18 Januari 2026

Progress Meeting on the Loitering Munition System (LMS) Project

18 Januari 2026

Since DSA 2024 Malaysian local industry introduced Loitering Munition System (photo: MSP)

KAJANG – The Director General of the Institute of Institut Penyelidikan Sains dan Teknologi Pertahanan/Defence Science and Technology Research (STRIDE), YBrs. Tuan Nor Azlan Mohd Ramli, chaired the Loitering Munition System (LMS) Project Progress Meeting which took place at STRIDE, Kajang.

This meeting aimed to assess the latest developments in the implementation of the LMS project which was carried out in collaboration with the local defence industry, Tinjau Mahir Sdn. Bhd., in addition to discussing the next steps to ensure that this project meets the set scope, operational requirements and strategic targets of the national defence.

This meeting was also attended by the Manager of Tinjau Mahir Sdn. Bhd., senior STRIDE officers, representatives of Tinjau Mahir, and representatives of the Defence Industry Division.

The discussion focused on the technical and operational progress of the project, the challenges faced and the need for integrated coordination of research activities. The LMS project is a strategic initiative in strengthening the capabilities of local armed drone systems, thus reducing dependence on external technology.

This session reflects STRIDE's continued commitment with local industry partners in ensuring that the development of defence technology is implemented in a phased, systematic and sustainable manner, in line with the goal of strengthening national defence.

(STRIDE)

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35 komentar:

  1. TsetoW18 Januari 2026 pukul 07.51

    WAH KATANYA JENDERAL²NYA KENA TANGKAP ANTI RASUAH !

    BalasHapus
  2. Pe-5-dhot _ PS Pensiun18 Januari 2026 pukul 08.44

    Anduk...comel sangat...πŸ˜‚πŸ˜‚πŸ€£πŸ€£πŸ˜›

    BalasHapus
  3. GEMPURWIRA18 Januari 2026 pukul 09.45

    DRON KAMIKAZE BUATAN MALAYSIA.....alhamdulilah.... GORILLA MISKIN KETAR KETIR...HAHAHAHAHA

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. .18 Januari 2026 pukul 09.59

      DEBT PROBLEMS SINCE 2000
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      DEBT PROBLEMS SINCE 2000 =
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      Hapus
    2. .18 Januari 2026 pukul 10.00

      ZONK MRSS/LPD 2025-2016
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      MRSS/LPD 2025-2016 = ZONK
      5x GANTI PM
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      Hapus
    3. .18 Januari 2026 pukul 10.00

      INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
      GOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 2,9%
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      MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
      GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 3,8%
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      MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
      GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP = HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% OF GDP
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      GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP = HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% OF GDP
      GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP = HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% OF GDP
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      GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP = HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% OF GDP
      GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP = HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% OF GDP
      GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP = HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% OF GDP
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      GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP = HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% OF GDP
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      GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP = HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% OF GDP

      Hapus
    4. .1 Maret 2026 pukul 16.37

      INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
      GOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 2,9%
      GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
      =============
      =============
      MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
      GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 3,8%
      GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
      5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      -
      πŸ“Œ 1. Malaydesh n Armed Forces (ATM) Structure
      • Army (TDM) → largest service, but light and poorly mechanized.
      • Navy (TLDM) → overstretched, with too few warships to patrol massive waters.
      • Air Force (RMAF/TUDM) → very small, with limited combat aircraft and surveillance capability.
      Overall → ATM is small in size and outdated in technology.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 2. Army (TDM) – Outdated & Lightly Armed
      • Tanks & Armor:
      o No modern Main Battle Tanks (MBTs).
      o Relies mostly on PT-91M Pendekar (Polish MBT, ~2000s tech, inferior to Leopard 2 or T-90).
      o Many armored vehicles (Condor, Sibmas) date back to the 1980s.
      • Artillery:
      o Mostly old Oto Melara 105mm howitzers, with limited 155mm systems.
      o No long-range rocket artillery (MLRS) like Indonesia (ASTROS) or Singapore (HIMARS).
      • Air Defense:
      o Only short-range MANPADS (Igla, Starstreak).
      o No medium- or long-range SAMs → airspace exposed.
      • Helicopters:
      o Nuri (Sikorsky S-61A) retired without full replacement.
      o Limited utility/attack helicopter capability.
      πŸ‘‰ Problem: The Army is big in manpower (~80,000) but under-armed compared to regional standards.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 3. Navy (TLDM) – Shrinking & Aging
      • Frigates/Corvettes:
      o Only 2 Lekiu-class (1990s), and 4 Laksamana-class corvettes (1980s Italian ships).
      o All nearing end-of-life.
      • Submarines:
      o 2 Scorpène-class (KD Tunku Abdul Rahman, KD Tun Razak).
      o Aging, with high maintenance costs.
      o Cannot cover both Peninsular & East Malaydesh simultaneously.
      • Patrol Vessels:
      o Many are small, slow, and aging (Kasturi-class corvettes, Handalan-class FACs from the 1970s).
      • New ships delayed:
      o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal: 6 planned Gowind-class frigates, 0 delivered since 2011.
      πŸ‘‰ Problem: The Navy is too small to secure Malaydesh South China Sea EEZ or counter Chinese presence.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 4. Air Force (RMAF/TUDM) – Very Small Fleet
      • Fighters:
      o ~18 Su-30MKM (but many often grounded due to maintenance issues).
      o ~8 F/A-18D Hornets (aging, no replacements yet).
      o MiG-29 fleet retired with no direct replacement.
      o Only 36 FA-50 light fighters on order (delivery starting mid-2020s).
      • Air Defense:
      o No long-range SAMs, no integrated IADS.
      o Airspace relies on fighters only.
      • Surveillance/Support:
      o Limited AEW&C (Airborne Early Warning & Control).
      o Few aerial tankers → no long-range endurance.
      • Transport/Helicopters:
      o Small fleet of C-130s and CN-235s.
      o Heavy dependence on aging Nuri helicopters (retired, with gaps in capability).
      πŸ‘‰ Problem: The Air Force is tiny compared to neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam).
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 5. Why “Small & Obsolete” Matters
      • Cannot project power: ATM lacks long-range strike, strong navy, or heavy armor.
      • Poor deterrence: Enemies know Malaydesh cannot respond effectively.
      • Maintenance burden: Old equipment costs more to keep running than buying new.
      • Capability gaps:
      o No long-range air defense.
      o No modern drones for ISR/strike.
      o No sufficient submarine fleet.
      o Weak sealift/airlift for East Malaydesh defense.

