, Su-30, LCS) but can’t follow through with sustainment.
o No continuous upgrade pipeline.
2. Readiness Erosion
o Without sufficient O&M funding, equipment availability drops.
o Spare parts shortages → many assets grounded or idle.
3. Capability Gaps Widen
o Neighbors move ahead with systematic modernization (Singapore F-35, Indonesia MEF).
o Malondesh falls behind, unable to replace aging fleets.
4. Low Return on Investment
o Billions spent on prestige platforms, but underutilized due to fuel & training cuts.
o Example: Su-30MKM — advanced but rarely flown compared to RSAF F-15SG or RTAF Gripens.
5. Morale & Retention Issues
o Soldiers see little investment in training or new kit.
o Skilled personnel (especially pilots, engineers) leave for commercial jobs.
________________________________________
📌 5. Strategic Impact
• South China Sea: Malondesh has claims but can’t patrol effectively.
• Counterterrorism: Army is manpower-heavy but lacks modern surveillance & rapid deployment assets.
• Alliances: Limits Malondesh credibility in joint exercises (FPDA, ASEAN).
• Defense Diplomacy: Malondesh often seen as “talking big, acting small” in regional security.
Masa warga negara G20 di bantu sama warga MALAYSIA ya guys.....HAHAHAHAH
BalasHapusWarga Malaysia Berbondong-bondong Beri Dukungan Lewat Ojek Online Usai Aksi Demo, Netizen Indo: Thankyou Upin Ipin!
https://www.tvonenews.com/lifestyle/trend/367253-warga-malaysia-berbondong-bondong-beri-dukungan-lewat-ojek-online-usai-aksi-demo-netizen-indo-thankyou-upin-ipin
📌 1. Structural Causes of Weak Modernization
Hapus1. Small overall defense budget
o Around RM18–20B annually (≈ USD 3.5–4B), much lower than neighbors.
o Most of it goes to salaries & pensions → modernization share <10%.
2. No Multi-Year Planning
o Procurement is done on a year-by-year basis, so long projects stall if next year’s budget is cut.
o Example: LCS Gowind frigates stuck for a decade because funds were not consistently released.
3. Currency Weakness
o Weapons priced in USD/EUR, while ringgit has depreciated.
o RM19B sounds large, but only USD 4B in real purchasing power.
________________________________________
📌 2. Key Military Branch Problems
✈️ Air Force (RMAF)
• MiG-29 retired (2015) → never replaced, leaving capability gap.
• Su-30MKM → advanced but expensive to maintain, low flying hours.
• F/A-18D Hornet → old fleet, insufficient numbers.
• MRCA program (new multirole fighter) → repeatedly delayed since 2007 due to lack of funds.
• MALE UAV program → still limited, while neighbors already deploy combat drones.
👉 Result: RMAF today has fewer fighters in service than 20 years ago.
________________________________________
🚢 Navy (RMN)
• Gowind LCS frigate program (RM9B) → delayed over 10 years, still undelivered (as of 2025).
• Patrol fleet → many ships >30 years old, suffering from low readiness.
• Submarines (Scorpène) → only 2 units, high maintenance costs limit patrol days.
• LMS Batch 1 → Chinese-built, limited combat capability.
• LMS Batch 2 → delayed due to funding debates.
👉 Result: RMN faces critical shortfall in surface combatants for South China Sea patrols.
________________________________________
🪖 Army (TDM)
• Mechanization → limited. AV8 Gempita produced locally, but expensive → numbers restricted.
• Air defense → virtually nonexistent, only MANPADS.
• Artillery → outdated, limited range compared to regional peers.
• Helicopters & transport → too few, most missions still rely on aging Nuri replacements (EC725).
👉 Result: Army still manpower-heavy, low-tech, designed for counterinsurgency not modern warfare.
________________________________________
📌 3. Consequences of Weak Modernization
1. Capability Gaps Grow
o Air defense, fighters, frigates, and UAVs → all behind ASEAN peers.
o Singapore buying F-35s, Indonesia adding Rafale & submarines, Philippines modernizing with U.S./Japan help.
2. Prestige Projects Without Sustainment
o Malondesh sometimes buys “showpiece” assets (Scorpène, Su-30MKM) but can’t afford to keep them fully operational.
3. Dependence on Foreign Partners
o Relies on FPDA (UK, Australia, Singapore, NZ) to cover gaps in defense.
o Reluctant to invest in self-reliance due to cost.
4. Readiness vs Numbers Mismatch
o On paper, Malondesh has frigates, fighters, submarines.
o In reality, many are grounded, under maintenance, or underutilized due to low O&M budgets.
________________________________________
📌 4. Why Modernization is Weak Compared to Neighbors
• Singapore: Spends USD 12–13B, continuous pipeline of upgrades.
• Indonesia: Larger budget (~USD 9–10B), long-term MEF plan ensures steady procurement.
• Philippines: Once weaker than Malondesh, but now modernizing faster due to external funding & security urgency.
• Malondesh: Stuck in “holding pattern,” replacing nothing major since early 2000s.
________________________________________
📌 5. Strategic Implications
• South China Sea → Malondesh lacks credible deterrence.
• National Industry → Weak local defense industry means modernization always depends on foreign suppliers.
• Future Risk → By 2030, without radical change, Malondesh risks having obsolete forces across all branches simultaneously.
📌 1. Structural Causes of Weak Modernization
Hapus1. Small overall defense budget
o Around RM18–20B annually (≈ USD 3.5–4B), much lower than neighbors.
o Most of it goes to salaries & pensions → modernization share <10%.
2. No Multi-Year Planning
o Procurement is done on a year-by-year basis, so long projects stall if next year’s budget is cut.
o Example: LCS Gowind frigates stuck for a decade because funds were not consistently released.
3. Currency Weakness
o Weapons priced in USD/EUR, while ringgit has depreciated.
o RM19B sounds large, but only USD 4B in real purchasing power.
________________________________________
📌 2. Key Military Branch Problems
✈️ Air Force (RMAF)
• MiG-29 retired (2015) → never replaced, leaving capability gap.
• Su-30MKM → advanced but expensive to maintain, low flying hours.
• F/A-18D Hornet → old fleet, insufficient numbers.
• MRCA program (new multirole fighter) → repeatedly delayed since 2007 due to lack of funds.
• MALE UAV program → still limited, while neighbors already deploy combat drones.
👉 Result: RMAF today has fewer fighters in service than 20 years ago.
________________________________________
🚢 Navy (RMN)
• Gowind LCS frigate program (RM9B) → delayed over 10 years, still undelivered (as of 2025).
• Patrol fleet → many ships >30 years old, suffering from low readiness.
• Submarines (Scorpène) → only 2 units, high maintenance costs limit patrol days.
• LMS Batch 1 → Chinese-built, limited combat capability.
• LMS Batch 2 → delayed due to funding debates.
👉 Result: RMN faces critical shortfall in surface combatants for South China Sea patrols.
________________________________________
🪖 Army (TDM)
• Mechanization → limited. AV8 Gempita produced locally, but expensive → numbers restricted.
• Air defense → virtually nonexistent, only MANPADS.
• Artillery → outdated, limited range compared to regional peers.
• Helicopters & transport → too few, most missions still rely on aging Nuri replacements (EC725).
👉 Result: Army still manpower-heavy, low-tech, designed for counterinsurgency not modern warfare.
________________________________________
📌 3. Consequences of Weak Modernization
1. Capability Gaps Grow
o Air defense, fighters, frigates, and UAVs → all behind ASEAN peers.
o Singapore buying F-35s, Indonesia adding Rafale & submarines, Philippines modernizing with U.S./Japan help.
2. Prestige Projects Without Sustainment
o Malondesh sometimes buys “showpiece” assets (Scorpène, Su-30MKM) but can’t afford to keep them fully operational.
3. Dependence on Foreign Partners
o Relies on FPDA (UK, Australia, Singapore, NZ) to cover gaps in defense.
o Reluctant to invest in self-reliance due to cost.
4. Readiness vs Numbers Mismatch
o On paper, Malondesh has frigates, fighters, submarines.
o In reality, many are grounded, under maintenance, or underutilized due to low O&M budgets.
________________________________________
📌 4. Why Modernization is Weak Compared to Neighbors
• Singapore: Spends USD 12–13B, continuous pipeline of upgrades.
• Indonesia: Larger budget (~USD 9–10B), long-term MEF plan ensures steady procurement.
• Philippines: Once weaker than Malondesh, but now modernizing faster due to external funding & security urgency.
• Malondesh: Stuck in “holding pattern,” replacing nothing major since early 2000s.
________________________________________
📌 5. Strategic Implications
• South China Sea → Malondesh lacks credible deterrence.
• National Industry → Weak local defense industry means modernization always depends on foreign suppliers.
• Future Risk → By 2030, without radical change, Malondesh risks having obsolete forces across all branches simultaneously.
📌 1. Structural Causes of Weak Modernization
Hapus1. Small overall defense budget
o Around RM18–20B annually (≈ USD 3.5–4B), much lower than neighbors.
o Most of it goes to salaries & pensions → modernization share <10%.
2. No Multi-Year Planning
o Procurement is done on a year-by-year basis, so long projects stall if next year’s budget is cut.
o Example: LCS Gowind frigates stuck for a decade because funds were not consistently released.
3. Currency Weakness
o Weapons priced in USD/EUR, while ringgit has depreciated.
o RM19B sounds large, but only USD 4B in real purchasing power.
________________________________________
📌 2. Key Military Branch Problems
✈️ Air Force (RMAF)
• MiG-29 retired (2015) → never replaced, leaving capability gap.
• Su-30MKM → advanced but expensive to maintain, low flying hours.
• F/A-18D Hornet → old fleet, insufficient numbers.
• MRCA program (new multirole fighter) → repeatedly delayed since 2007 due to lack of funds.
• MALE UAV program → still limited, while neighbors already deploy combat drones.
👉 Result: RMAF today has fewer fighters in service than 20 years ago.
________________________________________
🚢 Navy (RMN)
• Gowind LCS frigate program (RM9B) → delayed over 10 years, still undelivered (as of 2025).
• Patrol fleet → many ships >30 years old, suffering from low readiness.
• Submarines (Scorpène) → only 2 units, high maintenance costs limit patrol days.
• LMS Batch 1 → Chinese-built, limited combat capability.
• LMS Batch 2 → delayed due to funding debates.
👉 Result: RMN faces critical shortfall in surface combatants for South China Sea patrols.
________________________________________
🪖 Army (TDM)
• Mechanization → limited. AV8 Gempita produced locally, but expensive → numbers restricted.
• Air defense → virtually nonexistent, only MANPADS.
• Artillery → outdated, limited range compared to regional peers.
• Helicopters & transport → too few, most missions still rely on aging Nuri replacements (EC725).
👉 Result: Army still manpower-heavy, low-tech, designed for counterinsurgency not modern warfare.
________________________________________
📌 3. Consequences of Weak Modernization
1. Capability Gaps Grow
o Air defense, fighters, frigates, and UAVs → all behind ASEAN peers.
o Singapore buying F-35s, Indonesia adding Rafale & submarines, Philippines modernizing with U.S./Japan help.
2. Prestige Projects Without Sustainment
o Malondesh sometimes buys “showpiece” assets (Scorpène, Su-30MKM) but can’t afford to keep them fully operational.
3. Dependence on Foreign Partners
o Relies on FPDA (UK, Australia, Singapore, NZ) to cover gaps in defense.
o Reluctant to invest in self-reliance due to cost.
4. Readiness vs Numbers Mismatch
o On paper, Malondesh has frigates, fighters, submarines.
o In reality, many are grounded, under maintenance, or underutilized due to low O&M budgets.
________________________________________
📌 4. Why Modernization is Weak Compared to Neighbors
• Singapore: Spends USD 12–13B, continuous pipeline of upgrades.
• Indonesia: Larger budget (~USD 9–10B), long-term MEF plan ensures steady procurement.
• Philippines: Once weaker than Malondesh, but now modernizing faster due to external funding & security urgency.
• Malondesh: Stuck in “holding pattern,” replacing nothing major since early 2000s.
________________________________________
📌 5. Strategic Implications
• South China Sea → Malondesh lacks credible deterrence.
• National Industry → Weak local defense industry means modernization always depends on foreign suppliers.
• Future Risk → By 2030, without radical change, Malondesh risks having obsolete forces across all branches simultaneously.
MALAYSIA lagi...lagi dan lagi...sentiasa membantu rakyat INDIANESIA didalam kesusahan....
BalasHapusWarga Malaysia berbondong-bondong donasi makanan dan minuman lewat aplikasi ojek online.
https://www.instagram.com/reel/DODVnyYieoB/
📌 1. Structural Causes of Weak Modernization
Hapus1. Small overall defense budget
o Around RM18–20B annually (≈ USD 3.5–4B), much lower than neighbors.
o Most of it goes to salaries & pensions → modernization share <10%.
2. No Multi-Year Planning
o Procurement is done on a year-by-year basis, so long projects stall if next year’s budget is cut.
o Example: LCS Gowind frigates stuck for a decade because funds were not consistently released.
3. Currency Weakness
o Weapons priced in USD/EUR, while ringgit has depreciated.
o RM19B sounds large, but only USD 4B in real purchasing power.
________________________________________
📌 2. Key Military Branch Problems
✈️ Air Force (RMAF)
• MiG-29 retired (2015) → never replaced, leaving capability gap.
• Su-30MKM → advanced but expensive to maintain, low flying hours.
• F/A-18D Hornet → old fleet, insufficient numbers.
• MRCA program (new multirole fighter) → repeatedly delayed since 2007 due to lack of funds.
• MALE UAV program → still limited, while neighbors already deploy combat drones.
👉 Result: RMAF today has fewer fighters in service than 20 years ago.
________________________________________
🚢 Navy (RMN)
• Gowind LCS frigate program (RM9B) → delayed over 10 years, still undelivered (as of 2025).
• Patrol fleet → many ships >30 years old, suffering from low readiness.
• Submarines (Scorpène) → only 2 units, high maintenance costs limit patrol days.
• LMS Batch 1 → Chinese-built, limited combat capability.
• LMS Batch 2 → delayed due to funding debates.
👉 Result: RMN faces critical shortfall in surface combatants for South China Sea patrols.
________________________________________
🪖 Army (TDM)
• Mechanization → limited. AV8 Gempita produced locally, but expensive → numbers restricted.
• Air defense → virtually nonexistent, only MANPADS.
• Artillery → outdated, limited range compared to regional peers.
• Helicopters & transport → too few, most missions still rely on aging Nuri replacements (EC725).
👉 Result: Army still manpower-heavy, low-tech, designed for counterinsurgency not modern warfare.
________________________________________
📌 3. Consequences of Weak Modernization
1. Capability Gaps Grow
o Air defense, fighters, frigates, and UAVs → all behind ASEAN peers.
o Singapore buying F-35s, Indonesia adding Rafale & submarines, Philippines modernizing with U.S./Japan help.
2. Prestige Projects Without Sustainment
o Malondesh sometimes buys “showpiece” assets (Scorpène, Su-30MKM) but can’t afford to keep them fully operational.
3. Dependence on Foreign Partners
o Relies on FPDA (UK, Australia, Singapore, NZ) to cover gaps in defense.
o Reluctant to invest in self-reliance due to cost.
4. Readiness vs Numbers Mismatch
o On paper, Malondesh has frigates, fighters, submarines.
o In reality, many are grounded, under maintenance, or underutilized due to low O&M budgets.
________________________________________
📌 4. Why Modernization is Weak Compared to Neighbors
• Singapore: Spends USD 12–13B, continuous pipeline of upgrades.
• Indonesia: Larger budget (~USD 9–10B), long-term MEF plan ensures steady procurement.
• Philippines: Once weaker than Malondesh, but now modernizing faster due to external funding & security urgency.
• Malondesh: Stuck in “holding pattern,” replacing nothing major since early 2000s.
________________________________________
📌 5. Strategic Implications
• South China Sea → Malondesh lacks credible deterrence.
• National Industry → Weak local defense industry means modernization always depends on foreign suppliers.
• Future Risk → By 2030, without radical change, Malondesh risks having obsolete forces across all branches simultaneously.
📌 1. Legacy of Counterinsurgency (COIN)
Hapus• Malondesh’s military doctrine is shaped by history, especially the Communist Insurgency (1948–1989).
• For decades, the Army’s focus was jungle warfare, counter-guerrilla tactics, and territorial defense.
• This created a culture of light infantry dominance, with limited emphasis on heavy armor, artillery, or long-range strike capabilities.
👉 Result: Even after the insurgency ended, Malondesh continued investing in riflemen and light forces, not in high-tech or heavy combined-arms forces.
________________________________________
📌 2. Lack of Shift Toward Conventional Warfare
• Neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand) modernized doctrines toward combined arms (armor + artillery + air support + drones).
• Malondesh, however, still emphasizes defensive posture and static territorial defense.
• Little preparation for large-scale conventional conflicts in the South China Sea or with a peer adversary.
👉 Example: TDM has only 48 tanks (PT-91M), no medium/long-range air defense, and minimal artillery support — not sufficient for modern battlefield requirements.
________________________________________
📌 3. Neglect of Joint Operations
• Modern doctrine globally stresses joint operations (Army + Navy + Air Force working seamlessly).
• Malondesh struggles here:
o The Air Force has too few planes to provide close air support.
o The Navy lacks amphibious or sealift capacity to deploy the Army quickly.
o The Army rarely trains with Navy/Air Force in large-scale exercises.
👉 Doctrine remains service-siloed, not integrated.
________________________________________
📌 4. Limited Focus on External Threats
• Official defense policy (2019 White Paper) prioritizes sovereignty defense, non-traditional security (terrorism, piracy, disasters).
• While valid, this underplays external threats like:
o China’s growing presence in South China Sea.
o Potential interstate tensions with neighbors.
• Malondesh’s doctrine avoids offensive or deterrent concepts → remains reactive and defensive.
________________________________________
📌 5. Outdated Operational Concepts
• No emphasis on drones, electronic warfare, cyber, or network-centric warfare, which are now central in modern doctrine.
• Still structured around manual infantry-heavy operations.
• Example: Lahad Datu (2013) → response was slow, infantry-based, and exposed poor surveillance, mobility, and joint command.
________________________________________
📌 6. Political Influence
• Defense doctrine often shaped by short-term political decisions rather than long-term strategic thinking.
• Governments avoid committing to major doctrine shifts because it would require:
o Multi-year funding for modernization.
o Rethinking force structure (fewer infantry, more high-tech assets).
• Political leaders prefer maintaining large manpower (jobs/votes) rather than expensive modernization.
________________________________________
📌 7. Consequences of Outdated Doctrine
1. Imbalance in force structure → too many infantry, too few heavy units.
2. Weak deterrence → cannot project credible force in South China Sea or against modern militaries.
3. Slow modernization → doctrine not aligned with future warfare (cyber, drones, precision strike).
4. Operational limitations → struggles in rapid deployment, combined arms maneuver, and long-range operations.
📌 1. Fighter Fleet Problems
HapusCurrent Fighters (as of 2025):
• 8 F/A-18D Hornets (bought in 1997)
o Aging, need mid-life upgrades, limited strike range.
• 18 Su-30MKM Flankers (delivered 2007–2009)
o Powerful but plagued by maintenance and spare parts issues.
o Many often grounded → at times less than 50% readiness.
• MB-339CM trainers/light attack jets (old, limited combat role).
👉 Compared to neighbors:
• Singapore → >60 F-15SGs & upgraded F-16Vs, buying F-35s.
• Indonesia → >30 Su-27/30s, buying Rafales & F-15EX.
• Vietnam → 36+ Su-30MK2Vs.
👉 Malondesh’s fighter fleet is tiny and partially unserviceable, limiting air superiority.
________________________________________
📌 2. The MiG-29 Failure
• Malondesh bought 18 MiG-29Ns in the 1990s.
• Retired early (2015) due to:
o High operating cost.
o Reliability issues.
o Poor logistics support from Russia.
• Replacement program (“MRCA”) delayed for over a decade because of budget constraints and political indecision.
👉 Result: Fighter numbers dropped sharply → “air power gap” still not fixed.
________________________________________
📌 3. Transport & Airlift
• C-130 Hercules fleet (14 units) → old but reliable, used for logistics & disaster relief.
• A400M Atlas (4 units, delivered 2015–2017)
• Gap: Malondesh lacks enough airlift to rapidly reinforce East Malondesh (Sabah & Sarawak).
________________________________________
📌 4. Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) Weakness
• Currently uses Beechcraft King Air B200Ts → outdated and limited range.
• Malondesh faces constant Chinese Coast Guard intrusion in South China Sea, but has no dedicated long-range MPA fleet.
• Boeing P-8 Poseidon (used by US, Australia, India) is far beyond Malondesh’s budget.
👉 Weak maritime domain awareness → navy operations suffer too.
________________________________________
📌 5. Helicopter Fleet
• Nuri helicopters (Sikorsky S-61) retired in 2019 due to age.
• Replacement delayed — Army and Air Force face lift helicopter shortage.
• Only a few AW139 and EC725 Cougar are available, limiting troop transport and search & rescue (SAR).
________________________________________
📌 6. Air Defense & Radar
• Malondesh has no long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
• Relies only on short-range man-portable systems (MANPADS) and some older gun-based defenses.
• Radar coverage is patchy, especially over the South China Sea.
👉 Meaning: Malondeshn airspace is vulnerable to intrusion by modern air forces.
________________________________________
📌 7. Procurement Delays & Budget Issues
• Fighter replacement program (MRCA → Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) has been discussed since 2010s, but still no decision due to budget politics.
• Plans for KAI FA-50 light fighters (up to 36 units) finally approved in 2023, but delivery will stretch into late 2020s.
