The Maritime Advanced SATCOM Terrestrial Infrastructure System (MASTIS) is removed from HMAS Sydney at Garden Island, NSW (photo: RAN)
Navy’s SATCOM transformation begins
A sweeping project to replace Navy’s satellite communications got underway in August with the upgrade of HMAS Sydney’s SATCOM capability from the current Maritime Advanced SATCOM Terrestrial Infrastructure System (MASTIS) to the King Cobra system.
The MASTIS system was the first of its kind when installed across the fleet in the early 2000s.
The dual-band terminal could transmit and receive simultaneously across multiple SATCOM frequencies and enabled communication with the Optus/ADF satellite constellation launched in 2003.
The King Cobra and Cobra systems were selected as Navy’s primary and alternate SATCOM systems to replace MASTIS after 25 years.
Developed with support through the Defence Innovation Hub, the King Cobra and Cobra systems provide an enhanced capability and are capable of operating on the Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) constellations.
The new systems provide greater bandwidth and coverage to satellites in different orbits, leading to more assured communications for the fleet.
The WGS constellation in geostationary orbit provides communications for the United States military and partner forces such as Australia.
The installation of the King Cobra terminal on six frigates commences with HMAS Ballarat next year.
The King Cobra can communicate with satellites in low-Earth orbit to geostationary orbit and will be installed on the guided-missile destroyers, landing helicopter docks, auxiliary oiler replenishment ships and landing ship docks, with HMAS Sydney being the first to receive the King Cobra SATCOM system.
The rollout is expected to be completed by the end of the decade.
Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group project manager Ruiqi Wang said the new systems provide greater bandwidth and coverage to satellites in different orbits, leading to more assured communications for the fleet.
In 2023, it was announced Brisbane communications company EM Solutions would provide upgraded SATCOM systems under a contract worth $150 million.
Mr Wang said domestic manufacture and supply was important for maintaining system components across the existing fleet.
(Aus DoD)
📌 1. Frequent Change of Governments
BalasHapus• Since 2018, Malondesh has gone through five prime ministers (Najib → Mahathir → Muhyiddin → Ismail Sabri → Anwar).
• Each new administration brings in new defense ministers, new priorities, and new reviews of procurement plans.
• Defense programs often get shelved, re-tendered, or cancelled, even if already in progress.
👉 Example: The MRCA (fighter jet replacement) program was delayed repeatedly as every government pushed it aside to focus on other political promises.
________________________________________
📌 2. Short-Term Political Goals vs. Long-Term Defense Needs
• Politicians often treat the defense budget as a political tool, not a national strategy.
• Instead of investing in long-term modernization (ships, jets, systems that take 10–20 years), governments focus on populist measures like subsidies and cash transfers.
• Defense ends up being underfunded because it doesn’t bring quick electoral returns.
👉 Result: Modernization plans are written on paper (e.g., Malondesh Defence White Paper 2019) but rarely implemented.
________________________________________
📌 3. Procurement Decisions Driven by Politics
• Major defense deals are often influenced by political patronage and corruption instead of operational needs.
• Contracts are awarded to companies with political links, regardless of whether they can deliver.
👉 Example: The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project was handed to Boustead Naval Shipyard (linked to UMNO interests), leading to billions spent without a single ship delivered by 2025.
________________________________________
📌 4. Policy Flip-Flops
• Projects often get reversed or changed midway because of political shifts.
• Example:
o NGPV (New Generation Patrol Vessel) plan was for 27 ships. After political scandals and leadership changes, only 6 were built.
o MRCA Program (to replace MiG-29s) has been “top priority” since 2010, but each government postponed it → leaving RMAF with a shrinking fleet.
• This creates a stop-go cycle where billions are wasted and no consistent progress is made.
________________________________________
📌 5. Lack of Bipartisan Consensus on Defense
• Unlike Singapore (where defense is a non-political, bipartisan national priority), in Malondesh defense policy shifts with each ruling coalition.
• No stable long-term vision: every government reopens old debates instead of following through on past commitments.
👉 The 2019 Defence White Paper was a good roadmap, but after Pakatan Harapan fell in 2020, it was quietly shelved.
________________________________________
📌 6. Overemphasis on Local Industry & Patronage
• Malondesh insists on local build requirements to create domestic defense jobs.
• In principle this is good, but in practice it often serves political interests and patronage networks.
• Without strong oversight, projects like LCS or AV-8 Gempita become political cash cows, plagued by cost overruns and delays.
📌 1. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
BalasHapus• Contract signed: 2011 with Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS).
• Budget: RM 9 billion for 6 LCS frigates based on the French Gowind-class design.
• Promise: First ship to be delivered in 2019.
• Reality (as of 2025):
o 0 ships delivered.
o Construction stalled, costs ballooned, and the project was marred by mismanagement and alleged corruption.
o Some funds used for unrelated purposes, poor oversight.
o First ship expected only by 2026 after multiple restructuring attempts.
👉 Result: The Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN) still relies on old corvettes and patrol ships, while neighbors modernize.
________________________________________
📌 2. Armored Vehicle & Army Projects
• Condor APCs (1970s–80s) still in service because replacement programs were delayed.
• Malondesh purchased AV-8 Gempita armored vehicles (Turkey-Malondesh joint project, 2011), but production was slow and plagued by cost overruns.
• Planned replacements for older artillery and vehicles often stall due to lack of funds and changing government priorities.
________________________________________
📌 3. Aircraft Procurement Issues
• The Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) Program to replace aging MiG-29s (retired in 2017) has been delayed for over a decade.
o Candidates: Rafale (France), Typhoon (UK), Gripen (Sweden), F/A-18 (US).
o Political changes caused the program to be postponed indefinitely.
o Malondesh now only relies on 18 Su-30MKM and 8 F/A-18D Hornets — both aging fleets.
• RMAF struggles with readiness: at one point, only 4 of 18 Su-30MKMs were operational due to spare parts shortages.
________________________________________
📌 4. Patrol Vessel (NGPV) Project
• 1990s project for New Generation Patrol Vessels (NGPV) — intended 27 ships.
• Only 6 Kedah-class ships were delivered (2006–2010).
• Project faced budget mismanagement and corruption, forcing scaling down.
• Navy ended up with far fewer ships than planned, with limited capabilities.
________________________________________
📌 5. Submarine Program (Scorpène Class)
• Two French-made Scorpène submarines purchased in mid-2000s.
• Program tainted by corruption allegations involving middlemen and political figures (linked to the controversial Altantuya case).
• While subs are operational, maintenance has been expensive, and one was sidelined for long periods due to technical issues.
________________________________________
📌 6. Frequent Policy & Leadership Changes
• Since 2018, Malondesh has had multiple changes of prime minister and defense ministers.
• Each leadership change often restarts or reshuffles procurement plans.
• Example: MRCA program shelved, then revived, then shelved again.
• Long-term defense planning is almost impossible in this environment.
________________________________________
📌 7. Overdependence on Local Industry with Weak Oversight
• Malondesh often insists on local content & offsets in defense contracts.
• While this helps local industry, weak oversight leads to inefficiency, delays, and inflated costs (e.g., LCS, AV-8 projects).
• Unlike Singapore, which has a well-managed defense industry (ST Engineering), Malondesh’s defense industry lacks capacity and accountability.
1. Aging Equipment
BalasHapus• A large portion of Malondesh’s armed forces equipment is 30–40+ years old.
• Examples:
o Navy: Some vessels date back to the 1970s–1980s; patrol craft and auxiliary ships are beyond recommended service life.
o Air Force (RMAF): Operates Su-30MKM (delivered 2007, but with spare parts issues), F/A-18D Hornets (1997), and Hawks (1994) — all aging platforms.
o Army: Armored vehicles like Condor APCs from the 1980s are still in service.
👉 Obsolescence makes maintenance expensive and reduces combat readiness.
________________________________________
2. Underinvestment in Modernisation
• Malondesh’s defense budget is small (around 1% of GDP, RM15–18 billion yearly) compared to regional peers.
• Over 40% goes to salaries and pensions, leaving little for procurement or modernization.
• This means many assets simply stay in service until they break down, instead of being replaced regularly like in Singapore or Australia.
________________________________________
3. Procurement Delays & Scandals
• Major programs often face delays, mismanagement, or corruption scandals.
• Example: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project – launched in 2011 (RM9 billion for 6 ships). As of 2025, no ship is operational; first delivery delayed to 2026.
• Result: the Navy is stuck using older corvettes and patrol vessels far past their prime.
________________________________________
4. Poor Maintenance & Spare Parts
• Limited budget also affects maintenance.
• The RMAF has had periods where only a fraction of its Su-30MKM fighters were airworthy due to spare parts shortages.
• Old systems without steady spare parts supply quickly degrade into obsolescence.
________________________________________
5. Shifts in Regional Military Balance
• Neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand) have invested heavily in modern systems (submarines, 5th-gen fighters, frigates, drones).
• By contrast, Malondesh’s fleet and aircraft look increasingly outdated not just in age, but in capability compared to regional peers.
________________________________________
6. Political Interference & Short-Termism
• Defense procurement is often politicized.
• Changes in government (frequent in Malondesh since 2018) cause projects to be halted, renegotiated, or reset.
• This leads to long gaps without new equipment, forcing older assets to remain in use.
