ITS Giussepe Garibaldi (photo: MarinaMilitare)
Jakarta (ANTARA) - Kepala Staf TNI Angkatan Laut (KSAL) Laksamana TNI Muhammad Ali mengatakan pihaknya tengah mengincar kapal induk milik Angkatan Laut Italia yakni Giussepe Garibaldi untuk diakuisisi menjadi milik Indonesia.
"Kita berusaha untuk mengakuisisi kapal induk yang dulu dimiliki oleh Angkatan Laut Italia, yaitu Garibaldi, dan nanti harapannya bisa memperkuat jajaran kita," kata Ali saat ditemui dalam kegiatan penyambutan KRI Brawijaya 320 di Tanjung Priok, Jakarta Utara, Senin.
Jika upaya itu berhasil, maka kapal buatan Italia tersebut akan menjadi kapal induk pertama yang dimiliki Indonesia.
Kapal tersebut, kata Ali, akan lebih diperuntukkan untuk membantu TNI menjalankan misi kemanusiaan atau Operasi Militer Selain Perang (OMSP).
"Lebih kita gunakan untuk OMSP, tapi bisa juga digunakan untuk Operasi Militer Untuk Perang," jelas Ali.
Namun demikian, Ali tidak menjelaskan sejauh mana proses akuisisi yang sedang berlangsung antara TNI AL, Kementerian Pertahanan dan pihak Italia.
Ali juga tidak menjelaskan berapa harga yang harus dibayar pemerintah untuk membawa pulang kapal induk tersebut.
Untuk diketahui, kapal induk ini memiliki kesamaan dengan KRI Brawijaya 320 dan KRI Prabu Siliwangi 321 yakni sama sama dibuat oleh perusahaan asal Italia Fincantieri.
Kapal induk dengan panjang 180,2 meter ini dilengkapi dengan mesin penggerak super yang dapat menggerakkan kapal dengan kecepatan 30 knot atau 56 kilometer per jam.
Kapal pengangkut pesawat tempur ini juga dilengkapi beberapa radar jamming hingga senjata seperti peluncur oktupel Mk.29 untuk rudal antipesawat Sea Sparrow / Selenia Aspide , Oto Melara Kembar 40L70 DARDO, 324 mm tabung torpedo rangkap tiga dan Otomat Mk 2 SSM.
(Antara)
Pertamax
BalasHapus01. Salam bina Candi LCS MaharajaLele Mangkrak Karatan 14 tahun SALAH POTONG, seharga RM 12 Billion
BalasHapus02. Salam bina senapang Allien tembak tupai VITA lendir BERAPI
03. Salam KERAjaan BANGKRAP di gondoli Jho Law
04. Salam bina kereta kebal 8x8 GEMPITA tampel sticker tak boleh eksport
05. Salam bina tank ugly STRIDE bentuk KOTAK Turet impoten
06. Salam bina rudal antar Galaxy ugly TAMING SARI
07. Salam bina jet PTM GEN 6 hasil mimpi basah insinyur 5 top university
08. Salam bina drone ugly NYAMUK
09. Salam bina KERETA KIPAS TERBANG tampal Sticker dari Cina
10. Salam bina kereta PROTON tak laku di jual ke gelly cina
11. Salam Komando LETUPKAN wanita hamil
12. Salam komando TEWAS saat DEMO, tembak Komandan sendiri
13. Salam komando PINGSAN saat latihan berbaris
14. Salam Komando TEWAS dilempar GRANAT teman sendiri
15. Salam Komando tewas Saat BERENANG
16. Salam kapal selam SCORPANE tak boleh selam sebelum MRO
17. Salam LMS Ompong, plat tipis, lambat, setahun pakai radio rusak, dari CINA untuk lawan CINA
18. Salam kapal RUSAK oleh JARING nelayan NGUYEN
19. Salam kapal TONGKANG untuk kapal militer BUNGA MAS LIMA
20. Salam 7 Jet Tersikit dunia F18 hornet meletup JATUH guna parade aja tiada SOURCE CODE
21. Salam Su30MKM 18 Ekor hanya 4 yg boleh terbang
22. Salam Mig29 GROUNDED
23. Salam kilang AIRCROD Lembab MRO 1 pesawat butuh masa 3 tahun
24. Salam heli TELUR PUYUH MD530 KILANGnya Bangkrut
25. Salam engine jet HILANG di SONGLAP ke Uruguay
26. Salam ASKAR BERSARONG bangga jadi penjaga ISTANA british
27. Salam EJECT KAT HANGGAR world record 2 kali
28. Salam kapal militer Gagah Samudra kena sita MYBANK
29. Salam JUDI HALAL BERSYARIAH Gentting Highland daulat tuanku
30. Salam tak punya korps MARINIR,Kapal HOSPITAL,LPD,LST, Tank Amphibi dan SPH
31. Salam TANK PENDEKAR design WW II MOGOK tengah jalan
32. Salam HUTANG Rm 1.5 Trillion 84% PDB, Kumpul koin, Bayar hutang CINA pakai hutang JEPUN, gali LOBANG tutup LOBANG
33. Salam BELI pespur MB339 BARU TANPA ENGIN baru 12 tahun pakai sudah Grounded
34. Salam 88 bijik Jet Bekas GURUN A4 Skyhawk hilang setengah di parkiran GURUN
35. Salam BOMBER Cina dan 16 Pesawat Cina pusing - Pusing langit Sabah cuma kirim NOTA Protes
36. Salam CCG KEKAL 289 hari pertahun di betting Ali, CCG dan nelayan Cina sudah makan tidor berak sedot ikan sedot minyak buang tahi
37. Salam Komando tewas kena tembak SENAPAN ANGIN penyelundup Perlis
38. Salam TAMPAL STICKER Batik,Reog,Wayang,Rendang,Anklung,kuda lumping,Keris,pacu jalur,lagu rasa sayange,lagu halo halo bandung dan lagu terang bulan
39. Salam 9 APC Guardian di tolak PBB tiada RCWS hendak prank PBB dengan harga komplit RCWS
40. Salam dapat SEDEKAH Amerika Convert CN235 basic ke versi MSA Upgrade di PT DI
41. Salam UCAV drone DJI di tempel dua senapan M4 untuk menakuti Kelalawar
42. Salam di bully Singapure, bayar air murah, di ceroboh Jet dan Apache, di ambil batu puteh, bayar denda kereta Cepat, Su 30 MKM di usir dari singapure tiada SLOT
43. Salam dapat SEDEKAH Merdeka semu 999 tahun Tanah mesti sedia di tempati
44. Salam HMAV 4X4 TARANTULA SEWA, Tempel Sticker Hizir Turki
45. Salam RADAR IMPOTEN tak bisa kesan MH370
46. Salam satu satunya LST KD Sri Idrapura Terbakar tiada ganti
47. Salam pesawat intai ISRAEL kencing di langit Ibu negara tak takut di salvo Jernas Lapook
48. Salam TERJUN PAYUNG tersasar ke PASAR
49. Salam 4 kali ditolak NGEMIS hornet bekas RONGSOK Kuwait
50. Salam Eksportir kondom Unisex,Narkoba,Teroris,Togel,Maling ikan,Maling patok
51. Salam tak bayar SEWA Sabah, aset Petronas kena sita SULU
52. Salam GFP Rank 48 di bawah kaki Myanmar
53. Salam SEWA Merata untuk militer Heli AW139,Heli EC120 B,Kapal Hidrografi,Simulator heli,Boat FIB,Boat RHFB,Rover,Motosikal,ATV, Vellfire
54. Salam OPV Fatima berenang MIRING
55. Salam Rehull kapal USANG di Make Over PC ex KD Sundang, PC ex KD Panah
56. Salam PM ex Narapidana Korupsi dan ex Narapidana Sodomi
57. Salam tentara tanam SAYUR
58. Salam KD Ganas Kapal Peyot Tua Rongsok Ompong
59. Salam dapat Sedekah kapal rongsok 56 tahun ex USCG Cutter
Dan Malaydesh masih bangga tepuk dada dengan kapal rongsok Maharaja lele dan ex USGC cutter 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusTenang pur,,,TNI AL memang suka bikin surprise,,contoh aja KRI.BRAWIJAYA,,jgn gampang kagetan ya! 🤭
BalasHapusKapal ex USGC cutter kena ombak Garibaldi langsung jdi tukun di lautan 🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapus1. AGING AND OBSOLETE FLEET
BalasHapusA large portion of the RMAF's aircraft is old, with some models in service for several decades. This has created a fleet with a high average age, leading to a number of critical problems:
• High Maintenance Costs: Keeping an aging fleet airworthy is expensive. Older aircraft require more frequent and specialized maintenance, consuming a large part of the RMAF's operating budget that could otherwise be used for modernization.
• Low Operational Readiness: Due to frequent technical issues and the unavailability of spare parts, many aircraft have low readiness rates and spend significant time on the ground. This severely limits the RMAF's capacity to conduct regular training and respond to threats effectively.
• Corrosion Issues: Operating in Malondesh's hot and humid tropical environment, with coastal bases, accelerates corrosion in the aluminum structures of older aircraft. This can lead to metal fatigue and structural failures, raising serious safety concerns for pilots and crew.
• Technological Obsolescence: Many older aircraft lack the modern avionics, weapon systems, and networking capabilities needed for contemporary air combat. This puts the RMAF at a disadvantage against more technologically advanced air forces in the region.
________________________________________
2. Budgetary Constraints and Slow Modernization
The RMAF's modernization efforts have been consistently hampered by a limited and inconsistent defense budget.
• Insufficient Funding: The budget allocated for military development is often insufficient to fund major, large-scale acquisitions. This forces the RMAF to adopt a piecemeal approach to modernization, acquiring a small number of new platforms at a time.
• Delayed Plans: Key acquisition programs, such as the procurement of new Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) and Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), have been repeatedly delayed or scaled back due to a lack of funds.
________________________________________
3. Inefficient Procurement Process
The process of acquiring new military assets is a major weakness, often criticized for being slow, opaque, and inefficient.
• Lack of Transparency: Procurement is frequently conducted through direct negotiation rather than open tenders, which can lead to inflated prices and a lack of accountability.
• Role of Intermediaries: The involvement of middlemen or agents in defense deals can drive up costs significantly, wasting public funds and sometimes resulting in the acquisition of unsuitable equipment.
• Project Delays: These issues have led to numerous project failures and delays, leaving the RMAF's fleet in a state of limbo and undermining its long-term strategic plans.
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
kalau bisa perbanyak dulu fregat dan adakan destroyer beberapa unit, percuma kapal induk bekas cuma 1 unit.
BalasHapusBungkus aja untuk Platform Berlatih TNI AL dalam Operasional Kapal Induk
BalasHapusSisi lainnya minya Italy berikan Blue Print Kapal Induk ini untuk dibangun BRAND NEW sebagai Sister Ship di PT. PAL Surabaya
Bungkus juga Sea Harrier Bekas Pakai Italy Navy FULL Combat Ready agar Puspenerbal PUNYA Jet Fighter yang Support Operasi Amfibi dan Penegak Hukum Udara di wilayah Indonesia
Bungkus aja untuk Platform Berlatih TNI AL dalam Operasional Kapal Induk
BalasHapusSisi lainnya minta Italy berikan Blue Print Kapal Induk ini untuk dibangun BRAND NEW sebagai Sister Ship di PT. PAL Surabaya
Bungkus juga Sea Harrier Bekas Pakai Italy Navy FULL Combat Ready agar Puspenerbal PUNYA Jet Fighter yang Support Operasi Amfibi dan Penegak Hukum Udara di wilayah Indonesia
https://youtu.be/IP7Um-8THGg?si=IPK5z45BSyreZZWx
BalasHapusMenteri PERANG US Government bakalan ke Singapura untuk Tekan Kontrak Procurement Military Asset
Apakah Malondesh masih Pura Pura BEGO atas TAMPARAN KERAS Presiden TRUMP USD 240 Billion???
Come to papa 🙆🙆
BalasHapusSemakin hampir...manakala Malaydesh tak mampu shoping LPD
BalasHapus🤣🤣😂🤪🇧🇩👎
LPD, SPH, MERAD 30 tahun Onli Kaji...last last Kaburrrr om pedang haha!😋😋😋
Hapuskapal Induk konon...BBM kapal pun tak mampu dibayar lagi GORILLA mau MEMBUAL.....HAHAHAHHA
BalasHapusTHE MALONDESH MILITARY FACES SIGNIFICANT LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES DUE TO A RELIANCE ON A DIVERSE RANGE OF PLATFORMS FROM DIFFERENT INTERNATIONAL SUPPLIERS, AGING EQUIPMENT, AND A LACK OF A COHESIVE, MODERN LOGISTICS SYSTEM. THIS CREATES PROBLEMS IN MAINTENANCE, READINESS, AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS.
Hapus1. Fragmentation of Supply Chains
Malondeshhas historically procured military equipment from various countries, including the United States, Russia, Poland, the United Kingdom, and China. This practice has created a complex and inefficient supply chain.
• Diverse Parts and Maintenance Needs: Each type of equipment, from the Polish-made PT-91M tanks to the Russian Sukhoi Su-30MKM fighter jets, requires different spare parts, tools, and maintenance expertise.
• Reliance on Foreign Suppliers: The military is highly dependent on foreign manufacturers for critical components. For example, sanctions on Russia have made it difficult to secure spare parts for the Su-30MKM fleet, leading to a low operational readiness rate.
• Obsolete Parts: A diverse and aging inventory means that many spare parts become obsolete. The Royal MalondeshNavy (RMN) reportedly has millions of ringgit in unused, obsolete spare parts because of a mismatched fleet and inconsistent procurement.
2. Aging Fleet and High Maintenance Costs
A significant portion of Malondesh military assets is over 30 years old, which directly impacts operational readiness.
• Increased Maintenance Burden: Older vehicles, ships, and aircraft require more frequent and expensive maintenance. A 2021 study revealed that 34 of the RMN's 53 vessels had exceeded their intended service life, with 28 being over 40 years old. This leads to higher maintenance costs and a lower operational tempo.
• Inadequate Readiness: An aging fleet often fails to meet readiness targets. For instance, the MalondeshArmy's Type-B vehicles, which include non-armored transport vehicles, have historically failed to meet their mandated 80% serviceability rate, limiting their ability to support operations.
3. Delays and Mismanagement in Procurement
Long-standing procurement issues have worsened the logistical problems.
• Project Delays: The most prominent example is the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. The project has been plagued by delays and cost overruns, with no ships delivered despite significant payments. This has forced the RMN to rely on its aging fleet, which further strains its maintenance budget.
• Corruption and Inefficiency: Investigations into major procurement projects, such as the LCS program, have revealed issues with mismanagement and alleged corruption. The use of "middlemen" has been criticized for inflating prices, while poor contract management has resulted in projects failing to meet deadlines or deliver on their promised capabilities.
4. Limited Local and Automated Support
While Malondeshis trying to develop its defense industry, a lack of local expertise and modern systems exacerbates logistical issues.
• Limited Local Production: Despite efforts to boost domestic defense industries, Malondeshstill heavily relies on foreign suppliers. This limits the ability to produce spare parts locally, making the military vulnerable to supply chain disruptions.
• Outdated Inventory Management: Some military units still use manual, traditional methods for inventory and maintenance records. This prevents real-time tracking of assets and spare parts, leading to inefficiencies in maintenance planning and supply chain management
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
THE MALONDESH MILITARY FACES SIGNIFICANT LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES DUE TO A RELIANCE ON A DIVERSE RANGE OF PLATFORMS FROM DIFFERENT INTERNATIONAL SUPPLIERS, AGING EQUIPMENT, AND A LACK OF A COHESIVE, MODERN LOGISTICS SYSTEM. THIS CREATES PROBLEMS IN MAINTENANCE, READINESS, AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS.
Hapus1. Fragmentation of Supply Chains
Malondeshhas historically procured military equipment from various countries, including the United States, Russia, Poland, the United Kingdom, and China. This practice has created a complex and inefficient supply chain.
• Diverse Parts and Maintenance Needs: Each type of equipment, from the Polish-made PT-91M tanks to the Russian Sukhoi Su-30MKM fighter jets, requires different spare parts, tools, and maintenance expertise.
• Reliance on Foreign Suppliers: The military is highly dependent on foreign manufacturers for critical components. For example, sanctions on Russia have made it difficult to secure spare parts for the Su-30MKM fleet, leading to a low operational readiness rate.
• Obsolete Parts: A diverse and aging inventory means that many spare parts become obsolete. The Royal MalondeshNavy (RMN) reportedly has millions of ringgit in unused, obsolete spare parts because of a mismatched fleet and inconsistent procurement.
2. Aging Fleet and High Maintenance Costs
A significant portion of Malondesh military assets is over 30 years old, which directly impacts operational readiness.
• Increased Maintenance Burden: Older vehicles, ships, and aircraft require more frequent and expensive maintenance. A 2021 study revealed that 34 of the RMN's 53 vessels had exceeded their intended service life, with 28 being over 40 years old. This leads to higher maintenance costs and a lower operational tempo.
• Inadequate Readiness: An aging fleet often fails to meet readiness targets. For instance, the MalondeshArmy's Type-B vehicles, which include non-armored transport vehicles, have historically failed to meet their mandated 80% serviceability rate, limiting their ability to support operations.
3. Delays and Mismanagement in Procurement
Long-standing procurement issues have worsened the logistical problems.
• Project Delays: The most prominent example is the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. The project has been plagued by delays and cost overruns, with no ships delivered despite significant payments. This has forced the RMN to rely on its aging fleet, which further strains its maintenance budget.
• Corruption and Inefficiency: Investigations into major procurement projects, such as the LCS program, have revealed issues with mismanagement and alleged corruption. The use of "middlemen" has been criticized for inflating prices, while poor contract management has resulted in projects failing to meet deadlines or deliver on their promised capabilities.
4. Limited Local and Automated Support
While Malondeshis trying to develop its defense industry, a lack of local expertise and modern systems exacerbates logistical issues.
• Limited Local Production: Despite efforts to boost domestic defense industries, Malondeshstill heavily relies on foreign suppliers. This limits the ability to produce spare parts locally, making the military vulnerable to supply chain disruptions.
• Outdated Inventory Management: Some military units still use manual, traditional methods for inventory and maintenance records. This prevents real-time tracking of assets and spare parts, leading to inefficiencies in maintenance planning and supply chain management
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
THE MALONDESH MILITARY FACES SIGNIFICANT LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES DUE TO A RELIANCE ON A DIVERSE RANGE OF PLATFORMS FROM DIFFERENT INTERNATIONAL SUPPLIERS, AGING EQUIPMENT, AND A LACK OF A COHESIVE, MODERN LOGISTICS SYSTEM. THIS CREATES PROBLEMS IN MAINTENANCE, READINESS, AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS.
Hapus1. Fragmentation of Supply Chains
Malondeshhas historically procured military equipment from various countries, including the United States, Russia, Poland, the United Kingdom, and China. This practice has created a complex and inefficient supply chain.
• Diverse Parts and Maintenance Needs: Each type of equipment, from the Polish-made PT-91M tanks to the Russian Sukhoi Su-30MKM fighter jets, requires different spare parts, tools, and maintenance expertise.
• Reliance on Foreign Suppliers: The military is highly dependent on foreign manufacturers for critical components. For example, sanctions on Russia have made it difficult to secure spare parts for the Su-30MKM fleet, leading to a low operational readiness rate.
• Obsolete Parts: A diverse and aging inventory means that many spare parts become obsolete. The Royal MalondeshNavy (RMN) reportedly has millions of ringgit in unused, obsolete spare parts because of a mismatched fleet and inconsistent procurement.
2. Aging Fleet and High Maintenance Costs
A significant portion of Malondesh military assets is over 30 years old, which directly impacts operational readiness.
• Increased Maintenance Burden: Older vehicles, ships, and aircraft require more frequent and expensive maintenance. A 2021 study revealed that 34 of the RMN's 53 vessels had exceeded their intended service life, with 28 being over 40 years old. This leads to higher maintenance costs and a lower operational tempo.
• Inadequate Readiness: An aging fleet often fails to meet readiness targets. For instance, the MalondeshArmy's Type-B vehicles, which include non-armored transport vehicles, have historically failed to meet their mandated 80% serviceability rate, limiting their ability to support operations.
3. Delays and Mismanagement in Procurement
Long-standing procurement issues have worsened the logistical problems.
• Project Delays: The most prominent example is the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. The project has been plagued by delays and cost overruns, with no ships delivered despite significant payments. This has forced the RMN to rely on its aging fleet, which further strains its maintenance budget.
• Corruption and Inefficiency: Investigations into major procurement projects, such as the LCS program, have revealed issues with mismanagement and alleged corruption. The use of "middlemen" has been criticized for inflating prices, while poor contract management has resulted in projects failing to meet deadlines or deliver on their promised capabilities.
4. Limited Local and Automated Support
While Malondeshis trying to develop its defense industry, a lack of local expertise and modern systems exacerbates logistical issues.
• Limited Local Production: Despite efforts to boost domestic defense industries, Malondeshstill heavily relies on foreign suppliers. This limits the ability to produce spare parts locally, making the military vulnerable to supply chain disruptions.