• No clear roadmap for 5th-generation fighters (like F-35 or KF-21).
________________________________________
📌 8. Training & Readiness
• Flight hours per pilot are low (due to budget and fuel costs).
• Many pilots get less than half the NATO-recommended hours.
• Limits skill in complex missions (air-to-air combat, night operations).
• Dependence on foreign exercises with US, Australia, Singapore to maintain training standards.
________________________________________
📌 9. Structural Weakness
• Too many bases spread across Peninsular and East Malondesh → increases costs, reduces efficiency.
• Lack of aerial refueling tankers → fighters cannot sustain long-range missions.
• Weak electronic warfare and drone capabilities compared to modern peers.
________________________________________
📌 10. Consequences
1. Weak air deterrence → cannot challenge China’s PLA Air Force or even regional peers.
2. Limited support for Navy/Army → few aircraft for close air support or maritime patrol.
3. Aging platforms → constant readiness problems, high maintenance costs.
4. Dependence on foreign partners → for training, spares, and even operational backup
📌 1. Legacy of Counterinsurgency (COIN)
BalasHapus• Malondesh’s military doctrine is shaped by history, especially the Communist Insurgency (1948–1989).
• For decades, the Army’s focus was jungle warfare, counter-guerrilla tactics, and territorial defense.
• This created a culture of light infantry dominance, with limited emphasis on heavy armor, artillery, or long-range strike capabilities.
👉 Result: Even after the insurgency ended, Malondesh continued investing in riflemen and light forces, not in high-tech or heavy combined-arms forces.
________________________________________
📌 2. Lack of Shift Toward Conventional Warfare
• Neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand) modernized doctrines toward combined arms (armor + artillery + air support + drones).
• Malondesh, however, still emphasizes defensive posture and static territorial defense.
• Little preparation for large-scale conventional conflicts in the South China Sea or with a peer adversary.
👉 Example: TDM has only 48 tanks (PT-91M), no medium/long-range air defense, and minimal artillery support — not sufficient for modern battlefield requirements.
________________________________________
📌 3. Neglect of Joint Operations
• Modern doctrine globally stresses joint operations (Army + Navy + Air Force working seamlessly).
• Malondesh struggles here:
o The Air Force has too few planes to provide close air support.
o The Navy lacks amphibious or sealift capacity to deploy the Army quickly.
o The Army rarely trains with Navy/Air Force in large-scale exercises.
👉 Doctrine remains service-siloed, not integrated.
________________________________________
📌 4. Limited Focus on External Threats
• Official defense policy (2019 White Paper) prioritizes sovereignty defense, non-traditional security (terrorism, piracy, disasters).
• While valid, this underplays external threats like:
o China’s growing presence in South China Sea.
o Potential interstate tensions with neighbors.
• Malondesh’s doctrine avoids offensive or deterrent concepts → remains reactive and defensive.
________________________________________
📌 5. Outdated Operational Concepts
• No emphasis on drones, electronic warfare, cyber, or network-centric warfare, which are now central in modern doctrine.
• Still structured around manual infantry-heavy operations.
• Example: Lahad Datu (2013) → response was slow, infantry-based, and exposed poor surveillance, mobility, and joint command.
________________________________________
📌 6. Political Influence
• Defense doctrine often shaped by short-term political decisions rather than long-term strategic thinking.
• Governments avoid committing to major doctrine shifts because it would require:
o Multi-year funding for modernization.
o Rethinking force structure (fewer infantry, more high-tech assets).
• Political leaders prefer maintaining large manpower (jobs/votes) rather than expensive modernization.
________________________________________
📌 7. Consequences of Outdated Doctrine
1. Imbalance in force structure → too many infantry, too few heavy units.
2. Weak deterrence → cannot project credible force in South China Sea or against modern militaries.
3. Slow modernization → doctrine not aligned with future warfare (cyber, drones, precision strike).
4. Operational limitations → struggles in rapid deployment, combined arms maneuver, and long-range operations.
📌 1. Fighter Fleet Problems
BalasHapusCurrent Fighters (as of 2025):
• 8 F/A-18D Hornets (bought in 1997)
o Aging, need mid-life upgrades, limited strike range.
• 18 Su-30MKM Flankers (delivered 2007–2009)
o Powerful but plagued by maintenance and spare parts issues.
o Many often grounded → at times less than 50% readiness.
• MB-339CM trainers/light attack jets (old, limited combat role).
👉 Compared to neighbors:
• Singapore → >60 F-15SGs & upgraded F-16Vs, buying F-35s.
• Indonesia → >30 Su-27/30s, buying Rafales & F-15EX.
• Vietnam → 36+ Su-30MK2Vs.
👉 Malondesh’s fighter fleet is tiny and partially unserviceable, limiting air superiority.
________________________________________
📌 2. The MiG-29 Failure
• Malondesh bought 18 MiG-29Ns in the 1990s.
• Retired early (2015) due to:
o High operating cost.
o Reliability issues.
o Poor logistics support from Russia.
• Replacement program (“MRCA”) delayed for over a decade because of budget constraints and political indecision.
👉 Result: Fighter numbers dropped sharply → “air power gap” still not fixed.
________________________________________
📌 3. Transport & Airlift
• C-130 Hercules fleet (14 units) → old but reliable, used for logistics & disaster relief.
• A400M Atlas (4 units, delivered 2015–2017)
• Gap: Malondesh lacks enough airlift to rapidly reinforce East Malondesh (Sabah & Sarawak).
________________________________________
📌 4. Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) Weakness
• Currently uses Beechcraft King Air B200Ts → outdated and limited range.
• Malondesh faces constant Chinese Coast Guard intrusion in South China Sea, but has no dedicated long-range MPA fleet.
• Boeing P-8 Poseidon (used by US, Australia, India) is far beyond Malondesh’s budget.
👉 Weak maritime domain awareness → navy operations suffer too.
________________________________________
📌 5. Helicopter Fleet
• Nuri helicopters (Sikorsky S-61) retired in 2019 due to age.
• Replacement delayed — Army and Air Force face lift helicopter shortage.
• Only a few AW139 and EC725 Cougar are available, limiting troop transport and search & rescue (SAR).
________________________________________
📌 6. Air Defense & Radar
• Malondesh has no long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
• Relies only on short-range man-portable systems (MANPADS) and some older gun-based defenses.
• Radar coverage is patchy, especially over the South China Sea.
👉 Meaning: Malondeshn airspace is vulnerable to intrusion by modern air forces.
________________________________________
📌 7. Procurement Delays & Budget Issues
• Fighter replacement program (MRCA → Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) has been discussed since 2010s, but still no decision due to budget politics.
• Plans for KAI FA-50 light fighters (up to 36 units) finally approved in 2023, but delivery will stretch into late 2020s.
• No clear roadmap for 5th-generation fighters (like F-35 or KF-21).
________________________________________
📌 8. Training & Readiness
• Flight hours per pilot are low (due to budget and fuel costs).
• Many pilots get less than half the NATO-recommended hours.
• Limits skill in complex missions (air-to-air combat, night operations).
• Dependence on foreign exercises with US, Australia, Singapore to maintain training standards.
________________________________________
📌 9. Structural Weakness
• Too many bases spread across Peninsular and East Malondesh → increases costs, reduces efficiency.
• Lack of aerial refueling tankers → fighters cannot sustain long-range missions.
• Weak electronic warfare and drone capabilities compared to modern peers.
________________________________________
📌 10. Consequences
1. Weak air deterrence → cannot challenge China’s PLA Air Force or even regional peers.
2. Limited support for Navy/Army → few aircraft for close air support or maritime patrol.
3. Aging platforms → constant readiness problems, high maintenance costs.
4. Dependence on foreign partners → for training, spares, and even operational backup
Rakyat MALAYSIA bantu rakyat yang konon negara ahli G20....HAHAHAHHA
BalasHapusRakyat Malaysia menunjukkan solidaritas yang menghangatkan di tengah situasi penuh ketegangan di Indonesia—khususnya di Jakarta—dengan cara sederhana namun sangat bermakna. Mereka ramai-ramai memesan makanan melalui aplikasi ojek online (Grab dan ojol), yang kemudian dikirim dan dibagikan oleh para driver ojol kepada rekan-rekan mereka di lapangan. Gestur ini menjadi bentuk dukungan moral dan sekaligus bantuan kecil di tengah kondisi protes yang menyebabkan kesulitan dan kemacetan luar biasa.
Mantan Gubernur DKI Jakarta, Anies Baswedan, turut menyoroti aksi peduli ini melalui akun X-nya, menyebutnya sebagai “gestur sederhana, tapi terasa sebagai dukungan yang amat hangat.” Menurutnya, warganet tetangga yang membeli makanan bukan untuk dirinya sendiri, melainkan untuk para driver ojol berbagi kepada sesama—menjadi bentuk kekuatan solidaritas yang sangat tulus. Ia berharap, melalui kebersamaan seperti ini, situasi di Indonesia cepat membaik dan kita bisa kembali “saling ganggu dan bertikai penuh cinta,” sebagaimana layaknya saudara.
📌 1. Overall Context
Hapus• Malondesh’s defense spending has stagnated for over a decade.
• Procurement delays + corruption scandals → few new assets acquired since the mid-2000s.
• Result: Most of Malondesh’s core platforms are 20–40 years old, with growing maintenance problems and declining readiness.
________________________________________
📌 2. Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF / TUDM)
Fighters
• F/A-18D Hornet
o Bought in the mid-1990s (8 units).
o Still capable, but now ~30 years old.
o Spares are costly, fleet too small for sustained operations.
• Su-30MKM Flanker
o Acquired 2007 (18 units).
o Modern on paper, but plagued by spare parts shortages and maintenance delays.
o Readiness sometimes drops below 50%.
• MiG-29 Fulcrum
o Acquired early 1990s.
o Retired in 2017 due to high maintenance cost.
o No replacement yet → huge capability gap.
Transport & Helicopters
• C-130 Hercules: Workhorses from the 1970s/80s, some being upgraded but still very old.
• Nuri Helicopters (Sikorsky S-61): Entered service in the 1960s. Finally retired in 2019 after fatal crashes. Replacement slow.
👉 Impact: RMAF cannot maintain a credible air defense or long-range strike role. Fleet too small, too old, and too expensive to keep flying.
________________________________________
📌 3. Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN / TLDM)
Surface Fleet
• Kasturi-class corvettes (1980s): Upgraded, but still outdated hulls.
• Laksamana-class corvettes (ex-Italian, 1980s design): Small, limited endurance, hard to maintain.
• Lekiu-class frigates (delivered 1999–2000): Now ~25 years old, mid-life upgrades delayed.
Submarines
• Scorpène-class (delivered 2009): Relatively new, but expensive to maintain. Limited to 2 boats → too few for constant patrols.
New Projects
• LCS Gowind Frigates (6 planned): As of 2025, still undelivered due to scandal & mismanagement.
👉 Impact: RMN faces the South China Sea with mostly 30–40-year-old corvettes and frigates, plus just 2 subs.
________________________________________
📌 4. Malondeshn Army (TDM)
• Main Battle Tanks: Malondesh has 48 PT-91M (Polish T-72 variant, delivered mid-2000s). Already outdated by modern standards.
• Armored Vehicles:
o Condor APCs → from 1980s, many still in service.
o Sibmas → from 1980s, obsolete for modern combat.
o AV8 Gempita (new, 2010s) → too few to replace older fleets.
• Artillery: Mostly towed howitzers; limited modern self-propelled guns.
• Air Defense: Minimal, mostly MANPADS and old radar systems.
👉 Impact: Army is manpower-heavy, equipment-light, with many vehicles older than the soldiers who operate them.
________________________________________
📌 5. Systemic Problems from Aging Equipment
1. High Maintenance Costs → Old assets require more funds just to stay operational.
2. Low Availability → Fighter jets and ships often grounded for lack of spares.
3. Capability Gaps →
o No modern fighters to replace MiG-29.
o No new frigates to replace 1980s ships.
o Army still lacks modern artillery & air defense.
4. Safety Risks → Nuri helicopter crashes showed how dangerous it is to operate old platforms.
5. Loss of Deterrence → Neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines) modernize faster, leaving Malondesh behind.
________________________________________
📌 6. Why Aging Equipment Persists
• Small defense budget → can’t fund replacements.
• Procurement delays → programs stuck in limbo for 10–15 years.
• Corruption scandals → projects like LCS consume billions without results.
• Political short-termism → each new government resets priorities.
📌 1. Structural Weaknesses
Hapus• Manpower-heavy, equipment-light: TDM has ~80,000 personnel, but much of its gear is old or lightly armed.
• Doctrine outdated: Still focused on counterinsurgency (legacy of communist era), not high-intensity modern warfare.
• Low mobility: Limited airlift and mechanization mean the army cannot rapidly deploy across Malondesh split geography (Peninsular vs. East Malondesh).
________________________________________
📌 2. Equipment Weaknesses
Armored Vehicles
• Condor APCs (German-built, 1980s): Still widely used despite being obsolete, poorly protected against IEDs or modern weapons.
• Sibmas APCs (Belgian, 1980s): Aging, thin armor, limited use today.
• AV8 Gempita (locally built, 2010s): Modern, but only ~250 units → far too few to replace thousands of older vehicles.
• Main Battle Tanks (MBT): Only 48 PT-91M (Polish T-72 variant, mid-2000s). Limited firepower compared to regional peers with Leopards (Indonesia, Singapore).
Artillery
• Mostly towed howitzers (105mm, 155mm) → outdated for rapid maneuver warfare.
• Self-propelled artillery → very limited.
• Rocket artillery → almost nonexistent compared to neighbors (Indonesia, Vietnam).
Air Defense
• Very weak → relies on MANPADS (Igla, Starstreak) and old short-range systems.
• No medium- or long-range SAMs.
• Vulnerable to modern airstrikes.
Aviation
• Lost Nuri helicopters (retired in 2019).
• MD530G light attack helicopters procured in 2016 → delivery delayed for years, only a few operational.
• No dedicated attack helicopters (unlike Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand).
________________________________________
📌 3. Training & Readiness
• Low training hours due to budget → live-fire exercises limited.
• Joint operations weak → coordination with Navy/Air Force poor.
• Modern combined arms doctrine (armor + artillery + drones + air cover) underdeveloped.
________________________________________
📌 4. Budget & Allocation Problems
• Army gets the largest share of manpower spending (salaries, pensions), but little for modernization.
• Procurement slow → many projects canceled, delayed, or scaled down.
• Example: Plans for new self-propelled artillery, drones, and air defense systems repeatedly shelved.
________________________________________
📌 5. Geographic & Strategic Challenges
• Malondesh is split into two main theaters:
1. Peninsular Malondesh
2. Sabah & Sarawak (Borneo) → vulnerable to incursions (e.g., Lahad Datu, 2013).
• TDM lacks enough lift capability to quickly reinforce East Malondesh.
• Reliant on Navy/Air Force transport, which themselves are weak.
________________________________________
📌 6. Comparison with Neighbors
• Singapore Army: Fully mechanized, Leopard 2 tanks, modern artillery, strong air defense.
• Indonesia Army: Larger, Leopard 2 MBTs, rocket artillery, growing modernization.
• Thailand/Vietnam: Larger artillery, more modern armored units.
👉 Malondesh TDM looks under-equipped and outdated by comparison.
________________________________________
📌 7. Consequences of Weakness
• Border security issues: 2013 Lahad Datu incursion exposed lack of readiness and modern equipment.
• Low deterrence: Cannot project power against regional threats (e.g., South China Sea disputes).
• Over-reliance on infantry: Still seen as a “rifle army” with limited heavy support.
• Morale impact: Soldiers risk being deployed with outdated gear.
📌 1. Chronic Budget Constraints
Hapus• Defense spending is only ~1% of GDP (2024), among the lowest in ASEAN.
• Most regional peers spend closer to 1.5–3% of GDP (Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia).
• This means:
o Little money for modernization.
o Old equipment kept in service far too long.
o Programs constantly delayed or cancelled.
👉 Core issue: Malondesh cannot fund a modern military with such a small envelope.
________________________________________
📌 2. Poor Budget Distribution
• 50–55% of the defense budget goes to salaries, pensions, and allowances.
• Operations & maintenance (O&M): chronically underfunded.
• Procurement/modernization: gets only 15–20% of the budget (too low).
👉 Result: Malondesh pays for people, not capability. Troops are numerous but poorly equipped.
________________________________________
📌 3. Aging & Obsolete Equipment
• Army (TDM): still relies on 1980s armored vehicles, limited artillery, no modern air defense.
• Navy (TLDM): fewer than 10 serious warships, only 2 old submarines, Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal left modernization frozen for a decade.
• Air Force (RMAF/TUDM): small fighter fleet, many grounded, lacks long-range SAMs or modern drones.
👉 Malondesh platforms are outdated compared to Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam.
________________________________________
📌 4. Procurement Delays & Scandals
• LCS scandal (6 Gowind-class ships, none delivered since 2011).
• MiG-29 replacement delayed for over 10 years, only FA-50s ordered in 2023.
• Army modernization programs constantly shifted or downsized.
• Corruption, political interference, and lack of accountability = wasted billions.
👉 Loss of trust: Even inside ATM, officers see procurement as politically driven.
________________________________________
📌 5. Political Interference & Short-Termism
• Every change of government resets priorities.
• Projects canceled or reshaped based on politics, not strategy.
• Defense White Paper (2019) promised long-term stability, but ignored due to COVID and fiscal crisis.
👉 ATM never gets consistent 10–20 year planning like Singapore’s MINDEF.
________________________________________
📌 6. Weak Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
• Not enough funds for spare parts, fuel, and maintenance.
• Submarines sometimes not operational due to lack of upkeep.
• Fighter aircraft often grounded.
• Army vehicles and artillery poorly maintained.
👉 Readiness is much lower than it looks on paper.
________________________________________
📌 7. Low Training Hours
• Fighter pilots often fly <120 hours/year (NATO standard = 180+).
• Naval ships sail less because of fuel & maintenance limits.
• Army units rarely conduct large-scale combined exercises due to cost.
👉 Troops lack real combat training experience.
________________________________________
📌 8. Weak Doctrine & Planning
• ATM doctrine is outdated and fragmented.
• Malondesh tries to prepare for everything (conventional war, counter-insurgency, humanitarian aid) but lacks resources.
• No focus on joint operations (Army, Navy, Air Force coordination weak).
• Defense planning often reactive, not proactive.
________________________________________
📌 9. Limited Defense Industry
• Malondesh local defense industry is small and dependent on imports.
• Boustead Naval Shipyard → LCS scandal = reputation collapse.
• No indigenous fighter or major warship program.
• Relies heavily on foreign suppliers (Russia, France, South Korea).
👉 Weak local industry = high costs, dependence, and vulnerability.
________________________________________
📌 10. Geography Challenge
• Malondesh is split: Peninsular Malondesh & Sabah/Sarawak.
• Requires strong airlift, sealift, and naval presence to defend.
• ATM too small to cover both regions simultaneously.
• Chinese Coast Guard, Navy, and militia heavily outnumber Malondesh in the South China Sea.
________________________________________
📌 11. Corruption & Mismanagement
• Defense procurement often linked to patronage networks.
• Examples: LCS, Scorpène submarines (2002 scandal), helicopter programs.
📌 1. Overall Context
BalasHapus• Malondesh’s defense spending has stagnated for over a decade.
• Procurement delays + corruption scandals → few new assets acquired since the mid-2000s.
• Result: Most of Malondesh’s core platforms are 20–40 years old, with growing maintenance problems and declining readiness.
________________________________________
📌 2. Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF / TUDM)
Fighters
• F/A-18D Hornet
o Bought in the mid-1990s (8 units).
o Still capable, but now ~30 years old.
o Spares are costly, fleet too small for sustained operations.
• Su-30MKM Flanker
o Acquired 2007 (18 units).
o Modern on paper, but plagued by spare parts shortages and maintenance delays.
o Readiness sometimes drops below 50%.
• MiG-29 Fulcrum
o Acquired early 1990s.
o Retired in 2017 due to high maintenance cost.
o No replacement yet → huge capability gap.
Transport & Helicopters
• C-130 Hercules: Workhorses from the 1970s/80s, some being upgraded but still very old.
• Nuri Helicopters (Sikorsky S-61): Entered service in the 1960s. Finally retired in 2019 after fatal crashes. Replacement slow.
👉 Impact: RMAF cannot maintain a credible air defense or long-range strike role. Fleet too small, too old, and too expensive to keep flying.
________________________________________
📌 3. Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN / TLDM)
Surface Fleet
• Kasturi-class corvettes (1980s): Upgraded, but still outdated hulls.
• Laksamana-class corvettes (ex-Italian, 1980s design): Small, limited endurance, hard to maintain.
• Lekiu-class frigates (delivered 1999–2000): Now ~25 years old, mid-life upgrades delayed.
Submarines
• Scorpène-class (delivered 2009): Relatively new, but expensive to maintain. Limited to 2 boats → too few for constant patrols.
New Projects
• LCS Gowind Frigates (6 planned): As of 2025, still undelivered due to scandal & mismanagement.
👉 Impact: RMN faces the South China Sea with mostly 30–40-year-old corvettes and frigates, plus just 2 subs.
________________________________________
📌 4. Malondeshn Army (TDM)
• Main Battle Tanks: Malondesh has 48 PT-91M (Polish T-72 variant, delivered mid-2000s). Already outdated by modern standards.
• Armored Vehicles:
o Condor APCs → from 1980s, many still in service.
o Sibmas → from 1980s, obsolete for modern combat.
o AV8 Gempita (new, 2010s) → too few to replace older fleets.
