04 Februari 2026

Boeing Select Ferra for HAAWC Torpedo Wing Kit

04 Februari 2026

Boeing's HAAWC torpedo wing kit, in partnership with Ferra Engineering, enhances P-8A aircraft capabilities by enabling high-altitude submarine engagement. (Image: Boeing)

Boeing Expands Precision Aerial Munition Partnership with Ferra

BRISBANE, Queensland — Boeing has selected Ferra Engineering to produce wing kits for its High Altitude Anti-Submarine Warfare Weapon Capability (HAAWC). The contract extends the existing partnership between Boeing and Ferra and establishes a local production line for the advanced system, further strengthening Australia’s sovereign defence capabilities.

The HAAWC is designed to be deployed from Boeing’s P-8A multi-mission maritime patrol aircraft. This all-weather, air-launched torpedo kit allows operators to engage submarines from high altitudes, significantly enhancing operational effectiveness and ensuring crew safety.

“Local HAAWC production with Ferra means more skilled jobs in Australia and deeper sovereign manufacturing capability,” said Bob Ciesla, vice president, Boeing Precision Engagement Systems. “This partnership serves as a practical investment in national defence and regional security aligned to Australia’s Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise sovereign objectives.”

Ferra supplies precision components to various Boeing programs — including the Australian manufactured MQ-28 Ghost Bat as well as exporting components to the US for the F/A-18F Super Hornet, AH-64E Apache and P-8A Poseidon — developed as part of the Australian Defence Force’s Global Supply Chain Program. In 2023, the companies signed a Memorandum of Understanding to produce wing kits for Joint Direct Attack Munition Extended Range (JDAM ER) and Joint Direct Attack Munition Long Range (JDAM LR).

“We are honored to continue our 17-year-long partnership with Boeing on the HAAWC program,” said Aaron Thompson, CEO of Ferra Engineering. “This contract not only reinforces our commitment to delivering high-quality, Australian-made defence solutions but also highlights the importance of collaboration in advancing our nation’s defense capabilities. Together, we are paving the way for innovation and excellence in aerospace manufacturing.”

Boeing's involvement in the Global Supply Chain program has significantly enhanced opportunities for the Australian industry to export products, services, and technology within Boeing's worldwide supply chain. Boeing's partnership with the Australian industry bolsters its commercial aircraft and defence products, space and satellite systems, as well as research and development initiatives, alongside the company’s operations based in Australia.

148 komentar:

  1. Hore SIGN M346 RESMI YAA haha!🤑😭🤑
    LOA nich haha!👍🤑👍

    warganyet dipersilakan NGAMUK🔥
    ⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️
    Leonardo, PT ESystem Solutions and the Ministry of Defence Of the Republic of Indonesia sign M-346 F AIRCRAFT Letter of Intent to meet Indonesian Air Force training and combat requirements
    https://www.leonardo.com/en/press-release-detail/-/detail/04-02-2026-leonardo-pt-esystem-solutions-and-the-ministry-of-defence-of-the-republic-of-indonesia-sign-m-346-f-aircraft-letter-of-intent-to-meet-indonesian-air-force-training-and-combat-requirements

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. Nah fix kan
      Coz calon homebase nya sudah di inspeksi.

      Hapus
    2. Pindah haluan ini dari F 50 golden eagle..🤫

      Hapus
    3. Bukan pindah sih... melengkapi lebih tepatnya.
      M 346F block 20 sebagai trainer sebelum ke Rafale & next pesawat gen 5

      Hapus
    4. Yup! Dengan M-346F akan mendekat ke gen 5, KAAN..?
      😁🤟

      Hapus
    5. M346F Twin Engine...nyamain Rafale ama KAAN serta ESYU haha!😎🦾😎

      Hapus
    6. sabda BIB BIB NO F15, NO BORA...
      satu uda konfirm
      kalo kejadian lagi yg buntut,
      2026 alamat perpisahaan yg telak donk dengan SHOPPING SOPING kita ke negri PIZZA & KEBAB om tupz haha!🤭😆🤭

      betewe hegemoni kpop auto tamat donk yak om pedang haha!😬😉😬

      Hapus
    7. Biarin aja k pop2 ini... nanti juga jatuh sendiri salah dia kalau mau cari masalah dengan King Indo.

      Polandia sudah merasakan bagaimana si korengan

      Hapus
  2. N⛔️ BOWING, MASI ADA LEONARDO & Om BIB BIB haha!💰🤑💰

    BalasHapus
  3. setelah qatar, prancis, ceko, jerman, britis

    UAE & ITALI SAYANG KITA jugak gaesz haha!😍🥳😍

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. Iya masih banyak negara lain yg sayang kita ... Untuk korsel ...maaf anda terlalu kurang ajar

      Hapus
    2. Korengan buang saja ke laut kebanyakan drama & menghina harga diri bangsa.

      Hapus
    3. Mudah2an di serang Korut segera amin ya Allah🤲

      Hapus
    4. tentuw donk..Bajet Kita Besar...dimana ada madu ada semut dan tawon om haha!🤑😋🤑

      kalo cuman fisank kyk seblah...yg ada rebutan ama warganyet kl yg MeWeK haha!😭🤥😭

      Hapus
  4. Sudah kubilang, warganyet kl siyap2 yach...
    SHOPPING M346 UDA RESMI NICH haha!🤑😭🤑
    warganyet dipersilakan NGAMUK🔥
    ⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️
    Leonardo, PT ESystem Solutions and the Ministry of Defence Of the Republic of Indonesia sign M-346 F AIRCRAFT Letter of Intent to meet Indonesian Air Force training and combat requirements
    https://www.leonardo.com/en/press-release-detail/-/detail/04-02-2026-leonardo-pt-esystem-solutions-and-the-ministry-of-defence-of-the-republic-of-indonesia-sign-m-346-f-aircraft-letter-of-intent-to-meet-indonesian-air-force-training-and-combat-requirements

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. klojot-klojot sebelah om @palu gada .......

      Hapus
    2. nyoihh goyang tremor Panik🥶mreka kena Stroke awal tahun 2026 om pemburu haha!🤪😤🤪

      Hapus
  5. 5X PM 6X MOD/MOF = ART : WAJIB LAPOR USA
    💰 1. Budget Composition Skewed Toward Salaries and Maintenance
    • In 2024, Malaydesh allocated RM19.73 billion (~USD 4.16 billion) for defense.
    o RM8.2 billion (~41.5%) went to salaries and allowances.
    o RM5.8 billion was earmarked for maintenance and asset upkeep.
    • That leaves less than RM6 billion for all other needs—including procurement, R&D, and infrastructure.
    Impact: The lion’s share of the budget sustains personnel and legacy systems, leaving little for new combat capabilities.
    📦 2. Procurement Budget Includes Legacy Payments
    • The RM5.71 billion procurement allocation in 2024 isn’t entirely for new systems. It includes:
    o Scheduled payments for previously signed contracts (e.g. FA-50 jets from South Korea, A400M upgrades).
    o Progressive payments for delayed projects like the Maharaja Lela-class Littoral Combat Ships.
    o Small-scale purchases (e.g. small arms, radios, support vehicles).
    Impact: The actual discretionary funding for new combat platforms is far lower than it appears on paper.
    📉 3. Currency Depreciation Erodes Purchasing Power
    • Malaydesh sources most of its advanced systems from foreign OEMs (e.g. France, UK, South Korea).
    • The depreciation of the ringgit against major currencies means that even modest increases in nominal budget do not translate into real gains.
    Impact: Malaydesh pays more for the same equipment, reducing the volume and quality of new acquisitions.
    🧱 4. No Multi-Year Strategic Investment Framework
    • Unlike Singapore or South Korea, Malaydesh lacks a ring-fenced capital investment stream for defense.
    • Each year’s procurement is subject to political negotiation and fiscal trade-offs, with no guaranteed continuity.
    • This discourages long-term programs like missile development, drone fleets, or integrated air defense systems.
    Impact: Strategic programs are fragmented, delayed, or abandoned mid-cycle.
    📊 Summary Table: Why Funding for New Combat Systems Is Thin
    Factor Description Strategic Impact
    Budget skew 60–70% spent on salaries and maintenance Minimal room for new acquisitions
    Legacy obligations Procurement includes old contracts and delayed projects New systems get crowded out
    Currency depreciation Ringgit weakens against USD/EUR Reduces real purchasing power
    No strategic investment model No multi-year capital planning Limits continuity and ambition

    BalasHapus
  6. Fevruari 2026 kita SIGN LAGIIII..ASOY haha!🤗👍🤗

    Kahsiyan negri🎰kasino genting terusz pusing
    Salah PASANG PIPA & KABEL
    RE WORK...4000pcs
    genk sewa NGAMUK🔥 NO SIGN haha!🤣😆🤣

    BalasHapus
  7. OVERLIMITS DEBT = MELARAT SEKARAT = SEWA
    FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DEBT = PER PEOPLE : RM 36,139
    HOUSEHOLD DEBT = PER PEOPLE : RM 45,859.
    GOV + HOUSEHOLD = PER PEOPLE : RM 81,998
    --------------------
    1️⃣ DATA YANG DIGUNAKAN
    • Utang akhir 2024: RM 1.25 triliun
    • Utang akhir Juni 2025: RM 1.30 triliun
    • Jumlah penduduk Malaydesh 2025 (perkiraan pertengahan tahun): 35,977,838 jiwa
    2️⃣ Perhitungan utang per penduduk
    1.30 triliun = 1,300,000,000,000
    Per Orang = 1,300,000,000,000/35,977,838 : RM 36,139 per orang
    --------------------
    1️⃣ DATA YANG DIGUNAKAN
    • Utang rumah tangga (akhir Maret 2025): RM 1.65 triliun
    • Persentase terhadap PDB: 84.3%
    • Jumlah penduduk Malaydesh pertengahan 2025: 35,977,838 jiwa
    2️⃣ Perhitungan utang per penduduk
    Utang per orang =1,650,000,000,000/35,977,838 : RM 45,859 per orang
    -------------------
    Structural Causes of Modernization Delays
    Why does modernization lag behind?
    5. Budget Constraints
    o Defense budget is below 1.5% of GDP.
    o Modern jets, ships, and tanks are expensive, and Malaydesh must prioritize social and economic programs.
    6. Procurement Scandals & Mismanagement
    o The LCS scandal is the biggest example: billions spent, no ships delivered.
    o Procurement decisions often influenced by politics instead of operational needs.
    7. Over-Reliance on Foreign Suppliers
    o Lack of a strong domestic defense industry means Malaydesh must import equipment.
    o Currency fluctuations and sanctions (e.g., Russia) complicate maintenance.
    8. Shifting Political Priorities
    o Every new government tends to change defense priorities.
    o Long-term projects (like the MRCA) get delayed or canceled.
    =============
    Federal Government Debt
    • End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
    • End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
    • Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
    Household Debt
    2025 : RM1.73 trillion, or 85.8% of GDP GDP

    BalasHapus
  8. ⚠️ CONSEQUENCES OF POLICY FLIP-FLOPS IN MALAYDESH ’S MILITARY
    1. Delayed Modernization
    • Procurement Paralysis: Repeated changes in aircraft or equipment acquisition plans (e.g., MRCA selection delays) stall modernization.
    • Outdated Capabilities: The RMAF and other branches continue operating aging platforms while waiting for decisions that keep shifting.
    2. Loss of Strategic Credibility
    • Regional Perception: Neighbors like Singapore and Indonesia view Malaydesh as indecisive, weakening its deterrence posture.
    • Diplomatic Strain: Defense partners may hesitate to offer technology transfers or joint exercises due to uncertainty in Malaydesh ’s commitments.
    3. Economic and Industrial Impact
    • Defense Industry Stagnation: Local companies struggle to grow when policies change midstream, affecting contracts and R&D investments.
    • Investor Hesitation: Foreign defense firms may avoid long-term partnerships due to unpredictable procurement behavior.
    4. Operational Inefficiency
    • Training Disruptions: Constant changes in equipment plans mean personnel training is inconsistent or mismatched with future platforms.
    • Logistics Complexity: A mixed fleet from different origins (Russian, American, European) becomes harder to maintain without a clear roadmap.
    5. Budget Waste
    • Sunk Costs: Funds spent on feasibility studies, negotiations, or partial upgrades are wasted when plans are scrapped.
    • Emergency Purchases: Flip-flops often lead to rushed acquisitions (e.g., used jets) that are less cost-effective and harder to integrate.
    🧭 Real-World Example: MRCA Procurement
    Malaydesh ’s MRCA program has seen years of indecision:
    • Originally planned to replace MiG-29s in the early 2010s.
    • Considered Rafale, Typhoon, Gripen, and Super Hornet—but no final decision.
    • Now exploring used Kuwaiti Hornets as a stopgap.
    This indecision has left the RMAF with a capability gap and weakened its regional air power status.
    =============
    Federal Government Debt
    • End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
    • End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
    • Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
    Household Debt
    2025 : RM1.73 trillion, or 85.8% of GDP GDP

    BalasHapus
  9. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
    1. Procurement Mismanagement
    • The project began in 2011, with a contract awarded to Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS) to build 6 ships.
    • By 2022, despite RM6.08 billion already spent, not a single ship had been delivered.
    • Poor oversight and lack of accountability led to cost overruns and schedule slippage.
    2. Design Changes Midway
    • The original plan was to use the MEKO A-100 design from France.
    • Midway, the Navy requested changes to combat systems and sensors, causing delays in integration and testing.
    • These changes required re-certification and re-engineering, adding years to the timeline.
    3. Supply Chain & OEM Issues
    • Delays in receiving components from Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) disrupted construction schedules.
    • Some systems were not delivered on time, while others were incompatible with the revised ship design.
    4. Financial Overruns
    Metric Original Plan Current Status
    Total Cost RM9 billion RM11.22 billion
    Ships Ordered 6 5 (1 cancelled)
    Completion Timeline 2019–2023 2026–2029
    The cost ballooned by RM2.22 billion, forcing the government to scale down the number of ships.
    5. Political & Institutional Delays
    • Multiple changes in government between 2018–2022 led to policy uncertainty.
    • Investigations by the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) revealed serious lapses in governance.
    • The project was temporarily frozen, then restarted under a restructured plan.
    6. Impact on National Security
    • Experts warn that the delay leaves Malaydesh vulnerable in its maritime zones, especially in the South China Sea.
    • The Navy lacks modern surface combatants to replace aging ships like the KD Kasturi and KD Lekir

    BalasHapus
  10. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
    📌 1. Air Force (RMAF)
    a. MiG-29 Replacement / MRCA Program
    • Planned: Since 2007, Malaydesh has sought replacements for its aging MiG-29 Fulcrums.
    • Options considered: Rafale (France), Eurofighter Typhoon (UK), Gripen (Sweden), F/A-18 (US).
    • Status: Repeatedly delayed, suspended, and re-announced due to budget constraints and changing governments.
    • Impact:
    o MiG-29 retired in 2017 → fighter gap remains.
    o RMAF left relying on only 18 Su-30MKM and 8 F/A-18D, both aging.
    o MRCA “shelved” and replaced with smaller Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) plan (FA-50 from South Korea, delivery starting 2026).
    ________________________________________
    b. Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA)
    • Planned: Requirement identified since early 2000s to monitor South China Sea and piracy.
    • Status: Delayed nearly 20 years.
    • Only in 2023 was the Leonardo ATR-72 MPA selected (delivery by 2026).
    • Impact:
    o Malaydesh had no dedicated MPA fleet for decades, relying on converted transport aircraft and UAVs.
    o Limited maritime surveillance → weakness in South China Sea patrols.
    ________________________________________
    📌 2. Navy (RMN)
    a. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
    • Planned: 2011, RM9 billion for 6 Gowind-class ships (local build by Boustead Naval Shipyard).
    • Status: By 2025, zero ships delivered.
    o Design changes, corruption, mismanagement, and cost overruns stalled the project.
    • Impact:
    o Navy still depends on old Kedah-class (2006) and even older corvettes from the 1980s.
    o Weakens ability to secure South China Sea claims.
    ________________________________________
    b. Multi-Role Support Ship (MRSS)
    • Planned: Amphibious ship program since 2000s.
    • Status: Cancelled/postponed multiple times due to budget.
    • Impact:
    o RMN has no large amphibious lift → limited ability to move troops/equipment in regional crises.
    ________________________________________
    c. Second Batch of Scorpène Submarines
    • Planned: Expansion to 4 submarines.
    • Status: Shelved due to cost.
    • Impact:
    o Malaydesh stuck with just 2 Scorpènes (delivered 2009–2010), insufficient for wide maritime area.
    ________________________________________
    📌 3. Army (TDM)
    a. Self-Propelled Howitzers (SPH)
    • Planned: SPH requirement since early 2000s (to replace old towed artillery).
    • Status: Program repeatedly delayed. Korea’s K9 Thunder shortlisted in 2020s, but no final contract.
    • Impact: Army artillery remains outdated → reduced firepower compared to Indonesia, Singapore.
    ________________________________________
    b. Armored Vehicle Programs
    • AV-8 Gempita: Entered production in 2014, but scaled down from 257 planned units due to cost.
    • Condor APC Replacement: Long planned, but repeatedly delayed → Condors from the 1980s still in service.
    ________________________________________
    c. Rotary Wing (Helicopters)
    • Army Aviation requested more utility and attack helicopters.
    • Programs for attack helicopters (AH-1Z, T129, etc.) discussed but cancelled/delayed.
    • Impact: Army lacks dedicated attack helicopter capability, unlike Indonesia.
    ________________________________________
    📌 4. Reasons for Delay/Failure
    1. Budget constraints → defense stuck at ~1% of GDP.
    2. Political instability → 5 prime ministers between 2018–2025, each with shifting priorities.
    3. Corruption & mismanagement → especially visible in LCS.
    4. Overreliance on foreign suppliers → negotiations stall or get too expensive.
    5. Short-termism → lack of 10–15 year strategic procurement planning.
    ________________________________________
    📌 5. Consequences
    • Capability gaps:
    o Air surveillance weak (delayed MPAs, fighter gap).
    o Maritime security weak (LCS delay, only 2 submarines).
    o Ground firepower weak (delayed SPH, old APCs).
    • Readiness reduced: much equipment obsolete, with few modern replacements.
    • Regional imbalance: Neighbors like Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam modernize faster, leaving Malaydesh behind

    BalasHapus
  11. Mana tuh geng beruk 1Q999 yg sok bilang kontrak kosong
    Mwm
    Gemprok
    Selama heli masih sewa versi akan ttender hahahha
    Kitta sign kontrak kosonG jadi REAL
    NO BUAL

    WKKWKWKW
    SALAM IQ 9999 SMART BUT IDIOT😭😭😭

    BalasHapus
  12. GENK BOTOL SOTOMIE MALONDESH CUMA BISA SHOPPING RECEHAN MAKLUM NEGARA KISMIN 🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣

    BalasHapus
  13. Kita sudah sign LOI shooping 24 M346
    Hahahaha..just see n wait ya lon

    BalasHapus
  14. Malaysewa mau sewa apalagi gempur & MMW ? 🤔😅😅😅

    BalasHapus
  15. Kontrrak pesawat tempur indo
    Rafale 42 unit + add 18 biji
    KAAN gen 5 48 unit
    M346 24 unit LOI

    Mallon menangis koyak hati 😭😭😭

    BalasHapus
  16. "FAKTA BELUM TAHU, BACA MALAS, MENGAJI TAK MAU, DIBILANG BODOH MARAH"
    TANIAH PAPANON SOTOMIE.......😅😅😅😅😅😅

    Ucapan PAPANON di Program TEMU ANWAR @ TAR UMT
    https://youtu.be/DRWoMQYtpDI

    BalasHapus
  17. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
    💰 1. Budget Composition Skewed Toward Salaries and Maintenance
    • In 2024, Malaydesh allocated RM19.73 billion (~USD 4.16 billion) for defense.
    o RM8.2 billion (~41.5%) went to salaries and allowances.
    o RM5.8 billion was earmarked for maintenance and asset upkeep.
    • That leaves less than RM6 billion for all other needs—including procurement, R&D, and infrastructure.
    Impact: The lion’s share of the budget sustains personnel and legacy systems, leaving little for new combat capabilities.
    📦 2. Procurement Budget Includes Legacy Payments
    • The RM5.71 billion procurement allocation in 2024 isn’t entirely for new systems. It includes:
    o Scheduled payments for previously signed contracts (e.g. FA-50 jets from South Korea, A400M upgrades).
    o Progressive payments for delayed projects like the Maharaja Lela-class Littoral Combat Ships.
    o Small-scale purchases (e.g. small arms, radios, support vehicles).
    Impact: The actual discretionary funding for new combat platforms is far lower than it appears on paper.
    📉 3. Currency Depreciation Erodes Purchasing Power
    • Malaydesh sources most of its advanced systems from foreign OEMs (e.g. France, UK, South Korea).
    • The depreciation of the ringgit against major currencies means that even modest increases in nominal budget do not translate into real gains.
    Impact: Malaydesh pays more for the same equipment, reducing the volume and quality of new acquisitions.
    🧱 4. No Multi-Year Strategic Investment Framework
    • Unlike Singapore or South Korea, Malaydesh lacks a ring-fenced capital investment stream for defense.
    • Each year’s procurement is subject to political negotiation and fiscal trade-offs, with no guaranteed continuity.
    • This discourages long-term programs like missile development, drone fleets, or integrated air defense systems.
    Impact: Strategic programs are fragmented, delayed, or abandoned mid-cycle.
    📊 Summary Table: Why Funding for New Combat Systems Is Thin
    Factor Description Strategic Impact
    Budget skew 60–70% spent on salaries and maintenance Minimal room for new acquisitions
    Legacy obligations Procurement includes old contracts and delayed projects New systems get crowded out
    Currency depreciation Ringgit weakens against USD/EUR Reduces real purchasing power
    No strategic investment model No multi-year capital planning Limits continuity and ambition

    BalasHapus
  18. Baruu lagi mau big shopping...semakin hampir
    Ditunggu Gari Gari hahhhaay
    Mamamia

    "...Leonardo, PT ESystem Solutions and the Ministry of Defence Of the Republic of Indonesia sign M-346 F AIRCRAFT Letter of Intent to meet Indonesian Air Force training and combat requirements

    Rome,  04 February 2026 07:38

    https://www.leonardo.com/en/press-release-detail/-/detail/04-02-2026-leonardo-pt-esystem-solutions-and-the-ministry-of-defence-of-the-republic-of-indonesia-sign-m-346-f-aircraft-letter-of-intent-to-meet-indonesian-air-force-training-and-combat-requirements?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQPMjc1MjU0NjkyNTk4Mjc5AAEeVy_x8q2IGWoZXQl4JBhfNauJafVz4Z5PE1w3EiHRaaKFQW3UYgoYaw4SjtM_aem_iP5aY0lTIZYBdUskI9SFuQ

    BalasHapus
  19. Ntar ada DUO malaysdesh yang negative framing terhadap INDONESIA atas Project Procurement M-346 Block 20 dengan angkat issue:
    1. Masih LoI
    2. Kontrak Kosong
    3. Pembiayaan Skema Hutang Luar Negeri
    4. Dan lain lain

    Konklusi
    Sakit Hati dan IRI DENGKI malaysdesh sudah menjadi karakter

    BalasHapus
  20. Kesian BOEING di PRANK sama negara MISKIN.... 🤣🤣🤣🤣

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      💰 1. Budget Composition Skewed Toward Salaries and Maintenance
      • In 2024, Malaydesh allocated RM19.73 billion (~USD 4.16 billion) for defense.
      o RM8.2 billion (~41.5%) went to salaries and allowances.
      o RM5.8 billion was earmarked for maintenance and asset upkeep.
      • That leaves less than RM6 billion for all other needs—including procurement, R&D, and infrastructure.
      Impact: The lion’s share of the budget sustains personnel and legacy systems, leaving little for new combat capabilities.
      📦 2. Procurement Budget Includes Legacy Payments
      • The RM5.71 billion procurement allocation in 2024 isn’t entirely for new systems. It includes:
      o Scheduled payments for previously signed contracts (e.g. FA-50 jets from South Korea, A400M upgrades).
      o Progressive payments for delayed projects like the Maharaja Lela-class Littoral Combat Ships.
      o Small-scale purchases (e.g. small arms, radios, support vehicles).
      Impact: The actual discretionary funding for new combat platforms is far lower than it appears on paper.
      📉 3. Currency Depreciation Erodes Purchasing Power
      • Malaydesh sources most of its advanced systems from foreign OEMs (e.g. France, UK, South Korea).
      • The depreciation of the ringgit against major currencies means that even modest increases in nominal budget do not translate into real gains.
      Impact: Malaydesh pays more for the same equipment, reducing the volume and quality of new acquisitions.
      🧱 4. No Multi-Year Strategic Investment Framework
      • Unlike Singapore or South Korea, Malaydesh lacks a ring-fenced capital investment stream for defense.
      • Each year’s procurement is subject to political negotiation and fiscal trade-offs, with no guaranteed continuity.
      • This discourages long-term programs like missile development, drone fleets, or integrated air defense systems.
      Impact: Strategic programs are fragmented, delayed, or abandoned mid-cycle.
      📊 Summary Table: Why Funding for New Combat Systems Is Thin
      Factor Description Strategic Impact
      Budget skew 60–70% spent on salaries and maintenance Minimal room for new acquisitions
      Legacy obligations Procurement includes old contracts and delayed projects New systems get crowded out
      Currency depreciation Ringgit weakens against USD/EUR Reduces real purchasing power
      No strategic investment model No multi-year capital planning Limits continuity and ambition

      Hapus
    2. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      💰 1. Budget Composition: Operational vs Development
      • In 2025, Malaydesh allocated RM21.2 billion to the Ministry of Defence.
      o Operational Expenditure (OPEX): RM13.36 billion (~63%) — covers salaries, pensions, allowances, and day-to-day operations.
      o Development Expenditure (DE): RM7.49 billion (~37%) — intended for asset acquisition, infrastructure, and modernization.
      Impact: The bulk of funding goes to sustaining the status quo, not building future capabilities.
      👥 2. Personnel Costs Dominate Spending
      • Salaries, pensions, and welfare programs for active-duty personnel and veterans consume over half of OPEX.
      • Initiatives like RKAT housing repairs, pension adjustments, and cost-of-living allowances are important for morale but crowd out capital investment.
      • Malaydesh armed forces have a relatively large administrative footprint compared to its combat strength.
      Impact: High fixed costs reduce flexibility for strategic procurement or force restructuring.
      🔧 3. Maintenance Over Modernization
      • RM5.8 billion in 2025 was earmarked for maintenance, repair, and acquisition of military assets.
      • However, most of this goes to keeping aging platforms operational, not acquiring new ones.
      • Example: The Royal Malaydesh n Navy spends heavily on maintaining ships that are 30–40 years old, with minimal upgrades.
      Impact: Funds are spent on patching legacy systems rather than leapfrogging to modern technologies.
      📉 4. Low R&D and Capability Investment
      • Malaydesh allocates negligible funding to defense R&D, indigenous production, or strategic systems (e.g. missiles, cyber, ISR).
      • Unlike peers such as Indonesia or Vietnam, Malaydesh has no major co-development programs or defense industrial offsets.
      Impact: Malaydesh remains dependent on foreign suppliers and lacks autonomy in capability planning.
      📊 Summary Table: Budget Allocation Weaknesses
      Category Description Strategic Impact
      Operational Expenditure RM13.36B for salaries, pensions, and operations Limits modernization and flexibility
      Personnel Costs High welfare and admin spending Crowds out combat capability investment
      Maintenance Focus RM5.8B for upkeep of aging assets Sustains outdated platforms
      Low R&D Investment Minimal funding for innovation or strategic systems No indigenous capability development

      Hapus
    3. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🚫 1. No Long-Range Strike Systems
      • Malaydesh does not possess ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or standoff precision-guided munitions.
      • Its air force lacks platforms capable of launching deep-strike missions. The Su-30MKM fighters have range and payload potential, but Malaydesh has not equipped them with long-range strike munitions like Kh-59 or BrahMos.
      • Naval assets are similarly limited—no ship-launched cruise missiles or land-attack capabilities exist.
      Impact: Malaydesh cannot credibly threaten retaliation against adversaries beyond its borders, reducing its strategic leverage.
      🛡️ 2. Deterrence by Denial, Not Punishment
      • Malaydesh defense doctrine emphasizes “concentric deterrence”, focusing on denial rather than punishment.
      • This means the strategy is built around preventing aggression, not retaliating against it.
      • While this suits peacetime stability, it’s increasingly inadequate in a region where China, Vietnam, and the Philippines are investing in deterrence-by-punishment capabilities.
      Impact: Malaydesh lacks escalation control and cannot impose costs on adversaries, weakening its deterrent posture.
      💸 3. Budget Priorities Undermine Capability Development
      • Over 60–70% of Malaydesh defense budget goes to salaries, maintenance, and operations.
      • This leaves minimal room for R&D, procurement of advanced weapons, or strategic force development.
      • The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal and delays have further eroded trust and diverted resources from strategic programs.
      Impact: Malaydesh is stuck in a cycle of maintaining legacy systems rather than investing in future capabilities.
      🌐 4. No Indigenous Missile or Strategic Weapons Program
      • Unlike regional peers such as Indonesia (which is co-developing missiles with Turkey) or Vietnam (which fields Russian cruise missiles), Malaydesh has no domestic missile development program.
      • It also lacks partnerships for co-production or licensed manufacturing of strategic weapons.
      Impact: Total dependence on foreign suppliers; no autonomy in strategic force planning.
      📊 Summary Table: Strategic Strike & Deterrence Weaknesses
      Weakness Description Strategic Impact
      No long-range strike systems No cruise, ballistic, or standoff weapons Cannot retaliate or shape adversary behavior
      Denial-based doctrine Focus on defense, not punishment Weak deterrence posture
      Budget constraints Most funds go to salaries and maintenance No room for strategic force development
      No indigenous capability No missile R&D or co-production High dependency, low autonomy

      Hapus
    4. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🔧 1. Fragmented and Underdeveloped MRO Infrastructure
      • Malaydesh defense MRO sector is technically shallow, with most local firms focused on commercial aviation, not military-grade systems.
      • Despite having over 200 aerospace companies, only a handful are equipped to handle complex military platforms like fighter jets, naval combat systems, or armored vehicles.
      • The defense MRO ecosystem lacks dedicated facilities for:
      o Engine overhauls (especially for Su-30MKM and Hawk aircraft)
      o Combat system integration
      o Naval propulsion and sensor maintenance
      Impact: Military platforms face long downtimes and must rely on foreign OEMs for critical servicing.
      🧱 2. Slow Localization and Limited Technical Depth
      • Malaydesh has made partial progress in localizing MRO for platforms like the F/A-18D Hornet, but most high-end servicing still requires foreign technical assistance.
      • There is no national MRO roadmap aligned with defense modernization goals, unlike countries like Turkey or South Korea that have built robust domestic ecosystems through tech transfer and industrial offsets.
      • Local firms lack access to classified schematics, proprietary software, and advanced diagnostic tools needed for full-spectrum support.
      Impact: Strategic dependence persists, and Malaydesh cannot sustain its fleet autonomously during crises or embargoes.
      🕵️ 3. Weak Vendor Oversight and Governance
      • The 2025 Auditor-General’s Report flagged major lapses in vendor management:
      o RM162.75 million in late penalties were not collected
      o RM1.42 million in fines were never imposed for delayed maintenance
      • Contracts are often awarded to politically connected firms without rigorous performance benchmarks or technical vetting.
      • Oversight is fragmented across MINDEF, the Ministry of Finance, and service branches, leading to diffused accountability.
      Impact: Maintenance quality is inconsistent, costs are inflated, and readiness suffers.
      📉 4. Obsolete Platforms and Spare Part Bottlenecks
      • Malaydesh inventory includes 171 platforms over 30 years old, many of which require parts that are:
      o No longer manufactured
      o Sourced from defunct suppliers
      o Incompatible with newer systems
      • RM384.5 million was lost due to 1.62 million unused spare parts that no longer matched operational needs.
      Impact: Maintenance becomes reactive and inefficient, with high sunk costs and low operational returns.
      📊 Summary Table: MRO Asset Weaknesses in Malaydesh n Military
      Weakness Area Description Strategic Impact
      Infrastructure gaps Few facilities for military-grade MRO Long downtimes, foreign dependency
      Slow localization Limited tech transfer, no unified roadmap No autonomy in fleet sustainment
      Vendor oversight Poor contract enforcement, inflated costs Inconsistent quality, low accountability
      Spare part obsolescence Aging platforms, mismatched inventory Budget waste, reduced readiness
      🧭 Strategic Consequences
      • Malaydesh ability to sustain combat operations over time is compromised.
      • Without robust MRO capabilities, even newly acquired platforms (e.g. FA-50 jets, LCS ships) risk becoming high-cost liabilities.
      • Regional peers like Indonesia and Singapore are investing in integrated MRO hubs, giving them a long-term readiness advantage.