• Outdated Inventory Management: Some military units still use manual, traditional methods for inventory and maintenance records. This prevents real-time tracking of assets and spare parts, leading to inefficiencies in maintenance planning and supply chain management
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
THE WEAKNESSES OF THE MALONDESHMILITARY'S TANK FORCE ARE PRIMARILY CENTERED ON QUANTITY, AGE, AND LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES. THE ROYAL ARMOURED CORPS OPERATES A SMALL FLEET OF MAIN BATTLE TANKS (MBTS), WHICH LIMITS ITS CAPABILITIES IN COMPARISON TO OTHER REGIONAL POWERS.
Hapus1. Limited Number of Tanks
Malondesh main battle tank fleet consists of a small number of PT-91M Pendekar tanks. The exact number varies in reports, but it is generally cited as around 48 units. This number is significantly lower than neighboring countries like Indonesia, which has a much larger tank fleet. This limited quantity can be a major disadvantage in a large-scale land conflict, as it restricts the ability to deploy tanks across different operational theaters and provides less strategic depth.
2. Obsolescence and Maintenance Issues
The PT-91M, while a capable tank, is a modernized variant of the T-72, a design that dates back to the Soviet era. While the Malondeshversion has been upgraded with a new engine, fire control system, and reactive armor, it still faces challenges related to its older design.
• Reliance on a Single Supplier: The PT-91M was purchased from Poland. This creates a dependency on a single foreign supplier for spare parts and maintenance, a problem that has been highlighted with the PT-91M. The Polish manufacturer has ceased production of some key components, which has led to a proposed Life Extension Program (LEP) to ensure the tanks remain operational. This program will rely on local expertise, which can be a slow and expensive process.
• Vulnerability to Modern Threats: The PT-91M, like many older tank designs, can be vulnerable to modern anti-tank weapons and drone attacks. While it is equipped with ERAWA-2 explosive reactive armor to protect against shaped-charge projectiles, it may be less effective against modern kinetic energy penetrators.
3. Logistical and Operational Constraints
Malondesh tank force also faces logistical challenges that can hinder its effectiveness.
• Mobility: While the PT-91M's weight (48.5 tonnes) makes it suitable for Malondesh often soft and uneven terrain, it may still face difficulties with older infrastructure, such as bridges with lower weight limits.
• Readiness: The small number of tanks and maintenance issues can impact the readiness of the fleet. Breakdowns have been reported in the past, underscoring the challenges of keeping a small fleet of specialized vehicles operational.
Ultimately, the main weakness of Malondesh tank force is not necessarily the quality of the PT-91M itself, but rather the small size of the fleet and the long-term logistical challenges of maintaining an aging and specialized inventory.
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
Biar FAKTA berbicara....kapal INDUK.....???....HAHAHAH
BalasHapusTNI AL Punya Utang BBM Rp3,2 Triliun ke Pertamina
https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20250429072257-4-629507/tni-al-punya-utang-bbm-rp32-triliun-ke-pertamina
BERIKUT ADALAH BEBERAPA CONTOH KAPAL TLDM YANG DIANGGAP USANG ATAU SUDAH TIDAK LAYAK OPERASIONAL:
Hapus• Korvet Kelas Laksamana: Baru-baru ini, tiga korvet kelas Laksamana, yaitu KD Laksamana Tun Abdul Jamil, KD Laksamana Tan Pusmah, dan KD Pendekar, telah secara resmi dinonaktifkan. Kapal-kapal ini dibangun di Italia pada tahun 1980-an dan telah bertugas selama beberapa dekade. Penonaktifan ini adalah bagian dari rencana untuk mengganti kapal-kapal usang dengan aset yang lebih modern, seperti Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
• Kapal Serangan Cepat (Fast Attack Craft): KD Pendekar, yang dinonaktifkan bersama dua korvet Laksamana, adalah contoh kapal serangan cepat yang telah lama bertugas sejak tahun 1979. Usia kapal ini yang sangat tua menunjukkan keterbatasan dalam teknologi dan kemampuan operasional dibandingkan dengan kapal modern.
• Kapal Patroli Kelas Kris dan Sabah: Kapal-kapal patroli ini telah dinonaktifkan atau dialihkan ke MMEA. Meskipun telah melayani TLDM selama lebih dari 30 tahun, keterbatasan operasionalnya, seperti jangkauan patroli yang pendek, membuatnya tidak lagi efektif untuk misi pengawasan di perairan yang lebih luas, seperti Zona Ekonomi Eksklusif (ZEE) Malondesh yang membentang lebih dari 320 km.
• Kapal Pendukung Serbaguna (Multi-Purpose Support Ships): Kapal-kapal lama seperti KD Sri Indera Sakti dan KD Mahawangsa telah mencapai batas usia pakainya. TLDM memiliki rencana untuk menggantinya dengan Kapal Pendukung Serbaguna Multi-Role Support Ship (MRSS) yang baru, tetapi pelaksanaannya menghadapi kendala.
• Armada Secara Umum: Secara keseluruhan, rata-rata usia kapal tempur dan patroli TLDM saat ini lebih dari 25 tahun, dengan mayoritas kapal bahkan berusia lebih dari 30 tahun. Kapal-kapal yang sudah terlalu tua ini sering kali mencapai titik di mana biaya pemeliharaan menjadi sangat tinggi dan tidak efisien. Program modernisasi yang tertunda, seperti proyek Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) yang mengalami penundaan, memperburuk masalah ini.
Kapal-Kapal Usang Agensi Penguatkuasaan Maritim Malondesh (MMEA)
• Kapal Patroli Tua (Ex-Police and Fisheries Vessels): Banyak kapal patroli MMEA sebelumnya adalah kapal milik Pasukan Polis Marin (PPM) atau Jabatan Perikanan. Contohnya termasuk kapal-kapal dari kelas "Gagah" dan "Nusa". Meskipun beberapa kapal ini telah menjalani program pembaruan (repowering) untuk mengganti mesin dan melakukan perbaikan struktural, usia desain dan lambungnya tetap membatasi kemampuan mereka.
• Kurangnya Kapal Patroli Jarak Jauh (Offshore Patrol Vessels): MMEA sangat membutuhkan Kapal Patroli Lepas Pantai (Offshore Patrol Vessels - OPV) yang lebih besar dan modern untuk misi pengawasan di ZEE. Proyek pengadaan OPV untuk MMEA mengalami berbagai tantangan. Ini berarti MMEA masih harus mengandalkan kapal-kapal yang lebih kecil dengan jangkauan dan daya tahan yang terbatas untuk mengawasi perairan yang sangat luas.
• Donasi dan Transfer Kapal: MMEA juga menerima kapal-kapal yang dinonaktifkan dari angkatan laut negara lain, seperti kapal patroli dari Amerika Serikat (Ex-USCGC Steadfast) dan Australia. Meskipun ini dapat menjadi solusi cepat untuk menambah armada, kapal-kapal ini sering kali sudah berusia dan memerlukan pemeliharaan dan suku cadang yang khusus, yang dapat menjadi tantangan logistik.
Dampak dari Armada yang Usang
• Kesiapan Operasional yang Rendah: Kapal-kapal yang usang cenderung lebih sering mengalami kerusakan, yang mengurangi waktu operasional mereka di laut. Hal ini berdampak langsung pada kemampuan TLDM dan MMEA untuk melakukan patroli, penegakan hukum, dan operasi keamanan maritim secara efektif.
• Biaya Pemeliharaan yang Tinggi: Sebagaimana disebutkan dalam laporan, banyak kapal tua sudah mencapai "titik pengembalian yang menurun" (point of diminishing returns), di mana biaya pemeliharaan dan perbaikan menjadi lebih besar daripada nilai dan kegunaan operasional kapal itu sendiri.
THE PRIMARY WEAKNESS OF THE MALONDESHMILITARY'S AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITIES IS THE LACK OF A DEDICATED MARINE CORPS. INSTEAD OF A SINGLE, specialized branch, Malondesh amphibious forces are fragmented and distributed among different services, which creates several significant gaps.
Hapus1. Fragmentation of Command and Control
Without a unified Marine Corps, the various units responsible for amphibious operations—such as the Army's 10th Parachute Brigade and the Navy's PASKAL—must coordinate their efforts during a mission. This lack of a single, dedicated command structure can lead to:
• Slower Response Times: The time required to coordinate and deploy different units from separate services can delay a rapid response to maritime threats or humanitarian crises.
• Interoperability Issues: Despite joint exercises, the different services have distinct doctrines, equipment, and training, which can lead to communication and operational gaps in a real-world scenario.
2. Limited Dedicated Assets
A dedicated Marine Corps typically possesses its own fleet of specialized equipment designed for amphibious operations, such as amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs) and large landing craft. The MalondeshArmed Forces (MAF) lack a similar inventory, relying on a more limited and general-purpose set of assets.
• Reliance on Older or Less Capable Platforms: While the MalondeshNavy is modernizing, its current fleet may not be sufficient for large-scale amphibious operations. The absence of a dedicated fleet of landing ships and AAVs limits the force's ability to transport troops and heavy equipment from sea to shore efficiently.
3. Reduced Deterrence and Strategic Projection
In a region with growing maritime disputes, a dedicated amphibious force serves as a powerful deterrent. Its existence signals a nation's ability and resolve to project power and defend its territorial claims.
• Vulnerability in Maritime Disputes: Malondeshis a claimant in the South China Sea, and the lack of a dedicated Marine Corps may be perceived as a strategic weakness when dealing with more assertive neighbors. The 2013 Lahad Datu incursion, for example, exposed a gap in the military's ability to swiftly and decisively respond to a maritime-based threat.
4. Constraints on Training and Expertise
While Malondeshforces regularly train with foreign partners like the U.S. Marine Corps, this exposure is not a substitute for having a fully integrated, self-sustaining force.
• Knowledge Gaps: Without a dedicated Marine Corps, the continuous development of a specialized doctrine and expertise in amphibious warfare is hindered. This can lead to a reliance on foreign partners for high-end amphibious training, rather than being able to conduct such training internally and on a large scale
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
THE ABSENCE OF A DEDICATED MARINE CORPS
Hapus1. Gaps in Amphibious and Expeditionary Capabilities
• Lack of a Cohesive Force: A dedicated Marine Corps is designed to be a self-contained, rapidly deployable expeditionary force. It integrates naval support, ground combat, and aviation assets into a single cohesive unit. In Malondesh case, these capabilities are spread across different services (the Army's 10th Parachute Brigade, the Navy's PASKAL, and various naval ships). This fragmented approach can lead to coordination problems, "turf wars" between services, and a lack of unified command during complex amphibious operations.
• Limited Rapid Response: A Marine Corps is structured for immediate, decisive action in littoral environments. Without such a force, Malondeshmay face delays in deploying troops to respond to threats in its vast maritime domain, particularly in remote areas of the South China Sea or the eastern coast of Sabah. The 2013 Lahad Datu incursion, for instance, highlighted the need for a more agile and specialized maritime security force.
• Lack of Dedicated Amphibious Assets: A Marine Corps comes with its own fleet of specialized assets, such as amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs), hovercraft, and landing craft. While the MalondeshArmy is acquiring some hovercraft, these acquisitions are often piecemeal and not part of a larger, dedicated force structure. This can limit the scale and scope of amphibious operations.
2. Slower Military Modernization
• Outdated Doctrine: The MalondeshArmed Forces (MAF) doctrine has historically been shaped by its counter-insurgency and land-centric experience. While the 2019 Defense White Paper has acknowledged the need for amphibious capabilities, the absence of a dedicated Marine Corps suggests a slower pace in fully embracing a modern, multi-domain warfare doctrine that is crucial for a maritime nation.
• Budgetary and Bureaucratic Hurdles: The creation of a new military branch requires significant political will and a long-term financial commitment. Due to a history of fluctuating defense budgets and administrative complexities, proposals to establish a MalondeshMarine Corps have repeatedly been put on the back burner. This has led to a situation where critical capabilities, like those needed for amphibious warfare, are not fully developed or funded.
3. Vulnerability in Maritime Disputes
• Inadequate Deterrence: Malondeshis a claimant state in the South China Sea and faces increasing assertiveness from China. As noted by some military analysts, the Royal MalondeshNavy's (RMN) naval vessels are in some cases smaller and less capable than the Chinese coast guard ships that operate in Malondesh Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). A robust Marine Corps could serve as a powerful deterrent, signaling Malondesh resolve to protect its maritime claims and remote outposts.
• Challenges in Defending Remote Outposts: Malondeshmaintains a presence on several reefs and islands in the disputed waters. Reinforcing these remote garrisons requires significant air and sea-lift capabilities, which can be challenging and slow without a dedicated, integrated amphibious force.
4. Limitations in Joint Operations and Interoperability
• Fragmented Training: While the Royal MalondeshArmy trains with foreign marine forces (e.g., the U.S. Marine Corps) in exercises like CARAT, this training is often ad-hoc and focuses on specific, limited scenarios. It does not replace the continuous, integrated, and large-scale training that a dedicated Marine Corps undergoes to achieve seamless interoperability between sea and land forces.
• Reduced Effectiveness in Multinational Operations: In a combined operation with a country that has a Marine Corps, Malondesh lack of a similar force can hinder a seamless integration of its assets. This can create communication and procedural gaps that reduce overall operational effectiveness in joint exercises or real-world coalition efforts.
HERE ARE THE KEY ASEAN NATIONS WITH A DEDICATED MARINE CORPS:
Hapus________________________________________
Indonesia 🇮🇩
Indonesia's Korps Marinir Republik Indonesia (KORMAR RI) is a highly capable and well-established Marine Corps that is a core component of the Indonesian Navy (TNI AL).
• Geographical Imperative: As the world's largest archipelagic state with over 17,000 islands, Indonesia requires a force that can project power across its vast maritime domain. KORMAR's primary role is to conduct amphibious operations, secure strategic coastal areas, and defend remote islands.
• Size and Capabilities: KORMAR is a substantial force with its own armor, artillery, and specialized units. It can operate independently or as a key part of a larger naval task force, making it essential for a nation with such a dispersed territory.
• Historical Context: The Korps Marinir was formed in 1945 during the Indonesian National Revolution, giving it a long history and a firm place in the country's military structure. Its missions have included counter-insurgency and securing the nation's borders.
________________________________________
Philippines 🇵🇭
The Philippine Marine Corps (PMC) is the naval infantry force of the Philippine Navy.
• Archipelagic Defense: Like Indonesia, the Philippines is an archipelago, making a dedicated Marine Corps vital for internal and external security. The PMC's role is to conduct amphibious, expeditionary, and special operations missions to defend the country's extensive coastline and numerous islands.
• Missions: The PMC is heavily involved in operations against communist insurgents and extremist groups. It has also been instrumental in securing disputed areas, such as the Spratly Islands, and in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts, a critical role given the Philippines' vulnerability to natural disasters.
• U.S. Influence: The Philippine Marine Corps was formed with assistance from the U.S. Marine Corps and shares many of its traditions, including its rank system and some ceremonial practices.
________________________________________
Thailand 🇹🇭
The Royal Thai Marine Corps (RTMC) is a specialized amphibious force that is part of the Royal Thai Navy.
• Historical Ties: The RTMC has a long history, with its origins tracing back to the early 20th century, and it was significantly developed with the assistance of the U.S. Marine Corps.
• Missions: The RTMC's responsibilities include coastal defense, amphibious operations, and internal security, particularly in the country's southern provinces. They have also been involved in counter-insurgency operations on the Malondeshborder and in peacekeeping missions.
• Modernization: The RTMC has been modernizing its forces, acquiring specialized equipment like amphibious assault vehicles to enhance its capability for power projection from the sea to the shore.
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
Ini konon mau kapal Induk.....??? BBM kapal saja tak mampu dibayar....HAHAHAHHA
BalasHapusKala TNI AL Nunggak BBM Rp 3,2 Triliun ke Pertamina, Minta Dikasih Subsidi seperti Polri
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/04/28/18100571/kala-tni-al-nunggak-bbm-rp-32-triliun-ke-pertamina-minta-dikasih-subsidi
1. MASALAH PERAWATAN DAN KESIAPAN OPERASIONAL 🚧
HapusIni adalah kelemahan yang paling sering disorot dan menjadi viral di media sosial.
• Insiden Mogok di Jalan Umum: Tank PT-91M Pendekar pernah beberapa kali mogok di tengah jalan raya, bahkan saat sedang dalam perjalanan untuk acara parade Hari Kemerdekaan. Insiden ini menimbulkan pertanyaan serius dari masyarakat dan parlemen tentang standar perawatan aset militer.
• Kurangnya Suku Cadang: Masalah ini adalah inti dari inefisiensi. Penghentian produksi suku cadang oleh produsen aslinya, Bumar Labedy, memaksa Malondesh untuk mencari solusi alternatif. Upaya ini termasuk menggunakan tenaga ahli lokal untuk memproduksi komponen tertentu, tetapi ini menunjukkan ketergantungan yang rapuh pada produsen eksternal dan kurangnya jaminan rantai pasokan.
• Kurva Pembelajaran yang Curam: Sebagai negara pertama di Asia Tenggara yang mengoperasikan MBT modern, Malondesh menghadapi tantangan dalam mengembangkan basis pengetahuan, keahlian, dan infrastruktur untuk perawatan tank tersebut. Hal ini berbeda dengan negara-negara yang sudah memiliki pengalaman lebih lama dalam mengelola aset militer yang kompleks.
________________________________________
2. Keterbatasan Teknis dan Operasional ⚙️
Meskipun PT-91M adalah versi yang ditingkatkan dari T-72, beberapa keterbatasan masih ada.
• Desain Lama dan Kerentanan: PT-91M merupakan turunan dari T-72, yang memiliki desain kokpit dan penyimpanan amunisi yang terkenal rentan. Dalam pertempuran modern, ini bisa menjadi kelemahan fatal jika dibandingkan dengan tank-tank tempur utama lain yang lebih baru dengan desain yang lebih aman.
• Kemampuan Serangan Terbatas: Dibandingkan dengan tank tempur utama modern yang dimiliki oleh negara tetangga, seperti Leopard 2A4 milik Singapura dan Indonesia, PT-91M Pendekar dianggap memiliki sistem kendali tembak dan perlindungan yang kurang unggul. Meskipun dilengkapi dengan Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA), perlindungan ini mungkin tidak cukup untuk menahan serangan dari amunisi anti-tank terbaru.
________________________________________
3. Masalah Pengadaan dan Jumlah yang Tidak Memadai 💰
• Skandal dan Inefisiensi: Sama seperti proyek kapal LCS, skandal pengadaan dan inefisiensi juga terjadi dalam program tank. Laporan menunjukkan adanya masalah tata kelola yang buruk dalam manajemen kontrak, yang menyebabkan aset tidak dapat digunakan secara maksimal.
• Jumlah yang Sedikit: Malondesh hanya memiliki 48 unit tank PT-91M Pendekar. Jumlah ini dianggap sangat tidak memadai untuk kebutuhan pertahanan negara, terutama jika dibandingkan dengan negara tetangga yang memiliki jumlah armada lapis baja yang jauh lebih besar.
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
1. Keterbatasan Jumlah dan Kualitas
Hapus• Jumlah yang Tidak Memadai: Dibandingkan dengan negara-negara lain di kawasan, terutama Indonesia, jumlah kendaraan lapis baja yang dimiliki Malondesh relatif sedikit. Misalnya, perbandingan kekuatan darat menunjukkan Indonesia memiliki sekitar 20.440 kendaraan lapis baja, sementara Malondesh hanya memiliki sekitar 13.506 unit. Angka ini juga menunjukkan Indonesia memiliki lebih banyak tank tempur (331 unit) dibandingkan Malondesh (48 unit). Keterbatasan ini memengaruhi kemampuan Malondesh dalam menjalankan operasi darat berskala besar.
• Ketergantungan pada Model Lama: Meskipun memiliki beberapa unit modern seperti AV8 Gempita, Angkatan Darat Malondesh masih mengoperasikan kendaraan lapis baja tua yang sudah usang. Hal ini menciptakan tantangan logistik yang besar dan membuat kekuatan darat kurang homogen.
2. Masalah Kesiapan Operasional dan Pemeliharaan
Ini adalah salah satu kelemahan paling signifikan dan sering disorot.
• Sering Mogok: Kendaraan lapis baja Malondesh, termasuk tank, seringkali dilaporkan mogok di jalan raya atau saat latihan. Insiden ini tidak hanya menjadi bahan ejekan publik tetapi juga mengindikasikan kurangnya perawatan rutin dan pemeliharaan yang memadai.
• Kurangnya Suku Cadang: Masalah ini terkait dengan keragaman jenis kendaraan yang dimiliki Malondesh. Karena mereka membeli kendaraan dari berbagai negara produsen, pasokan suku cadang sering kali tidak terjamin, menyebabkan unit-unit tidak dapat beroperasi dalam jangka waktu lama.
• Skandal dan Korupsi: Seperti yang terjadi pada proyek kapal LCS, skandal pengadaan dan pemeliharaan juga terjadi pada kendaraan lapis baja. Laporan menyebutkan adanya masalah tata kelola dan korupsi dalam industri pertahanan yang berdampak langsung pada kesiapan kendaraan tempur.