• Artillery: Mostly towed howitzers; limited modern self-propelled guns.
• Air Defense: Minimal, mostly MANPADS and old radar systems.
👉 Impact: Army is manpower-heavy, equipment-light, with many vehicles older than the soldiers who operate them.
________________________________________
📌 5. Systemic Problems from Aging Equipment
1. High Maintenance Costs → Old assets require more funds just to stay operational.
2. Low Availability → Fighter jets and ships often grounded for lack of spares.
3. Capability Gaps →
o No modern fighters to replace MiG-29.
o No new frigates to replace 1980s ships.
o Army still lacks modern artillery & air defense.
4. Safety Risks → Nuri helicopter crashes showed how dangerous it is to operate old platforms.
5. Loss of Deterrence → Neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines) modernize faster, leaving Malondesh behind.
________________________________________
📌 6. Why Aging Equipment Persists
• Small defense budget → can’t fund replacements.
• Procurement delays → programs stuck in limbo for 10–15 years.
• Corruption scandals → projects like LCS consume billions without results.
• Political short-termism → each new government resets priorities.
📌 1. Overall Context
BalasHapus• Malondesh’s defense spending has stagnated for over a decade.
• Procurement delays + corruption scandals → few new assets acquired since the mid-2000s.
• Result: Most of Malondesh’s core platforms are 20–40 years old, with growing maintenance problems and declining readiness.
________________________________________
📌 2. Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF / TUDM)
Fighters
• F/A-18D Hornet
o Bought in the mid-1990s (8 units).
o Still capable, but now ~30 years old.
o Spares are costly, fleet too small for sustained operations.
• Su-30MKM Flanker
o Acquired 2007 (18 units).
o Modern on paper, but plagued by spare parts shortages and maintenance delays.
o Readiness sometimes drops below 50%.
• MiG-29 Fulcrum
o Acquired early 1990s.
o Retired in 2017 due to high maintenance cost.
o No replacement yet → huge capability gap.
Transport & Helicopters
• C-130 Hercules: Workhorses from the 1970s/80s, some being upgraded but still very old.
• Nuri Helicopters (Sikorsky S-61): Entered service in the 1960s. Finally retired in 2019 after fatal crashes. Replacement slow.
👉 Impact: RMAF cannot maintain a credible air defense or long-range strike role. Fleet too small, too old, and too expensive to keep flying.
________________________________________
📌 3. Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN / TLDM)
Surface Fleet
• Kasturi-class corvettes (1980s): Upgraded, but still outdated hulls.
• Laksamana-class corvettes (ex-Italian, 1980s design): Small, limited endurance, hard to maintain.
• Lekiu-class frigates (delivered 1999–2000): Now ~25 years old, mid-life upgrades delayed.
Submarines
• Scorpène-class (delivered 2009): Relatively new, but expensive to maintain. Limited to 2 boats → too few for constant patrols.
New Projects
• LCS Gowind Frigates (6 planned): As of 2025, still undelivered due to scandal & mismanagement.
👉 Impact: RMN faces the South China Sea with mostly 30–40-year-old corvettes and frigates, plus just 2 subs.
________________________________________
📌 4. Malondeshn Army (TDM)
• Main Battle Tanks: Malondesh has 48 PT-91M (Polish T-72 variant, delivered mid-2000s). Already outdated by modern standards.
• Armored Vehicles:
o Condor APCs → from 1980s, many still in service.
o Sibmas → from 1980s, obsolete for modern combat.
o AV8 Gempita (new, 2010s) → too few to replace older fleets.
• Artillery: Mostly towed howitzers; limited modern self-propelled guns.
• Air Defense: Minimal, mostly MANPADS and old radar systems.
👉 Impact: Army is manpower-heavy, equipment-light, with many vehicles older than the soldiers who operate them.
________________________________________
📌 5. Systemic Problems from Aging Equipment
1. High Maintenance Costs → Old assets require more funds just to stay operational.
2. Low Availability → Fighter jets and ships often grounded for lack of spares.
3. Capability Gaps →
o No modern fighters to replace MiG-29.
o No new frigates to replace 1980s ships.
o Army still lacks modern artillery & air defense.
4. Safety Risks → Nuri helicopter crashes showed how dangerous it is to operate old platforms.
5. Loss of Deterrence → Neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines) modernize faster, leaving Malondesh behind.
________________________________________
📌 6. Why Aging Equipment Persists
• Small defense budget → can’t fund replacements.
• Procurement delays → programs stuck in limbo for 10–15 years.
• Corruption scandals → projects like LCS consume billions without results.
• Political short-termism → each new government resets priorities.
📌 1. Structural Weaknesses
BalasHapus• Manpower-heavy, equipment-light: TDM has ~80,000 personnel, but much of its gear is old or lightly armed.
• Doctrine outdated: Still focused on counterinsurgency (legacy of communist era), not high-intensity modern warfare.
• Low mobility: Limited airlift and mechanization mean the army cannot rapidly deploy across Malondesh split geography (Peninsular vs. East Malondesh).
________________________________________
📌 2. Equipment Weaknesses
Armored Vehicles
• Condor APCs (German-built, 1980s): Still widely used despite being obsolete, poorly protected against IEDs or modern weapons.
• Sibmas APCs (Belgian, 1980s): Aging, thin armor, limited use today.
• AV8 Gempita (locally built, 2010s): Modern, but only ~250 units → far too few to replace thousands of older vehicles.
• Main Battle Tanks (MBT): Only 48 PT-91M (Polish T-72 variant, mid-2000s). Limited firepower compared to regional peers with Leopards (Indonesia, Singapore).
Artillery
• Mostly towed howitzers (105mm, 155mm) → outdated for rapid maneuver warfare.
• Self-propelled artillery → very limited.
• Rocket artillery → almost nonexistent compared to neighbors (Indonesia, Vietnam).
Air Defense
• Very weak → relies on MANPADS (Igla, Starstreak) and old short-range systems.
• No medium- or long-range SAMs.
• Vulnerable to modern airstrikes.
Aviation
• Lost Nuri helicopters (retired in 2019).
• MD530G light attack helicopters procured in 2016 → delivery delayed for years, only a few operational.
• No dedicated attack helicopters (unlike Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand).
________________________________________
📌 3. Training & Readiness
• Low training hours due to budget → live-fire exercises limited.
• Joint operations weak → coordination with Navy/Air Force poor.
• Modern combined arms doctrine (armor + artillery + drones + air cover) underdeveloped.
________________________________________
📌 4. Budget & Allocation Problems
• Army gets the largest share of manpower spending (salaries, pensions), but little for modernization.
• Procurement slow → many projects canceled, delayed, or scaled down.
• Example: Plans for new self-propelled artillery, drones, and air defense systems repeatedly shelved.
________________________________________
📌 5. Geographic & Strategic Challenges
• Malondesh is split into two main theaters:
1. Peninsular Malondesh
2. Sabah & Sarawak (Borneo) → vulnerable to incursions (e.g., Lahad Datu, 2013).
• TDM lacks enough lift capability to quickly reinforce East Malondesh.
• Reliant on Navy/Air Force transport, which themselves are weak.
________________________________________
📌 6. Comparison with Neighbors
• Singapore Army: Fully mechanized, Leopard 2 tanks, modern artillery, strong air defense.
• Indonesia Army: Larger, Leopard 2 MBTs, rocket artillery, growing modernization.
• Thailand/Vietnam: Larger artillery, more modern armored units.
👉 Malondesh TDM looks under-equipped and outdated by comparison.
________________________________________
📌 7. Consequences of Weakness
• Border security issues: 2013 Lahad Datu incursion exposed lack of readiness and modern equipment.
• Low deterrence: Cannot project power against regional threats (e.g., South China Sea disputes).
• Over-reliance on infantry: Still seen as a “rifle army” with limited heavy support.
• Morale impact: Soldiers risk being deployed with outdated gear.
📌 1. Legacy of Counterinsurgency (COIN)
BalasHapus• Malondesh’s military doctrine is shaped by history, especially the Communist Insurgency (1948–1989).
• For decades, the Army’s focus was jungle warfare, counter-guerrilla tactics, and territorial defense.
• This created a culture of light infantry dominance, with limited emphasis on heavy armor, artillery, or long-range strike capabilities.
👉 Result: Even after the insurgency ended, Malondesh continued investing in riflemen and light forces, not in high-tech or heavy combined-arms forces.
________________________________________
📌 2. Lack of Shift Toward Conventional Warfare
• Neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand) modernized doctrines toward combined arms (armor + artillery + air support + drones).
• Malondesh, however, still emphasizes defensive posture and static territorial defense.
• Little preparation for large-scale conventional conflicts in the South China Sea or with a peer adversary.
👉 Example: TDM has only 48 tanks (PT-91M), no medium/long-range air defense, and minimal artillery support — not sufficient for modern battlefield requirements.
________________________________________
📌 3. Neglect of Joint Operations
• Modern doctrine globally stresses joint operations (Army + Navy + Air Force working seamlessly).
• Malondesh struggles here:
o The Air Force has too few planes to provide close air support.
o The Navy lacks amphibious or sealift capacity to deploy the Army quickly.
o The Army rarely trains with Navy/Air Force in large-scale exercises.
👉 Doctrine remains service-siloed, not integrated.
________________________________________
📌 4. Limited Focus on External Threats
• Official defense policy (2019 White Paper) prioritizes sovereignty defense, non-traditional security (terrorism, piracy, disasters).
• While valid, this underplays external threats like:
o China’s growing presence in South China Sea.
o Potential interstate tensions with neighbors.
• Malondesh’s doctrine avoids offensive or deterrent concepts → remains reactive and defensive.
________________________________________
📌 5. Outdated Operational Concepts
• No emphasis on drones, electronic warfare, cyber, or network-centric warfare, which are now central in modern doctrine.
• Still structured around manual infantry-heavy operations.
• Example: Lahad Datu (2013) → response was slow, infantry-based, and exposed poor surveillance, mobility, and joint command.
________________________________________
📌 6. Political Influence
• Defense doctrine often shaped by short-term political decisions rather than long-term strategic thinking.
• Governments avoid committing to major doctrine shifts because it would require:
o Multi-year funding for modernization.
o Rethinking force structure (fewer infantry, more high-tech assets).
• Political leaders prefer maintaining large manpower (jobs/votes) rather than expensive modernization.
________________________________________
📌 7. Consequences of Outdated Doctrine
1. Imbalance in force structure → too many infantry, too few heavy units.
2. Weak deterrence → cannot project credible force in South China Sea or against modern militaries.
3. Slow modernization → doctrine not aligned with future warfare (cyber, drones, precision strike).
4. Operational limitations → struggles in rapid deployment, combined arms maneuver, and long-range operations.
📌 1. Small and Aging Fleet
BalasHapus• Surface combatants:
o Only 2 Lekiu-class frigates (1999) → nearing obsolescence, modernization delayed.
o 2 Kasturi-class frigates (1980s German design) → upgraded but still old.
o 4 Kedah-class OPVs (2000s, MEKO-100 design) → lightly armed, more like patrol vessels than real warships.
• Total “serious” warships: fewer than 10, compared to:
o Singapore Navy: >20 modern, high-tech vessels (Formidable-class frigates, Littoral Mission Vessels).
o Indonesia Navy: dozens of frigates, corvettes, and modern missile boats.
👉 TLDM cannot sustain a large-scale naval fight.
________________________________________
📌 2. Submarine Force Weakness
• Only 2 Scorpène-class submarines (delivered 2009–2010).
• Problems:
o High operating cost → often not fully operational.
o Limited numbers → cannot maintain continuous presence at sea.
o No replacement or expansion plans due to budget constraints.
• By contrast:
o Vietnam has 6 Kilo-class submarines.
o Singapore operates 4 advanced submarines (with more on order).
________________________________________
📌 3. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
• In 2011, Malondesh approved 6 Gowind-class LCS frigates (French design, built locally).
• Supposed to be the backbone of TLDM modernization.
• Scandal: corruption, mismanagement, political interference → no ship delivered after more than a decade.
• First ship expected only in 2026–2027, cost ballooned from RM 6 billion → >RM 11 billion.
👉 A whole decade lost with zero new frontline warships.
________________________________________
📌 4. Poor Naval Aviation & Support
• Helicopters: only a few Super Lynx and AW139 → limited ASW (anti-submarine warfare).
• No naval combat aircraft (relies entirely on RMAF).
• Weak sealift/amphibious capacity:
o Only 2–3 support/transport ships (KD Mahawangsa, KD Sri Inderapura-class, etc.).
o Insufficient to deploy large forces rapidly to Sabah/Sarawak.
________________________________________
📌 5. Budget Constraints
• Navy modernization requires long-term funding, but:
o Defense budget = only 1.0–1.1% of GDP.
o Navy often loses out to Army in budget share.
o Procurement done piecemeal → delays, cost overruns.
• Example: LCS program stalled because of funding + political issues, not just technical delays.
________________________________________
📌 6. Strategic Geography Challenge
• Malondesh has to defend two separate regions:
1. Peninsular Malondesh (Strait of Malacca).
2. East Malondesh (Sabah & Sarawak, near South China Sea).
• TLDM has too few ships to patrol both areas effectively.
• South China Sea disputes: Chinese Coast Guard and militia often outnumber Malondeshn presence.
________________________________________
📌 7. Weak Deterrence
• Malondesh cannot project naval power.
• TLDM’s ships are often patrol-focused (low firepower).
• Relies on diplomacy rather than deterrence in South China Sea.
• In contrast:
o Singapore Navy = highly modern, networked, with submarines, frigates, and advanced air defense.
o Indonesia Navy = larger fleet, more missile boats, expanding rapidly.
o Vietnam Navy = strong submarine force and anti-access weapons.
________________________________________
📌 8. Consequences
1. Operational gaps → TLDM cannot maintain presence in South China Sea, leaving oil & gas fields exposed.
2. Low readiness → too few ships operational at a time.
3. Dependence on allies → Malondesh relies on the US, Australia, or joint ASEAN diplomacy rather than its own deterrence.
4. Morale issues → sailors operate old, under-armed ships while modernization programs stall.
📌 1. Fighter Fleet Problems
BalasHapusCurrent Fighters (as of 2025):
• 8 F/A-18D Hornets (bought in 1997)
o Aging, need mid-life upgrades, limited strike range.
• 18 Su-30MKM Flankers (delivered 2007–2009)
o Powerful but plagued by maintenance and spare parts issues.
o Many often grounded → at times less than 50% readiness.
• MB-339CM trainers/light attack jets (old, limited combat role).
👉 Compared to neighbors:
• Singapore → >60 F-15SGs & upgraded F-16Vs, buying F-35s.
• Indonesia → >30 Su-27/30s, buying Rafales & F-15EX.
• Vietnam → 36+ Su-30MK2Vs.
👉 Malondesh’s fighter fleet is tiny and partially unserviceable, limiting air superiority.
________________________________________
📌 2. The MiG-29 Failure
• Malondesh bought 18 MiG-29Ns in the 1990s.
• Retired early (2015) due to:
o High operating cost.
o Reliability issues.
o Poor logistics support from Russia.
• Replacement program (“MRCA”) delayed for over a decade because of budget constraints and political indecision.
👉 Result: Fighter numbers dropped sharply → “air power gap” still not fixed.
________________________________________
📌 3. Transport & Airlift
• C-130 Hercules fleet (14 units) → old but reliable, used for logistics & disaster relief.
• A400M Atlas (4 units, delivered 2015–2017)
• Gap: Malondesh lacks enough airlift to rapidly reinforce East Malondesh (Sabah & Sarawak).
________________________________________
📌 4. Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) Weakness
• Currently uses Beechcraft King Air B200Ts → outdated and limited range.
• Malondesh faces constant Chinese Coast Guard intrusion in South China Sea, but has no dedicated long-range MPA fleet.
• Boeing P-8 Poseidon (used by US, Australia, India) is far beyond Malondesh’s budget.
👉 Weak maritime domain awareness → navy operations suffer too.
________________________________________
📌 5. Helicopter Fleet
• Nuri helicopters (Sikorsky S-61) retired in 2019 due to age.
• Replacement delayed — Army and Air Force face lift helicopter shortage.
• Only a few AW139 and EC725 Cougar are available, limiting troop transport and search & rescue (SAR).
________________________________________
📌 6. Air Defense & Radar
• Malondesh has no long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
• Relies only on short-range man-portable systems (MANPADS) and some older gun-based defenses.
• Radar coverage is patchy, especially over the South China Sea.
👉 Meaning: Malondeshn airspace is vulnerable to intrusion by modern air forces.
________________________________________
📌 7. Procurement Delays & Budget Issues
• Fighter replacement program (MRCA → Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) has been discussed since 2010s, but still no decision due to budget politics.
• Plans for KAI FA-50 light fighters (up to 36 units) finally approved in 2023, but delivery will stretch into late 2020s.
• No clear roadmap for 5th-generation fighters (like F-35 or KF-21).
________________________________________
📌 8. Training & Readiness
• Flight hours per pilot are low (due to budget and fuel costs).
• Many pilots get less than half the NATO-recommended hours.
• Limits skill in complex missions (air-to-air combat, night operations).
• Dependence on foreign exercises with US, Australia, Singapore to maintain training standards.
________________________________________
📌 9. Structural Weakness
• Too many bases spread across Peninsular and East Malondesh → increases costs, reduces efficiency.
• Lack of aerial refueling tankers → fighters cannot sustain long-range missions.
• Weak electronic warfare and drone capabilities compared to modern peers.
________________________________________
📌 10. Consequences
1. Weak air deterrence → cannot challenge China’s PLA Air Force or even regional peers.
2. Limited support for Navy/Army → few aircraft for close air support or maritime patrol.
3. Aging platforms → constant readiness problems, high maintenance costs.
4. Dependence on foreign partners → for training, spares, and even operational backup
📌 1. Fighter Fleet Problems
BalasHapusCurrent Fighters (as of 2025):
• 8 F/A-18D Hornets (bought in 1997)
o Aging, need mid-life upgrades, limited strike range.
• 18 Su-30MKM Flankers (delivered 2007–2009)
o Powerful but plagued by maintenance and spare parts issues.
o Many often grounded → at times less than 50% readiness.
• MB-339CM trainers/light attack jets (old, limited combat role).
👉 Compared to neighbors:
• Singapore → >60 F-15SGs & upgraded F-16Vs, buying F-35s.
• Indonesia → >30 Su-27/30s, buying Rafales & F-15EX.
• Vietnam → 36+ Su-30MK2Vs.
👉 Malondesh’s fighter fleet is tiny and partially unserviceable, limiting air superiority.
________________________________________
📌 2. The MiG-29 Failure
• Malondesh bought 18 MiG-29Ns in the 1990s.
• Retired early (2015) due to:
o High operating cost.
o Reliability issues.
o Poor logistics support from Russia.
• Replacement program (“MRCA”) delayed for over a decade because of budget constraints and political indecision.
👉 Result: Fighter numbers dropped sharply → “air power gap” still not fixed.
________________________________________
📌 3. Transport & Airlift
• C-130 Hercules fleet (14 units) → old but reliable, used for logistics & disaster relief.
• A400M Atlas (4 units, delivered 2015–2017)
• Gap: Malondesh lacks enough airlift to rapidly reinforce East Malondesh (Sabah & Sarawak).
________________________________________
📌 4. Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) Weakness
• Currently uses Beechcraft King Air B200Ts → outdated and limited range.
• Malondesh faces constant Chinese Coast Guard intrusion in South China Sea, but has no dedicated long-range MPA fleet.
• Boeing P-8 Poseidon (used by US, Australia, India) is far beyond Malondesh’s budget.
👉 Weak maritime domain awareness → navy operations suffer too.
________________________________________
📌 5. Helicopter Fleet
• Nuri helicopters (Sikorsky S-61) retired in 2019 due to age.
• Replacement delayed — Army and Air Force face lift helicopter shortage.
• Only a few AW139 and EC725 Cougar are available, limiting troop transport and search & rescue (SAR).
________________________________________
📌 6. Air Defense & Radar
• Malondesh has no long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
• Relies only on short-range man-portable systems (MANPADS) and some older gun-based defenses.
• Radar coverage is patchy, especially over the South China Sea.
👉 Meaning: Malondeshn airspace is vulnerable to intrusion by modern air forces.
________________________________________
📌 7. Procurement Delays & Budget Issues
• Fighter replacement program (MRCA → Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) has been discussed since 2010s, but still no decision due to budget politics.
• Plans for KAI FA-50 light fighters (up to 36 units) finally approved in 2023, but delivery will stretch into late 2020s.
• No clear roadmap for 5th-generation fighters (like F-35 or KF-21).
________________________________________
📌 8. Training & Readiness
• Flight hours per pilot are low (due to budget and fuel costs).
• Many pilots get less than half the NATO-recommended hours.
• Limits skill in complex missions (air-to-air combat, night operations).
• Dependence on foreign exercises with US, Australia, Singapore to maintain training standards.
________________________________________
📌 9. Structural Weakness
• Too many bases spread across Peninsular and East Malondesh → increases costs, reduces efficiency.
• Lack of aerial refueling tankers → fighters cannot sustain long-range missions.
• Weak electronic warfare and drone capabilities compared to modern peers.
________________________________________
📌 10. Consequences
1. Weak air deterrence → cannot challenge China’s PLA Air Force or even regional peers.
2. Limited support for Navy/Army → few aircraft for close air support or maritime patrol.
3. Aging platforms → constant readiness problems, high maintenance costs.
4. Dependence on foreign partners → for training, spares, and even operational backup
Rakyat MALAYSIA sentiasa ada membantu rakyat INDON didalam Kesusahan.....