      Hapus
  4. GEMPURWIRA18 Januari 2026 pukul 09.49

    Guys khabarnya INDIANESIA PANIK MATAWANG JATUH hingga Rp17.000 setara 1 USD..... HAHAHAHAHHA

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. .18 Januari 2026 pukul 09.59

      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
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      SPH 2025-1995 = PRANK
      5x GANTI PM
      5x GANTI MOD
      6x GANTI MOF

      Hapus
    2. .18 Januari 2026 pukul 09.59

      DEFISIT 2025-1998
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      DEFISIT 2025-1998
      DEFISIT 2025-1998
      DEFISIT 2025-1998
      -------------------
      DEFISIT 2025-1998 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
      7x GANTI PM
      10x GANTI MOF
      10x GANTI MOD

      Hapus
    3. .18 Januari 2026 pukul 10.00

      INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
      GOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 2,9%
      =============
      =============
      MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
      GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 3,8%
      -
      MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998
      OVERLIMIT DEBT = DEFISIT SEJAK 1998

      Hapus
    4. .1 Maret 2026 pukul 16.37

      INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
      GOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 2,9%
      GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
      =============
      =============
      MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
      GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 3,8%
      GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
      5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      -
      πŸ“Œ 1. What Policy Flip-Flops Mean in Procurement
      In Malaydesh ’s case:
      • A procurement program is announced, then delayed, cancelled, or changed.
      • Often re-started later under different specs, suppliers, or budget levels.
      • Result: equipment arrives 10–20 years late — or never at all.
      These flip-flops waste money, damage credibility, and create long gaps in capabilities.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 2. Key Drivers of Procurement Flip-Flops
      1. Frequent Government Changes → new prime minister or defense minister wants to review/restart.
      2. Budget Constraints → once economy slows, defense is first to be cut.
      3. Scandals/Corruption → programs frozen or restructured.
      4. Shifting Priorities → suddenly focus on cheaper “interim” solutions.
      5. Lack of Multi-Year Funding → no guarantee a program survives beyond one budget cycle.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 3. Case Studies of Procurement Flip-Flops
      ✈️ MRCA Fighter Program
      • 2007: Malaydesh starts plan to replace MiG-29 (retired 2017).
      • 2010–2015: Bidders included Rafale, Eurofighter, Gripen, Su-35, F/A-18E.
      • 2015: Najib defers due to budget.
      • 2018: Mahathir cancels MRCA, shifts to LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).
      • 2021: RMAF issues tender → 2023 chooses FA-50 (Korea).
      • Flip-Flop Outcome: 20 years of talk, still no MRCA fleet by 2025. Only stopgap FA-50 arriving 2026.
      ________________________________________
      🚒 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
      • 2011: Approved → 6 ships (RM9b).
      • 2014–2018: Delays + corruption scandals.
      • 2019: PH gov stops payments pending audit.
      • 2020: PN gov restarts but restructures.
      • 2022: Again reviewed, delivery pushed to 2029.
      • Flip-Flop Outcome: After 14 years, 0 ships delivered, billions sunk.
      ________________________________________
      🚁 Helicopter Replacement (Nuri/Medium-Lift)
      • 2017: Nuri retired abruptly → big air mobility gap.
      • 2018–2019: PH gov cancels procurement, proposes leasing option.
      • 2021: Leasing plan with 12 helicopters → downsized to 4 Black Hawks.
      • 2023: Contract collapses due to dispute.
      • Flip-Flop Outcome: Still no medium-lift replacement by 2025. Army depends on ad-hoc leased platforms.
      ________________________________________
      πŸͺ– Army Armored Vehicles
      • 1980s-era Condor APCs still in service.
      • 2011: Order for 257 AV-8 Gempita → delivered but overpriced.
      • Plan for new 4x4 and 6x6 vehicles → multiple tenders cancelled, restarted, then frozen.
      • Flip-Flop Outcome: Malaydesh lacks a coherent APC fleet, stuck with old Condors.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ”­ Radar & Air Defense Systems
      • Plans for new air defense radars since mid-2000s.
      • 2015: Deferred.
      • 2020: Restarted → selected Thales GM403.
      • 2022: Procurement delayed again due to budget reallocation.
      • Flip-Flop Outcome: Still no nationwide radar coverage in 2025.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 4. Patterns of Flip-Flops
      • Announce Big Program (fighters, ships, subs).
      • Budget Tightens or Political Change → program postponed.
      • Resurrect as Smaller/Interim Program (e.g., MRCA → LCA).
      • New Scandal or Government Change → program cancelled again.
      • Restart under new specs → wasting years.
      This cycle explains why Malaydesh still operates:
      • 1980s Condors, 1960s artillery, 1990s fighters, 1970s patrol boats.

      Hapus
  5. GEMPURWIRA18 Januari 2026 pukul 10.00

    Pesawat C130J INDIANESIA di tembak oleh pejuang OPM.... HAHAHAHAH



    Wakil Presiden Republik Indonesia, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, batal melakukan kunjungan kerja ke Kabupaten Yahukimo, Provinsi Papua Pegunungan pada, Rabu, 14 Januari 2026.

    Pembatalan kunjungan tersebut diduga dikarenakan adanya gangguan teror keamanan dari Kelompok Kriminal Bersenjata (KKB) Papua Pimpinan Kopi Tua Heluka di wilayah Yahukimo.


    https://web.facebook.com/reel/1373360927257187

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. .1 Maret 2026 pukul 16.37

      INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
      GOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 2,9%
      GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
      =============
      =============
      MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
      GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 3,8%
      GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
      5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      -
      πŸ“Œ 1. What is Fiscal Space?
      • Fiscal space = the government’s capacity to spend without threatening debt sustainability.
      • For defense, it means: how much room Malaydesh has in its annual budget to allocate funds for military modernization, operations, and maintenance.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 2. Why Malaydesh Has Limited Fiscal Space
      a. High National Debt
      • As of mid-2025: Debt = RM1.3 trillion (~69% of GDP).
      • Much higher than during the 2000s (below 55%).
      • Debt servicing (interest payments) alone takes up 15–17% of annual federal revenue.
      • This squeezes out spending on “non-priority” sectors like defense.
      ________________________________________
      b. Revenue Constraints
      • Malaydesh ’s tax base is relatively small.
      • GST (Goods & Services Tax) abolished in 2018 → replaced by SST (Sales & Service Tax).
      o GST: broad, efficient, higher revenue.
      o SST: narrower, less revenue.
      • Oil & gas revenue is volatile (20–25% of government income), so during oil price slumps, fiscal stress rises.
      ________________________________________
      c. Competing Social Priorities
      • Large commitments to:
      o Education & health (biggest budget shares).
      o Fuel subsidies & cash assistance programs.
      o Infrastructure projects.
      • Defense is politically unpopular → gets < 1% of GDP annually, one of the lowest in ASEAN.
      ________________________________________
      d. Rigid Operating Expenditure
      • Around 70% of defense budget goes to salaries, pensions, and allowances.
      • Very little left for capital expenditure (procurement & modernization).
      • Fiscal rigidities make it impossible to redirect funds without upsetting powerful civil service & veterans’ groups.
      ________________________________________
      e. Currency Weakness
      • Ringgit depreciation against USD (RM4.70–RM4.80 in 2025) makes imported defense systems much more expensive.
      • Every billion USD contract now costs far more in local currency terms, shrinking what Malaydesh can buy.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 3. Effects on Military Spending
      • Annual defense budget stuck at ~RM15–19 billion (0.9–1% of GDP).
      • Compare:
      o Singapore: ~3–4% of GDP.
      o Indonesia: 1–1.2% of GDP, but on a much bigger GDP base.
      • Result: Malaydesh ’s defense envelope is too small to cover both O&M (operations & maintenance) and procurement.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 4. Consequences for Military Procurement
      1. Delayed Programs → MRCA fighter jets, LCS frigates, helicopters.
      2. Cancelled or Downsized Orders → e.g., MRCA reduced to LCA, Black Hawk leasing plan shrunk then collapsed.
      3. Inability to Commit to Multi-Year Plans → no guaranteed funding stream.
      4. Patchwork Modernization → instead of comprehensive upgrades, Malaydesh buys in piecemeal fashion.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 5. Strategic Impact
      • Malaydesh cannot sustain credible deterrence in South China Sea.
      • Must rely heavily on diplomacy and ASEAN forums instead of hard power.
      • Forces risk becoming a “hollow military”: large on paper, weak in practice.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 6. Comparison with Indonesia (MEF)
      • Indonesia also has fiscal limits, but:
      o Clear 25-year modernization roadmap (MEF).
      o Willingness to borrow externally for defense procurement.
      o Gradual capability improvements visible (submarines, fighters, naval ships).
      • Malaydesh : stuck in short-term annual budgeting + unwillingness to take on foreign defense loans → programs constantly stall.