      Hapus
    5. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🚫 1. Limited Missile Inventory and Range
      • The Malaydesh n Army currently fields only short-range air defense systems, notably the Starstreak and aging Rapier missiles.
      • These systems are effective only within 5–7 km, offering minimal protection against modern aircraft, drones, or cruise missiles.
      • Malaydesh lacks medium- and long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), leaving critical infrastructure and forward bases vulnerable.
      Impact: Inability to defend against high-altitude or standoff threats; poor layered defense architecture.
      🛠️ 2. Delayed Modernization and Funding Gaps
      • Although Malaydesh has published requirements for new Ground-Based Air Defence (GBAD) systems, no funding has been allocated.
      • Proposed systems like MBDA’s MICA VL NG and EMADS (CAMM) offer 40+ km range and advanced seekers, but remain unprocured.
      • The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program includes VL MICA missiles, but the ships themselves are years behind schedule, delaying missile deployment.
      Impact: Strategic plans remain theoretical; operational readiness is compromised by procurement delays.
      🔄 3. Fragmented Missile Ecosystem
      • Malaydesh missile systems are sourced from multiple foreign suppliers (UK, France, Russia), resulting in:
      o Interoperability issues
      o Complex logistics and maintenance
      o Training burdens across platforms
      • No indigenous missile production capability exists, and local defense industry lacks integration with global supply chains.
      Impact: High dependency on foreign vendors; low sustainability in prolonged conflict scenarios.
      📉 4. No Strategic Strike or Deterrent Capability
      • Malaydesh does not possess ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or standoff precision-guided munitions.
      • This absence limits its ability to:
      o Strike high-value targets beyond its borders
      o Deter adversaries with credible retaliation
      o Support joint operations with regional partners
      Impact: Malaydesh remains a defensive-only actor, unable to shape regional dynamics or respond asymmetrically.
      📊 Summary Table: Missile Capability Weaknesses
      Weakness Description Strategic Impact
      Short-range inventory Only Starstreak and Rapier systems in service Vulnerable to modern air threats
      Procurement delays No funding for new GBAD systems; LCS delays Reduced readiness and deterrence
      Fragmented ecosystem Multiple suppliers, no local production Poor interoperability and sustainment
      No strike capability No cruise or ballistic missiles Limited strategic options and deterrence

      Hapus
    6. Bingung mo ngetrol apa si gembulll🤣😁😅

      Hapus
  21. Apa sign kontrak 24 buah F15...? 🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣

    SI MISKIN NGEPRANK BOEING guys... 🤣🤣🤣

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🚢 1. Aging Fleet Beyond Serviceable Lifespan
      • As of 2025, over half of RMN’s 49 ships are operating beyond their designed lifespan, some exceeding 40–45 years2.
      • Example: The KD Pendekar, commissioned in 1979, sank in 2024 after colliding with an underwater object—experts cited wear and tear as a contributing factor.
      • Naval experts warn that vessels typically have a 20–25 year lifespan, after which structural integrity and system reliability degrade significantly.
      Impact: Increased risk of mechanical failure, reduced combat effectiveness, and safety hazards for personnel.
      🔧 2. Delayed Replacement and Procurement Failures
      • Malaydesh planned to acquire 18 new vessels, but only 4 have been delivered as of mid-2025.
      • The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, intended to modernize the fleet, has been plagued by delays, mismanagement, and corruption.
      • The Auditor-General’s report revealed continued reliance on outdated ships due to non-delivery of replacements.
      Impact: Strategic gaps in patrol coverage, reduced deterrence, and overreliance on aging platforms.
      🧱 3. Obsolete Systems and Spare Part Incompatibility
      • RMN has incurred RM384.5 million in losses from 1.62 million unused spare parts that are no longer compatible with its ships.
      • Many vessels use legacy systems from diverse foreign suppliers (France, UK, Italy, Germany), making interoperability and maintenance complex.
      Impact: High maintenance costs, long repair cycles, and logistical inefficiencies.
      🌊 4. Limited Deterrence and Strategic Reach
      • Malaydesh maritime domain spans over 500,000 sq km, yet its aging fleet lacks the endurance and sensor range to patrol effectively.
      • Analysts warn that RMN’s current posture offers insufficient deterrence against rising threats, especially from China’s naval and coast guard presence.
      Impact: Reduced strategic options for defense planners and vulnerability in contested waters.
      📊 Summary Table: Key Weaknesses of Malaydesh n Navy Vessels
      Weakness Description Strategic Impact
      Aging platforms Over half the fleet >40 years old High failure risk, low combat value
      Procurement delays Only 4 of 18 planned ships delivered Capability gaps, reduced patrol reach
      Obsolete systems Legacy tech, incompatible spare parts Maintenance burden, poor interoperability
      Limited deterrence Inadequate coverage of vast maritime domain Strategic vulnerability in South China Sea

      Hapus
    2. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🚢 1. Aging Fleet Beyond Serviceable Lifespan
      • As of 2025, over half of RMN’s 49 ships are operating beyond their designed lifespan, some exceeding 40–45 years2.
      • Example: The KD Pendekar, commissioned in 1979, sank in 2024 after colliding with an underwater object—experts cited wear and tear as a contributing factor.
      • Naval experts warn that vessels typically have a 20–25 year lifespan, after which structural integrity and system reliability degrade significantly.
      Impact: Increased risk of mechanical failure, reduced combat effectiveness, and safety hazards for personnel.
      🔧 2. Delayed Replacement and Procurement Failures
      • Malaydesh planned to acquire 18 new vessels, but only 4 have been delivered as of mid-2025.
      • The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, intended to modernize the fleet, has been plagued by delays, mismanagement, and corruption.
      • The Auditor-General’s report revealed continued reliance on outdated ships due to non-delivery of replacements.
      Impact: Strategic gaps in patrol coverage, reduced deterrence, and overreliance on aging platforms.
      🧱 3. Obsolete Systems and Spare Part Incompatibility
      • RMN has incurred RM384.5 million in losses from 1.62 million unused spare parts that are no longer compatible with its ships.
      • Many vessels use legacy systems from diverse foreign suppliers (France, UK, Italy, Germany), making interoperability and maintenance complex.
      Impact: High maintenance costs, long repair cycles, and logistical inefficiencies.
      🌊 4. Limited Deterrence and Strategic Reach
      • Malaydesh maritime domain spans over 500,000 sq km, yet its aging fleet lacks the endurance and sensor range to patrol effectively.
      • Analysts warn that RMN’s current posture offers insufficient deterrence against rising threats, especially from China’s naval and coast guard presence.
      Impact: Reduced strategic options for defense planners and vulnerability in contested waters.
      📊 Summary Table: Key Weaknesses of Malaydesh n Navy Vessels
      Weakness Description Strategic Impact
      Aging platforms Over half the fleet >40 years old High failure risk, low combat value
      Procurement delays Only 4 of 18 planned ships delivered Capability gaps, reduced patrol reach
      Obsolete systems Legacy tech, incompatible spare parts Maintenance burden, poor interoperability
      Limited deterrence Inadequate coverage of vast maritime domain Strategic vulnerability in South China Sea

      Hapus
    3. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🚀 1. Accelerated Modernization by Neighbors
      • Singapore maintains one of the most technologically advanced militaries in Southeast Asia, with investments in F-15SG fighters, submarines, and integrated air defense systems.
      • Indonesia has ramped up procurement of Rafale jets, frigates, and drones, aiming for a more balanced tri-service force.
      • Vietnam has focused on asymmetric capabilities, acquiring Kilo-class submarines, coastal missile systems, and modernizing its air defense.
      • Philippines is deepening defense ties with the US, Japan, and Australia, acquiring BrahMos missiles and upgrading its naval fleet.
      Result: Malaydesh risks falling behind in both conventional and hybrid warfare capabilities2.
      📉 2. Malaydesh Budget Bottleneck
      • Malaydesh defense budget has stagnated at RM15–18 billion annually, with 60–70% spent on salaries and maintenance, leaving little for modernization.
      • Major projects like the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program have been plagued by delays and scandals, further eroding trust and capability.
      Result: While neighbors invest in future-ready systems, Malaydesh struggles to maintain legacy platforms.
      🌊 3. Strategic Exposure in the South China Sea
      • China’s coast guard and maritime militia have repeatedly entered Malaydesh Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), testing its maritime sovereignty.
      • Malaydesh aging naval fleet—28 of 34 vessels are over 40 years old—limits its ability to respond effectively.
      Result: Malaydesh deterrence posture is weakened, especially in contested maritime zones.
      🧭 4. Diplomatic vs. Hard Power Approach
      • Malaydesh has traditionally relied on quiet diplomacy and ASEAN mechanisms to manage regional tensions.
      • However, the geopolitical landscape is shifting toward hard power signaling, with countries like the Philippines and Vietnam adopting more assertive defense postures.
      Result: Malaydesh soft approach is increasingly outpaced by neighbors who combine diplomacy with credible military strength.
      📊 Summary Table: Malaydesh vs. Regional Peers
      Country Modernization Focus Strategic Advantage Over Malaydesh
      Singapore High-tech platforms, integrated C4ISR Superior air/naval integration
      Indonesia Balanced tri-service upgrades Larger force, expanding reach
      Vietnam Asymmetric coastal defense Strong deterrence in South China Sea
      Philippines Allied-backed modernization Rapid capability growth, joint exercises
      Malaydesh Aging inventory, budget constraints Limited deterrence, slow procurement

      Hapus
    4. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES – 2023 CANCELLED
      🧓 1. Aging Components Beyond Service Life
      • As of 2024, 171 military assets across the Army, Navy, and Air Force have exceeded 30 years of service2.
      • Many platforms—like the Royal Malaydesh n Navy’s Fast Attack Craft (FAC)—are over 40 years old, with some approaching 50 years.
      • These assets were designed for past-era threats and technologies, and their mechanical systems are now prone to fatigue, corrosion, and failure.
      Result: Even routine operations carry elevated risk of malfunction, requiring constant patchwork maintenance.
      🌴 2. Tropical Climate Accelerates Wear
      • Malaydesh ’s hot, humid, and saline environment is particularly harsh on military hardware:
      o Metal fatigue and corrosion are accelerated, especially in naval vessels and aircraft.
      o Rubber seals, electronics, and hydraulics degrade faster under tropical heat and moisture.
      • The Navy has acknowledged that many vessels no longer meet modern standards due to environmental degradation.
      Result: Maintenance cycles shorten, costs rise, and reliability drops.
      🔧 3. Obsolete Systems and Spare Parts Shortage
      • Many legacy platforms rely on foreign OEMs that have ceased production or support.
      • Spare parts must be sourced internationally, often at inflated prices and long lead times.
      • In some cases, technicians resort to cannibalizing other units or fabricating parts locally—neither of which guarantees reliability.
      Result: Delays in repairs, reduced fleet availability, and compromised safety.
      ⚠️ 4. Operational Incidents and Safety Risks
      • A tragic example: In July 2025, a Malaydesh n commando died during a maritime exercise due to suspected failure of aging diving equipment.
      • The Army Chief confirmed that the gear was “rather old,” prompting a full audit of equipment lifecycle and maintenance protocols.
      Result: Legacy systems not only reduce readiness—they pose direct risks to personnel.
      📊 Summary Table: Breakdown Drivers in Malaydesh n Military
      Factor Description Operational Impact
      Aging components Platforms >30–50 years old, beyond design limits Frequent failures, low reliability
      Tropical wear Heat, humidity, salt accelerate degradation Shorter maintenance cycles
      Obsolete systems Legacy tech, no OEM support Spare part shortages, delays
      Safety incidents Equipment failures linked to fatal accidents Personnel risk, public scrutiny

      Hapus
    5. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES – 2023 CANCELLED
      🧓 1. Aging Components Beyond Service Life
      • As of 2024, 171 military assets across the Army, Navy, and Air Force have exceeded 30 years of service2.
      • Many platforms—like the Royal Malaydesh n Navy’s Fast Attack Craft (FAC)—are over 40 years old, with some approaching 50 years.
      • These assets were designed for past-era threats and technologies, and their mechanical systems are now prone to fatigue, corrosion, and failure.
      Result: Even routine operations carry elevated risk of malfunction, requiring constant patchwork maintenance.
      🌴 2. Tropical Climate Accelerates Wear
      • Malaydesh ’s hot, humid, and saline environment is particularly harsh on military hardware:
      o Metal fatigue and corrosion are accelerated, especially in naval vessels and aircraft.
      o Rubber seals, electronics, and hydraulics degrade faster under tropical heat and moisture.
      • The Navy has acknowledged that many vessels no longer meet modern standards due to environmental degradation.
      Result: Maintenance cycles shorten, costs rise, and reliability drops.
      🔧 3. Obsolete Systems and Spare Parts Shortage
      • Many legacy platforms rely on foreign OEMs that have ceased production or support.
      • Spare parts must be sourced internationally, often at inflated prices and long lead times.
      • In some cases, technicians resort to cannibalizing other units or fabricating parts locally—neither of which guarantees reliability.
      Result: Delays in repairs, reduced fleet availability, and compromised safety.
      ⚠️ 4. Operational Incidents and Safety Risks
      • A tragic example: In July 2025, a Malaydesh n commando died during a maritime exercise due to suspected failure of aging diving equipment.
      • The Army Chief confirmed that the gear was “rather old,” prompting a full audit of equipment lifecycle and maintenance protocols.
      Result: Legacy systems not only reduce readiness—they pose direct risks to personnel.
      📊 Summary Table: Breakdown Drivers in Malaydesh n Military
      Factor Description Operational Impact
      Aging components Platforms >30–50 years old, beyond design limits Frequent failures, low reliability
      Tropical wear Heat, humidity, salt accelerate degradation Shorter maintenance cycles
      Obsolete systems Legacy tech, no OEM support Spare part shortages, delays
      Safety incidents Equipment failures linked to fatal accidents Personnel risk, public scrutiny

      Hapus
    6. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🧓 1. Obsolete Systems and Aging Platforms
      • As of 2024, 171 military assets across the Army, Navy, and Air Force have exceeded 30 years of service.
      • Many platforms—like the Royal Malaydesh n Navy’s Fast Attack Craft (FAC) and older patrol vessels—are over 40 years old, far beyond their optimal lifespan.
      • These systems were designed decades ago and now lack compatibility with modern sensors, weapons, and communications.
      Impact: Upgrades are either impossible or prohibitively expensive, forcing reliance on outdated capabilities.
      🔧 2. Dependence on Foreign Spare Parts
      • Malaydesh military inventory is highly diversified, sourced from the US, UK, France, Russia, and others. This creates logistical complexity:
      o Spare parts must be imported from multiple countries.
      o Some OEMs have ceased production, making parts scarce or unavailable.
      o Political or economic shifts can disrupt supply chains.
      Example: The Army’s Condor APCs and Scorpion light tanks require parts from legacy suppliers that no longer support them.
      Impact: Long lead times, inflated costs, and cannibalization of other units for parts.
      🔁 3. Frequent Breakdowns and Repair Cycles
      • Older platforms experience higher failure rates, especially under tropical conditions and extended use.
      • Maintenance crews often resort to patchwork fixes, which are temporary and unreliable.
      • The Navy reported that 28 of its 34 aging vessels have exceeded 40 years of service, with many no longer meeting operational standards.
      Impact: Reduced availability, increased downtime, and lower mission success rates.
      📉 4. Budget Drain and Opportunity Cost
      • Between 60–70% of Malaydesh defense budget goes to salaries, maintenance, and operations, leaving little for modernization.
      • Funds spent on keeping obsolete systems running could be redirected toward acquiring new platforms or investing in indigenous maintenance capabilities.
      Impact: Strategic stagnation—Malaydesh spends heavily but gains little in terms of capability.
      📊 Summary Table: Why Maintenance Costs Are So High
      Factor Description Consequence
      Obsolete systems Platforms >30–40 years old, incompatible with modern tech Expensive to maintain, low utility
      Foreign parts dependency Diverse suppliers, legacy systems, political risk Long delays, inflated costs
      Frequent breakdowns High failure rates, tropical wear, aging components Reduced readiness, more downtime
      Budget imbalance Majority spent on upkeep, not modernization Strategic stagnation

      Hapus
    7. Bingung ni Yee..🤣😁😅

      Hapus
  22. SUKA KLAIM ya..? 🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣



    Menhan Prabowo Resmi Beli 24 Unit Jet F-15 EX Eagle

    https://nasional.tvrinews.com/berita/tbeup2d-menhan-prabowo-resmi-beli-24-unit-jet-f-15-ex-eagle#

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🧓 1. Obsolete Systems and Aging Platforms
      • As of 2024, 171 military assets across the Army, Navy, and Air Force have exceeded 30 years of service.
      • Many platforms—like the Royal Malaydesh n Navy’s Fast Attack Craft (FAC) and older patrol vessels—are over 40 years old, far beyond their optimal lifespan.
      • These systems were designed decades ago and now lack compatibility with modern sensors, weapons, and communications.
      Impact: Upgrades are either impossible or prohibitively expensive, forcing reliance on outdated capabilities.
      🔧 2. Dependence on Foreign Spare Parts
      • Malaydesh military inventory is highly diversified, sourced from the US, UK, France, Russia, and others. This creates logistical complexity:
      o Spare parts must be imported from multiple countries.
      o Some OEMs have ceased production, making parts scarce or unavailable.
      o Political or economic shifts can disrupt supply chains.
      Example: The Army’s Condor APCs and Scorpion light tanks require parts from legacy suppliers that no longer support them.
      Impact: Long lead times, inflated costs, and cannibalization of other units for parts.
      🔁 3. Frequent Breakdowns and Repair Cycles
      • Older platforms experience higher failure rates, especially under tropical conditions and extended use.
      • Maintenance crews often resort to patchwork fixes, which are temporary and unreliable.
      • The Navy reported that 28 of its 34 aging vessels have exceeded 40 years of service, with many no longer meeting operational standards.
      Impact: Reduced availability, increased downtime, and lower mission success rates.
      📉 4. Budget Drain and Opportunity Cost
      • Between 60–70% of Malaydesh defense budget goes to salaries, maintenance, and operations, leaving little for modernization.
      • Funds spent on keeping obsolete systems running could be redirected toward acquiring new platforms or investing in indigenous maintenance capabilities.
      Impact: Strategic stagnation—Malaydesh spends heavily but gains little in terms of capability.
      📊 Summary Table: Why Maintenance Costs Are So High
      Factor Description Consequence
      Obsolete systems Platforms >30–40 years old, incompatible with modern tech Expensive to maintain, low utility
      Foreign parts dependency Diverse suppliers, legacy systems, political risk Long delays, inflated costs
      Frequent breakdowns High failure rates, tropical wear, aging components Reduced readiness, more downtime
      Budget imbalance Majority spent on upkeep, not modernization Strategic stagnation

      Hapus
    2. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      💰 1. Chronic Budget Constraints
      • Malaydesh defense budget has remained stagnant or modest relative to its strategic needs. Successive governments have been unwilling to reallocate funds from other sectors or reduce manpower to prioritize modernization.
      • For example, the Army is still awaiting Finance Ministry approval for the procurement of 136 High Mobility Armoured Vehicles (HMAV), despite urgent operational requirements.
      Result: Procurement plans are delayed or scaled down, leaving aging platforms in service well past their intended lifespan.
      🧱 2. Procurement Mismanagement & Delays
      • The Auditor-General’s 2025 report flagged RM7.8 billion in armoured vehicle contracts plagued by:
      o Delayed deliveries (e.g., 68 GEMPITA units delivered late)
      o Full payments made despite contract breaches
      o Weak enforcement of penalties (RM162.75 million fine claimed two years late)3
      • Maintenance and spare parts for key assets like ADNAN and PENDEKAR were also delayed, with fines left uncollected.
      Result: Even when acquisitions are approved, execution is inefficient and accountability is weak.
      🕴️ 3. Middlemen & Non-Transparent Deal Structures
      • Defense procurement is often conducted via limited tenders or single-source contracts, with fewer than one-third awarded through open competition.
      • Politically connected firms—often led by retired military officers—dominate the landscape, inflating costs and reducing transparency.
      • The King of Malaydesh recently rebuked the Defence Ministry for relying on “agents” and “salesmen,” calling out inflated prices and the attempted purchase of 30-year-old Black Hawk helicopters, which he likened to “flying coffins”.
      Result: Corruption risks and inflated pricing erode trust and reduce the effectiveness of spending.
      🧓 4. Aging Inventory & No Replacement Strategy
      • As of late 2024, 171 military assets across the Army, Air Force, and Navy were over 30 years old.
      • Yet, there is no clear roadmap for phased replacement or recapitalization, and ad hoc purchases continue to dominate.
      Result: Operational readiness suffers, and Malaydesh risks capability gaps in key domains like air defense, maritime patrol, and armored mobility.
      📊 Summary Table: Why Malaydesh Struggles to Acquire Military Assets
      Factor Description Impact
      Budget limitations Low prioritization of defense in national spending Delayed or cancelled acquisitions
      Procurement mismanagement Poor contract enforcement, late deliveries Waste of funds, reduced readiness
      Middlemen & opaque deals Politically connected firms inflate costs Corruption risk, poor value
      Aging inventory No structured replacement plan Capability gaps, low deterrence

      Hapus
    3. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🧾 1. Delayed or Suppressed Audit Findings
      • The Auditor-General’s Reports, which are meant to expose irregularities in defense spending, often face delays in publication or are selectively tabled in Parliament.
      • Some findings are redacted or softened before release, especially when they involve politically sensitive contracts or high-ranking officials.
      • For example, the 2025 Auditor-General’s Report revealed that RM162.75 million in penalties for late delivery of GEMPITA vehicles were never collected, and RM1.42 million in fines were never imposed2.
      Impact: Delayed audits allow problems to fester, and suppressed findings prevent public scrutiny or corrective action.
      🕵️ 2. Limited Enforcement of Audit Recommendations
      • Although the Auditor-General routinely issues recommendations, ministries and agencies often fail to implement them.
      • In 2025, only a fraction of the 22 audit recommendations across seven ministries were acted upon, despite covering RM48.87 billion in programs.
      • The Ministry of Defence was flagged for fragmenting maintenance contracts to bypass procurement controls, yet no disciplinary action was taken.
      Impact: Without enforcement, audits become symbolic rather than corrective.
      🧱 3. Structural Weaknesses in Oversight Mechanisms
      • Malaydesh lacks an independent defense procurement oversight body. Oversight is split between the Ministry of Finance, Prime Minister’s Department, and MINDEF itself—creating conflicts of interest.
      • Internal audit units within the Armed Forces are under-resourced and lack authority to challenge senior leadership.
      • There’s no legal requirement for real-time audit tracking or public disclosure of contract performance.
      Impact: Oversight is fragmented, reactive, and vulnerable to political interference.
      🔄 4. Culture of Impunity and Political Protection
      • High-profile scandals (e.g. LCS, Scorpene submarines) have rarely led to convictions or full asset recovery.
      • Procurement agents and contractors with political ties often avoid prosecution, even when audit reports implicate them.
      • Transparency International Malaydesh has called this a “culture of impunity”, where systemic failures are normalized.
      Impact: Accountability is undermined, and corruption risks remain entrenched.
      📊 Summary Table: Audit Weaknesses and Their Consequences
      Audit Weakness Consequence for Military Procurement
      Delayed or redacted reports Public unaware of mismanagement
      Poor enforcement of recommendations No corrective action taken
      Fragmented oversight Conflicts of interest, weak governance
      Political protection No accountability for procurement failures

      Hapus
    4. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🧨 1. Lack of Transparency and Oversight
      • Limited Competitive Tendering: Fewer than 30% of major defense contracts are awarded through open competition. Most deals are single-source or limited tenders, often favoring politically connected firms.
      • Opaque Contract Structures: Many contracts lack public disclosure of terms, pricing, or delivery milestones, making it difficult to track progress or detect irregularities.
      🕴️ 2. Role of Middlemen and Politically Connected Agents
      • Procurement is often mediated by retired military officers or politically linked intermediaries, who act as “agents” or “salesmen” within the Ministry of Defence.
      • These middlemen inflate prices, obscure accountability, and steer contracts toward preferred vendors—sometimes with little regard for capability or quality.
      • The King of Malaydesh recently rebuked this practice, calling out the use of “flying coffins” (referring to outdated helicopters) and warning that inflated middleman pricing would exhaust the defense budget.
      🚨 3. Major Scandals: Case Studies
      A. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
      • RM9 billion allocated for six ships; none delivered as of 2025.
      • Investigations revealed mismanagement, payment irregularities, and involvement of figures linked to the earlier Scorpene submarine scandal.
      • The Armed Forces Pension Fund (LTAT) was implicated in channeling illegal commissions.
      B. Scorpene Submarine Scandal
      • French court proceedings exposed kickbacks and illegal commissions tied to Malaydesh ’s purchase of two submarines in 2002.
      • Former PM Najib Razak, who was defense minister at the time, was linked to the deal and later convicted in unrelated corruption cases.
      C. MD530G Helicopter Deal
      • Malaydesh paid 35% of the contract value for six helicopters in 2015, but none were delivered by 2018.
      • The deal was flagged for irregularities, and the Defense Ministry lodged a report with the anti-graft agency.
      🧭 4. Systemic Weaknesses That Enable Scandals
      Weakness Impact
      No centralized procurement authority Fragmented decision-making, poor oversight
      Political interference Contracts awarded based on connections, not merit
      Weak audit enforcement Delayed or suppressed findings, limited accountability
      Budget opacity Hard to trace payments, detect overpricing or ghost assets
      🔄 5. Consequences for Military Readiness
      • Delayed modernization: Platforms like the LCS and helicopters remain undelivered.
      • Eroded trust: OEMs and foreign partners view Malaydesh as a high-risk client.
      • Operational gaps: Forces operate with aging equipment while waiting for replacements.
      • Public backlash: Scandals undermine public confidence in defense institutions.