Asoy aset Baru PPA dah masyuk Tanah Air hore haha!👍👍👍
BalasHapustetangga makin dengki haha!😝😝😝
NGAMUK🔥
✨️Hadiah Hari Kemerdekaan 🇮🇩RI 80,
BalasHapusTambah ASET HASIL KARYA ANAK BANGSA hore haha!👏🦾👏
Aplot KSR X 33 donk min
FULL RUDAL NSM nich haha!🚀🚀🚀
Pertamax seKawasan...warganyet seblah pasti KEFANASAAANNN haha!🔥🔥🔥
⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️
KSR X-33 adalah kapal rudal siluman berkecepatan tinggi dengan panjang 19 meter dan memiliki lambung dengan draft rendah, dirancang sebagai platform tempur rudal serbaguna untuk wilayah pesisir, yang dioptimalkan untuk kondisi geografis kepulauan Indonesia yang kompleks. Dengan kecepatan maksimum lebih dari 50–55 knot serta kemampuan manuver tinggi hasil ✨️Hadiah Hari Kemerdekaan 🇮🇩RI 80,
Tambah ASET HASIL KARYA ANAK BANGSA hore haha!👏🦾👏
Aplot KSR X 33 donk min
FULL RUDAL NSM nich haha!🚀🚀🚀
Pertamax seKawasan...warganyet seblah pasti KEFANASAAANNN haha!🔥🔥🔥
⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️
KSR X-33 adalah kapal rudal siluman berkecepatan tinggi dengan panjang 19 meter dan memiliki lambung dengan draft rendah, dirancang sebagai platform tempur rudal serbaguna untuk wilayah pesisir, yang dioptimalkan untuk kondisi geografis kepulauan Indonesia yang kompleks. Dengan kecepatan maksimum lebih dari 50–55 knot serta kemampuan manuver tinggi hasil dari pemodelan Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) yang ekstensif, KSR X-33 direkayasa untuk menjalankan operasi tersembunyi di balik pulau-pulau terluar, memberikan perlindungan langsung di titik-titik strategis maritim di seluruh jaringan kepulauan Indonesia. Sistem canggih yang dimilikinya—termasuk perangkat optronik mutakhir, sistem pertahanan anti-drone, UAV yang siap pakai dan dapat dioperasikan langsung dari kapal, serta sepasang rudal anti-kapal jarak jauh—menjadikannya aset tangguh untuk operasi multi-domain.
https://youtube.com/watch?v=u_4RgkBKsx0
✨️KRI BRAWIJAYA 320 dah sampe perairan kita gaesz hore haha!🥳🦾🥳
BalasHapusbentar lagi berlabuh di Tj Priok Asooyy haha!🤗🤗🤗
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
============
Efek Penghapusan GST
1. Penerimaan Negara Turun Tajam
• GST 2017: menyumbang RM 44 miliar (sekitar 20% pendapatan federal).
• SST 2019: hanya menyumbang sekitar RM 27 miliar.
👉 Artinya ada kehilangan pendapatan tahunan ± RM 15–20 miliar.
• Dampak langsung: ruang fiskal pemerintah makin sempit, bergantung lebih besar pada minyak & gas serta pajak langsung (corporate tax, income tax).
________________________________________
2. Defisit Anggaran Melebar
• Hilangnya pemasukan dari GST membuat defisit fiskal sulit diturunkan.
• Malondesh tetap terjebak defisit 4–6% dari PDB hampir tiap tahun sejak itu.
• Pemerintah harus menambah utang untuk menutup belanja publik.
👉 Salah satu faktor yang mendorong utang publik naik ke >60% PDB.
________________________________________
3. Keterbatasan Belanja Publik
• Banyak pos penting tertekan, misalnya:
o Pertahanan (budget stagnan, modernisasi tertunda).
o Infrastruktur (sebagian proyek besar ditunda atau direstrukturisasi).
o Subsidi tetap tinggi karena tekanan politik → makin membebani anggaran
https://kcic.co.id/kcic-siaran-pers/capai-78-juta-penumpang-whoosh-kini-jadi-kereta-komuter-super-cepat/
BalasHapusJumlah total penumpang whoosh adalah 7.800.000 sampai Februari 2025
Jumlah penumpang Malaysia adalah 225.000
https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20250904134032-4-664274/warga-malaysia-suka-naik-kereta-cepat-whoosh-borong-tiket-rombongan
Artinya:
% Malondesh = 225.000 : 7.800.000 x 100% = 2,88%
Artinya:
Penumpang Indonesia yang Paling Banyak memakai kereta whoosh
Malondesh GAGAL TOTAL NEGATIVE FRAMING terhadap INDONESIA LAGI....
Netizen Indonesia tertawa terbahak-bahak dong
WKWKWKWK
Arti sebenarnya orang MALON kagum dan iri dengan whoos
HapusJangan Sebut satelit ada negara MISKIN.. GAGAL BAYAR SEWA SATELIT NAVAYO... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusUTANG mu berapa pur?
HapusSudah bayar belum?
🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣
1. Keterbatasan Anggaran dan Alokasi Belanja
Hapus• Anggaran pertahanan Malondesh stagnan di kisaran RM15–18 miliar per tahun, namun mayoritas digunakan untuk operasi harian—alih-alih modernisasi atau peningkatan kapasitas.
• Anggaran 2024 hanya sebesar USD 4,16 miliar, dan lebih dari 40% digunakan untuk gaji dan tunjangan personel
• DPR mendesak pemerintah untuk meningkatkan pagu hingga 1,5% dari PDB, bahkan beberapa pihak menganjurkan 4% PDB agar Militer Mampu menjalankan misi pertahanan yang optimal.
________________________________________
2. Aset & Peralatan Usang
• Terdapat 171 aset militer yang telah berusia lebih dari 30 tahun, mencakup:
o 108 milik TDM
o 29 milik TUDM
o 34 milik TLDM
• Contohnya:
o KD Pendekar, kapal lama (~45 tahun), tenggelam setelah tertabrak objek bawah laut
o Sepertiga armada kapal keamanan (misalnya dari Agensi Maritim Malondesh) rusak atau tidak berfungsi.
________________________________________
3. Proyek Besar Tertunda dan Skandal Pengadaan
• Proyek Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)—senilai RM9 miliar—berasal dari rencana 6 kapal:
o Pengiriman pertama, Maharaja Lela, seharusnya 2019, tapi tertunda.
o Proyek dihentikan dan dilanjutkan kembali, dengan estimasi pengiriman baru: satu kapal selesai 2026, sisanya 2029.
• Skandal pengadaan LCS menunjukkan korupsi dan mismanagement—termasuk soal desain yang tidak dipilih RMN dan pembayaran besar sebelum penyelesaian desain.
________________________________________
4. Korupsi, Perencanaan Buruk, dan Interferensi Politik
• Militer Malondesh berada dalam “band D, kategori risiko tinggi untuk korupsi di sektor pertahanan.”
• Terdapat banyak intervensi politik dalam pengadaan dan kontrak militer, yang menurunkan efektivitas dan memunculkan biaya transaksional tak perlu.
• Perencanaan yang buruk sering menyebabkan pengadaan disetujui tanpa kebutuhan pengguna yang jelas—contoh kasus jet tempur LCA.
________________________________________
5. Masalah Operasional dan Sumber Daya Personel
• Personel militer dilaporkan menghadapi masalah keterampilan berpikir, pengambilan keputusan, dan pemecahan masalah selama operasi
• RMAF sendiri bermasalah dalam pemeliharaan pesawat dan pasokan suku cadang, untuk jenis lawas seperti Su-30MKM maupun Hornet bekas Kuwait.
________________________________________
6. Ancaman Eksternal dan Keamanan Maritim Terancam
• Tiongkok melakukan tekanan terhadap eksplorasi minyak di zona ekonomi eksklusif (EEZ) Malondesh, termasuk Luconia Shoals. Pemerintah sedang mempercepat pembangunan pangkalan angkatan laut di Bintulu (direncanakan selesai 2030), namun dianggap terlambat.
• Kekurangan aset yang memadai membuat Malondesh berisiko kesulitan mempertahankan EEZ dari pelanggaran negara lain.
📌 1. Fighter Fleet Problems
HapusCurrent Fighters (as of 2025):
• 8 F/A-18D Hornets (bought in 1997)
o Aging, need mid-life upgrades, limited strike range.
• 18 Su-30MKM Flankers (delivered 2007–2009)
o Powerful but plagued by maintenance and spare parts issues.
o Many often grounded → at times less than 50% readiness.
• MB-339CM trainers/light attack jets (old, limited combat role).
👉 Compared to neighbors:
• Singapore → >60 F-15SGs & upgraded F-16Vs, buying F-35s.
• Indonesia → >30 Su-27/30s, buying Rafales & F-15EX.
• Vietnam → 36+ Su-30MK2Vs.
👉 Malondesh’s fighter fleet is tiny and partially unserviceable, limiting air superiority.
________________________________________
📌 2. The MiG-29 Failure
• Malondesh bought 18 MiG-29Ns in the 1990s.
• Retired early (2015) due to:
o High operating cost.
o Reliability issues.
o Poor logistics support from Russia.
• Replacement program (“MRCA”) delayed for over a decade because of budget constraints and political indecision.
👉 Result: Fighter numbers dropped sharply → “air power gap” still not fixed.
________________________________________
📌 3. Transport & Airlift
• C-130 Hercules fleet (14 units) → old but reliable, used for logistics & disaster relief.
• A400M Atlas (4 units, delivered 2015–2017)
• Gap: Malondesh lacks enough airlift to rapidly reinforce East Malondesh (Sabah & Sarawak).
________________________________________
📌 4. Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) Weakness
• Currently uses Beechcraft King Air B200Ts → outdated and limited range.
• Malondesh faces constant Chinese Coast Guard intrusion in South China Sea, but has no dedicated long-range MPA fleet.
• Boeing P-8 Poseidon (used by US, Australia, India) is far beyond Malondesh’s budget.
👉 Weak maritime domain awareness → navy operations suffer too.
________________________________________
📌 5. Helicopter Fleet
• Nuri helicopters (Sikorsky S-61) retired in 2019 due to age.
• Replacement delayed — Army and Air Force face lift helicopter shortage.
• Only a few AW139 and EC725 Cougar are available, limiting troop transport and search & rescue (SAR).