3. Kelemahan Teknis pada Model Utama (Studi Kasus: AV8 Gempita)
AV8 Gempita adalah andalan utama kendaraan lapis baja Malondesh. Meskipun merupakan produk lokal yang dikembangkan dari platform FNSS Pars Turki, kendaraan ini juga memiliki beberapa kelemahan:
• Penurunan Kemampuan Amfibi: Varian-varian yang memiliki berat lebih besar, seperti varian antitank dengan turret LCT30, kehilangan kemampuan amfibinya. Hal ini membatasi fleksibilitas operasional kendaraan di medan dengan banyak sungai atau perairan. Bahkan pada varian yang dirancang untuk amfibi, penambahan lapisan pelindung membuat kecepatannya di air menurun.
• Perlindungan yang Memadai Namun Tidak Unggul: Kendaraan lapis baja seperti Tarantula HMAV dan AV8 Gempita dirancang dengan standar perlindungan NATO STANAG 4569. Namun, tingkat perlindungan ini (level 2A/2B) dianggap memadai untuk ancaman ranjau dan IED, tetapi mungkin tidak cukup untuk menghadapi serangan anti-tank atau ancaman yang lebih berat dari kendaraan lapis baja modern lainnya.
• Persenjataan dan Varian yang Berbeda: Meskipun memiliki banyak varian, ada masalah dengan sistem senjata yang digunakan. Sebagai contoh, varian antitank AV8 Gempita dengan rudal anti-tank belum terbukti sepenuhnya efektif atau tersedia dalam jumlah yang cukup.
Secara keseluruhan, kelemahan kendaraan lapis baja militer Malondesh berpusat pada masalah manajemen dan logistik yang kronis, yang menyebabkan armada mereka tidak terawat dan seringkali tidak siap untuk operasi. Selain itu, jumlahnya yang terbatas dan ketergantungan pada model lama membuat kekuatan darat Malondesh tertinggal dibandingkan dengan tetangga regional mereka yang melakukan modernisasi lebih cepat.
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
SYSTEMIC ISSUES
HapusSeveral factors contribute to this entrenched problem:
• Lack of Transparency and Oversight: Defense procurement is often conducted through direct negotiations rather than open tenders, which makes the process opaque and susceptible to abuse. Transparency International's Government Defence Integrity Index has consistently rated Malondesh as having a high risk of corruption in its defense sector due to weak parliamentary oversight and limited financial scrutiny.
• The Role of Middlemen and Agents: A key feature of the Malondeshn system is the reliance on middlemen, or "agents," who are often politically connected. These individuals or firms insert themselves into deals between the government and foreign arms manufacturers, adding unnecessary commissions and inflating the final price of the assets. As Malondesh's King Sultan Ibrahim recently pointed out, this system allows agents to profit at the expense of national defense.
• Political Influence and Cronyism: The awarding of contracts is frequently influenced by political interests rather than the actual needs of the military. Projects are often given to politically connected firms, some of which have no prior experience in defense manufacturing. This leads to a vicious cycle where a lack of capability and experience results in project delays and failures.
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal: A Case Study
The LCS scandal is a prime example of the deep-seated issues within Malondeshn defense procurement. The project, intended to build six ships for the Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN) at a cost of RM9 billion, has been a complete failure.
• Misappropriation of Funds: The government has already paid over RM6 billion, but not a single ship has been delivered. Forensic audits and a Public Accounts Committee (PAC) report revealed that funds were allegedly misappropriated, with payments made for "fake services" and a significant portion of the money disappearing without a trace.
• Ignoring User Needs: The scandal also highlighted a critical breakdown in communication and a disregard for military expertise. The RMN initially recommended a Dutch-made design (Sigma class), but the Ministry of Defence, under the advice of the main contractor, Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS), chose a different, unproven French design (Gowind class) instead. This decision was made without the navy's consultation.
• Gross Inefficiency and Delays: The project has been plagued by delays due to BNS's poor financial management, lack of skilled labor, and failure to follow design specifications. The company, which is a subsidiary of a conglomerate with close ties to the Armed Forces Pension Fund, was in a "weak and critical" financial state, yet was still awarded the massive contract. This showcases a complete breakdown of due diligence and project management.
Other Notable Scandals and Issues
The LCS scandal is just one of many that have plagued the MAF.
• Submarine Procurement: A previous submarine deal was also marred by allegations of corruption, with reports of exorbitant commissions paid to local agents.
• Aircraft and Patrol Boats: The MAF has a history of acquiring assets that are either not fully operational upon delivery or are poorly maintained due to a lack of spare parts and technical expertise. This has led to a high number of non-flying aircraft and inoperable patrol boats, essentially leaving the military with expensive, but useless, equipment.
• Lack of Accountability: Despite multiple scandals and reports from the Auditor-General and PAC, there has been a notable lack of accountability. Few, if any, senior politicians or high-ranking military officials have been held responsible for the failures and financial losses. This has fostered a culture where such misconduct is tolerated, and a cynical public has grown desensitized to the issue.
The Malondeshn military, also known as the Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF), faces several significant challenges, which can be categorized into three main areas: procurement and modernization, human resources, and defense policy.
HapusProcurement and Modernization 💰
A primary issue for the MAF is its aging and obsolete equipment. The country's defense spending has historically been low, and while recent budgets have seen increases, they are often insufficient to cover the extensive modernization needs.
• Financial Constraints: The 1997 Asian financial crisis had a lasting impact, forcing a de-prioritization of defense spending. Despite recent budget increases, competing priorities like healthcare and education often limit the funds available for military upgrades.
• Corruption and Inefficiency: Past procurement projects, such as the Littoral Combat Ship program, have been plagued by delays, cost overruns, and allegations of corruption, which have wasted funds and resulted in a lack of operational assets.
• Aging Inventory: The MAF relies on a mix of equipment from various countries, making maintenance difficult. For example, the Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF) has struggled to maintain its Russian-made Sukhoi Su-30MKM fighter jets due to sanctions and a lack of spare parts. The country also retired its MiG-29s without a timely replacement, creating a significant capability gap.
Human Resources 🧍
Recruitment and personnel issues are another major problem for the MAF, affecting its overall readiness and capability.
• Recruitment Challenges: The military has difficulty attracting and retaining high-quality personnel. This is partly due to low wages and poor living conditions. The quality of candidates has been a concern, with a declining pool of eligible recruits.
• Ethnic Imbalance: There is a significant ethnic disparity in the armed forces, with a very low percentage of non-Malay recruits. This could affect national unity and the military's ability to represent the country's diverse population.
• Personnel Well-being: There are ongoing concerns about the well-being and welfare of military personnel, including work-life balance issues and the need for better mental health support.
Defense Policy and Strategic Challenges 🗺️
The MAF operates in a complex regional environment with evolving security threats.
• South China Sea Disputes: Malondesh has overlapping territorial claims with China in the South China Sea. China's increasingly aggressive "grey-zone" tactics—using coast guard vessels and fishing militia to assert its claims—are a major challenge that the MAF is not fully equipped to handle.
• Non-Traditional Threats: While traditionally an army-centric force due to a history of internal counter-insurgency, the MAF must now pivot to address maritime and cyber threats. This requires a re-calibration of its force structure and a focus on new technologies like drones, cyber warfare, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
• Political Instability: Frequent changes in government have led to a lack of continuity in defense policy and the slow implementation of key reforms outlined in the country's first Defence White Paper. This political instability can stall long-term projects and strategic planning.
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
Parah...hingga Ngemis minta dibayarkan...HAHAHAH
BalasHapusTunggakan BBM TNI AL di Pertamina Rp3,2 Triliun, KSAL Minta Diputihkan
https://makassartoday.com/2025/04/29/tunggakan-bbm-tni-al-di-pertamina-rp32-triliun-ksal-minta-diputihkan/
KEY FACTORS
Hapus1. Direct Negotiation and Lack of Open Tenders
A major problem is the frequent use of direct negotiation instead of open and competitive tenders. This practice, often justified under the pretext of national security, limits competition and reduces transparency. By bypassing the tender process, the government loses the ability to secure the best value for money, and it creates a fertile ground for corruption.
• Example: The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal is a prime example. The multi-billion ringgit contract was awarded through direct negotiation, with a parliamentary inquiry later revealing that the decision ignored the navy's preference for a different ship design.
________________________________________
2. The Role of Middlemen and Agents
The procurement process is often riddled with intermediaries or agents who act as go-betweens for the military and foreign contractors. These middlemen, often with political connections or being former military personnel, add significant markups to the cost of equipment. This practice inflates prices, wastes public funds, and has been a major source of controversy. The King of Malondesh himself has publicly criticized this issue, warning against the influence of "agents and salesmen" in the Defence Ministry.
________________________________________
3. Financial Mismanagement and Weak Oversight
Government audits have consistently revealed systemic financial mismanagement.
• Failure to Collect Penalties: Audit reports have shown that the government failed to impose and collect penalties for delayed deliveries from contractors. In one case, a contractor for armored vehicles did not face a penalty of over RM160 million despite significant delays.
• Contract Splitting: To avoid the scrutiny of larger contracts, some projects are broken down into smaller ones, a practice known as "contract splitting." This allows them to bypass the open tender threshold and be awarded through less rigorous methods, raising concerns about accountability.
• Misappropriation of Funds: In the LCS scandal, a significant portion of the project's funds were allegedly used to pay off debts from old, unrelated naval projects, showcasing a severe lack of financial discipline.
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
THE MALONDESH MILITARY HAS A SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY GAP IN ITS COUNTER-INSURGENCY (COIN) AIRCRAFT FLEET, PRIMARILY DUE TO THE AGING AND LIMITED NUMBER OF LIGHT COMBAT AND SURVEILLANCE PLATFORMS SUITABLE FOR THIS TYPE OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE.
Hapus1. Lack of Dedicated COIN Aircraft
Unlike a dedicated air force built for large-scale conventional warfare, a successful COIN force requires aircraft optimized for a unique set of missions:
• Low and Slow: COIN operations often occur in dense jungle or urban environments where fast jets are ineffective. They require aircraft that can fly low and slow to provide close air support and accurate surveillance.
• Persistent Presence: COIN aircraft must be able to loiter for extended periods to track insurgents and provide sustained support to ground troops.
• Cost-Effectiveness: Using expensive, high-performance fighter jets like the Su-30MKM for COIN missions is a significant waste of resources.
The Royal MalondeshAir Force (RMAF) lacks a dedicated fleet of such aircraft. Its existing fleet is more suited for air defense and conventional warfare, creating a mismatch between its capabilities and the specific demands of counter-insurgency.
________________________________________
2. Aging Fleet and Reliance on Other Assets
The RMAF's current inventory is not well-suited for the COIN role, forcing it to rely on a mix of aging platforms and less-than-ideal helicopters.
• Retired Aircraft: The RMAF has retired dedicated COIN aircraft like the Canadair CT-114 Tutor. This leaves a major gap that has not been adequately filled.
• Helicopter Gaps: While the Army operates light attack helicopters like the MD530G, these are limited in their range, endurance, and payload. This places a heavy burden on a small fleet to support ground forces over vast and often difficult terrain.
________________________________________
3. Delays in New Acquisitions
Malondeshis actively trying to address this gap, but procurement has been slow and challenging.
• FA-50M Purchase: The RMAF is acquiring 18 FA-50M light combat aircraft from Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI). These jets are intended to fulfill both a fighter lead-in trainer role and a light combat role. However, deliveries are not expected to begin until 2026. This leaves the RMAF with a capability gap in the interim.
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): Malondeshhas made some progress in acquiring drones for surveillance, but these still do not fully replace the role of a manned COIN aircraft, which can provide more direct and immediate fire support.
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
1. FINANCIAL AND BUDGETARY REASONS
HapusOne of the most common reasons for cancellation is a lack of funds. The Malondeshn defense budget has historically been inconsistent and insufficient to support major, multi-year projects. When budgets are cut or not allocated as planned, the military is forced to scrap projects it can no longer afford.
• Impact on Acquisitions: This has led to the cancellation of proposed acquisitions, such as the plan to buy Kuwait's F/A-18C/D Hornet fighter jets. The decision was based on concerns about the high costs of upgrading and integrating the older jets, which were deemed to not provide sufficient "value for money."
• Inability to Pay: In some cases, the government or contractors may simply lack the funds to continue a project. This was a contributing factor to the failures of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project, where a contractor struggled with financial solvency.
________________________________________
2. Poor Governance and Lack of Transparency
Many cancellations stem from fundamental issues in how contracts are awarded and managed.
• Direct Negotiation vs. Open Tenders: The use of direct negotiation instead of open tenders is a major weakness. It limits competition and can result in contracts being awarded to politically connected companies, even if they lack the expertise or financial capability to complete the project.
• Mismanagement and Corruption: Projects are often canceled due to evidence of financial mismanagement, overspending, or corruption. The LCS scandal is the most infamous example, where a parliamentary inquiry found evidence of funds being misused and payments made to unverified subcontractors.
________________________________________
3. Lack of Operational Feasibility
Sometimes, a project is canceled because the proposed asset is not suitable for the military's needs or poses a risk to personnel.
• Obsolete Technology: The recent cancellation of the deal to lease four Black Hawk helicopters is a clear example. Malondesh King Sultan Ibrahim ordered the deal to be scrapped, publicly criticizing the acquisition of old, over 30-year-old aircraft that he called "flying coffins." He noted that such acquisitions endanger the lives of pilots and do not provide the military with a necessary capability.
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
BBM kapal saja hingga NGEMIS minta dibayarkan...mau kapal Induk konon....HAHAHAHAH
BalasHapus1. INADEQUATE AND INCONSISTENT FUNDING
HapusThe Malondesh n government has historically deprioritized defense spending in favor of other sectors like education and healthcare. This has led to a military budget that is often insufficient to meet the needs of a modern armed force. The allocation is also inconsistent, fluctuating from year to year based on economic conditions and political priorities, which makes long-term planning for large-scale procurement projects difficult. This limited and unpredictable funding has forced the ATM to operate with a significant portion of its assets being obsolete or aged, a problem that has become more acute in the face of rising regional tensions.
________________________________________
2. Chronic Procurement and Corruption Issues
Corruption and lack of transparency are persistent problems in military procurement. 💰
• Scandals and Delays: High-profile scandals, such as the troubled Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project, highlight the mismanagement and alleged corruption. This project has seen significant cost overruns and delays, with no ships delivered despite a large portion of the budget having been spent. Such failures not only waste public funds but also leave the Royal Malondesh n Navy without vital assets.
• Middlemen and High Costs: The involvement of middlemen and "agents" in defense deals inflates costs and diverts funds away from direct military needs. The King of Malondesh has publicly criticized this practice, warning that it makes procurement budgets insufficient and can compromise the safety of military personnel.
• Lack of Accountability: Despite numerous scandals and public criticism, there has been a lack of strong action against those responsible for these procurement failures, which perpetuates a cycle of mismanagement and corruption.
________________________________________
3. Impact on Military Readiness and Capabilities
The budgetary problems have direct and severe consequences for the operational readiness of the ATM.
• Aging Equipment: Many military assets, including aircraft and naval vessels, are old and expensive to maintain, with some even having their armaments rendered obsolete. This reduces their operational days at sea and in the air, limiting the ATM's ability to conduct patrols and training exercises.
• Capability Gaps: The lack of sufficient funds prevents the acquisition of modern technology needed to address contemporary threats. The ATM has significant gaps in key areas such as cybersecurity, intelligence gathering, and maritime surveillance, which are critical for protecting Malondesh 's vast maritime borders, especially in the South China Sea.
• Personnel Morale and Retention: Poor funding also affects the welfare of military personnel, including inadequate housing and less competitive salaries compared to the private sector. This can hinder the recruitment and retention of high-caliber talent, further weakening the armed forces' overall capabilitie
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
1. INADEQUATE AND INCONSISTENT FUNDING
HapusThe Malondesh n government has historically deprioritized defense spending in favor of other sectors like education and healthcare. This has led to a military budget that is often insufficient to meet the needs of a modern armed force. The allocation is also inconsistent, fluctuating from year to year based on economic conditions and political priorities, which makes long-term planning for large-scale procurement projects difficult. This limited and unpredictable funding has forced the ATM to operate with a significant portion of its assets being obsolete or aged, a problem that has become more acute in the face of rising regional tensions.
________________________________________
2. Chronic Procurement and Corruption Issues
Corruption and lack of transparency are persistent problems in military procurement. 💰
• Scandals and Delays: High-profile scandals, such as the troubled Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project, highlight the mismanagement and alleged corruption. This project has seen significant cost overruns and delays, with no ships delivered despite a large portion of the budget having been spent. Such failures not only waste public funds but also leave the Royal Malondesh n Navy without vital assets.
• Middlemen and High Costs: The involvement of middlemen and "agents" in defense deals inflates costs and diverts funds away from direct military needs. The King of Malondesh has publicly criticized this practice, warning that it makes procurement budgets insufficient and can compromise the safety of military personnel.
• Lack of Accountability: Despite numerous scandals and public criticism, there has been a lack of strong action against those responsible for these procurement failures, which perpetuates a cycle of mismanagement and corruption.
________________________________________
3. Impact on Military Readiness and Capabilities
The budgetary problems have direct and severe consequences for the operational readiness of the ATM.
• Aging Equipment: Many military assets, including aircraft and naval vessels, are old and expensive to maintain, with some even having their armaments rendered obsolete. This reduces their operational days at sea and in the air, limiting the ATM's ability to conduct patrols and training exercises.
• Capability Gaps: The lack of sufficient funds prevents the acquisition of modern technology needed to address contemporary threats. The ATM has significant gaps in key areas such as cybersecurity, intelligence gathering, and maritime surveillance, which are critical for protecting Malondesh 's vast maritime borders, especially in the South China Sea.
• Personnel Morale and Retention: Poor funding also affects the welfare of military personnel, including inadequate housing and less competitive salaries compared to the private sector. This can hinder the recruitment and retention of high-caliber talent, further weakening the armed forces' overall capabilitie
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
THE MALONDESHN ARMY (TENTERA DARAT MALONDESH) FACES SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT WEAKNESSES THAT HINDER ITS MODERNIZATION AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. These issues are primarily tied to an aging equipment inventory and systemic procurement problems, which are compounded by limited and inconsistent funding.
Hapus________________________________________
1. Aging and Obsolete Equipment
A substantial portion of the Malondeshn Army's equipment is old and technologically outdated, limiting its capabilities against modern threats. This includes armored vehicles, artillery, and transport fleets.
• Armored Vehicles: While the army possesses a number of armored personnel carriers (APCs), many of these are older models that are expensive to maintain and lack modern protection and firepower.
• Artillery Systems: The army's artillery units are also in need of modernization. It has been trying to acquire new self-propelled howitzers for years, with projects often delayed or canceled, leaving it with less mobile and effective firepower compared to its neighbors.
________________________________________
2. Inefficient Procurement and Financial Mismanagement
The process of acquiring new assets is a major weakness for the Malondeshn Army. It is often plagued by a lack of transparency and accountability, as highlighted by reports from the Auditor-General.
• Project Delays and Uncollected Penalties: Recent audit reports have revealed serious flaws in managing contracts. For instance, the army was found to have failed to collect RM162.75 million in penalties from a contractor for the delayed delivery of armored vehicles.
• Contract Splitting: The audit also noted that a RM107.54 million maintenance and repair contract was broken down into 86 smaller contracts, a practice often used to bypass open tenders and proper oversight.
• Impact on Readiness: These delays and inefficiencies directly affect the army's readiness, as it cannot rely on having a sufficient number of modern, well-maintained vehicles for its operations.
________________________________________
3. Limited Budgetary Support
Like other branches of the Malondeshn Armed Forces, the army has to operate with a limited defense budget. This makes it challenging to undertake comprehensive modernization programs. The focus is often on stop-gap measures and piecemeal acquisitions rather than a coordinated, long-term plan. This financial constraint, combined with procurement issues, creates a cycle where the army continues to rely on older, less reliable equipment.
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
1. AGING AND OBSOLETE FLEET
HapusA large portion of the RMAF's aircraft is old, with some models in service for several decades. This has created a fleet with a high average age, leading to a number of critical problems:
• High Maintenance Costs: Keeping an aging fleet airworthy is expensive. Older aircraft require more frequent and specialized maintenance, consuming a large part of the RMAF's operating budget that could otherwise be used for modernization.
• Low Operational Readiness: Due to frequent technical issues and the unavailability of spare parts, many aircraft have low readiness rates and spend significant time on the ground. This severely limits the RMAF's capacity to conduct regular training and respond to threats effectively.
• Corrosion Issues: Operating in Malondesh's hot and humid tropical environment, with coastal bases, accelerates corrosion in the aluminum structures of older aircraft. This can lead to metal fatigue and structural failures, raising serious safety concerns for pilots and crew.
• Technological Obsolescence: Many older aircraft lack the modern avionics, weapon systems, and networking capabilities needed for contemporary air combat. This puts the RMAF at a disadvantage against more technologically advanced air forces in the region.