      Hapus
    5. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      💰 1. What Are Progressive Multi-Year Payments?
      In Malaydesh defense procurement model:
      • Large acquisitions (e.g. ships, aircraft, armored vehicles) are not paid for upfront.
      • Instead, the government commits to multi-year installment payments, often spread across 5–10 years.
      • Each annual defense budget allocates a portion to these ongoing payments, limiting funds available for new projects.
      This structure is meant to ease fiscal pressure, but it creates long-term bottlenecks.
      🛑 2. How It Slows Platform Delivery
      A. Cash Flow Constraints
      • When most of the budget is tied up in legacy payments (e.g. for the Littoral Combat Ship or FA-50 jets), new programs are deferred.
      • Even approved platforms face delayed production schedules due to inconsistent or partial payments to contractors.
      B. Contractual Fragmentation
      • OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers) often require milestone-based payments to proceed with manufacturing.
      • If Malaydesh delays or underpays a milestone, production halts—leading to slippage in delivery timelines.
      C. Budget Volatility
      • Political transitions or economic downturns (e.g. COVID-19, ringgit depreciation) can cause annual budget cuts, disrupting payment schedules.
      • This leads to renegotiations, cost overruns, and sometimes contract termination.
      ⚓ 3. Real-World Examples
      Program Intended Delivery Status Cause of Delay
      Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) First ship by 2019 None delivered as of 2025 Payment delays, mismanagement
      FA-50 Light Fighters Initial batch by 2024 Slipped to 2026+ Budget phasing, contract finalization
      AV8 Gempita IFVs Full fleet by 2020 Still incomplete Staggered payments, local production issues
      🔄 4. Systemic Impact
      • Capability Gaps: Forces operate with aging platforms while waiting for replacements.
      • Operational Risk: Delays in naval and air assets reduce deterrence and readiness.
      • Loss of Credibility: OEMs and partners view Malaydesh as a high-risk client, demanding stricter payment terms.

      Hapus
    6. Bingung ya cah gembulll🤣🙃😛

      Hapus
  23. SUKA KLAIM ya..? 🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣



    Menhan Prabowo Resmi Beli 24 Unit Jet F-15 EX Eagle

    https://nasional.tvrinews.com/berita/tbeup2d-menhan-prabowo-resmi-beli-24-unit-jet-f-15-ex-eagle#

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. Sakit hati ya gak dpt hornet
      Wkkwkkww
      GOIB

      Hapus
    2. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🧩 1. Fragmented Procurement Budget Structure
      Malaydesh ’s defense procurement budget is not centralized or strategically sequenced, leading to:
      • Progressive Payments Over Multiple Years: Major acquisitions like the FA-50 fighter jets and Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) are funded through staggered payments, which consume annual budgets without delivering immediate capability.
      • No Clear Long-Term Procurement Roadmap: Each year’s budget includes a mix of legacy payments, small one-off purchases (e.g. small arms, radios), and ad hoc upgrades. This prevents coherent modernization across platforms.
      • Overlap of Operational and Capital Expenditures: Funds for maintenance, upgrades, and new acquisitions often compete within the same budget pool, diluting impact.
      🛠️ 2. Delays in Modernization Programs
      These budget issues directly cause delays in key modernization efforts:
      • Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Originally planned to deliver six ships starting in 2019, none have been commissioned as of 2025 due to financial mismanagement and contract disputes.
      • Army Vehicle Replacement: The Malaydesh n Army is still awaiting approval to replace its aging Condor APCs with High Mobility Armoured Vehicles (HMAVs), despite urgent operational need.
      • Air Force Capability Gaps: The RMAF’s transition from MiG-29s to FA-50s has been slow, with only partial funding secured and delivery timelines stretched.
      💸 3. Currency Depreciation and Import Dependence
      • Malaydesh relies heavily on foreign OEMs (original equipment manufacturers) for defense systems.
      • The depreciation of the ringgit reduces real purchasing power, meaning even increased nominal budgets don’t translate into more capability.
      • Domestic defense manufacturing is limited and still dependent on imported components, compounding delays.
      🧭 4. Lack of Strategic Procurement Governance
      • There’s no unified procurement authority with long-term oversight. Instead, decisions are made across multiple ministries and agencies.
      • Political transitions often lead to shifting priorities, causing cancellations or re-scoping of existing programs.
      • This results in capability gaps, where planned upgrades are delayed or abandoned mid-cycle.
      📊 Summary Table: How Fragmented Budget Causes Modernization Delays
      Issue Consequence
      Progressive multi-year payments Slow delivery of major platforms
      Ad hoc purchases No coherent force-wide modernization
      Currency depreciation Reduced real procurement capacity
      Lack of centralized governance Program delays and cancellations
      Political instability Shifting priorities, inconsistent funding

      Hapus
    3. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      💰 1. Budget Priorities Skewed Toward Salaries and Pensions
      • In 2024, Malaydesh allocated RM19.73 billion (~USD 4.16 billion) for defense, but over 40% of that went to salaries and allowances.
      • This leaves a much smaller portion for capital expenditure (CAPEX) like procurement, upgrades, and maintenance.
      • The imbalance means aging equipment stays in service longer without proper refurbishment, increasing breakdowns and reducing combat readiness.
      🧾 2. Procurement Funding Is Fragmented and Reactive
      • The budget for procurement includes progressive payments for ongoing contracts (e.g., FA-50 fighter jets, A400M upgrades, Littoral Combat Ships).
      • These payments are pre-committed, leaving little flexibility for new upgrades or emergency repairs.
      • Funding for large-scale modernization is often spread across multiple years, making it hard to respond quickly to urgent needs.
      📉 3. Currency Depreciation Reduces Purchasing Power
      • Malaydesh sources much of its military equipment from foreign suppliers, and the weakening ringgit erodes the real value of allocated funds.
      • Even when budgets increase nominally, the actual capability to purchase spare parts or upgrade systems may remain stagnant or decline.
      🧱 4. Political Reluctance to Reallocate Spending
      • Successive governments have been unwilling to cut spending elsewhere or reduce manpower to boost defense funding.
      • Defense modernization is often deprioritized in favor of social programs, infrastructure, or healthcare.
      • This results in a military that is operationally stretched, with outdated platforms and limited upgrade cycles.
      🚢 5. Real-World Consequences: Equipment Failures
      • A 45-year-old Malaydesh n Navy vessel, KD Pendekar, sank during patrol in 2024 due to hull failure, highlighting the dangers of underfunded maintenance.
      • Half of the Navy’s 49 ships are operating beyond their serviceable lifespan, according to the Auditor-General.
      📊 Summary Table: Why Repairs and Upgrades Are Underfunded
      Cause Impact on Military Capability
      High Personnel Costs Less funding for equipment upkeep
      Fragmented Procurement Budget Delays in modernization and upgrades
      Currency Depreciation Reduced ability to buy foreign parts
      Political Spending Priorities Defense often sidelined for domestic programs
      Aging Fleet and Infrastructure Increased breakdowns and operational risk

      Hapus
    4. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🧓 1. Aging Equipment Across All Branches
      • Over 171 military assets—including tanks, aircraft, and naval vessels—have exceeded 30 years of service.
      • These aging platforms require frequent repairs, often using obsolete parts that are hard to source or no longer manufactured.
      • For example, 28 Royal Malaydesh n Navy (RMN) ships have been in service for over 40 years, far beyond their optimal lifespan.
      Impact: Older systems break down more often, reducing operational availability and increasing downtime.
      🔧 2. Outsourced Maintenance with Governance Issues
      • Malaydesh has long relied on outsourcing maintenance to private contractors, aiming to reduce costs and improve efficiency.
      • However, poor oversight and fragmented contracts have led to inconsistent service quality, delays, and inflated costs.
      • The lack of centralized control means that maintenance standards vary, and accountability is diluted.
      Impact: Maintenance becomes reactive instead of preventive, driving up costs and reducing reliability.
      💸 3. Budget Constraints and Spending Priorities
      • A large portion of Malaydesh ’s defense budget goes to salaries and pensions, leaving limited funds for asset upkeep.
      • Capital expenditure (CAPEX) and operational expenditure (OPEX) are split almost evenly, but OPEX often falls short of what’s needed to maintain aging systems.
      • Modernization plans are frequently delayed due to competing national priorities.
      Impact: Insufficient funding for spare parts, upgrades, and technical support leads to degraded performance.
      🧠 4. Technological Obsolescence
      • Many older platforms lack interoperability with newer systems and are incompatible with modern digital warfare tools.
      • Upgrading legacy systems is often more expensive than replacing them, but replacements are slow due to procurement delays.
      Impact: Even when operational, outdated equipment may not meet mission requirements or integrate with allied forces.
      📊 Summary Table: Why Equipment Availability Is Low and Maintenance Costs Are High
      Root Cause Effect on Military Capability
      Aging Assets Frequent breakdowns, hard-to-source parts
      Outsourced Maintenance Inconsistent quality, higher long-term costs
      Budget Limitations Underfunded repairs and upgrades
      Technological Obsolescence Reduced mission effectiveness

      Hapus
    5. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🧱 1. Weak Implementation of Integrated Logistics Support (ILS)
      ILS is a structured approach used globally to ensure military assets are supported throughout their lifecycle. In Malaydesh :
      • The ILS framework is not consistently applied across all branches of the Armed Forces.
      • Logistics Support Analysis (LSA), which helps forecast maintenance and supply needs, is underutilized or poorly executed, especially for armored vehicles.
      • This leads to inefficient sustainment, meaning equipment can't be reliably maintained or deployed when needed.
      🔄 2. Fragmented Logistics Planning Across Services
      • The Army, Navy, and Air Force each operate their own logistics systems with limited integration, causing duplication and delays.
      • There’s a lack of centralized coordination, which means supplies, spare parts, and maintenance schedules are often mismatched or delayed.
      • During joint operations or disaster response, this fragmentation slows down deployment and resupply efforts.
      🧠 3. Limited Organizational Learning and Process Capability
      • Studies show that the Malaydesh n Army struggles with adapting logistics processes to dynamic operational environments.
      • There’s insufficient investment in training logisticians and developing agile systems that can respond to fast-changing battlefield conditions.
      • Without a culture of continuous improvement, logistics systems remain rigid and outdated.
      🛠️ 4. Aging Infrastructure and Supply Chain Bottlenecks
      • Warehouses, transport fleets, and IT systems used for logistics are often outdated or underfunded.
      • Malaydesh broader logistics sector also faces regulatory inconsistencies and economic instability, which spill over into military logistics.
      • These bottlenecks reduce the speed and reliability of asset delivery, repairs, and replenishment.
      📉 5. Lack of Strategic Logistics Alliances
      • Unlike some regional militaries, Malaydesh has limited partnerships with private sector logistics providers or international allies.
      • This restricts access to advanced supply chain technologies, predictive maintenance tools, and global best practices.
      📊 Summary Table: Why Logistics Undermines Sustainment & Reliability
      Problem Area Impact on Military Capability
      Poor ILS Implementation Unreliable asset maintenance and forecasting
      Fragmented Planning Delays in resupply and joint operations
      Weak Organizational Learning Inflexible logistics systems
      Aging Infrastructure Slow and inefficient supply chains
      Lack of Strategic Alliances Limited access to modern logistics solutions

      Hapus
    6. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🧱 1. Aging and Inadequate Equipment
      • Many of Malaydesh military platforms—especially aircraft, naval vessels, and armored vehicles—are over 30 years old, with limited upgrades.
      • This leads to frequent breakdowns, low availability rates, and high maintenance costs.
      • For example, the Royal Malaydesh n Air Force still operates MiG-29s and F-5s, which are outdated compared to regional counterparts.
      💸 2. Budget Allocation Issues
      • Malaydesh spends around RM15–18 billion annually on defense, but 60–70% of that goes to salaries, pensions, and basic operations.
      • This leaves little room for modernization, procurement of new systems, or advanced training.
      • The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project, meant to boost naval capability, has been plagued by delays and mismanagement, with no ships delivered despite billions spent.
      🔧 3. Weak Logistics and Support Systems
      • Malaydesh lacks a robust Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) system, which is crucial for sustaining equipment over its lifecycle.
      • Poor implementation of logistics planning leads to inefficient supply chains, delayed repairs, and low asset readiness.
      • Without proper logistics, even well-equipped units struggle to maintain operational tempo.
      🧠 4. Training and Doctrine Gaps
      • Military exercises are limited in scope and frequency, reducing the ability to simulate real combat scenarios.
      • There’s insufficient emphasis on joint and combined operations, which are essential for modern warfare.
      • Training doctrines are not fully aligned with emerging threats like cyber warfare, grey-zone conflict, and multi-domain operations.
      🧍 5. Human Resource Challenges
      • Recruitment is uneven across ethnic groups, and there’s a shortage of personnel with skills in cybersecurity, AI, and electronic warfare.
      • Retention is also a problem, especially for highly trained specialists who may leave for better-paying civilian roles.
      🧭 6. Strategic and Geopolitical Lag
      • Malaydesh defense posture has traditionally relied on non-provocative diplomacy, especially in the South China Sea.
      • But with rising tensions and assertiveness from regional powers like China, this approach is increasingly seen as insufficient.
      • Malaydesh risks falling behind countries like Vietnam and the Philippines, which are rapidly modernizing and strengthening alliances.
      📉 Summary Table: Key Factors Reducing Operational Capability
      Factor Impact on Military Readiness
      Aging Equipment Low availability, high maintenance costs
      Budget Imbalance Limited modernization and procurement
      Weak Logistics Poor sustainment and asset reliability
      Training Gaps Inadequate combat preparedness
      HR Shortages Skills gap in modern warfare domains
      Strategic Lag Vulnerability in regional power dynamics

      Hapus
    7. Mau ngetrol apa ya..bingung..gembulll🙃🙃🙃🤣😁

      Hapus
  24. Indo beli senjata ke Nato..NO US
    NO SOURCE CODE WKKWW

    BYE MALON
    SHOPING BUAL CASH WKKWKW

    BalasHapus
  25. Nwgara miskin bisa beli
    Rafale
    Kaan gen 5
    Byk lagi
    Wkwkkww

    BalasHapus
  26. 42 Rafale
    48 Kaan
    24 M 346

    Woooww.Hormet makin krik krikk
    Biasa malon just PEMBUAL🤣🤣🤣

    BalasHapus
  27. Up berita terbaru admin.... Kerjasama pertahanan MALAYSIA - JERMAN... ada bau bau shoping ASET MADE IN JERMAN ni tau..... HOREYYYY... 🇲🇾🇲🇾🇲🇾🇲🇾



    Malaysia-Jerman perkukuh hubungan pertahanan, sasar muktamadkan JDOI

    https://www.sinarharian.com.my/article/766669/berita/nasional/malaysia-jerman-perkukuh-hubungan-pertahanan-sasar-muktamadkan-jdoi

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. TAK USAH MIN, PALING SHOPPING RECEHAN LAGI...🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣

      Hapus
    2. Ngimpi lo pur, malaysia kan miskin. Upgraded cn235 yang murah aja dibayarin US.. hahaha

      Hapus
    3. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🛠️ 1. Aging Equipment and Maintenance Issues
      • Many of Malaydesh ’s military assets—especially aircraft, ships, and armored vehicles—are over 30 years old, leading to frequent breakdowns and reduced operational availability.
      • Maintenance is often outsourced to private contractors, which can be cost-effective but also introduces delays and accountability issues.
      • Spare parts for legacy systems are hard to source, and upgrades are slow due to budget constraints.
      💰 2. Budget Constraints and Spending Inefficiencies
      • Although Malaydesh spends around USD 4 billion annually on defense, much of this goes to salaries and pensions rather than modernization or training.
      • Procurement processes are often delayed or mismanaged, as seen in the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project, which has faced years of setbacks.
      🧠 3. Limited Training and Exercise Frequency
      • Military exercises are crucial for readiness, but Malaydesh conducts fewer joint and combined drills compared to regional peers.
      • Training programs are not always aligned with modern doctrines like Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), which integrate cyber, space, and information warfare.
      • The lack of realistic, high-intensity training limits the military’s ability to respond to hybrid or asymmetric threats.
      🧍 4. Human Resource Challenges
      • Recruitment and retention are uneven across ethnic groups. Non-Malay youth, for example, face barriers to joining due to cultural, linguistic, and perception issues.
      • There’s also a shortage of personnel trained in cybersecurity, AI, and electronic warfare, which are critical for modern readiness.
      🧭 5. Strategic and Doctrinal Gaps
      • Malaydesh ’s defense strategy has been slow to adapt to multi-domain threats, such as cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and maritime incursions.
      • The absence of a unified doctrine across the Army, Navy, and Air Force leads to fragmented planning and poor inter-service coordination.
      🧃 6. Public Perception and Political Will
      • Public sensitivity and support for the military are lower than for other institutions like the police or immigration services.
      • This affects recruitment, funding priorities, and political momentum for reform.
      🧩 Summary of Key Factors
      Factor Impact on Readiness
      Aging Equipment Reduces operational capability
      Budget Allocation Limits modernization and training
      Training Deficiencies Weakens combat preparedness
      Recruitment Challenges Shrinks talent pool and diversity
      Strategic Gaps Poor adaptation to modern threats
      Public Support Low political pressure for reform

      Hapus
    4. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      1. Overweight on Operating Expenditure
      • Over 40% of Malaydesh defence budget goes to salaries, pensions, and allowances.
      • This leaves limited room for capital expenditure (procurement, upgrades, R&D).
      • Example: In 2024, RM8.2 billion was allocated for personnel costs, while only RM5.71 billion went to procurement.
      2. Fragmented Procurement Planning
      • The Ministry of Defence lacks a clear multi-year procurement roadmap.
      • Funding is often allocated year-to-year, making it hard to commit to long-term modernization projects.
      • This leads to delays, cost overruns, and underutilized platforms (e.g. the Littoral Combat Ship fiasco).
      3. Political Hesitation to Rebalance
      • Successive governments have been unwilling to cut personnel costs or restructure the armed forces.
      • Reducing manpower or retiring outdated equipment is politically sensitive, especially with veterans and civil service unions.
      4. Currency Depreciation & Import Dependence
      • Malaydesh imports most of its defence equipment.
      • The weak ringgit erodes purchasing power, so even increased budgets don’t translate into real capability gains.
      5. Multi-Year Commitments Hidden in Annual Budgets
      • Annual allocations include progressive payments for past procurements (e.g. FA-50 jets, A400M upgrades).
      • These payments crowd out new investments, creating the illusion of fresh funding when it’s actually backlog servicing.
      📊 Budget Allocation Snapshot (2024)
      Category Allocation (RM) % of Total Budget
      Personnel Costs 8.2 billion ~41%
      Procurement 5.71 billion ~29%
      Operations & Training ~3.5 billion ~18%
      Miscellaneous ~2.3 billion ~12%
      🔍 Consequences of the Chronic Allocation Problem
      • Delayed modernization: RMN, RMAF, and Army struggle to replace aging platforms.
      • Capability gaps: Limited readiness for maritime threats, cyber warfare, and regional deterrence.
      • Low regional competitiveness: Malaydesh lags behind Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam in defence tech and force structure

      Hapus
    5. Kerja sama pertahanan apa..emang apa kapability malon..ha..gak tau diri..paling beli recehan😅

      Hapus
  28. Sudah kubilang, warganyet kl siyap2 yach...
    SHOPPING M346 UDA RESMI NICH haha!🤑😭🤑
    warganyet dipersilakan NGAMUK🔥
    ⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️
    Leonardo, PT ESystem Solutions and the Ministry of Defence Of the Republic of Indonesia sign M-346 F AIRCRAFT Letter of Intent to meet Indonesian Air Force training and combat requirements
    https://www.leonardo.com/en/press-release-detail/-/detail/04-02-2026-leonardo-pt-esystem-solutions-and-the-ministry-of-defence-of-the-republic-of-indonesia-sign-m-346-f-aircraft-letter-of-intent-to-meet-indonesian-air-force-training-and-combat-requirements

    BalasHapus
  29. M346 jauh lebih unggul dri F50A hahahahaa

    BalasHapus
  30. Yg miskkin yg masih suka sewa pakai lender dan tender


    Hahahhahahhahhaha...hahhhaba

    BalasHapus
  31. Aset Jerman kita banyak...dari kasel, Embiti Leopard, kapal anti ranjau sampe yg TERBARUW
    ✅️Kapal BHO 105 uda real Sea Trial siyap kirim haha!🥳🤑🥳

    sebkah KOSONK, takde bajet..level jimat kos..sono hus huss haha!😁😋😁

    BalasHapus
  32. M-346 F, come to force...
    Rileks jee buang F-15EX, masih banyak kontrak baru lainny...😁🤟

    BalasHapus
  33. Radar AESA original nii, bukan downgrade lalu kena blokir..hhurraiiyy

    https://www.indomiliter.com/leonardo-dan-kemhan-ri-teken-loi-untuk-jet-latih-tempur-m-346-f-block-20-di-singapore-airshow-2026/#more-114612

    BalasHapus
  34. Up berita terbaru admin.... Kerjasama pertahanan MALAYSIA - JERMAN... ada bau bau shoping ASET MADE IN JERMAN ni tau..... HOREYYYY... 🇲🇾🇲🇾🇲🇾🇲🇾



    Malaysia-Jerman perkukuh hubungan pertahanan, sasar muktamadkan JDOI

    https://www.sinarharian.com.my/article/766669/berita/nasional/malaysia-jerman-perkukuh-hubungan-pertahanan-sasar-muktamadkan-jdoi

    BalasHapus
  35. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
    🛡️ Why Malaydesh Lags Behind in Defence Tech & Force Structure
    1. Limited Defence Budget & Allocation Inefficiency
    • Malaydesh ’s defence budget is lower than Indonesia and Singapore, and a large portion goes to personnel costs, not modernization.
    • In contrast:
    o Indonesia: USD10.6 billion budget (2025), focused on maritime security and modernization
    o Singapore: USD15 billion budget, with 4.9% of GDP allocated to defence—the highest in ASEAN
    o Vietnam: Prioritizes coastal defence with diversified procurement from the U.S., South Korea, and Israel
    2. Outdated Equipment & Slow Modernization
    • Malaydesh still operates legacy platforms like MiG-29s (retired), aging Scorpene submarines, and delayed Littoral Combat Ships.
    • Meanwhile:
    o Indonesia is acquiring Rafale jets, Scorpène-class submarines, and expanding naval bases
    o Singapore has F-35B stealth fighters, advanced UAVs, and integrated cyber warfare units
    o Vietnam is modernizing its Soviet-era arsenal and investing in coastal missile systems
    3. Force Structure Limitations
    • Malaydesh ’s armed forces are fragmented and lack joint operational doctrine.
    • Singapore’s SAF is highly integrated, with tri-service coordination and advanced simulation training.
    • Indonesia and Vietnam maintain large active personnel (400,000 and 600,000 respectively), while Malaydesh has ~110,000 with limited reserve depth1
    4. Strategic Doctrine & Regional Role
    • Malaydesh ’s defence posture is non-confrontational, focused on internal security and humanitarian missions.
    • In contrast:
    o Indonesia asserts maritime dominance in the South China Sea and Malacca Strait.
    o Vietnam maintains a deterrence posture against China, especially in the Spratly Islands.
    o Singapore positions itself as a technological leader and regional training hub.
    📊 Comparative Snapshot (2025)
    Country Defence Budget Key Assets Strategic Focus
    🇲🇾 Malaydesh ~USD5.7B FA-50 jets, LMS Batch 2 Internal security, HADR
    🇮🇩 Indonesia USD10.6B Rafale jets, submarines Maritime security, deterrence
    🇸🇬 Singapore USD15B F-35B, cyber units, UAVs Tech superiority, joint ops
    🇻🇳 Vietnam ~USD6.5B Coastal missiles, Su-30MK2 China deterrence, coastal ops

    BalasHapus
  36. Baru sign LOI / surat tunjuk minat Geng GORILLA sudah klaim BELI..... HAHAHAHHAHA

    Psssttttt....kalau INDIANESIA LOI tu macam biasa SIGN KONTRAK KOSONG je seperti F15, J10B, MIRAGE, Su35 dan KFX....HAHAHAHAHA

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      What Are Malaydesh Force Structure Limitations?
      1. Small Active Force Size
      • Malaydesh has ~113,000 active personnel and ~51,600 reserves.
      • Compared to regional peers like Indonesia (~400,000) and Vietnam (~600,000), Malaydesh manpower is modest.
      • This limits its ability to sustain multi-domain operations or respond to simultaneous threats across Peninsular and East Malaydesh .
      2. Fragmented Tri-Service Coordination
      • The Malaydesh n Army, Navy, and Air Force operate with limited joint doctrine and interoperability.
      • There’s no unified Joint Operations Command, which hampers integrated responses in complex scenarios (e.g. amphibious landings, cyber warfare).
      • Exercises like CARAT and Bersama Shield help, but internal coordination remains weak.
      3. Lack of Force Projection Capability
      • Malaydesh lacks long-range strategic assets:
      o No aircraft carriers, heavy bombers, or ballistic missile systems
      o Limited aerial refueling and sealift capacity
      • This restricts Malaydesh ability to deploy forces beyond its borders or sustain operations in contested zones like the South China Sea.
      4. Overreliance on Legacy Platforms
      • Many platforms are aging or obsolete, such as:
      o MiG-29s (retired), F/A-18Ds (limited numbers), and Scorpene submarines (aging)
      • Procurement delays (e.g. Littoral Combat Ships) have stalled modernization
      • New acquisitions like FA-50 jets and LMS Batch 2 are promising but not yet integrated into full operational doctrine
      5. Budget Allocation Imbalance
      • Over 40% of the defence budget goes to personnel costs
      • Capital expenditure for modernization is squeezed, limiting upgrades and new systems
      • Multi-year commitments (e.g. aircraft payments) crowd out fresh investments
      6. Limited Indigenous Defence Industry
      • Malaydesh domestic defence production focuses on maintenance, small arms, and vehicles
      • It lacks capacity for advanced systems like missiles, radar, or naval combatants
      • This increases dependence on foreign suppliers and slows force structure evolution
      📊 Summary Table: Key Force Structure Gaps
      Limitation Impact on Capability
      Small active force Limited operational depth
      Weak joint command Poor tri-service coordination
      No strategic assets No regional power projection
      Aging platforms Reduced combat readiness
      Budget imbalance Slow modernization, procurement delays
      Weak defence industry High import dependence, slow tech adoption

      Hapus
    2. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      What Are Malaydesh Force Structure Limitations?
      1. Small Active Force Size
      • Malaydesh has ~113,000 active personnel and ~51,600 reserves.
      • Compared to regional peers like Indonesia (~400,000) and Vietnam (~600,000), Malaydesh manpower is modest.
      • This limits its ability to sustain multi-domain operations or respond to simultaneous threats across Peninsular and East Malaydesh .
      2. Fragmented Tri-Service Coordination
      • The Malaydesh n Army, Navy, and Air Force operate with limited joint doctrine and interoperability.
      • There’s no unified Joint Operations Command, which hampers integrated responses in complex scenarios (e.g. amphibious landings, cyber warfare).
      • Exercises like CARAT and Bersama Shield help, but internal coordination remains weak.
      3. Lack of Force Projection Capability
      • Malaydesh lacks long-range strategic assets:
      o No aircraft carriers, heavy bombers, or ballistic missile systems
      o Limited aerial refueling and sealift capacity
      • This restricts Malaydesh ability to deploy forces beyond its borders or sustain operations in contested zones like the South China Sea.
      4. Overreliance on Legacy Platforms
      • Many platforms are aging or obsolete, such as:
      o MiG-29s (retired), F/A-18Ds (limited numbers), and Scorpene submarines (aging)
      • Procurement delays (e.g. Littoral Combat Ships) have stalled modernization
      • New acquisitions like FA-50 jets and LMS Batch 2 are promising but not yet integrated into full operational doctrine
      5. Budget Allocation Imbalance
      • Over 40% of the defence budget goes to personnel costs
      • Capital expenditure for modernization is squeezed, limiting upgrades and new systems
      • Multi-year commitments (e.g. aircraft payments) crowd out fresh investments
      6. Limited Indigenous Defence Industry
      • Malaydesh domestic defence production focuses on maintenance, small arms, and vehicles
      • It lacks capacity for advanced systems like missiles, radar, or naval combatants
      • This increases dependence on foreign suppliers and slows force structure evolution
      📊 Summary Table: Key Force Structure Gaps
      Limitation Impact on Capability
      Small active force Limited operational depth
      Weak joint command Poor tri-service coordination
      No strategic assets No regional power projection
      Aging platforms Reduced combat readiness
      Budget imbalance Slow modernization, procurement delays
      Weak defence industry High import dependence, slow tech adoption

      Hapus
    3. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      ✈️ 1. Aging and Limited Fleet Composition
      • The RMAF operates a small and aging fleet of combat aircraft, including:
      o Su-30MKM (Russian-made multirole fighters)
      o F/A-18D Hornets (American-made strike fighters)
      o BAE Hawk 208/108 (light attack and trainer aircraft)
      • Many of these platforms are over 20 years old, with increasing maintenance costs and reduced reliability.
      • The MiG-29N fleet was retired in 2015 due to high upkeep and obsolescence, leaving a gap in air superiority capability.
      🛫 2. Limited Strategic Reach
      • Malaydesh lacks aerial refueling capability, which restricts the range and endurance of its fighter jets.
      • There are no airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) systems, which are critical for modern airspace management and long-range threat detection.
      • The absence of long-range transport aircraft limits Malaydesh ’s ability to deploy forces or provide humanitarian aid beyond its immediate region.
      🧰 3. Maintenance and Logistics Challenges
      • The RMAF relies on a diverse mix of Western and Russian platforms, complicating logistics, training, and spare parts management.
      • This lack of standardization increases costs and reduces interoperability, especially in joint operations or multinational exercises.
      • Maintenance contracts have faced delays and mismanagement, as highlighted in recent Auditor General reports.
      💸 4. Budgetary Constraints
      • Defence spending prioritizes personnel and basic operations, leaving limited funds for fleet modernization.
      • High-end platforms like the Rafale or Eurofighter Typhoon were considered but deemed too expensive.
      • Malaydesh recently opted for 18 FA-50 light combat aircraft from South Korea, which are more affordable but offer limited capability compared to full-fledged multirole fighters.
      🧭 5. Training and Readiness Gaps
      • Pilots often train on older platforms that do not reflect modern combat environments.
      • Simulator availability and advanced tactical training programs are limited, affecting combat readiness.
      • The RMAF’s ability to conduct 24/7 air patrols or rapid response missions is constrained by fleet size and operational tempo.
      🌐 6. Limited ISR and Drone Capability
      • Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets are minimal.
      • Malaydesh has begun acquiring Turkish-made drones for maritime surveillance, but integration and deployment are still in early stages.
      • The lack of a robust drone fleet limits situational awareness, especially in contested zones like the South China Sea.