________________________________________
📌 6. Air Defense & Radar
• Malondesh has no long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
• Relies only on short-range man-portable systems (MANPADS) and some older gun-based defenses.
• Radar coverage is patchy, especially over the South China Sea.
👉 Meaning: Malondeshn airspace is vulnerable to intrusion by modern air forces.
________________________________________
📌 7. Procurement Delays & Budget Issues
• Fighter replacement program (MRCA → Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) has been discussed since 2010s, but still no decision due to budget politics.
• Plans for KAI FA-50 light fighters (up to 36 units) finally approved in 2023, but delivery will stretch into late 2020s.
• No clear roadmap for 5th-generation fighters (like F-35 or KF-21).
________________________________________
📌 8. Training & Readiness
• Flight hours per pilot are low (due to budget and fuel costs).
• Many pilots get less than half the NATO-recommended hours.
• Limits skill in complex missions (air-to-air combat, night operations).
• Dependence on foreign exercises with US, Australia, Singapore to maintain training standards.
________________________________________
📌 9. Structural Weakness
• Too many bases spread across Peninsular and East Malondesh → increases costs, reduces efficiency.
• Lack of aerial refueling tankers → fighters cannot sustain long-range missions.
• Weak electronic warfare and drone capabilities compared to modern peers.
________________________________________
📌 10. Consequences
1. Weak air deterrence → cannot challenge China’s PLA Air Force or even regional peers.
2. Limited support for Navy/Army → few aircraft for close air support or maritime patrol.
3. Aging platforms → constant readiness problems, high maintenance costs.
4. Dependence on foreign partners → for training, spares, and even operational backup
📌 1. Small and Aging Fleet
Hapus• Surface combatants:
o Only 2 Lekiu-class frigates (1999) → nearing obsolescence, modernization delayed.
o 2 Kasturi-class frigates (1980s German design) → upgraded but still old.
o 4 Kedah-class OPVs (2000s, MEKO-100 design) → lightly armed, more like patrol vessels than real warships.
• Total “serious” warships: fewer than 10, compared to:
o Singapore Navy: >20 modern, high-tech vessels (Formidable-class frigates, Littoral Mission Vessels).
o Indonesia Navy: dozens of frigates, corvettes, and modern missile boats.
👉 TLDM cannot sustain a large-scale naval fight.
________________________________________
📌 2. Submarine Force Weakness
• Only 2 Scorpène-class submarines (delivered 2009–2010).
• Problems:
o High operating cost → often not fully operational.
o Limited numbers → cannot maintain continuous presence at sea.
o No replacement or expansion plans due to budget constraints.
• By contrast:
o Vietnam has 6 Kilo-class submarines.
o Singapore operates 4 advanced submarines (with more on order).
________________________________________
📌 3. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
• In 2011, Malondesh approved 6 Gowind-class LCS frigates (French design, built locally).
• Supposed to be the backbone of TLDM modernization.
• Scandal: corruption, mismanagement, political interference → no ship delivered after more than a decade.
• First ship expected only in 2026–2027, cost ballooned from RM 6 billion → >RM 11 billion.
👉 A whole decade lost with zero new frontline warships.
________________________________________
📌 4. Poor Naval Aviation & Support
• Helicopters: only a few Super Lynx and AW139 → limited ASW (anti-submarine warfare).
• No naval combat aircraft (relies entirely on RMAF).
• Weak sealift/amphibious capacity:
o Only 2–3 support/transport ships (KD Mahawangsa, KD Sri Inderapura-class, etc.).
o Insufficient to deploy large forces rapidly to Sabah/Sarawak.
________________________________________
📌 5. Budget Constraints
• Navy modernization requires long-term funding, but:
o Defense budget = only 1.0–1.1% of GDP.
o Navy often loses out to Army in budget share.
o Procurement done piecemeal → delays, cost overruns.
• Example: LCS program stalled because of funding + political issues, not just technical delays.
________________________________________
📌 6. Strategic Geography Challenge
• Malondesh has to defend two separate regions:
1. Peninsular Malondesh (Strait of Malacca).
2. East Malondesh (Sabah & Sarawak, near South China Sea).
• TLDM has too few ships to patrol both areas effectively.
• South China Sea disputes: Chinese Coast Guard and militia often outnumber Malondeshn presence.
________________________________________
📌 7. Weak Deterrence
• Malondesh cannot project naval power.
• TLDM’s ships are often patrol-focused (low firepower).
• Relies on diplomacy rather than deterrence in South China Sea.
• In contrast:
o Singapore Navy = highly modern, networked, with submarines, frigates, and advanced air defense.
o Indonesia Navy = larger fleet, more missile boats, expanding rapidly.
o Vietnam Navy = strong submarine force and anti-access weapons.
________________________________________
📌 8. Consequences
1. Operational gaps → TLDM cannot maintain presence in South China Sea, leaving oil & gas fields exposed.
2. Low readiness → too few ships operational at a time.
3. Dependence on allies → Malondesh relies on the US, Australia, or joint ASEAN diplomacy rather than its own deterrence.
4. Morale issues → sailors operate old, under-armed ships while modernization programs stall.
🚢 NAVAL WEAKNESS — STRUGGLES TO PROTECT ITS EEZ FROM CHINA
HapusMALONDESH’S CURRENT SITUATION
• FLEET COMPOSITION
O 2 LEKIU-CLASS FRIGATES (1990S).
O 2 KASTURI-CLASS CORVETTES (1980S).
O 2 SCORPÈNE-CLASS SUBMARINES (DELIVERED 2009, BUT HIGH MAINTENANCE COSTS).
O SEVERAL PATROL VESSELS, MANY AGING AND UNDER-ARMED.
• LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) PROGRAM
O PLANNED 6 MODERN GOWIND-CLASS SHIPS.
O AS OF 2025: 0 DELIVERED, DUE TO SCANDAL AND DELAYS.
• MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS
O LIMITED LONG-RANGE RADAR COVERAGE AND MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT.
THREATS IN EEZ
• SOUTH CHINA SEA (SCS):
O CHINA REGULARLY SENDS COAST GUARD AND NAVAL VESSELS INTO MALONDESH’S EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (EEZ), ESPECIALLY AROUND LUCONIA SHOALS AND JAMES SHOAL.
O CHINESE VESSELS ARE LARGER, MORE HEAVILY ARMED, AND OFTEN OPERATE IN GROUPS.
• STRAIT OF MALACCA:
O WORLD’S BUSIEST SEA LANE.
O PIRACY, SMUGGLING, AND ILLEGAL FISHING REQUIRE CONSTANT PATROLS.
REGIONAL COMPARISON
• SINGAPORE: HAS MODERN FORMIDABLE-CLASS FRIGATES, INDEPENDENCE-CLASS LITTORAL SHIPS, SUBMARINES, AND A STRONG MODERNIZATION PACE.
• INDONESIA: EXPANDING ITS NAVY WITH NEW FRIGATES AND SUBMARINES (NAGAPASA-CLASS).
• THAILAND: OPERATES CHINESE-BUILT FRIGATES AND EVEN PURCHASED A YUAN-CLASS SUBMARINE (YET TO BE DELIVERED).
IMPLICATIONS
• MALONDESH CANNOT EFFECTIVELY PATROL ITS EEZ OR DETER CHINESE INCURSIONS.
• WITHOUT THE LCS, THE RMN LACKS MODERN SURFACE COMBATANTS.
• RISK: MALONDESH BECOMES THE WEAK LINK IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE, DEPENDENT ON DIPLOMACY AND ALLIES INSTEAD OF NAVAL POWER
LAWAK...MISKIN... 🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusSengketa Satelit Kemenhan, Yusril Sebut Navayo Ajukan Penyitaan Aset Indonesia di Perancis
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/03/20/15515151/sengketa-satelit-kemenhan-yusril-sebut-navayo-ajukan-penyitaan-aset?page=all
1. High Personnel Costs vs. Limited Modernization
Hapus• A large share of Malondesh defense budget goes to salaries, pensions, and welfare for military personnel.
• This leaves limited funds for modernization programs, equipment procurement, or advanced training.
• For example, more than half of the annual defense allocation is often consumed by operating and personnel expenditures.
________________________________________
2. Underfunded Procurement & Maintenance
• With so much spent on personnel, Malondesh struggles to allocate enough for:
o New acquisitions (fighter jets, naval vessels, surveillance systems).
o Maintenance of existing platforms, many of which are already aging.
• This imbalance leads to a growing capability gap compared to regional peers.
________________________________________
3. Skewed Distribution Across Services
• The Army traditionally receives a larger share of the defense budget compared to the Navy and Air Force.
• Yet, Malondesh main security challenges are maritime-based (South China Sea, Strait of Malacca, Sulu Sea).
• This creates a mismatch between budget priorities and strategic needs.
________________________________________
4. Reactive Rather than Strategic Spending
• Defense spending often reacts to short-term needs (e.g., counterterrorism, piracy, or disaster relief) instead of long-term modernization.
• This results in fragmented, stop-start procurement projects — for example, delays in fighter jet replacements or naval shipbuilding programs.
________________________________________
5. Dependence on Imports & High Costs
• Malondesh relies on imported defense technology, which is expensive.
• Budget constraints mean Malondesh often buys small numbers of different platforms from multiple countries.
• This creates inefficiencies in logistics, training, and maintenance, further straining limited funds.
===========
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
📌 1. Structural Weaknesses
Hapus• Manpower-heavy, equipment-light: TDM has ~80,000 personnel, but much of its gear is old or lightly armed.
• Doctrine outdated: Still focused on counterinsurgency (legacy of communist era), not high-intensity modern warfare.
• Low mobility: Limited airlift and mechanization mean the army cannot rapidly deploy across Malondesh split geography (Peninsular vs. East Malondesh).
________________________________________
📌 2. Equipment Weaknesses
Armored Vehicles
• Condor APCs (German-built, 1980s): Still widely used despite being obsolete, poorly protected against IEDs or modern weapons.