________________________________________
2. Budgetary Constraints and Slow Modernization
The RMAF's modernization efforts have been consistently hampered by a limited and inconsistent defense budget.
• Insufficient Funding: The budget allocated for military development is often insufficient to fund major, large-scale acquisitions. This forces the RMAF to adopt a piecemeal approach to modernization, acquiring a small number of new platforms at a time.
• Delayed Plans: Key acquisition programs, such as the procurement of new Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) and Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), have been repeatedly delayed or scaled back due to a lack of funds.
________________________________________
3. Inefficient Procurement Process
The process of acquiring new military assets is a major weakness, often criticized for being slow, opaque, and inefficient.
• Lack of Transparency: Procurement is frequently conducted through direct negotiation rather than open tenders, which can lead to inflated prices and a lack of accountability.
• Role of Intermediaries: The involvement of middlemen or agents in defense deals can drive up costs significantly, wasting public funds and sometimes resulting in the acquisition of unsuitable equipment.
• Project Delays: These issues have led to numerous project failures and delays, leaving the RMAF's fleet in a state of limbo and undermining its long-term strategic plans.
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
Pesawat MPA INDIANESIA kemalangan......
BalasHapushttps://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1220146676797382&set=a.449970883814969
THE LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) SCANDAL
HapusThe LCS scandal is arguably the most notorious military procurement failure in Malondesh history. It involves a RM9 billion contract to build six stealth frigates for the Royal Malondeshn Navy.
• Project Failure: Despite the government paying over RM6 billion, not a single ship has been delivered, years past the original deadline. A parliamentary report labeled the project a "colossal procurement and governance failure."
• Misappropriation of Funds: A forensic audit revealed that funds were allegedly siphoned off for other purposes, including paying old debts from an unrelated naval project. Payments were also made to dubious companies for services that were never rendered.
• Political Interference: Investigations found that the Ministry of Defence ignored the Royal Malondeshn Navy's choice of ship design, opting instead for a different model recommended by the main contractor. This decision led to a series of technical and design problems.
________________________________________
The Scorpene Submarine Scandal
This scandal dates back to the early 2000s and involves Malondesh purchase of two French-Spanish Scorpene-class submarines for €1.2 billion.
• Suspicious Payments: A central issue was the payment of over €114 million in commissions to a Malondeshn company, Perimekar Sdn Bhd, which was owned by a close associate of the then-Defense Minister, despite having no prior experience in submarine projects.
• Corruption Allegations: French prosecutors investigated allegations that these payments were disguised bribes. The case also gained international notoriety due to its connection to the murder of a Mongolian woman, Altantuya Shaariibuu, who was a translator involved in the deal.
________________________________________
Procurement Irregularities and Financial Mismanagement
Beyond specific scandals, government audit reports and recent events have highlighted systemic weaknesses in military procurement.
• Inefficient Procurement: The Auditor-General's reports have repeatedly exposed major inefficiencies. For example, the government has failed to collect penalties from contractors for major project delays, and has been found to use direct negotiation instead of open tenders, which can lead to inflated prices and a lack of accountability.
• The Black Hawk Helicopter Deal: The King of Malondesh recently intervened to halt a proposal to lease four used Black Hawk helicopters, publicly rebuking the practice of using "agents and salesmen" in military procurement. He criticized the system for favoring politically connected middlemen who inflate prices and compromise the military's actual needs.
These scandals and persistent issues demonstrate a pattern of poor governance and a lack of transparency that have severely undermined the Malondeshn military's capabilities and its credibility with the public
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
Key Issues and Failures
Hapus1. Poor Governance and Lack of Transparency
The contract was awarded to BNS through direct negotiation, bypassing an open tender process. This lack of transparency was a major red flag, as it allowed for decisions to be made without proper scrutiny.
2. Ignoring the End-User's Needs
A parliamentary inquiry revealed that the Ministry of Defence and BNS ignored the RMN's recommendation for a specific ship design (the Sigma class). Instead, they opted for an alternative design (the Gowind class) at the suggestion of BNS, a decision that a former navy chief called "gravely wrong." This change resulted in a series of design and technical problems that contributed to the project's delays.
3. Financial Mismanagement
The scandal was characterized by widespread financial irregularities:
• Misappropriation of Funds: The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) found that around RM1.4 billion from the LCS project funds were used for other purposes, including paying off old debts from a previous, unrelated naval project.
• Dubious Payments: A forensic audit revealed that payments were made to questionable companies for services that were never rendered.
• Weak Contract Terms: Payments were made to the contractor based on a progress schedule rather than on actual work completed, allowing the contractor to receive money for work that was far behind schedule.
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Malondeshn military has a history of major procurement projects being plagued by delays, cost overruns, and outright failures. This issue, often linked to weak governance and a lack of accountability, has severely impacted the armed forces' modernization and operational readiness.
HapusHigh-Profile Failures
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
The most significant example of a failed project is the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program for the Royal Malondeshn Navy.
• Massive Delays and No Delivery: The project, initiated in 2011, was meant to deliver six vessels. However, despite the government paying a substantial portion of the RM9 billion contract, not a single ship has been delivered to the navy, years past the original deadline.
• Financial Irregularities: Audits and parliamentary inquiries revealed massive financial mismanagement, with billions of ringgit paid to questionable subcontractors. This led to a parliamentary report that described the project as a "colossal procurement and governance failure."
________________________________________
Systemic Issues Leading to Delays
These failures are not isolated incidents but symptoms of deeper, systemic problems within the procurement process.
• Weak Contract Enforcement: The government has frequently failed to impose penalties or collect damages from contractors for project delays. An Auditor-General's report found that penalties worth over RM162 million for the delayed delivery of armored vehicles were not collected.
• Unsuitability of Contractors: Contractors are sometimes awarded major projects despite having a poor track record or being in a weak financial position. The LCS project, for instance, was awarded to a company that had previously struggled with another naval project.
• Influence of Middlemen: The involvement of intermediaries and agents in defense contracts often drives up costs and can lead to a selection process that is not based on the military's genuine needs.
• Lack of Oversight: There is a persistent lack of effective monitoring and oversight throughout the project lifecycle. This allows contractors to get away with poor performance and non-compliance with agreed-upon terms.
In short, a combination of political interference, a lack of transparency, and poor financial management has created an environment where major defense projects in Malondesh are highly susceptible to failure. These delays and failures not only waste public funds but also leave the armed forces with an outdated and under-equipped inventory, compromising national security.
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
1. Lack of Transparency and Accountability 🕵️♀️
HapusDefense procurement in Malondesh frequently operates with a high degree of secrecy, often justified under the guise of national security. This lack of public scrutiny makes the process vulnerable to mismanagement and corruption.
• Direct Negotiation: A common practice is direct negotiation instead of open tenders, which limits competition and can lead to inflated costs. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim himself has stated the need to end the old practice of involving "too many agents" who profit from commissions.
• Role of Middlemen: The use of intermediaries and agents in defense contracts is a long-standing issue. These middlemen often add significant markups, leading to the government paying far more than the actual value of the equipment.
________________________________________
2. High-Profile Scandals and Financial Mismanagement
Several major defense projects have been mired in controversy, serving as stark examples of procurement failures.
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal: This is the most notorious case. The project to build six naval vessels for the Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN) has been plagued by delays and cost overruns. Despite the government having paid a substantial portion of the RM9 billion contract, not a single ship has been delivered. A parliamentary report revealed that the contract was awarded through direct negotiation and that hundreds of millions of ringgit were paid to dubious companies.
• Auditor-General's Reports: Reports from the Auditor-General's Department have repeatedly exposed financial irregularities. For example, a recent audit on the army's armored vehicle project found that the government failed to collect RM162.75 million in penalties from contractors for delayed deliveries. The report also highlighted instances of "contract splitting," where large contracts were broken into smaller ones to bypass proper tender procedures.
________________________________________
3. Consequences on Military Readiness
The inefficient and opaque procurement process has tangible negative consequences for the Malondeshn Armed Forces' operational capabilities.
• Obsolete Equipment: The inability to acquire new assets in a timely and cost-effective manner forces the military to rely on an aging inventory. This leads to high maintenance costs, low operational readiness, and a diminished capacity to respond to modern threats.
• Erosion of Public Trust: Scandals and mismanagement erode public trust in government institutions and the armed forces. It also raises questions about whether taxpayer money is being used effectively to ensure national security.
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
Apa kapal Induk.....??? HAHAHHAH
BalasHapusTNI AL Pusing Karena Nunggak BBM Rp3,2 Triliun: Ganggu Operasional, Minta Disubsidi Seperti Polri
https://disway.id/read/870967/tni-al-pusing-karena-nunggak-bbm-rp32-triliun-ganggu-operasional-minta-disubsidi-seperti-polri
1. Budgetary and Procurement Constraints
HapusThe MAF's modernization efforts are consistently hampered by limited defense budgets. For many years, defense spending has not been a top government priority, leading to a slow and often delayed acquisition of new assets. This has a direct impact on the military's ability to replace aging platforms and acquire advanced technology.
• Procurement Inefficiency: The process of acquiring new assets is often criticized for a lack of transparency and efficiency. There have been instances of project delays, inflated prices due to middlemen, and even non-delivery of equipment, as highlighted in public reports. This not only wastes taxpayer money but also prevents the MAF from obtaining the assets they need in a timely manner.
2. Aging and Obsolescent Equipment
A significant portion of the MAF's inventory is old and in urgent need of replacement. This is a critical weakness that affects all three branches of the military.
• Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN): Many of the RMN's ships have been in service for decades. This leads to high maintenance costs, frequent breakdowns, and reduced operational availability, which hinders their ability to effectively patrol and defend Malondesh's vast maritime territory.
• Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF): The RMAF operates an aging fleet of helicopters and fighter jets. The use of outdated aircraft not only poses safety risks to personnel but also limits their capacity to perform modern missions, such as air combat and surveillance, especially against more technologically advanced neighbors.
• Malondeshn Army (MA): While the army has seen some recent modernization, it still faces challenges with older armored vehicles and a need for more modern self-propelled artillery and surveillance systems to meet contemporary threats.
3. Limited Self-Reliance
Malondesh has a nascent defense industry and is heavily reliant on foreign suppliers for its military hardware. This dependence creates several problems:
• High Costs: Purchasing from foreign manufacturers is expensive, and without a strong domestic industry, Malondesh has limited leverage for price negotiation or technology transfer.
• Maintenance and Spares: Relying on foreign suppliers for spare parts and maintenance services can be slow and costly, further exacerbating the issue of low operational readiness for key assets.
4. Human Resources Challenges
Beyond hardware, the MAF also faces challenges in personnel management. Issues such as low morale, poor living conditions in some barracks, and difficulty in recruiting and retaining skilled personnel have been noted. These factors can affect the overall professionalism and readiness of the armed forces.
In summary, the MAF's weaknesses are intertwined: limited budgets lead to slow procurement, which results in an aging inventory. This aging equipment then drives up maintenance costs and lowers operational readiness, creating a cycle of challenges that impacts the MAF's ability to effectively protect national sovereignty and interests.
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
🚄 What Is the ECRL?
Hapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
⚔️ Key Problems of the Malondeshn Armed Forces
Hapus________________________________________
1. Outdated Equipment → Modernization Delayed for Decades
• Air Force (RMAF):
o Retired MiG-29s in 2017 due to high costs.
o Current frontline jets: Su-30MKM (2007) and F/A-18D Hornet (1997) — small fleet, aging, and expensive to maintain.
o Still waiting for FA-50 light combat aircraft, deliveries only starting in 2026.
o Weak surveillance capability → lacks modern maritime patrol aircraft and AWACS.
• Navy (RMN):
o Many ships date from the 1980s–90s (Lekiu-class frigates, Kasturi-class corvettes).
o Only 2 Scorpène submarines, insufficient to cover Malondesh vast waters.
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal froze modernization — billions spent, no ships delivered.
• Army:
o Still operates Condor APCs from the 1980s.
o AV8 Gempita is modern but only partially deployed.
o Lacks modern long-range artillery and medium/long-range air defense systems.
Impact: The MAF has been stuck with aging platforms, while neighbors upgrade to Rafales, F-35s, Gripens, modern submarines, and frigates. Malondesh risks being outclassed in any regional confrontation.
________________________________________
2. Low Defense Budget → Insufficient for High-Tech Upgrades
• Malondesh spends only 1.0–1.5% of GDP on defense.
o Singapore spends ~3%, Vietnam ~2.3%, Thailand ~1.5%.
• Of this budget, more than half goes to salaries, pensions, and operations → leaving little for modernization.
• Modern assets (jets, ships, submarines) require long-term investment, but Malondesh often cuts or delays purchases due to economic pressures.
• Example: MRCA fighter program (to replace MiG-29s) has been delayed for over a decade.
Impact: Malondesh cannot keep pace with regional military spending. Modernization becomes piecemeal, leaving gaps in readiness and deterrence.
________________________________________
3. Maritime Security Challenges → China & Piracy Overstretch the Navy
• South China Sea (SCS):
o China’s Coast Guard and Navy frequently intrude into Malondesh EEZ, especially around Luconia Shoals.
o Malondesh has overlapping maritime claims with China, Vietnam, and the Philippines.
• Strait of Malacca:
o One of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.
o Vulnerable to piracy, smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal fishing.
• Navy Limitations:
o Small, aging fleet cannot patrol both SCS and Malacca Strait effectively.
o Relies heavily on offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) that lack strong firepower.
o Only 2 submarines → insufficient deterrent against China or other navies.
Impact: Malondesh struggles to enforce sovereignty over its waters. The Navy is stretched thin, unable to cover vast sea areas against both traditional (China) and non-traditional (piracy) threats.
________________________________________
✅ Summary / Conclusion
The Malondeshn Armed Forces face three interconnected problems:
1. Outdated Equipment: Modernization stalled for decades, leaving MAF dependent on aging jets, ships, and vehicles.
2. Low Defense Budget: Limited funding prevents the acquisition of high-tech assets, keeping Malondesh behind regional peers.
3. Maritime Security Challenges: A small, overstretched Navy struggles to protect Malondesh EEZ in the South China Sea and secure the Strait of Malacca.
📌 Conclusion: Unless Malondesh increases defense spending, reforms procurement, and accelerates modernization, the MAF risks becoming a force capable only of low-intensity domestic missions, not one prepared to defend national sovereignty against regional powers like China or match its Southeast Asian neighbors.
ini konon mau kapal Induk....??? BBM kapal saja tak NUNGGAK....HAHAHHA
BalasHapusTNI AL Nunggak Pembayaran BBM ke Pertamina Hingga Rp 2,25 Triliun, Minta Diputihkan
https://www.merahputih.com/post/read/tni-al-nunggak-pembayaran-bbm-ke-pertamina-hingga-rp-2-25-triliun-minta-diputihkan
Gempur klimpungan mo ngetroll apa..blum abis shock ppa..datang kapal induk lagi..kembali Kat Jamban jadi Saksi🤣🤣🤣
Hapus1. CELAH KEMAMPUAN (CAPABILITY GAP)
HapusIni adalah masalah yang paling mendesak, terutama jika dibandingkan dengan negara-negara tetangga seperti Singapura dan Indonesia yang terus memodernisasi angkatan bersenjata mereka.
• Angkatan Udara yang Melemah: Angkatan Udara Kerajaan Malondesh (TUDM) menghadapi tantangan terbesar. Dengan pensiunnya jet tempur MiG-29, TUDM memiliki celah yang signifikan dalam kekuatan tempur multi-peran. Meskipun mereka sedang dalam proses mengakuisisi pesawat ringan seperti FA-50, hal ini tidak sepenuhnya bisa menggantikan peran jet tempur berat. Selain itu, masalah pemeliharaan dan ketersediaan suku cadang untuk jet tempur Sukhoi Su-30MKM yang sudah ada juga menjadi masalah kronis.
• Kesenjangan Armada Laut: Angkatan Laut Kerajaan Malondesh (TLDM) menghadapi dua masalah besar:
o Kapal Tua: Banyak kapal perang TLDM sudah sangat tua, dengan usia rata-rata melebihi 30 tahun. Ini membuat biaya perawatan menjadi sangat tinggi dan menurunkan kesiapan operasional.
o Skandal LCS: Proyek kapal tempur pesisir (LCS) yang sarat korupsi telah menelan miliaran ringgit tanpa menghasilkan satu pun kapal yang siap beroperasi. Ini menciptakan celah besar dalam kekuatan maritim dan merusak kepercayaan publik serta kredibilitas industri pertahanan Malondesh.
• Peralatan Darat yang Kurang Canggih: Meskipun ada upaya modernisasi, Angkatan Darat Malondesh masih mengandalkan sebagian besar peralatan lama. Tank PT-91M Pendekar, yang merupakan aset utama, seringkali mengalami masalah teknis dan ketersediaan suku cadang.
2. Celah Anggaran dan Kebijakan (Budget and Policy Gap)
Meskipun anggaran pertahanan telah meningkat, masih ada ketidaksesuaian antara alokasi dana dan kebutuhan nyata.
• Prioritas yang Berubah-ubah: Pemerintah Malondesh sering kali mengalihkan prioritas anggaran, terutama di masa kesulitan ekonomi. Ini menyebabkan proyek modernisasi militer yang sudah direncanakan berulang kali ditunda atau dibatalkan.
• Kurangnya Transparansi: Pengadaan militer sering dilakukan di balik layar (direct negotiation), yang membuka celah besar untuk korupsi dan inefisiensi. Hal ini tidak hanya membuang anggaran, tetapi juga mengakibatkan keterlambatan proyek dan akuisisi peralatan yang tidak sesuai dengan kebutuhan militer.
3. Celah Teknis dan Industri (Technology and Industry Gap)
• Ketergantungan pada Impor: Malondesh masih sangat bergantung pada produsen asing untuk peralatan pertahanan canggih. Kurangnya kapabilitas industri pertahanan dalam negeri untuk memproduksi dan memelihara aset-aset kunci membuat militer rentan terhadap fluktuasi pasokan dan perubahan kebijakan dari negara produsen.
• Keterlambatan dalam Teknologi Baru: Sambil negara lain berinvestasi besar-besaran dalam teknologi perang modern seperti drone, kecerdasan buatan (AI), dan perang siber, Malondesh tertinggal dalam adopsi teknologi ini. Meskipun ada inisiatif untuk mengakuisisi drone Anka-S dari Turki, langkah ini masih terbilang lambat dibandingkan dengan kecepatan modernisasi militer di kawasan.
4. Celah Sumber Daya Manusia (Human Resources Gap)
• Kualitas dan Retensi Personel: Militer Malondesh menghadapi tantangan dalam menarik dan mempertahankan personel berkualitas tinggi. Gaji yang relatif rendah dan kondisi kerja yang kurang memadai seringkali menjadi faktor penghambat. Hal ini berdampak pada kemampuan militer untuk mengoperasikan dan memelihara peralatan canggih.
• Keterbatasan Pelatihan: Dengan terbatasnya anggaran dan peralatan yang tidak siap operasional, militer sering kali tidak dapat melakukan latihan yang memadai dan realistis. Ini membatasi pengalaman dan kesiapan tempur personel.
Secara ringkas, celah terbesar dalam modernisasi militer Malondesh adalah antara apa yang seharusnya mereka miliki untuk menghadapi ancaman modern dan apa yang benar-benar mereka miliki. Ini adalah siklus yang kompleks dari masalah keuangan, kebijakan yang tidak konsisten, kurangnya industri dalam negeri yang kuat, dan masalah korupsi yang merusak semua upaya untuk memodernisasi angkatan bersenjata.
📌 1. Overall Context
Hapus• Malondesh’s defense spending has stagnated for over a decade.
• Procurement delays + corruption scandals → few new assets acquired since the mid-2000s.
• Result: Most of Malondesh’s core platforms are 20–40 years old, with growing maintenance problems and declining readiness.
________________________________________
📌 2. Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF / TUDM)
Fighters
• F/A-18D Hornet
o Bought in the mid-1990s (8 units).
o Still capable, but now ~30 years old.
o Spares are costly, fleet too small for sustained operations.
• Su-30MKM Flanker
o Acquired 2007 (18 units).
o Modern on paper, but plagued by spare parts shortages and maintenance delays.
o Readiness sometimes drops below 50%.
• MiG-29 Fulcrum
o Acquired early 1990s.
o Retired in 2017 due to high maintenance cost.
o No replacement yet → huge capability gap.
Transport & Helicopters
• C-130 Hercules: Workhorses from the 1970s/80s, some being upgraded but still very old.
• Nuri Helicopters (Sikorsky S-61): Entered service in the 1960s. Finally retired in 2019 after fatal crashes. Replacement slow.
👉 Impact: RMAF cannot maintain a credible air defense or long-range strike role. Fleet too small, too old, and too expensive to keep flying.
________________________________________
📌 3. Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN / TLDM)
Surface Fleet
• Kasturi-class corvettes (1980s): Upgraded, but still outdated hulls.
• Laksamana-class corvettes (ex-Italian, 1980s design): Small, limited endurance, hard to maintain.
• Lekiu-class frigates (delivered 1999–2000): Now ~25 years old, mid-life upgrades delayed.
Submarines
• Scorpène-class (delivered 2009): Relatively new, but expensive to maintain. Limited to 2 boats → too few for constant patrols.