      Hapus
    4. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🧾 1. Overreliance on Middlemen
      • Defence procurement in Malaydesh is often conducted through intermediaries, many of whom are retired military officers or politically connected individuals.
      • These middlemen inflate costs and complicate negotiations, leading to delays and reduced transparency.
      • In 2023, Malaydesh King publicly rebuked the Defence Ministry for relying on agents and “salesmen,” calling out the purchase of 30-year-old Black Hawk helicopters as “flying coffins”.
      📉 2. Limited Open Tendering
      • Only 20–30% of major defence contracts are awarded through open competition.
      • Most deals are done via single-source or limited tendering, which reduces accountability and increases the risk of mismanagement.
      • This environment favors politically connected firms, often with ex-military figures on their boards.
      🛠️ 3. Contract Management Failures
      • The Auditor General’s Report (2025) revealed serious lapses in the management of armoured vehicle contracts worth RM7.8 billion.
      • Key issues included:
      o Delays in delivery of 68 Gempita vehicles, resulting in a RM162.75 million fine—claimed two years late.
      o Full payments made despite missed deadlines.
      o Performance bonds were insufficient to cover penalties.
      o Maintenance and spare parts services were delayed by over 200 days, with fines still uncollected.
      🧩 4. Fragmented Procurement Practices
      • Some units conducted small-batch procurements that violated financial regulations.
      • Contracts exceeding RM500,000 should go through open tenders, but many were awarded via direct purchases and quotations, totaling RM107.54 million between 2020–2023.
      • This ad hoc approach increases governance risks and weakens oversight.
      🧭 5. Delayed Enforcement and Oversight
      • The Army has called for stronger contract enforcement, noting that RM167 million in late penalties remain uncollected from contractors.
      • While the Army monitors delays, enforcement lies with the Ministry of Defence (Mindef), which has been slow to act.
      • These lapses damage the military’s reputation and delay critical capability upgrades

      Hapus
  37. ALHAMDULILAH........ HOREYYYY



    Hubungan pertahanan Malaysia-Jerman diperkukuh, JDOI dijangka dimuktamad

    https://www.buletintv3.my/nasional/hubungan-pertahanan-malaysia-jerman-diperkukuh-jdoi-dijangka-dimuktamad/

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🔍 Why Malaydesh Deterrence Is Reduced
      1. Limited Military Capabilities
      • Malaydesh lacks strategic assets like long-range missiles, stealth aircraft, or advanced naval platforms.
      • Its air force has only 18 F/A-18Ds and is just beginning to induct FA-50 light fighters, which are not deterrent-grade.
      • The Navy’s delayed Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program and aging submarines weaken maritime deterrence.
      2. Fragmented Force Structure
      • The armed forces operate in silos, with weak joint command and coordination.
      • This reduces operational effectiveness in multi-domain scenarios like amphibious defense or cyber warfare.
      3. Budget Constraints
      • Over 40% of the defence budget goes to personnel costs, leaving little for modernization.
      • Malaydesh defence spending is ~1% of GDP, far below regional peers like Singapore (~4.9%).
      4. Technological Gaps
      • Malaydesh defence tech lags behind in:
      o Cyber warfare
      o Electronic warfare
      o Unmanned systems
      • This limits its ability to counter modern threats like drones, grey-zone tactics, and hybrid warfare.
      5. Geostrategic Vulnerabilities
      • Malaydesh sits near critical maritime chokepoints: the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea.
      • Chinese Coast Guard incursions near Sarawak and airspace violations in 2021 exposed Malaydesh inability to respond decisively.
      6. Diplomatic Ambiguity
      • Malaydesh non-confrontational foreign policy avoids hard deterrence postures.
      • While it promotes regional peace, this can be perceived as strategic passivity, reducing deterrence credibility.
      📊 Summary Table: Key Deterrence Weaknesses
      Factor Impact on Deterrence
      Limited strategic assets Weak denial and punishment capability
      Budget imbalance Slow modernization, poor readiness
      Tech lag Vulnerable to modern threats
      Weak joint ops Ineffective multi-domain response
      Passive diplomacy Low credibility in threat signaling

      Hapus
    2. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      Malaydesh ’s Military Modernization Is Slow
      1. Budget Allocation Imbalance
      • Over 60–70% of the defence budget goes to salaries, pensions, and maintenance, leaving little for new systems or upgrades.
      • Malaydesh spends around RM15–18 billion annually, but most of it is used to “keep the lights on” rather than invest in future capabilities.
      2. Procurement Delays & Scandals
      • The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program—meant to modernize the Navy—has faced years of delay, cost overruns, and corruption investigations2.
      • These setbacks have eroded public trust and stalled critical upgrades, leaving the Navy with outdated ships.
      3. Fragmented Modernization Strategy
      • Malaydesh lacks a cohesive long-term defence roadmap.
      • Procurement is often reactive, driven by political cycles rather than strategic planning.
      • Result: a patchwork of platforms from Russia, the U.S., France, and China, complicating logistics and interoperability.
      4. Weak Indigenous Defence Industry
      • Malaydesh ’s domestic defence sector focuses on maintenance and basic manufacturing, not advanced systems.
      • Outsourcing of maintenance since the 1970s was meant to build self-reliance, but it hasn’t scaled to meet modernization needs.
      5. Currency Depreciation & Fiscal Constraints
      • The weak ringgit reduces Malaydesh ’s purchasing power for foreign defence equipment.
      • Declining oil revenues and economic pressures have shrunk the government’s coffers, limiting capital expenditure.
      ⚠️ Why Readiness Is Poor
      1. Aging Equipment
      • Many platforms are decades old, including:
      o C-130 Hercules (1970s)
      o Condor APCs (1980s)
      o Scorpene submarines (2009)
      • These systems require frequent maintenance and offer limited combat capability.
      2. Limited Joint Operations Capability
      • The Army, Navy, and Air Force operate with minimal integration.
      • There’s no unified Joint Operations Command, reducing effectiveness in multi-domain missions.
      3. Training & Doctrine Gaps
      • Budget constraints affect training frequency, simulation systems, and doctrinal development.
      • Malaydesh lacks advanced cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and drone operations capabilities.
      📊 Summary Table: Key Factors
      Challenge Impact on Modernization & Readiness
      Budget imbalance Little funding for new systems
      Procurement delays Missed timelines, capability gaps
      Weak defence industry High import dependence
      Currency depreciation Reduced purchasing power
      Aging platforms High maintenance, low combat effectiveness
      Poor joint ops integration Inefficient multi-service coordination

      Hapus
    3. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🧾 1. Role of Middlemen and Retired Officers
      • Defence procurement in Malaydesh is often conducted through intermediaries, many of whom are retired military officers or politically connected individuals.
      • These middlemen act as “agents” or “salesmen,” influencing contract awards and inflating prices.
      • In a rare public rebuke, Malaydesh King Sultan Ibrahim condemned this practice in 2025, calling out the Defence Ministry for relying on agents and ordering the cancellation of a deal involving 30-year-old Black Hawk helicopters, which he referred to as “flying coffins”.
      🏛️ 2. Politically Connected Firms Favoured
      • According to research by Transparency International, only 20–30% of defence contracts are awarded through open competition.
      • The rest are handled via single-source or limited tenders, often favoring firms with political ties or ex-military board members.
      • This environment allows agents to exert significant influence over deal structuring, sidelining merit-based selection.
      💸 3. Scorpene Submarine Scandal
      • One of the most infamous cases involved the purchase of French-made Scorpene submarines, which was mired in allegations of kickbacks and corruption.
      • French investigators indicted several individuals and companies in 2018, highlighting the risks of compromised secrecy and foreign contractor influence3.
      ⚠️ 4. Weak Oversight and Accountability
      • Malaydesh lacks a robust oversight system to monitor defence procurement.
      • Unlike countries like the U.S. or Singapore, Malaydesh does not have multi-agency checks or parliamentary committees dedicated to defence contract scrutiny.
      • This gap allows conflicts of interest to persist with minimal consequences.
      📉 5. Impact on Military Readiness
      • Inflated costs and mismanaged contracts result in delayed deliveries, substandard equipment, and budget overruns.
      • This directly affects the Malaydesh n Armed Forces’ ability to modernize and maintain operational readiness.
      🧭 6. Balancing Transparency and Secrecy
      • While secrecy is necessary to protect national security, excessive opacity can hide corruption and conflicts of interest.
      • Experts argue Malaydesh must adopt best practices from other countries—such as transparent budgeting, competitive bidding, and independent audits—to restore trust and efficiency

      Hapus
    4. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🧾 1. Overreliance on Middlemen
      • Defence procurement in Malaydesh is often conducted through intermediaries, many of whom are retired military officers or politically connected individuals.
      • These middlemen inflate costs and complicate negotiations, leading to delays and reduced transparency.
      • In 2023, Malaydesh King publicly rebuked the Defence Ministry for relying on agents and “salesmen,” calling out the purchase of 30-year-old Black Hawk helicopters as “flying coffins”.
      📉 2. Limited Open Tendering
      • Only 20–30% of major defence contracts are awarded through open competition.
      • Most deals are done via single-source or limited tendering, which reduces accountability and increases the risk of mismanagement.
      • This environment favors politically connected firms, often with ex-military figures on their boards.
      🛠️ 3. Contract Management Failures
      • The Auditor General’s Report (2025) revealed serious lapses in the management of armoured vehicle contracts worth RM7.8 billion.
      • Key issues included:
      o Delays in delivery of 68 Gempita vehicles, resulting in a RM162.75 million fine—claimed two years late.
      o Full payments made despite missed deadlines.
      o Performance bonds were insufficient to cover penalties.
      o Maintenance and spare parts services were delayed by over 200 days, with fines still uncollected.
      🧩 4. Fragmented Procurement Practices
      • Some units conducted small-batch procurements that violated financial regulations.
      • Contracts exceeding RM500,000 should go through open tenders, but many were awarded via direct purchases and quotations, totaling RM107.54 million between 2020–2023.
      • This ad hoc approach increases governance risks and weakens oversight.
      🧭 5. Delayed Enforcement and Oversight
      • The Army has called for stronger contract enforcement, noting that RM167 million in late penalties remain uncollected from contractors.
      • While the Army monitors delays, enforcement lies with the Ministry of Defence (Mindef), which has been slow to act.
      • These lapses damage the military’s reputation and delay critical capability upgrades

      Hapus
  38. Apa yang MALAYSIA dapat dari KERJASAMA PERTAHANAN bersama JERMAN..... Baca guys..... HOREYYYYYY



    Beliau menjelaskan, deklarasi berkenaan bertujuan mengangkat hubungan dua hala ke tahap yang lebih strategik dan dijangka dimuktamadkan di sela-sela Munich Security Conference 2026 pada pertengahan Februari.

    "Perbincangan turut menyentuh kerjasama industri pertahanan selari dengan Dasar Industri Pertahanan Negara (DIPN) yang dilancarkan pada Januari lalu, serta sokongan Jerman melalui Enable & Enhance (E&E) Initiative.

    "E&E merupakan inisiatif bantuan keselamatan Kerajaan Jerman yang bertujuan membantu rakan strategik meningkatkan keupayaan ketenteraan dan keselamatan, khususnya di rantau Indo-Pasifik," katanya menerusi hantaran itu.


    https://www.buletintv3.my/nasional/hubungan-pertahanan-malaysia-jerman-diperkukuh-jdoi-dijangka-dimuktamad/

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      1. Procurement Mismanagement
      • The project began in 2011, with a contract awarded to Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS) to build 6 ships.
      • By 2022, despite RM6.08 billion already spent, not a single ship had been delivered.
      • Poor oversight and lack of accountability led to cost overruns and schedule slippage.
      2. Design Changes Midway
      • The original plan was to use the MEKO A-100 design from France.
      • Midway, the Navy requested changes to combat systems and sensors, causing delays in integration and testing.
      • These changes required re-certification and re-engineering, adding years to the timeline.
      3. Supply Chain & OEM Issues
      • Delays in receiving components from Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) disrupted construction schedules.
      • Some systems were not delivered on time, while others were incompatible with the revised ship design.
      4. Financial Overruns
      Metric Original Plan Current Status
      Total Cost RM9 billion RM11.22 billion
      Ships Ordered 6 5 (1 cancelled)
      Completion Timeline 2019–2023 2026–2029
      The cost ballooned by RM2.22 billion, forcing the government to scale down the number of ships.
      5. Political & Institutional Delays
      • Multiple changes in government between 2018–2022 led to policy uncertainty.
      • Investigations by the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) revealed serious lapses in governance.
      • The project was temporarily frozen, then restarted under a restructured plan.
      6. Impact on National Security
      • Experts warn that the delay leaves Malaydesh vulnerable in its maritime zones, especially in the South China Sea.
      • The Navy lacks modern surface combatants to replace aging ships like the KD Kasturi and KD Lekir

      Hapus
    2. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      1. Overdependence on Foreign OEMs
      • Malaydesh relies heavily on international suppliers for critical components, systems, and platforms.
      • This includes aircraft avionics, naval combat systems, and armored vehicle parts.
      • Any delay or disruption from these OEMs—due to geopolitical tensions, export controls, or production backlogs—directly stalls Malaydesh n projects.
      2. Limited Local Manufacturing Capability
      • Domestic defense firms mostly handle maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO), not full-scale production.
      • Indigenous capabilities are focused on small arms, logistics vehicles, and basic electronics—not advanced systems like radar, missiles, or propulsion.
      • This creates a dependency loop, where even minor upgrades require foreign input.
      3. Fragmented Supply Chain Ecosystem
      • Malaydesh defense supply chain lacks integration and coordination between stakeholders.
      • Poor visibility across upstream (OEMs) and downstream (end users) leads to inefficiencies.
      • Absence of a centralized strategic procurement framework weakens resilience during crises or delays.
      4. Custom Design & Integration Challenges
      • Malaydesh often requests custom configurations (e.g., in the LCS project), which complicates integration of foreign systems.
      • OEMs must redesign or adapt components, leading to technical mismatches and longer lead times.
      5. Lack of Economies of Scale
      • Malaydesh relatively small order volumes make it less attractive to global OEMs.
      • This results in higher unit costs, longer delivery timelines, and lower priority in production queues.
      6. Policy & Bureaucratic Delays
      • Procurement processes are slow and opaque, with frequent changes in specifications and leadership.
      • Delays in contract approvals, payment schedules, and regulatory compliance further disrupt supply timelines.
      🔧 Example: LCS Project Impact
      • The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program suffered from delayed component deliveries, incompatible systems, and OEM withdrawal, all linked to poor supply chain coordination2.
      • Result: RM6 billion spent, zero ships delivered as of 2025.

      Hapus
    3. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      ⚙️ Aging Equipment Across All Branches
      • Over 30 Years in Service: A total of 171 military assets have exceeded 30 years of service:
      o Malaydesh n Army: 108 units
      o Royal Malaydesh n Air Force (RMAF): 29 units
      o Royal Malaydesh n Navy (RMN): 34 units2
      • Maintenance Burden: These aging platforms require more frequent and costly maintenance, often with diminishing returns in performance and reliability.
      • Obsolete Technology: Many systems are technologically outdated, making them less effective in modern combat scenarios and harder to integrate with newer platforms.
      🚢 Naval Fleet Limitations
      • RMN Vessels Past Lifespan: Of the 53 ships operated by the RMN, 34 have exceeded their intended service life, with 28 vessels over 40 years old2.
      • Capability Gaps: These older ships lack modern sensors, weapons systems, and propulsion technologies, reducing Malaydesh ability to patrol and secure its vast maritime zones.
      • Urgent Replacement Needs: The Navy has highlighted the need to replace these vessels to maintain operational readiness and maritime security.
      ✈️ Procurement and Oversight Issues
      • Middlemen and Inflated Costs: Defence procurement has been criticized for relying on intermediaries, often retired military officers, which can lead to inflated prices and questionable deals.
      • “Flying Coffins” Controversy: Malaydesh King recently ordered the cancellation of a deal involving 30-year-old Black Hawk helicopters, calling them “flying coffins” and condemning the use of outdated assets.
      • Limited Open Competition: Only 20–30% of major defence contracts are awarded through open tenders, reducing transparency and value for money.
      🔧 Operational Readiness Challenges
      • Training vs. Technology Gap: Troops often train on platforms that are no longer representative of modern battlefield conditions, limiting their tactical preparedness.
      • Interoperability Issues: Malaydesh mix of Western, Russian, and local systems creates integration challenges, especially in joint operations or multinational exercises.

      Hapus
    4. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🧾 1. Overreliance on Middlemen
      • Defence procurement in Malaydesh is often conducted through intermediaries, many of whom are retired military officers or politically connected individuals.
      • These middlemen inflate costs and complicate negotiations, leading to delays and reduced transparency.
      • In 2023, Malaydesh King publicly rebuked the Defence Ministry for relying on agents and “salesmen,” calling out the purchase of 30-year-old Black Hawk helicopters as “flying coffins”.
      📉 2. Limited Open Tendering
      • Only 20–30% of major defence contracts are awarded through open competition.
      • Most deals are done via single-source or limited tendering, which reduces accountability and increases the risk of mismanagement.
      • This environment favors politically connected firms, often with ex-military figures on their boards.
      🛠️ 3. Contract Management Failures
      • The Auditor General’s Report (2025) revealed serious lapses in the management of armoured vehicle contracts worth RM7.8 billion.
      • Key issues included:
      o Delays in delivery of 68 Gempita vehicles, resulting in a RM162.75 million fine—claimed two years late.
      o Full payments made despite missed deadlines.
      o Performance bonds were insufficient to cover penalties.
      o Maintenance and spare parts services were delayed by over 200 days, with fines still uncollected.
      🧩 4. Fragmented Procurement Practices
      • Some units conducted small-batch procurements that violated financial regulations.
      • Contracts exceeding RM500,000 should go through open tenders, but many were awarded via direct purchases and quotations, totaling RM107.54 million between 2020–2023.
      • This ad hoc approach increases governance risks and weakens oversight.
      🧭 5. Delayed Enforcement and Oversight
      • The Army has called for stronger contract enforcement, noting that RM167 million in late penalties remain uncollected from contractors.
      • While the Army monitors delays, enforcement lies with the Ministry of Defence (Mindef), which has been slow to act.
      • These lapses damage the military’s reputation and delay critical capability upgrades

      Hapus
  39. Sebelumnya lawatan kerja FINCANTIERI ke LUNAS Shipyard ye guys..... Ehemmmm....Ehemmmmm



    LUNAS Receives Visit From Fincantieri and ENRA Energy Solutions

    https://www.mylunas.com.my/lunas-receives-visit-from-fincantieri-and-enra-energy-solutions/

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      1. Overview
      Malaydesh armed forces, Angkatan Tentera Malaydesh (ATM), operate under limited budgets. Over the decades, this has led to prolonged use of older military equipment and delays in modernizing their forces. These challenges impact operational readiness, capabilities, and strategic deterrence.
      ________________________________________
      2. Ageing Equipment
      “Ageing equipment” refers to military hardware that has outlived its intended operational lifespan or requires extensive maintenance to remain functional.
      Examples in Malaydesh :
      1. Air Force (TUDM / Tentera Udara Diraja Malaydesh )
      o MiG-29s and F-5E Tiger IIs: Some aircraft are over 30 years old.
      o Maintenance costs increase with age, and spare parts become harder to source.
      o Operational readiness is reduced; fewer aircraft are available for exercises or patrols.
      2. Navy (TLDM / Tentera Laut Diraja Malaydesh )
      o Kasturi-class frigates and older Perdana-class patrol vessels are decades old.
      o Ships need constant upkeep; older vessels have limited combat capabilities compared to modern ships.
      3. Army (TDM / Tentera Darat Malaydesh )
      o Condor armored vehicles and old artillery systems are still in service.
      o Modern threats like asymmetric warfare or rapid deployment require more advanced, mobile systems.
      Consequences of Ageing Equipment
      • Higher maintenance costs: More resources go into keeping old hardware operational.
      • Reduced combat effectiveness: Outdated technology may be inferior to neighboring militaries’ systems.
      • Operational limitations: Older platforms may be slower, less reliable, or incompatible with modern communication and weapon systems.
      ________________________________________
      3. Delayed Modernization
      “Delayed modernization” occurs when planned upgrades or new acquisitions are postponed, usually due to budget constraints, bureaucratic issues, or changing priorities.
      Examples in Malaydesh :
      1. Air Force
      o Replacement of aging fighters like MiG-29s and F-5E has been delayed.
      o New acquisitions like the Su-30MKM and M346 trainers are fewer than initially planned.
      2. Navy
      o Plans for new frigates, submarines, and multi-role combat ships are often slow-moving or downscaled.
      o Patrol vessels are prioritized over high-end warships due to cost constraints.
      3. Army
      o Modern armored vehicles and artillery acquisition programs face delays, affecting mobility and firepower.
      o Emphasis is placed on upgrading existing equipment rather than full-scale replacement.
      Causes of Delayed Modernization
      • Limited defense budget: Malaydesh allocates ~1.5–2% of GDP to defense. High-cost projects compete with other national priorities.
      • Procurement bureaucracy: Complex procurement processes slow down acquisition.
      • Foreign dependence: Reliance on imported equipment leads to delays in deliveries.
      • Strategic threat assessment: Malaydesh relatively low external threat level reduces urgency for rapid modernization.
      ________________________________________
      4. Impacts
      1. Operational Readiness
      o Fewer active platforms are available due to maintenance of old systems.
      2. Capability Gap
      o Aging systems may lack advanced radar, missile systems, or networked command capabilities.
      3. Regional Competitiveness
      o Malaydesh may lag behind neighbors like Singapore or Thailand in modern warfare technology.
      4. Financial Burden
      o Continuous repair and patching of old equipment may ultimately cost more than timely modernization.
      ________________________________________
      5. Summary
      • Ageing Equipment: Military platforms (aircraft, ships, vehicles) are decades old, expensive to maintain, and less effective.
      • Delayed Modernization: New acquisitions or upgrades are postponed due to budget, bureaucracy, and strategic prioritization.
      • Overall Effect: Malaydesh maintains a capable but moderately modernized military, with limitations in high-end operations, regional power projection, and technological parity.

      Hapus
    2. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🧭 Strategic and Policy Challenges
      • Lack of Clear Long-Term Vision: Malaydesh ’s defence budgeting process often lacks transparency and predictability, making it difficult for the armed forces to plan long-term procurement and modernization programs.
      • Frequent Political Changes: Since 2018, Malaydesh has seen multiple changes in government, which has disrupted continuity in defence planning and policy execution.
      💰 Budgetary Constraints
      • Limited Procurement Funding: Although the defence budget has increased to RM19.73 billion in 2024, over 40% is allocated to salaries and allowances, leaving relatively little for equipment upgrades and procurement.
      • Currency Depreciation: Malaydesh relies heavily on foreign defence suppliers. The weakening ringgit reduces purchasing power, making imported equipment more expensive.
      ⚙️ Operational and Equipment Issues
      • Aging Equipment: Many platforms, such as the Condor Armoured Personnel Carriers, are outdated. Replacement plans are slow due to budget and bureaucratic hurdles.
      • Dependence on Foreign OEMs: Domestic defence manufacturing is still heavily reliant on foreign original equipment manufacturers, limiting self-reliance.
      🧪 Technological and Industrial Limitations
      • Underdeveloped Defence Industry: Malaydesh ’s local defence industry lacks the capacity to produce advanced systems independently, which hampers modernization efforts.
      • Low R&D Investment: There’s insufficient investment in defence science and technology, which affects innovation and indigenous capability development.
      🤝 Civil-Military Integration Issues
      • Misunderstanding of HANRUH Concept: The “Comprehensive Defence” (HANRUH) strategy is often misinterpreted as a purely military doctrine, rather than a whole-of-nation approach involving civil sectors.
      • Weak Civil-Military Collaboration: The fading spirit of civil-military synergy, once strong during the Malayan Emergency, has weakened over time.

      Hapus
    3. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      ⚙️ Aging Equipment Across All Branches
      • Over 30 Years in Service: A total of 171 military assets have exceeded 30 years of service:
      o Malaydesh n Army: 108 units
      o Royal Malaydesh n Air Force (RMAF): 29 units
      o Royal Malaydesh n Navy (RMN): 34 units2
      • Maintenance Burden: These aging platforms require more frequent and costly maintenance, often with diminishing returns in performance and reliability.
      • Obsolete Technology: Many systems are technologically outdated, making them less effective in modern combat scenarios and harder to integrate with newer platforms.
      🚢 Naval Fleet Limitations
      • RMN Vessels Past Lifespan: Of the 53 ships operated by the RMN, 34 have exceeded their intended service life, with 28 vessels over 40 years old2.
      • Capability Gaps: These older ships lack modern sensors, weapons systems, and propulsion technologies, reducing Malaydesh ability to patrol and secure its vast maritime zones.
      • Urgent Replacement Needs: The Navy has highlighted the need to replace these vessels to maintain operational readiness and maritime security.
      ✈️ Procurement and Oversight Issues
      • Middlemen and Inflated Costs: Defence procurement has been criticized for relying on intermediaries, often retired military officers, which can lead to inflated prices and questionable deals.
      • “Flying Coffins” Controversy: Malaydesh King recently ordered the cancellation of a deal involving 30-year-old Black Hawk helicopters, calling them “flying coffins” and condemning the use of outdated assets.
      • Limited Open Competition: Only 20–30% of major defence contracts are awarded through open tenders, reducing transparency and value for money.
      🔧 Operational Readiness Challenges
      • Training vs. Technology Gap: Troops often train on platforms that are no longer representative of modern battlefield conditions, limiting their tactical preparedness.
      • Interoperability Issues: Malaydesh mix of Western, Russian, and local systems creates integration challenges, especially in joint operations or multinational exercises.