      Hapus
    2. .1 Maret 2026 pukul 16.37

      INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
      GOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 2,9%
      GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
      =============
      =============
      MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
      GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 3,8%
      GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
      5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      -
      πŸ“Œ 1. Why Training Hours Matter
      • Training hours = the amount of time pilots, sailors, soldiers spend actively practicing their skills.
      • In modern militaries, high training tempo is crucial to:
      o Keep proficiency with complex equipment.
      o Build unit cohesion.
      o Maintain combat readiness.
      If training hours fall below international standards, equipment becomes almost useless in real combat.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 2. Malaydesh ’s Low Training Hours – Causes
      ✈️ Air Force (RMAF)
      • Fighter pilots should have 150–180 flight hours per year (NATO standard).
      • Many RMAF pilots only get 60–80 hours annually due to:
      o Limited fuel budget.
      o Spare parts shortages.
      o Aircraft availability problems (MiG-29 retired, Su-30 often grounded).
      ________________________________________
      🚒 Navy (RMN)
      • Warships should spend 90–120 days at sea per year to maintain readiness.
      • RMN vessels average 30–50 days at sea, far below requirement.
      • Reasons:
      o Budget cuts for fuel and logistics.
      o Maintenance backlogs (many patrol vessels >40 years old).
      o LCS program delays leaving capability gaps.
      ________________________________________
      πŸͺ– Army (TDM)
      • Modern armies conduct large-scale combined arms exercises regularly.
      • TDM focuses on small-scale, low-cost jungle training instead.
      • Limited live-fire, armored maneuvers, or joint training with air/navy units.
      • Fuel & ammunition budgets are often capped → less field time.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 3. Impact of Low Training Hours
      a. Skill Degradation
      • Pilots risk losing combat proficiency (dogfighting, weapons delivery).
      • Sailors struggle with complex operations (anti-submarine warfare, missile defense).
      • Soldiers lack practice in modern combined-arms tactics.
      ________________________________________
      b. Safety Risks
      • Low training hours lead to higher accident rates.
      • Example: RMAF has had multiple crashes (Hawk, Nuri) linked partly to training gaps & maintenance issues.
      ________________________________________
      c. Reduced Interoperability
      • Joint operations (Air–Land–Sea) require constant practice.
      • Without adequate exercises, coordination is weak.
      • Limits Malaydesh ’s ability to operate with allies (e.g., Five Power Defence Arrangements with Singapore, UK, Australia, New Zealand).
      ________________________________________
      d. Wasted Equipment Investment
      • Even when Malaydesh buys modern platforms (e.g., Su-30MKM, ScorpΓ¨ne submarines), lack of training hours means underutilization.
      • Submarine crews need at least 150 sea-days per year → RMN ScorpΓ¨nes often achieve far less.
      ________________________________________
      e. Morale & Retention Problems
      • Professional soldiers want to train and improve.
      • When budgets restrict them to desk duty or symbolic exercises, morale falls.
      • Leads to difficulties in retaining skilled pilots and officers, who may leave for commercial jobs.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 4. Strategic Consequences
      • Malaydesh ’s forces appear large on paper, but real combat readiness is low.
      • In a crisis (e.g., South China Sea standoff), Malaydesh may struggle to deploy capable units quickly.
      • Neighbors like Singapore and Australia maintain much higher training hours → widening readiness gap.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 5. Comparison
      • Singapore: RSAF pilots log ~180+ hours/year, Navy ships 100+ days at sea, Army runs constant joint training.
      • Indonesia: Still prioritizes major exercises (Super Garuda Shield with US).
      • Malaydesh : Keeps training mostly low-intensity & symbolic due to budget fuel/ammo limits.

      Hapus
  6. GEMPURWIRA18 Januari 2026 pukul 10.03

    ini konon tentera ke 13 terkuat didunia....??? HAHAHAHAHA



    Setelah mengakui melakukan aksi penembakan terhadap sejumlah Pesawat yang memasuki Bandar Udara Nop Goliat Dekai, Kabupaten Yahukimo, pada Selasa 13 Januari 2026, KKB Papua kembali merilis sebuah video.

    Dalam video tersebut, mereka mengklaim bahwa telah berhasil menang karena telah menggagalkan kunjungan Wakil Presiden Republik Indonesia Gibran Rakabuming Raka ke Kabupaten Yahukimo.

    Mereka juga mengancam akan melakukan aksi di Yahukimo hingga mengajak perang aparat TNI-Polri.


    https://web.facebook.com/reel/908993801702375

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. .18 Januari 2026 pukul 10.04

      GORILA MALAYDESH NGAMUK ....
      -
      2026 PM says =
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
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      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
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      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
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      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
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      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      FREEZES ARMY AND POLICE PROCUREMENT
      --------------------
      KUALA LUMPUR, Jan 16 (Reuters) - The procurement decisions of the Malaydeshn armed forces and the police linked to a corruption probed will be temporarily frozen until they fully comply with related rules, state media reported, citing Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim.
      The suspension comes following allegations of bribery linked to army procurement projects, with the Malaydeshn Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) raiding several firms suspected of involvement in a bribery scheme and freezing six bank accounts belonging to a suspect and their family members.
      A former army chief and four others were detained on January 8 in connection with the alleged bribery. Local media reported that the former army chief was released from remand on Monday.
      Former army chief Muhammad Hafizuddeain Jantan has been placed on leave since late December pending an investigation into the matter.
      According to Bernama, Anwar said the government, through relevant ministries, will review and reorganise all procurement to ensure transparency in the existing system.
      "We will take note and await reports of any loopholes or weaknesses in the procurement system, so that we can review and restructure it to ensure full compliance," he said.