BalasHapusRakyat Malaysia menunjukkan solidaritas yang menghangatkan di tengah situasi penuh ketegangan di Indonesia—khususnya di Jakarta—dengan cara sederhana namun sangat bermakna. Mereka ramai-ramai memesan makanan melalui aplikasi ojek online (Grab dan ojol), yang kemudian dikirim dan dibagikan oleh para driver ojol kepada rekan-rekan mereka di lapangan. Gestur ini menjadi bentuk dukungan moral dan sekaligus bantuan kecil di tengah kondisi protes yang menyebabkan kesulitan dan kemacetan luar biasa.
Mantan Gubernur DKI Jakarta, Anies Baswedan, turut menyoroti aksi peduli ini melalui akun X-nya, menyebutnya sebagai “gestur sederhana, tapi terasa sebagai dukungan yang amat hangat.” Menurutnya, warganet tetangga yang membeli makanan bukan untuk dirinya sendiri, melainkan untuk para driver ojol berbagi kepada sesama—menjadi bentuk kekuatan solidaritas yang sangat tulus. Ia berharap, melalui kebersamaan seperti ini, situasi di Indonesia cepat membaik dan kita bisa kembali “saling ganggu dan bertikai penuh cinta,” sebagaimana layaknya saudara.
📌 1. Chronic Budget Constraints
Hapus• Defense spending is only ~1% of GDP (2024), among the lowest in ASEAN.
• Most regional peers spend closer to 1.5–3% of GDP (Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia).
• This means:
o Little money for modernization.
o Old equipment kept in service far too long.
o Programs constantly delayed or cancelled.
👉 Core issue: Malondesh cannot fund a modern military with such a small envelope.
________________________________________
📌 2. Poor Budget Distribution
• 50–55% of the defense budget goes to salaries, pensions, and allowances.
• Operations & maintenance (O&M): chronically underfunded.
• Procurement/modernization: gets only 15–20% of the budget (too low).
👉 Result: Malondesh pays for people, not capability. Troops are numerous but poorly equipped.
________________________________________
📌 3. Aging & Obsolete Equipment
• Army (TDM): still relies on 1980s armored vehicles, limited artillery, no modern air defense.
• Navy (TLDM): fewer than 10 serious warships, only 2 old submarines, Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal left modernization frozen for a decade.
• Air Force (RMAF/TUDM): small fighter fleet, many grounded, lacks long-range SAMs or modern drones.
👉 Malondesh platforms are outdated compared to Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam.
________________________________________
📌 4. Procurement Delays & Scandals
• LCS scandal (6 Gowind-class ships, none delivered since 2011).
• MiG-29 replacement delayed for over 10 years, only FA-50s ordered in 2023.
• Army modernization programs constantly shifted or downsized.
• Corruption, political interference, and lack of accountability = wasted billions.
👉 Loss of trust: Even inside ATM, officers see procurement as politically driven.
________________________________________
📌 5. Political Interference & Short-Termism
• Every change of government resets priorities.
• Projects canceled or reshaped based on politics, not strategy.
• Defense White Paper (2019) promised long-term stability, but ignored due to COVID and fiscal crisis.
👉 ATM never gets consistent 10–20 year planning like Singapore’s MINDEF.
________________________________________
📌 6. Weak Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
• Not enough funds for spare parts, fuel, and maintenance.
• Submarines sometimes not operational due to lack of upkeep.
• Fighter aircraft often grounded.
• Army vehicles and artillery poorly maintained.
👉 Readiness is much lower than it looks on paper.
________________________________________
📌 7. Low Training Hours
• Fighter pilots often fly <120 hours/year (NATO standard = 180+).
• Naval ships sail less because of fuel & maintenance limits.
• Army units rarely conduct large-scale combined exercises due to cost.
👉 Troops lack real combat training experience.
________________________________________
📌 8. Weak Doctrine & Planning
• ATM doctrine is outdated and fragmented.
• Malondesh tries to prepare for everything (conventional war, counter-insurgency, humanitarian aid) but lacks resources.
• No focus on joint operations (Army, Navy, Air Force coordination weak).
• Defense planning often reactive, not proactive.
________________________________________
📌 9. Limited Defense Industry
• Malondesh local defense industry is small and dependent on imports.
• Boustead Naval Shipyard → LCS scandal = reputation collapse.
• No indigenous fighter or major warship program.
• Relies heavily on foreign suppliers (Russia, France, South Korea).
👉 Weak local industry = high costs, dependence, and vulnerability.
________________________________________
📌 10. Geography Challenge
• Malondesh is split: Peninsular Malondesh & Sabah/Sarawak.
• Requires strong airlift, sealift, and naval presence to defend.
• ATM too small to cover both regions simultaneously.
• Chinese Coast Guard, Navy, and militia heavily outnumber Malondesh in the South China Sea.
________________________________________
📌 11. Corruption & Mismanagement
• Defense procurement often linked to patronage networks.
• Examples: LCS, Scorpène submarines (2002 scandal), helicopter programs.
1. High Personnel Costs vs. Limited Modernization
Hapus• A large share of Malondesh defense budget goes to salaries, pensions, and welfare for military personnel.
• This leaves limited funds for modernization programs, equipment procurement, or advanced training.
• For example, more than half of the annual defense allocation is often consumed by operating and personnel expenditures.
________________________________________
2. Underfunded Procurement & Maintenance
• With so much spent on personnel, Malondesh struggles to allocate enough for:
o New acquisitions (fighter jets, naval vessels, surveillance systems).
o Maintenance of existing platforms, many of which are already aging.
• This imbalance leads to a growing capability gap compared to regional peers.
________________________________________
3. Skewed Distribution Across Services
• The Army traditionally receives a larger share of the defense budget compared to the Navy and Air Force.
• Yet, Malondesh main security challenges are maritime-based (South China Sea, Strait of Malacca, Sulu Sea).
• This creates a mismatch between budget priorities and strategic needs.
________________________________________
4. Reactive Rather than Strategic Spending
• Defense spending often reacts to short-term needs (e.g., counterterrorism, piracy, or disaster relief) instead of long-term modernization.
• This results in fragmented, stop-start procurement projects — for example, delays in fighter jet replacements or naval shipbuilding programs.
________________________________________
5. Dependence on Imports & High Costs
• Malondesh relies on imported defense technology, which is expensive.
• Budget constraints mean Malondesh often buys small numbers of different platforms from multiple countries.
• This creates inefficiencies in logistics, training, and maintenance, further straining limited funds.
===========
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=
Warga Malaysia berbondong-bondong donasi makanan dan minuman lewat aplikasi ojek online.
BalasHapushttps://www.instagram.com/reel/DODVnyYieoB/
📌 1. Chronic Budget Constraints
Hapus• Defense spending is only ~1% of GDP (2024), among the lowest in ASEAN.
• Most regional peers spend closer to 1.5–3% of GDP (Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia).
• This means:
o Little money for modernization.
o Old equipment kept in service far too long.
o Programs constantly delayed or cancelled.
👉 Core issue: Malondesh cannot fund a modern military with such a small envelope.
________________________________________
📌 2. Poor Budget Distribution
• 50–55% of the defense budget goes to salaries, pensions, and allowances.
• Operations & maintenance (O&M): chronically underfunded.
• Procurement/modernization: gets only 15–20% of the budget (too low).
👉 Result: Malondesh pays for people, not capability. Troops are numerous but poorly equipped.
________________________________________
📌 3. Aging & Obsolete Equipment
• Army (TDM): still relies on 1980s armored vehicles, limited artillery, no modern air defense.
• Navy (TLDM): fewer than 10 serious warships, only 2 old submarines, Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal left modernization frozen for a decade.
• Air Force (RMAF/TUDM): small fighter fleet, many grounded, lacks long-range SAMs or modern drones.
👉 Malondesh platforms are outdated compared to Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam.
________________________________________
📌 4. Procurement Delays & Scandals
• LCS scandal (6 Gowind-class ships, none delivered since 2011).
• MiG-29 replacement delayed for over 10 years, only FA-50s ordered in 2023.
• Army modernization programs constantly shifted or downsized.
• Corruption, political interference, and lack of accountability = wasted billions.
👉 Loss of trust: Even inside ATM, officers see procurement as politically driven.
________________________________________
📌 5. Political Interference & Short-Termism
• Every change of government resets priorities.
• Projects canceled or reshaped based on politics, not strategy.
• Defense White Paper (2019) promised long-term stability, but ignored due to COVID and fiscal crisis.
👉 ATM never gets consistent 10–20 year planning like Singapore’s MINDEF.
________________________________________
📌 6. Weak Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
• Not enough funds for spare parts, fuel, and maintenance.
• Submarines sometimes not operational due to lack of upkeep.
• Fighter aircraft often grounded.
• Army vehicles and artillery poorly maintained.
👉 Readiness is much lower than it looks on paper.
________________________________________
📌 7. Low Training Hours
• Fighter pilots often fly <120 hours/year (NATO standard = 180+).
• Naval ships sail less because of fuel & maintenance limits.
• Army units rarely conduct large-scale combined exercises due to cost.
👉 Troops lack real combat training experience.
________________________________________
📌 8. Weak Doctrine & Planning
• ATM doctrine is outdated and fragmented.
• Malondesh tries to prepare for everything (conventional war, counter-insurgency, humanitarian aid) but lacks resources.
• No focus on joint operations (Army, Navy, Air Force coordination weak).
• Defense planning often reactive, not proactive.
________________________________________
📌 9. Limited Defense Industry
• Malondesh local defense industry is small and dependent on imports.
• Boustead Naval Shipyard → LCS scandal = reputation collapse.
• No indigenous fighter or major warship program.
• Relies heavily on foreign suppliers (Russia, France, South Korea).
👉 Weak local industry = high costs, dependence, and vulnerability.
________________________________________
📌 10. Geography Challenge
• Malondesh is split: Peninsular Malondesh & Sabah/Sarawak.
• Requires strong airlift, sealift, and naval presence to defend.
• ATM too small to cover both regions simultaneously.
• Chinese Coast Guard, Navy, and militia heavily outnumber Malondesh in the South China Sea.
________________________________________
📌 11. Corruption & Mismanagement
• Defense procurement often linked to patronage networks.
• Examples: LCS, Scorpène submarines (2002 scandal), helicopter programs.
1. High Personnel Costs vs. Limited Modernization
Hapus• A large share of Malondesh defense budget goes to salaries, pensions, and welfare for military personnel.
• This leaves limited funds for modernization programs, equipment procurement, or advanced training.
• For example, more than half of the annual defense allocation is often consumed by operating and personnel expenditures.
________________________________________
2. Underfunded Procurement & Maintenance
• With so much spent on personnel, Malondesh struggles to allocate enough for:
o New acquisitions (fighter jets, naval vessels, surveillance systems).
o Maintenance of existing platforms, many of which are already aging.
• This imbalance leads to a growing capability gap compared to regional peers.
________________________________________
3. Skewed Distribution Across Services
• The Army traditionally receives a larger share of the defense budget compared to the Navy and Air Force.
• Yet, Malondesh main security challenges are maritime-based (South China Sea, Strait of Malacca, Sulu Sea).
• This creates a mismatch between budget priorities and strategic needs.
________________________________________
4. Reactive Rather than Strategic Spending
• Defense spending often reacts to short-term needs (e.g., counterterrorism, piracy, or disaster relief) instead of long-term modernization.
• This results in fragmented, stop-start procurement projects — for example, delays in fighter jet replacements or naval shipbuilding programs.
________________________________________
5. Dependence on Imports & High Costs
• Malondesh relies on imported defense technology, which is expensive.
• Budget constraints mean Malondesh often buys small numbers of different platforms from multiple countries.
• This creates inefficiencies in logistics, training, and maintenance, further straining limited funds.
===========
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=
1. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Project
BalasHapus• Initial Cost and Delays: The LCS project, initially budgeted at RM6 billion, has experienced substantial delays and cost escalations. The project, which was supposed to deliver six ships, has been reduced to five, with the total cost now exceeding RM11 billion .
• Overspending and Misallocation: A Public Accounts Committee (PAC) report revealed that RM400 million of the funds were used to settle debts from a previous patrol vessel project, and 15% of the equipment purchased became obsolete due to prolonged storage
• Progress and Future Plans: As of recent updates, the LCS project has achieved 72.43% completion across all five vessels, with the first ship expected to be delivered by 2026
________________________________________
2. New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) Program
• Cost Overruns: The NGPV program, initially planned for 27 vessels, faced significant cost overruns, with the final expenditure reaching RM6.75 billion, up from the original RM5.35 billion .
• Quality Issues: The Kedah-class NGPVs suffered from technical problems, quality issues, and delays, leading to the cancellation of the program and a reduction in the number of vessels delivered .
________________________________________
3. Scorpène Submarine Deal
• Increased Costs: The procurement of two Scorpène-class submarines, initially contracted at RM4.3 billion, experienced cost increases due to delays and mismanagement, raising concerns about the efficiency of the procurement process .
• Corruption Allegations: The deal has been associated with corruption allegations, further complicating the project's financial and operational outcomes .
________________________________________
4. Black Hawk Helicopter Procurement
• Controversial Deal: A deal for the purchase of Black Hawk helicopters was scrapped after the Malondeshn King intervened, criticizing the procurement of outdated equipment at high costs
• Safety Concerns: The decision followed a fatal helicopter collision involving naval officers, highlighting the risks associated with outdated military equipment.
________________________________________
5. General Factors Contributing to Delays and Cost Overruns
• Poor Planning and Oversight: Inadequate project planning and lack of stringent oversight have been identified as key factors leading to delays and budget overruns in military procurement .
• Political Interference: Political considerations and interference have often influenced procurement decisions, sometimes at the expense of operational requirements and cost-effectiveness.
• Corruption and Mismanagement: Instances of corruption and mismanagement have further exacerbated the financial and operational challenges in defense procurement.
===========
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
1. Keterbatasan Anggaran dan Alokasi Belanja
• Anggaran pertahanan Malondesh stagnan di kisaran RM15–18 miliar per tahun, namun mayoritas digunakan untuk operasi harian—alih-alih modernisasi atau peningkatan kapasitas.
• Anggaran 2024 hanya sebesar USD 4,16 miliar, dan lebih dari 40% digunakan untuk gaji dan tunjangan personel
• DPR mendesak pemerintah untuk meningkatkan pagu hingga 1,5% dari PDB, bahkan beberapa pihak menganjurkan 4% PDB agar Militer Mampu menjalankan misi pertahanan yang optimal.
________________________________________
2. Aset & Peralatan Usang
• Terdapat 171 aset militer yang telah berusia lebih dari 30 tahun, mencakup:
o 108 milik TDM
o 29 milik TUDM
o 34 milik TLDM
• Contohnya:
o KD Pendekar, kapal lama (~45 tahun), tenggelam setelah tertabrak objek bawah laut
o Sepertiga armada kapal keamanan (misalnya dari Agensi Maritim Malondesh) rusak atau tidak berfungsi.
________________________________________
3. Proyek Besar Tertunda dan Skandal Pengadaan
• Proyek Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)—senilai RM9 miliar—berasal dari rencana 6 kapal:
o Pengiriman pertama, Maharaja Lela, seharusnya 2019, tapi tertunda.
o Proyek dihentikan dan dilanjutkan kembali, dengan estimasi pengiriman baru: satu kapal selesai 2026, sisanya 2029.
• Skandal pengadaan LCS menunjukkan korupsi dan mismanagement—termasuk soal desain yang tidak dipilih RMN dan pembayaran besar sebelum penyelesaian desain.
________________________________________
4. Korupsi, Perencanaan Buruk, dan Interferensi Politik
• Militer Malondesh berada dalam “band D, kategori risiko tinggi untuk korupsi di sektor pertahanan.”
• Terdapat banyak intervensi politik dalam pengadaan dan kontrak militer, yang menurunkan efektivitas dan memunculkan biaya transaksional tak perlu.
• Perencanaan yang buruk sering menyebabkan pengadaan disetujui tanpa kebutuhan pengguna yang jelas—contoh kasus jet tempur LCA.
________________________________________
5. Masalah Operasional dan Sumber Daya Personel
• Personel militer dilaporkan menghadapi masalah keterampilan berpikir, pengambilan keputusan, dan pemecahan masalah selama operasi
• RMAF sendiri bermasalah dalam pemeliharaan pesawat dan pasokan suku cadang, untuk jenis lawas seperti Su-30MKM maupun Hornet bekas Kuwait.
________________________________________
6. Ancaman Eksternal dan Keamanan Maritim Terancam
• Tiongkok melakukan tekanan terhadap eksplorasi minyak di zona ekonomi eksklusif (EEZ) Malondesh, termasuk Luconia Shoals. Pemerintah sedang mempercepat pembangunan pangkalan angkatan laut di Bintulu (direncanakan selesai 2030), namun dianggap terlambat.
• Kekurangan aset yang memadai membuat Malondesh berisiko kesulitan mempertahankan EEZ dari pelanggaran negara lain.
Makin KESIAN saya lihat INDIANESIA... 🤣🤣
BalasHapusMISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
1. Keterbatasan Anggaran dan Alokasi Belanja
• Anggaran pertahanan Malondesh stagnan di kisaran RM15–18 miliar per tahun, namun mayoritas digunakan untuk operasi harian—alih-alih modernisasi atau peningkatan kapasitas.
• Anggaran 2024 hanya sebesar USD 4,16 miliar, dan lebih dari 40% digunakan untuk gaji dan tunjangan personel
• DPR mendesak pemerintah untuk meningkatkan pagu hingga 1,5% dari PDB, bahkan beberapa pihak menganjurkan 4% PDB agar Militer Mampu menjalankan misi pertahanan yang optimal.
________________________________________
2. Aset & Peralatan Usang
• Terdapat 171 aset militer yang telah berusia lebih dari 30 tahun, mencakup:
o 108 milik TDM
o 29 milik TUDM
o 34 milik TLDM
• Contohnya:
o KD Pendekar, kapal lama (~45 tahun), tenggelam setelah tertabrak objek bawah laut
o Sepertiga armada kapal keamanan (misalnya dari Agensi Maritim Malondesh) rusak atau tidak berfungsi.
________________________________________
3. Proyek Besar Tertunda dan Skandal Pengadaan
• Proyek Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)—senilai RM9 miliar—berasal dari rencana 6 kapal:
o Pengiriman pertama, Maharaja Lela, seharusnya 2019, tapi tertunda.
o Proyek dihentikan dan dilanjutkan kembali, dengan estimasi pengiriman baru: satu kapal selesai 2026, sisanya 2029.
• Skandal pengadaan LCS menunjukkan korupsi dan mismanagement—termasuk soal desain yang tidak dipilih RMN dan pembayaran besar sebelum penyelesaian desain.
________________________________________
4. Korupsi, Perencanaan Buruk, dan Interferensi Politik
• Militer Malondesh berada dalam “band D, kategori risiko tinggi untuk korupsi di sektor pertahanan.”
• Terdapat banyak intervensi politik dalam pengadaan dan kontrak militer, yang menurunkan efektivitas dan memunculkan biaya transaksional tak perlu.
• Perencanaan yang buruk sering menyebabkan pengadaan disetujui tanpa kebutuhan pengguna yang jelas—contoh kasus jet tempur LCA.
________________________________________
5. Masalah Operasional dan Sumber Daya Personel
• Personel militer dilaporkan menghadapi masalah keterampilan berpikir, pengambilan keputusan, dan pemecahan masalah selama operasi
• RMAF sendiri bermasalah dalam pemeliharaan pesawat dan pasokan suku cadang, untuk jenis lawas seperti Su-30MKM maupun Hornet bekas Kuwait.
________________________________________
6. Ancaman Eksternal dan Keamanan Maritim Terancam
• Tiongkok melakukan tekanan terhadap eksplorasi minyak di zona ekonomi eksklusif (EEZ) Malondesh, termasuk Luconia Shoals. Pemerintah sedang mempercepat pembangunan pangkalan angkatan laut di Bintulu (direncanakan selesai 2030), namun dianggap terlambat.
• Kekurangan aset yang memadai membuat Malondesh berisiko kesulitan mempertahankan EEZ dari pelanggaran negara lain.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
1. Keterbatasan Anggaran dan Alokasi Belanja
• Anggaran pertahanan Malondesh stagnan di kisaran RM15–18 miliar per tahun, namun mayoritas digunakan untuk operasi harian—alih-alih modernisasi atau peningkatan kapasitas.
• Anggaran 2024 hanya sebesar USD 4,16 miliar, dan lebih dari 40% digunakan untuk gaji dan tunjangan personel
• DPR mendesak pemerintah untuk meningkatkan pagu hingga 1,5% dari PDB, bahkan beberapa pihak menganjurkan 4% PDB agar Militer Mampu menjalankan misi pertahanan yang optimal.
________________________________________
2. Aset & Peralatan Usang
• Terdapat 171 aset militer yang telah berusia lebih dari 30 tahun, mencakup:
o 108 milik TDM
o 29 milik TUDM
o 34 milik TLDM
• Contohnya:
o KD Pendekar, kapal lama (~45 tahun), tenggelam setelah tertabrak objek bawah laut
o Sepertiga armada kapal keamanan (misalnya dari Agensi Maritim Malondesh) rusak atau tidak berfungsi.
________________________________________
3. Proyek Besar Tertunda dan Skandal Pengadaan
• Proyek Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)—senilai RM9 miliar—berasal dari rencana 6 kapal:
o Pengiriman pertama, Maharaja Lela, seharusnya 2019, tapi tertunda.
o Proyek dihentikan dan dilanjutkan kembali, dengan estimasi pengiriman baru: satu kapal selesai 2026, sisanya 2029.
• Skandal pengadaan LCS menunjukkan korupsi dan mismanagement—termasuk soal desain yang tidak dipilih RMN dan pembayaran besar sebelum penyelesaian desain.