      Hapus
    4. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🧨 1. Long-Delayed Procurement Timeline
      • The SPH program was first proposed in 2010, but has faced repeated delays and cancellations.
      • As of 2024, the Malaydesh n Army expressed renewed interest in acquiring 66 units of 155mm/52 calibre SPHs, but the program remains in limbo.
      💸 2. Opaque Tendering and Political Controversy
      • The procurement, valued at RM819.09 million, went through a selected pre-qualification tender involving six bidders.
      • In 2022, allegations surfaced that the contract had been awarded directly to a company linked to a former deputy defence minister’s family, raising concerns about conflict of interest and cronyism.
      • The Ministry of Finance approved the tender in January 2024, but required renegotiation of the price before finalization.
      🔄 3. Government-to-Government (G2G) Confusion
      • Initially, Malaydesh planned to acquire the Yavuz 155mm SPH from Türkiye’s state-owned MKE via a G2G deal.
      • However, the deal was later reviewed and renegotiated, with the Defence Minister emphasizing the need for open tendering to ensure the equipment meets end-user specifications.
      • This flip-flop between direct negotiation and open tendering reflects fragmented procurement strategy and lack of institutional clarity.
      🧩 4. Dual Oversight and Bureaucratic Gridlock
      • Defence procurement in Malaydesh is overseen by both Mindef and the Ministry of Finance, creating a dual-layered approval process that often leads to delays and misalignment.
      • The lack of a centralized procurement authority results in conflicting decisions, as seen in the SPH case where Mindef had to renegotiate a deal already approved by MOF.
      🧭 5. Impact on Operational Capability
      • Malaydesh ’s artillery units currently rely on towed howitzers, which are slower to deploy and less survivable in modern combat.
      • The delay in acquiring SPHs hampers the Army’s ability to conduct rapid fire support missions, especially in mobile and contested environments.

      Hapus
  40. Ada bau bau kapal MRSS MADE IN ITALI ni guys....HOREYYYYY



    LUNAS received a visit from Fincantieri
    SpA and their local partner ENRA Energy Solutions as part of ongoing engagements to explore potential areas of future collaboration.

    https://x.com/LUNAS_MY/status/2015752985255743535

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED 1. Limited Defense Budget Allocation
      Malaydesh historically allocates a relatively modest portion of its national budget to defense. While exact figures vary yearly, defense spending generally hovers around 1.2%–1.5% of GDP, which is lower than many neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. This limited allocation constrains the military’s ability to fund:
      • Procurement of advanced weapons systems
      • Research and development (R&D)
      • Infrastructure maintenance and upgrades
      • Personnel training and welfare
      ________________________________________
      2. High Operational Costs vs. Budget
      Even with a modest defense budget, a significant portion goes toward salaries, pensions, and day-to-day operations, leaving limited funds for modernization programs. For instance:
      • Military personnel costs (salaries, benefits, retirement pay) consume a large share of the budget.
      • Routine operational expenses such as fuel, maintenance, and logistics reduce available funds for new equipment.
      This means that Malaydesh often faces trade-offs between maintaining existing forces and acquiring new capabilities.
      ________________________________________
      3. Competition with Domestic Priorities
      Malaydesh faces multiple domestic financial priorities, including:
      • Education and healthcare
      • Infrastructure development
      • Social welfare programs
      These competing priorities make it politically and economically difficult to significantly increase defense spending, even when modernization is needed.
      ________________________________________
      4. Dependency on Foreign Technology
      Malaydesh relies heavily on foreign suppliers for advanced military hardware, which is expensive. Limited financial resources make it challenging to:
      • Procure large quantities of modern equipment
      • Maintain sophisticated systems
      • Engage in long-term defense research or develop indigenous capabilities
      As a result, Malaydesh often acquires second-hand equipment or delays procurement programs.
      ________________________________________
      5. Impact on Modernization and Strategic Readiness
      The financial constraints directly influence Malaydesh ’s military readiness:
      • Aging Equipment: Existing platforms (ships, aircraft, and vehicles) are kept operational beyond their intended lifespan due to budget constraints.
      • Delayed Modernization: Planned acquisitions, such as advanced fighter jets, naval vessels, or air defense systems, are often postponed.
      • Limited Training and Exercises: Reduced funds for joint exercises, international cooperation, and troop training can affect operational effectiveness.
      ________________________________________
      6. Political and Economic Uncertainties
      Fluctuating oil revenues, global economic conditions, and political changes affect budget allocations. Defense funding is often reactive rather than strategic, meaning modernization projects may stall if economic growth slows or budget priorities shift.
      ________________________________________
      Summary:
      Financial limitations in Malaydesh ’s military are primarily caused by modest defense budget allocations, high operational costs, competing domestic priorities, reliance on costly foreign technology, and economic/political uncertainties. These factors collectively constrain modernization, maintenance, and strategic readiness, leaving the armed forces with aging equipment and delayed capability development.

      Hapus
    2. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      1. Aging Fleet & Capability Gaps
      • Many ships, like the KD Kasturi and KD Lekir, are over 30 years old, with limited combat capability.
      • Malaydesh lacks modern anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platforms and long-range missile systems, leaving gaps in deterrence.
      • The fleet is not equipped to handle high-tempo operations or multi-domain threats.
      2. LCS Procurement Scandal & Delays
      • The RM11 billion Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has been plagued by:
      o Procurement mismanagement
      o Political interference
      o Technical delays
      • As of 2025, only 72% progress has been made, with the first ship expected to begin sea trials in December 2025.
      • This delay leaves Malaydesh without modern surface combatants for coastal and EEZ defense.
      3. Fragmented Fleet Structure
      • RMN operates too many ship classes, complicating logistics, training, and maintenance.
      • The 15-to-5 Transformation Plan aims to consolidate the fleet into five core classes, but implementation is slow.
      • Fragmentation leads to supply chain inefficiencies and higher operational costs.
      4. Budgetary Constraints
      • Defense spending is insufficient to support rapid modernization.
      • High personnel costs consume over 40% of the defense budget, leaving limited funds for procurement and upgrades.
      • Malaydesh ’s navy modernization is often delayed or scaled down due to fiscal pressures.
      5. Limited Maritime Surveillance & Deterrence
      • Malaydesh faces frequent incursions by foreign vessels, especially in the South China Sea.
      • Lack of long-range radars, UAVs, and submarine detection systems weakens maritime domain awareness.
      • The Navy is stretched thin across Peninsular and East Malaydesh , with limited ability to respond quickly.
      6. Geopolitical Pressure & Strategic Vulnerability
      • Malaydesh ’s neutral foreign policy limits its access to strategic alliances like AUKUS or QUAD.
      • Rising Chinese assertiveness and illegal fishing by Vietnamese vessels challenge Malaydesh ’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
      • Without a credible naval deterrent, Malaydesh risks losing strategic influence in regional waters.
      🧭 Summary Table
      Problem Area Impact on RMN
      Aging Fleet Reduced combat readiness
      LCS Delays No modern surface combatants
      Fragmented Ship Classes Inefficient logistics & maintenance
      Budget Constraints Slow modernization
      Weak Maritime Surveillance Vulnerable EEZ & coastlines
      Strategic Isolation Limited deterrence in South China Sea

      Hapus
    3. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      1. Major Examples
      a. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Project
      • Budget: Initially RM9 billion for 6 ships.
      • Actual Spending: Over RM11 billion and only partial completion (first ship expected in 2026).
      • Reasons:
      o Poor project planning.
      o Technical challenges and redesigns.
      o Use of shell companies and opaque contracts.
      • Impact: Reduced naval capability and wasted taxpayer money.
      b. New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) Program
      • Initial Budget: RM5.35 billion for 27 vessels.
      • Final Cost: RM6.75 billion for only a portion of the ships.
      • Causes: Delays, quality issues, and mismanagement.
      c. Scorpène Submarine Procurement
      • Original Cost: RM4.3 billion for 2 submarines.
      • Overrun Factors: Bribery allegations, use of intermediaries, and additional unforeseen costs in logistics and training.
      d. Light Helicopters & MD530G
      • Contracts were canceled after payment, or delivery failures caused financial losses.
      • Resulted in extra spending for replacements or alternative solutions.
      ________________________________________
      2. Causes of Cost Overruns
      1. Poor Planning & Project Management
      o Unrealistic timelines.
      o Underestimation of technical and operational complexities.
      2. Political Interference
      o Decisions often influenced by political connections rather than operational requirements.
      o Preference for certain contractors can inflate costs.
      3. Corruption & Cronyism
      o Inflated contract values due to intermediaries or bribes.
      o Shell companies and indirect payments increase total expenditure.
      4. Technological & Operational Challenges
      o Acquisition of outdated or incompatible equipment requires modifications.
      o Training and infrastructure costs escalate unexpectedly.
      5. Weak Oversight & Transparency
      o Limited parliamentary supervision.
      o Use of Official Secrets Act to hide financial irregularities.
      ________________________________________
      3. Consequences
      • Operational Impact: Delays in delivery reduce combat readiness.
      • Financial Loss: Taxpayer money is wasted, limiting funds for other essential projects.
      • Public Trust Erosion: Perception of mismanagement and corruption undermines confidence in the military and government.
      • Long-term Strategic Weakness: Dependence on foreign suppliers increases vulnerability.
      ________________________________________
      4. Conclusion
      Cost overruns in Malaydesh military procurement are systemic, caused by a mix of poor planning, political interference, corruption, and lack of transparency.
      They reduce operational effectiveness, inflate defense spending, and erode public trust.

      Hapus
    4. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      🧾 1. Cronyism in Defence Contracts
      • Defence contracts are frequently awarded to companies with political connections or ties to retired military officers, rather than based on merit or technical capability.
      • Analysts have pointed out that unqualified firms often win major tenders, resulting in poor execution and missed deadlines.
      • For example, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project—initially a RM9 billion contract—was plagued by mismanagement. Despite over RM6 billion being paid, none of the six ships were delivered on time.
      ⚠️ 2. Conflict of Interest in Procurement
      • In some cases, contracts have been awarded to companies linked to former defence officials or their families, raising serious questions about impartiality.
      • The Self-Propelled Howitzer (SPH) deal faced scrutiny when it was revealed that a company involved had ties to a former deputy defence minister’s family. This prompted public backlash and calls for renegotiation.
      💸 3. Financial Mismanagement and Delays
      • Crony-linked firms often lack the technical expertise or financial stability to manage complex defence projects.
      • This leads to:
      o Delayed deliveries (e.g., offshore patrol vessels handed over three years late)
      o Cost overruns (LCS project now revised to over RM11 billion)
      o Unaccounted spending with little transparency or oversight
      🧭 4. Weak Enforcement and Accountability
      • Experts have questioned the government’s willingness to pursue legal action against companies that fail to deliver.
      • There’s concern that lawsuits could expose deeper corruption within the procurement system, making authorities hesitant to act.
      🔄 5. Impact on Military Readiness
      • These practices directly affect the Malaydesh n Armed Forces’ ability to modernize and maintain operational readiness.
      • Delays in acquiring critical assets—like helicopters, ships, and artillery—leave the military under-equipped and vulnerable in key strategic areas.

      Hapus
  41. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
    🧭 Strategic and Policy Challenges
    • Lack of Clear Long-Term Vision: Malaydesh ’s defence budgeting process often lacks transparency and predictability, making it difficult for the armed forces to plan long-term procurement and modernization programs.
    • Frequent Political Changes: Since 2018, Malaydesh has seen multiple changes in government, which has disrupted continuity in defence planning and policy execution.
    💰 Budgetary Constraints
    • Limited Procurement Funding: Although the defence budget has increased to RM19.73 billion in 2024, over 40% is allocated to salaries and allowances, leaving relatively little for equipment upgrades and procurement.
    • Currency Depreciation: Malaydesh relies heavily on foreign defence suppliers. The weakening ringgit reduces purchasing power, making imported equipment more expensive.
    ⚙️ Operational and Equipment Issues
    • Aging Equipment: Many platforms, such as the Condor Armoured Personnel Carriers, are outdated. Replacement plans are slow due to budget and bureaucratic hurdles.
    • Dependence on Foreign OEMs: Domestic defence manufacturing is still heavily reliant on foreign original equipment manufacturers, limiting self-reliance.
    🧪 Technological and Industrial Limitations
    • Underdeveloped Defence Industry: Malaydesh ’s local defence industry lacks the capacity to produce advanced systems independently, which hampers modernization efforts.
    • Low R&D Investment: There’s insufficient investment in defence science and technology, which affects innovation and indigenous capability development.
    🤝 Civil-Military Integration Issues
    • Misunderstanding of HANRUH Concept: The “Comprehensive Defence” (HANRUH) strategy is often misinterpreted as a purely military doctrine, rather than a whole-of-nation approach involving civil sectors.
    • Weak Civil-Military Collaboration: The fading spirit of civil-military synergy, once strong during the Malayan Emergency, has weakened over time.

    BalasHapus
  42. Apa yang MALAYSIA dapat dari KERJASAMA PERTAHANAN bersama JERMAN..... Baca guys..... HOREYYYYYY



    Beliau menjelaskan, deklarasi berkenaan bertujuan mengangkat hubungan dua hala ke tahap yang lebih strategik dan dijangka dimuktamadkan di sela-sela Munich Security Conference 2026 pada pertengahan Februari.

    "Perbincangan turut menyentuh kerjasama industri pertahanan selari dengan Dasar Industri Pertahanan Negara (DIPN) yang dilancarkan pada Januari lalu, serta sokongan Jerman melalui Enable & Enhance (E&E) Initiative.

    "E&E merupakan inisiatif bantuan keselamatan Kerajaan Jerman yang bertujuan membantu rakan strategik meningkatkan keupayaan ketenteraan dan keselamatan, khususnya di rantau Indo-Pasifik," katanya menerusi hantaran itu.


    https://www.buletintv3.my/nasional/hubungan-pertahanan-malaysia-jerman-diperkukuh-jdoi-dijangka-dimuktamad/

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      1. Scorpène Submarine Scandal (2002 Onward)
      • Malaydesh procured two Scorpène-class submarines and one Agosta-class submarine for RM4.5 billion via Perimekar Sdn Bhd, a company with no track record, tied to defense analyst Abdul Razak Baginda. Perimekar received RM510 million in commissions—around 11% of the deal value
      • French investigators implicated key figures, including members of DCNS/Naval Group, in bribery and misuse of corporate assets
      • This case also interwove with a tragic murder: Altantuyaa Shaariibuugiin, a translator allegedly involved in the deal, was murdered amid claims she demanded a commission. Baginda was acquitted of the conspiracy charges in Malaydesh , but French courts later charged him with corruption and misappropriation
      ________________________________________
      2. Little Bird (MD530G) Helicopter Contract (2016)
      • A RM321 million deal for six light attack helicopters collapsed due to delivery failures and substandard adherence to specifications.
      • After a MACC probe, the Attorney General’s Chambers opted not to prosecute, prompting public outrage.
      “No further action will be taken… typical. Corruption from top to bottom.”

      ________________________________________
      3. New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) Scandal (1990s–2000s)
      • The project aimed to replace aging patrol crafts with 27 Meko 100-designed ships. PSC-ND, a politically linked company, secured the contract.
      • Only six vessels were completed, and delays and financial mismanagement ballooned costs from RM5.35 billion to RM6.75 billion.
      • PSC-ND fell into debt and was absorbed by Boustead Holdings, becoming Boustead Naval Shipyard
      ________________________________________
      4. Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) Fiasco
      • In the late 1990s, an UMNO-linked firm was contracted for six OPVs at RM4.9 billion. Only two were delivered, fraught with defects.
      • Payments reached RM4.26 billion for merely RM2.87 billion worth of work completed—a 48% overpayment. Late penalties were waived by government directive.
      ________________________________________
      5. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal (2011–Present)
      • Valued at RM9 billion, the LCS project delivered zero ships despite over RM6 billion disbursed
      • The Royal Malaydesh n Navy preferred the Dutch-designed Sigma class, but the decision was overridden to adopt the French Gowind class—aligned with Boustead’s interests
      • MACC investigations revealed shell companies were used to siphon off at least RM23 million for fake technical services, linked to high-ranking officials
      • There were also allegations of circular flow of funds benefitting a core network of political and contractor cronies
      • PAC uncovered RM1.4 billion in cost overruns, and RM400 million was used to repay liabilities from past failed projects
      • The public and parliament now clamour for a Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI) to fully investigate the scandal
      • Commentary reflects deep frustration:
      “Before everyone gets their pitchforks out… First 2 ships supposed to deliver in 2020. Now none delivered… How much go into pocket of officials?”

      ________________________________________
      6. Public Accountability & Civil Society Response
      • The Consumers’ Association of Penang (CAP) has urged the establishment of an RCI, warning that these scandals jeopardize national security and sovereignty
      • The patterns underscore systemic failure—from opaque deals, lack of accountability, and misuse of public funds.
      • In August 2025, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim called for "graft-free procurement" in defense, emphasizing transparency and favoring G2G (government-to-government) deals over intermediaries ________________________________________
      Summary Table: High-Impact Scandals
      Scandal Key Issues
      Scorpène Submarine Deal Commissions, corruption, murder linked to procurement
      MD530G Helicopters Failed deliveries, no legal accountability
      NGPV Program Delays, cost overruns, company collapse
      OPV Deal Defective deliveries, huge financial losses
      LCS Project No deliveries, massive overspending, shell companies

      Hapus
    2. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      1. Scorpène Submarine Scandal (2002 Onward)
      • Malaydesh procured two Scorpène-class submarines and one Agosta-class submarine for RM4.5 billion via Perimekar Sdn Bhd, a company with no track record, tied to defense analyst Abdul Razak Baginda. Perimekar received RM510 million in commissions—around 11% of the deal value
      • French investigators implicated key figures, including members of DCNS/Naval Group, in bribery and misuse of corporate assets
      • This case also interwove with a tragic murder: Altantuyaa Shaariibuugiin, a translator allegedly involved in the deal, was murdered amid claims she demanded a commission. Baginda was acquitted of the conspiracy charges in Malaydesh , but French courts later charged him with corruption and misappropriation
      ________________________________________
      2. Little Bird (MD530G) Helicopter Contract (2016)
      • A RM321 million deal for six light attack helicopters collapsed due to delivery failures and substandard adherence to specifications.
      • After a MACC probe, the Attorney General’s Chambers opted not to prosecute, prompting public outrage.
      “No further action will be taken… typical. Corruption from top to bottom.”

      ________________________________________
      3. New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) Scandal (1990s–2000s)
      • The project aimed to replace aging patrol crafts with 27 Meko 100-designed ships. PSC-ND, a politically linked company, secured the contract.
      • Only six vessels were completed, and delays and financial mismanagement ballooned costs from RM5.35 billion to RM6.75 billion.
      • PSC-ND fell into debt and was absorbed by Boustead Holdings, becoming Boustead Naval Shipyard
      ________________________________________
      4. Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) Fiasco
      • In the late 1990s, an UMNO-linked firm was contracted for six OPVs at RM4.9 billion. Only two were delivered, fraught with defects.
      • Payments reached RM4.26 billion for merely RM2.87 billion worth of work completed—a 48% overpayment. Late penalties were waived by government directive.
      ________________________________________
      5. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal (2011–Present)
      • Valued at RM9 billion, the LCS project delivered zero ships despite over RM6 billion disbursed
      • The Royal Malaydesh n Navy preferred the Dutch-designed Sigma class, but the decision was overridden to adopt the French Gowind class—aligned with Boustead’s interests
      • MACC investigations revealed shell companies were used to siphon off at least RM23 million for fake technical services, linked to high-ranking officials
      • There were also allegations of circular flow of funds benefitting a core network of political and contractor cronies
      • PAC uncovered RM1.4 billion in cost overruns, and RM400 million was used to repay liabilities from past failed projects
      • The public and parliament now clamour for a Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI) to fully investigate the scandal
      • Commentary reflects deep frustration:
      “Before everyone gets their pitchforks out… First 2 ships supposed to deliver in 2020. Now none delivered… How much go into pocket of officials?”

      ________________________________________
      6. Public Accountability & Civil Society Response
      • The Consumers’ Association of Penang (CAP) has urged the establishment of an RCI, warning that these scandals jeopardize national security and sovereignty
      • The patterns underscore systemic failure—from opaque deals, lack of accountability, and misuse of public funds.
      • In August 2025, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim called for "graft-free procurement" in defense, emphasizing transparency and favoring G2G (government-to-government) deals over intermediaries ________________________________________
      Summary Table: High-Impact Scandals
      Scandal Key Issues
      Scorpène Submarine Deal Commissions, corruption, murder linked to procurement
      MD530G Helicopters Failed deliveries, no legal accountability
      NGPV Program Delays, cost overruns, company collapse
      OPV Deal Defective deliveries, huge financial losses
      LCS Project No deliveries, massive overspending, shell companies

      Hapus
    3. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      1. UH-60A Black Hawk Helicopter Lease (May 2023 – November 2024)
      • Background: In May 2023, Malaydesh ’s Ministry of Defence signed a five-year RM187 million lease deal for four UH-60A Black Hawk helicopters with Aerotree Defence and Services
      • Delays & Contract Issues: The first helicopter, initially due in November 2023, was repeatedly delayed—extended to April 2024, then to October 30
      • Cancellation: After the October deadline passed without delivery, the contract was officially cancelled in November 2024
      • Royal Intervention: Sultan Ibrahim publicly opposed the deal, warning against “flying coffins”—over 30-year-old helicopters unsuitable for service
      • Aftermath: A fresh tender for leasing alternative helicopters was launched in August 2025. The Ministry will evaluate proposals and consider factors such as helicopter type, age, leasing cost; the tender closes in September
      ________________________________________
      2. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Project (2011–Present)
      • Project Overview: Awarded in 2011, the RM9.13 billion LCS contract with Boustead Naval Shipyard aimed to deliver six warships. However, by August 2022, none had been delivered despite two-thirds of payment being made (~RM6 billion)
      • Delays & Cost Overruns: As of mid-2025, completion was at 72.9% against a target of 76.1% The total cost ballooned to approximately RM11.2 billion under revised agreements
      • Scrutiny and Reforms: The project drew heavy criticism from Malaydesh ’s parliamentary PAC and triggered calls for a Royal Commission of Inquiry A project oversight committee was later set up to improve delivery and accountability
      ________________________________________
      3. Multiple Smaller Contract Cancellations (Early 2023)
      • Measure for Transparency: In January 2023, the Defence Ministry cancelled five procurement contracts—spanning supplies, services, and infrastructure—to combat potential financial leakage and align with government emphasis on open tenders and value for money
      ________________________________________
      4. Armoured Vehicle Procurement Irregularities (Mid-2025)
      • Delivery Penalties & Contract Splits: The Auditor-General’s report uncovered major delays in claiming RM162.75 million in penalties for late Gempita armoured vehicle deliveries. It also flagged contract splitting worth RM107.54 million and late service penalties of RM1.42 million left unclaimed
      ________________________________________
      5. Expert Insights on Procurement Failures
      • Cronyism & Mismanagement: Analysts point to cronyism, financial mismanagement, and lack of expertise behind repeated procurement delays and cancellations—including the offshore patrol vessel and Black Hawk contracts
      ________________________________________
      6. Leadership Response & Reforms
      • King’s Reprimand: Sultan Ibrahim’s public condemnation of “nonsensical and unacceptable” procurement deals marks an unusually active supervisory stance by the monarch
      • Prime Minister’s Push for Transparency: PM Anwar Ibrahim has emphasized transparency, discouraging dependence on agents, and favoring government-to-government arrangements. He cited the LCS debacle as calling for procurement reform
      • Procurement Bill: In August 2025, a Government Procurement Bill was tabled, making violations of tender laws prosecutable and aiming to institutionalize transparency across government procurement—while still exempting defense procurements requiring confidentiality
      =============
      Federal Government Debt
      • End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
      • End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
      • Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
      Household Debt
      2025 : RM1.73 trillion, or 85.8% of GDP GDP

      Hapus
    4. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      📌 1. What Are Policy Flip-Flops?
      Policy flip-flops in Malaydesh ’s defense mean:
      • Frequent changes in plans, programs, and procurement priorities.
      • Caused by government changes, minister reshuffles, or shifting political agendas.
      • Leads to cancellations, re-tendering, or redesigning programs.
      • Results in years of delays, wasted funds, and capability gaps.
      ________________________________________
      📌 2. Drivers of Policy Flip-Flops
      a. Frequent Political Changes
      • Since 2018: Malaydesh had 5 prime ministers in 7 years (Najib → Mahathir → Muhyiddin → Ismail Sabri → Anwar).
      • Each PM/defense minister reviews and changes defense priorities.
      • Example: The same program (fighter jets, navy ships) can be launched, paused, revived, or cancelled multiple times.
      ________________________________________
      b. Short-Term Focus
      • Politicians prioritize 5-year election cycles over 15–20 year defense modernization.
      • Programs requiring long-term funding commitments (e.g., fighter jets, submarines, frigates) get disrupted.
      ________________________________________
      c. Budget Pressures
      • High national debt (69% of GDP in 2025).
      • Defense is seen as “non-essential”, so big-ticket programs are often the first to be cut or postponed.
      • Leads to repeated “defer until later” cycles.
      ________________________________________
      d. Corruption & Scandals
      • When scandals erupt (e.g., LCS RM9 billion scandal), programs face:
      o Audits, suspensions, parliamentary probes.
      o Restructuring or even outright cancellation.
      • Creates uncertainty for ongoing and future procurement.
      ________________________________________
      📌 3. Examples of Policy Flip-Flops
      ✈️ Fighter Jet Replacement (MRCA Program)
      • 2007–2010: Plan to replace MiG-29 with new fighters.
      • Candidates: Rafale, Typhoon, Gripen, Super Hornet, Su-35.
      • 2015: Najib government delayed due to budget.
      • 2018: Mahathir cancelled, shifted to cheaper LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).
      • 2022: RMAF selected Korean FA-50 → but deliveries only from 2026.
      ⏳ Result: 20 years later, still no MRCA. MiG-29 retired with no replacement.
      ________________________________________
      🚢 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program
      • 2011: Najib government approved 6 ships (RM9 billion).
      • 2018: PH government halted payments due to mismanagement.
      • 2020: PN government restarted program with restructuring.
      • 2023–2025: Still no ship delivered.
      ⏳ Result: Program flip-flopped between “go-ahead” and “pause”, now 14 years with 0 ships.
      ________________________________________
      🚁 Helicopter Procurement
      • Malaydesh planned medium-lift helicopter replacements (Nuri).
      • 2017: Nuri retired suddenly → capability gap.
      • 2019: Mahathir’s government cancelled immediate purchase, shifted to leasing option.
      • 2022: Army announced leasing 4 Black Hawks → contract collapsed due to disputes.
      ⏳ Result: Years without adequate helicopters.
      ________________________________________
      🪖 Army Armored Vehicles
      • 1980s Condor APCs still in use.
      • AV-8 Gempita ordered (2011) → only 257 built, production ended.
      • Plan for new wheeled APC → repeatedly delayed.
      ⏳ Result: Army still operates outdated vehicles because replacement kept shifting.
      ________________________________________
      📌 4. Consequences of Policy Flip-Flops
      1. Capability Gaps
      o Air Force without MRCA fighters.
      o Navy without new frigates.
      o Army using outdated artillery and APCs.
      2. Wasted Money
      o Billions spent on projects that stall or fail (e.g., LCS, helicopter leasing).
      3. Industry Instability
      o Local companies cannot plan or invest because contracts keep shifting.
      o Leads to failures like Boustead Naval Shipyard.
      4. Loss of Credibility
      o Foreign suppliers lose trust in Malaydesh .
      o Military loses confidence that promised equipment will ever arrive

      Hapus
  43. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
    🧾 1. Overreliance on Middlemen
    • Defence procurement in Malaydesh is often conducted through intermediaries, many of whom are retired military officers or politically connected individuals.
    • These middlemen inflate costs and complicate negotiations, leading to delays and reduced transparency.
    • In 2023, Malaydesh King publicly rebuked the Defence Ministry for relying on agents and “salesmen,” calling out the purchase of 30-year-old Black Hawk helicopters as “flying coffins”.
    📉 2. Limited Open Tendering
    • Only 20–30% of major defence contracts are awarded through open competition.
    • Most deals are done via single-source or limited tendering, which reduces accountability and increases the risk of mismanagement.
    • This environment favors politically connected firms, often with ex-military figures on their boards.
    🛠️ 3. Contract Management Failures
    • The Auditor General’s Report (2025) revealed serious lapses in the management of armoured vehicle contracts worth RM7.8 billion.
    • Key issues included:
    o Delays in delivery of 68 Gempita vehicles, resulting in a RM162.75 million fine—claimed two years late.
    o Full payments made despite missed deadlines.
    o Performance bonds were insufficient to cover penalties.
    o Maintenance and spare parts services were delayed by over 200 days, with fines still uncollected.
    🧩 4. Fragmented Procurement Practices
    • Some units conducted small-batch procurements that violated financial regulations.
    • Contracts exceeding RM500,000 should go through open tenders, but many were awarded via direct purchases and quotations, totaling RM107.54 million between 2020–2023.
    • This ad hoc approach increases governance risks and weakens oversight.
    🧭 5. Delayed Enforcement and Oversight
    • The Army has called for stronger contract enforcement, noting that RM167 million in late penalties remain uncollected from contractors.
    • While the Army monitors delays, enforcement lies with the Ministry of Defence (Mindef), which has been slow to act.
    • These lapses damage the military’s reputation and delay critical capability upgrades

    BalasHapus
  44. Malaysia rancang beli aset ketenteraan dari Itali, perkukuh keselamatan maritim

    https://www.sinarharian.com.my/article/736893/berita/nasional/malaysia-rancang-beli-aset-ketenteraan-dari-itali-perkukuh-keselamatan-maritim

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      1. Scorpène Submarine Scandal (2002 Onward)
      • Malaydesh procured two Scorpène-class submarines and one Agosta-class submarine for RM4.5 billion via Perimekar Sdn Bhd, a company with no track record, tied to defense analyst Abdul Razak Baginda. Perimekar received RM510 million in commissions—around 11% of the deal value
      • French investigators implicated key figures, including members of DCNS/Naval Group, in bribery and misuse of corporate assets
      • This case also interwove with a tragic murder: Altantuyaa Shaariibuugiin, a translator allegedly involved in the deal, was murdered amid claims she demanded a commission. Baginda was acquitted of the conspiracy charges in Malaydesh , but French courts later charged him with corruption and misappropriation
      ________________________________________
      2. Little Bird (MD530G) Helicopter Contract (2016)
      • A RM321 million deal for six light attack helicopters collapsed due to delivery failures and substandard adherence to specifications.
      • After a MACC probe, the Attorney General’s Chambers opted not to prosecute, prompting public outrage.
      “No further action will be taken… typical. Corruption from top to bottom.”