• Sibmas APCs (Belgian, 1980s): Aging, thin armor, limited use today.
• AV8 Gempita (locally built, 2010s): Modern, but only ~250 units → far too few to replace thousands of older vehicles.
• Main Battle Tanks (MBT): Only 48 PT-91M (Polish T-72 variant, mid-2000s). Limited firepower compared to regional peers with Leopards (Indonesia, Singapore).
Artillery
• Mostly towed howitzers (105mm, 155mm) → outdated for rapid maneuver warfare.
• Self-propelled artillery → very limited.
• Rocket artillery → almost nonexistent compared to neighbors (Indonesia, Vietnam).
Air Defense
• Very weak → relies on MANPADS (Igla, Starstreak) and old short-range systems.
• No medium- or long-range SAMs.
• Vulnerable to modern airstrikes.
Aviation
• Lost Nuri helicopters (retired in 2019).
• MD530G light attack helicopters procured in 2016 → delivery delayed for years, only a few operational.
• No dedicated attack helicopters (unlike Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand).
________________________________________
📌 3. Training & Readiness
• Low training hours due to budget → live-fire exercises limited.
• Joint operations weak → coordination with Navy/Air Force poor.
• Modern combined arms doctrine (armor + artillery + drones + air cover) underdeveloped.
________________________________________
📌 4. Budget & Allocation Problems
• Army gets the largest share of manpower spending (salaries, pensions), but little for modernization.
• Procurement slow → many projects canceled, delayed, or scaled down.
• Example: Plans for new self-propelled artillery, drones, and air defense systems repeatedly shelved.
________________________________________
📌 5. Geographic & Strategic Challenges
• Malondesh is split into two main theaters:
1. Peninsular Malondesh
2. Sabah & Sarawak (Borneo) → vulnerable to incursions (e.g., Lahad Datu, 2013).
• TDM lacks enough lift capability to quickly reinforce East Malondesh.
• Reliant on Navy/Air Force transport, which themselves are weak.
________________________________________
📌 6. Comparison with Neighbors
• Singapore Army: Fully mechanized, Leopard 2 tanks, modern artillery, strong air defense.
• Indonesia Army: Larger, Leopard 2 MBTs, rocket artillery, growing modernization.
• Thailand/Vietnam: Larger artillery, more modern armored units.
👉 Malondesh TDM looks under-equipped and outdated by comparison.
________________________________________
📌 7. Consequences of Weakness
• Border security issues: 2013 Lahad Datu incursion exposed lack of readiness and modern equipment.
• Low deterrence: Cannot project power against regional threats (e.g., South China Sea disputes).
• Over-reliance on infantry: Still seen as a “rifle army” with limited heavy support.
• Morale impact: Soldiers risk being deployed with outdated gear.
📌 1. Overall Context
Hapus• Malondesh’s defense spending has stagnated for over a decade.
• Procurement delays + corruption scandals → few new assets acquired since the mid-2000s.
• Result: Most of Malondesh’s core platforms are 20–40 years old, with growing maintenance problems and declining readiness.
________________________________________
📌 2. Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF / TUDM)
Fighters
• F/A-18D Hornet
o Bought in the mid-1990s (8 units).
o Still capable, but now ~30 years old.
o Spares are costly, fleet too small for sustained operations.
• Su-30MKM Flanker
o Acquired 2007 (18 units).
o Modern on paper, but plagued by spare parts shortages and maintenance delays.
o Readiness sometimes drops below 50%.
• MiG-29 Fulcrum
o Acquired early 1990s.
o Retired in 2017 due to high maintenance cost.
o No replacement yet → huge capability gap.
Transport & Helicopters
• C-130 Hercules: Workhorses from the 1970s/80s, some being upgraded but still very old.
• Nuri Helicopters (Sikorsky S-61): Entered service in the 1960s. Finally retired in 2019 after fatal crashes. Replacement slow.
👉 Impact: RMAF cannot maintain a credible air defense or long-range strike role. Fleet too small, too old, and too expensive to keep flying.
________________________________________
📌 3. Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN / TLDM)
Surface Fleet
• Kasturi-class corvettes (1980s): Upgraded, but still outdated hulls.
• Laksamana-class corvettes (ex-Italian, 1980s design): Small, limited endurance, hard to maintain.
• Lekiu-class frigates (delivered 1999–2000): Now ~25 years old, mid-life upgrades delayed.
Submarines
• Scorpène-class (delivered 2009): Relatively new, but expensive to maintain. Limited to 2 boats → too few for constant patrols.
New Projects
• LCS Gowind Frigates (6 planned): As of 2025, still undelivered due to scandal & mismanagement.
👉 Impact: RMN faces the South China Sea with mostly 30–40-year-old corvettes and frigates, plus just 2 subs.
________________________________________
📌 4. Malondeshn Army (TDM)
• Main Battle Tanks: Malondesh has 48 PT-91M (Polish T-72 variant, delivered mid-2000s). Already outdated by modern standards.
• Armored Vehicles:
o Condor APCs → from 1980s, many still in service.
o Sibmas → from 1980s, obsolete for modern combat.
o AV8 Gempita (new, 2010s) → too few to replace older fleets.
• Artillery: Mostly towed howitzers; limited modern self-propelled guns.
• Air Defense: Minimal, mostly MANPADS and old radar systems.
👉 Impact: Army is manpower-heavy, equipment-light, with many vehicles older than the soldiers who operate them.
________________________________________
📌 5. Systemic Problems from Aging Equipment
1. High Maintenance Costs → Old assets require more funds just to stay operational.
2. Low Availability → Fighter jets and ships often grounded for lack of spares.
3. Capability Gaps →
o No modern fighters to replace MiG-29.
o No new frigates to replace 1980s ships.
o Army still lacks modern artillery & air defense.
4. Safety Risks → Nuri helicopter crashes showed how dangerous it is to operate old platforms.
5. Loss of Deterrence → Neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines) modernize faster, leaving Malondesh behind.
________________________________________
📌 6. Why Aging Equipment Persists
• Small defense budget → can’t fund replacements.
• Procurement delays → programs stuck in limbo for 10–15 years.
• Corruption scandals → projects like LCS consume billions without results.
• Political short-termism → each new government resets priorities.
📌 1. Nature of Corruption in Defense
HapusDefense procurement is especially vulnerable in Malondesh because:
• Contracts are opaque, often labeled “national security” (no public scrutiny).
• Deals are politically negotiated, not based on military needs.
• Offsets and local content requirements create opportunities for rent-seeking.
• Oversight is weak; Parliament rarely audits defense deals in depth.
________________________________________
📌 2. Major Examples of Corruption & Mismanagement
a. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
• Budget: RM9 billion (≈ USD 2B) approved in 2011.
• Plan: 6 Gowind-class stealth frigates (from France/Thales-DCNS via Boustead Naval Shipyard).
• Reality:
o By 2022, not a single ship delivered despite RM6B already spent.
o Designs were changed mid-way without Navy approval.
o Funds misused → overpriced contracts, subcontracting to cronies.
o Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee (PAC) found “serious mismanagement & corruption.”
• Effect: Malondesh’s navy today still lacks new major combatants.
________________________________________
b. Scorpène Submarine Scandal (2002 deal)
• Malondesh bought 2 French Scorpène submarines (~EUR 1B).
• Allegations:
o Commissions of over EUR 100M paid to Malondeshn middlemen.
o Linked to Altantuya Shaariibuu murder case (Mongolian translator who was investigating kickbacks).
• Submarines delivered, but maintenance problems + corruption controversy damaged credibility.
________________________________________
c. AV8 Gempita Armored Vehicles
• Contract: RM7.5 billion for 257 vehicles (with Turkish FNSS tech transfer).
• Issues:
o Final unit cost very high (~USD 7M per vehicle, more expensive than Western IFVs).
o Questionable whether Malondesh needed so many heavy IFVs for its geography.
o Seen as more of an industrial project for DRB-HICOM than a military necessity.
________________________________________
d. Helicopter & Aircraft Procurement
• MD530G light scout helicopters → ordered in 2016 (RM321M), but delivery delayed for years.
• Spare parts for Nuri helicopters (now retired) were procured at inflated prices.
• Many contracts allegedly awarded to politically connected firms with no expertise.
________________________________________
📌 3. Forms of Mismanagement
1. Overpricing → Malondesh pays higher than global market prices.
2. Delayed Deliveries → money spent, assets not delivered on time (or never).
3. Capability Mismatch → politicians push prestige projects instead of what the armed forces need.
4. Maintenance Neglect → assets delivered but poorly supported (e.g., Su-30MKM spare parts issue).
5. Cronyism in Local Industry → contracts given to politically linked companies (Boustead, DRB-HICOM, etc.).
________________________________________
📌 4. Systemic Causes
• Weak Oversight: PAC investigations only happen after scandals explode.
• Political Patronage: Defense contracts = tool to fund ruling parties & allies.
• Short-Term Politics: Each government wants “their own” deals, canceling or altering old ones.
• Secrecy Shield: “National security” label prevents open tender.
• Lack of Continuity: Frequent government changes → projects stall.
________________________________________
📌 5. Consequences for the Military
• Loss of Trust: Public sees defense as corrupt, reducing support for bigger budgets.
• Capability Gaps: Navy still using aging ships, Air Force has no new fighters, Army modernization slow.
• Higher Costs: Delays and corruption inflate prices, wasting scarce funds.
• Readiness Impact: Submarines, aircraft, ships often grounded due to missing spare parts & poor maintenance.
• Regional Decline: Malondesh falls behind Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, and even the Philippines.
________________________________________
✅ Summary
Corruption and mismanagement in Malondesh’s defense sector are structural problems: big-ticket deals are designed to serve political patronage and cronies, not military strategy. From the Scorpène scandal to the LCS fiasco, billions have been lost while the armed forces struggle with aging assets and low readiness.