New Projects
• LCS Gowind Frigates (6 planned): As of 2025, still undelivered due to scandal & mismanagement.
👉 Impact: RMN faces the South China Sea with mostly 30–40-year-old corvettes and frigates, plus just 2 subs.
________________________________________
📌 4. Malondeshn Army (TDM)
• Main Battle Tanks: Malondesh has 48 PT-91M (Polish T-72 variant, delivered mid-2000s). Already outdated by modern standards.
• Armored Vehicles:
o Condor APCs → from 1980s, many still in service.
o Sibmas → from 1980s, obsolete for modern combat.
o AV8 Gempita (new, 2010s) → too few to replace older fleets.
• Artillery: Mostly towed howitzers; limited modern self-propelled guns.
• Air Defense: Minimal, mostly MANPADS and old radar systems.
👉 Impact: Army is manpower-heavy, equipment-light, with many vehicles older than the soldiers who operate them.
________________________________________
📌 5. Systemic Problems from Aging Equipment
1. High Maintenance Costs → Old assets require more funds just to stay operational.
2. Low Availability → Fighter jets and ships often grounded for lack of spares.
3. Capability Gaps →
o No modern fighters to replace MiG-29.
o No new frigates to replace 1980s ships.
o Army still lacks modern artillery & air defense.
4. Safety Risks → Nuri helicopter crashes showed how dangerous it is to operate old platforms.
5. Loss of Deterrence → Neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines) modernize faster, leaving Malondesh behind.
________________________________________
📌 6. Why Aging Equipment Persists
• Small defense budget → can’t fund replacements.
• Procurement delays → programs stuck in limbo for 10–15 years.
• Corruption scandals → projects like LCS consume billions without results.
• Political short-termism → each new government resets priorities.
📌 1. Structural Weaknesses
Hapus• Manpower-heavy, equipment-light: TDM has ~80,000 personnel, but much of its gear is old or lightly armed.
• Doctrine outdated: Still focused on counterinsurgency (legacy of communist era), not high-intensity modern warfare.
• Low mobility: Limited airlift and mechanization mean the army cannot rapidly deploy across Malondesh split geography (Peninsular vs. East Malondesh).
________________________________________
📌 2. Equipment Weaknesses
Armored Vehicles
• Condor APCs (German-built, 1980s): Still widely used despite being obsolete, poorly protected against IEDs or modern weapons.
• Sibmas APCs (Belgian, 1980s): Aging, thin armor, limited use today.
• AV8 Gempita (locally built, 2010s): Modern, but only ~250 units → far too few to replace thousands of older vehicles.
• Main Battle Tanks (MBT): Only 48 PT-91M (Polish T-72 variant, mid-2000s). Limited firepower compared to regional peers with Leopards (Indonesia, Singapore).
Artillery
• Mostly towed howitzers (105mm, 155mm) → outdated for rapid maneuver warfare.
• Self-propelled artillery → very limited.
• Rocket artillery → almost nonexistent compared to neighbors (Indonesia, Vietnam).
Air Defense
• Very weak → relies on MANPADS (Igla, Starstreak) and old short-range systems.
• No medium- or long-range SAMs.
• Vulnerable to modern airstrikes.
Aviation
• Lost Nuri helicopters (retired in 2019).
• MD530G light attack helicopters procured in 2016 → delivery delayed for years, only a few operational.
• No dedicated attack helicopters (unlike Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand).
________________________________________
📌 3. Training & Readiness
• Low training hours due to budget → live-fire exercises limited.
• Joint operations weak → coordination with Navy/Air Force poor.
• Modern combined arms doctrine (armor + artillery + drones + air cover) underdeveloped.
________________________________________
📌 4. Budget & Allocation Problems
• Army gets the largest share of manpower spending (salaries, pensions), but little for modernization.
• Procurement slow → many projects canceled, delayed, or scaled down.
• Example: Plans for new self-propelled artillery, drones, and air defense systems repeatedly shelved.
________________________________________
📌 5. Geographic & Strategic Challenges
• Malondesh is split into two main theaters:
1. Peninsular Malondesh
2. Sabah & Sarawak (Borneo) → vulnerable to incursions (e.g., Lahad Datu, 2013).
• TDM lacks enough lift capability to quickly reinforce East Malondesh.
• Reliant on Navy/Air Force transport, which themselves are weak.
________________________________________
📌 6. Comparison with Neighbors
• Singapore Army: Fully mechanized, Leopard 2 tanks, modern artillery, strong air defense.
• Indonesia Army: Larger, Leopard 2 MBTs, rocket artillery, growing modernization.
• Thailand/Vietnam: Larger artillery, more modern armored units.
👉 Malondesh TDM looks under-equipped and outdated by comparison.
________________________________________
📌 7. Consequences of Weakness
• Border security issues: 2013 Lahad Datu incursion exposed lack of readiness and modern equipment.
• Low deterrence: Cannot project power against regional threats (e.g., South China Sea disputes).
• Over-reliance on infantry: Still seen as a “rifle army” with limited heavy support.
• Morale impact: Soldiers risk being deployed with outdated gear.
📌 1. Fighter Fleet Problems
HapusCurrent Fighters (as of 2025):
• 8 F/A-18D Hornets (bought in 1997)
o Aging, need mid-life upgrades, limited strike range.
• 18 Su-30MKM Flankers (delivered 2007–2009)
o Powerful but plagued by maintenance and spare parts issues.
o Many often grounded → at times less than 50% readiness.
• MB-339CM trainers/light attack jets (old, limited combat role).
👉 Compared to neighbors:
• Singapore → >60 F-15SGs & upgraded F-16Vs, buying F-35s.
• Indonesia → >30 Su-27/30s, buying Rafales & F-15EX.
• Vietnam → 36+ Su-30MK2Vs.
👉 Malondesh’s fighter fleet is tiny and partially unserviceable, limiting air superiority.
________________________________________
📌 2. The MiG-29 Failure
• Malondesh bought 18 MiG-29Ns in the 1990s.
• Retired early (2015) due to:
o High operating cost.
o Reliability issues.
o Poor logistics support from Russia.
• Replacement program (“MRCA”) delayed for over a decade because of budget constraints and political indecision.
👉 Result: Fighter numbers dropped sharply → “air power gap” still not fixed.
________________________________________
📌 3. Transport & Airlift
• C-130 Hercules fleet (14 units) → old but reliable, used for logistics & disaster relief.
• A400M Atlas (4 units, delivered 2015–2017)
• Gap: Malondesh lacks enough airlift to rapidly reinforce East Malondesh (Sabah & Sarawak).
________________________________________
📌 4. Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) Weakness
• Currently uses Beechcraft King Air B200Ts → outdated and limited range.
• Malondesh faces constant Chinese Coast Guard intrusion in South China Sea, but has no dedicated long-range MPA fleet.
• Boeing P-8 Poseidon (used by US, Australia, India) is far beyond Malondesh’s budget.
👉 Weak maritime domain awareness → navy operations suffer too.
________________________________________
📌 5. Helicopter Fleet
• Nuri helicopters (Sikorsky S-61) retired in 2019 due to age.
• Replacement delayed — Army and Air Force face lift helicopter shortage.
• Only a few AW139 and EC725 Cougar are available, limiting troop transport and search & rescue (SAR).
________________________________________
📌 6. Air Defense & Radar
• Malondesh has no long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
• Relies only on short-range man-portable systems (MANPADS) and some older gun-based defenses.
• Radar coverage is patchy, especially over the South China Sea.
👉 Meaning: Malondeshn airspace is vulnerable to intrusion by modern air forces.
________________________________________
📌 7. Procurement Delays & Budget Issues
• Fighter replacement program (MRCA → Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) has been discussed since 2010s, but still no decision due to budget politics.
• Plans for KAI FA-50 light fighters (up to 36 units) finally approved in 2023, but delivery will stretch into late 2020s.
• No clear roadmap for 5th-generation fighters (like F-35 or KF-21).
________________________________________
📌 8. Training & Readiness
• Flight hours per pilot are low (due to budget and fuel costs).
• Many pilots get less than half the NATO-recommended hours.
• Limits skill in complex missions (air-to-air combat, night operations).
• Dependence on foreign exercises with US, Australia, Singapore to maintain training standards.
________________________________________
📌 9. Structural Weakness
• Too many bases spread across Peninsular and East Malondesh → increases costs, reduces efficiency.
• Lack of aerial refueling tankers → fighters cannot sustain long-range missions.
• Weak electronic warfare and drone capabilities compared to modern peers.
________________________________________
📌 10. Consequences
1. Weak air deterrence → cannot challenge China’s PLA Air Force or even regional peers.
2. Limited support for Navy/Army → few aircraft for close air support or maritime patrol.
3. Aging platforms → constant readiness problems, high maintenance costs.
4. Dependence on foreign partners → for training, spares, and even operational backup
📌 1. Chronic Budget Constraints
Hapus• Defense spending is only ~1% of GDP (2024), among the lowest in ASEAN.
• Most regional peers spend closer to 1.5–3% of GDP (Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia).
• This means:
o Little money for modernization.
o Old equipment kept in service far too long.
o Programs constantly delayed or cancelled.
👉 Core issue: Malondesh cannot fund a modern military with such a small envelope.
________________________________________
📌 2. Poor Budget Distribution
• 50–55% of the defense budget goes to salaries, pensions, and allowances.
• Operations & maintenance (O&M): chronically underfunded.
• Procurement/modernization: gets only 15–20% of the budget (too low).
👉 Result: Malondesh pays for people, not capability. Troops are numerous but poorly equipped.
________________________________________
📌 3. Aging & Obsolete Equipment
• Army (TDM): still relies on 1980s armored vehicles, limited artillery, no modern air defense.
• Navy (TLDM): fewer than 10 serious warships, only 2 old submarines, Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal left modernization frozen for a decade.
• Air Force (RMAF/TUDM): small fighter fleet, many grounded, lacks long-range SAMs or modern drones.
👉 Malondesh platforms are outdated compared to Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam.
________________________________________
📌 4. Procurement Delays & Scandals
•
• Corruption, political interference, and lack of accountability = wasted billions.
👉 Loss of trust: Even inside ATM, officers see procurement as politically driven.
________________________________________
📌 5. Political Interference & Short-Termism
• Every change of government resets priorities.
• Projects canceled or reshaped based on politics, not strategy.
• Defense White Paper (2019) promised long-term stability, but ignored due to COVID and fiscal crisis.
👉 ATM never gets consistent 10–20 year planning like Singapore’s MINDEF.
________________________________________
📌 6. Weak Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
• Not enough funds for spare parts, fuel, and maintenance.
• Submarines sometimes not operational due to lack of upkeep.
• Fighter aircraft often grounded.
• Army vehicles and artillery poorly maintained.
👉 Readiness is much lower than it looks on paper.
________________________________________
📌 7. Low Training Hours
• Fighter pilots often fly <120 hours/year (NATO standard = 180+).
• Naval ships sail less because of fuel & maintenance limits.
• Army units rarely conduct large-scale combined exercises due to cost.
👉 Troops lack real combat training experience.
________________________________________
📌 8. Weak Doctrine & Planning
• ATM doctrine is outdated and fragmented.
• Malondesh tries to prepare for everything (conventional war, counter-insurgency, humanitarian aid) but lacks resources.
• No focus on joint operations (Army, Navy, Air Force coordination weak).
• Defense planning often reactive, not proactive.
________________________________________
📌 9. Limited Defense Industry
• Malondesh local defense industry is small and dependent on imports.
• Boustead Naval Shipyard → LCS scandal = reputation collapse.
• No indigenous fighter or major warship program.
• Relies heavily on foreign suppliers (Russia, France, South Korea).
👉 Weak local industry = high costs, dependence, and vulnerability.
________________________________________
📌 10. Geography Challenge
• Malondesh is split: Peninsular Malondesh & Sabah/Sarawak.
• Requires strong airlift, sealift, and naval presence to defend.
• ATM too small to cover both regions simultaneously.
• Chinese Coast Guard, Navy, and militia heavily outnumber Malondesh in the South China Sea.
________________________________________
📌 11. Corruption & Mismanagement
• Defense procurement often linked to patronage networks.
• Examples: LCS, Scorpène submarines (2002 scandal), helicopter programs.
Yang mau Shopping Kapal Induk itu Indonesia kenapa Malondesh yang TANTRUM KEPANASAN sambil Loncat Loncat kesana kemari?
BalasHapusMalondesh bayar Hutang LCS Gowind class aja Gak Bisa apalagi bayar SEWA TANAH SABAH kepada Ahli Waris Sultan Sulu, right?
HUTANG GAGAL BAYAR SEWA NAVAYO HINGGA ASET MILIK INDIANESIA DI RAMPAS PERANCIS lagi GORILLA mau MEMBUAL... 🤣🤣🤣
HapusEittt High Court sebit LCS pun mau dirampas KUWAIT FINANCE HOUSE dan 17 entitas lainnya..masi Utang haha!😝😤😝
Hapus1. Overview of Malondesh’s Military Budget
HapusMalondesh’s armed forces are collectively called Angkatan Tentera Malondesh (ATM), which includes:
• Tentera Darat (Army)
• Tentera Laut (Navy)
• Tentera Udara (Air Force)
The military budget comes from the national budget, which is approved annually by the government. Historically, Malondesh allocates around 1.5% to 2% of its GDP to defense, which is lower than regional neighbors like Singapore (~3% of GDP) or Thailand (~2.5% of GDP).
________________________________________
2. Reasons for Budgetary Constraints
Several factors contribute to limits on Malondesh’s military spending:
1. Economic Priorities
o Malondesh has competing priorities like infrastructure, healthcare, education, and social programs.
o Defense often has to share funding with these critical sectors, especially during economic slowdowns or crises like the COVID-19 pandemic.
2. Low GDP Proportion Allocation
o Defense spending is not a large share of GDP, meaning ATM must operate efficiently with limited resources.
3. Cost of Modernization
o Modern weapons systems (jets, naval ships, missile defense) are very expensive.
o Limited budgets often force Malondesh to prioritize maintenance over new acquisitions.
4. Debt and Fiscal Policy Constraints
o The government manages national debt levels and budget deficits, which restricts discretionary spending, including military upgrades.
5. Regional Security Assessment
o Malondesh generally faces lower direct military threats compared to neighbors like the Philippines or Singapore, so it may choose cost-effective defense rather than high-tech military expansion.
________________________________________
3. Impact of Budgetary Constraints
Budget limits have several practical effects on Malondesh’s armed forces:
1. Delayed Modernization
o Acquisition of advanced aircraft, naval ships, and weapon systems may be postponed or scaled down.
o Example: Procurement of new fighter jets or submarines can take decades from planning to delivery.
2. Maintenance Challenges
o Aging equipment sometimes cannot be replaced, leading to higher maintenance costs and operational limitations.
o Some aircraft or naval vessels may be grounded due to lack of spare parts or funding.
3. Operational Readiness
o Limited funds can affect training exercises, personnel numbers, and military readiness.
o The military may focus on territorial defense and counter-insurgency, rather than high-tech, long-range capabilities.
4. Dependence on Foreign Suppliers
o Malondesh often relies on imports of military hardware, which can be costly and subject to international politics.
________________________________________
4. Examples of Budget-Related Decisions
• Air Force: Delays in acquiring modern fighter jets due to high costs; focus on upgrading older MiG-29s and Sukhoi Su-30s.
• Navy: Limited new ship acquisitions; focus on patrol vessels for maritime security instead of expensive frigates.
• Army: Equipment modernization is gradual; focus on light arms, armored vehicles, and special forces rather than full mechanized upgrades.
________________________________________
5. Conclusion
Malondesh’s military faces budgetary constraints due to a combination of economic priorities, limited GDP allocation, modernization costs, and debt management. While ATM remains capable for regional defense and internal security, high-end modernization and rapid expansion are restricted, requiring strategic prioritization of resources.
1. Cronyism & Middleman Influence in Defence Deals
Hapus• Middlemen & Agents
Analysts and civil society highlight how defence procurement often involves politically connected intermediaries—sometimes retired military officers—who earn hefty commissions and influence decisions. These agents contribute to inflated costs and undermine transparency.
• Lack of Open Competition
Fewer than one-third of major defence contracts are awarded through open competition, creating a system that favors these intermediaries and their affiliated firms
________________________________________
2. High-Profile Procurement Scandals
a) Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Project
• Awarded via direct negotiation, ignoring naval preference. Despite RM6 billion disbursed, zero ships delivered. Cost ballooned to RM11.2 billion.
• Investigations revealed overlapping key figures implicated previously in the Scorpene submarine scandal—suggesting systemic manipulation.c
• Critics say accountability remains elusive, even as oversight committees were formed.
b) Scorpene Submarine Deal (2002)
• A massive RM4.5 billion deal saw RM510 million paid as commissions to politically linked intermediaries. Ship performance issues followed.
c) New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) Program
• Awarded to a firm tied to political cronies; suffered major delays, cost overruns, and unpaid contractors. PAC uncovered corruption, leading to institutional restructuring.
d) Little Bird Helicopters (MD530G)
• A RM321 million contract in 2016 failed to deliver timely. Procurement bypassed technical benchmarks, lacked military specs, and ended with no prosecutions despite MACC scrutiny.
• Public frustration is palpable:
“No further action will be taken over alleged corruption… typical. Corruption from top to bottom.”
e) SIBMAS Armoured Vehicles (1980s)
• Tender allegedly rigged to favor SIBMAS despite failure to meet specs; final product was heavier, underpowered, and underutilized.
f) Missing Jet Engines (2007)
• Two F-5E jet engines were stolen from RMAF stores; individually linked to procurement corruption during Najib’s tenure. They surfaced in Uruguay later.
________________________________________
3. Mismanagement & Systemic Procurement Failures
• Audit Findings on Gempita Armoured Vehicles
RM162.75 million in penalties for late delivery went unclaimed; maintenance contracts worth RM107 million were fragmented to evade procurement controls.
• Wasted Naval Spare Parts
Auditor-General reported RM384 million worth of unused spare parts for the navy. Public reaction via Reddit reflects widespread disillusionment:
“So much for that expense is kickbacks? 90 percent?”
________________________________________
4. Institutional Weaknesses & Reform Efforts
• The Consumers Association of Penang (CAP) has advocated for a Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI) to address 40 years of defence procurement scandals and institutional failures.
• Transparency International Malondesh (TI-M) has criticized recurrent procurement irregularities (e.g., poor contract evaluation, bypassed controls, fragmented tenders) as symptoms of systemic governance breakdown.
• In August 2025, Parliament passed the Government Procurement Bill, aiming to standardize procedures, penalize wrongdoing, and reduce rent-seeking—yet civil society warns about potential loopholes giving ministers excessive power.
• Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has emphasized a "graft-free" defence procurement approach, advocating Government-to-Government (G2G) deals over intermediated ones to reduce corruption and improve transparency.
________________________________________
Summary Overview
Issue Manifestation
Cronyism & Agent Influence Backdoor deals, inflated costs, sidelined military preferences
Scandals LCS, Scorpene, NGPV, MD530G, SIBMAS, missing jet engines
Mismanagement & Waste Unclaimed penalties, unused assets, botched delivery
Institutional Weakness Weak oversight, fragmented tenders, audit warnings disregarded
Reform Initiatives PAC scrutiny, RCI advocacy, new Procurement Bill, push for G2G
📌 1. Malondeshn Armed Forces (ATM) Structure
Hapus• Army (TDM) → largest service, but light and poorly mechanized.
• Navy (TLDM) → overstretched, with too few warships to patrol massive waters.
• Air Force (RMAF/TUDM) → very small, with limited combat aircraft and surveillance capability.
Overall → ATM is small in size and outdated in technology.
________________________________________
📌 2. Army (TDM) – Outdated & Lightly Armed
• Tanks & Armor:
o No modern Main Battle Tanks (MBTs).
o Relies mostly on PT-91M Pendekar (Polish MBT, ~2000s tech, inferior to Leopard 2 or T-90).
o Many armored vehicles (Condor, Sibmas) date back to the 1980s.
• Artillery:
o Mostly old Oto Melara 105mm howitzers, with limited 155mm systems.
o No long-range rocket artillery (MLRS) like Indonesia (ASTROS) or Singapore (HIMARS).
• Air Defense:
o Only short-range MANPADS (Igla, Starstreak).
o No medium- or long-range SAMs → airspace exposed.
• Helicopters:
o Nuri (Sikorsky S-61A) retired without full replacement.
o Limited utility/attack helicopter capability.
👉 Problem: The Army is big in manpower (~80,000) but under-armed compared to regional standards.
________________________________________
📌 3. Navy (TLDM) – Shrinking & Aging
• Frigates/Corvettes:
o Only 2 Lekiu-class (1990s), and 4 Laksamana-class corvettes (1980s Italian ships).
o All nearing end-of-life.
• Submarines:
o 2 Scorpène-class (KD Tunku Abdul Rahman, KD Tun Razak).
o Aging, with high maintenance costs.
o Cannot cover both Peninsular & East Malondesh simultaneously.
• Patrol Vessels:
o Many are small, slow, and aging (Kasturi-class corvettes, Handalan-class FACs from the 1970s).