      ________________________________________
      3. New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) Scandal (1990s–2000s)
      • The project aimed to replace aging patrol crafts with 27 Meko 100-designed ships. PSC-ND, a politically linked company, secured the contract.
      • Only six vessels were completed, and delays and financial mismanagement ballooned costs from RM5.35 billion to RM6.75 billion.
      • PSC-ND fell into debt and was absorbed by Boustead Holdings, becoming Boustead Naval Shipyard
      ________________________________________
      4. Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) Fiasco
      • In the late 1990s, an UMNO-linked firm was contracted for six OPVs at RM4.9 billion. Only two were delivered, fraught with defects.
      • Payments reached RM4.26 billion for merely RM2.87 billion worth of work completed—a 48% overpayment. Late penalties were waived by government directive.
      ________________________________________
      5. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal (2011–Present)
      • Valued at RM9 billion, the LCS project delivered zero ships despite over RM6 billion disbursed
      • The Royal Malaydesh n Navy preferred the Dutch-designed Sigma class, but the decision was overridden to adopt the French Gowind class—aligned with Boustead’s interests
      • MACC investigations revealed shell companies were used to siphon off at least RM23 million for fake technical services, linked to high-ranking officials
      • There were also allegations of circular flow of funds benefitting a core network of political and contractor cronies
      • PAC uncovered RM1.4 billion in cost overruns, and RM400 million was used to repay liabilities from past failed projects
      • The public and parliament now clamour for a Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI) to fully investigate the scandal
      • Commentary reflects deep frustration:
      “Before everyone gets their pitchforks out… First 2 ships supposed to deliver in 2020. Now none delivered… How much go into pocket of officials?”

      ________________________________________
      6. Public Accountability & Civil Society Response
      • The Consumers’ Association of Penang (CAP) has urged the establishment of an RCI, warning that these scandals jeopardize national security and sovereignty
      • The patterns underscore systemic failure—from opaque deals, lack of accountability, and misuse of public funds.
      • In August 2025, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim called for "graft-free procurement" in defense, emphasizing transparency and favoring G2G (government-to-government) deals over intermediaries ________________________________________
      Summary Table: High-Impact Scandals
      Scandal Key Issues
      Scorpène Submarine Deal Commissions, corruption, murder linked to procurement
      MD530G Helicopters Failed deliveries, no legal accountability
      NGPV Program Delays, cost overruns, company collapse
      OPV Deal Defective deliveries, huge financial losses
      LCS Project No deliveries, massive overspending, shell companies

      Hapus
    2. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      📌 1. What “Deterrence” Means
      • Deterrence = convincing a potential adversary that attacking you will be too costly.
      • Effective deterrence requires:
      1. Credible combat power (modern weapons, trained forces).
      2. Readiness (forces operational at short notice).
      3. Clear strategy (political will to use military force).
      👉 Malaydesh lacks all three.
      ________________________________________
      📌 2. Small & Obsolete Armed Forces
      • Army (TDM): Still uses 1980s-era armored vehicles and artillery. No long-range rockets or modern air defense.
      • Navy (TLDM):
      o Only 2 Scorpène submarines (limited readiness).
      o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal left Malaydesh without new ships for over a decade.
      o Fleet shrinking as old ships decommission faster than new ones arrive.
      • Air Force (RMAF/TUDM):
      o Only ~26 combat jets (Su-30MKM + F/A-18D), many often grounded.
      o No long-range SAMs, tankers, or AWACS.
      o Pilots have low training hours.
      👉 Malaydesh cannot credibly threaten retaliation if attacked.
      ________________________________________
      📌 3. China in the South China Sea
      • Chinese Coast Guard & Navy regularly enter Malaydesh ’s EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone).
      • Malaydesh responds only with diplomatic protests & small patrols.
      • No credible deterrence:
      o No modern MPAs (maritime patrol aircraft).
      o Weak naval presence.
      o No anti-ship missile coverage to deter Chinese fleets.
      👉 China does not take Malaydesh ’s military seriously.
      ________________________________________
      📌 4. Budget Too Small
      • Malaydesh spends ~1% of GDP on defense — one of the lowest in ASEAN.
      • More than half goes to salaries & pensions, not weapons or readiness.
      • Modernization projects delayed or cancelled (LCS, MRCA fighter replacement, Nuri helicopter replacement).
      👉 Military cannot modernize fast enough to maintain deterrence.
      ________________________________________
      📌 5. Weak Defense Industry
      • Malaydesh cannot produce its own modern fighters, warships, or missiles.
      • Dependent on imports → delays, corruption, and cost overruns.
      • Example: Boustead LCS scandal wasted billions, leaving Navy with no new ships.
      👉 Without a strong local industry, deterrence = permanently dependent on foreign suppliers.
      ________________________________________
      📌 6. Low Training & Readiness
      • Pilots fly ~100 hours/year or less (NATO standard = 180+).
      • Ships sail less due to fuel and maintenance limits.
      • Army does limited joint/combined exercises because of budget.
      • Many assets grounded for lack of spare parts.
      👉 Even if weapons exist, they cannot be deployed effectively.
      ________________________________________
      📌 7. No Strategic Doctrine
      • Malaydesh ’s 2019 Defense White Paper acknowledged threats but failed to provide long-term funding or a clear modernization path.
      • Governments keep flip-flopping procurement plans (MiG-29 replacement delayed >10 years).
      • Political leaders avoid strong defense postures → prefer diplomacy.
      👉 Adversaries know Malaydesh lacks willpower to escalate militarily.
      ________________________________________
      📌 8. Comparison with Neighbors
      • Singapore: Credible deterrence with 100+ modern fighters, Leopard 2 tanks, advanced submarines, long-range SAMs.
      • Vietnam: Deterrence against China with large Su-30 fleet, strong coastal missile defenses.
      • Indonesia: Expanding deterrence with Rafales, F-15EX, submarines.
      • Malaydesh : Stuck with old equipment, no long-range strike capability.
      👉 Neighbors can deter aggression. Malaydesh cannot.

      Hapus
    3. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      📌 1. Air Force (RMAF)
      a. MiG-29 Replacement / MRCA Program
      • Planned: Since 2007, Malaydesh has sought replacements for its aging MiG-29 Fulcrums.
      • Options considered: Rafale (France), Eurofighter Typhoon (UK), Gripen (Sweden), F/A-18 (US).
      • Status: Repeatedly delayed, suspended, and re-announced due to budget constraints and changing governments.
      • Impact:
      o MiG-29 retired in 2017 → fighter gap remains.
      o RMAF left relying on only 18 Su-30MKM and 8 F/A-18D, both aging.
      o MRCA “shelved” and replaced with smaller Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) plan (FA-50 from South Korea, delivery starting 2026).
      ________________________________________
      b. Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA)
      • Planned: Requirement identified since early 2000s to monitor South China Sea and piracy.
      • Status: Delayed nearly 20 years.
      • Only in 2023 was the Leonardo ATR-72 MPA selected (delivery by 2026).
      • Impact:
      o Malaydesh had no dedicated MPA fleet for decades, relying on converted transport aircraft and UAVs.
      o Limited maritime surveillance → weakness in South China Sea patrols.
      ________________________________________
      📌 2. Navy (RMN)
      a. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
      • Planned: 2011, RM9 billion for 6 Gowind-class ships (local build by Boustead Naval Shipyard).
      • Status: By 2025, zero ships delivered.
      o Design changes, corruption, mismanagement, and cost overruns stalled the project.
      • Impact:
      o Navy still depends on old Kedah-class (2006) and even older corvettes from the 1980s.
      o Weakens ability to secure South China Sea claims.
      ________________________________________
      b. Multi-Role Support Ship (MRSS)
      • Planned: Amphibious ship program since 2000s.
      • Status: Cancelled/postponed multiple times due to budget.
      • Impact:
      o RMN has no large amphibious lift → limited ability to move troops/equipment in regional crises.
      ________________________________________
      c. Second Batch of Scorpène Submarines
      • Planned: Expansion to 4 submarines.
      • Status: Shelved due to cost.
      • Impact:
      o Malaydesh stuck with just 2 Scorpènes (delivered 2009–2010), insufficient for wide maritime area.
      ________________________________________
      📌 3. Army (TDM)
      a. Self-Propelled Howitzers (SPH)
      • Planned: SPH requirement since early 2000s (to replace old towed artillery).
      • Status: Program repeatedly delayed. Korea’s K9 Thunder shortlisted in 2020s, but no final contract.
      • Impact: Army artillery remains outdated → reduced firepower compared to Indonesia, Singapore.
      ________________________________________
      b. Armored Vehicle Programs
      • AV-8 Gempita: Entered production in 2014, but scaled down from 257 planned units due to cost.
      • Condor APC Replacement: Long planned, but repeatedly delayed → Condors from the 1980s still in service.
      ________________________________________
      c. Rotary Wing (Helicopters)
      • Army Aviation requested more utility and attack helicopters.
      • Programs for attack helicopters (AH-1Z, T129, etc.) discussed but cancelled/delayed.
      • Impact: Army lacks dedicated attack helicopter capability, unlike Indonesia.
      ________________________________________
      📌 4. Reasons for Delay/Failure
      1. Budget constraints → defense stuck at ~1% of GDP.
      2. Political instability → 5 prime ministers between 2018–2025, each with shifting priorities.
      3. Corruption & mismanagement → especially visible in LCS.
      4. Overreliance on foreign suppliers → negotiations stall or get too expensive.
      5. Short-termism → lack of 10–15 year strategic procurement planning.
      ________________________________________
      📌 5. Consequences
      • Capability gaps:
      o Air surveillance weak (delayed MPAs, fighter gap).
      o Maritime security weak (LCS delay, only 2 submarines).
      o Ground firepower weak (delayed SPH, old APCs).
      • Readiness reduced: much equipment obsolete, with few modern replacements.
      • Regional imbalance: Neighbors like Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam modernize faster, leaving Malaydesh behind.

      Hapus
    4. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      📌 1. Air Force (RMAF)
      a. MiG-29 Replacement / MRCA Program
      • Planned: Since 2007, Malaydesh has sought replacements for its aging MiG-29 Fulcrums.
      • Options considered: Rafale (France), Eurofighter Typhoon (UK), Gripen (Sweden), F/A-18 (US).
      • Status: Repeatedly delayed, suspended, and re-announced due to budget constraints and changing governments.
      • Impact:
      o MiG-29 retired in 2017 → fighter gap remains.
      o RMAF left relying on only 18 Su-30MKM and 8 F/A-18D, both aging.
      o MRCA “shelved” and replaced with smaller Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) plan (FA-50 from South Korea, delivery starting 2026).
      ________________________________________
      b. Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA)
      • Planned: Requirement identified since early 2000s to monitor South China Sea and piracy.
      • Status: Delayed nearly 20 years.
      • Only in 2023 was the Leonardo ATR-72 MPA selected (delivery by 2026).
      • Impact:
      o Malaydesh had no dedicated MPA fleet for decades, relying on converted transport aircraft and UAVs.
      o Limited maritime surveillance → weakness in South China Sea patrols.
      ________________________________________
      📌 2. Navy (RMN)
      a. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
      • Planned: 2011, RM9 billion for 6 Gowind-class ships (local build by Boustead Naval Shipyard).
      • Status: By 2025, zero ships delivered.
      o Design changes, corruption, mismanagement, and cost overruns stalled the project.
      • Impact:
      o Navy still depends on old Kedah-class (2006) and even older corvettes from the 1980s.
      o Weakens ability to secure South China Sea claims.
      ________________________________________
      b. Multi-Role Support Ship (MRSS)
      • Planned: Amphibious ship program since 2000s.
      • Status: Cancelled/postponed multiple times due to budget.
      • Impact:
      o RMN has no large amphibious lift → limited ability to move troops/equipment in regional crises.
      ________________________________________
      c. Second Batch of Scorpène Submarines
      • Planned: Expansion to 4 submarines.
      • Status: Shelved due to cost.
      • Impact:
      o Malaydesh stuck with just 2 Scorpènes (delivered 2009–2010), insufficient for wide maritime area.
      ________________________________________
      📌 3. Army (TDM)
      a. Self-Propelled Howitzers (SPH)
      • Planned: SPH requirement since early 2000s (to replace old towed artillery).
      • Status: Program repeatedly delayed. Korea’s K9 Thunder shortlisted in 2020s, but no final contract.
      • Impact: Army artillery remains outdated → reduced firepower compared to Indonesia, Singapore.
      ________________________________________
      b. Armored Vehicle Programs
      • AV-8 Gempita: Entered production in 2014, but scaled down from 257 planned units due to cost.
      • Condor APC Replacement: Long planned, but repeatedly delayed → Condors from the 1980s still in service.
      ________________________________________
      c. Rotary Wing (Helicopters)
      • Army Aviation requested more utility and attack helicopters.
      • Programs for attack helicopters (AH-1Z, T129, etc.) discussed but cancelled/delayed.
      • Impact: Army lacks dedicated attack helicopter capability, unlike Indonesia.
      ________________________________________
      📌 4. Reasons for Delay/Failure
      1. Budget constraints → defense stuck at ~1% of GDP.
      2. Political instability → 5 prime ministers between 2018–2025, each with shifting priorities.
      3. Corruption & mismanagement → especially visible in LCS.
      4. Overreliance on foreign suppliers → negotiations stall or get too expensive.
      5. Short-termism → lack of 10–15 year strategic procurement planning.
      ________________________________________
      📌 5. Consequences
      • Capability gaps:
      o Air surveillance weak (delayed MPAs, fighter gap).
      o Maritime security weak (LCS delay, only 2 submarines).
      o Ground firepower weak (delayed SPH, old APCs).
      • Readiness reduced: much equipment obsolete, with few modern replacements.
      • Regional imbalance: Neighbors like Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam modernize faster, leaving Malaydesh behind.

      Hapus
    5. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      📌 1. Overview of Malaydesh ’s Local Defense Industry
      • Malaydesh has several state-linked defense companies like Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS), DefTech, SME Ordnance, ATSC (Aerospace Technology Systems Corporation).
      • However, compared to Singapore’s ST Engineering or Indonesia’s PT Pindad/PT PAL/PT Dirgantara, Malaydesh ’s industry is:
      o Small in scale
      o Heavily dependent on foreign technology transfer
      o Politically influenced
      o Limited in R&D capacity
      ________________________________________
      📌 2. Structural Weaknesses
      a. Overdependence on Foreign Technology
      • Local companies rarely design or develop indigenous platforms.
      • Instead, they assemble or license-build:
      o AV-8 Gempita → Turkish FNSS design
      o LCS Gowind-class → French Naval Group design
      o DefTech trucks/APCs → based on imported chassis
      • This makes Malaydesh vulnerable when foreign partners withdraw or when funding for ToT (Transfer of Technology) dries up.
      ________________________________________
      b. Limited R&D and Innovation
      • Defense R&D budgets are tiny (well under 1% of defense spending).
      • No serious indigenous aircraft, ship, or armored vehicle program has emerged.
      • Malaydesh lacks the ecosystem (universities + defense labs + industry partnerships) that Singapore and South Korea used to build self-reliant industries.
      ________________________________________
      c. Project Mismanagement
      • Local companies given prestige projects beyond their capacity.
      • Example:
      o Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS) with the RM9 billion Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program.
      o BNS failed to deliver even 1 ship by 2025, despite billions spent.
      o Poor project management, design changes, and alleged corruption highlight the weakness of local capability.
      ________________________________________
      d. Small Market Size
      • Malaydesh ’s defense budget is low (~1% of GDP).
      • Domestic orders are too small to sustain a strong local industry.
      • Example: DefTech’s AV-8 Gempita → only ~250 ordered, not enough to support large-scale production.
      • Without export markets, companies cannot achieve economies of scale.
      ________________________________________
      e. Political Interference
      • Contracts often awarded to politically connected firms rather than those with genuine expertise.
      • Results in cost overruns, low quality, and weak accountability.
      • Defense industry becomes a tool for patronage, not capability.
      ________________________________________
      f. Weak Supply Chain
      • Malaydesh imports engines, avionics, weapons, electronics → only basic assembly done locally.
      • Spare parts often need to be ordered from Europe, the US, or Russia → long delays, high costs.
      ________________________________________
      📌 3. Examples of Weakness in Action
      1. LCS Program (Boustead Naval Shipyard)
      o RM9 billion contract (2011) → no ships delivered by 2025.
      o Demonstrates limits of local project management.
      2. AV-8 Gempita (DefTech)
      o Based on Turkish design.
      o Good vehicle, but overpriced (RM30 million per unit) due to local production inefficiencies.
      o No exports → production ends after Malaydesh n order.
      3. SME Ordnance (Small Arms)
      o Tried producing M4 rifles under license.
      o Quality issues and low output.
      o Malaydesh still imports small arms and ammo in bulk.
      4. ATSC (Aircraft Maintenance)
      o Handles Su-30MKM maintenance.
      o Limited capability; many spare parts still need to come from Russia.
      o Readiness rates remain low.
      ________________________________________
      📌 4. Consequences for the Armed Forces
      • Procurement Delays: Local firms cannot deliver on time.
      • Higher Costs: Local assembly often more expensive than imports.
      • Low Readiness: Spare parts and upgrades delayed.
      • Capability Gaps: Programs like MRSS (amphibious ships), SPH (artillery), or fighter jets stuck because local firms cannot handle complexity.


      Hapus
    6. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      📌 1. Why Training Hours Matter
      • Training hours = the amount of time pilots, sailors, soldiers spend actively practicing their skills.
      • In modern militaries, high training tempo is crucial to:
      o Keep proficiency with complex equipment.
      o Build unit cohesion.
      o Maintain combat readiness.
      If training hours fall below international standards, equipment becomes almost useless in real combat.
      ________________________________________
      📌 2. Malaydesh ’s Low Training Hours – Causes
      ✈️ Air Force (RMAF)
      • Fighter pilots should have 150–180 flight hours per year (NATO standard).
      • Many RMAF pilots only get 60–80 hours annually due to:
      o Limited fuel budget.
      o Spare parts shortages.
      o Aircraft availability problems (MiG-29 retired, Su-30 often grounded).
      ________________________________________
      🚢 Navy (RMN)
      • Warships should spend 90–120 days at sea per year to maintain readiness.
      • RMN vessels average 30–50 days at sea, far below requirement.
      • Reasons:
      o Budget cuts for fuel and logistics.
      o Maintenance backlogs (many patrol vessels >40 years old).
      o LCS program delays leaving capability gaps.
      ________________________________________
      🪖 Army (TDM)
      • Modern armies conduct large-scale combined arms exercises regularly.
      • TDM focuses on small-scale, low-cost jungle training instead.
      • Limited live-fire, armored maneuvers, or joint training with air/navy units.
      • Fuel & ammunition budgets are often capped → less field time.
      ________________________________________
      📌 3. Impact of Low Training Hours
      a. Skill Degradation
      • Pilots risk losing combat proficiency (dogfighting, weapons delivery).
      • Sailors struggle with complex operations (anti-submarine warfare, missile defense).
      • Soldiers lack practice in modern combined-arms tactics.
      ________________________________________
      b. Safety Risks
      • Low training hours lead to higher accident rates.
      • Example: RMAF has had multiple crashes (Hawk, Nuri) linked partly to training gaps & maintenance issues.
      ________________________________________
      c. Reduced Interoperability
      • Joint operations (Air–Land–Sea) require constant practice.
      • Without adequate exercises, coordination is weak.
      • Limits Malaydesh ’s ability to operate with allies (e.g., Five Power Defence Arrangements with Singapore, UK, Australia, New Zealand).
      ________________________________________
      d. Wasted Equipment Investment
      • Even when Malaydesh buys modern platforms (e.g., Su-30MKM, Scorpène submarines), lack of training hours means underutilization.
      • Submarine crews need at least 150 sea-days per year → RMN Scorpènes often achieve far less.
      ________________________________________
      e. Morale & Retention Problems
      • Professional soldiers want to train and improve.
      • When budgets restrict them to desk duty or symbolic exercises, morale falls.
      • Leads to difficulties in retaining skilled pilots and officers, who may leave for commercial jobs.
      ________________________________________
      📌 4. Strategic Consequences
      • Malaydesh ’s forces appear large on paper, but real combat readiness is low.
      • In a crisis (e.g., South China Sea standoff), Malaydesh may struggle to deploy capable units quickly.
      • Neighbors like Singapore and Australia maintain much higher training hours → widening readiness gap.
      ________________________________________
      📌 5. Comparison
      • Singapore: RSAF pilots log ~180+ hours/year, Navy ships 100+ days at sea, Army runs constant joint training.
      • Indonesia: Still prioritizes major exercises (Super Garuda Shield with US).
      • Malaydesh : Keeps training mostly low-intensity & symbolic due to budget fuel/ammo limits.

      Hapus
  45. Patutlah FINCANTIERI tiba tiba datang ke LUNAS baru baru ni..... Ada Bau bau LMS 3 dan MRSS guys.....



    Fincantieri Berkolaborasi dengan Enra Energy Malaysia untuk Kapal LMS Batch 3 dan Kapal MRSS

    http://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/06/fincantieri-berkolaborasi-dengan-enra.html

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      📌 1. What Policy Flip-Flops Mean in Procurement
      In Malaydesh ’s case:
      • A procurement program is announced, then delayed, cancelled, or changed.
      • Often re-started later under different specs, suppliers, or budget levels.
      • Result: equipment arrives 10–20 years late — or never at all.
      These flip-flops waste money, damage credibility, and create long gaps in capabilities.
      ________________________________________
      📌 2. Key Drivers of Procurement Flip-Flops
      1. Frequent Government Changes → new prime minister or defense minister wants to review/restart.
      2. Budget Constraints → once economy slows, defense is first to be cut.
      3. Scandals/Corruption → programs frozen or restructured.
      4. Shifting Priorities → suddenly focus on cheaper “interim” solutions.
      5. Lack of Multi-Year Funding → no guarantee a program survives beyond one budget cycle.
      ________________________________________
      📌 3. Case Studies of Procurement Flip-Flops
      ✈️ MRCA Fighter Program
      • 2007: Malaydesh starts plan to replace MiG-29 (retired 2017).
      • 2010–2015: Bidders included Rafale, Eurofighter, Gripen, Su-35, F/A-18E.
      • 2015: Najib defers due to budget.
      • 2018: Mahathir cancels MRCA, shifts to LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).
      • 2021: RMAF issues tender → 2023 chooses FA-50 (Korea).
      • Flip-Flop Outcome: 20 years of talk, still no MRCA fleet by 2025. Only stopgap FA-50 arriving 2026.
      ________________________________________
      🚢 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
      • 2011: Approved → 6 ships (RM9b).
      • 2014–2018: Delays + corruption scandals.
      • 2019: PH gov stops payments pending audit.
      • 2020: PN gov restarts but restructures.
      • 2022: Again reviewed, delivery pushed to 2029.
      • Flip-Flop Outcome: After 14 years, 0 ships delivered, billions sunk.
      ________________________________________
      🚁 Helicopter Replacement (Nuri/Medium-Lift)
      • 2017: Nuri retired abruptly → big air mobility gap.
      • 2018–2019: PH gov cancels procurement, proposes leasing option.
      • 2021: Leasing plan with 12 helicopters → downsized to 4 Black Hawks.
      • 2023: Contract collapses due to dispute.
      • Flip-Flop Outcome: Still no medium-lift replacement by 2025. Army depends on ad-hoc leased platforms.
      ________________________________________
      🪖 Army Armored Vehicles
      • 1980s-era Condor APCs still in service.
      • 2011: Order for 257 AV-8 Gempita → delivered but overpriced.
      • Plan for new 4x4 and 6x6 vehicles → multiple tenders cancelled, restarted, then frozen.
      • Flip-Flop Outcome: Malaydesh lacks a coherent APC fleet, stuck with old Condors.
      ________________________________________
      🔭 Radar & Air Defense Systems
      • Plans for new air defense radars since mid-2000s.
      • 2015: Deferred.
      • 2020: Restarted → selected Thales GM403.
      • 2022: Procurement delayed again due to budget reallocation.
      • Flip-Flop Outcome: Still no nationwide radar coverage in 2025.
      ________________________________________
      📌 4. Patterns of Flip-Flops
      • Announce Big Program (fighters, ships, subs).
      • Budget Tightens or Political Change → program postponed.
      • Resurrect as Smaller/Interim Program (e.g., MRCA → LCA).
      • New Scandal or Government Change → program cancelled again.
      • Restart under new specs → wasting years.
      This cycle explains why Malaydesh still operates:
      • 1980s Condors, 1960s artillery, 1990s fighters, 1970s patrol boats.

      Hapus
    2. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      📌 1. What is Fiscal Space?
      • Fiscal space = the government’s capacity to spend without threatening debt sustainability.
      • For defense, it means: how much room Malaydesh has in its annual budget to allocate funds for military modernization, operations, and maintenance.
      ________________________________________
      📌 2. Why Malaydesh Has Limited Fiscal Space
      a. High National Debt
      • As of mid-2025: Debt = RM1.3 trillion (~69% of GDP).
      • Much higher than during the 2000s (below 55%).
      • Debt servicing (interest payments) alone takes up 15–17% of annual federal revenue.
      • This squeezes out spending on “non-priority” sectors like defense.
      ________________________________________
      b. Revenue Constraints
      • Malaydesh ’s tax base is relatively small.
      • GST (Goods & Services Tax) abolished in 2018 → replaced by SST (Sales & Service Tax).
      o GST: broad, efficient, higher revenue.
      o SST: narrower, less revenue.
      • Oil & gas revenue is volatile (20–25% of government income), so during oil price slumps, fiscal stress rises.
      ________________________________________
      c. Competing Social Priorities
      • Large commitments to:
      o Education & health (biggest budget shares).
      o Fuel subsidies & cash assistance programs.
      o Infrastructure projects.
      • Defense is politically unpopular → gets < 1% of GDP annually, one of the lowest in ASEAN.
      ________________________________________
      d. Rigid Operating Expenditure
      • Around 70% of defense budget goes to salaries, pensions, and allowances.
      • Very little left for capital expenditure (procurement & modernization).
      • Fiscal rigidities make it impossible to redirect funds without upsetting powerful civil service & veterans’ groups.
      ________________________________________
      e. Currency Weakness
      • Ringgit depreciation against USD (RM4.70–RM4.80 in 2025) makes imported defense systems much more expensive.
      • Every billion USD contract now costs far more in local currency terms, shrinking what Malaydesh can buy.
      ________________________________________
      📌 3. Effects on Military Spending
      • Annual defense budget stuck at ~RM15–19 billion (0.9–1% of GDP).
      • Compare:
      o Singapore: ~3–4% of GDP.
      o Indonesia: 1–1.2% of GDP, but on a much bigger GDP base.
      • Result: Malaydesh ’s defense envelope is too small to cover both O&M (operations & maintenance) and procurement.
      ________________________________________
      📌 4. Consequences for Military Procurement
      1. Delayed Programs → MRCA fighter jets, LCS frigates, helicopters.
      2. Cancelled or Downsized Orders → e.g., MRCA reduced to LCA, Black Hawk leasing plan shrunk then collapsed.
      3. Inability to Commit to Multi-Year Plans → no guaranteed funding stream.
      4. Patchwork Modernization → instead of comprehensive upgrades, Malaydesh buys in piecemeal fashion.
      ________________________________________
      📌 5. Strategic Impact
      • Malaydesh cannot sustain credible deterrence in South China Sea.
      • Must rely heavily on diplomacy and ASEAN forums instead of hard power.
      • Forces risk becoming a “hollow military”: large on paper, weak in practice.
      ________________________________________
      📌 6. Comparison with Indonesia (MEF)
      • Indonesia also has fiscal limits, but:
      o Clear 25-year modernization roadmap (MEF).
      o Willingness to borrow externally for defense procurement.
      o Gradual capability improvements visible (submarines, fighters, naval ships).
      • Malaydesh : stuck in short-term annual budgeting + unwillingness to take on foreign defense loans → programs constantly stall.