________________________________________
4. Korupsi, Perencanaan Buruk, dan Interferensi Politik
• Militer Malondesh berada dalam “band D, kategori risiko tinggi untuk korupsi di sektor pertahanan.”
• Terdapat banyak intervensi politik dalam pengadaan dan kontrak militer, yang menurunkan efektivitas dan memunculkan biaya transaksional tak perlu.
• Perencanaan yang buruk sering menyebabkan pengadaan disetujui tanpa kebutuhan pengguna yang jelas—contoh kasus jet tempur LCA.
________________________________________
5. Masalah Operasional dan Sumber Daya Personel
• Personel militer dilaporkan menghadapi masalah keterampilan berpikir, pengambilan keputusan, dan pemecahan masalah selama operasi
• RMAF sendiri bermasalah dalam pemeliharaan pesawat dan pasokan suku cadang, untuk jenis lawas seperti Su-30MKM maupun Hornet bekas Kuwait.
________________________________________
6. Ancaman Eksternal dan Keamanan Maritim Terancam
• Tiongkok melakukan tekanan terhadap eksplorasi minyak di zona ekonomi eksklusif (EEZ) Malondesh, termasuk Luconia Shoals. Pemerintah sedang mempercepat pembangunan pangkalan angkatan laut di Bintulu (direncanakan selesai 2030), namun dianggap terlambat.
• Kekurangan aset yang memadai membuat Malondesh berisiko kesulitan mempertahankan EEZ dari pelanggaran negara lain.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
1. Keterbatasan Anggaran dan Alokasi Belanja
• Anggaran pertahanan Malondesh stagnan di kisaran RM15–18 miliar per tahun, namun mayoritas digunakan untuk operasi harian—alih-alih modernisasi atau peningkatan kapasitas.
• Anggaran 2024 hanya sebesar USD 4,16 miliar, dan lebih dari 40% digunakan untuk gaji dan tunjangan personel
• DPR mendesak pemerintah untuk meningkatkan pagu hingga 1,5% dari PDB, bahkan beberapa pihak menganjurkan 4% PDB agar Militer Mampu menjalankan misi pertahanan yang optimal.
________________________________________
2. Aset & Peralatan Usang
• Terdapat 171 aset militer yang telah berusia lebih dari 30 tahun, mencakup:
o 108 milik TDM
o 29 milik TUDM
o 34 milik TLDM
• Contohnya:
o KD Pendekar, kapal lama (~45 tahun), tenggelam setelah tertabrak objek bawah laut
o Sepertiga armada kapal keamanan (misalnya dari Agensi Maritim Malondesh) rusak atau tidak berfungsi.
________________________________________
3. Proyek Besar Tertunda dan Skandal Pengadaan
• Proyek Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)—senilai RM9 miliar—berasal dari rencana 6 kapal:
o Pengiriman pertama, Maharaja Lela, seharusnya 2019, tapi tertunda.
o Proyek dihentikan dan dilanjutkan kembali, dengan estimasi pengiriman baru: satu kapal selesai 2026, sisanya 2029.
• Skandal pengadaan LCS menunjukkan korupsi dan mismanagement—termasuk soal desain yang tidak dipilih RMN dan pembayaran besar sebelum penyelesaian desain.
________________________________________
4. Korupsi, Perencanaan Buruk, dan Interferensi Politik
• Militer Malondesh berada dalam “band D, kategori risiko tinggi untuk korupsi di sektor pertahanan.”
• Terdapat banyak intervensi politik dalam pengadaan dan kontrak militer, yang menurunkan efektivitas dan memunculkan biaya transaksional tak perlu.
• Perencanaan yang buruk sering menyebabkan pengadaan disetujui tanpa kebutuhan pengguna yang jelas—contoh kasus jet tempur LCA.
________________________________________
5. Masalah Operasional dan Sumber Daya Personel
• Personel militer dilaporkan menghadapi masalah keterampilan berpikir, pengambilan keputusan, dan pemecahan masalah selama operasi
• RMAF sendiri bermasalah dalam pemeliharaan pesawat dan pasokan suku cadang, untuk jenis lawas seperti Su-30MKM maupun Hornet bekas Kuwait.
________________________________________
6. Ancaman Eksternal dan Keamanan Maritim Terancam
• Tiongkok melakukan tekanan terhadap eksplorasi minyak di zona ekonomi eksklusif (EEZ) Malondesh, termasuk Luconia Shoals. Pemerintah sedang mempercepat pembangunan pangkalan angkatan laut di Bintulu (direncanakan selesai 2030), namun dianggap terlambat.
• Kekurangan aset yang memadai membuat Malondesh berisiko kesulitan mempertahankan EEZ dari pelanggaran negara lain.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
1. Aging Equipment
• A large portion of Malondesh’s armed forces equipment is 30–40+ years old.
• Examples:
o Navy: Some vessels date back to the 1970s–1980s; patrol craft and auxiliary ships are beyond recommended service life.
o Air Force (RMAF): Operates Su-30MKM (delivered 2007, but with spare parts issues), F/A-18D Hornets (1997), and Hawks (1994) — all aging platforms.
o Army: Armored vehicles like Condor APCs from the 1980s are still in service.
👉 Obsolescence makes maintenance expensive and reduces combat readiness.
________________________________________
2. Underinvestment in Modernisation
• Malondesh’s defense budget is small (around 1% of GDP, RM15–18 billion yearly) compared to regional peers.
• Over 40% goes to salaries and pensions, leaving little for procurement or modernization.
• This means many assets simply stay in service until they break down, instead of being replaced regularly like in Singapore or Australia.
________________________________________
3. Procurement Delays & Scandals
• Major programs often face delays, mismanagement, or corruption scandals.
• Example: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project – launched in 2011 (RM9 billion for 6 ships). As of 2025, no ship is operational; first delivery delayed to 2026.
• Result: the Navy is stuck using older corvettes and patrol vessels far past their prime.
________________________________________
4. Poor Maintenance & Spare Parts
• Limited budget also affects maintenance.
• The RMAF has had periods where only a fraction of its Su-30MKM fighters were airworthy due to spare parts shortages.
• Old systems without steady spare parts supply quickly degrade into obsolescence.
________________________________________
5. Shifts in Regional Military Balance
• Neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand) have invested heavily in modern systems (submarines, 5th-gen fighters, frigates, drones).
• By contrast, Malondesh’s fleet and aircraft look increasingly outdated not just in age, but in capability compared to regional peers.
________________________________________
6. Political Interference & Short-Termism
• Defense procurement is often politicized.
• Changes in government (frequent in Malondesh since 2018) cause projects to be halted, renegotiated, or reset.
• This leads to long gaps without new equipment, forcing older assets to remain in use.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
📌 1. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
• Contract signed: 2011 with Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS).
• Budget: RM 9 billion for 6 LCS frigates based on the French Gowind-class design.
• Promise: First ship to be delivered in 2019.
• Reality (as of 2025):
o 0 ships delivered.
o Construction stalled, costs ballooned, and the project was marred by mismanagement and alleged corruption.
o Some funds used for unrelated purposes, poor oversight.
o First ship expected only by 2026 after multiple restructuring attempts.
👉 Result: The Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN) still relies on old corvettes and patrol ships, while neighbors modernize.
________________________________________
📌 2. Armored Vehicle & Army Projects
• Condor APCs (1970s–80s) still in service because replacement programs were delayed.
• Malondesh purchased AV-8 Gempita armored vehicles (Turkey-Malondesh joint project, 2011), but production was slow and plagued by cost overruns.
• Planned replacements for older artillery and vehicles often stall due to lack of funds and changing government priorities.
________________________________________
📌 3. Aircraft Procurement Issues
• The Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) Program to replace aging MiG-29s (retired in 2017) has been delayed for over a decade.
o Candidates: Rafale (France), Typhoon (UK), Gripen (Sweden), F/A-18 (US).
o Political changes caused the program to be postponed indefinitely.
o Malondesh now only relies on 18 Su-30MKM and 8 F/A-18D Hornets — both aging fleets.
• RMAF struggles with readiness: at one point, only 4 of 18 Su-30MKMs were operational due to spare parts shortages.
________________________________________
📌 4. Patrol Vessel (NGPV) Project
• 1990s project for New Generation Patrol Vessels (NGPV) — intended 27 ships.
• Only 6 Kedah-class ships were delivered (2006–2010).
• Project faced budget mismanagement and corruption, forcing scaling down.
• Navy ended up with far fewer ships than planned, with limited capabilities.
________________________________________
📌 5. Submarine Program (Scorpène Class)
• Two French-made Scorpène submarines purchased in mid-2000s.
• Program tainted by corruption allegations involving middlemen and political figures (linked to the controversial Altantuya case).
• While subs are operational, maintenance has been expensive, and one was sidelined for long periods due to technical issues.
________________________________________
📌 6. Frequent Policy & Leadership Changes
• Since 2018, Malondesh has had multiple changes of prime minister and defense ministers.
• Each leadership change often restarts or reshuffles procurement plans.
• Example: MRCA program shelved, then revived, then shelved again.
• Long-term defense planning is almost impossible in this environment.
________________________________________
📌 7. Overdependence on Local Industry with Weak Oversight
• Malondesh often insists on local content & offsets in defense contracts.
• While this helps local industry, weak oversight leads to inefficiency, delays, and inflated costs (e.g., LCS, AV-8 projects).
• Unlike Singapore, which has a well-managed defense industry (ST Engineering), Malondesh’s defense industry lacks capacity and accountability.
Lagi LAWAK negara yang Makin parah dengan PEMBAKARAN & PENJARAHAN di mana mana.... ada hati mau menghina negara jiran .... 🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusMISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
📌 1. Frequent Change of Governments
• Since 2018, Malondesh has gone through five prime ministers (Najib → Mahathir → Muhyiddin → Ismail Sabri → Anwar).
• Each new administration brings in new defense ministers, new priorities, and new reviews of procurement plans.
• Defense programs often get shelved, re-tendered, or cancelled, even if already in progress.
👉 Example: The MRCA (fighter jet replacement) program was delayed repeatedly as every government pushed it aside to focus on other political promises.
________________________________________
📌 2. Short-Term Political Goals vs. Long-Term Defense Needs
• Politicians often treat the defense budget as a political tool, not a national strategy.
• Instead of investing in long-term modernization (ships, jets, systems that take 10–20 years), governments focus on populist measures like subsidies and cash transfers.
• Defense ends up being underfunded because it doesn’t bring quick electoral returns.
👉 Result: Modernization plans are written on paper (e.g., Malondesh Defence White Paper 2019) but rarely implemented.
________________________________________
📌 3. Procurement Decisions Driven by Politics
• Major defense deals are often influenced by political patronage and corruption instead of operational needs.
• Contracts are awarded to companies with political links, regardless of whether they can deliver.
👉 Example: The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project was handed to Boustead Naval Shipyard (linked to UMNO interests), leading to billions spent without a single ship delivered by 2025.
________________________________________
📌 4. Policy Flip-Flops
• Projects often get reversed or changed midway because of political shifts.
• Example:
o NGPV (New Generation Patrol Vessel) plan was for 27 ships. After political scandals and leadership changes, only 6 were built.
o MRCA Program (to replace MiG-29s) has been “top priority” since 2010, but each government postponed it → leaving RMAF with a shrinking fleet.
• This creates a stop-go cycle where billions are wasted and no consistent progress is made.
________________________________________
📌 5. Lack of Bipartisan Consensus on Defense
• Unlike Singapore (where defense is a non-political, bipartisan national priority), in Malondesh defense policy shifts with each ruling coalition.
• No stable long-term vision: every government reopens old debates instead of following through on past commitments.
👉 The 2019 Defence White Paper was a good roadmap, but after Pakatan Harapan fell in 2020, it was quietly shelved.
________________________________________
📌 6. Overemphasis on Local Industry & Patronage
• Malondesh insists on local build requirements to create domestic defense jobs.
• In principle this is good, but in practice it often serves political interests and patronage networks.
• Without strong oversight, projects like LCS or AV-8 Gempita become political cash cows, plagued by cost overruns and delays.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
📌 1. Frequent Change of Governments
• Since 2018, Malondesh has gone through five prime ministers (Najib → Mahathir → Muhyiddin → Ismail Sabri → Anwar).
• Each new administration brings in new defense ministers, new priorities, and new reviews of procurement plans.
• Defense programs often get shelved, re-tendered, or cancelled, even if already in progress.
👉 Example: The MRCA (fighter jet replacement) program was delayed repeatedly as every government pushed it aside to focus on other political promises.
________________________________________
📌 2. Short-Term Political Goals vs. Long-Term Defense Needs
• Politicians often treat the defense budget as a political tool, not a national strategy.
• Instead of investing in long-term modernization (ships, jets, systems that take 10–20 years), governments focus on populist measures like subsidies and cash transfers.
• Defense ends up being underfunded because it doesn’t bring quick electoral returns.
👉 Result: Modernization plans are written on paper (e.g., Malondesh Defence White Paper 2019) but rarely implemented.
________________________________________
📌 3. Procurement Decisions Driven by Politics
• Major defense deals are often influenced by political patronage and corruption instead of operational needs.
• Contracts are awarded to companies with political links, regardless of whether they can deliver.
👉 Example: The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project was handed to Boustead Naval Shipyard (linked to UMNO interests), leading to billions spent without a single ship delivered by 2025.
________________________________________
📌 4. Policy Flip-Flops
• Projects often get reversed or changed midway because of political shifts.
• Example:
o NGPV (New Generation Patrol Vessel) plan was for 27 ships. After political scandals and leadership changes, only 6 were built.
o MRCA Program (to replace MiG-29s) has been “top priority” since 2010, but each government postponed it → leaving RMAF with a shrinking fleet.
• This creates a stop-go cycle where billions are wasted and no consistent progress is made.
________________________________________
📌 5. Lack of Bipartisan Consensus on Defense
• Unlike Singapore (where defense is a non-political, bipartisan national priority), in Malondesh defense policy shifts with each ruling coalition.
• No stable long-term vision: every government reopens old debates instead of following through on past commitments.
👉 The 2019 Defence White Paper was a good roadmap, but after Pakatan Harapan fell in 2020, it was quietly shelved.
________________________________________
📌 6. Overemphasis on Local Industry & Patronage
• Malondesh insists on local build requirements to create domestic defense jobs.
• In principle this is good, but in practice it often serves political interests and patronage networks.
• Without strong oversight, projects like LCS or AV-8 Gempita become political cash cows, plagued by cost overruns and delays.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
📌 1. Small Defense Budget (Overall Envelope)
• Malondesh spends around RM15–18 billion per year on defense (≈ 1% of GDP).
• This is low compared to regional peers:
o Singapore: ~3% of GDP (RM70+ billion equivalent)
o Indonesia: ~0.8% of GDP, but larger economy → higher absolute spending (~RM60 billion)
o Thailand & Vietnam also outspend Malondesh in modernization.
👉 Malondesh’s small budget puts it at a disadvantage from the start.
________________________________________
📌 2. Budget Distribution – Heavy on Salaries
Typical Malondeshn defense budget split:
• 60% → Salaries & pensions
• 20–25% → Operations & maintenance (O&M)
• 15–20% → Procurement / modernization
🔎 In practice:
• Most of the money pays for personnel (over 100,000 active forces + veterans pensions).
• Very little left for buying new weapons or even maintaining old ones.
👉 This creates a large but poorly equipped force.
________________________________________
📌 3. Pensions Burden
• Malondesh has a generous pensions system for retired military personnel.
• As veterans population grows, pension spending keeps rising.
• Defense Ministry becomes a welfare ministry for ex-servicemen as much as a warfighting institution.
• This crowds out funds for modernization.
________________________________________
📌 4. Operations & Maintenance (O&M) Shortfall
• The O&M budget (fuel, spare parts, training, repairs) is chronically underfunded.
• Impact:
o Aircraft often grounded due to lack of parts.
o Navy ships idle in dockyards.
o Troops train less (pilots fewer flight hours, sailors fewer sea days).
👉 This lowers readiness, even before considering modernization gaps.
________________________________________
📌 5. Procurement = Stop-Go Cycle
• With only 15–20% for procurement, Malondesh struggles to commit to big projects.
• Big-ticket items (frigates, fighter jets, armored vehicles) are so expensive that the government buys in small batches or delays purchases for years.
• Example:
o MRCA (fighter jet replacement) delayed since 2010.
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) consumed billions, but no ships delivered yet.
• Each time budgets tighten (economic slowdown, political crisis), procurement is the first to be cut.
________________________________________
📌 6. Political Priorities & Populism
• Politicians prefer to protect salaries (because soldiers & veterans are voters).
• Cutting personnel costs is politically unpopular → no downsizing of the armed forces.
• Procurement and maintenance (less visible to voters) are sacrificed when budgets are tight.
👉 Leads to “big manpower, weak firepower” problem.
________________________________________
📌 7. Lack of Multi-Year Defense Planning
• Budgets are set year by year, with no guaranteed long-term allocation.
• Projects requiring 10–15 years of steady funding (like ships, aircraft fleets) are vulnerable to delays and underfunding.
• Unlike Singapore, which has a rolling multi-decade defense plan, Malondesh’s defense budgeting is short-term and reactive.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
📌 1. Frequent Change of Governments
• Since 2018, Malondesh has gone through five prime ministers (Najib → Mahathir → Muhyiddin → Ismail Sabri → Anwar).
• Each new administration brings in new defense ministers, new priorities, and new reviews of procurement plans.
• Defense programs often get shelved, re-tendered, or cancelled, even if already in progress.
👉 Example: The MRCA (fighter jet replacement) program was delayed repeatedly as every government pushed it aside to focus on other political promises.
________________________________________
📌 2. Short-Term Political Goals vs. Long-Term Defense Needs
• Politicians often treat the defense budget as a political tool, not a national strategy.
• Instead of investing in long-term modernization (ships, jets, systems that take 10–20 years), governments focus on populist measures like subsidies and cash transfers.
• Defense ends up being underfunded because it doesn’t bring quick electoral returns.
👉 Result: Modernization plans are written on paper (e.g., Malondesh Defence White Paper 2019) but rarely implemented.
________________________________________
📌 3. Procurement Decisions Driven by Politics
• Major defense deals are often influenced by political patronage and corruption instead of operational needs.
• Contracts are awarded to companies with political links, regardless of whether they can deliver.
👉 Example: The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project was handed to Boustead Naval Shipyard (linked to UMNO interests), leading to billions spent without a single ship delivered by 2025.
________________________________________
📌 4. Policy Flip-Flops
• Projects often get reversed or changed midway because of political shifts.
• Example:
o NGPV (New Generation Patrol Vessel) plan was for 27 ships. After political scandals and leadership changes, only 6 were built.
o MRCA Program (to replace MiG-29s) has been “top priority” since 2010, but each government postponed it → leaving RMAF with a shrinking fleet.
• This creates a stop-go cycle where billions are wasted and no consistent progress is made.
________________________________________
📌 5. Lack of Bipartisan Consensus on Defense
• Unlike Singapore (where defense is a non-political, bipartisan national priority), in Malondesh defense policy shifts with each ruling coalition.
• No stable long-term vision: every government reopens old debates instead of following through on past commitments.
👉 The 2019 Defence White Paper was a good roadmap, but after Pakatan Harapan fell in 2020, it was quietly shelved.
________________________________________
📌 6. Overemphasis on Local Industry & Patronage
• Malondesh insists on local build requirements to create domestic defense jobs.
• In principle this is good, but in practice it often serves political interests and patronage networks.
• Without strong oversight, projects like LCS or AV-8 Gempita become political cash cows, plagued by cost overruns and delays.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
📌 1. Small Defense Budget (Overall Envelope)
• Malondesh spends around RM15–18 billion per year on defense (≈ 1% of GDP).
• This is low compared to regional peers:
o Singapore: ~3% of GDP (RM70+ billion equivalent)
o Indonesia: ~0.8% of GDP, but larger economy → higher absolute spending (~RM60 billion)
o Thailand & Vietnam also outspend Malondesh in modernization.
👉 Malondesh’s small budget puts it at a disadvantage from the start.
________________________________________
📌 2. Budget Distribution – Heavy on Salaries
Typical Malondeshn defense budget split:
• 60% → Salaries & pensions
• 20–25% → Operations & maintenance (O&M)
• 15–20% → Procurement / modernization
🔎 In practice:
• Most of the money pays for personnel (over 100,000 active forces + veterans pensions).
• Very little left for buying new weapons or even maintaining old ones.
👉 This creates a large but poorly equipped force.
________________________________________
📌 3. Pensions Burden
• Malondesh has a generous pensions system for retired military personnel.
• As veterans population grows, pension spending keeps rising.
• Defense Ministry becomes a welfare ministry for ex-servicemen as much as a warfighting institution.
• This crowds out funds for modernization.
________________________________________
📌 4. Operations & Maintenance (O&M) Shortfall
• The O&M budget (fuel, spare parts, training, repairs) is chronically underfunded.
• Impact:
o Aircraft often grounded due to lack of parts.
o Navy ships idle in dockyards.
o Troops train less (pilots fewer flight hours, sailors fewer sea days).
👉 This lowers readiness, even before considering modernization gaps.
________________________________________
📌 5. Procurement = Stop-Go Cycle
• With only 15–20% for procurement, Malondesh struggles to commit to big projects.
• Big-ticket items (frigates, fighter jets, armored vehicles) are so expensive that the government buys in small batches or delays purchases for years.
• Example:
o MRCA (fighter jet replacement) delayed since 2010.
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) consumed billions, but no ships delivered yet.
• Each time budgets tighten (economic slowdown, political crisis), procurement is the first to be cut.