• New ships delayed:
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal: 6 planned Gowind-class frigates, 0 delivered since 2011.
👉 Problem: The Navy is too small to secure Malondesh South China Sea EEZ or counter Chinese presence.
________________________________________
📌 4. Air Force (RMAF/TUDM) – Very Small Fleet
• Fighters:
o ~18 Su-30MKM (but many often grounded due to maintenance issues).
o ~8 F/A-18D Hornets (aging, no replacements yet).
o MiG-29 fleet retired with no direct replacement.
o Only 36 FA-50 light fighters on order (delivery starting mid-2020s).
• Air Defense:
o No long-range SAMs, no integrated IADS.
o Airspace relies on fighters only.
• Surveillance/Support:
o Limited AEW&C (Airborne Early Warning & Control).
o Few aerial tankers → no long-range endurance.
• Transport/Helicopters:
o Small fleet of C-130s and CN-235s.
o Heavy dependence on aging Nuri helicopters (retired, with gaps in capability).
👉 Problem: The Air Force is tiny compared to neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam).
________________________________________
📌 5. Why “Small & Obsolete” Matters
• Cannot project power: ATM lacks long-range strike, strong navy, or heavy armor.
• Poor deterrence: Enemies know Malondesh cannot respond effectively.
• Maintenance burden: Old equipment costs more to keep running than buying new.
• Capability gaps:
o No long-range air defense.
o No modern drones for ISR/strike.
o No sufficient submarine fleet.
o Weak sealift/airlift for East Malondesh defense.
________________________________________
📌 6. Regional Comparison
• Singapore: 100+ F-15/16 fighters, Leopard 2 tanks, Formidable-class frigates, submarines, HIMARS, long-range SAMs.
• Indonesia: Expanding with Rafale, F-15EX, submarines, frigates, rocket artillery.
• Vietnam: Strong Su-30 fleet, Bastion-P coastal missile batteries, Kilo-class submarines.
• Malondesh:
o ~26 operational fighters.
o 2 submarines.
o No long-range SAMs or modern coastal defense systems.
o Aging ships & vehicles.
👉 Malondesh is the weakest among the mid-tier ASEAN militaries.
________________________________________
📌 7. Core Reason: Budget & Political Will
• Defense budget ~1% of GDP → not enough for modernization.
• Half of budget spent on salaries/pensions → leaves little for procurement.
• Procurement scandals (LCS, helicopter deals) wasted billions.
• Political leaders prioritize subsidies & populism over defense.
📌 1. Malondeshn Armed Forces (ATM) Structure
Hapus• Army (TDM) → largest service, but light and poorly mechanized.
• Navy (TLDM) → overstretched, with too few warships to patrol massive waters.
• Air Force (RMAF/TUDM) → very small, with limited combat aircraft and surveillance capability.
Overall → ATM is small in size and outdated in technology.
________________________________________
📌 2. Army (TDM) – Outdated & Lightly Armed
• Tanks & Armor:
o No modern Main Battle Tanks (MBTs).
o Relies mostly on PT-91M Pendekar (Polish MBT, ~2000s tech, inferior to Leopard 2 or T-90).
o Many armored vehicles (Condor, Sibmas) date back to the 1980s.
• Artillery:
o Mostly old Oto Melara 105mm howitzers, with limited 155mm systems.
o No long-range rocket artillery (MLRS) like Indonesia (ASTROS) or Singapore (HIMARS).
• Air Defense:
o Only short-range MANPADS (Igla, Starstreak).
o No medium- or long-range SAMs → airspace exposed.
• Helicopters:
o Nuri (Sikorsky S-61A) retired without full replacement.
o Limited utility/attack helicopter capability.
👉 Problem: The Army is big in manpower (~80,000) but under-armed compared to regional standards.
________________________________________
📌 3. Navy (TLDM) – Shrinking & Aging
• Frigates/Corvettes:
o Only 2 Lekiu-class (1990s), and 4 Laksamana-class corvettes (1980s Italian ships).
o All nearing end-of-life.
• Submarines:
o 2 Scorpène-class (KD Tunku Abdul Rahman, KD Tun Razak).
o Aging, with high maintenance costs.
o Cannot cover both Peninsular & East Malondesh simultaneously.
• Patrol Vessels:
o Many are small, slow, and aging (Kasturi-class corvettes, Handalan-class FACs from the 1970s).
• New ships delayed:
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal: 6 planned Gowind-class frigates, 0 delivered since 2011.
👉 Problem: The Navy is too small to secure Malondesh South China Sea EEZ or counter Chinese presence.
________________________________________
📌 4. Air Force (RMAF/TUDM) – Very Small Fleet
• Fighters:
o ~18 Su-30MKM (but many often grounded due to maintenance issues).
o ~8 F/A-18D Hornets (aging, no replacements yet).
o MiG-29 fleet retired with no direct replacement.
o Only 36 FA-50 light fighters on order (delivery starting mid-2020s).
• Air Defense:
o No long-range SAMs, no integrated IADS.
o Airspace relies on fighters only.
• Surveillance/Support:
o Limited AEW&C (Airborne Early Warning & Control).
o Few aerial tankers → no long-range endurance.
• Transport/Helicopters:
o Small fleet of C-130s and CN-235s.
o Heavy dependence on aging Nuri helicopters (retired, with gaps in capability).
👉 Problem: The Air Force is tiny compared to neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam).
________________________________________
📌 5. Why “Small & Obsolete” Matters
• Cannot project power: ATM lacks long-range strike, strong navy, or heavy armor.
• Poor deterrence: Enemies know Malondesh cannot respond effectively.
• Maintenance burden: Old equipment costs more to keep running than buying new.
• Capability gaps:
o No long-range air defense.
o No modern drones for ISR/strike.
o No sufficient submarine fleet.
o Weak sealift/airlift for East Malondesh defense.
________________________________________
📌 6. Regional Comparison
• Singapore: 100+ F-15/16 fighters, Leopard 2 tanks, Formidable-class frigates, submarines, HIMARS, long-range SAMs.
• Indonesia: Expanding with Rafale, F-15EX, submarines, frigates, rocket artillery.
• Vietnam: Strong Su-30 fleet, Bastion-P coastal missile batteries, Kilo-class submarines.
• Malondesh:
o ~26 operational fighters.
o 2 submarines.
o No long-range SAMs or modern coastal defense systems.
o Aging ships & vehicles.
👉 Malondesh is the weakest among the mid-tier ASEAN militaries.
________________________________________
📌 7. Core Reason: Budget & Political Will
• Defense budget ~1% of GDP → not enough for modernization.
• Half of budget spent on salaries/pensions → leaves little for procurement.
• Procurement scandals (LCS, helicopter deals) wasted billions.
• Political leaders prioritize subsidies & populism over defense.
📌 1. Nature of Corruption in Defense
HapusDefense procurement is especially vulnerable in Malondesh because:
• Contracts are opaque, often labeled “national security” (no public scrutiny).
• Deals are politically negotiated, not based on military needs.
• Offsets and local content requirements create opportunities for rent-seeking.
• Oversight is weak; Parliament rarely audits defense deals in depth.
________________________________________
📌 2. Major Examples of Corruption & Mismanagement
a. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
• Budget: RM9 billion (≈ USD 2B) approved in 2011.
• Plan: 6 Gowind-class stealth frigates (from France/Thales-DCNS via Boustead Naval Shipyard).
• Reality:
o By 2022, not a single ship delivered despite RM6B already spent.
o Designs were changed mid-way without Navy approval.
o Funds misused → overpriced contracts, subcontracting to cronies.
o Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee (PAC) found “serious mismanagement & corruption.”
• Effect: Malondesh’s navy today still lacks new major combatants.
________________________________________
b. Scorpène Submarine Scandal (2002 deal)
• Malondesh bought 2 French Scorpène submarines (~EUR 1B).
• Allegations:
o Commissions of over EUR 100M paid to Malondeshn middlemen.
o Linked to Altantuya Shaariibuu murder case (Mongolian translator who was investigating kickbacks).
• Submarines delivered, but maintenance problems + corruption controversy damaged credibility.
________________________________________
c. AV8 Gempita Armored Vehicles
• Contract: RM7.5 billion for 257 vehicles (with Turkish FNSS tech transfer).
• Issues:
o Final unit cost very high (~USD 7M per vehicle, more expensive than Western IFVs).
o Questionable whether Malondesh needed so many heavy IFVs for its geography.
o Seen as more of an industrial project for DRB-HICOM than a military necessity.
________________________________________
d. Helicopter & Aircraft Procurement
• MD530G light scout helicopters → ordered in 2016 (RM321M), but delivery delayed for years.
• Spare parts for Nuri helicopters (now retired) were procured at inflated prices.
• Many contracts allegedly awarded to politically connected firms with no expertise.
________________________________________
📌 3. Forms of Mismanagement
1. Overpricing → Malondesh pays higher than global market prices.
2. Delayed Deliveries → money spent, assets not delivered on time (or never).
3. Capability Mismatch → politicians push prestige projects instead of what the armed forces need.
4. Maintenance Neglect → assets delivered but poorly supported (e.g., Su-30MKM spare parts issue).
5. Cronyism in Local Industry → contracts given to politically linked companies (Boustead, DRB-HICOM, etc.).
________________________________________
📌 4. Systemic Causes
• Weak Oversight: PAC investigations only happen after scandals explode.
• Political Patronage: Defense contracts = tool to fund ruling parties & allies.
• Short-Term Politics: Each government wants “their own” deals, canceling or altering old ones.
• Secrecy Shield: “National security” label prevents open tender.
• Lack of Continuity: Frequent government changes → projects stall.
________________________________________
📌 5. Consequences for the Military
• Loss of Trust: Public sees defense as corrupt, reducing support for bigger budgets.
• Capability Gaps: Navy still using aging ships, Air Force has no new fighters, Army modernization slow.
• Higher Costs: Delays and corruption inflate prices, wasting scarce funds.
• Readiness Impact: Submarines, aircraft, ships often grounded due to missing spare parts & poor maintenance.
• Regional Decline: Malondesh falls behind Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, and even the Philippines.
________________________________________
✅ Summary
Corruption and mismanagement in Malondesh’s defense sector are structural problems: big-ticket deals are designed to serve political patronage and cronies, not military strategy. From the Scorpène scandal to the LCS fiasco, billions have been lost while the armed forces struggle with aging assets and low readiness.
HUTANG BBM KAPAL saja tak mampu dibayar... Lagi mau MEMBUAL konon mau kapal induk... 🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusLegal Grey Zones in “Offsets” & “Consultancy Fees”
Hapus• Commissions to middlemen are often disguised as:
o Offset programs (e.g., promising technology transfer, training, local jobs).
o Consultancy fees for “facilitating” deals.
o Logistics or IT support contracts.
• These make it appear legitimate on paper, even if the services provided are minimal or irrelevant.
Why it continues: Because the practice can be masked under legal business terms, it becomes difficult to prove corruption.
________________________________________
Institutionalized Culture of Corruption
• In Malondesh, the role of middlemen has been entrenched since the 1980s–1990s when large defense contracts (MiG-29s, patrol boats, submarines) first involved commissions.
• Once established, it became a “standard practice” in defense procurement.
• Military officers are aware of it but cannot override political leaders who approve procurement.
Why it continues: Corruption in procurement has become part of the status quo — changing it would threaten entrenched interests.
________________________________________
Limited Domestic Defense Industry Capacity
• Malondesh does not have a strong indigenous defense industry compared to countries like Singapore.
• This weakness forces Malondesh to import most major weapons (jets, submarines, ships, tanks).
• Because imports are complex, middlemen exploit the situation by presenting themselves as “essential” facilitators.
Why it continues: Without a robust local defense industry, Malondesh depends on foreign deals, which middlemen dominate.
________________________________________
Short-Term Political Gains Over Long-Term Military Needs
• Defense deals are often politically timed (e.g., before elections) to show “progress” in military modernization.
• Politicians prioritize contracts that reward allies or fund political campaigns instead of long-term military requirements.
• Middlemen are crucial to channel funds quickly and quietly.
Why it continues: Political survival often outweighs genuine defense needs.
________________________________________
✅ Summary
Middlemen continue to exist in Malondeshn defense procurement because of:
1. Political patronage → Contracts reward allies.
2. Opaque, secretive procurement → No transparency.
3. Weak oversight → Parliament & auditors lack power.
4. Foreign supplier practices → They accept middlemen as part of the deal.
5. Legal disguise → Commissions hidden as consultancy or offsets.
6. Entrenched corruption culture → Seen as “normal.”
7. Weak local defense industry → Dependence on imports makes intermediaries seem necessary.
8. Political short-termism → Leaders use procurement for power, not military readiness.
=============
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
💰 MIDDLEMEN & COMMISSIONS IN MALONDESHN Armed Forces Procurement
Hapus1. What Are Middlemen in Defense Deals?
• In defense procurement, middlemen (sometimes called agents, consultants, or brokers) act as intermediaries between the Malondeshn government/military and foreign defense suppliers (e.g., shipbuilders, aircraft manufacturers, arms companies).
• In theory, they are supposed to:
o Facilitate negotiations.
o Provide local expertise.
o Smoothen bureaucracy.
• In practice, they often inflate costs, demand commissions, and channel kickbacks to political figures or officials.
________________________________________
2. How Middlemen Work in Malondeshn Defense Procurement
1. Foreign Supplier → Local Agent
o A foreign company selling jets, submarines, or ships is required (sometimes unofficially) to use a Malondeshn intermediary.
2. Mark-Up & Commission
o The agent adds commission fees (5–15% or more) on top of the real price.
o These inflated costs are hidden under “consultancy services” or “offset agreements.”
3. Kickbacks
o Part of the commission is allegedly funneled to politicians, senior officials, or linked companies to secure the contract.
4. Result
o Malondesh ends up paying far above market price for equipment.
o The military gets fewer assets for the same budget.
________________________________________
3. Examples of Middlemen in Malondeshn Defense Scandals
🟢 a. The Scorpène Submarine Deal (2002)
• Malondesh purchased two Scorpène-class submarines from French company DCNS (now Naval Group) worth about RM 4.3 billion (~USD 1 billion).
• A Malondeshn company, Perimekar Sdn Bhd, acted as the “support services provider.”
• Perimekar received RM 500 million (≈ USD 120 million) in “commissions.”
• French investigations later revealed this was effectively kickbacks disguised as consultancy fees, with allegations that money was funneled to Malondeshn political elites.
Impact: Malondesh got the submarines, but at a heavily inflated price — while international corruption investigations damaged Malondesh reputation.
________________________________________
🟢 b. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal (2011–present)
• The RM 9 billion contract to build 6 Gowind-class ships involved subcontracting and changes in design.
• Reports suggest multiple layers of subcontractors and consultants, many linked to politically connected firms.
• Payments were made for “consultancy” and “IT systems” that had little to do with shipbuilding.
• Some of these contracts were allegedly ways to siphon money out of the project.
Impact: Billions spent, zero ships delivered by 2025. The use of middlemen and subcontractors directly contributed to the collapse of the program.
________________________________________
🟢 c. Fighter Jet & Helicopter Purchases
• Past deals for MiG-29s (1990s), Su-30MKMs (2000s), and helicopters (2010s) also involved agents.
• Allegations:
o Overpricing of spare parts.
o Long-term maintenance contracts given to politically linked firms.
o Kickbacks hidden in “service fees.”
________________________________________
4. Why Middlemen Are a Problem in Malondesh
1. Inflated Costs
o Commissions can push prices 20–30% higher than international norms.
2. Reduced Military Capability
o With the same budget, Malondesh buys fewer ships, jets, or vehicles.
3. Encourages Corruption
o Middlemen often act as money channels for bribes.
4. Weak Accountability
o These commissions are often hidden in classified “national security” budgets, so Parliament and public auditors cannot fully track them.
5. Foreign Dependence
o Malondesh has limited domestic defense industry capacity, making it vulnerable to manipulation by foreign suppliers and local agents.
1. Overview
HapusMalondesh armed forces, Angkatan Tentera Malondesh (ATM), operate under limited budgets. Over the decades, this has led to prolonged use of older military equipment and delays in modernizing their forces. These challenges impact operational readiness, capabilities, and strategic deterrence.
________________________________________
2. Ageing Equipment
“Ageing equipment” refers to military hardware that has outlived its intended operational lifespan or requires extensive maintenance to remain functional.
Examples in Malondesh:
1. Air Force (TUDM / Tentera Udara Diraja Malondesh)
o MiG-29s and F-5E Tiger IIs: Some aircraft are over 30 years old.
o Maintenance costs increase with age, and spare parts become harder to source.
o Operational readiness is reduced; fewer aircraft are available for exercises or patrols.
2. Navy (TLDM / Tentera Laut Diraja Malondesh)
o Kasturi-class frigates and older Perdana-class patrol vessels are decades old.
o Ships need constant upkeep; older vessels have limited combat capabilities compared to modern ships.
3. Army (TDM / Tentera Darat Malondesh)
o Condor armored vehicles and old artillery systems are still in service.
o Modern threats like asymmetric warfare or rapid deployment require more advanced, mobile systems.
Consequences of Ageing Equipment
• Higher maintenance costs: More resources go into keeping old hardware operational.
• Reduced combat effectiveness: Outdated technology may be inferior to neighboring militaries’ systems.
• Operational limitations: Older platforms may be slower, less reliable, or incompatible with modern communication and weapon systems.
________________________________________
3. Delayed Modernization
“Delayed modernization” occurs when planned upgrades or new acquisitions are postponed, usually due to budget constraints, bureaucratic issues, or changing priorities.
Examples in Malondesh:
1. Air Force
o Replacement of aging fighters like MiG-29s and F-5E has been delayed.
o New acquisitions like the Su-30MKM and M346 trainers are fewer than initially planned.
2. Navy
o Plans for new frigates, submarines, and multi-role combat ships are often slow-moving or downscaled.
o Patrol vessels are prioritized over high-end warships due to cost constraints.
3. Army
o Modern armored vehicles and artillery acquisition programs face delays, affecting mobility and firepower.
o Emphasis is placed on upgrading existing equipment rather than full-scale replacement.
Causes of Delayed Modernization
• Limited defense budget: Malondesh allocates ~1.5–2% of GDP to defense. High-cost projects compete with other national priorities.
• Procurement bureaucracy: Complex procurement processes slow down acquisition.
• Foreign dependence: Reliance on imported equipment leads to delays in deliveries.
• Strategic threat assessment: Malondesh relatively low external threat level reduces urgency for rapid modernization.
________________________________________
4. Impacts
1. Operational Readiness
o Fewer active platforms are available due to maintenance of old systems.
2. Capability Gap
o Aging systems may lack advanced radar, missile systems, or networked command capabilities.
3. Regional Competitiveness
o Malondesh may lag behind neighbors like Singapore or Thailand in modern warfare technology.
4. Financial Burden
o Continuous repair and patching of old equipment may ultimately cost more than timely modernization.
________________________________________
5. Summary
• Ageing Equipment: Military platforms (aircraft, ships, vehicles) are decades old, expensive to maintain, and less effective.
• Delayed Modernization: New acquisitions or upgrades are postponed due to budget, bureaucracy, and strategic prioritization.
• Overall Effect: Malondesh maintains a capable but moderately modernized military, with limitations in high-end operations, regional power projection, and technological parity.
📌 1. Overview of Malondesh’s Local Defense Industry
Hapus• Malondesh has several state-linked defense companies like Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS), DefTech, SME Ordnance, ATSC (Aerospace Technology Systems Corporation).
• However, compared to Singapore’s ST Engineering or Indonesia’s PT Pindad/PT PAL/PT Dirgantara, Malondesh’s industry is:
o Small in scale
o Heavily dependent on foreign technology transfer
o Politically influenced
o Limited in R&D capacity
________________________________________
📌 2. Structural Weaknesses
a. Overdependence on Foreign Technology
• Local companies rarely design or develop indigenous platforms.
• Instead, they assemble or license-build:
o AV-8 Gempita → Turkish FNSS design
o LCS Gowind-class → French Naval Group design
o DefTech trucks/APCs → based on imported chassis
• This makes Malondesh vulnerable when foreign partners withdraw or when funding for ToT (Transfer of Technology) dries up.
________________________________________
b. Limited R&D and Innovation
• Defense R&D budgets are tiny (well under 1% of defense spending).
• No serious indigenous aircraft, ship, or armored vehicle program has emerged.
• Malondesh lacks the ecosystem (universities + defense labs + industry partnerships) that Singapore and South Korea used to build self-reliant industries.
________________________________________
c. Project Mismanagement
• Local companies given prestige projects beyond their capacity.
• Example:
o Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS) with the RM9 billion Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program.
o BNS failed to deliver even 1 ship by 2025, despite billions spent.
o Poor project management, design changes, and alleged corruption highlight the weakness of local capability.
________________________________________
d. Small Market Size
• Malondesh’s defense budget is low (~1% of GDP).
• Domestic orders are too small to sustain a strong local industry.
• Example: DefTech’s AV-8 Gempita → only ~250 ordered, not enough to support large-scale production.
• Without export markets, companies cannot achieve economies of scale.