      Hapus
    2. .1 Maret 2026 pukul 16.38

      INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
      GOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 2,9%
      GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
      =============
      =============
      MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
      GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 3,8%
      GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
      5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      -
      πŸ“Œ 1. Structural Causes of Weak Modernization
      1. Small overall defense budget
      o Around RM18–20B annually (≈ USD 3.5–4B), much lower than neighbors.
      o Most of it goes to salaries & pensions → modernization share <10%.
      2. No Multi-Year Planning
      o Procurement is done on a year-by-year basis, so long projects stall if next year’s budget is cut.
      o Example: LCS Gowind frigates stuck for a decade because funds were not consistently released.
      3. Currency Weakness
      o Weapons priced in USD/EUR, while ringgit has depreciated.
      o RM19B sounds large, but only USD 4B in real purchasing power.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 2. Key Military Branch Problems
      ✈️ Air Force (RMAF)
      • MiG-29 retired (2015) → never replaced, leaving capability gap.
      • Su-30MKM → advanced but expensive to maintain, low flying hours.
      • F/A-18D Hornet → old fleet, insufficient numbers.
      • MRCA program (new multirole fighter) → repeatedly delayed since 2007 due to lack of funds.
      • MALE UAV program → still limited, while neighbors already deploy combat drones.
      πŸ‘‰ Result: RMAF today has fewer fighters in service than 20 years ago.
      ________________________________________
      🚒 Navy (RMN)
      • Gowind LCS frigate program (RM9B) → delayed over 10 years, still undelivered (as of 2025).
      • Patrol fleet → many ships >30 years old, suffering from low readiness.
      • Submarines (ScorpΓ¨ne) → only 2 units, high maintenance costs limit patrol days.
      • LMS Batch 1 → Chinese-built, limited combat capability.
      • LMS Batch 2 → delayed due to funding debates.
      πŸ‘‰ Result: RMN faces critical shortfall in surface combatants for South China Sea patrols.
      ________________________________________
      πŸͺ– Army (TDM)
      • Mechanization → limited. AV8 Gempita produced locally, but expensive → numbers restricted.
      • Air defense → virtually nonexistent, only MANPADS.
      • Artillery → outdated, limited range compared to regional peers.
      • Helicopters & transport → too few, most missions still rely on aging Nuri replacements (EC725).
      πŸ‘‰ Result: Army still manpower-heavy, low-tech, designed for counterinsurgency not modern warfare.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 3. Consequences of Weak Modernization
      1. Capability Gaps Grow
      o Air defense, fighters, frigates, and UAVs → all behind ASEAN peers.
      o Singapore buying F-35s, Indonesia adding Rafale & submarines, Philippines modernizing with U.S./Japan help.
      2. Prestige Projects Without Sustainment
      o Malaydesh sometimes buys “showpiece” assets (ScorpΓ¨ne, Su-30MKM) but can’t afford to keep them fully operational.
      3. Dependence on Foreign Partners
      o Relies on FPDA (UK, Australia, Singapore, NZ) to cover gaps in defense.
      o Reluctant to invest in self-reliance due to cost.
      4. Readiness vs Numbers Mismatch
      o On paper, Malaydesh has frigates, fighters, submarines.
      o In reality, many are grounded, under maintenance, or underutilized due to low O&M budgets.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 4. Why Modernization is Weak Compared to Neighbors
      • Singapore: Spends USD 12–13B, continuous pipeline of upgrades.
      • Indonesia: Larger budget (~USD 9–10B), long-term MEF plan ensures steady procurement.
      • Philippines: Once weaker than Malaydesh , but now modernizing faster due to external funding & security urgency.
      • Malaydesh : Stuck in “holding pattern,” replacing nothing major since early 2000s.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 5. Strategic Implications
      • South China Sea → Malaydesh lacks credible deterrence.
      • National Industry → Weak local defense industry means modernization always depends on foreign suppliers.
      • Future Risk → By 2030, without radical change, Malaydesh risks having obsolete forces across all branches simultaneously.

      Hapus
    3. .1 Maret 2026 pukul 16.38

      INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
      GOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 2,9%
      GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
      =============
      =============
      MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
      GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 3,8%
      GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
      5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      -
      πŸ“Œ 1. Nature of Corruption in Defense
      Defense procurement is especially vulnerable in Malaydesh because:
      • Contracts are opaque, often labeled “national security” (no public scrutiny).
      • Deals are politically negotiated, not based on military needs.
      • Offsets and local content requirements create opportunities for rent-seeking.
      • Oversight is weak; Parliament rarely audits defense deals in depth.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 2. Major Examples of Corruption & Mismanagement
      a. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
      • Budget: RM9 billion (≈ USD 2B) approved in 2011.
      • Plan: 6 Gowind-class stealth frigates (from France/Thales-DCNS via Boustead Naval Shipyard).
      • Reality:
      o By 2022, not a single ship delivered despite RM6B already spent.
      o Designs were changed mid-way without Navy approval.
      o Funds misused → overpriced contracts, subcontracting to cronies.
      o Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee (PAC) found “serious mismanagement & corruption.”
      • Effect: Malaydesh ’s navy today still lacks new major combatants.
      ________________________________________
      b. Scorpène Submarine Scandal (2002 deal)
      • Malaydesh bought 2 French ScorpΓ¨ne submarines (~EUR 1B).
      • Allegations:
      o Commissions of over EUR 100M paid to Malaydesh n middlemen.
      o Linked to Altantuya Shaariibuu murder case (Mongolian translator who was investigating kickbacks).
      • Submarines delivered, but maintenance problems + corruption controversy damaged credibility.
      ________________________________________
      c. AV8 Gempita Armored Vehicles
      • Contract: RM7.5 billion for 257 vehicles (with Turkish FNSS tech transfer).
      • Issues:
      o Final unit cost very high (~USD 7M per vehicle, more expensive than Western IFVs).
      o Questionable whether Malaydesh needed so many heavy IFVs for its geography.
      o Seen as more of an industrial project for DRB-HICOM than a military necessity.
      ________________________________________
      d. Helicopter & Aircraft Procurement
      • MD530G light scout helicopters → ordered in 2016 (RM321M), but delivery delayed for years.
      • Spare parts for Nuri helicopters (now retired) were procured at inflated prices.
      • Many contracts allegedly awarded to politically connected firms with no expertise.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 3. Forms of Mismanagement
      1. Overpricing → Malaydesh pays higher than global market prices.
      2. Delayed Deliveries → money spent, assets not delivered on time (or never).
      3. Capability Mismatch → politicians push prestige projects instead of what the armed forces need.
      4. Maintenance Neglect → assets delivered but poorly supported (e.g., Su-30MKM spare parts issue).
      5. Cronyism in Local Industry → contracts given to politically linked companies (Boustead, DRB-HICOM, etc.).
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 4. Systemic Causes
      • Weak Oversight: PAC investigations only happen after scandals explode.
      • Political Patronage: Defense contracts = tool to fund ruling parties & allies.
      • Short-Term Politics: Each government wants “their own” deals, canceling or altering old ones.
      • Secrecy Shield: “National security” label prevents open tender.
      • Lack of Continuity: Frequent government changes → projects stall.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 5. Consequences for the Military
      • Loss of Trust: Public sees defense as corrupt, reducing support for bigger budgets.
      • Capability Gaps: Navy still using aging ships, Air Force has no new fighters, Army modernization slow.
      • Higher Costs: Delays and corruption inflate prices, wasting scarce funds.
      • Readiness Impact: Submarines, aircraft, ships often grounded due to missing spare parts & poor maintenance.
      • Regional Decline: Malaydesh falls behind Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, and even the Philippines.