📌 1. Structural Causes of Weak Modernization
Hapus1. Small overall defense budget
o Around RM18–20B annually (≈ USD 3.5–4B), much lower than neighbors.
o Most of it goes to salaries & pensions → modernization share <10%.
2. No Multi-Year Planning
o Procurement is done on a year-by-year basis, so long projects stall if next year’s budget is cut.
o Example: LCS Gowind frigates stuck for a decade because funds were not consistently released.
3. Currency Weakness
o Weapons priced in USD/EUR, while ringgit has depreciated.
o RM19B sounds large, but only USD 4B in real purchasing power.
________________________________________
📌 2. Key Military Branch Problems
✈️ Air Force (RMAF)
• MiG-29 retired (2015) → never replaced, leaving capability gap.
• Su-30MKM → advanced but expensive to maintain, low flying hours.
• F/A-18D Hornet → old fleet, insufficient numbers.
• MRCA program (new multirole fighter) → repeatedly delayed since 2007 due to lack of funds.
• MALE UAV program → still limited, while neighbors already deploy combat drones.
👉 Result: RMAF today has fewer fighters in service than 20 years ago.
________________________________________
🚢 Navy (RMN)
• Gowind LCS frigate program (RM9B) → delayed over 10 years, still undelivered (as of 2025).
• Patrol fleet → many ships >30 years old, suffering from low readiness.
• Submarines (Scorpène) → only 2 units, high maintenance costs limit patrol days.
• LMS Batch 1 → Chinese-built, limited combat capability.
• LMS Batch 2 → delayed due to funding debates.
👉 Result: RMN faces critical shortfall in surface combatants for South China Sea patrols.
________________________________________
🪖 Army (TDM)
• Mechanization → limited. AV8 Gempita produced locally, but expensive → numbers restricted.
• Air defense → virtually nonexistent, only MANPADS.
• Artillery → outdated, limited range compared to regional peers.
• Helicopters & transport → too few, most missions still rely on aging Nuri replacements (EC725).
👉 Result: Army still manpower-heavy, low-tech, designed for counterinsurgency not modern warfare.
________________________________________
📌 3. Consequences of Weak Modernization
1. Capability Gaps Grow
o Air defense, fighters, frigates, and UAVs → all behind ASEAN peers.
o Singapore buying F-35s, Indonesia adding Rafale & submarines, Philippines modernizing with U.S./Japan help.
2. Prestige Projects Without Sustainment
o Malondesh sometimes buys “showpiece” assets (Scorpène, Su-30MKM) but can’t afford to keep them fully operational.
3. Dependence on Foreign Partners
o Relies on FPDA (UK, Australia, Singapore, NZ) to cover gaps in defense.
o Reluctant to invest in self-reliance due to cost.
4. Readiness vs Numbers Mismatch
o On paper, Malondesh has frigates, fighters, submarines.
o In reality, many are grounded, under maintenance, or underutilized due to low O&M budgets.
________________________________________
📌 4. Why Modernization is Weak Compared to Neighbors
• Singapore: Spends USD 12–13B, continuous pipeline of upgrades.
• Indonesia: Larger budget (~USD 9–10B), long-term MEF plan ensures steady procurement.
• Philippines: Once weaker than Malondesh, but now modernizing faster due to external funding & security urgency.
• Malondesh: Stuck in “holding pattern,” replacing nothing major since early 2000s.
________________________________________
📌 5. Strategic Implications
• South China Sea → Malondesh lacks credible deterrence.
• National Industry → Weak local defense industry means modernization always depends on foreign suppliers.
• Future Risk → By 2030, without radical change, Malondesh risks having obsolete forces across all branches simultaneously.
Legal Grey Zones in “Offsets” & “Consultancy Fees”
Hapus• Commissions to middlemen are often disguised as:
o Offset programs (e.g., promising technology transfer, training, local jobs).
o Consultancy fees for “facilitating” deals.
o Logistics or IT support contracts.
• These make it appear legitimate on paper, even if the services provided are minimal or irrelevant.
Why it continues: Because the practice can be masked under legal business terms, it becomes difficult to prove corruption.
________________________________________
Institutionalized Culture of Corruption
• In Malaysia, the role of middlemen has been entrenched since the 1980s–1990s when large defense contracts (MiG-29s, patrol boats, submarines) first involved commissions.
• Once established, it became a “standard practice” in defense procurement.
• Military officers are aware of it but cannot override political leaders who approve procurement.
Why it continues: Corruption in procurement has become part of the status quo — changing it would threaten entrenched interests.
________________________________________
Limited Domestic Defense Industry Capacity
• Malaysia does not have a strong indigenous defense industry compared to countries like Singapore.
• This weakness forces Malaysia to import most major weapons (jets, submarines, ships, tanks).
• Because imports are complex, middlemen exploit the situation by presenting themselves as “essential” facilitators.
Why it continues: Without a robust local defense industry, Malaysia depends on foreign deals, which middlemen dominate.
________________________________________
Short-Term Political Gains Over Long-Term Military Needs
• Defense deals are often politically timed (e.g., before elections) to show “progress” in military modernization.
• Politicians prioritize contracts that reward allies or fund political campaigns instead of long-term military requirements.
• Middlemen are crucial to channel funds quickly and quietly.
Why it continues: Political survival often outweighs genuine defense needs.
________________________________________
✅ Summary
Middlemen continue to exist in Malaysian defense procurement because of:
1. Political patronage → Contracts reward allies.
2. Opaque, secretive procurement → No transparency.
3. Weak oversight → Parliament & auditors lack power.
4. Foreign supplier practices → They accept middlemen as part of the deal.
5. Legal disguise → Commissions hidden as consultancy or offsets.
6. Entrenched corruption culture → Seen as “normal.”
7. Weak local defense industry → Dependence on imports makes intermediaries seem necessary.
8. Political short-termism → Leaders use procurement for power, not military readiness.
GAGAL BAYAR SEWA...? Parah MISKIN... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapus1. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Project
Hapus• Initial Cost and Delays: The LCS project, initially budgeted at RM6 billion, has experienced substantial delays and cost escalations. The project, which was supposed to deliver six ships, has been reduced to five, with the total cost now exceeding RM11 billion .
• Overspending and Misallocation: A Public Accounts Committee (PAC) report revealed that RM400 million of the funds were used to settle debts from a previous patrol vessel project, and 15% of the equipment purchased became obsolete due to prolonged storage
• Progress and Future Plans: As of recent updates, the LCS project has achieved 72.43% completion across all five vessels, with the first ship expected to be delivered by 2026
________________________________________
2. New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) Program
• Cost Overruns: The NGPV program, initially planned for 27 vessels, faced significant cost overruns, with the final expenditure reaching RM6.75 billion, up from the original RM5.35 billion .
• Quality Issues: The Kedah-class NGPVs suffered from technical problems, quality issues, and delays, leading to the cancellation of the program and a reduction in the number of vessels delivered .
________________________________________
3. Scorpène Submarine Deal
• Increased Costs: The procurement of two Scorpène-class submarines, initially contracted at RM4.3 billion, experienced cost increases due to delays and mismanagement, raising concerns about the efficiency of the procurement process .
• Corruption Allegations: The deal has been associated with corruption allegations, further complicating the project's financial and operational outcomes .
________________________________________
4. Black Hawk Helicopter Procurement
• Controversial Deal: A deal for the purchase of Black Hawk helicopters was scrapped after the Malondeshn King intervened, criticizing the procurement of outdated equipment at high costs
• Safety Concerns: The decision followed a fatal helicopter collision involving naval officers, highlighting the risks associated with outdated military equipment.
________________________________________
5. General Factors Contributing to Delays and Cost Overruns
• Poor Planning and Oversight: Inadequate project planning and lack of stringent oversight have been identified as key factors leading to delays and budget overruns in military procurement .
• Political Interference: Political considerations and interference have often influenced procurement decisions, sometimes at the expense of operational requirements and cost-effectiveness.
• Corruption and Mismanagement: Instances of corruption and mismanagement have further exacerbated the financial and operational challenges in defense procurement.
===========
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
📌 1. Chronic Budget Constraints
Hapus• Defense spending is only ~1% of GDP (2024), among the lowest in ASEAN.
• Most regional peers spend closer to 1.5–3% of GDP (Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia).
• This means:
o Little money for modernization.
o Old equipment kept in service far too long.
o Programs constantly delayed or cancelled.
👉 Core issue: Malondesh cannot fund a modern military with such a small envelope.
________________________________________
📌 2. Poor Budget Distribution
• 50–55% of the defense budget goes to salaries, pensions, and allowances.
• Operations & maintenance (O&M): chronically underfunded.
• Procurement/modernization: gets only 15–20% of the budget (too low).
👉 Result: Malondesh pays for people, not capability. Troops are numerous but poorly equipped.
________________________________________
📌 3. Aging & Obsolete Equipment
• Army (TDM): still relies on 1980s armored vehicles, limited artillery, no modern air defense.
• Navy (TLDM): fewer than 10 serious warships, only 2 old submarines, Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal left modernization frozen for a decade.
• Air Force (RMAF/TUDM): small fighter fleet, many grounded, lacks long-range SAMs or modern drones.
👉 Malondesh platforms are outdated compared to Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam.
________________________________________
📌 4. Procurement Delays & Scandals
• LCS scandal (6 Gowind-class ships, none delivered since 2011).
• MiG-29 replacement delayed for over 10 years, only FA-50s ordered in 2023.
• Army modernization programs constantly shifted or downsized.
• Corruption, political interference, and lack of accountability = wasted billions.
👉 Loss of trust: Even inside ATM, officers see procurement as politically driven.
________________________________________
📌 5. Political Interference & Short-Termism
• Every change of government resets priorities.
• Projects canceled or reshaped based on politics, not strategy.