      Hapus
    3. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      📌 1. Why Training Hours Matter
      • Training hours = the amount of time pilots, sailors, soldiers spend actively practicing their skills.
      • In modern militaries, high training tempo is crucial to:
      o Keep proficiency with complex equipment.
      o Build unit cohesion.
      o Maintain combat readiness.
      If training hours fall below international standards, equipment becomes almost useless in real combat.
      ________________________________________
      📌 2. Malaydesh ’s Low Training Hours – Causes
      ✈️ Air Force (RMAF)
      • Fighter pilots should have 150–180 flight hours per year (NATO standard).
      • Many RMAF pilots only get 60–80 hours annually due to:
      o Limited fuel budget.
      o Spare parts shortages.
      o Aircraft availability problems (MiG-29 retired, Su-30 often grounded).
      ________________________________________
      🚢 Navy (RMN)
      • Warships should spend 90–120 days at sea per year to maintain readiness.
      • RMN vessels average 30–50 days at sea, far below requirement.
      • Reasons:
      o Budget cuts for fuel and logistics.
      o Maintenance backlogs (many patrol vessels >40 years old).
      o LCS program delays leaving capability gaps.
      ________________________________________
      🪖 Army (TDM)
      • Modern armies conduct large-scale combined arms exercises regularly.
      • TDM focuses on small-scale, low-cost jungle training instead.
      • Limited live-fire, armored maneuvers, or joint training with air/navy units.
      • Fuel & ammunition budgets are often capped → less field time.
      ________________________________________
      📌 3. Impact of Low Training Hours
      a. Skill Degradation
      • Pilots risk losing combat proficiency (dogfighting, weapons delivery).
      • Sailors struggle with complex operations (anti-submarine warfare, missile defense).
      • Soldiers lack practice in modern combined-arms tactics.
      ________________________________________
      b. Safety Risks
      • Low training hours lead to higher accident rates.
      • Example: RMAF has had multiple crashes (Hawk, Nuri) linked partly to training gaps & maintenance issues.
      ________________________________________
      c. Reduced Interoperability
      • Joint operations (Air–Land–Sea) require constant practice.
      • Without adequate exercises, coordination is weak.
      • Limits Malaydesh ’s ability to operate with allies (e.g., Five Power Defence Arrangements with Singapore, UK, Australia, New Zealand).
      ________________________________________
      d. Wasted Equipment Investment
      • Even when Malaydesh buys modern platforms (e.g., Su-30MKM, Scorpène submarines), lack of training hours means underutilization.
      • Submarine crews need at least 150 sea-days per year → RMN Scorpènes often achieve far less.
      ________________________________________
      e. Morale & Retention Problems
      • Professional soldiers want to train and improve.
      • When budgets restrict them to desk duty or symbolic exercises, morale falls.
      • Leads to difficulties in retaining skilled pilots and officers, who may leave for commercial jobs.
      ________________________________________
      📌 4. Strategic Consequences
      • Malaydesh ’s forces appear large on paper, but real combat readiness is low.
      • In a crisis (e.g., South China Sea standoff), Malaydesh may struggle to deploy capable units quickly.
      • Neighbors like Singapore and Australia maintain much higher training hours → widening readiness gap.
      ________________________________________
      📌 5. Comparison
      • Singapore: RSAF pilots log ~180+ hours/year, Navy ships 100+ days at sea, Army runs constant joint training.
      • Indonesia: Still prioritizes major exercises (Super Garuda Shield with US).
      • Malaydesh : Keeps training mostly low-intensity & symbolic due to budget fuel/ammo limits.

      Hapus
    4. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      📌 1. Structural Causes of Weak Modernization
      1. Small overall defense budget
      o Around RM18–20B annually (≈ USD 3.5–4B), much lower than neighbors.
      o Most of it goes to salaries & pensions → modernization share <10%.
      2. No Multi-Year Planning
      o Procurement is done on a year-by-year basis, so long projects stall if next year’s budget is cut.
      o Example: LCS Gowind frigates stuck for a decade because funds were not consistently released.
      3. Currency Weakness
      o Weapons priced in USD/EUR, while ringgit has depreciated.
      o RM19B sounds large, but only USD 4B in real purchasing power.
      ________________________________________
      📌 2. Key Military Branch Problems
      ✈️ Air Force (RMAF)
      • MiG-29 retired (2015) → never replaced, leaving capability gap.
      • Su-30MKM → advanced but expensive to maintain, low flying hours.
      • F/A-18D Hornet → old fleet, insufficient numbers.
      • MRCA program (new multirole fighter) → repeatedly delayed since 2007 due to lack of funds.
      • MALE UAV program → still limited, while neighbors already deploy combat drones.
      👉 Result: RMAF today has fewer fighters in service than 20 years ago.
      ________________________________________
      🚢 Navy (RMN)
      • Gowind LCS frigate program (RM9B) → delayed over 10 years, still undelivered (as of 2025).
      • Patrol fleet → many ships >30 years old, suffering from low readiness.
      • Submarines (Scorpène) → only 2 units, high maintenance costs limit patrol days.
      • LMS Batch 1 → Chinese-built, limited combat capability.
      • LMS Batch 2 → delayed due to funding debates.
      👉 Result: RMN faces critical shortfall in surface combatants for South China Sea patrols.
      ________________________________________
      🪖 Army (TDM)
      • Mechanization → limited. AV8 Gempita produced locally, but expensive → numbers restricted.
      • Air defense → virtually nonexistent, only MANPADS.
      • Artillery → outdated, limited range compared to regional peers.
      • Helicopters & transport → too few, most missions still rely on aging Nuri replacements (EC725).
      👉 Result: Army still manpower-heavy, low-tech, designed for counterinsurgency not modern warfare.
      ________________________________________
      📌 3. Consequences of Weak Modernization
      1. Capability Gaps Grow
      o Air defense, fighters, frigates, and UAVs → all behind ASEAN peers.
      o Singapore buying F-35s, Indonesia adding Rafale & submarines, Philippines modernizing with U.S./Japan help.
      2. Prestige Projects Without Sustainment
      o Malaydesh sometimes buys “showpiece” assets (Scorpène, Su-30MKM) but can’t afford to keep them fully operational.
      3. Dependence on Foreign Partners
      o Relies on FPDA (UK, Australia, Singapore, NZ) to cover gaps in defense.
      o Reluctant to invest in self-reliance due to cost.
      4. Readiness vs Numbers Mismatch
      o On paper, Malaydesh has frigates, fighters, submarines.
      o In reality, many are grounded, under maintenance, or underutilized due to low O&M budgets.
      ________________________________________
      📌 4. Why Modernization is Weak Compared to Neighbors
      • Singapore: Spends USD 12–13B, continuous pipeline of upgrades.
      • Indonesia: Larger budget (~USD 9–10B), long-term MEF plan ensures steady procurement.
      • Philippines: Once weaker than Malaydesh , but now modernizing faster due to external funding & security urgency.
      • Malaydesh : Stuck in “holding pattern,” replacing nothing major since early 2000s.
      ________________________________________
      📌 5. Strategic Implications
      • South China Sea → Malaydesh lacks credible deterrence.
      • National Industry → Weak local defense industry means modernization always depends on foreign suppliers.
      • Future Risk → By 2030, without radical change, Malaydesh risks having obsolete forces across all branches simultaneously.

      Hapus
  46. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
    📌 1. Chronic Underfunding
    • Malaydesh spends ~1% of GDP on defense (2023–2025: around RM16–19 billion).
    • By comparison:
    o Singapore: ~3% of GDP
    o Indonesia: ~1.2–1.3% but rising
    • The small “envelope” means:
    o Not enough money for procurement + operations + maintenance simultaneously.
    o Programs get stretched for decades, cancelled, or reduced in scale.
    o Even when announced, many projects end up shelved.
    ________________________________________
    📌 2. Political Instability & Short-Termism
    • Since 2018, Malaydesh has had 5 prime ministers in 7 years → policies keep changing.
    • Each new government “re-evaluates” defense programs, often pausing or cancelling them.
    • Politicians see defense as low priority compared to subsidies, social spending, and debt repayment.
    • Long-term defense plans (like the Defense White Paper 2019) collapse because they require 10–15 years of consistent execution, which Malaydesh ’s politics cannot provide.
    ________________________________________
    📌 3. Budget Distribution Problems
    • Even the small budget is poorly allocated:
    o ~50–60% on salaries and pensions.
    o ~20–30% on operations & maintenance.
    o <20% left for procurement/modernization.
    • Effect: Malaydesh maintains a large but under-equipped force → many personnel, few modern assets.
    ________________________________________
    📌 4. Weak Local Defense Industry
    • Malaydesh relies on foreign technology and local assembly (e.g., AV-8 Gempita, LCS).
    • Local firms often have political ties, not technical competence.
    • Results in scandals and failures (e.g., Littoral Combat Ship – RM9 billion, zero ships delivered).
    • No strong exports → cannot sustain industry with economies of scale.
    ________________________________________
    📌 5. Procurement Delays, Cancellations & Scandals
    • Major programs (fighters, ships, artillery) delayed for 10–20 years.
    • Scandals (LCS, helicopter purchases) erode public and political trust.
    • Frequent “resetting” of programs → capability gaps widen.
    • Example: MRCA program to replace MiG-29 has been discussed since 2007, still no aircraft by 2025.
    ________________________________________
    📌 6. Operational & Maintenance Weakness
    • Many platforms cannot be sustained:
    o Su-30MKM fighter availability often <50%.
    o Submarines require costly foreign maintenance.
    o Condor APCs from 1980s still in service because replacements delayed.
    • Spare parts supply chain weak → long downtime for equipment.
    ________________________________________
    📌 7. External Dependence
    • Malaydesh buys from multiple suppliers (Russia, US, Europe, China, Korea).
    • Creates logistics nightmare → incompatible spare parts, training, and support.
    • Unlike Singapore (which standardizes on Western tech), Malaydesh struggles with interoperability.
    ________________________________________
    📌 8. Public Perception & Priorities
    • Ordinary Malaydesh ns often see defense spending as “wasteful”.
    • Scandals reinforce belief that defense = corruption.
    • Governments focus instead on subsidies, civil service pay, and development projects to win votes.
    • Defense is always sacrificed first when budget pressures rise.
    ________________________________________
    📌 9. Consequences: Why Malaydesh Stays Stuck
    • Capability gaps in all services:
    o Air Force: fighter gap, weak surveillance.
    o Navy: LCS delays, only 2 submarines, no amphibious capability.
    o Army: outdated artillery, APCs, no attack helicopters.
    • Low readiness: Many assets grounded or unavailable.
    • Falling behind neighbors:
    o Singapore maintains cutting-edge military.
    o Indonesia accelerating modernization.
    o Vietnam expanding navy & air force for South China Sea.
    • Malaydesh risks becoming a “hollow force”: large on paper, weak in reality.

    BalasHapus
  47. Aset Jet Ringan Baruw kita
    ✨️LAMBORGINI=M-346F BLOK 20
    PREMIUM SUPER JET KLAS KAUM ELIT
    ✅️LEONARDO GRIFO AESA RADAR
    ✅️TWIN ENGINE
    All Made In Yurop Mahal & Mewah haha!😎💰😎

    sedangkan negri🎰kasino genting, hanya mampu barter F/A50M(URAH) haha!🤣🍌🤣
    teile hundai gaesz..
    BEDA LEPEL BEDA KASTA haha!😋😂😋

    BalasHapus
  48. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
    📌 1. Malaydesh n Armed Forces (ATM) Structure
    • Army (TDM) → largest service, but light and poorly mechanized.
    • Navy (TLDM) → overstretched, with too few warships to patrol massive waters.
    • Air Force (RMAF/TUDM) → very small, with limited combat aircraft and surveillance capability.
    Overall → ATM is small in size and outdated in technology.
    ________________________________________
    📌 2. Army (TDM) – Outdated & Lightly Armed
    • Tanks & Armor:
    o No modern Main Battle Tanks (MBTs).
    o Relies mostly on PT-91M Pendekar (Polish MBT, ~2000s tech, inferior to Leopard 2 or T-90).
    o Many armored vehicles (Condor, Sibmas) date back to the 1980s.
    • Artillery:
    o Mostly old Oto Melara 105mm howitzers, with limited 155mm systems.
    o No long-range rocket artillery (MLRS) like Indonesia (ASTROS) or Singapore (HIMARS).
    • Air Defense:
    o Only short-range MANPADS (Igla, Starstreak).
    o No medium- or long-range SAMs → airspace exposed.
    • Helicopters:
    o Nuri (Sikorsky S-61A) retired without full replacement.
    o Limited utility/attack helicopter capability.
    👉 Problem: The Army is big in manpower (~80,000) but under-armed compared to regional standards.
    ________________________________________
    📌 3. Navy (TLDM) – Shrinking & Aging
    • Frigates/Corvettes:
    o Only 2 Lekiu-class (1990s), and 4 Laksamana-class corvettes (1980s Italian ships).
    o All nearing end-of-life.
    • Submarines:
    o 2 Scorpène-class (KD Tunku Abdul Rahman, KD Tun Razak).
    o Aging, with high maintenance costs.
    o Cannot cover both Peninsular & East Malaydesh simultaneously.
    • Patrol Vessels:
    o Many are small, slow, and aging (Kasturi-class corvettes, Handalan-class FACs from the 1970s).
    • New ships delayed:
    o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal: 6 planned Gowind-class frigates, 0 delivered since 2011.
    👉 Problem: The Navy is too small to secure Malaydesh South China Sea EEZ or counter Chinese presence.
    ________________________________________
    📌 4. Air Force (RMAF/TUDM) – Very Small Fleet
    • Fighters:
    o ~18 Su-30MKM (but many often grounded due to maintenance issues).
    o ~8 F/A-18D Hornets (aging, no replacements yet).
    o MiG-29 fleet retired with no direct replacement.
    o Only 36 FA-50 light fighters on order (delivery starting mid-2020s).
    • Air Defense:
    o No long-range SAMs, no integrated IADS.
    o Airspace relies on fighters only.
    • Surveillance/Support:
    o Limited AEW&C (Airborne Early Warning & Control).
    o Few aerial tankers → no long-range endurance.
    • Transport/Helicopters:
    o Small fleet of C-130s and CN-235s.
    o Heavy dependence on aging Nuri helicopters (retired, with gaps in capability).
    👉 Problem: The Air Force is tiny compared to neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam).
    ________________________________________
    📌 5. Why “Small & Obsolete” Matters
    • Cannot project power: ATM lacks long-range strike, strong navy, or heavy armor.
    • Poor deterrence: Enemies know Malaydesh cannot respond effectively.
    • Maintenance burden: Old equipment costs more to keep running than buying new.
    • Capability gaps:
    o No long-range air defense.
    o No modern drones for ISR/strike.
    o No sufficient submarine fleet.
    o Weak sealift/airlift for East Malaydesh defense.
    ________________________________________
    📌 6. Regional Comparison
    • Singapore: 100+ F-15/16 fighters, Leopard 2 tanks, Formidable-class frigates, submarines, HIMARS, long-range SAMs.
    • Indonesia: Expanding with Rafale, F-15EX, submarines, frigates, rocket artillery.
    • Vietnam: Strong Su-30 fleet, Bastion-P coastal missile batteries, Kilo-class submarines.
    • Malaydesh :
    o ~26 operational fighters.
    o 2 submarines.
    o No long-range SAMs or modern coastal defense systems.
    o Aging ships & vehicles.

    BalasHapus
  49. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
    📌 1. What Policy Flip-Flops Mean in Procurement
    In Malaydesh ’s case:
    • A procurement program is announced, then delayed, cancelled, or changed.
    • Often re-started later under different specs, suppliers, or budget levels.
    • Result: equipment arrives 10–20 years late — or never at all.
    These flip-flops waste money, damage credibility, and create long gaps in capabilities.
    ________________________________________
    📌 2. Key Drivers of Procurement Flip-Flops
    1. Frequent Government Changes → new prime minister or defense minister wants to review/restart.
    2. Budget Constraints → once economy slows, defense is first to be cut.
    3. Scandals/Corruption → programs frozen or restructured.
    4. Shifting Priorities → suddenly focus on cheaper “interim” solutions.
    5. Lack of Multi-Year Funding → no guarantee a program survives beyond one budget cycle.
    ________________________________________
    📌 3. Case Studies of Procurement Flip-Flops
    ✈️ MRCA Fighter Program
    • 2007: Malaydesh starts plan to replace MiG-29 (retired 2017).
    • 2010–2015: Bidders included Rafale, Eurofighter, Gripen, Su-35, F/A-18E.
    • 2015: Najib defers due to budget.
    • 2018: Mahathir cancels MRCA, shifts to LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).
    • 2021: RMAF issues tender → 2023 chooses FA-50 (Korea).
    • Flip-Flop Outcome: 20 years of talk, still no MRCA fleet by 2025. Only stopgap FA-50 arriving 2026.
    ________________________________________
    🚢 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
    • 2011: Approved → 6 ships (RM9b).
    • 2014–2018: Delays + corruption scandals.
    • 2019: PH gov stops payments pending audit.
    • 2020: PN gov restarts but restructures.
    • 2022: Again reviewed, delivery pushed to 2029.
    • Flip-Flop Outcome: After 14 years, 0 ships delivered, billions sunk.
    ________________________________________
    🚁 Helicopter Replacement (Nuri/Medium-Lift)
    • 2017: Nuri retired abruptly → big air mobility gap.
    • 2018–2019: PH gov cancels procurement, proposes leasing option.
    • 2021: Leasing plan with 12 helicopters → downsized to 4 Black Hawks.
    • 2023: Contract collapses due to dispute.
    • Flip-Flop Outcome: Still no medium-lift replacement by 2025. Army depends on ad-hoc leased platforms.
    ________________________________________
    🪖 Army Armored Vehicles
    • 1980s-era Condor APCs still in service.
    • 2011: Order for 257 AV-8 Gempita → delivered but overpriced.
    • Plan for new 4x4 and 6x6 vehicles → multiple tenders cancelled, restarted, then frozen.
    • Flip-Flop Outcome: Malaydesh lacks a coherent APC fleet, stuck with old Condors.
    ________________________________________
    🔭 Radar & Air Defense Systems
    • Plans for new air defense radars since mid-2000s.
    • 2015: Deferred.
    • 2020: Restarted → selected Thales GM403.
    • 2022: Procurement delayed again due to budget reallocation.
    • Flip-Flop Outcome: Still no nationwide radar coverage in 2025.
    ________________________________________
    📌 4. Patterns of Flip-Flops
    • Announce Big Program (fighters, ships, subs).
    • Budget Tightens or Political Change → program postponed.
    • Resurrect as Smaller/Interim Program (e.g., MRCA → LCA).
    • New Scandal or Government Change → program cancelled again.
    • Restart under new specs → wasting years.
    This cycle explains why Malaydesh still operates:
    • 1980s Condors, 1960s artillery, 1990s fighters, 1970s patrol boats.

    BalasHapus
  50. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
    📌 1. What Policy Flip-Flops Mean in Procurement
    In Malaydesh ’s case:
    • A procurement program is announced, then delayed, cancelled, or changed.
    • Often re-started later under different specs, suppliers, or budget levels.
    • Result: equipment arrives 10–20 years late — or never at all.
    These flip-flops waste money, damage credibility, and create long gaps in capabilities.
    ________________________________________
    📌 2. Key Drivers of Procurement Flip-Flops
    1. Frequent Government Changes → new prime minister or defense minister wants to review/restart.
    2. Budget Constraints → once economy slows, defense is first to be cut.
    3. Scandals/Corruption → programs frozen or restructured.
    4. Shifting Priorities → suddenly focus on cheaper “interim” solutions.
    5. Lack of Multi-Year Funding → no guarantee a program survives beyond one budget cycle.
    ________________________________________
    📌 3. Case Studies of Procurement Flip-Flops
    ✈️ MRCA Fighter Program
    • 2007: Malaydesh starts plan to replace MiG-29 (retired 2017).
    • 2010–2015: Bidders included Rafale, Eurofighter, Gripen, Su-35, F/A-18E.
    • 2015: Najib defers due to budget.
    • 2018: Mahathir cancels MRCA, shifts to LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).
    • 2021: RMAF issues tender → 2023 chooses FA-50 (Korea).
    • Flip-Flop Outcome: 20 years of talk, still no MRCA fleet by 2025. Only stopgap FA-50 arriving 2026.
    ________________________________________
    🚢 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
    • 2011: Approved → 6 ships (RM9b).
    • 2014–2018: Delays + corruption scandals.
    • 2019: PH gov stops payments pending audit.
    • 2020: PN gov restarts but restructures.
    • 2022: Again reviewed, delivery pushed to 2029.
    • Flip-Flop Outcome: After 14 years, 0 ships delivered, billions sunk.
    ________________________________________
    🚁 Helicopter Replacement (Nuri/Medium-Lift)
    • 2017: Nuri retired abruptly → big air mobility gap.
    • 2018–2019: PH gov cancels procurement, proposes leasing option.
    • 2021: Leasing plan with 12 helicopters → downsized to 4 Black Hawks.
    • 2023: Contract collapses due to dispute.
    • Flip-Flop Outcome: Still no medium-lift replacement by 2025. Army depends on ad-hoc leased platforms.
    ________________________________________
    🪖 Army Armored Vehicles
    • 1980s-era Condor APCs still in service.
    • 2011: Order for 257 AV-8 Gempita → delivered but overpriced.
    • Plan for new 4x4 and 6x6 vehicles → multiple tenders cancelled, restarted, then frozen.
    • Flip-Flop Outcome: Malaydesh lacks a coherent APC fleet, stuck with old Condors.
    ________________________________________
    🔭 Radar & Air Defense Systems
    • Plans for new air defense radars since mid-2000s.
    • 2015: Deferred.
    • 2020: Restarted → selected Thales GM403.
    • 2022: Procurement delayed again due to budget reallocation.
    • Flip-Flop Outcome: Still no nationwide radar coverage in 2025.
    ________________________________________
    📌 4. Patterns of Flip-Flops
    • Announce Big Program (fighters, ships, subs).
    • Budget Tightens or Political Change → program postponed.
    • Resurrect as Smaller/Interim Program (e.g., MRCA → LCA).
    • New Scandal or Government Change → program cancelled again.
    • Restart under new specs → wasting years.
    This cycle explains why Malaydesh still operates:
    • 1980s Condors, 1960s artillery, 1990s fighters, 1970s patrol boats.


    BalasHapus
  51. Hahhaha malondeshh kita bukan level lagi
    Negara kok byk bual
    Sewa aja masih kajian tender

    Salam PWMBUAL

    BalasHapus
  52. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
    📌 1. Nature of Corruption in Defense
    Defense procurement is especially vulnerable in Malaydesh because:
    • Contracts are opaque, often labeled “national security” (no public scrutiny).
    • Deals are politically negotiated, not based on military needs.
    • Offsets and local content requirements create opportunities for rent-seeking.
    • Oversight is weak; Parliament rarely audits defense deals in depth.
    ________________________________________
    📌 2. Major Examples of Corruption & Mismanagement
    a. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
    • Budget: RM9 billion (≈ USD 2B) approved in 2011.
    • Plan: 6 Gowind-class stealth frigates (from France/Thales-DCNS via Boustead Naval Shipyard).
    • Reality:
    o By 2022, not a single ship delivered despite RM6B already spent.
    o Designs were changed mid-way without Navy approval.
    o Funds misused → overpriced contracts, subcontracting to cronies.
    o Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee (PAC) found “serious mismanagement & corruption.”
    • Effect: Malaydesh ’s navy today still lacks new major combatants.
    ________________________________________
    b. Scorpène Submarine Scandal (2002 deal)
    • Malaydesh bought 2 French Scorpène submarines (~EUR 1B).
    • Allegations:
    o Commissions of over EUR 100M paid to Malaydesh n middlemen.
    o Linked to Altantuya Shaariibuu murder case (Mongolian translator who was investigating kickbacks).
    • Submarines delivered, but maintenance problems + corruption controversy damaged credibility.
    ________________________________________
    c. AV8 Gempita Armored Vehicles
    • Contract: RM7.5 billion for 257 vehicles (with Turkish FNSS tech transfer).
    • Issues:
    o Final unit cost very high (~USD 7M per vehicle, more expensive than Western IFVs).
    o Questionable whether Malaydesh needed so many heavy IFVs for its geography.
    o Seen as more of an industrial project for DRB-HICOM than a military necessity.
    ________________________________________
    d. Helicopter & Aircraft Procurement
    • MD530G light scout helicopters → ordered in 2016 (RM321M), but delivery delayed for years.
    • Spare parts for Nuri helicopters (now retired) were procured at inflated prices.
    • Many contracts allegedly awarded to politically connected firms with no expertise.
    ________________________________________
    📌 3. Forms of Mismanagement
    1. Overpricing → Malaydesh pays higher than global market prices.
    2. Delayed Deliveries → money spent, assets not delivered on time (or never).
    3. Capability Mismatch → politicians push prestige projects instead of what the armed forces need.
    4. Maintenance Neglect → assets delivered but poorly supported (e.g., Su-30MKM spare parts issue).
    5. Cronyism in Local Industry → contracts given to politically linked companies (Boustead, DRB-HICOM, etc.).
    ________________________________________
    📌 4. Systemic Causes
    • Weak Oversight: PAC investigations only happen after scandals explode.
    • Political Patronage: Defense contracts = tool to fund ruling parties & allies.
    • Short-Term Politics: Each government wants “their own” deals, canceling or altering old ones.
    • Secrecy Shield: “National security” label prevents open tender.
    • Lack of Continuity: Frequent government changes → projects stall.
    ________________________________________
    📌 5. Consequences for the Military
    • Loss of Trust: Public sees defense as corrupt, reducing support for bigger budgets.
    • Capability Gaps: Navy still using aging ships, Air Force has no new fighters, Army modernization slow.
    • Higher Costs: Delays and corruption inflate prices, wasting scarce funds.
    • Readiness Impact: Submarines, aircraft, ships often grounded due to missing spare parts & poor maintenance.
    • Regional Decline: Malaydesh falls behind Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, and even the Philippines.

    BalasHapus
  53. Rafale,kaan,n346,f50,j10..dan nanti di ujung bikin kejutan su35 dan 57..siap siap merenung Kat jamban si gembulll malaydesss..😅😁🤣🙃😛

    BalasHapus
  54. Rafale,kaan,n346,f50,j10..dan nanti di ujung bikin kejutan su35 dan 57..siap siap merenung Kat jamban si gembulll malaydesss..😅😁🤣🙃😛

    BalasHapus
  55. Itali sayang kita, langsung tawarkan ASET PREMIUM haha!🧞‍♂️✨️🧞‍♂️
    ✅️FINCANTIERI PPA
    ✅️LEONARDO M346F
    ✅️LEONARDO RADAR
    ✅️LEONARDO 127/64
    ✅️LEONARDO SOVRAPONTE 76 STRALES
    langsung kita SHOPPING SOPING
    TANPA BASA BASI BAYAR CA$H haha!🤑😎🤑

    tawarkan lagi ASET MAHAL PREMIUM
    ✅️FINCANTIERI GARIBALDI CV
    ✅️FINCANTIERI 212 NFS
    ✅️FINCANTIERI FREMM
    Siyap siyap kita bungkus lagiii..CA$H haha!🤗🤑🤗

    Sedangkan negri🎰kasino genting
    Fincantieri tak tawarkan aset premium
    hanya tengok shipyard penghasil kapal rongsok kena komplen NAVAL GRUP,
    ❌️SALAH PASANG PIPA & KABEL WIRE
    4000 PCS
    Kena tegur RE WORK haha!🤪😝🤪

    kahsiyan tak dianggap haha!😋😁😋

    BalasHapus
  56. Selalu shoping karena orang kaya


    pemilihan M-346 oleh Kementerian Pertahanan RI guna mengejar rencana modernisasi armada pesawat TNI AU dengan memanfaatkan teknologi dan kinerja canggih. M-346 akan menggantikan peran pesawat yang sudah tua, seperti Hawk 100/200.