      Hapus
  7. GEMPURWIRA18 Januari 2026 pukul 10.05

    NGERI... pejuang OPM tembak pesawat....... INDIANESIA ketar ketir....

    https://web.facebook.com/reel/1207766071496028

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. .1 Maret 2026 pukul 16.38

      INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
      GOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 2,9%
      GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
      =============
      =============
      MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
      GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 3,8%
      GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
      5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      -
      πŸ“Œ 1. Overall Context
      • Malaydesh ’s defense spending has stagnated for over a decade.
      • Procurement delays + corruption scandals → few new assets acquired since the mid-2000s.
      • Result: Most of Malaydesh ’s core platforms are 20–40 years old, with growing maintenance problems and declining readiness.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 2. Royal Malaydesh n Air Force (RMAF / TUDM)
      Fighters
      • F/A-18D Hornet
      o Bought in the mid-1990s (8 units).
      o Still capable, but now ~30 years old.
      o Spares are costly, fleet too small for sustained operations.
      • Su-30MKM Flanker
      o Acquired 2007 (18 units).
      o Modern on paper, but plagued by spare parts shortages and maintenance delays.
      o Readiness sometimes drops below 50%.
      • MiG-29 Fulcrum
      o Acquired early 1990s.
      o Retired in 2017 due to high maintenance cost.
      o No replacement yet → huge capability gap.
      Transport & Helicopters
      • C-130 Hercules: Workhorses from the 1970s/80s, some being upgraded but still very old.
      • Nuri Helicopters (Sikorsky S-61): Entered service in the 1960s. Finally retired in 2019 after fatal crashes. Replacement slow.
      πŸ‘‰ Impact: RMAF cannot maintain a credible air defense or long-range strike role. Fleet too small, too old, and too expensive to keep flying.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 3. Royal Malaydesh n Navy (RMN / TLDM)
      Surface Fleet
      • Kasturi-class corvettes (1980s): Upgraded, but still outdated hulls.
      • Laksamana-class corvettes (ex-Italian, 1980s design): Small, limited endurance, hard to maintain.
      • Lekiu-class frigates (delivered 1999–2000): Now ~25 years old, mid-life upgrades delayed.
      Submarines
      • ScorpΓ¨ne-class (delivered 2009): Relatively new, but expensive to maintain. Limited to 2 boats → too few for constant patrols.
      New Projects
      • LCS Gowind Frigates (6 planned): As of 2025, still undelivered due to scandal & mismanagement.
      πŸ‘‰ Impact: RMN faces the South China Sea with mostly 30–40-year-old corvettes and frigates, plus just 2 subs.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 4. Malaydesh n Army (TDM)
      • Main Battle Tanks: Malaydesh has 48 PT-91M (Polish T-72 variant, delivered mid-2000s). Already outdated by modern standards.
      • Armored Vehicles:
      o Condor APCs → from 1980s, many still in service.
      o Sibmas → from 1980s, obsolete for modern combat.
      o AV8 Gempita (new, 2010s) → too few to replace older fleets.
      • Artillery: Mostly towed howitzers; limited modern self-propelled guns.
      • Air Defense: Minimal, mostly MANPADS and old radar systems.
      πŸ‘‰ Impact: Army is manpower-heavy, equipment-light, with many vehicles older than the soldiers who operate them.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 5. Systemic Problems from Aging Equipment
      1. High Maintenance Costs → Old assets require more funds just to stay operational.
      2. Low Availability → Fighter jets and ships often grounded for lack of spares.
      3. Capability Gaps →
      o No modern fighters to replace MiG-29.
      o No new frigates to replace 1980s ships.
      o Army still lacks modern artillery & air defense.
      4. Safety Risks → Nuri helicopter crashes showed how dangerous it is to operate old platforms.
      5. Loss of Deterrence → Neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines) modernize faster, leaving Malaydesh behind.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 6. Why Aging Equipment Persists
      • Small defense budget → can’t fund replacements.
      • Procurement delays → programs stuck in limbo for 10–15 years.
      • Corruption scandals → projects like LCS consume billions without results.
      • Political short-termism → each new government resets priorities.

      Hapus
    2. .1 Maret 2026 pukul 16.39

      INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
      GOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 2,9%
      GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
      =============
      =============
      MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
      GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 3,8%
      GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
      5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      -
      πŸ“Œ 1. Legacy of Counterinsurgency (COIN)
      • Malaydesh ’s military doctrine is shaped by history, especially the Communist Insurgency (1948–1989).
      • For decades, the Army’s focus was jungle warfare, counter-guerrilla tactics, and territorial defense.
      • This created a culture of light infantry dominance, with limited emphasis on heavy armor, artillery, or long-range strike capabilities.
      πŸ‘‰ Result: Even after the insurgency ended, Malaydesh continued investing in riflemen and light forces, not in high-tech or heavy combined-arms forces.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 2. Lack of Shift Toward Conventional Warfare
      • Neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand) modernized doctrines toward combined arms (armor + artillery + air support + drones).
      • Malaydesh , however, still emphasizes defensive posture and static territorial defense.
      • Little preparation for large-scale conventional conflicts in the South China Sea or with a peer adversary.
      πŸ‘‰ Example: TDM has only 48 tanks (PT-91M), no medium/long-range air defense, and minimal artillery support — not sufficient for modern battlefield requirements.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 3. Neglect of Joint Operations
      • Modern doctrine globally stresses joint operations (Army + Navy + Air Force working seamlessly).
      • Malaydesh struggles here:
      o The Air Force has too few planes to provide close air support.
      o The Navy lacks amphibious or sealift capacity to deploy the Army quickly.
      o The Army rarely trains with Navy/Air Force in large-scale exercises.
      πŸ‘‰ Doctrine remains service-siloed, not integrated.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 4. Limited Focus on External Threats
      • Official defense policy (2019 White Paper) prioritizes sovereignty defense, non-traditional security (terrorism, piracy, disasters).
      • While valid, this underplays external threats like:
      o China’s growing presence in South China Sea.
      o Potential interstate tensions with neighbors.
      • Malaydesh ’s doctrine avoids offensive or deterrent concepts → remains reactive and defensive.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 5. Outdated Operational Concepts
      • No emphasis on drones, electronic warfare, cyber, or network-centric warfare, which are now central in modern doctrine.
      • Still structured around manual infantry-heavy operations.
      • Example: Lahad Datu (2013) → response was slow, infantry-based, and exposed poor surveillance, mobility, and joint command.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 6. Political Influence
      • Defense doctrine often shaped by short-term political decisions rather than long-term strategic thinking.
      • Governments avoid committing to major doctrine shifts because it would require:
      o Multi-year funding for modernization.
      o Rethinking force structure (fewer infantry, more high-tech assets).
      • Political leaders prefer maintaining large manpower (jobs/votes) rather than expensive modernization.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 7. Consequences of Outdated Doctrine
      1. Imbalance in force structure → too many infantry, too few heavy units.
      2. Weak deterrence → cannot project credible force in South China Sea or against modern militaries.
      3. Slow modernization → doctrine not aligned with future warfare (cyber, drones, precision strike).
      4. Operational limitations → struggles in rapid deployment, combined arms maneuver, and long-range operations.