________________________________________
📌 6. Political Priorities & Populism
• Politicians prefer to protect salaries (because soldiers & veterans are voters).
• Cutting personnel costs is politically unpopular → no downsizing of the armed forces.
• Procurement and maintenance (less visible to voters) are sacrificed when budgets are tight.
👉 Leads to “big manpower, weak firepower” problem.
________________________________________
📌 7. Lack of Multi-Year Defense Planning
• Budgets are set year by year, with no guaranteed long-term allocation.
• Projects requiring 10–15 years of steady funding (like ships, aircraft fleets) are vulnerable to delays and underfunding.
• Unlike Singapore, which has a rolling multi-decade defense plan, Malondesh’s defense budgeting is short-term and reactive.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
📌 1. Small Defense Budget (Overall Envelope)
• Malondesh spends around RM15–18 billion per year on defense (≈ 1% of GDP).
• This is low compared to regional peers:
o Singapore: ~3% of GDP (RM70+ billion equivalent)
o Indonesia: ~0.8% of GDP, but larger economy → higher absolute spending (~RM60 billion)
o Thailand & Vietnam also outspend Malondesh in modernization.
👉 Malondesh’s small budget puts it at a disadvantage from the start.
________________________________________
📌 2. Budget Distribution – Heavy on Salaries
Typical Malondeshn defense budget split:
• 60% → Salaries & pensions
• 20–25% → Operations & maintenance (O&M)
• 15–20% → Procurement / modernization
🔎 In practice:
• Most of the money pays for personnel (over 100,000 active forces + veterans pensions).
• Very little left for buying new weapons or even maintaining old ones.
👉 This creates a large but poorly equipped force.
________________________________________
📌 3. Pensions Burden
• Malondesh has a generous pensions system for retired military personnel.
• As veterans population grows, pension spending keeps rising.
• Defense Ministry becomes a welfare ministry for ex-servicemen as much as a warfighting institution.
• This crowds out funds for modernization.
________________________________________
📌 4. Operations & Maintenance (O&M) Shortfall
• The O&M budget (fuel, spare parts, training, repairs) is chronically underfunded.
• Impact:
o Aircraft often grounded due to lack of parts.
o Navy ships idle in dockyards.
o Troops train less (pilots fewer flight hours, sailors fewer sea days).
👉 This lowers readiness, even before considering modernization gaps.
________________________________________
📌 5. Procurement = Stop-Go Cycle
• With only 15–20% for procurement, Malondesh struggles to commit to big projects.
• Big-ticket items (frigates, fighter jets, armored vehicles) are so expensive that the government buys in small batches or delays purchases for years.
• Example:
o MRCA (fighter jet replacement) delayed since 2010.
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) consumed billions, but no ships delivered yet.
• Each time budgets tighten (economic slowdown, political crisis), procurement is the first to be cut.
________________________________________
📌 6. Political Priorities & Populism
• Politicians prefer to protect salaries (because soldiers & veterans are voters).
• Cutting personnel costs is politically unpopular → no downsizing of the armed forces.
• Procurement and maintenance (less visible to voters) are sacrificed when budgets are tight.
👉 Leads to “big manpower, weak firepower” problem.
________________________________________
📌 7. Lack of Multi-Year Defense Planning
• Budgets are set year by year, with no guaranteed long-term allocation.
• Projects requiring 10–15 years of steady funding (like ships, aircraft fleets) are vulnerable to delays and underfunding.
• Unlike Singapore, which has a rolling multi-decade defense plan, Malondesh’s defense budgeting is short-term and reactive.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
📌 1. Small Defense Budget (Overall Envelope)
• Malondesh spends around RM15–18 billion per year on defense (≈ 1% of GDP).
• This is low compared to regional peers:
o Singapore: ~3% of GDP (RM70+ billion equivalent)
o Indonesia: ~0.8% of GDP, but larger economy → higher absolute spending (~RM60 billion)
o Thailand & Vietnam also outspend Malondesh in modernization.
👉 Malondesh’s small budget puts it at a disadvantage from the start.
________________________________________
📌 2. Budget Distribution – Heavy on Salaries
Typical Malondeshn defense budget split:
• 60% → Salaries & pensions
• 20–25% → Operations & maintenance (O&M)
• 15–20% → Procurement / modernization
🔎 In practice:
• Most of the money pays for personnel (over 100,000 active forces + veterans pensions).
• Very little left for buying new weapons or even maintaining old ones.
👉 This creates a large but poorly equipped force.
________________________________________
📌 3. Pensions Burden
• Malondesh has a generous pensions system for retired military personnel.
• As veterans population grows, pension spending keeps rising.
• Defense Ministry becomes a welfare ministry for ex-servicemen as much as a warfighting institution.
• This crowds out funds for modernization.
________________________________________
📌 4. Operations & Maintenance (O&M) Shortfall
• The O&M budget (fuel, spare parts, training, repairs) is chronically underfunded.
• Impact:
o Aircraft often grounded due to lack of parts.
o Navy ships idle in dockyards.
o Troops train less (pilots fewer flight hours, sailors fewer sea days).
👉 This lowers readiness, even before considering modernization gaps.
________________________________________
📌 5. Procurement = Stop-Go Cycle
• With only 15–20% for procurement, Malondesh struggles to commit to big projects.
• Big-ticket items (frigates, fighter jets, armored vehicles) are so expensive that the government buys in small batches or delays purchases for years.
• Example:
o MRCA (fighter jet replacement) delayed since 2010.
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) consumed billions, but no ships delivered yet.
• Each time budgets tighten (economic slowdown, political crisis), procurement is the first to be cut.
________________________________________
📌 6. Political Priorities & Populism
• Politicians prefer to protect salaries (because soldiers & veterans are voters).
• Cutting personnel costs is politically unpopular → no downsizing of the armed forces.
• Procurement and maintenance (less visible to voters) are sacrificed when budgets are tight.
👉 Leads to “big manpower, weak firepower” problem.
________________________________________
📌 7. Lack of Multi-Year Defense Planning
• Budgets are set year by year, with no guaranteed long-term allocation.
• Projects requiring 10–15 years of steady funding (like ships, aircraft fleets) are vulnerable to delays and underfunding.
• Unlike Singapore, which has a rolling multi-decade defense plan, Malondesh’s defense budgeting is short-term and reactive.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
📌 1. Small Defense Budget (Overall Envelope)
• Malondesh spends around RM15–18 billion per year on defense (≈ 1% of GDP).
• This is low compared to regional peers:
o Singapore: ~3% of GDP (RM70+ billion equivalent)
o Indonesia: ~0.8% of GDP, but larger economy → higher absolute spending (~RM60 billion)
o Thailand & Vietnam also outspend Malondesh in modernization.
👉 Malondesh’s small budget puts it at a disadvantage from the start.
________________________________________
📌 2. Budget Distribution – Heavy on Salaries
Typical Malondeshn defense budget split:
• 60% → Salaries & pensions
• 20–25% → Operations & maintenance (O&M)
• 15–20% → Procurement / modernization
🔎 In practice:
• Most of the money pays for personnel (over 100,000 active forces + veterans pensions).
• Very little left for buying new weapons or even maintaining old ones.
👉 This creates a large but poorly equipped force.
________________________________________
📌 3. Pensions Burden
• Malondesh has a generous pensions system for retired military personnel.
• As veterans population grows, pension spending keeps rising.
• Defense Ministry becomes a welfare ministry for ex-servicemen as much as a warfighting institution.
• This crowds out funds for modernization.
________________________________________
📌 4. Operations & Maintenance (O&M) Shortfall
• The O&M budget (fuel, spare parts, training, repairs) is chronically underfunded.
• Impact:
o Aircraft often grounded due to lack of parts.
o Navy ships idle in dockyards.
o Troops train less (pilots fewer flight hours, sailors fewer sea days).
👉 This lowers readiness, even before considering modernization gaps.
________________________________________
📌 5. Procurement = Stop-Go Cycle
• With only 15–20% for procurement, Malondesh struggles to commit to big projects.
• Big-ticket items (frigates, fighter jets, armored vehicles) are so expensive that the government buys in small batches or delays purchases for years.
• Example:
o MRCA (fighter jet replacement) delayed since 2010.
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) consumed billions, but no ships delivered yet.
• Each time budgets tighten (economic slowdown, political crisis), procurement is the first to be cut.
________________________________________
📌 6. Political Priorities & Populism
• Politicians prefer to protect salaries (because soldiers & veterans are voters).
• Cutting personnel costs is politically unpopular → no downsizing of the armed forces.
• Procurement and maintenance (less visible to voters) are sacrificed when budgets are tight.
👉 Leads to “big manpower, weak firepower” problem.
________________________________________
📌 7. Lack of Multi-Year Defense Planning
• Budgets are set year by year, with no guaranteed long-term allocation.
• Projects requiring 10–15 years of steady funding (like ships, aircraft fleets) are vulnerable to delays and underfunding.
• Unlike Singapore, which has a rolling multi-decade defense plan, Malondesh’s defense budgeting is short-term and reactive.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
📌 1. Malondesh Defence White Paper (DWP) 2019
a. Objective
• The DWP 2019 was intended as Malondesh’s first long-term defense roadmap.
• Goals:
o Identify threats and security priorities (maritime security, terrorism, cyber, regional tensions).
o Outline modernization plans for Navy, Air Force, and Army through 2030.
o Provide guidance for procurement, O&M, and capability building.
b. Proposed Approach
• 10-year horizon (2021–2030) for modernization.
• Emphasis on:
o Upgrading aging ships, aircraft, and armored vehicles.
o Strengthening maritime and air defense.
o Developing cyber, UAV, and special operations capabilities.
c. Failure Reasons
1. Political Collapse
o Pakatan Harapan government fell in 2020.
o DWP implementation depended on continuity of political support, which disappeared.
2. No Legal/Institutional Backing
o Unlike Singapore or Indonesia, Malondesh has no law forcing successive governments to follow the plan.
3. Short-Term Budgeting
o Malondesh still allocates budgets year-by-year, leaving little certainty for multi-year projects.
4. Budget Constraints
o Small overall defense budget (~1% of GDP) → most plans remained aspirational.
5. Result
o Modernization projects delayed or cancelled.
o Navy still waits for LCS ships, Air Force stuck with aging jets, Army using 1980s APCs.
👉 DWP became a paper plan with little real impact.
________________________________________
📌 2. Indonesia Minimum Essential Force (MEF)
a. Objective
• MEF (Minimum Essential Force) is Indonesia’s long-term military modernization plan, started in 2004.
• Goals:
o Achieve a minimum level of capability to defend the country.
o Develop integrated capabilities across Army, Navy, Air Force.
o Plan modernization in phases over decades.
b. Implementation Approach
• Multi-phase program:
o MEF I (2004–2009): Procurement of basic platforms, focus on territorial defense.
o MEF II (2010–2014): Expand fleet, improve air defense.
o MEF III (2015–2024): Focus on advanced assets (fighters, submarines, naval combatants).
• Legally recognized: MEF has multi-year funding plans, independent of short-term political changes.
• Result:
o Indonesian Navy expanded with new frigates, corvettes, submarines.
o Air Force replaced aging fighters and increased UAV capabilities.
o Army received modern APCs, artillery, and transport vehicles.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
📌 1. Limited Procurement & Modernization
• Malondesh’s annual defense budget (~RM15–18 billion, 1% of GDP) is insufficient for large-scale procurement.
• Effects:
o Fighter jets: MRCA replacement program delayed; RMAF still uses aging F/A-18D Hornets, Hawks, and Su-30MKMs with limited operational readiness.
o Navy: LCS project stalled for over a decade; old corvettes and patrol ships remain in service.
o Army: Many vehicles like Condor APCs and older artillery pieces are still in use because modernization is unaffordable.
• Result: Malondesh acquires equipment piecemeal instead of building a balanced, modern force.
________________________________________
📌 2. Underfunded Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
• Only ~20–25% of the budget is allocated to fuel, spare parts, repairs, training.
• Effects:
o Many aircraft and ships are grounded due to maintenance backlogs.
o Pilots and crews get fewer training hours, reducing readiness.
o Aging vehicles and ships wear out faster, accelerating obsolescence.
• Examples:
o Only ~4 of 18 Su-30MKMs were airworthy at one point.
o Navy relies on ships built in the 1980s due to delays in LCS delivery.
________________________________________
📌 3. Personnel vs Capability Imbalance
• ~60% of the budget goes to salaries and pensions.
• Consequences:
o Large manpower (110,000 active personnel) cannot be properly equipped.
o Military is “people-heavy but equipment-light,” limiting operational effectiveness.
• Soldiers are well-paid but often lack modern tools or transport, reducing combat effectiveness.
________________________________________
📌 4. Reduced Readiness
• Small budget and underfunding of O&M → low operational readiness:
o Aircraft, ships, and armored vehicles often not deployable.
o Training exercises are limited due to fuel and maintenance costs.
• Malondesh cannot sustain continuous deterrence or regional presence, unlike Singapore or Indonesia.
________________________________________
📌 5. Vulnerability to Regional Gap
• Neighbors (Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia) have invested more in modernization and readiness.
• Malondesh’s small budget → capability gap grows:
o Navy: fewer modern frigates and submarines.
o Air Force: fewer operational jets and limited air defense.
o Army: older vehicles, limited mobility.
________________________________________
📌 6. Delayed or Cancelled Programs
• Many projects are postponed indefinitely due to funding constraints:
o MRCA (fighter replacement)
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
o Armored vehicle upgrades and artillery modernization
• Stop-go procurement leads to wasted funds, inefficiency, and obsolescence.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
📌 1. Limited Procurement & Modernization
• Malondesh’s annual defense budget (~RM15–18 billion, 1% of GDP) is insufficient for large-scale procurement.
• Effects:
o Fighter jets: MRCA replacement program delayed; RMAF still uses aging F/A-18D Hornets, Hawks, and Su-30MKMs with limited operational readiness.
o Navy: LCS project stalled for over a decade; old corvettes and patrol ships remain in service.
o Army: Many vehicles like Condor APCs and older artillery pieces are still in use because modernization is unaffordable.
• Result: Malondesh acquires equipment piecemeal instead of building a balanced, modern force.
________________________________________
📌 2. Underfunded Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
• Only ~20–25% of the budget is allocated to fuel, spare parts, repairs, training.
• Effects:
o Many aircraft and ships are grounded due to maintenance backlogs.
o Pilots and crews get fewer training hours, reducing readiness.
o Aging vehicles and ships wear out faster, accelerating obsolescence.
• Examples:
o Only ~4 of 18 Su-30MKMs were airworthy at one point.
o Navy relies on ships built in the 1980s due to delays in LCS delivery.
________________________________________
📌 3. Personnel vs Capability Imbalance
• ~60% of the budget goes to salaries and pensions.
• Consequences:
o Large manpower (110,000 active personnel) cannot be properly equipped.
o Military is “people-heavy but equipment-light,” limiting operational effectiveness.
• Soldiers are well-paid but often lack modern tools or transport, reducing combat effectiveness.
________________________________________
📌 4. Reduced Readiness
• Small budget and underfunding of O&M → low operational readiness:
o Aircraft, ships, and armored vehicles often not deployable.
o Training exercises are limited due to fuel and maintenance costs.
• Malondesh cannot sustain continuous deterrence or regional presence, unlike Singapore or Indonesia.
________________________________________
📌 5. Vulnerability to Regional Gap
• Neighbors (Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia) have invested more in modernization and readiness.
• Malondesh’s small budget → capability gap grows:
o Navy: fewer modern frigates and submarines.
o Air Force: fewer operational jets and limited air defense.
o Army: older vehicles, limited mobility.
________________________________________
📌 6. Delayed or Cancelled Programs
• Many projects are postponed indefinitely due to funding constraints:
o MRCA (fighter replacement)
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
o Armored vehicle upgrades and artillery modernization
• Stop-go procurement leads to wasted funds, inefficiency, and obsolescence.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
📌 1. Limited Procurement & Modernization
• Malondesh’s annual defense budget (~RM15–18 billion, 1% of GDP) is insufficient for large-scale procurement.
• Effects:
o Fighter jets: MRCA replacement program delayed; RMAF still uses aging F/A-18D Hornets, Hawks, and Su-30MKMs with limited operational readiness.
o Navy: LCS project stalled for over a decade; old corvettes and patrol ships remain in service.
o Army: Many vehicles like Condor APCs and older artillery pieces are still in use because modernization is unaffordable.
• Result: Malondesh acquires equipment piecemeal instead of building a balanced, modern force.
________________________________________
📌 2. Underfunded Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
• Only ~20–25% of the budget is allocated to fuel, spare parts, repairs, training.
• Effects:
o Many aircraft and ships are grounded due to maintenance backlogs.
o Pilots and crews get fewer training hours, reducing readiness.
o Aging vehicles and ships wear out faster, accelerating obsolescence.
• Examples:
o Only ~4 of 18 Su-30MKMs were airworthy at one point.
o Navy relies on ships built in the 1980s due to delays in LCS delivery.
________________________________________
📌 3. Personnel vs Capability Imbalance
• ~60% of the budget goes to salaries and pensions.
• Consequences:
o Large manpower (110,000 active personnel) cannot be properly equipped.
o Military is “people-heavy but equipment-light,” limiting operational effectiveness.
• Soldiers are well-paid but often lack modern tools or transport, reducing combat effectiveness.
________________________________________
📌 4. Reduced Readiness
• Small budget and underfunding of O&M → low operational readiness:
o Aircraft, ships, and armored vehicles often not deployable.
o Training exercises are limited due to fuel and maintenance costs.
• Malondesh cannot sustain continuous deterrence or regional presence, unlike Singapore or Indonesia.
________________________________________
📌 5. Vulnerability to Regional Gap
• Neighbors (Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia) have invested more in modernization and readiness.
• Malondesh’s small budget → capability gap grows:
o Navy: fewer modern frigates and submarines.
o Air Force: fewer operational jets and limited air defense.
o Army: older vehicles, limited mobility.
________________________________________
📌 6. Delayed or Cancelled Programs
• Many projects are postponed indefinitely due to funding constraints:
o MRCA (fighter replacement)
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
o Armored vehicle upgrades and artillery modernization
• Stop-go procurement leads to wasted funds, inefficiency, and obsolescence.
MASJID juga tak Terlepas DIBAKAR.....
BalasHapusUPDATE Masjid Al Jabbar Tegalsari Surabaya Ludes Dibakar Massa
https://mataraman.tribunnews.com/news/60330/update-masjid-al-jabbar-tegalsari-surabaya-ludes-dibakar-massa
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
📌 1. What O&M Covers
Operations & Maintenance (O&M) includes:
• Fuel and consumables for aircraft, ships, and vehicles
• Spare parts for planes, ships, and vehicles
• Repairs and overhauls (preventive and corrective maintenance)
• Training exercises for personnel
• Operational readiness support (e.g., simulation, logistics)
Weak O&M means all of these areas are underfunded or poorly managed.
________________________________________
📌 2. Budget Constraints
• Only 20–25% of Malondesh’s small defense budget (~1% GDP) goes to O&M.
• Consequences:
o Aircraft grounded due to lack of fuel or spare parts
o Ships docked for extended periods awaiting repairs
o Vehicles idle in depots because they cannot be maintained
Example:
• RMAF Su-30MKM: at one point, only 4 of 18 fighters were airworthy due to spare parts shortages.
• Navy corvettes & patrol vessels from the 1980s continue in service because LCS delays mean there’s no replacement.
________________________________________
📌 3. Impact on Training
• O&M limitations reduce training opportunities:
o Pilots get fewer flight hours → degrade skills
o Naval crews sail less → operational proficiency drops
o Soldiers train less with heavy vehicles and artillery → less effective combat units
• Training shortfalls compound the readiness problem, even if equipment is technically available.
________________________________________
📌 4. Maintenance Culture Issues
• Maintenance is often reactive, not preventive:
o Equipment is used until breakdown, then repaired.
o Preventive maintenance (regular inspections, part replacements) is skipped to save costs.
• Consequence: equipment wears out faster, reducing lifespan and readiness.
________________________________________
📌 5. Spare Parts Shortages
• Many Malondeshn military systems are imported: Russia, France, US, Turkey.
• Budget shortfalls and procurement delays cause spare parts shortages, resulting in:
o Aircraft grounded
o Ships unable to sail
o Armored vehicles idle
• Some old platforms have parts no longer manufactured, forcing cannibalization of other units.
________________________________________
📌 6. Effects on Operational Readiness
Effect Example
Low aircraft readiness Only ~30–40% of fighter jets flyable
Naval limitations Fewer patrols; reliance on 1980s ships
Army mobility problems APCs, artillery under-maintained
Reduced training Crews and soldiers less combat-ready
Accelerated obsolescence Old equipment fails faster, forcing prolonged use
________________________________________
📌 7. Systemic Causes
1. Small overall budget → O&M underfunded
2. Salary-heavy allocation → majority of funds go to personnel
3. Political short-termism → O&M often deprioritized for visible projects
4. Procurement delays & scandals → new assets delayed, old ones overused
5. Limited local defense industry → spare parts must be imported, increasing cost & delays
MASJID juga tak Terlepas DIBAKAR.....
BalasHapusUPDATE Masjid Al Jabbar Tegalsari Surabaya Ludes Dibakar Massa
https://mataraman.tribunnews.com/news/60330/update-masjid-al-jabbar-tegalsari-surabaya-ludes-dibakar-massa
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
📌 1. Procurement Overview
• Malondesh’s defense procurement is piecemeal, delayed, and often politically influenced.