________________________________________
e. Political Interference
• Contracts often awarded to politically connected firms rather than those with genuine expertise.
• Results in cost overruns, low quality, and weak accountability.
• Defense industry becomes a tool for patronage, not capability.
________________________________________
f. Weak Supply Chain
• Malondesh imports engines, avionics, weapons, electronics → only basic assembly done locally.
• Spare parts often need to be ordered from Europe, the US, or Russia → long delays, high costs.
________________________________________
📌 3. Examples of Weakness in Action
1. LCS Program (Boustead Naval Shipyard)
o RM9 billion contract (2011) → no ships delivered by 2025.
o Demonstrates limits of local project management.
2. AV-8 Gempita (DefTech)
o Based on Turkish design.
o Good vehicle, but overpriced (RM30 million per unit) due to local production inefficiencies.
o No exports → production ends after Malondeshn order.
3. SME Ordnance (Small Arms)
o Tried producing M4 rifles under license.
o Quality issues and low output.
o Malondesh still imports small arms and ammo in bulk.
4. ATSC (Aircraft Maintenance)
o Handles Su-30MKM maintenance.
o Limited capability; many spare parts still need to come from Russia.
o Readiness rates remain low.
________________________________________
📌 4. Consequences for the Armed Forces
• Procurement Delays: Local firms cannot deliver on time.
• Higher Costs: Local assembly often more expensive than imports.
• Low Readiness: Spare parts and upgrades delayed.
• Capability Gaps: Programs like MRSS (amphibious ships), SPH (artillery), or fighter jets stuck because local firms cannot handle complexity.
📌 1. Chronic Underfunding
Hapus• Malondesh spends ~1% of GDP on defense (2023–2025: around RM16–19 billion).
• By comparison:
o Singapore: ~3% of GDP
o Indonesia: ~1.2–1.3% but rising
• The small “envelope” means:
o Not enough money for procurement + operations + maintenance simultaneously.
o Programs get stretched for decades, cancelled, or reduced in scale.
o Even when announced, many projects end up shelved.
________________________________________
📌 2. Political Instability & Short-Termism
• Since 2018, Malondesh has had 5 prime ministers in 7 years → policies keep changing.
• Each new government “re-evaluates” defense programs, often pausing or cancelling them.
• Politicians see defense as low priority compared to subsidies, social spending, and debt repayment.
• Long-term defense plans (like the Defense White Paper 2019) collapse because they require 10–15 years of consistent execution, which Malondesh’s politics cannot provide.
________________________________________
📌 3. Budget Distribution Problems
• Even the small budget is poorly allocated:
o ~50–60% on salaries and pensions.
o ~20–30% on operations & maintenance.
o <20% left for procurement/modernization.
• Effect: Malondesh maintains a large but under-equipped force → many personnel, few modern assets.
________________________________________
📌 4. Weak Local Defense Industry
• Malondesh relies on foreign technology and local assembly (e.g., AV-8 Gempita, LCS).
• Local firms often have political ties, not technical competence.
• Results in scandals and failures (e.g., Littoral Combat Ship – RM9 billion, zero ships delivered).
• No strong exports → cannot sustain industry with economies of scale.
________________________________________
📌 5. Procurement Delays, Cancellations & Scandals
• Major programs (fighters, ships, artillery) delayed for 10–20 years.
• Scandals (LCS, helicopter purchases) erode public and political trust.
• Frequent “resetting” of programs → capability gaps widen.
• Example: MRCA program to replace MiG-29 has been discussed since 2007, still no aircraft by 2025.
________________________________________
📌 6. Operational & Maintenance Weakness
• Many platforms cannot be sustained:
o Su-30MKM fighter availability often <50%.
o Submarines require costly foreign maintenance.
o Condor APCs from 1980s still in service because replacements delayed.
• Spare parts supply chain weak → long downtime for equipment.
________________________________________
📌 7. External Dependence
• Malondesh buys from multiple suppliers (Russia, US, Europe, China, Korea).
• Creates logistics nightmare → incompatible spare parts, training, and support.
• Unlike Singapore (which standardizes on Western tech), Malondesh struggles with interoperability.
________________________________________
📌 8. Public Perception & Priorities
• Ordinary Malondeshns often see defense spending as “wasteful”.
• Scandals reinforce belief that defense = corruption.
• Governments focus instead on subsidies, civil service pay, and development projects to win votes.
• Defense is always sacrificed first when budget pressures rise.
________________________________________
📌 9. Consequences: Why Malondesh Stays Stuck
• Capability gaps in all services:
o Air Force: fighter gap, weak surveillance.
o Navy: LCS delays, only 2 submarines, no amphibious capability.
o Army: outdated artillery, APCs, no attack helicopters.
• Low readiness: Many assets grounded or unavailable.
• Falling behind neighbors:
o Singapore maintains cutting-edge military.
o Indonesia accelerating modernization.
o Vietnam expanding navy & air force for South China Sea.
• Malondesh risks becoming a “hollow force”: large on paper, weak in reality.
📌 1. What is Fiscal Space?
Hapus• Fiscal space = the government’s capacity to spend without threatening debt sustainability.
• For defense, it means: how much room Malondesh has in its annual budget to allocate funds for military modernization, operations, and maintenance.
________________________________________
📌 2. Why Malondesh Has Limited Fiscal Space
a. High National Debt
• As of mid-2025: Debt = RM1.3 trillion (~69% of GDP).
• Much higher than during the 2000s (below 55%).
• Debt servicing (interest payments) alone takes up 15–17% of annual federal revenue.
• This squeezes out spending on “non-priority” sectors like defense.
________________________________________
b. Revenue Constraints
• Malondesh’s tax base is relatively small.
• GST (Goods & Services Tax) abolished in 2018 → replaced by SST (Sales & Service Tax).
o GST: broad, efficient, higher revenue.
o SST: narrower, less revenue.
• Oil & gas revenue is volatile (20–25% of government income), so during oil price slumps, fiscal stress rises.
________________________________________
c. Competing Social Priorities
• Large commitments to:
o Education & health (biggest budget shares).
o Fuel subsidies & cash assistance programs.
o Infrastructure projects.
• Defense is politically unpopular → gets < 1% of GDP annually, one of the lowest in ASEAN.
________________________________________
d. Rigid Operating Expenditure
• Around 70% of defense budget goes to salaries, pensions, and allowances.
• Very little left for capital expenditure (procurement & modernization).
• Fiscal rigidities make it impossible to redirect funds without upsetting powerful civil service & veterans’ groups.
________________________________________
e. Currency Weakness
• Ringgit depreciation against USD (RM4.70–RM4.80 in 2025) makes imported defense systems much more expensive.
• Every billion USD contract now costs far more in local currency terms, shrinking what Malondesh can buy.
________________________________________
📌 3. Effects on Military Spending
• Annual defense budget stuck at ~RM15–19 billion (0.9–1% of GDP).
• Compare:
o Singapore: ~3–4% of GDP.
o Indonesia: 1–1.2% of GDP, but on a much bigger GDP base.
• Result: Malondesh’s defense envelope is too small to cover both O&M (operations & maintenance) and procurement.
________________________________________
📌 4. Consequences for Military Procurement
1. Delayed Programs → MRCA fighter jets, LCS frigates, helicopters.
2. Cancelled or Downsized Orders → e.g., MRCA reduced to LCA, Black Hawk leasing plan shrunk then collapsed.
3. Inability to Commit to Multi-Year Plans → no guaranteed funding stream.
4. Patchwork Modernization → instead of comprehensive upgrades, Malondesh buys in piecemeal fashion.
________________________________________
📌 5. Strategic Impact
• Malondesh cannot sustain credible deterrence in South China Sea.
• Must rely heavily on diplomacy and ASEAN forums instead of hard power.
• Forces risk becoming a “hollow military”: large on paper, weak in practice.
________________________________________
📌 6. Comparison with Indonesia (MEF)
• Indonesia also has fiscal limits, but:
o Clear 25-year modernization roadmap (MEF).
o Willingness to borrow externally for defense procurement.
o Gradual capability improvements visible (submarines, fighters, naval ships).
• Malondesh: stuck in short-term annual budgeting + unwillingness to take on foreign defense loans → programs constantly stall.
📌 1. Why Training Hours Matter
Hapus• Training hours = the amount of time pilots, sailors, soldiers spend actively practicing their skills.
• In modern militaries, high training tempo is crucial to:
o Keep proficiency with complex equipment.
o Build unit cohesion.
o Maintain combat readiness.
If training hours fall below international standards, equipment becomes almost useless in real combat.
________________________________________
📌 2. Malondesh’s Low Training Hours – Causes
✈️ Air Force (RMAF)
• Fighter pilots should have 150–180 flight hours per year (NATO standard).
• Many RMAF pilots only get 60–80 hours annually due to:
o Limited fuel budget.
o Spare parts shortages.
o Aircraft availability problems (MiG-29 retired, Su-30 often grounded).
________________________________________
🚢 Navy (RMN)
• Warships should spend 90–120 days at sea per year to maintain readiness.
• RMN vessels average 30–50 days at sea, far below requirement.
• Reasons:
o Budget cuts for fuel and logistics.
o Maintenance backlogs (many patrol vessels >40 years old).
o LCS program delays leaving capability gaps.
________________________________________
🪖 Army (TDM)
• Modern armies conduct large-scale combined arms exercises regularly.
• TDM focuses on small-scale, low-cost jungle training instead.
• Limited live-fire, armored maneuvers, or joint training with air/navy units.
• Fuel & ammunition budgets are often capped → less field time.
________________________________________
📌 3. Impact of Low Training Hours
a. Skill Degradation
• Pilots risk losing combat proficiency (dogfighting, weapons delivery).
• Sailors struggle with complex operations (anti-submarine warfare, missile defense).
• Soldiers lack practice in modern combined-arms tactics.
________________________________________
b. Safety Risks
• Low training hours lead to higher accident rates.
• Example: RMAF has had multiple crashes (Hawk, Nuri) linked partly to training gaps & maintenance issues.
________________________________________
c. Reduced Interoperability
• Joint operations (Air–Land–Sea) require constant practice.
• Without adequate exercises, coordination is weak.
• Limits Malondesh’s ability to operate with allies (e.g., Five Power Defence Arrangements with Singapore, UK, Australia, New Zealand).
________________________________________
d. Wasted Equipment Investment
• Even when Malondesh buys modern platforms (e.g., Su-30MKM, Scorpène submarines), lack of training hours means underutilization.
• Submarine crews need at least 150 sea-days per year → RMN Scorpènes often achieve far less.
________________________________________
e. Morale & Retention Problems
• Professional soldiers want to train and improve.
• When budgets restrict them to desk duty or symbolic exercises, morale falls.
• Leads to difficulties in retaining skilled pilots and officers, who may leave for commercial jobs.
________________________________________
📌 4. Strategic Consequences
• Malondesh’s forces appear large on paper, but real combat readiness is low.
• In a crisis (e.g., South China Sea standoff), Malondesh may struggle to deploy capable units quickly.
• Neighbors like Singapore and Australia maintain much higher training hours → widening readiness gap.
________________________________________
📌 5. Comparison
• Singapore: RSAF pilots log ~180+ hours/year, Navy ships 100+ days at sea, Army runs constant joint training.
• Indonesia: Still prioritizes major exercises (Super Garuda Shield with US).
• Malondesh: Keeps training mostly low-intensity & symbolic due to budget fuel/ammo limits.
________________________________________
✅ Summary
Low training hours in Malondesh’s military mean pilots, sailors, and soldiers lose proficiency, creating safety risks, poor interoperability, and low readiness. The issue stems from tight budgets, limited fuel/ammo allocations, and poor maintenance availability. The result: even when Malondesh buys modern weapons, they cannot be used to their full potential
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/cna-explains-malaysia-navy-littoral-combatant-ships-rm9billion-defence-boustead-naval-shipyard-2871701
BalasHapusNetizen Dunia pun Tertawa terbahak-bahak dong
WKWKWKWK
HAHAHAHA
GEMPURWIRA10 September 2025 pukul 22.47
BalasHapusHUTANG BBM KAPAL saja tak mampu dibayar... Lagi mau MEMBUAL konon mau kapal induk... 🤣🤣🤣🤣
Fakta adalah
Malondesh dapat Hibah Kapal Coast Guard dari US Government
Artinya TAK PUNYA UANG SHOPPING Kapal Baru
https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/a/jampidmil-tetapkan-3-tersangka-dalam-kasus-dugaan-korupsi-pengadaan-satelit-kemhan--ini-duduk-perkaranya-lt681c2d0475ef1/
BalasHapusPelaku Korupsi Kasus Navayo pun Jadi TERSANGKA
GEMPURWIRA10 September 2025 pukul 22.18
BalasHapusApa kapal Induk.....??? HAHAHHAH
TNI AL Pusing Karena Nunggak BBM Rp3,2 Triliun: Ganggu Operasional, Minta Disubsidi Seperti Polri
https://disway.id/read/870967/tni-al-pusing-karena-nunggak-bbm-rp32-triliun-ganggu-operasional-minta-disubsidi-seperti-polri
++++++
Itu adalah Job Desk dari DPR Komisi 1 untuk mendapatkan Masukan TNI AL atas Pos Anggaran Operasional TNI AL sehingga Mendapat Persetujuan Perubahan Anggaran dari DPR untuk tahun Anggaran berikut nya dalam mendukung Tugas Operasi Lapangan.
BERUK TOLOL COME TO PAPA MUNCUL LAGI 🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusSEKEDAR NEGAFA MISKIN AKA MALONDESH BOLEH LAH MEMBUAL SESEKALI TAPI JANGAN DIJADIKAN HOBBY YA LON 🤣🤣🤣🤣
SALAM 240 BILLION DARI PANTAT TRUMP 🤣🤣🤣🤣
SHOPPING Kapal Induk
BalasHapusPertanda Jet Tempur F35B semakin hampir jugak hore haha!🦾🧞♂️🦾
Hamiwowww..Hamiwowww MeWeK Melambaiii Semakin NGAMUK🔥 haha!😝😝😝
✨️PPA Sudah punyak
BalasHapustinggal SHOPPING
✅️KAPAL INDUK ITS GARIBALDI
✅️TB3, AKINCI
✅️SKALIAN F35B
WOWWW...MANTABBB haha!👍🦾👍
Makloum Bajet Besar
BEDA LEVEL BEDA KASTA...warganyet kl semakin NGAMUK🔥 Impian kita semakin jadi kenyataan..SHOPPING LANCAR JAYA haha!🤑🤑🤑
SHOPPING SUPER PAWER haha!🤑🦾🤑
BalasHapus✅️KAPAL INDUK ITS GARIBALDI
✅️TB3, AKINCI
✅️BLEKHOK
✅️F35B
✅️AH140
✅️PPA
✅️KHAN ITBM 600
✅️KAAN
✅️RAFALE
✅️BORAMAE
✅️ADS 400
✅️GM400 ALPHA
wah persiyapan Invasi nich...ke Anuw yak haha!🚀☠️🚀
wargajyet sangat ketar ketir..waktunya suaka tuch haha!🥶👻🥶
eitttt KTINGGALAN PULAK, masi ada EX dalam list SHOPPING SOPING kita haha!🤑🤗🤑
Hapusmakin NGAMUK🔥 para warganyet kl..nich fisanm🍌 biar tenang djiwa kleian haha!😂😂😂
eeeett dah lagi2 kelupaan, frigat ISTIF deal haha!🤑🤑🤑
Hapusyaa makloum Banyak Banget SHOPPING KITA saking BESAR BAJET haha!💰🥳💰
kahsiyan warganyet Iri Dengki hanya bisa Flanga Flongo..ngiler haha!😵💫🤭😵💫
Impor senjata dengan kode HS itu mayoritas berasal dari Uni Emirat Arab senilai US$ 25,84 juta, Amerika Serikat US$ 11,58 juta, Italia US$ 7,3 juta, sedangkan lainnya US$ 2,03 juta
BalasHapusDiam diam kita SHOPPING SOPING BOM,
RUDAL, TORPEDO Tiap Tahun Tambah Terusz Naik💰 haha!🚀🔥🚀
Menumpuk Amunisi, Persiyapan Perang & Invasi hore haha!👏🖖👏
warganyet kl, wajib PANIK🥶KETAKUTAN LAGIIIII haha!😭👻😭
tidur nyenyak mimpi indah SHOPPING terusz kita tiap malam, bangun2 jadi kenyataan hore haha!👏🤗👏
BalasHapussedangakan para warganyet kl, tiap mimpi sph, lpd, mrca, heli pun semakin hampir....pas Bangun jiahh Prenk last last kensel haha!🤥🤥🤥
Komentar ini telah dihapus oleh pengarang.
BalasHapusKapal pengangkut pesawat tempur ini juga dilengkapi beberapa radar jamming hingga senjata seperti peluncur oktupel Mk.29 untuk rudal antipesawat Sea Sparrow / Selenia Aspide , Oto Melara Kembar 40L70 DARDO, 324 mm tabung torpedo rangkap tiga dan Otomat Mk 2 SSM.
BalasHapus-------
SAM perluw diganti VLS A50 & tambahan 2x CIWS di depan & belakang
eitt radar kudu ganti yg longrange..apa perluw turkifisasi nich, makin ngambek aja genk ncis haha!😋👍😋
abis tuw bikin lhd sendiri, buat angkut pasukan marinir & aset amfibi hore haha!🦾🚀🦾
eitttt kalo vls keberatan kasi mistral ajah, biar kebagian tuch genk ncis haha!😄👍😄
Hapus1. Scorpène Submarine Scandal (2002 Onward)
BalasHapus• Malondesh procured two Scorpène-class submarines and one Agosta-class submarine for RM4.5 billion via Perimekar Sdn Bhd, a company with no track record, tied to defense analyst Abdul Razak Baginda. Perimekar received RM510 million in commissions—around 11% of the deal value
• French investigators implicated key figures, including members of DCNS/Naval Group, in bribery and misuse of corporate assets
• This case also interwove with a tragic murder: Altantuyaa Shaariibuugiin, a translator allegedly involved in the deal, was murdered amid claims she demanded a commission. Baginda was acquitted of the conspiracy charges in Malondesh, but French courts later charged him with corruption and misappropriation
________________________________________
2. Little Bird (MD530G) Helicopter Contract (2016)
• A RM321 million deal for six light attack helicopters collapsed due to delivery failures and substandard adherence to specifications.
• After a MACC probe, the Attorney General’s Chambers opted not to prosecute, prompting public outrage.
“No further action will be taken… typical. Corruption from top to bottom.”
________________________________________
3. New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) Scandal (1990s–2000s)
• The project aimed to replace aging patrol crafts with 27 Meko 100-designed ships. PSC-ND, a politically linked company, secured the contract.
• Only six vessels were completed, and delays and financial mismanagement ballooned costs from RM5.35 billion to RM6.75 billion.
• PSC-ND fell into debt and was absorbed by Boustead Holdings, becoming Boustead Naval Shipyard
________________________________________
4. Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) Fiasco
• In the late 1990s, an UMNO-linked firm was contracted for six OPVs at RM4.9 billion. Only two were delivered, fraught with defects.
• Payments reached RM4.26 billion for merely RM2.87 billion worth of work completed—a 48% overpayment. Late penalties were waived by government directive.
________________________________________
5. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal (2011–Present)
• Valued at RM9 billion, the LCS project delivered zero ships despite over RM6 billion disbursed
• The Royal Malondeshn Navy preferred the Dutch-designed Sigma class, but the decision was overridden to adopt the French Gowind class—aligned with Boustead’s interests
• MACC investigations revealed shell companies were used to siphon off at least RM23 million for fake technical services, linked to high-ranking officials
• There were also allegations of circular flow of funds benefitting a core network of political and contractor cronies
• PAC uncovered RM1.4 billion in cost overruns, and RM400 million was used to repay liabilities from past failed projects
• The public and parliament now clamour for a Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI) to fully investigate the scandal
• Commentary reflects deep frustration:
“Before everyone gets their pitchforks out… First 2 ships supposed to deliver in 2020. Now none delivered… How much go into pocket of officials?”
________________________________________
6. Public Accountability & Civil Society Response
• The Consumers’ Association of Penang (CAP) has urged the establishment of an RCI, warning that these scandals jeopardize national security and sovereignty
• The patterns underscore systemic failure—from opaque deals, lack of accountability, and misuse of public funds.
• In August 2025, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim called for "graft-free procurement" in defense, emphasizing transparency and favoring G2G (government-to-government) deals over intermediaries ________________________________________
Summary Table: High-Impact Scandals
Scandal Key Issues
Scorpène Submarine Deal Commissions, corruption, murder linked to procurement
MD530G Helicopters Failed deliveries, no legal accountability
NGPV Program Delays, cost overruns, company collapse
OPV Deal Defective deliveries, huge financial losses
LCS Project No deliveries, massive overspending, shell companies
📌 1. What “Deterrence” Means
BalasHapus• Deterrence = convincing a potential adversary that attacking you will be too costly.
• Effective deterrence requires:
1. Credible combat power (modern weapons, trained forces).
2. Readiness (forces operational at short notice).
3. Clear strategy (political will to use military force).
👉 Malondesh lacks all three.