      Hapus
  8. .18 Januari 2026 pukul 10.17

    NGEMIS MRCA 2025-2017
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    -------------------
    MRCA 2025-2017 = NGEMIS
    5x GANTI PM
    5x GANTI MOD
    6x GANTI MOF

    BalasHapus
  9. GEMPURWIRA18 Januari 2026 pukul 10.51

    ini konon tentera ke 13 terkuat didunia....??? Masa di AYAM AYAM sama pejuang OPM... πŸ”₯πŸ”₯🀣🀣



    Setelah mengakui melakukan aksi penembakan terhadap sejumlah Pesawat yang memasuki Bandar Udara Nop Goliat Dekai, Kabupaten Yahukimo, pada Selasa 13 Januari 2026, KKB Papua kembali merilis sebuah video.

    Dalam video tersebut, mereka mengklaim bahwa telah berhasil menang karena telah menggagalkan kunjungan Wakil Presiden Republik Indonesia Gibran Rakabuming Raka ke Kabupaten Yahukimo.

    Mereka juga mengancam akan melakukan aksi di Yahukimo hingga mengajak perang aparat TNI-Polri.


    https://web.facebook.com/reel/908993801702375

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. .18 Januari 2026 pukul 10.57

      NGEMIS MRCA 2025-2017
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      -------------------
      MRCA 2025-2017 = NGEMIS F18 KUWAIT
      5x GANTI PM
      5x GANTI MOD
      6x GANTI MOF

      Hapus
    2. .1 Maret 2026 pukul 16.39

      INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
      GOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 2,9%
      GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
      =============
      =============
      MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
      GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 3,8%
      GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
      5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      -
      πŸ“Œ 1. Small and Aging Fleet
      • Surface combatants:
      o Only 2 Lekiu-class frigates (1999) → nearing obsolescence, modernization delayed.
      o 2 Kasturi-class frigates (1980s German design) → upgraded but still old.
      o 4 Kedah-class OPVs (2000s, MEKO-100 design) → lightly armed, more like patrol vessels than real warships.
      • Total “serious” warships: fewer than 10, compared to:
      o Singapore Navy: >20 modern, high-tech vessels (Formidable-class frigates, Littoral Mission Vessels).
      o Indonesia Navy: dozens of frigates, corvettes, and modern missile boats.
      πŸ‘‰ TLDM cannot sustain a large-scale naval fight.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 2. Submarine Force Weakness
      • Only 2 ScorpΓ¨ne-class submarines (delivered 2009–2010).
      • Problems:
      o High operating cost → often not fully operational.
      o Limited numbers → cannot maintain continuous presence at sea.
      o No replacement or expansion plans due to budget constraints.
      • By contrast:
      o Vietnam has 6 Kilo-class submarines.
      o Singapore operates 4 advanced submarines (with more on order).
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 3. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
      • In 2011, Malaydesh approved 6 Gowind-class LCS frigates (French design, built locally).
      • Supposed to be the backbone of TLDM modernization.
      • Scandal: corruption, mismanagement, political interference → no ship delivered after more than a decade.
      • First ship expected only in 2026–2027, cost ballooned from RM 6 billion → >RM 11 billion.
      πŸ‘‰ A whole decade lost with zero new frontline warships.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 4. Poor Naval Aviation & Support
      • Helicopters: only a few Super Lynx and AW139 → limited ASW (anti-submarine warfare).
      • No naval combat aircraft (relies entirely on RMAF).
      • Weak sealift/amphibious capacity:
      o Only 2–3 support/transport ships (KD Mahawangsa, KD Sri Inderapura-class, etc.).
      o Insufficient to deploy large forces rapidly to Sabah/Sarawak.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 5. Budget Constraints
      • Navy modernization requires long-term funding, but:
      o Defense budget = only 1.0–1.1% of GDP.
      o Navy often loses out to Army in budget share.
      o Procurement done piecemeal → delays, cost overruns.
      • Example: LCS program stalled because of funding + political issues, not just technical delays.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 6. Strategic Geography Challenge
      • Malaydesh has to defend two separate regions:
      1. Peninsular Malaydesh (Strait of Malacca).
      2. East Malaydesh (Sabah & Sarawak, near South China Sea).
      • TLDM has too few ships to patrol both areas effectively.
      • South China Sea disputes: Chinese Coast Guard and militia often outnumber Malaydesh n presence.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 7. Weak Deterrence
      • Malaydesh cannot project naval power.
      • TLDM’s ships are often patrol-focused (low firepower).
      • Relies on diplomacy rather than deterrence in South China Sea.
      • In contrast:
      o Singapore Navy = highly modern, networked, with submarines, frigates, and advanced air defense.
      o Indonesia Navy = larger fleet, more missile boats, expanding rapidly.
      o Vietnam Navy = strong submarine force and anti-access weapons.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 8. Consequences
      1. Operational gaps → TLDM cannot maintain presence in South China Sea, leaving oil & gas fields exposed.
      2. Low readiness → too few ships operational at a time.
      3. Dependence on allies → Malaydesh relies on the US, Australia, or joint ASEAN diplomacy rather than its own deterrence.
      4. Morale issues → sailors operate old, under-armed ships while modernization programs stall.