• Limited modernization is the result of:
1. Small defense budget (~1% of GDP)
2. High personnel costs (~60% of budget)
3. Political short-termism and procurement scandals
________________________________________
📌 2. Major Modernization Programs and Delays
a. Air Force (RMAF)
• MRCA Fighter Replacement: Intended to replace MiG-29s (retired 2017).
o Candidates: Rafale, Typhoon, Gripen, F/A-18
o Program delayed repeatedly due to budget constraints, political changes, and procurement indecision.
o Result: RMAF relies on aging Su-30MKM, F/A-18D, and Hawk trainers, with limited readiness.
• Helicopters: Sikorsky S-70, AW139s delivered slowly; fleet size insufficient for operational needs.
b. Navy (RMN)
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Project
o Contract 2011, RM9 billion for 6 ships
o No operational ships as of 2025 due to construction delays, cost overruns, and political mismanagement
o Navy relies on Kedah-class corvettes (2006–2010) and older 1980s vessels
• Submarines: Two Scorpène-class delivered mid-2000s
o High maintenance costs and limited operational use
o Spare parts delays reduce readiness
c. Army (TDM)
• Armored vehicles: Condor APCs (1980s) still in service
• AV-8 Gempita (Turkey-Malondesh joint project) production delayed and expensive
• Artillery & support systems: Many systems remain outdated due to insufficient procurement funding
________________________________________
📌 3. Reasons for Limited Procurement
1. Small Defense Budget
o Only ~15–18 billion RM per year
o Majority spent on salaries → little left for big-ticket items
2. Stop-Go Procurement Cycle
o Projects start, then delayed or scaled down due to political or budget issues
o Example: LCS, MRCA, Army modernization programs
3. Political Interference & Corruption
o Contracts awarded based on political connections, not operational priority
o Leads to mismanagement, cost overruns, and delayed delivery
4. Dependence on Foreign Suppliers
o Many systems must be imported → costly and sensitive to geopolitical issues
5. Weak Multi-Year Planning
o No binding long-term plan → programs cannot be executed consistently
________________________________________
📌 4. Consequences of Limited Modernization
Area Effect
Air Force Aging jets; low operational readiness (~30–40%)
Navy Old corvettes/patrol ships in use; LCS delayed
Army Old APCs and artillery; partial vehicle upgrades only
Training Fewer exercises due to limited functional equipment
Regional capability Military capability lags behind neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam)
Strategic posture Limited deterrence and inability to sustain high-intensity operations
________________________________________
📌 5. Cumulative Effect
• Limited procurement + weak O&M + small budget + political short-termism = military stagnation
• Equipment remains obsolete, readiness is low, and modernization programs are repeatedly delayed or cancelled.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
📌 1. Definition of Readiness
• Military readiness is the ability of armed forces to deploy, fight, and sustain operations effectively.
• It depends on:
o Personnel training and morale
o Equipment availability and functionality
o Supply chains, spare parts, and logistics
o Command, control, and operational planning
________________________________________
📌 2. Factors Reducing Readiness in Malondesh
a. Aging Equipment
• Many systems are decades old:
o Army: Condor APCs (1980s), aging artillery
o Air Force: Hawks, F/A-18D, Su-30MKM maintenance-dependent
o Navy: Corvettes and patrol ships from the 1980s and 1990s
• Aging equipment is less reliable and requires more maintenance, reducing operational availability.
b. Weak Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
• Underfunded O&M (~20–25% of defense budget) leads to:
o Aircraft grounded for spare parts or repairs
o Ships docked for extended periods
o Vehicles in depots awaiting maintenance
• Result: Even available personnel cannot train on or deploy operational equipment.
c. Limited Procurement & Modernization
• Programs like LCS, MRCA, and AV-8 Gempita delayed or scaled down → old platforms overused
• Delayed modernization keeps capabilities obsolete, reducing effective combat power
d. Personnel vs Equipment Imbalance
• ~60% of the budget goes to salaries → large manpower, small equipment share
• Large number of soldiers and pilots, but few operational assets to use → readiness suffers
e. Short Training Hours
• Reduced O&M funds → limited exercises, flight hours, and sea days
• Consequences:
o Pilots lose proficiency
o Sailors have fewer operational patrols
o Soldiers have limited live-fire or armored vehicle training
f. Political Interference & Short-Termism
• Stop-go projects and annual budgeting → unpredictable availability of equipment
• Forces cannot plan for sustained readiness when budgets, programs, and leadership priorities keep changing
________________________________________
📌 3. Operational Examples
Branch Issue Readiness Effect
Air Force Su-30MKM grounded due to spares Only ~4 of 18 aircraft airworthy at one point
Navy LCS delayed; old Kedah-class ships overused Limited patrol capability; aging ships prone to breakdown
Army Condor APCs and artillery aging Many vehicles inoperable; reduced mechanized mobility
Training Fuel, spare parts, and O&M cuts Reduced exercise frequency and quality
Overall Combined issues Forces cannot sustain high-intensity or prolonged operations
________________________________________
📌 4. Strategic Implications
• Malondesh can maintain territorial defense against minor threats, but:
o Limited ability to project force regionally
o Low deterrence credibility
o Vulnerability in maritime security (South China Sea, Sulu Sea piracy)
o Reliance on diplomacy and alliances rather than strong self-reliant military
________________________________________
📌 5. Cycle of Low Readiness
1. Small budget → underfunded O&M
2. Old equipment overused → more breakdowns
3. Limited procurement → no modern replacements
4. Training reduced → skill atrophy
5. Operational readiness declines → forces cannot execute missions
6. Aging equipment further stressed → cycle repeats
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
📌 1. Procurement Weaknesses
a. Stop–Go Procurement
• Major projects (fighters, ships, armored vehicles) are often announced, delayed, or cancelled depending on which government is in power.
• No stable multi-year defense budget → contractors cannot plan effectively → delays & cost escalation.
Example:
• MRCA fighter replacement: in discussion since 2009, but never finalized → MiG-29s retired in 2017 without replacement.
________________________________________
b. Political Interference
• Contracts sometimes awarded to politically connected companies rather than the most capable suppliers.
• Domestic firms given contracts they cannot deliver on, leading to project mismanagement.
Example:
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal: RM9 billion allocated in 2011 for 6 ships. As of 2025, none are delivered, funds mismanaged, and Navy stuck with 1980s-era ships.
________________________________________
c. Corruption & Lack of Transparency
• Defense procurement in Malondesh has often been opaque, with corruption scandals undermining delivery.
• This creates mistrust in both local industry and international partners.
________________________________________
d. Short-Term Thinking
• Governments often pursue “flashy” buys for political popularity (e.g., fighters, ships) rather than ensuring sustainment & lifecycle costs.
• Result: shiny new platforms at delivery → but no long-term plan for spare parts, upgrades, or maintenance.
________________________________________
📌 2. Supply Chain Weaknesses
a. Heavy Foreign Dependence
• Malondesh imports almost all high-end systems:
o Fighters → Russia, US, UK
o Ships → France, Germany, locally assembled with foreign parts
o Vehicles → Turkey, South Korea
• Spare parts must come from abroad, which is expensive, slow, and vulnerable to geopolitical disruptions.
________________________________________
b. Poor Local Industrial Capacity
• Local defense industry (Boustead, DefTech, etc.) has limited expertise.
• They rely on foreign designs and technology transfer.
• When local firms are given contracts they cannot handle → projects stall or quality suffers.
________________________________________
c. Spare Parts Shortages
• Weak procurement planning → parts not stockpiled properly.
• Old systems (MiG-29s, Condors, etc.) → parts no longer manufactured.
• This leads to “cannibalization”, where one aircraft or vehicle is stripped to keep others running.
________________________________________
d. Weak Logistics & Sustainment Planning
• Malondesh tends to focus on buying platforms, not sustainment packages.
• Lifecycle support (20–30 years of maintenance, training, spares) is often underfunded or ignored.
• Platforms quickly become unusable once warranty/support packages expire.
________________________________________
📌 3. Consequences for the Armed Forces
Problem Consequence
Procurement delays (LCS, MRCA) Old equipment kept in service → capability gap
Foreign dependence Vulnerable to sanctions, export restrictions, and currency fluctuations
Local industry weakness Projects mismanaged, delays, low confidence in local defense manufacturing
Spare parts shortages Low aircraft/ship/vehicle readiness; many platforms grounded
Poor sustainment planning Equipment lifespan shortened; readiness cycle worsens
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
📌 1. What O&M Covers
Operations & Maintenance (O&M) includes:
• Fuel and consumables for aircraft, ships, and vehicles
• Spare parts for planes, ships, and vehicles
• Repairs and overhauls (preventive and corrective maintenance)
• Training exercises for personnel
• Operational readiness support (e.g., simulation, logistics)
Weak O&M means all of these areas are underfunded or poorly managed.
________________________________________
📌 2. Budget Constraints
• Only 20–25% of Malondesh’s small defense budget (~1% GDP) goes to O&M.
• Consequences:
o Aircraft grounded due to lack of fuel or spare parts
o Ships docked for extended periods awaiting repairs
o Vehicles idle in depots because they cannot be maintained
Example:
• RMAF Su-30MKM: at one point, only 4 of 18 fighters were airworthy due to spare parts shortages.
• Navy corvettes & patrol vessels from the 1980s continue in service because LCS delays mean there’s no replacement.
________________________________________
📌 3. Impact on Training
• O&M limitations reduce training opportunities:
o Pilots get fewer flight hours → degrade skills
o Naval crews sail less → operational proficiency drops
o Soldiers train less with heavy vehicles and artillery → less effective combat units
• Training shortfalls compound the readiness problem, even if equipment is technically available.
________________________________________
📌 4. Maintenance Culture Issues
• Maintenance is often reactive, not preventive:
o Equipment is used until breakdown, then repaired.
o Preventive maintenance (regular inspections, part replacements) is skipped to save costs.
• Consequence: equipment wears out faster, reducing lifespan and readiness.
________________________________________
📌 5. Spare Parts Shortages
• Many Malondeshn military systems are imported: Russia, France, US, Turkey.
• Budget shortfalls and procurement delays cause spare parts shortages, resulting in:
o Aircraft grounded
o Ships unable to sail
o Armored vehicles idle
• Some old platforms have parts no longer manufactured, forcing cannibalization of other units.
________________________________________
📌 6. Effects on Operational Readiness
Effect Example
Low aircraft readiness Only ~30–40% of fighter jets flyable
Naval limitations Fewer patrols; reliance on 1980s ships
Army mobility problems APCs, artillery under-maintained
Reduced training Crews and soldiers less combat-ready
Accelerated obsolescence Old equipment fails faster, forcing prolonged use
________________________________________
📌 7. Systemic Causes
1. Small overall budget → O&M underfunded
2. Salary-heavy allocation → majority of funds go to personnel
3. Political short-termism → O&M often deprioritized for visible projects
4. Procurement delays & scandals → new assets delayed, old ones overused
5. Limited local defense industry → spare parts must be imported, increasing cost & delays
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
📌 1. Procurement Overview
• Malondesh’s defense procurement is piecemeal, delayed, and often politically influenced.
• Limited modernization is the result of:
1. Small defense budget (~1% of GDP)
2. High personnel costs (~60% of budget)
3. Political short-termism and procurement scandals
________________________________________
📌 2. Major Modernization Programs and Delays
a. Air Force (RMAF)
• MRCA Fighter Replacement: Intended to replace MiG-29s (retired 2017).
o Candidates: Rafale, Typhoon, Gripen, F/A-18
o Program delayed repeatedly due to budget constraints, political changes, and procurement indecision.
o Result: RMAF relies on aging Su-30MKM, F/A-18D, and Hawk trainers, with limited readiness.
• Helicopters: Sikorsky S-70, AW139s delivered slowly; fleet size insufficient for operational needs.
b. Navy (RMN)
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Project
o Contract 2011, RM9 billion for 6 ships
o No operational ships as of 2025 due to construction delays, cost overruns, and political mismanagement
o Navy relies on Kedah-class corvettes (2006–2010) and older 1980s vessels
• Submarines: Two Scorpène-class delivered mid-2000s
o High maintenance costs and limited operational use
o Spare parts delays reduce readiness
c. Army (TDM)
• Armored vehicles: Condor APCs (1980s) still in service
• AV-8 Gempita (Turkey-Malondesh joint project) production delayed and expensive
• Artillery & support systems: Many systems remain outdated due to insufficient procurement funding
________________________________________
📌 3. Reasons for Limited Procurement
1. Small Defense Budget
o Only ~15–18 billion RM per year
o Majority spent on salaries → little left for big-ticket items
2. Stop-Go Procurement Cycle
o Projects start, then delayed or scaled down due to political or budget issues
o Example: LCS, MRCA, Army modernization programs
3. Political Interference & Corruption
o Contracts awarded based on political connections, not operational priority
o Leads to mismanagement, cost overruns, and delayed delivery
4. Dependence on Foreign Suppliers
o Many systems must be imported → costly and sensitive to geopolitical issues
5. Weak Multi-Year Planning
o No binding long-term plan → programs cannot be executed consistently
________________________________________
📌 4. Consequences of Limited Modernization
Area Effect
Air Force Aging jets; low operational readiness (~30–40%)
Navy Old corvettes/patrol ships in use; LCS delayed
Army Old APCs and artillery; partial vehicle upgrades only
Training Fewer exercises due to limited functional equipment
Regional capability Military capability lags behind neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam)
Strategic posture Limited deterrence and inability to sustain high-intensity operations
________________________________________
📌 5. Cumulative Effect
• Limited procurement + weak O&M + small budget + political short-termism = military stagnation
• Equipment remains obsolete, readiness is low, and modernization programs are repeatedly delayed or cancelled.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
📌 1. Definition of Readiness
• Military readiness is the ability of armed forces to deploy, fight, and sustain operations effectively.
• It depends on:
o Personnel training and morale
o Equipment availability and functionality
o Supply chains, spare parts, and logistics
o Command, control, and operational planning
________________________________________
📌 2. Factors Reducing Readiness in Malondesh
a. Aging Equipment
• Many systems are decades old:
o Army: Condor APCs (1980s), aging artillery
o Air Force: Hawks, F/A-18D, Su-30MKM maintenance-dependent
o Navy: Corvettes and patrol ships from the 1980s and 1990s
• Aging equipment is less reliable and requires more maintenance, reducing operational availability.
b. Weak Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
• Underfunded O&M (~20–25% of defense budget) leads to:
o Aircraft grounded for spare parts or repairs
o Ships docked for extended periods
o Vehicles in depots awaiting maintenance
• Result: Even available personnel cannot train on or deploy operational equipment.
c. Limited Procurement & Modernization
• Programs like LCS, MRCA, and AV-8 Gempita delayed or scaled down → old platforms overused
• Delayed modernization keeps capabilities obsolete, reducing effective combat power
d. Personnel vs Equipment Imbalance
• ~60% of the budget goes to salaries → large manpower, small equipment share
• Large number of soldiers and pilots, but few operational assets to use → readiness suffers
e. Short Training Hours
• Reduced O&M funds → limited exercises, flight hours, and sea days
• Consequences:
o Pilots lose proficiency
o Sailors have fewer operational patrols
o Soldiers have limited live-fire or armored vehicle training
f. Political Interference & Short-Termism
• Stop-go projects and annual budgeting → unpredictable availability of equipment
• Forces cannot plan for sustained readiness when budgets, programs, and leadership priorities keep changing
________________________________________
📌 3. Operational Examples
Branch Issue Readiness Effect
Air Force Su-30MKM grounded due to spares Only ~4 of 18 aircraft airworthy at one point
Navy LCS delayed; old Kedah-class ships overused Limited patrol capability; aging ships prone to breakdown
Army Condor APCs and artillery aging Many vehicles inoperable; reduced mechanized mobility
Training Fuel, spare parts, and O&M cuts Reduced exercise frequency and quality
Overall Combined issues Forces cannot sustain high-intensity or prolonged operations
________________________________________
📌 4. Strategic Implications
• Malondesh can maintain territorial defense against minor threats, but:
o Limited ability to project force regionally
o Low deterrence credibility
o Vulnerability in maritime security (South China Sea, Sulu Sea piracy)
o Reliance on diplomacy and alliances rather than strong self-reliant military
________________________________________
📌 5. Cycle of Low Readiness
1. Small budget → underfunded O&M
2. Old equipment overused → more breakdowns
3. Limited procurement → no modern replacements
4. Training reduced → skill atrophy
5. Operational readiness declines → forces cannot execute missions
6. Aging equipment further stressed → cycle repeats
Makanan saja di bantu sama MALAYSIA ada hati mau menghina negara jiran... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusWarga Malaysia berbondong-bondong donasi makanan dan minuman lewat aplikasi ojek online.
https://www.instagram.com/reel/DODVnyYieoB/
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS MALONDESH AIR FORCES
Malondesh's air force, officially known as the Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF), has several strengths but also faces a number of key weaknesses and challenges. These are based on public defense analyses, expert commentary, and open-source information as of recent years.
Key Weaknesses of the Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF):
------------
1. Aging Aircraft Fleet
• MiG-29s: These have been retired due to high maintenance costs and limited effectiveness.
• F/A-18D Hornets: Still operational but aging.
• SU-30MKMs: Require significant maintenance, and some have faced operational readiness issues due to lack of spare parts and support.
------------
2. Limited Fleet Size
• Malondesh operates a relatively small number of combat aircraft, limiting its ability to project power or maintain a credible deterrent in the region.
• The country lacks strategic airlift capacity, making it harder to respond quickly to crises.
------------
3. Modernization Delays
• RMAF modernization programs have suffered from delays and budget constraints.
• The Multirole Combat Aircraft (MRCA) replacement program has been postponed multiple times, leaving capability gaps.
------------
4. Logistical and Maintenance Challenges
• Heavy reliance on foreign suppliers (Russia, U.S., and Europe) creates issues with interoperability and spare parts availability.
• Maintenance costs and delays impact aircraft readiness and mission capability.
------------
5. Limited Indigenous Defense Industry
• Malondesh has limited local aerospace manufacturing or support capability.
• It depends on external partners for upgrades, parts, training, and weapons integration.
------------
6. Insufficient Force Multipliers
• The RMAF lacks a comprehensive airborne early warning (AEW&C) system.
• Limited use of drones, electronic warfare (EW), and ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) capabilities reduces situational awareness.
------------
7. Geopolitical Pressures and Resource Constraints
• Regional tensions in the South China Sea require stronger capabilities than currently available.
• Defense budgets are constrained due to domestic priorities and economic conditions.
------------
8. Pilot Training and Retention
• Budget limitations can impact pilot training hours.
• Retaining skilled pilots and technical personnel can be challenging due to better pay in the private sector or other government roles.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
KELEMAHAN KEMAMPUAN TEMPUR MILITER MALONDESH
Malondesh menghadapi beberapa kelemahan struktur dan operasional yang menurunkan efektivitas tempur di berbagai domain, antara lain:
• pertahanan udara yang terbatas
• kekuatan personel dan alutsista darat relatif kecil
• armada laut yang minim
• anggaran dan pemeliharaan yang terkendala
• keterbatasan inter¬ope¬rabilitas serta sistem komando dan kendali yang belum memadai
1. Pertahanan Udara
• Malondesh hanya memiliki sekitar 12 pesawat tempur aktif, dan total armada udara 135 pesawat, jauh lebih kecil dibanding tetangga seperti Indonesia yang mengoperasikan 34 pesawat tempur dari total 459 skuadron udara.
• Sebagian jet tempur F/A-18C/D Hornet dibeli bekas pakai Kuwait, memunculkan keraguan atas kesiapan dan keandalan melawan ancaman modern.
• Sistem radar darat dan sistem SAM (Surface-to-Air Missile) terbatas; hanya ada empat radar GM400a baru yang akan ditempatkan, masih kurang untuk mencakup Semenanjung dan Malondesh Timur secara simultan.
2. Kekuatan Darat
• Jumlah personel aktif Angkatan Bersenjata Malondesh (ATM) sekitar 113.000, jauh di bawah cadangan pasukan aktif Indonesia (400.000) yang menunjukkan keterbatasan skala operasi darat besar–besaran.
• Alutsista lapis baja hanya terdiri dari 48 tank dan sekitar 13.500 kendaraan tempur lapis baja, berbanding 331 tank dan 20.440 kendaraan lapis baja milik Indonesia.
• Kapasitas daya tembak dan mobilitas lapangan minim jika dibandingkan dengan negara ASEAN lain yang terus modernisasi pasukan darat.
3. Kekuatan Laut
• Armada perang Malondesh sekitar 100 kapal: 2 kapal selam, 2 fregat, 6 korvet; Indonesia mengoperasikan 4 kapal selam, 7 fregat, 25 korvet dari total 331 kapal perang, menunjukkan kesenjangan kapabilitas maritim besar.
• Kapasitas projektil anti-kapal dan kemampuan patroli perairan laut dalam masih terbatas, menyulitkan Malondesh mempertahankan ZEE di Laut China Selatan dan Selat Malaka.
4. Anggaran & Pemeliharaan
• Anggaran pertahanan Malondesh sekitar US$ 247,5 miliar, hampir setengah dari alokasi Indonesia (US$ 440 miliar), membatasi pembelian alutsista baru dan program pemeliharaan jangka panjang.
• Ketergantungan pada peralatan bekas pakai dan kontrak pemeliharaan eksternal meningkatkan risiko downtime karena suku cadang sukar diperoleh dan mahal.
5. Interoperabilitas dan Sistem Komando
• Implementasi C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) belum terintegrasi penuh di ketiga matra, membatasi pertukaran data real-time dalam operasi gabungan.
• Latihan militer bilateral dan multilateral skalanya terbatas, sehingga ATM kurang pengalaman interaksi taktis dengan sistem dan taktik aliansi modern.