________________________________________
📌 2. Small & Obsolete Armed Forces
• Army (TDM): Still uses 1980s-era armored vehicles and artillery. No long-range rockets or modern air defense.
• Navy (TLDM):
o Only 2 Scorpène submarines (limited readiness).
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal left Malondesh without new ships for over a decade.
o Fleet shrinking as old ships decommission faster than new ones arrive.
• Air Force (RMAF/TUDM):
o Only ~26 combat jets (Su-30MKM + F/A-18D), many often grounded.
o No long-range SAMs, tankers, or AWACS.
o Pilots have low training hours.
👉 Malondesh cannot credibly threaten retaliation if attacked.
________________________________________
📌 3. China in the South China Sea
• Chinese Coast Guard & Navy regularly enter Malondesh’s EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone).
• Malondesh responds only with diplomatic protests & small patrols.
• No credible deterrence:
o No modern MPAs (maritime patrol aircraft).
o Weak naval presence.
o No anti-ship missile coverage to deter Chinese fleets.
👉 China does not take Malondesh’s military seriously.
________________________________________
📌 4. Budget Too Small
• Malondesh spends ~1% of GDP on defense — one of the lowest in ASEAN.
• More than half goes to salaries & pensions, not weapons or readiness.
• Modernization projects delayed or cancelled (LCS, MRCA fighter replacement, Nuri helicopter replacement).
👉 Military cannot modernize fast enough to maintain deterrence.
________________________________________
📌 5. Weak Defense Industry
• Malondesh cannot produce its own modern fighters, warships, or missiles.
• Dependent on imports → delays, corruption, and cost overruns.
• Example: Boustead LCS scandal wasted billions, leaving Navy with no new ships.
👉 Without a strong local industry, deterrence = permanently dependent on foreign suppliers.
________________________________________
📌 6. Low Training & Readiness
• Pilots fly ~100 hours/year or less (NATO standard = 180+).
• Ships sail less due to fuel and maintenance limits.
• Army does limited joint/combined exercises because of budget.
• Many assets grounded for lack of spare parts.
👉 Even if weapons exist, they cannot be deployed effectively.
________________________________________
📌 7. No Strategic Doctrine
• Malondesh’s 2019 Defense White Paper acknowledged threats but failed to provide long-term funding or a clear modernization path.
• Governments keep flip-flopping procurement plans (MiG-29 replacement delayed >10 years).
• Political leaders avoid strong defense postures → prefer diplomacy.
👉 Adversaries know Malondesh lacks willpower to escalate militarily.
________________________________________
📌 8. Comparison with Neighbors
• Singapore: Credible deterrence with 100+ modern fighters, Leopard 2 tanks, advanced submarines, long-range SAMs.
• Vietnam: Deterrence against China with large Su-30 fleet, strong coastal missile defenses.
• Indonesia: Expanding deterrence with Rafales, F-15EX, submarines.
• Malondesh: Stuck with old equipment, no long-range strike capability.
👉 Neighbors can deter aggression. Malondesh cannot.
________________________________________
📌 9. Consequences of No Deterrence
1. China ignores Malondesh’s protests in South China Sea.
2. Piracy & illegal fishing remain constant in Malondeshn waters.
3. Dependence on allies (US, Australia, Singapore) for exercises, surveillance, and training.
4. Strategic vulnerability: If a conflict breaks out, Malondesh risks losing Sabah/Sarawak or control of EEZ.
5. Loss of credibility: Regional powers see Malondesh as the “soft” military of ASEAN.
📌 1. What “Deterrence” Means
BalasHapus• Deterrence = convincing a potential adversary that attacking you will be too costly.
• Effective deterrence requires:
1. Credible combat power (modern weapons, trained forces).
2. Readiness (forces operational at short notice).
3. Clear strategy (political will to use military force).
👉 Malondesh lacks all three.
________________________________________
📌 2. Small & Obsolete Armed Forces
• Army (TDM): Still uses 1980s-era armored vehicles and artillery. No long-range rockets or modern air defense.
• Navy (TLDM):
o Only 2 Scorpène submarines (limited readiness).
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal left Malondesh without new ships for over a decade.
o Fleet shrinking as old ships decommission faster than new ones arrive.
• Air Force (RMAF/TUDM):
o Only ~26 combat jets (Su-30MKM + F/A-18D), many often grounded.
o No long-range SAMs, tankers, or AWACS.
o Pilots have low training hours.
👉 Malondesh cannot credibly threaten retaliation if attacked.
________________________________________
📌 3. China in the South China Sea
• Chinese Coast Guard & Navy regularly enter Malondesh’s EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone).
• Malondesh responds only with diplomatic protests & small patrols.
• No credible deterrence:
o No modern MPAs (maritime patrol aircraft).
o Weak naval presence.
o No anti-ship missile coverage to deter Chinese fleets.
👉 China does not take Malondesh’s military seriously.
________________________________________
📌 4. Budget Too Small
• Malondesh spends ~1% of GDP on defense — one of the lowest in ASEAN.
• More than half goes to salaries & pensions, not weapons or readiness.
• Modernization projects delayed or cancelled (LCS, MRCA fighter replacement, Nuri helicopter replacement).
👉 Military cannot modernize fast enough to maintain deterrence.
________________________________________
📌 5. Weak Defense Industry
• Malondesh cannot produce its own modern fighters, warships, or missiles.
• Dependent on imports → delays, corruption, and cost overruns.
• Example: Boustead LCS scandal wasted billions, leaving Navy with no new ships.
👉 Without a strong local industry, deterrence = permanently dependent on foreign suppliers.
________________________________________
📌 6. Low Training & Readiness
• Pilots fly ~100 hours/year or less (NATO standard = 180+).
• Ships sail less due to fuel and maintenance limits.
• Army does limited joint/combined exercises because of budget.
• Many assets grounded for lack of spare parts.
👉 Even if weapons exist, they cannot be deployed effectively.
________________________________________
📌 7. No Strategic Doctrine
• Malondesh’s 2019 Defense White Paper acknowledged threats but failed to provide long-term funding or a clear modernization path.
• Governments keep flip-flopping procurement plans (MiG-29 replacement delayed >10 years).
• Political leaders avoid strong defense postures → prefer diplomacy.
👉 Adversaries know Malondesh lacks willpower to escalate militarily.
________________________________________
📌 8. Comparison with Neighbors
• Singapore: Credible deterrence with 100+ modern fighters, Leopard 2 tanks, advanced submarines, long-range SAMs.
• Vietnam: Deterrence against China with large Su-30 fleet, strong coastal missile defenses.
• Indonesia: Expanding deterrence with Rafales, F-15EX, submarines.
• Malondesh: Stuck with old equipment, no long-range strike capability.
👉 Neighbors can deter aggression. Malondesh cannot.
________________________________________
📌 9. Consequences of No Deterrence
1. China ignores Malondesh’s protests in South China Sea.
2. Piracy & illegal fishing remain constant in Malondeshn waters.
3. Dependence on allies (US, Australia, Singapore) for exercises, surveillance, and training.
4. Strategic vulnerability: If a conflict breaks out, Malondesh risks losing Sabah/Sarawak or control of EEZ.
5. Loss of credibility: Regional powers see Malondesh as the “soft” military of ASEAN.
📌 1. What “Deterrence” Means
BalasHapus• Deterrence = convincing a potential adversary that attacking you will be too costly.
• Effective deterrence requires:
1. Credible combat power (modern weapons, trained forces).
2. Readiness (forces operational at short notice).
3. Clear strategy (political will to use military force).
👉 Malondesh lacks all three.
________________________________________
📌 2. Small & Obsolete Armed Forces
• Army (TDM): Still uses 1980s-era armored vehicles and artillery. No long-range rockets or modern air defense.
• Navy (TLDM):
o Only 2 Scorpène submarines (limited readiness).
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal left Malondesh without new ships for over a decade.
o Fleet shrinking as old ships decommission faster than new ones arrive.
• Air Force (RMAF/TUDM):
o Only ~26 combat jets (Su-30MKM + F/A-18D), many often grounded.
o No long-range SAMs, tankers, or AWACS.
o Pilots have low training hours.
👉 Malondesh cannot credibly threaten retaliation if attacked.
________________________________________
📌 3. China in the South China Sea
• Chinese Coast Guard & Navy regularly enter Malondesh’s EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone).
• Malondesh responds only with diplomatic protests & small patrols.
• No credible deterrence:
o No modern MPAs (maritime patrol aircraft).
o Weak naval presence.
o No anti-ship missile coverage to deter Chinese fleets.
👉 China does not take Malondesh’s military seriously.
________________________________________
📌 4. Budget Too Small
• Malondesh spends ~1% of GDP on defense — one of the lowest in ASEAN.
• More than half goes to salaries & pensions, not weapons or readiness.
• Modernization projects delayed or cancelled (LCS, MRCA fighter replacement, Nuri helicopter replacement).
👉 Military cannot modernize fast enough to maintain deterrence.
________________________________________
📌 5. Weak Defense Industry
• Malondesh cannot produce its own modern fighters, warships, or missiles.
• Dependent on imports → delays, corruption, and cost overruns.
• Example: Boustead LCS scandal wasted billions, leaving Navy with no new ships.
👉 Without a strong local industry, deterrence = permanently dependent on foreign suppliers.
________________________________________
📌 6. Low Training & Readiness
• Pilots fly ~100 hours/year or less (NATO standard = 180+).
• Ships sail less due to fuel and maintenance limits.
• Army does limited joint/combined exercises because of budget.
• Many assets grounded for lack of spare parts.
👉 Even if weapons exist, they cannot be deployed effectively.
________________________________________
📌 7. No Strategic Doctrine
• Malondesh’s 2019 Defense White Paper acknowledged threats but failed to provide long-term funding or a clear modernization path.
• Governments keep flip-flopping procurement plans (MiG-29 replacement delayed >10 years).
• Political leaders avoid strong defense postures → prefer diplomacy.
👉 Adversaries know Malondesh lacks willpower to escalate militarily.
________________________________________
📌 8. Comparison with Neighbors
• Singapore: Credible deterrence with 100+ modern fighters, Leopard 2 tanks, advanced submarines, long-range SAMs.
• Vietnam: Deterrence against China with large Su-30 fleet, strong coastal missile defenses.
• Indonesia: Expanding deterrence with Rafales, F-15EX, submarines.
• Malondesh: Stuck with old equipment, no long-range strike capability.
👉 Neighbors can deter aggression. Malondesh cannot.
________________________________________
📌 9. Consequences of No Deterrence
1. China ignores Malondesh’s protests in South China Sea.
2. Piracy & illegal fishing remain constant in Malondeshn waters.
3. Dependence on allies (US, Australia, Singapore) for exercises, surveillance, and training.
4. Strategic vulnerability: If a conflict breaks out, Malondesh risks losing Sabah/Sarawak or control of EEZ.
5. Loss of credibility: Regional powers see Malondesh as the “soft” military of ASEAN.
📌 1. Overview of Malondesh’s Local Defense Industry
BalasHapus• Malondesh has several state-linked defense companies like Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS), DefTech, SME Ordnance, ATSC (Aerospace Technology Systems Corporation).
• However, compared to Singapore’s ST Engineering or Indonesia’s PT Pindad/PT PAL/PT Dirgantara, Malondesh’s industry is:
o Small in scale
o Heavily dependent on foreign technology transfer
o Politically influenced
o Limited in R&D capacity
________________________________________
📌 2. Structural Weaknesses
a. Overdependence on Foreign Technology
• Local companies rarely design or develop indigenous platforms.
• Instead, they assemble or license-build:
o AV-8 Gempita → Turkish FNSS design
o LCS Gowind-class → French Naval Group design
o DefTech trucks/APCs → based on imported chassis
• This makes Malondesh vulnerable when foreign partners withdraw or when funding for ToT (Transfer of Technology) dries up.
________________________________________
b. Limited R&D and Innovation
• Defense R&D budgets are tiny (well under 1% of defense spending).
• No serious indigenous aircraft, ship, or armored vehicle program has emerged.
• Malondesh lacks the ecosystem (universities + defense labs + industry partnerships) that Singapore and South Korea used to build self-reliant industries.
________________________________________
c. Project Mismanagement
• Local companies given prestige projects beyond their capacity.
• Example:
o Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS) with the RM9 billion Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program.
o BNS failed to deliver even 1 ship by 2025, despite billions spent.
o Poor project management, design changes, and alleged corruption highlight the weakness of local capability.
________________________________________
d. Small Market Size
• Malondesh’s defense budget is low (~1% of GDP).
• Domestic orders are too small to sustain a strong local industry.
• Example: DefTech’s AV-8 Gempita → only ~250 ordered, not enough to support large-scale production.
• Without export markets, companies cannot achieve economies of scale.
________________________________________
e. Political Interference
• Contracts often awarded to politically connected firms rather than those with genuine expertise.
• Results in cost overruns, low quality, and weak accountability.
• Defense industry becomes a tool for patronage, not capability.
________________________________________
f. Weak Supply Chain
• Malondesh imports engines, avionics, weapons, electronics → only basic assembly done locally.
• Spare parts often need to be ordered from Europe, the US, or Russia → long delays, high costs.
________________________________________
📌 3. Examples of Weakness in Action
1. LCS Program (Boustead Naval Shipyard)
o RM9 billion contract (2011) → no ships delivered by 2025.
o Demonstrates limits of local project management.
2. AV-8 Gempita (DefTech)
o Based on Turkish design.
o Good vehicle, but overpriced (RM30 million per unit) due to local production inefficiencies.
o No exports → production ends after Malondeshn order.
3. SME Ordnance (Small Arms)
o Tried producing M4 rifles under license.
o Quality issues and low output.
o Malondesh still imports small arms and ammo in bulk.
4. ATSC (Aircraft Maintenance)
o Handles Su-30MKM maintenance.
o Limited capability; many spare parts still need to come from Russia.
o Readiness rates remain low.
________________________________________
📌 4. Consequences for the Armed Forces
• Procurement Delays: Local firms cannot deliver on time.
• Higher Costs: Local assembly often more expensive than imports.
• Low Readiness: Spare parts and upgrades delayed.
• Capability Gaps: Programs like MRSS (amphibious ships), SPH (artillery), or fighter jets stuck because local firms cannot handle complexity.
📌 1. What Are Policy Flip-Flops?
BalasHapusPolicy flip-flops in Malondesh’s defense mean:
• Frequent changes in plans, programs, and procurement priorities.
• Caused by government changes, minister reshuffles, or shifting political agendas.
• Leads to cancellations, re-tendering, or redesigning programs.
• Results in years of delays, wasted funds, and capability gaps.
________________________________________
📌 2. Drivers of Policy Flip-Flops
a. Frequent Political Changes
• Since 2018: Malondesh had 5 prime ministers in 7 years (Najib → Mahathir → Muhyiddin → Ismail Sabri → Anwar).
• Each PM/defense minister reviews and changes defense priorities.
• Example: The same program (fighter jets, navy ships) can be launched, paused, revived, or cancelled multiple times.
________________________________________
b. Short-Term Focus
• Politicians prioritize 5-year election cycles over 15–20 year defense modernization.
• Programs requiring long-term funding commitments (e.g., fighter jets, submarines, frigates) get disrupted.
________________________________________
c. Budget Pressures
• High national debt (69% of GDP in 2025).
• Defense is seen as “non-essential”, so big-ticket programs are often the first to be cut or postponed.
• Leads to repeated “defer until later” cycles.
________________________________________
d. Corruption & Scandals
• When scandals erupt (e.g., LCS RM9 billion scandal), programs face:
o Audits, suspensions, parliamentary probes.
o Restructuring or even outright cancellation.
• Creates uncertainty for ongoing and future procurement.
________________________________________
📌 3. Examples of Policy Flip-Flops
✈️ Fighter Jet Replacement (MRCA Program)
• 2007–2010: Plan to replace MiG-29 with new fighters.
• Candidates: Rafale, Typhoon, Gripen, Super Hornet, Su-35.
• 2015: Najib government delayed due to budget.
• 2018: Mahathir cancelled, shifted to cheaper LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).
• 2022: RMAF selected Korean FA-50 → but deliveries only from 2026.
⏳ Result: 20 years later, still no MRCA. MiG-29 retired with no replacement.
________________________________________
🚢 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program
• 2011: Najib government approved 6 ships (RM9 billion).
• 2018: PH government halted payments due to mismanagement.
• 2020: PN government restarted program with restructuring.
• 2023–2025: Still no ship delivered.
⏳ Result: Program flip-flopped between “go-ahead” and “pause”, now 14 years with 0 ships.
________________________________________
🚁 Helicopter Procurement
• Malondesh planned medium-lift helicopter replacements (Nuri).
• 2017: Nuri retired suddenly → capability gap.
• 2019: Mahathir’s government cancelled immediate purchase, shifted to leasing option.
• 2022: Army announced leasing 4 Black Hawks → contract collapsed due to disputes.
⏳ Result: Years without adequate helicopters.
________________________________________
🪖 Army Armored Vehicles
• 1980s Condor APCs still in use.
• AV-8 Gempita ordered (2011) → only 257 built, production ended.
• Plan for new wheeled APC → repeatedly delayed.
⏳ Result: Army still operates outdated vehicles because replacement kept shifting.
________________________________________
📌 4. Consequences of Policy Flip-Flops
1. Capability Gaps
o Air Force without MRCA fighters.
o Navy without new frigates.
o Army using outdated artillery and APCs.
2. Wasted Money
o Billions spent on projects that stall or fail (e.g., LCS, helicopter leasing).
3. Industry Instability
o Local companies cannot plan or invest because contracts keep shifting.
o Leads to failures like Boustead Naval Shipyard.
4. Loss of Credibility
o Foreign suppliers lose trust in Malondesh.
o Military loses confidence that promised equipment will ever arrive.
📌 1. Small and Aging Fleet
BalasHapus• Surface combatants:
o Only 2 Lekiu-class frigates (1999) → nearing obsolescence, modernization delayed.
o 2 Kasturi-class frigates (1980s German design) → upgraded but still old.
o 4 Kedah-class OPVs (2000s, MEKO-100 design) → lightly armed, more like patrol vessels than real warships.
• Total “serious” warships: fewer than 10, compared to:
o Singapore Navy: >20 modern, high-tech vessels (Formidable-class frigates, Littoral Mission Vessels).
o Indonesia Navy: dozens of frigates, corvettes, and modern missile boats.
👉 TLDM cannot sustain a large-scale naval fight.
________________________________________
📌 2. Submarine Force Weakness
• Only 2 Scorpène-class submarines (delivered 2009–2010).
• Problems:
o High operating cost → often not fully operational.
o Limited numbers → cannot maintain continuous presence at sea.
o No replacement or expansion plans due to budget constraints.
• By contrast:
o Vietnam has 6 Kilo-class submarines.
o Singapore operates 4 advanced submarines (with more on order).
________________________________________
📌 3. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
• In 2011, Malondesh approved 6 Gowind-class LCS frigates (French design, built locally).
• Supposed to be the backbone of TLDM modernization.
• Scandal: corruption, mismanagement, political interference → no ship delivered after more than a decade.
• First ship expected only in 2026–2027, cost ballooned from RM 6 billion → >RM 11 billion.
👉 A whole decade lost with zero new frontline warships.
________________________________________
📌 4. Poor Naval Aviation & Support
• Helicopters: only a few Super Lynx and AW139 → limited ASW (anti-submarine warfare).
• No naval combat aircraft (relies entirely on RMAF).
• Weak sealift/amphibious capacity:
o Only 2–3 support/transport ships (KD Mahawangsa, KD Sri Inderapura-class, etc.).
o Insufficient to deploy large forces rapidly to Sabah/Sarawak.
________________________________________
📌 5. Budget Constraints
• Navy modernization requires long-term funding, but:
o Defense budget = only 1.0–1.1% of GDP.
o Navy often loses out to Army in budget share.
o Procurement done piecemeal → delays, cost overruns.
• Example: LCS program stalled because of funding + political issues, not just technical delays.
________________________________________
📌 6. Strategic Geography Challenge
• Malondesh has to defend two separate regions:
1. Peninsular Malondesh (Strait of Malacca).
2. East Malondesh (Sabah & Sarawak, near South China Sea).
• TLDM has too few ships to patrol both areas effectively.
• South China Sea disputes: Chinese Coast Guard and militia often outnumber Malondeshn presence.
________________________________________
📌 7. Weak Deterrence
• Malondesh cannot project naval power.
• TLDM’s ships are often patrol-focused (low firepower).
• Relies on diplomacy rather than deterrence in South China Sea.
• In contrast:
o Singapore Navy = highly modern, networked, with submarines, frigates, and advanced air defense.
o Indonesia Navy = larger fleet, more missile boats, expanding rapidly.
o Vietnam Navy = strong submarine force and anti-access weapons.
________________________________________
📌 8. Consequences
1. Operational gaps → TLDM cannot maintain presence in South China Sea, leaving oil & gas fields exposed.
2. Low readiness → too few ships operational at a time.
3. Dependence on allies → Malondesh relies on the US, Australia, or joint ASEAN diplomacy rather than its own deterrence.
4. Morale issues → sailors operate old, under-armed ships while modernization programs stall.