      Hapus
    3. .1 Maret 2026 pukul 16.39

      INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
      GOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 2,9%
      GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
      =============
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      MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
      GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 3,8%
      GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
      5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      -
      πŸ“Œ 1. Fighter Fleet Problems
      Current Fighters (as of 2025):
      • 8 F/A-18D Hornets (bought in 1997)
      o Aging, need mid-life upgrades, limited strike range.
      • 18 Su-30MKM Flankers (delivered 2007–2009)
      o Powerful but plagued by maintenance and spare parts issues.
      o Many often grounded → at times less than 50% readiness.
      • MB-339CM trainers/light attack jets (old, limited combat role).
      πŸ‘‰ Compared to neighbors:
      • Singapore → >60 F-15SGs & upgraded F-16Vs, buying F-35s.
      • Indonesia → >30 Su-27/30s, buying Rafales & F-15EX.
      • Vietnam → 36+ Su-30MK2Vs.
      πŸ‘‰ Malaydesh ’s fighter fleet is tiny and partially unserviceable, limiting air superiority.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 2. The MiG-29 Failure
      • Malaydesh bought 18 MiG-29Ns in the 1990s.
      • Retired early (2015) due to:
      o High operating cost.
      o Reliability issues.
      o Poor logistics support from Russia.
      • Replacement program (“MRCA”) delayed for over a decade because of budget constraints and political indecision.
      πŸ‘‰ Result: Fighter numbers dropped sharply → “air power gap” still not fixed.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 3. Transport & Airlift
      • C-130 Hercules fleet (14 units) → old but reliable, used for logistics & disaster relief.
      • A400M Atlas (4 units, delivered 2015–2017)
      • Gap: Malaydesh lacks enough airlift to rapidly reinforce East Malaydesh (Sabah & Sarawak).
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 4. Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) Weakness
      • Currently uses Beechcraft King Air B200Ts → outdated and limited range.
      • Malaydesh faces constant Chinese Coast Guard intrusion in South China Sea, but has no dedicated long-range MPA fleet.
      • Boeing P-8 Poseidon (used by US, Australia, India) is far beyond Malaydesh ’s budget.
      πŸ‘‰ Weak maritime domain awareness → navy operations suffer too.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 5. Helicopter Fleet
      • Nuri helicopters (Sikorsky S-61) retired in 2019 due to age.
      • Replacement delayed — Army and Air Force face lift helicopter shortage.
      • Only a few AW139 and EC725 Cougar are available, limiting troop transport and search & rescue (SAR).
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 6. Air Defense & Radar
      • Malaydesh has no long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
      • Relies only on short-range man-portable systems (MANPADS) and some older gun-based defenses.
      • Radar coverage is patchy, especially over the South China Sea.
      πŸ‘‰ Meaning: Malaydesh n airspace is vulnerable to intrusion by modern air forces.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 7. Procurement Delays & Budget Issues
      • Fighter replacement program (MRCA → Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) has been discussed since 2010s, but still no decision due to budget politics.
      • Plans for KAI FA-50 light fighters (up to 36 units) finally approved in 2023, but delivery will stretch into late 2020s.
      • No clear roadmap for 5th-generation fighters (like F-35 or KF-21).
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 8. Training & Readiness
      • Flight hours per pilot are low (due to budget and fuel costs).
      • Many pilots get less than half the NATO-recommended hours.
      • Limits skill in complex missions (air-to-air combat, night operations).
      • Dependence on foreign exercises with US, Australia, Singapore to maintain training standards.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 9. Structural Weakness
      • Too many bases spread across Peninsular and East Malaydesh → increases costs, reduces efficiency.
      • Lack of aerial refueling tankers → fighters cannot sustain long-range missions.
      • Weak electronic warfare and drone capabilities compared to modern peers.

      Hapus
  10. GEMPURWIRA18 Januari 2026 pukul 10.53

    DRON KAMIKAZE BUATAN MALAYSIA.... πŸ˜ŽπŸ˜ŽπŸ‡²πŸ‡ΎπŸ‡²πŸ‡ΎπŸ‡²πŸ‡Ύ

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. .18 Januari 2026 pukul 10.57

      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      MANGKRAK LCS 2025-2011
      -------------------
      LCS 2025-2011 = MANGKRAK
      5x GANTI PM
      6x GANTI MOD
      6x GANTI MOF

      Hapus
    2. .18 Januari 2026 pukul 10.57

      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      PRANK SPH 2025-1995
      -------------------
      SPH 2025-1995 = PRANK
      5x GANTI PM
      5x GANTI MOD
      6x GANTI MOF

      Hapus
    3. .1 Maret 2026 pukul 16.39

      INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
      GOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 2,9%
      GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
      =============
      =============
      MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
      GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
      HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
      DEFISIT : 3,8%
      GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
      5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
      -
      πŸ“Œ 1. Chronic Budget Constraints
      • Defense spending is only ~1% of GDP (2024), among the lowest in ASEAN.
      • Most regional peers spend closer to 1.5–3% of GDP (Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia).
      • This means:
      o Little money for modernization.
      o Old equipment kept in service far too long.
      o Programs constantly delayed or cancelled.
      πŸ‘‰ Core issue: Malaydesh cannot fund a modern military with such a small envelope.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 2. Poor Budget Distribution
      • 50–55% of the defense budget goes to salaries, pensions, and allowances.
      • Operations & maintenance (O&M): chronically underfunded.
      • Procurement/modernization: gets only 15–20% of the budget (too low).
      πŸ‘‰ Result: Malaydesh pays for people, not capability. Troops are numerous but poorly equipped.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 3. Aging & Obsolete Equipment
      • Army (TDM): still relies on 1980s armored vehicles, limited artillery, no modern air defense.
      • Navy (TLDM): fewer than 10 serious warships, only 2 old submarines, Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal left modernization frozen for a decade.
      • Air Force (RMAF/TUDM): small fighter fleet, many grounded, lacks long-range SAMs or modern drones.
      πŸ‘‰ Malaydesh platforms are outdated compared to Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 4. Procurement Delays & Scandals
      • LCS scandal (6 Gowind-class ships, none delivered since 2011).
      • MiG-29 replacement delayed for over 10 years, only FA-50s ordered in 2023.
      • Army modernization programs constantly shifted or downsized.
      • Corruption, political interference, and lack of accountability = wasted billions.
      πŸ‘‰ Loss of trust: Even inside ATM, officers see procurement as politically driven.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 5. Political Interference & Short-Termism
      • Every change of government resets priorities.
      • Projects canceled or reshaped based on politics, not strategy.
      • Defense White Paper (2019) promised long-term stability, but ignored due to COVID and fiscal crisis.
      πŸ‘‰ ATM never gets consistent 10–20 year planning like Singapore’s MINDEF.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 6. Weak Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
      • Not enough funds for spare parts, fuel, and maintenance.
      • Submarines sometimes not operational due to lack of upkeep.
      • Fighter aircraft often grounded.
      • Army vehicles and artillery poorly maintained.
      πŸ‘‰ Readiness is much lower than it looks on paper.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 7. Low Training Hours
      • Fighter pilots often fly <120 hours/year (NATO standard = 180+).
      • Naval ships sail less because of fuel & maintenance limits.
      • Army units rarely conduct large-scale combined exercises due to cost.
      πŸ‘‰ Troops lack real combat training experience.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 8. Weak Doctrine & Planning
      • ATM doctrine is outdated and fragmented.
      • Malaydesh tries to prepare for everything (conventional war, counter-insurgency, humanitarian aid) but lacks resources.
      • No focus on joint operations (Army, Navy, Air Force coordination weak).
      • Defense planning often reactive, not proactive.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 9. Limited Defense Industry
      • Malaydesh local defense industry is small and dependent on imports.
      • Boustead Naval Shipyard → LCS scandal = reputation collapse.
      • No indigenous fighter or major warship program.
      • Relies heavily on foreign suppliers (Russia, France, South Korea).
      πŸ‘‰ Weak local industry = high costs, dependence, and vulnerability.
      ________________________________________
      πŸ“Œ 10. Corruption & Mismanagement
      • Defense procurement often linked to patronage networks.
      • Examples: LCS, ScorpΓ¨ne submarines (2002 scandal), helicopter programs.