• Defense White Paper (2019) promised long-term stability, but ignored due to COVID and fiscal crisis.
👉 ATM never gets consistent 10–20 year planning like Singapore’s MINDEF.
________________________________________
📌 6. Weak Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
• Not enough funds for spare parts, fuel, and maintenance.
• Submarines sometimes not operational due to lack of upkeep.
• Fighter aircraft often grounded.
• Army vehicles and artillery poorly maintained.
👉 Readiness is much lower than it looks on paper.
________________________________________
📌 7. Low Training Hours
• Fighter pilots often fly <120 hours/year (NATO standard = 180+).
• Naval ships sail less because of fuel & maintenance limits.
• Army units rarely conduct large-scale combined exercises due to cost.
👉 Troops lack real combat training experience.
________________________________________
📌 8. Weak Doctrine & Planning
• ATM doctrine is outdated and fragmented.
• Malondesh tries to prepare for everything (conventional war, counter-insurgency, humanitarian aid) but lacks resources.
• No focus on joint operations (Army, Navy, Air Force coordination weak).
• Defense planning often reactive, not proactive.
________________________________________
📌 9. Limited Defense Industry
• Malondesh local defense industry is small and dependent on imports.
• Boustead Naval Shipyard → LCS scandal = reputation collapse.
• No indigenous fighter or major warship program.
• Relies heavily on foreign suppliers (Russia, France, South Korea).
👉 Weak local industry = high costs, dependence, and vulnerability.
________________________________________
📌 10. Geography Challenge
• Malondesh is split: Peninsular Malondesh & Sabah/Sarawak.
• Requires strong airlift, sealift, and naval presence to defend.
• ATM too small to cover both regions simultaneously.
• Chinese Coast Guard, Navy, and militia heavily outnumber Malondesh in the South China Sea.
________________________________________
📌 11. Corruption & Mismanagement
• Defense procurement often linked to patronage networks.
• Examples: LCS, Scorpène submarines (2002 scandal), helicopter programs.
📌 1. Malondesh Defense Budget in Absolute Terms
Hapus• Over the past decade (2015–2025), Malondesh defense allocation has hovered around:
o RM15–19 billion annually (≈ USD 3.2–4.0 billion).
• 2024 Budget: ~RM19.7 billion (~USD 4.2B).
• 2025: projected to stay roughly flat, given limited fiscal space and high national debt.
________________________________________
📌 2. Why This is Small in Absolute Terms
• While 1% of GDP looks modest, the total envelope in ringgit is also small compared to regional peers:
Country (2024 est.) Defense Budget (USD) Population Notes
Singapore ~$12.5B 6M Spends 3–4% GDP; much higher per capita.
Indonesia ~$9.5B 280M 1–1.2% GDP, but larger economy gives bigger envelope.
Thailand ~$7B 70M 1.2% GDP.
Philippines ~$5.3B 115M Rising due to South China Sea focus.
Malondesh ~$4.0B 34M ~0.9–1% GDP, lowest absolute spend among major ASEAN states.
👉 Malondesh absolute spending is the lowest among middle-sized ASEAN militaries, despite having major maritime security needs in the South China Sea.
________________________________________
📌 3. Effect of a Small Absolute Budget
Even if % of GDP rises slightly, the absolute ringgit amount remains too small to:
a. Fund Modern Procurement
• Fighter jets, frigates, and submarines are multi-billion RM projects.
• Example: 6 LCS Gowind frigates → RM9 billion+ (but still incomplete).
• With only RM19B annual budget, one major program can consume the entire procurement budget for years.
b. Support Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
• Fuel, spare parts, training, logistics are expensive.
• A small total envelope means O&M is constantly underfunded → low readiness.
c. Currency Weakness Effect
• Most modern weapons are priced in USD or EUR.
• Ringgit depreciation (RM4.7–4.8 per USD in 2025) shrinks buying power even further.
• What looks like RM19B is really only USD 4B, compared to Singapore’s USD 12B.
d. Crowding Out by Salaries
• Out of RM19B defense budget:
o ~70% goes to salaries, pensions, allowances.
o Only ~20–25% available for development & procurement.
• In absolute terms: less than RM4–5B/year for modernization.
________________________________________
📌 4. Strategic Impact
1. Procurement Delays → Malondesh can’t afford large-scale upgrades (MRCA fighter replacement, LCS frigates).
2. Training Cuts → limited fuel/ammo for exercises.
3. Capability Gap with Neighbors widens:
o Singapore buys F-35s, new submarines.
o Indonesia expands fighter fleet and naval assets.
o Philippines accelerates modernization with US/Japan support.
o Malondesh remains stagnant.
💰 MIDDLEMEN & COMMISSIONS IN MALONDESHN Armed Forces Procurement
Hapus1. What Are Middlemen in Defense Deals?
• In defense procurement, middlemen (sometimes called agents, consultants, or brokers) act as intermediaries between the Malondeshn government/military and foreign defense suppliers (e.g., shipbuilders, aircraft manufacturers, arms companies).
• In theory, they are supposed to:
o Facilitate negotiations.
o Provide local expertise.
o Smoothen bureaucracy.
• In practice, they often inflate costs, demand commissions, and channel kickbacks to political figures or officials.
________________________________________
2. How Middlemen Work in Malondeshn Defense Procurement
1. Foreign Supplier → Local Agent
o A foreign company selling jets, submarines, or ships is required (sometimes unofficially) to use a Malondeshn intermediary.
2. Mark-Up & Commission
o The agent adds commission fees (5–15% or more) on top of the real price.
o These inflated costs are hidden under “consultancy services” or “offset agreements.”
3. Kickbacks
o Part of the commission is allegedly funneled to politicians, senior officials, or linked companies to secure the contract.
4. Result
o Malondesh ends up paying far above market price for equipment.
o The military gets fewer assets for the same budget.
________________________________________
3. Examples of Middlemen in Malondeshn Defense Scandals
🟢 a. The Scorpène Submarine Deal (2002)
• Malondesh purchased two Scorpène-class submarines from French company DCNS (now Naval Group) worth about RM 4.3 billion (~USD 1 billion).
• A Malondeshn company, Perimekar Sdn Bhd, acted as the “support services provider.”
• Perimekar received RM 500 million (≈ USD 120 million) in “commissions.”
• French investigations later revealed this was effectively kickbacks disguised as consultancy fees, with allegations that money was funneled to Malondeshn political elites.
Impact: Malondesh got the submarines, but at a heavily inflated price — while international corruption investigations damaged Malondesh reputation.
________________________________________
🟢 b. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal (2011–present)
• The RM 9 billion contract to build 6 Gowind-class ships involved subcontracting and changes in design.
• Reports suggest multiple layers of subcontractors and consultants, many linked to politically connected firms.
• Payments were made for “consultancy” and “IT systems” that had little to do with shipbuilding.
• Some of these contracts were allegedly ways to siphon money out of the project.
Impact: Billions spent, zero ships delivered by 2025. The use of middlemen and subcontractors directly contributed to the collapse of the program.
________________________________________
🟢 c. Fighter Jet & Helicopter Purchases
• Past deals for MiG-29s (1990s), Su-30MKMs (2000s), and helicopters (2010s) also involved agents.
• Allegations:
o Overpricing of spare parts.
o Long-term maintenance contracts given to politically linked firms.
o Kickbacks hidden in “service fees.”
________________________________________
4. Why Middlemen Are a Problem in Malondesh
1. Inflated Costs
o Commissions can push prices 20–30% higher than international norms.
2. Reduced Military Capability
o With the same budget, Malondesh buys fewer ships, jets, or vehicles.
3. Encourages Corruption
o Middlemen often act as money channels for bribes.
4. Weak Accountability
o These commissions are often hidden in classified “national security” budgets, so Parliament and public auditors cannot fully track them.
5. Foreign Dependence
o Malondesh has limited domestic defense industry capacity, making it vulnerable to manipulation by foreign suppliers and local agents.
BalasHapusBIAR FAKTA BERBICARA... 🤣🤣🤣
Sengketa Satelit Kemenhan, Yusril Sebut Navayo Ajukan Penyitaan Aset Indonesia di Perancis
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/03/20/15515151/sengketa-satelit-kemenhan-yusril-sebut-navayo-ajukan-penyitaan-aset?page=all
1. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Project
Hapus• Initial Cost and Delays: The LCS project, initially budgeted at RM6 billion, has experienced substantial delays and cost escalations. The project, which was supposed to deliver six ships, has been reduced to five, with the total cost now exceeding RM11 billion .
• Overspending and Misallocation: A Public Accounts Committee (PAC) report revealed that RM400 million of the funds were used to settle debts from a previous patrol vessel project, and 15% of the equipment purchased became obsolete due to prolonged storage
• Progress and Future Plans: As of recent updates, the LCS project has achieved 72.43% completion across all five vessels, with the first ship expected to be delivered by 2026
________________________________________
2. New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) Program
• Cost Overruns: The NGPV program, initially planned for 27 vessels, faced significant cost overruns, with the final expenditure reaching RM6.75 billion, up from the original RM5.35 billion .
• Quality Issues: The Kedah-class NGPVs suffered from technical problems, quality issues, and delays, leading to the cancellation of the program and a reduction in the number of vessels delivered .
________________________________________
3. Scorpène Submarine Deal
• Increased Costs: The procurement of two Scorpène-class submarines, initially contracted at RM4.3 billion, experienced cost increases due to delays and mismanagement, raising concerns about the efficiency of the procurement process .
• Corruption Allegations: The deal has been associated with corruption allegations, further complicating the project's financial and operational outcomes .
________________________________________
4. Black Hawk Helicopter Procurement
• Controversial Deal: A deal for the purchase of Black Hawk helicopters was scrapped after the Malondeshn King intervened, criticizing the procurement of outdated equipment at high costs
• Safety Concerns: The decision followed a fatal helicopter collision involving naval officers, highlighting the risks associated with outdated military equipment.