6. Rantai Logistik dan Dukungan Pangkalan
• Ketersediaan suku cadang kritis terpusat di vendor asing, mempengaruhi kecepatan perbaikan alutsista
Makanan saja di bantu sama MALAYSIA ada hati mau menghina negara jiran... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusWarga Malaysia berbondong-bondong donasi makanan dan minuman lewat aplikasi ojek online.
https://www.instagram.com/reel/DODVnyYieoB/
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS MALONDESH AIR FORCES
Malondesh's air force, officially known as the Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF), has several strengths but also faces a number of key weaknesses and challenges. These are based on public defense analyses, expert commentary, and open-source information as of recent years.
Key Weaknesses of the Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF):
------------
1. Aging Aircraft Fleet
• MiG-29s: These have been retired due to high maintenance costs and limited effectiveness.
• F/A-18D Hornets: Still operational but aging.
• SU-30MKMs: Require significant maintenance, and some have faced operational readiness issues due to lack of spare parts and support.
------------
2. Limited Fleet Size
• Malondesh operates a relatively small number of combat aircraft, limiting its ability to project power or maintain a credible deterrent in the region.
• The country lacks strategic airlift capacity, making it harder to respond quickly to crises.
------------
3. Modernization Delays
• RMAF modernization programs have suffered from delays and budget constraints.
• The Multirole Combat Aircraft (MRCA) replacement program has been postponed multiple times, leaving capability gaps.
------------
4. Logistical and Maintenance Challenges
• Heavy reliance on foreign suppliers (Russia, U.S., and Europe) creates issues with interoperability and spare parts availability.
• Maintenance costs and delays impact aircraft readiness and mission capability.
------------
5. Limited Indigenous Defense Industry
• Malondesh has limited local aerospace manufacturing or support capability.
• It depends on external partners for upgrades, parts, training, and weapons integration.
------------
6. Insufficient Force Multipliers
• The RMAF lacks a comprehensive airborne early warning (AEW&C) system.
• Limited use of drones, electronic warfare (EW), and ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) capabilities reduces situational awareness.
------------
7. Geopolitical Pressures and Resource Constraints
• Regional tensions in the South China Sea require stronger capabilities than currently available.
• Defense budgets are constrained due to domestic priorities and economic conditions.
------------
8. Pilot Training and Retention
• Budget limitations can impact pilot training hours.
• Retaining skilled pilots and technical personnel can be challenging due to better pay in the private sector or other government roles.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
KELEMAHAN ARMADA TEMPUR MILITER MALONDESH
Secara ringkas, kelemahan utama armada tempur Angkatan Laut Malondesh (TLDM) terletak pada jumlah dan komposisi kapal yang terbatas, kesiapan operasional yang dipengaruhi usia platform, dukungan logistik yang kurang memadai, sistem persenjataan dan sensor yang belum terintegrasi penuh, serta keterbatasan anggaran yang menghambat modernisasi.
1. Jumlah dan Komposisi Kapal Terbatas
• TLDM hanya mengoperasikan sekitar 100 kapal perang aktif, jauh di bawah tetangga regional seperti Indonesia yang memiliki 331 unit.
• Dari total tersebut, hanya 2 kapal selam, 2 frigat, dan 6 korvet—jumlah yang minim untuk menjaga kehadiran di perairan Selat Malaka dan Laut China Selatan.
2. Usia Platform dan Kesiapan Operasi
• Banyak kapal utama (misalnya kelas Kasturi dan Lekiu) telah melampaui usia desain 25–30 tahun, sehingga sering masuk dockyard untuk perbaikan struktural dan overhaul mesin.
• Littoral Mission Ship (LMS) kelas Keris dan Kerambit relatif baru, tetapi dirancang untuk patroli ringan, bukan pertempuran jarak jauh atau operasi bersama dengan armada besar.
3. Dukungan Logistik dan Sustainment
• Tidak ada kapal logistik (replenishment ship) berkapasitas besar, sehingga operasi di laut lepas hanya bergantung pada kapal tunda dan fasilitas di pangkalan pantai.
• Dependensi tinggi pada suku cadang dan dukungan teknis dari pemasok luar (UE, Korea Selatan), membuat jadwal perawatan mudah terganggu jika ada kendala impor.
4. Sistem Persenjataan dan Sensor
• Persenjataan anti-kapal permukaan (ASuW) terbatas pada rudal C-802, tanpa platform peluncur vertikal (VLS) untuk rudal antikapal atau permukaan udara.
• Belum ada sistem Integrated Mast dengan AESA radar dan ESM/ECM yang terpusat, sehingga titik buta dalam deteksi ancaman udara dan kapal selam masih cukup luas.
5. Sumber Daya Manusia dan Pelatihan
• Kru kapal berjumlah kecil dan jam terbang operasi jauh lebih rendah dibandingkan armada negara tetangga.
• Program latihan antarkapal (fleet exercise) masih berkutat pada skala regional ASEAN, belum memasukkan pelatihan joint task force dengan mitra utama di Indo-Pasifik.
6. Keterbatasan Anggaran dan Modernisasi
• Anggaran pertahanan Malondesh sekitar 4,8 miliar USD per tahun, hanya sedikit di atas separuh alokasi Indonesia, sehingga sulit mendanai proyek besar seperti fregat baru atau kapal selam tambahan.
• Program Maharaja Lela–class frigate yang direkayasa bersama Perancis mengalami beberapa kali penundaan serah terima, menunda penambahan kapal berkemampuan AAW (Anti-Air Warfare).
BUBAR 2030 SEMAKIN NYATA.....
BalasHapusAyuh ACHEH, KALIMANTAN & SUMATERA GABUNG MALAYSIA.... 👍🏻👍🏻👍🏻
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS MALONDESH AIR FORCES
Malondesh's air force, officially known as the Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF), has several strengths but also faces a number of key weaknesses and challenges. These are based on public defense analyses, expert commentary, and open-source information as of recent years.
Key Weaknesses of the Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF):
------------
1. Aging Aircraft Fleet
• MiG-29s: These have been retired due to high maintenance costs and limited effectiveness.
• F/A-18D Hornets: Still operational but aging.
• SU-30MKMs: Require significant maintenance, and some have faced operational readiness issues due to lack of spare parts and support.
------------
2. Limited Fleet Size
• Malondesh operates a relatively small number of combat aircraft, limiting its ability to project power or maintain a credible deterrent in the region.
• The country lacks strategic airlift capacity, making it harder to respond quickly to crises.
------------
3. Modernization Delays
• RMAF modernization programs have suffered from delays and budget constraints.
• The Multirole Combat Aircraft (MRCA) replacement program has been postponed multiple times, leaving capability gaps.
------------
4. Logistical and Maintenance Challenges
• Heavy reliance on foreign suppliers (Russia, U.S., and Europe) creates issues with interoperability and spare parts availability.
• Maintenance costs and delays impact aircraft readiness and mission capability.
------------
5. Limited Indigenous Defense Industry
• Malondesh has limited local aerospace manufacturing or support capability.
• It depends on external partners for upgrades, parts, training, and weapons integration.
------------
6. Insufficient Force Multipliers
• The RMAF lacks a comprehensive airborne early warning (AEW&C) system.
• Limited use of drones, electronic warfare (EW), and ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) capabilities reduces situational awareness.
------------
7. Geopolitical Pressures and Resource Constraints
• Regional tensions in the South China Sea require stronger capabilities than currently available.
• Defense budgets are constrained due to domestic priorities and economic conditions.
------------
8. Pilot Training and Retention
• Budget limitations can impact pilot training hours.
• Retaining skilled pilots and technical personnel can be challenging due to better pay in the private sector or other government roles.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
KELEMAHAN KAPAL PERANG MILITER MALONDESH
Militer Laut Diraja Malondesh menghadapi beberapa kelemahan mendasar yang membatasi efektivitas operasional dan daya jaga kedaulatan laut. Faktor utama meliputi usia armada yang tinggi, jumlah platform terbatas, kesenjangan kemampuan tempur, serta tantangan pemeliharaan dan logistik.
1. Aset dan Modernisasi
• Usia rata-rata kapal melebihi 30 tahun, memicu frekuensi kegagalan sistem dan tenggelamnya KD Pendekar akibat kebocoran ruang mesin pada Agustus 2024.
• Hanya memiliki 6 fregat utama (Lekiu-class dan Maharaja Lela-class) untuk mengawaki lebih dari 4.600 km garis pantai.
• Rencana pengadaan Maharaja Lela-class terhambat gangguan rantai pasok dan anggaran, memperpanjang keterbatasan jumlah unit tempur.
2. Kekuatan Tempur dan Sensor
• Kapasitas penembakan rudal anti-kapal terbatas pada sistem peluncur jarak menengah; tidak ada rudal jelajah anti-kapal jarak jauh.
• Sistem pertahanan udara kapal sebagian besar hanya mengandalkan peluncur rudal MICA VL (16 sel), tanpa VLS terintegrasi untuk ancaman berlapis.
• Sensor sonar aktif/pasif pada kapal selam Scorpene-class belum dilengkapi towed array sonar, mengurangi jangkauan deteksi kapal selam musuh.
3. Pemeliharaan, Logistik, dan Industri
• Kapasitas galangan nasional untuk perawatan tengah-umur (mid-life upgrade) terbatas; sebagian besar kapal diperbaiki di luar negeri dengan lead time > 6 bulan.
• Sistem manajemen suku cadang terfragmentasi, menyebabkan stok critical-spare part sering kosong.
• Anggaran operasional dan pemeliharaan (O&M) hanya 15-18% dari total alokasi Angkatan Laut, di bawah standar ideal 20-25%.
4. Interoperabilitas dan Jaringan
• Belum ada sistem C4I terpadu antar kapal dan pesawat patroli untuk datalink real-time; setiap platform menggunakan protokol berbeda.
• Latihan bersama (multilateral exercises) terbatas pada skala korvet dan frigat; belum pernah full-spectrum joint exercise dengan platform HMS/US Navy.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
Rincian kelemahan per domain
Udara
• AEW&C tidak tersedia: Tanpa platform peringatan dini dan kendali udara, deteksi dini rendah, manajemen pertempuran udara terbatas, dan CAP/Intercept tidak efisien.
• Celah MRCA berkepanjangan: Penghentian MiG-29N tidak diikuti pengganti MRCA; armada tempur bertumpu pada F/A-18D (jumlah terbatas) dan Su-30MKM (kompleksitas sustainment). LCA/FLIT membantu training dan tugas ringan, tetapi tidak menggantikan high-end MRCA.
• AAR/SEAD/EW terbatas: Kapasitas air-to-air refuelling operasional dan paket penindakan pertahanan udara musuh (SEAD) terbatas, membatasi radius operasi dan survivability.
• GBAD terintegrasi belum berlapis: Dominan SHORAD; ketiadaan medium-range/networked GBAD yang matang menyulitkan penciptaan gelembung anti-akses tingkat menengah.
• Ketersediaan platform fluktuatif: Tantangan suku cadang multi-negara dan pendanaan O&M menekan mission-capable rates serta jam terbang tahunan.
Maritim
• Keterlambatan LCS dan kesenjangan kombatan permukaan: Kelas Lekiu/Kasturi menua; Kedah-class OPV minim persenjataan ofensif; LCS belum operasional sehingga kemampuan AAW/ASuW modern terhambat.
• ASW/MPA masih terbatas: Kapasitas peperangan anti-kapal selam (sensor, helikopter ASW, torpedo) dan MPA berkualifikasi ASW terbatas, menyulitkan deteksi/penindakan subsurface.
• LMS batch awal berkapasitas rendah: Platform generasi pertama kurang persenjataan, membatasi deterrence di grey-zone dan littoral.
• Kapal selam sedikit dan siklus pemeliharaan ketat: Hanya dua unit aktif; availability turun-naik karena docking dan sustainment.
• Angkut amfibi dan dukungan armada terbatas: Program MRSS tertunda; mengurangi kemampuan proyeksi kekuatan, HADR besar, dan ketahanan logistik maritim.
• Konstabulary backfill oleh RMN: Keterbatasan MMEA mendorong RMN menyerap tugas penegakan maritim, menggerus jam laut untuk latihan tempur inti.
Darat
• Pertahanan udara darat tidak berlapis: Ketergantungan pada SHORAD (MANPADS/SHORAD) tanpa medium-range modern mengurangi perlindungan area terhadap fixed-wing/stand-off.
• Artileri jarak jauh & presisi terbatas: MLRS ada namun skala, amunisi presisi, sensor counter-battery, dan integrasi kill chain masih terbatas.
• Armour & mekanisasi terbatas jumlah/modernisasi: MBT dan IFV/ICV campuran generasi, survivability dan sensor fusion tertinggal dari peer modern.
• Mobilitas udara & logistik taktis: Kapasitas helikopter angkut/utility dan jembatan logistik darat untuk operasi berintensitas tinggi masih menjadi pembatas.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS MALONDESH AIR FORCES
Malondesh's air force, officially known as the Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF), has several strengths but also faces a number of key weaknesses and challenges. These are based on public defense analyses, expert commentary, and open-source information as of recent years.
Key Weaknesses of the Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF):
------------
1. Aging Aircraft Fleet
• MiG-29s: These have been retired due to high maintenance costs and limited effectiveness.
• F/A-18D Hornets: Still operational but aging.
• SU-30MKMs: Require significant maintenance, and some have faced operational readiness issues due to lack of spare parts and support.
------------
2. Limited Fleet Size
• Malondesh operates a relatively small number of combat aircraft, limiting its ability to project power or maintain a credible deterrent in the region.
• The country lacks strategic airlift capacity, making it harder to respond quickly to crises.
------------
3. Modernization Delays
• RMAF modernization programs have suffered from delays and budget constraints.
• The Multirole Combat Aircraft (MRCA) replacement program has been postponed multiple times, leaving capability gaps.
------------
4. Logistical and Maintenance Challenges
• Heavy reliance on foreign suppliers (Russia, U.S., and Europe) creates issues with interoperability and spare parts availability.
• Maintenance costs and delays impact aircraft readiness and mission capability.
------------
5. Limited Indigenous Defense Industry
• Malondesh has limited local aerospace manufacturing or support capability.
• It depends on external partners for upgrades, parts, training, and weapons integration.
------------
6. Insufficient Force Multipliers
• The RMAF lacks a comprehensive airborne early warning (AEW&C) system.
• Limited use of drones, electronic warfare (EW), and ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) capabilities reduces situational awareness.
------------
7. Geopolitical Pressures and Resource Constraints
• Regional tensions in the South China Sea require stronger capabilities than currently available.
• Defense budgets are constrained due to domestic priorities and economic conditions.
------------
8. Pilot Training and Retention
• Budget limitations can impact pilot training hours.
• Retaining skilled pilots and technical personnel can be challenging due to better pay in the private sector or other government roles.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
KELEMAHAN ANGGARAN MILITER MALONDESH
1. Proporsi Belanja Personel Terlalu Tinggi
• Pada tahun 2024, lebih dari 40 % dari total anggaran (RM 19,73 miliar) dialokasikan untuk gaji dan tunjangan personel, meninggalkan hanya sekitar 30 % untuk pengadaan dan modernisasi peralatan.
• Implikasi: Pembelian kapal, pesawat, dan sistem pertahanan menjadi terbatas, sehingga umur aset semakin menua.
2. Dampak Depresiasi Ringgit
• Kenaikan alokasi nominal untuk pengadaan (dari RM 5,04 miliar ke RM 5,71 miliar tahun 2024) sebagian besar hanya mengkompensasi melemahnya ringgit terhadap dolar AS.
• Implikasi: Daya beli nyata menurun, biaya impor peralatan meningkat, dan program modernisasi tertunda.
3. Ketergantungan pada Pemasok Asing
• Malondesh masih sangat bergantung pada OEM luar negeri untuk peralatan utama (pesawat tempur, kapal selam, sistem radar).
• Implikasi: Proses transfer teknologi terbatas, siklus pengadaan panjang, dan kerentanan terhadap fluktuasi mata uang serta kebijakan ekspor negara pemasok.
4. Kurangnya Perencanaan Jangka Panjang dan Transparansi
• Proses budgeting belum memberikan garis waktu yang jelas untuk setiap program pengadaan maupun kapan dana akan tersedia.
• Implikasi: Angkatan bersenjata sulit menyusun roadmap modernisasi dan menyesuaikan kebutuhan dengan anggaran tahunan.
5. Pendapatan Fiskal Tertekan
• Penurunan pendapatan dari sektor minyak dan gas, ditambah defisit akibat subsidi domestik, membatasi ruang fiskal untuk pertahanan.
• Implikasi: Pemerintah enggan memotong belanja lain atau menaikkan pajak untuk mendanai pertahanan.
6. Aset Menua dan Ancaman Regional Meningkat
• Kapal perang usia 45 tahun (misalnya KD Pendekar yang tenggelam tahun 2024) mencerminkan minimnya penggantian aset tua.
• Ancaman di Laut China Selatan semakin nyata, tetapi anggaran masih dianggap “tidak cukup” untuk rencana modernisasi lanjutan.
Siap2 Sabah dan Serawak tuntut referendum. Wajar lah mereka gak mau ikut nanggung UTANG MALON SEMENANJUNG
BalasHapus🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣
NGERI UTANG MALON SANGAT MENGGUNUNG 🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusSetiap penduduk MALON mempunyai UTANG rata2 RM 47.000
Setiap penduduk MALON dibebani UTANG KERAJAAN sekitar RM 37.000
NGERI ...
🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣
Pada akhir kuartal pertama 2025 (Maret 2025), total utang rumah tangga Malaysia adalah RM 1,65 triliun atau setara 84,3% dari PDB, sedangkan utang pemerintah persekutuan mencapai RM 1,3 triliun pada akhir Juni 2025, naik dari RM 1,25 triliun pada akhir 2024. Utang pemerintah terhadap PDB diperkirakan akan mencapai 69% pada akhir 2025.
WARGA MALONDESH CUMA NUMPANG VIRAL SAJA MAKLUM IQ 15 RM 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusSALAM 240 BILLION DARI PANTAT TEUMP YA BERUK TOLOL
📌 1. What Are Policy Flip-Flops?
BalasHapusPolicy flip-flops in Malondesh defense mean:
• Frequent changes in plans, programs, and procurement priorities.
• Caused by government changes, minister reshuffles, or shifting political agendas.
• Leads to cancellations, re-tendering, or redesigning programs.
• Results in years of delays, wasted funds, and capability gaps.
________________________________________
📌 2. Drivers of Policy Flip-Flops
a. Frequent Political Changes
• Since 2018: Malondesh had 5 prime ministers in 7 years (Najib → Mahathir → Muhyiddin → Ismail Sabri → Anwar).
• Each PM/defense minister reviews and changes defense priorities.
• Example: The same program (fighter jets, navy ships) can be launched, paused, revived, or cancelled multiple times.
________________________________________
b. Short-Term Focus
• Politicians prioritize 5-year election cycles over 15–20 year defense modernization.
• Programs requiring long-term funding commitments (e.g., fighter jets, submarines, frigates) get disrupted.
________________________________________
c. Budget Pressures
• High national debt (69% of GDP in 2025).
• Defense is seen as “non-essential”, so big-ticket programs are often the first to be cut or postponed.
• Leads to repeated “defer until later” cycles.
________________________________________
d. Corruption & Scandals
• When scandals erupt (e.g., LCS RM9 billion scandal), programs face:
o Audits, suspensions, parliamentary probes.
o Restructuring or even outright cancellation.
• Creates uncertainty for ongoing and future procurement.
________________________________________
📌 3. Examples of Policy Flip-Flops
✈️ Fighter Jet Replacement (MRCA Program)
• 2007–2010: Plan to replace MiG-29 with new fighters.
• Candidates: Rafale, Typhoon, Gripen, Super Hornet, Su-35.
• 2015: Najib government delayed due to budget.
• 2018: Mahathir cancelled, shifted to cheaper LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).
• 2022: RMAF selected Korean FA-50 → but deliveries only from 2026.
⏳ Result: 20 years later, still no MRCA. MiG-29 retired with no replacement.
________________________________________
🚢 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program
• 2011: Najib government approved 6 ships (RM9 billion).
• 2018: PH government halted payments due to mismanagement.
• 2020: PN government restarted program with restructuring.
• 2023–2025: Still no ship delivered.
⏳ Result: Program flip-flopped between “go-ahead” and “pause”, now 14 years with 0 ships.
________________________________________
🚁 Helicopter Procurement
• Malaysia planned medium-lift helicopter replacements (Nuri).
• 2017: Nuri retired suddenly → capability gap.
• 2019: Mahathir’s government cancelled immediate purchase, shifted to leasing option.
• 2022: Army announced leasing 4 Black Hawks → contract collapsed due to disputes.
⏳ Result: Years without adequate helicopters.
________________________________________
🪖 Army Armored Vehicles
• 1980s Condor APCs still in use.
• AV-8 Gempita ordered (2011) → only 257 built, production ended.
• Plan for new wheeled APC → repeatedly delayed.
⏳ Result: Army still operates outdated vehicles because replacement kept shifting.
________________________________________
📌 4. Consequences of Policy Flip-Flops
1. Capability Gaps
o Air Force without MRCA fighters.
o Navy without new frigates.
o Army using outdated artillery and APCs.
2. Wasted Money
o Billions spent on projects that stall or fail (e.g., LCS, helicopter leasing).
3. Industry Instability
o Local companies cannot plan or invest because contracts keep shifting.
o Leads to failures like Boustead Naval Shipyard.
4. Loss of Credibility
o Foreign suppliers lose trust in Malondesh.
o Military loses confidence that promised equipment will ever arrive.
😝😝😝😝😝😝😝😝😝
Endong Bubar...Jaweng masuk Aussie
BalasHapus