      Hapus
  11. Doblank7718 Januari 2026 pukul 11.23

    SARAWAK AND SABAH WILL BE RICH COUNTRY IF THEY LEAVE MALONDESH πŸ˜‚πŸ˜‚πŸ˜‚πŸ˜‚πŸ˜‚πŸ˜‚

    Kacau! Sabah Sarawak Ingin Pisah Dari Madani MALONDESH, Netizen MALONDESH Bungkam ⁉️
    https://youtu.be/J7Q8GxeTacA

    BalasHapus
  12. palu gada18 Januari 2026 pukul 16.40

    Dilaut ada Si LeMeS dr WuHaN
    Diudara ada Si LeMeS dr Stride haha!πŸ˜†πŸ˜πŸ˜†

    jiaaahh stride lagi, dulu bikin mokap tank 1/2 jadi
    ehh skrg jasil tak ada, hanyalah poto bareng haha!🀣🀭🀣
    https://www.instagram.com/p/DTTpKbakjpl/?img_index=1

    BalasHapus
  13. Karsonovsky19 Januari 2026 pukul 20.56

    Percaya STRIDE mampu? Bina pistol dan amunisi aja gak mampu nak bina aset yg aneh2 aja,,buat amunisi dan peluru dulu lah,,jgn yg aneh2🀭

    BalasHapus
  14. .1 Maret 2026 pukul 16.40

    INDONESIA = BATAS LIMIT 60%
    GOV. DEBT : 40% OF GDP
    HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 16% OF GDP
    DEFISIT : 2,9%
    GDP = USD 1,44 TRILIUN
    =============
    =============
    MALAYDESH = BATAS LIMIT 65%
    GOV. DEBT : 69% OF GDP
    HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84,3% OF GDP
    DEFISIT : 3,8%
    GDP = USD 416,90 MILIAR
    5X PM 6X MOD = 2026 FREEZES - 2023 CANCELLED
    -
    πŸ“Œ 1. Chronic Budget Constraints
    • Defense spending is only ~1% of GDP (2024), among the lowest in ASEAN.
    • Most regional peers spend closer to 1.5–3% of GDP (Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia).
    • This means:
    o Little money for modernization.
    o Old equipment kept in service far too long.
    o Programs constantly delayed or cancelled.
    πŸ‘‰ Core issue: Malaydesh cannot fund a modern military with such a small envelope.
    ________________________________________
    πŸ“Œ 2. Poor Budget Distribution
    • 50–55% of the defense budget goes to salaries, pensions, and allowances.
    • Operations & maintenance (O&M): chronically underfunded.
    • Procurement/modernization: gets only 15–20% of the budget (too low).
    πŸ‘‰ Result: Malaydesh pays for people, not capability. Troops are numerous but poorly equipped.
    ________________________________________
    πŸ“Œ 3. Aging & Obsolete Equipment
    • Army (TDM): still relies on 1980s armored vehicles, limited artillery, no modern air defense.
    • Navy (TLDM): fewer than 10 serious warships, only 2 old submarines, Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal left modernization frozen for a decade.
    • Air Force (RMAF/TUDM): small fighter fleet, many grounded, lacks long-range SAMs or modern drones.
    πŸ‘‰ Malaydesh platforms are outdated compared to Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam.
    ________________________________________
    πŸ“Œ 4. Procurement Delays & Scandals
    • LCS scandal (6 Gowind-class ships, none delivered since 2011).
    • MiG-29 replacement delayed for over 10 years, only FA-50s ordered in 2023.
    • Army modernization programs constantly shifted or downsized.
    • Corruption, political interference, and lack of accountability = wasted billions.
    πŸ‘‰ Loss of trust: Even inside ATM, officers see procurement as politically driven.
    ________________________________________
    πŸ“Œ 5. Political Interference & Short-Termism
    • Every change of government resets priorities.
    • Projects canceled or reshaped based on politics, not strategy.
    • Defense White Paper (2019) promised long-term stability, but ignored due to COVID and fiscal crisis.
    πŸ‘‰ ATM never gets consistent 10–20 year planning like Singapore’s MINDEF.
    ________________________________________
    πŸ“Œ 6. Weak Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
    • Not enough funds for spare parts, fuel, and maintenance.
    • Submarines sometimes not operational due to lack of upkeep.
    • Fighter aircraft often grounded.
    • Army vehicles and artillery poorly maintained.
    πŸ‘‰ Readiness is much lower than it looks on paper.
    ________________________________________
    πŸ“Œ 7. Low Training Hours
    • Fighter pilots often fly <120 hours/year (NATO standard = 180+).
    • Naval ships sail less because of fuel & maintenance limits.
    • Army units rarely conduct large-scale combined exercises due to cost.
    πŸ‘‰ Troops lack real combat training experience.
    ________________________________________
    πŸ“Œ 8. Weak Doctrine & Planning
    • ATM doctrine is outdated and fragmented.
    • Malaydesh tries to prepare for everything (conventional war, counter-insurgency, humanitarian aid) but lacks resources.
    • No focus on joint operations (Army, Navy, Air Force coordination weak).
    • Defense planning often reactive, not proactive.
    ________________________________________
    πŸ“Œ 9. Limited Defense Industry
    • Malaydesh local defense industry is small and dependent on imports.
    • Boustead Naval Shipyard → LCS scandal = reputation collapse.
    • No indigenous fighter or major warship program.
    • Relies heavily on foreign suppliers (Russia, France, South Korea).
    πŸ‘‰ Weak local industry = high costs, dependence, and vulnerability.
    ________________________________________
    πŸ“Œ 10. Corruption & Mismanagement
    • Defense procurement often linked to patronage networks.
    • Examples: LCS, ScorpΓ¨ne submarines (2002 scandal), helicopter programs.

    BalasHapus

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