________________________________________
5. General Factors Contributing to Delays and Cost Overruns
• Poor Planning and Oversight: Inadequate project planning and lack of stringent oversight have been identified as key factors leading to delays and budget overruns in military procurement .
• Political Interference: Political considerations and interference have often influenced procurement decisions, sometimes at the expense of operational requirements and cost-effectiveness.
• Corruption and Mismanagement: Instances of corruption and mismanagement have further exacerbated the financial and operational challenges in defense procurement.
===========
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
📌 1. Malondesh Defense Budget in Absolute Terms
Hapus• Over the past decade (2015–2025), Malondesh defense allocation has hovered around:
o RM15–19 billion annually (≈ USD 3.2–4.0 billion).
• 2024 Budget: ~RM19.7 billion (~USD 4.2B).
• 2025: projected to stay roughly flat, given limited fiscal space and high national debt.
________________________________________
📌 2. Why This is Small in Absolute Terms
• While 1% of GDP looks modest, the total envelope in ringgit is also small compared to regional peers:
Country (2024 est.) Defense Budget (USD) Population Notes
Singapore ~$12.5B 6M Spends 3–4% GDP; much higher per capita.
Indonesia ~$9.5B 280M 1–1.2% GDP, but larger economy gives bigger envelope.
Thailand ~$7B 70M 1.2% GDP.
Philippines ~$5.3B 115M Rising due to South China Sea focus.
Malondesh ~$4.0B 34M ~0.9–1% GDP, lowest absolute spend among major ASEAN states.
👉 Malondesh absolute spending is the lowest among middle-sized ASEAN militaries, despite having major maritime security needs in the South China Sea.
________________________________________
📌 3. Effect of a Small Absolute Budget
Even if % of GDP rises slightly, the absolute ringgit amount remains too small to:
a. Fund Modern Procurement
• Fighter jets, frigates, and submarines are multi-billion RM projects.
• Example: 6 LCS Gowind frigates → RM9 billion+ (but still incomplete).
• With only RM19B annual budget, one major program can consume the entire procurement budget for years.
b. Support Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
• Fuel, spare parts, training, logistics are expensive.
• A small total envelope means O&M is constantly underfunded → low readiness.
c. Currency Weakness Effect
• Most modern weapons are priced in USD or EUR.
• Ringgit depreciation (RM4.7–4.8 per USD in 2025) shrinks buying power even further.
• What looks like RM19B is really only USD 4B, compared to Singapore’s USD 12B.
d. Crowding Out by Salaries
• Out of RM19B defense budget:
o ~70% goes to salaries, pensions, allowances.
o Only ~20–25% available for development & procurement.
• In absolute terms: less than RM4–5B/year for modernization.
________________________________________
📌 4. Strategic Impact
1. Procurement Delays → Malondesh can’t afford large-scale upgrades (MRCA fighter replacement, LCS frigates).
2. Training Cuts → limited fuel/ammo for exercises.
3. Capability Gap with Neighbors widens:
o Singapore buys F-35s, new submarines.
o Indonesia expands fighter fleet and naval assets.
o Philippines accelerates modernization with US/Japan support.
o Malondesh remains stagnant.
📌 1. What is Fiscal Space?
Hapus• Fiscal space = the government’s capacity to spend without threatening debt sustainability.
• For defense, it means: how much room Malondesh has in its annual budget to allocate funds for military modernization, operations, and maintenance.
________________________________________
📌 2. Why Malondesh Has Limited Fiscal Space
a. High National Debt
• As of mid-2025: Debt = RM1.3 trillion (~69% of GDP).
• Much higher than during the 2000s (below 55%).
• Debt servicing (interest payments) alone takes up 15–17% of annual federal revenue.
• This squeezes out spending on “non-priority” sectors like defense.
________________________________________
b. Revenue Constraints
• Malondesh’s tax base is relatively small.
• GST (Goods & Services Tax) abolished in 2018 → replaced by SST (Sales & Service Tax).
o GST: broad, efficient, higher revenue.
o SST: narrower, less revenue.
• Oil & gas revenue is volatile (20–25% of government income), so during oil price slumps, fiscal stress rises.
________________________________________
c. Competing Social Priorities
• Large commitments to:
o Education & health (biggest budget shares).
o Fuel subsidies & cash assistance programs.
o Infrastructure projects.
• Defense is politically unpopular → gets < 1% of GDP annually, one of the lowest in ASEAN.
________________________________________
d. Rigid Operating Expenditure
• Around 70% of defense budget goes to salaries, pensions, and allowances.
• Very little left for capital expenditure (procurement & modernization).
• Fiscal rigidities make it impossible to redirect funds without upsetting powerful civil service & veterans’ groups.
________________________________________
e. Currency Weakness
• Ringgit depreciation against USD (RM4.70–RM4.80 in 2025) makes imported defense systems much more expensive.
• Every billion USD contract now costs far more in local currency terms, shrinking what Malondesh can buy.
________________________________________
📌 3. Effects on Military Spending
• Annual defense budget stuck at ~RM15–19 billion (0.9–1% of GDP).
• Compare:
o Singapore: ~3–4% of GDP.
o Indonesia: 1–1.2% of GDP, but on a much bigger GDP base.
• Result: Malondesh’s defense envelope is too small to cover both O&M (operations & maintenance) and procurement.
________________________________________
📌 4. Consequences for Military Procurement
1. Delayed Programs → MRCA fighter jets, LCS frigates, helicopters.
2. Cancelled or Downsized Orders → e.g., MRCA reduced to LCA, Black Hawk leasing plan shrunk then collapsed.
3. Inability to Commit to Multi-Year Plans → no guaranteed funding stream.
4. Patchwork Modernization → instead of comprehensive upgrades, Malondesh buys in piecemeal fashion.
________________________________________
📌 5. Strategic Impact
• Malondesh cannot sustain credible deterrence in South China Sea.
• Must rely heavily on diplomacy and ASEAN forums instead of hard power.
• Forces risk becoming a “hollow military”: large on paper, weak in practice.
________________________________________
📌 6. Comparison with Indonesia (MEF)
• Indonesia also has fiscal limits, but:
o Clear 25-year modernization roadmap (MEF).
o Willingness to borrow externally for defense procurement.
o Gradual capability improvements visible (submarines, fighters, naval ships).
• Malondesh: stuck in short-term annual budgeting + unwillingness to take on foreign defense loans → programs constantly stall.
📌 1. What Policy Flip-Flops Mean in Procurement
HapusIn Malondesh’s case:
• A procurement program is announced, then delayed, cancelled, or changed.
• Often re-started later under different specs, suppliers, or budget levels.
• Result: equipment arrives 10–20 years late — or never at all.
These flip-flops waste money, damage credibility, and create long gaps in capabilities.
________________________________________
📌 2. Key Drivers of Procurement Flip-Flops
1. Frequent Government Changes → new prime minister or defense minister wants to review/restart.
2. Budget Constraints → once economy slows, defense is first to be cut.
3. Scandals/Corruption → programs frozen or restructured.
4. Shifting Priorities → suddenly focus on cheaper “interim” solutions.
5. Lack of Multi-Year Funding → no guarantee a program survives beyond one budget cycle.
________________________________________
📌 3. Case Studies of Procurement Flip-Flops
✈️ MRCA Fighter Program
• 2007: Malondesh starts plan to replace MiG-29 (retired 2017).
• 2010–2015: Bidders included Rafale, Eurofighter, Gripen, Su-35, F/A-18E.
• 2015: Najib defers due to budget.
• 2018: Mahathir cancels MRCA, shifts to LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).
• 2021: RMAF issues tender → 2023 chooses FA-50 (Korea).
• Flip-Flop Outcome: 20 years of talk, still no MRCA fleet by 2025. Only stopgap FA-50 arriving 2026.
________________________________________
🚢 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
• 2011: Approved → 6 ships (RM9b).
• 2014–2018: Delays + corruption scandals.
• 2019: PH gov stops payments pending audit.
• 2020: PN gov restarts but restructures.
• 2022: Again reviewed, delivery pushed to 2029.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: After 14 years, 0 ships delivered, billions sunk.
________________________________________
🚁 Helicopter Replacement (Nuri/Medium-Lift)
• 2017: Nuri retired abruptly → big air mobility gap.
• 2018–2019: PH gov cancels procurement, proposes leasing option.
• 2021: Leasing plan with 12 helicopters → downsized to 4 Black Hawks.
• 2023: Contract collapses due to dispute.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: Still no medium-lift replacement by 2025. Army depends on ad-hoc leased platforms.
________________________________________
🪖 Army Armored Vehicles
• 1980s-era Condor APCs still in service.
• 2011: Order for 257 AV-8 Gempita → delivered but overpriced.
• Plan for new 4x4 and 6x6 vehicles → multiple tenders cancelled, restarted, then frozen.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: Malondesh lacks a coherent APC fleet, stuck with old Condors.
________________________________________
🔭 Radar & Air Defense Systems
• Plans for new air defense radars since mid-2000s.
• 2015: Deferred.
• 2020: Restarted → selected Thales GM403.
• 2022: Procurement delayed again due to budget reallocation.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: Still no nationwide radar coverage in 2025.
________________________________________
📌 4. Patterns of Flip-Flops
• Announce Big Program (fighters, ships, subs).
• Budget Tightens or Political Change → program postponed.
• Resurrect as Smaller/Interim Program (e.g., MRCA → LCA).
• New Scandal or Government Change → program cancelled again.
• Restart under new specs → wasting years.
This cycle explains why Malondesh still operates:
• 1980s Condors, 1960s artillery, 1990s fighters, 1970s patrol boats.