    BalasHapus
  57. Malaysia rancang beli aset ketenteraan dari Itali, perkukuh keselamatan maritim

    https://www.sinarharian.com.my/article/736893/berita/nasional/malaysia-rancang-beli-aset-ketenteraan-dari-itali-perkukuh-keselamatan-maritim

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      📌 1. Overall Context
      • Malaydesh ’s defense spending has stagnated for over a decade.
      • Procurement delays + corruption scandals → few new assets acquired since the mid-2000s.
      • Result: Most of Malaydesh ’s core platforms are 20–40 years old, with growing maintenance problems and declining readiness.
      ________________________________________
      📌 2. Royal Malaydesh n Air Force (RMAF / TUDM)
      Fighters
      • F/A-18D Hornet
      o Bought in the mid-1990s (8 units).
      o Still capable, but now ~30 years old.
      o Spares are costly, fleet too small for sustained operations.
      • Su-30MKM Flanker
      o Acquired 2007 (18 units).
      o Modern on paper, but plagued by spare parts shortages and maintenance delays.
      o Readiness sometimes drops below 50%.
      • MiG-29 Fulcrum
      o Acquired early 1990s.
      o Retired in 2017 due to high maintenance cost.
      o No replacement yet → huge capability gap.
      Transport & Helicopters
      • C-130 Hercules: Workhorses from the 1970s/80s, some being upgraded but still very old.
      • Nuri Helicopters (Sikorsky S-61): Entered service in the 1960s. Finally retired in 2019 after fatal crashes. Replacement slow.
      👉 Impact: RMAF cannot maintain a credible air defense or long-range strike role. Fleet too small, too old, and too expensive to keep flying.
      ________________________________________
      📌 3. Royal Malaydesh n Navy (RMN / TLDM)
      Surface Fleet
      • Kasturi-class corvettes (1980s): Upgraded, but still outdated hulls.
      • Laksamana-class corvettes (ex-Italian, 1980s design): Small, limited endurance, hard to maintain.
      • Lekiu-class frigates (delivered 1999–2000): Now ~25 years old, mid-life upgrades delayed.
      Submarines
      • Scorpène-class (delivered 2009): Relatively new, but expensive to maintain. Limited to 2 boats → too few for constant patrols.
      New Projects
      • LCS Gowind Frigates (6 planned): As of 2025, still undelivered due to scandal & mismanagement.
      👉 Impact: RMN faces the South China Sea with mostly 30–40-year-old corvettes and frigates, plus just 2 subs.
      ________________________________________
      📌 4. Malaydesh n Army (TDM)
      • Main Battle Tanks: Malaydesh has 48 PT-91M (Polish T-72 variant, delivered mid-2000s). Already outdated by modern standards.
      • Armored Vehicles:
      o Condor APCs → from 1980s, many still in service.
      o Sibmas → from 1980s, obsolete for modern combat.
      o AV8 Gempita (new, 2010s) → too few to replace older fleets.
      • Artillery: Mostly towed howitzers; limited modern self-propelled guns.
      • Air Defense: Minimal, mostly MANPADS and old radar systems.
      👉 Impact: Army is manpower-heavy, equipment-light, with many vehicles older than the soldiers who operate them.
      ________________________________________
      📌 5. Systemic Problems from Aging Equipment
      1. High Maintenance Costs → Old assets require more funds just to stay operational.
      2. Low Availability → Fighter jets and ships often grounded for lack of spares.
      3. Capability Gaps →
      o No modern fighters to replace MiG-29.
      o No new frigates to replace 1980s ships.
      o Army still lacks modern artillery & air defense.
      4. Safety Risks → Nuri helicopter crashes showed how dangerous it is to operate old platforms.
      5. Loss of Deterrence → Neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines) modernize faster, leaving Malaydesh behind.
      ________________________________________
      📌 6. Why Aging Equipment Persists
      • Small defense budget → can’t fund replacements.
      • Procurement delays → programs stuck in limbo for 10–15 years.
      • Corruption scandals → projects like LCS consume billions without results.
      • Political short-termism → each new government resets priorities.

      Hapus
    2. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      📌 1. Overall Context
      • Malaydesh ’s defense spending has stagnated for over a decade.
      • Procurement delays + corruption scandals → few new assets acquired since the mid-2000s.
      • Result: Most of Malaydesh ’s core platforms are 20–40 years old, with growing maintenance problems and declining readiness.
      ________________________________________
      📌 2. Royal Malaydesh n Air Force (RMAF / TUDM)
      Fighters
      • F/A-18D Hornet
      o Bought in the mid-1990s (8 units).
      o Still capable, but now ~30 years old.
      o Spares are costly, fleet too small for sustained operations.
      • Su-30MKM Flanker
      o Acquired 2007 (18 units).
      o Modern on paper, but plagued by spare parts shortages and maintenance delays.
      o Readiness sometimes drops below 50%.
      • MiG-29 Fulcrum
      o Acquired early 1990s.
      o Retired in 2017 due to high maintenance cost.
      o No replacement yet → huge capability gap.
      Transport & Helicopters
      • C-130 Hercules: Workhorses from the 1970s/80s, some being upgraded but still very old.
      • Nuri Helicopters (Sikorsky S-61): Entered service in the 1960s. Finally retired in 2019 after fatal crashes. Replacement slow.
      👉 Impact: RMAF cannot maintain a credible air defense or long-range strike role. Fleet too small, too old, and too expensive to keep flying.
      ________________________________________
      📌 3. Royal Malaydesh n Navy (RMN / TLDM)
      Surface Fleet
      • Kasturi-class corvettes (1980s): Upgraded, but still outdated hulls.
      • Laksamana-class corvettes (ex-Italian, 1980s design): Small, limited endurance, hard to maintain.
      • Lekiu-class frigates (delivered 1999–2000): Now ~25 years old, mid-life upgrades delayed.
      Submarines
      • Scorpène-class (delivered 2009): Relatively new, but expensive to maintain. Limited to 2 boats → too few for constant patrols.
      New Projects
      • LCS Gowind Frigates (6 planned): As of 2025, still undelivered due to scandal & mismanagement.
      👉 Impact: RMN faces the South China Sea with mostly 30–40-year-old corvettes and frigates, plus just 2 subs.
      ________________________________________
      📌 4. Malaydesh n Army (TDM)
      • Main Battle Tanks: Malaydesh has 48 PT-91M (Polish T-72 variant, delivered mid-2000s). Already outdated by modern standards.
      • Armored Vehicles:
      o Condor APCs → from 1980s, many still in service.
      o Sibmas → from 1980s, obsolete for modern combat.
      o AV8 Gempita (new, 2010s) → too few to replace older fleets.
      • Artillery: Mostly towed howitzers; limited modern self-propelled guns.
      • Air Defense: Minimal, mostly MANPADS and old radar systems.
      👉 Impact: Army is manpower-heavy, equipment-light, with many vehicles older than the soldiers who operate them.
      ________________________________________
      📌 5. Systemic Problems from Aging Equipment
      1. High Maintenance Costs → Old assets require more funds just to stay operational.
      2. Low Availability → Fighter jets and ships often grounded for lack of spares.
      3. Capability Gaps →
      o No modern fighters to replace MiG-29.
      o No new frigates to replace 1980s ships.
      o Army still lacks modern artillery & air defense.
      4. Safety Risks → Nuri helicopter crashes showed how dangerous it is to operate old platforms.
      5. Loss of Deterrence → Neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines) modernize faster, leaving Malaydesh behind.
      ________________________________________
      📌 6. Why Aging Equipment Persists
      • Small defense budget → can’t fund replacements.
      • Procurement delays → programs stuck in limbo for 10–15 years.
      • Corruption scandals → projects like LCS consume billions without results.
      • Political short-termism → each new government resets priorities.

      Hapus
    3. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      📌 1. Structural Weaknesses
      • Manpower-heavy, equipment-light: TDM has ~80,000 personnel, but much of its gear is old or lightly armed.
      • Doctrine outdated: Still focused on counterinsurgency (legacy of communist era), not high-intensity modern warfare.
      • Low mobility: Limited airlift and mechanization mean the army cannot rapidly deploy across Malaydesh split geography (Peninsular vs. East Malaydesh ).
      ________________________________________
      📌 2. Equipment Weaknesses
      Armored Vehicles
      • Condor APCs (German-built, 1980s): Still widely used despite being obsolete, poorly protected against IEDs or modern weapons.
      • Sibmas APCs (Belgian, 1980s): Aging, thin armor, limited use today.
      • AV8 Gempita (locally built, 2010s): Modern, but only ~250 units → far too few to replace thousands of older vehicles.
      • Main Battle Tanks (MBT): Only 48 PT-91M (Polish T-72 variant, mid-2000s). Limited firepower compared to regional peers with Leopards (Indonesia, Singapore).
      Artillery
      • Mostly towed howitzers (105mm, 155mm) → outdated for rapid maneuver warfare.
      • Self-propelled artillery → very limited.
      • Rocket artillery → almost nonexistent compared to neighbors (Indonesia, Vietnam).
      Air Defense
      • Very weak → relies on MANPADS (Igla, Starstreak) and old short-range systems.
      • No medium- or long-range SAMs.
      • Vulnerable to modern airstrikes.
      Aviation
      • Lost Nuri helicopters (retired in 2019).
      • MD530G light attack helicopters procured in 2016 → delivery delayed for years, only a few operational.
      • No dedicated attack helicopters (unlike Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand).
      ________________________________________
      📌 3. Training & Readiness
      • Low training hours due to budget → live-fire exercises limited.
      • Joint operations weak → coordination with Navy/Air Force poor.
      • Modern combined arms doctrine (armor + artillery + drones + air cover) underdeveloped.
      ________________________________________
      📌 4. Budget & Allocation Problems
      • Army gets the largest share of manpower spending (salaries, pensions), but little for modernization.
      • Procurement slow → many projects canceled, delayed, or scaled down.
      • Example: Plans for new self-propelled artillery, drones, and air defense systems repeatedly shelved.
      ________________________________________
      📌 5. Geographic & Strategic Challenges
      • Malaydesh is split into two main theaters:
      1. Peninsular Malaydesh
      2. Sabah & Sarawak (Borneo) → vulnerable to incursions (e.g., Lahad Datu, 2013).
      • TDM lacks enough lift capability to quickly reinforce East Malaydesh .
      • Reliant on Navy/Air Force transport, which themselves are weak.
      ________________________________________
      📌 6. Comparison with Neighbors
      • Singapore Army: Fully mechanized, Leopard 2 tanks, modern artillery, strong air defense.
      • Indonesia Army: Larger, Leopard 2 MBTs, rocket artillery, growing modernization.
      • Thailand/Vietnam: Larger artillery, more modern armored units.
      👉 Malaydesh TDM looks under-equipped and outdated by comparison.
      ________________________________________
      📌 7. Consequences of Weakness
      • Border security issues: 2013 Lahad Datu incursion exposed lack of readiness and modern equipment.
      • Low deterrence: Cannot project power against regional threats (e.g., South China Sea disputes).
      • Over-reliance on infantry: Still seen as a “rifle army” with limited heavy support.
      • Morale impact: Soldiers risk being deployed with outdated gear.

      Hapus
    4. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      📌 1. Structural Weaknesses
      • Manpower-heavy, equipment-light: TDM has ~80,000 personnel, but much of its gear is old or lightly armed.
      • Doctrine outdated: Still focused on counterinsurgency (legacy of communist era), not high-intensity modern warfare.
      • Low mobility: Limited airlift and mechanization mean the army cannot rapidly deploy across Malaydesh split geography (Peninsular vs. East Malaydesh ).
      ________________________________________
      📌 2. Equipment Weaknesses
      Armored Vehicles
      • Condor APCs (German-built, 1980s): Still widely used despite being obsolete, poorly protected against IEDs or modern weapons.
      • Sibmas APCs (Belgian, 1980s): Aging, thin armor, limited use today.
      • AV8 Gempita (locally built, 2010s): Modern, but only ~250 units → far too few to replace thousands of older vehicles.
      • Main Battle Tanks (MBT): Only 48 PT-91M (Polish T-72 variant, mid-2000s). Limited firepower compared to regional peers with Leopards (Indonesia, Singapore).
      Artillery
      • Mostly towed howitzers (105mm, 155mm) → outdated for rapid maneuver warfare.
      • Self-propelled artillery → very limited.
      • Rocket artillery → almost nonexistent compared to neighbors (Indonesia, Vietnam).
      Air Defense
      • Very weak → relies on MANPADS (Igla, Starstreak) and old short-range systems.
      • No medium- or long-range SAMs.
      • Vulnerable to modern airstrikes.
      Aviation
      • Lost Nuri helicopters (retired in 2019).
      • MD530G light attack helicopters procured in 2016 → delivery delayed for years, only a few operational.
      • No dedicated attack helicopters (unlike Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand).
      ________________________________________
      📌 3. Training & Readiness
      • Low training hours due to budget → live-fire exercises limited.
      • Joint operations weak → coordination with Navy/Air Force poor.
      • Modern combined arms doctrine (armor + artillery + drones + air cover) underdeveloped.
      ________________________________________
      📌 4. Budget & Allocation Problems
      • Army gets the largest share of manpower spending (salaries, pensions), but little for modernization.
      • Procurement slow → many projects canceled, delayed, or scaled down.
      • Example: Plans for new self-propelled artillery, drones, and air defense systems repeatedly shelved.
      ________________________________________
      📌 5. Geographic & Strategic Challenges
      • Malaydesh is split into two main theaters:
      1. Peninsular Malaydesh
      2. Sabah & Sarawak (Borneo) → vulnerable to incursions (e.g., Lahad Datu, 2013).
      • TDM lacks enough lift capability to quickly reinforce East Malaydesh .
      • Reliant on Navy/Air Force transport, which themselves are weak.
      ________________________________________
      📌 6. Comparison with Neighbors
      • Singapore Army: Fully mechanized, Leopard 2 tanks, modern artillery, strong air defense.
      • Indonesia Army: Larger, Leopard 2 MBTs, rocket artillery, growing modernization.
      • Thailand/Vietnam: Larger artillery, more modern armored units.
      👉 Malaydesh TDM looks under-equipped and outdated by comparison.
      ________________________________________
      📌 7. Consequences of Weakness
      • Border security issues: 2013 Lahad Datu incursion exposed lack of readiness and modern equipment.
      • Low deterrence: Cannot project power against regional threats (e.g., South China Sea disputes).
      • Over-reliance on infantry: Still seen as a “rifle army” with limited heavy support.
      • Morale impact: Soldiers risk being deployed with outdated gear.

      Hapus
    5. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      📌 1. Fighter Fleet Problems
      Current Fighters (as of 2025):
      • 8 F/A-18D Hornets (bought in 1997)
      o Aging, need mid-life upgrades, limited strike range.
      • 18 Su-30MKM Flankers (delivered 2007–2009)
      o Powerful but plagued by maintenance and spare parts issues.
      o Many often grounded → at times less than 50% readiness.
      • MB-339CM trainers/light attack jets (old, limited combat role).
      👉 Compared to neighbors:
      • Singapore → >60 F-15SGs & upgraded F-16Vs, buying F-35s.
      • Indonesia → >30 Su-27/30s, buying Rafales & F-15EX.
      • Vietnam → 36+ Su-30MK2Vs.
      👉 Malaydesh ’s fighter fleet is tiny and partially unserviceable, limiting air superiority.
      ________________________________________
      📌 2. The MiG-29 Failure
      • Malaydesh bought 18 MiG-29Ns in the 1990s.
      • Retired early (2015) due to:
      o High operating cost.
      o Reliability issues.
      o Poor logistics support from Russia.
      • Replacement program (“MRCA”) delayed for over a decade because of budget constraints and political indecision.
      👉 Result: Fighter numbers dropped sharply → “air power gap” still not fixed.
      ________________________________________
      📌 3. Transport & Airlift
      • C-130 Hercules fleet (14 units) → old but reliable, used for logistics & disaster relief.
      • A400M Atlas (4 units, delivered 2015–2017)
      • Gap: Malaydesh lacks enough airlift to rapidly reinforce East Malaydesh (Sabah & Sarawak).
      ________________________________________
      📌 4. Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) Weakness
      • Currently uses Beechcraft King Air B200Ts → outdated and limited range.
      • Malaydesh faces constant Chinese Coast Guard intrusion in South China Sea, but has no dedicated long-range MPA fleet.
      • Boeing P-8 Poseidon (used by US, Australia, India) is far beyond Malaydesh ’s budget.
      👉 Weak maritime domain awareness → navy operations suffer too.
      ________________________________________
      📌 5. Helicopter Fleet
      • Nuri helicopters (Sikorsky S-61) retired in 2019 due to age.
      • Replacement delayed — Army and Air Force face lift helicopter shortage.
      • Only a few AW139 and EC725 Cougar are available, limiting troop transport and search & rescue (SAR).
      ________________________________________
      📌 6. Air Defense & Radar
      • Malaydesh has no long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
      • Relies only on short-range man-portable systems (MANPADS) and some older gun-based defenses.
      • Radar coverage is patchy, especially over the South China Sea.
      👉 Meaning: Malaydesh n airspace is vulnerable to intrusion by modern air forces.
      ________________________________________
      📌 7. Procurement Delays & Budget Issues
      • Fighter replacement program (MRCA → Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) has been discussed since 2010s, but still no decision due to budget politics.
      • Plans for KAI FA-50 light fighters (up to 36 units) finally approved in 2023, but delivery will stretch into late 2020s.
      • No clear roadmap for 5th-generation fighters (like F-35 or KF-21).
      ________________________________________
      📌 8. Training & Readiness
      • Flight hours per pilot are low (due to budget and fuel costs).
      • Many pilots get less than half the NATO-recommended hours.
      • Limits skill in complex missions (air-to-air combat, night operations).
      • Dependence on foreign exercises with US, Australia, Singapore to maintain training standards.
      ________________________________________
      📌 9. Structural Weakness
      • Too many bases spread across Peninsular and East Malaydesh → increases costs, reduces efficiency.
      • Lack of aerial refueling tankers → fighters cannot sustain long-range missions.
      • Weak electronic warfare and drone capabilities compared to modern peers.

      Hapus
  58. seblah rancang SONGLAP doank buat nipu warganyet kl haha!🤪🤥🤪

    lah kita uda SHOPPING SOPING Realistis haha!🦾🤑🦾
    ✅️PPA
    ✅️RADAR LEONARDO
    ✅️M346F

    apalagi sama BRITIS januari 2026 Resmi £4 Biliun Poundsterling
    ✅️AH140
    ✅️BABKOK MARITIME

    kahsiyan warganyet kl, ke itali karna panik🥶
    NAVAL GRUP Prancis NGAMUK🔥
    Gowing SALAH PASANG PIPA & KABEL WIRE haha!😝😵😝

    BalasHapus
  59. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
    📌 1. Nature of Corruption in Defense
    Defense procurement is especially vulnerable in Malaydesh because:
    • Contracts are opaque, often labeled “national security” (no public scrutiny).
    • Deals are politically negotiated, not based on military needs.
    • Offsets and local content requirements create opportunities for rent-seeking.
    • Oversight is weak; Parliament rarely audits defense deals in depth.
    ________________________________________
    📌 2. Major Examples of Corruption & Mismanagement
    a. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
    • Budget: RM9 billion (≈ USD 2B) approved in 2011.
    • Plan: 6 Gowind-class stealth frigates (from France/Thales-DCNS via Boustead Naval Shipyard).
    • Reality:
    o By 2022, not a single ship delivered despite RM6B already spent.
    o Designs were changed mid-way without Navy approval.
    o Funds misused → overpriced contracts, subcontracting to cronies.
    o Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee (PAC) found “serious mismanagement & corruption.”
    • Effect: Malaydesh ’s navy today still lacks new major combatants.
    ________________________________________
    b. Scorpène Submarine Scandal (2002 deal)
    • Malaydesh bought 2 French Scorpène submarines (~EUR 1B).
    • Allegations:
    o Commissions of over EUR 100M paid to Malaydesh n middlemen.
    o Linked to Altantuya Shaariibuu murder case (Mongolian translator who was investigating kickbacks).
    • Submarines delivered, but maintenance problems + corruption controversy damaged credibility.
    ________________________________________
    c. AV8 Gempita Armored Vehicles
    • Contract: RM7.5 billion for 257 vehicles (with Turkish FNSS tech transfer).
    • Issues:
    o Final unit cost very high (~USD 7M per vehicle, more expensive than Western IFVs).
    o Questionable whether Malaydesh needed so many heavy IFVs for its geography.
    o Seen as more of an industrial project for DRB-HICOM than a military necessity.
    ________________________________________
    d. Helicopter & Aircraft Procurement
    • MD530G light scout helicopters → ordered in 2016 (RM321M), but delivery delayed for years.
    • Spare parts for Nuri helicopters (now retired) were procured at inflated prices.
    • Many contracts allegedly awarded to politically connected firms with no expertise.
    ________________________________________
    📌 3. Forms of Mismanagement
    1. Overpricing → Malaydesh pays higher than global market prices.
    2. Delayed Deliveries → money spent, assets not delivered on time (or never).
    3. Capability Mismatch → politicians push prestige projects instead of what the armed forces need.
    4. Maintenance Neglect → assets delivered but poorly supported (e.g., Su-30MKM spare parts issue).
    5. Cronyism in Local Industry → contracts given to politically linked companies (Boustead, DRB-HICOM, etc.).
    ________________________________________
    📌 4. Systemic Causes
    • Weak Oversight: PAC investigations only happen after scandals explode.
    • Political Patronage: Defense contracts = tool to fund ruling parties & allies.
    • Short-Term Politics: Each government wants “their own” deals, canceling or altering old ones.
    • Secrecy Shield: “National security” label prevents open tender.
    • Lack of Continuity: Frequent government changes → projects stall.
    ________________________________________
    📌 5. Consequences for the Military
    • Loss of Trust: Public sees defense as corrupt, reducing support for bigger budgets.
    • Capability Gaps: Navy still using aging ships, Air Force has no new fighters, Army modernization slow.
    • Higher Costs: Delays and corruption inflate prices, wasting scarce funds.
    • Readiness Impact: Submarines, aircraft, ships often grounded due to missing spare parts & poor maintenance.
    • Regional Decline: Malaydesh falls behind Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, and even the Philippines.

    BalasHapus
  60. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
    📌 1. Legacy of Counterinsurgency (COIN)
    • Malaydesh ’s military doctrine is shaped by history, especially the Communist Insurgency (1948–1989).
    • For decades, the Army’s focus was jungle warfare, counter-guerrilla tactics, and territorial defense.
    • This created a culture of light infantry dominance, with limited emphasis on heavy armor, artillery, or long-range strike capabilities.
    👉 Result: Even after the insurgency ended, Malaydesh continued investing in riflemen and light forces, not in high-tech or heavy combined-arms forces.
    ________________________________________
    📌 2. Lack of Shift Toward Conventional Warfare
    • Neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand) modernized doctrines toward combined arms (armor + artillery + air support + drones).
    • Malaydesh , however, still emphasizes defensive posture and static territorial defense.
    • Little preparation for large-scale conventional conflicts in the South China Sea or with a peer adversary.
    👉 Example: TDM has only 48 tanks (PT-91M), no medium/long-range air defense, and minimal artillery support — not sufficient for modern battlefield requirements.
    ________________________________________
    📌 3. Neglect of Joint Operations
    • Modern doctrine globally stresses joint operations (Army + Navy + Air Force working seamlessly).
    • Malaydesh struggles here:
    o The Air Force has too few planes to provide close air support.
    o The Navy lacks amphibious or sealift capacity to deploy the Army quickly.
    o The Army rarely trains with Navy/Air Force in large-scale exercises.
    👉 Doctrine remains service-siloed, not integrated.
    ________________________________________
    📌 4. Limited Focus on External Threats
    • Official defense policy (2019 White Paper) prioritizes sovereignty defense, non-traditional security (terrorism, piracy, disasters).
    • While valid, this underplays external threats like:
    o China’s growing presence in South China Sea.
    o Potential interstate tensions with neighbors.
    • Malaydesh ’s doctrine avoids offensive or deterrent concepts → remains reactive and defensive.
    ________________________________________
    📌 5. Outdated Operational Concepts
    • No emphasis on drones, electronic warfare, cyber, or network-centric warfare, which are now central in modern doctrine.
    • Still structured around manual infantry-heavy operations.
    • Example: Lahad Datu (2013) → response was slow, infantry-based, and exposed poor surveillance, mobility, and joint command.
    ________________________________________
    📌 6. Political Influence
    • Defense doctrine often shaped by short-term political decisions rather than long-term strategic thinking.
    • Governments avoid committing to major doctrine shifts because it would require:
    o Multi-year funding for modernization.
    o Rethinking force structure (fewer infantry, more high-tech assets).
    • Political leaders prefer maintaining large manpower (jobs/votes) rather than expensive modernization.
    ________________________________________
    📌 7. Consequences of Outdated Doctrine
    1. Imbalance in force structure → too many infantry, too few heavy units.
    2. Weak deterrence → cannot project credible force in South China Sea or against modern militaries.
    3. Slow modernization → doctrine not aligned with future warfare (cyber, drones, precision strike).
    4. Operational limitations → struggles in rapid deployment, combined arms maneuver, and long-range operations.

    BalasHapus
  61. ✨️LAMBORGINI=M346F
    PREMIUM KLAS haha!👍💰👍

    ❌️hyundai=FA50M(URAH) .. mana barter pulak, Memalyukan haha!😝😬😝

    jauhh jauuh dahhh
    BEDA LEPEL BEDA KASTA haha!😎😂😎

    BalasHapus
  62. 5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
    📌 1. Small and Aging Fleet
    • Surface combatants:
    o Only 2 Lekiu-class frigates (1999) → nearing obsolescence, modernization delayed.
    o 2 Kasturi-class frigates (1980s German design) → upgraded but still old.
    o 4 Kedah-class OPVs (2000s, MEKO-100 design) → lightly armed, more like patrol vessels than real warships.
    • Total “serious” warships: fewer than 10, compared to:
    o Singapore Navy: >20 modern, high-tech vessels (Formidable-class frigates, Littoral Mission Vessels).
    o Indonesia Navy: dozens of frigates, corvettes, and modern missile boats.
    👉 TLDM cannot sustain a large-scale naval fight.
    ________________________________________
    📌 2. Submarine Force Weakness
    • Only 2 Scorpène-class submarines (delivered 2009–2010).
    • Problems:
    o High operating cost → often not fully operational.
    o Limited numbers → cannot maintain continuous presence at sea.
    o No replacement or expansion plans due to budget constraints.
    • By contrast:
    o Vietnam has 6 Kilo-class submarines.
    o Singapore operates 4 advanced submarines (with more on order).
    ________________________________________
    📌 3. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
    • In 2011, Malaydesh approved 6 Gowind-class LCS frigates (French design, built locally).
    • Supposed to be the backbone of TLDM modernization.
    • Scandal: corruption, mismanagement, political interference → no ship delivered after more than a decade.
    • First ship expected only in 2026–2027, cost ballooned from RM 6 billion → >RM 11 billion.
    👉 A whole decade lost with zero new frontline warships.
    ________________________________________
    📌 4. Poor Naval Aviation & Support
    • Helicopters: only a few Super Lynx and AW139 → limited ASW (anti-submarine warfare).
    • No naval combat aircraft (relies entirely on RMAF).
    • Weak sealift/amphibious capacity:
    o Only 2–3 support/transport ships (KD Mahawangsa, KD Sri Inderapura-class, etc.).
    o Insufficient to deploy large forces rapidly to Sabah/Sarawak.
    ________________________________________
    📌 5. Budget Constraints
    • Navy modernization requires long-term funding, but:
    o Defense budget = only 1.0–1.1% of GDP.
    o Navy often loses out to Army in budget share.
    o Procurement done piecemeal → delays, cost overruns.
    • Example: LCS program stalled because of funding + political issues, not just technical delays.
    ________________________________________
    📌 6. Strategic Geography Challenge
    • Malaydesh has to defend two separate regions:
    1. Peninsular Malaydesh (Strait of Malacca).
    2. East Malaydesh (Sabah & Sarawak, near South China Sea).
    • TLDM has too few ships to patrol both areas effectively.
    • South China Sea disputes: Chinese Coast Guard and militia often outnumber Malaydesh n presence.
    ________________________________________
    📌 7. Weak Deterrence
    • Malaydesh cannot project naval power.
    • TLDM’s ships are often patrol-focused (low firepower).
    • Relies on diplomacy rather than deterrence in South China Sea.
    • In contrast:
    o Singapore Navy = highly modern, networked, with submarines, frigates, and advanced air defense.
    o Indonesia Navy = larger fleet, more missile boats, expanding rapidly.
    o Vietnam Navy = strong submarine force and anti-access weapons.
    ________________________________________
    📌 8. Consequences
    1. Operational gaps → TLDM cannot maintain presence in South China Sea, leaving oil & gas fields exposed.
    2. Low readiness → too few ships operational at a time.
    3. Dependence on allies → Malaydesh relies on the US, Australia, or joint ASEAN diplomacy rather than its own deterrence.
    4. Morale issues → sailors operate old, under-armed ships while modernization programs stall.

    BalasHapus
  63. om pemburu kita di seblah artikel baruw M346 haha!😬😎😬

    BalasHapus