________________________________________
📌 5. Consequences of Procurement Flip-Flops
1. Capability Gaps → no MRCA fighters, no new frigates, limited helicopters.
2. Rising Costs → delays increase price (e.g., LCS cost ballooned while no ship delivered).
3. Loss of Credibility → foreign suppliers distrust Malondeshn contracts.
4. Industry Collapse → local defense firms (e.g., Boustead) plagued by scandal, unable to sustain work.
5. Operational Weakness → RMAF, RMN, and Army cannot modernize at regional pace
⚠️ CORRUPTION & PROCUREMENT SCANDALS IN THE MALONDESHN ARMED FORCES
Hapus1. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
This is the largest defense procurement scandal in Malondesh’s history.
• Background
o In 2011, Malondesh signed a contract worth RM 9 billion (≈ USD 2.1 billion) with Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS) to build 6 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) for the Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN).
o These ships, based on the French Gowind-class frigate design, were meant to modernize the Navy and secure the South China Sea.
• Problems
o Despite the contract, not a single ship was delivered by 2025, even though billions were already paid.
o Reports revealed design changes, mismanagement, poor oversight, and possible corruption.
o The Navy originally wanted the Sigma-class design (Dutch), but the government switched to the French design without military input.
o Funds were allegedly misused for unrelated purchases (e.g., IT systems, consultancy fees).
• Impact
o RMN is left with an aging fleet while neighbors are modernizing.
o Malondesh lost at least a decade of naval modernization.
o Public confidence in the government’s ability to handle defense procurement is shaken.
________________________________________
2. Submarine Procurement Issues (2002)
• Malondesh purchased two Scorpène-class submarines from France in a deal worth RM 4.3 billion (≈ USD 1 billion).
• The deal was marred by allegations of kickbacks and bribery involving Malondeshn officials and French suppliers.
• A high-profile corruption scandal in France (known as the Scorpène scandal) linked Malondeshn intermediaries to illegal payments.
• Additionally, when the submarines arrived in 2009, one of them had technical defects and could not dive for months.
Impact:
• While the submarines are now operational, the scandal tarnished the project and raised concerns about costs vs capability.
________________________________________
3. MIG-29 and Sukhoi Su-30MKM Maintenance Issues
• Malondesh bought 18 MiG-29s in the 1990s and later 18 Su-30MKMs (2007).
• Corruption allegations emerged around maintenance contracts and spare parts procurement, with accusations of inflated costs.
• The MiG-29s were retired early in 2017 due to high costs and low availability — seen by critics as a waste of taxpayer money.
________________________________________
4. Other Reported Issues
• Helicopter Procurement Delays (MD530G “Little Birds”)
o Ordered in 2016 (RM 300 million).
o Delivery delayed for years; helicopters only arrived in 2022.
o Critics claimed the deal was overpriced and non-transparent.
• Radar & Surveillance Systems
o Some radar projects were criticized for overpricing and favoritism in awarding contracts.
________________________________________
5. Structural Causes of Corruption in Defense Procurement
1. Weak Oversight
o Parliament and independent bodies have limited access to detailed defense procurement information (often classified under “national security”).
2. Political Influence
o Major contracts are often awarded to companies linked to politicians or government-linked corporations (GLCs).
3. Opaque Procurement Process
o Tenders are often not competitive. Direct negotiations and political considerations override military requirements.
4. Middlemen & Commissions
o Use of intermediaries in defense deals creates opportunities for kickbacks.
BIAR FAKTA BERBICARA... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusSengketa Satelit Kemenhan, Yusril Sebut Navayo Ajukan Penyitaan Aset Indonesia di Perancis
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/03/20/15515151/sengketa-satelit-kemenhan-yusril-sebut-navayo-ajukan-penyitaan-aset?page=all
1. High Personnel Costs vs. Limited Modernization
Hapus• A large share of Malondesh defense budget goes to salaries, pensions, and welfare for military personnel.
• This leaves limited funds for modernization programs, equipment procurement, or advanced training.
• For example, more than half of the annual defense allocation is often consumed by operating and personnel expenditures.
________________________________________
2. Underfunded Procurement & Maintenance
• With so much spent on personnel, Malondesh struggles to allocate enough for:
o New acquisitions (fighter jets, naval vessels, surveillance systems).
o Maintenance of existing platforms, many of which are already aging.
• This imbalance leads to a growing capability gap compared to regional peers.
________________________________________
3. Skewed Distribution Across Services
• The Army traditionally receives a larger share of the defense budget compared to the Navy and Air Force.
• Yet, Malondesh main security challenges are maritime-based (South China Sea, Strait of Malacca, Sulu Sea).
• This creates a mismatch between budget priorities and strategic needs.
________________________________________
4. Reactive Rather than Strategic Spending
• Defense spending often reacts to short-term needs (e.g., counterterrorism, piracy, or disaster relief) instead of long-term modernization.
• This results in fragmented, stop-start procurement projects — for example, delays in fighter jet replacements or naval shipbuilding programs.
________________________________________
5. Dependence on Imports & High Costs
• Malondesh relies on imported defense technology, which is expensive.
• Budget constraints mean Malondesh often buys small numbers of different platforms from multiple countries.
• This creates inefficiencies in logistics, training, and maintenance, further straining limited funds.
===========
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
📌 1. Malondeshn Armed Forces (ATM) Structure
Hapus• Army (TDM) → largest service, but light and poorly mechanized.
• Navy (TLDM) → overstretched, with too few warships to patrol massive waters.
• Air Force (RMAF/TUDM) → very small, with limited combat aircraft and surveillance capability.
Overall → ATM is small in size and outdated in technology.
________________________________________
📌 2. Army (TDM) – Outdated & Lightly Armed
• Tanks & Armor:
o No modern Main Battle Tanks (MBTs).
o Relies mostly on PT-91M Pendekar (Polish MBT, ~2000s tech, inferior to Leopard 2 or T-90).
o Many armored vehicles (Condor, Sibmas) date back to the 1980s.
• Artillery:
o Mostly old Oto Melara 105mm howitzers, with limited 155mm systems.
o No long-range rocket artillery (MLRS) like Indonesia (ASTROS) or Singapore (HIMARS).
• Air Defense:
o Only short-range MANPADS (Igla, Starstreak).
o No medium- or long-range SAMs → airspace exposed.
• Helicopters:
o Nuri (Sikorsky S-61A) retired without full replacement.
o Limited utility/attack helicopter capability.
👉 Problem: The Army is big in manpower (~80,000) but under-armed compared to regional standards.
________________________________________
📌 3. Navy (TLDM) – Shrinking & Aging
• Frigates/Corvettes:
o Only 2 Lekiu-class (1990s), and 4 Laksamana-class corvettes (1980s Italian ships).
o All nearing end-of-life.
• Submarines:
o 2 Scorpène-class (KD Tunku Abdul Rahman, KD Tun Razak).
o Aging, with high maintenance costs.
o Cannot cover both Peninsular & East Malondesh simultaneously.
• Patrol Vessels:
o Many are small, slow, and aging (Kasturi-class corvettes, Handalan-class FACs from the 1970s).
• New ships delayed:
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal: 6 planned Gowind-class frigates, 0 delivered since 2011.
👉 Problem: The Navy is too small to secure Malondesh South China Sea EEZ or counter Chinese presence.
________________________________________
📌 4. Air Force (RMAF/TUDM) – Very Small Fleet
• Fighters:
o ~18 Su-30MKM (but many often grounded due to maintenance issues).
o ~8 F/A-18D Hornets (aging, no replacements yet).
o MiG-29 fleet retired with no direct replacement.
o Only 36 FA-50 light fighters on order (delivery starting mid-2020s).
• Air Defense:
o No long-range SAMs, no integrated IADS.
o Airspace relies on fighters only.
• Surveillance/Support:
o Limited AEW&C (Airborne Early Warning & Control).
o Few aerial tankers → no long-range endurance.
• Transport/Helicopters:
o Small fleet of C-130s and CN-235s.
o Heavy dependence on aging Nuri helicopters (retired, with gaps in capability).
👉 Problem: The Air Force is tiny compared to neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam).
________________________________________
📌 5. Why “Small & Obsolete” Matters
• Cannot project power: ATM lacks long-range strike, strong navy, or heavy armor.
• Poor deterrence: Enemies know Malondesh cannot respond effectively.
• Maintenance burden: Old equipment costs more to keep running than buying new.
• Capability gaps:
o No long-range air defense.
o No modern drones for ISR/strike.
o No sufficient submarine fleet.
o Weak sealift/airlift for East Malondesh defense.
________________________________________
📌 6. Regional Comparison
• Singapore: 100+ F-15/16 fighters, Leopard 2 tanks, Formidable-class frigates, submarines, HIMARS, long-range SAMs.
• Indonesia: Expanding with Rafale, F-15EX, submarines, frigates, rocket artillery.
• Vietnam: Strong Su-30 fleet, Bastion-P coastal missile batteries, Kilo-class submarines.
• Malondesh:
o ~26 operational fighters.
o 2 submarines.
o No long-range SAMs or modern coastal defense systems.
o Aging ships & vehicles.
👉 Malondesh is the weakest among the mid-tier ASEAN militaries.
________________________________________
📌 7. Core Reason: Budget & Political Will
• Defense budget ~1% of GDP → not enough for modernization.
• Half of budget spent on salaries/pensions → leaves little for procurement.
• Procurement scandals (LCS, helicopter deals) wasted billions.
• Political leaders prioritize subsidies & populism over defense.
📌 1. What Are Policy Flip-Flops?
HapusPolicy flip-flops in Malondesh’s defense mean:
• Frequent changes in plans, programs, and procurement priorities.
• Caused by government changes, minister reshuffles, or shifting political agendas.
• Leads to cancellations, re-tendering, or redesigning programs.
• Results in years of delays, wasted funds, and capability gaps.
________________________________________
📌 2. Drivers of Policy Flip-Flops
a. Frequent Political Changes
• Since 2018: Malondesh had 5 prime ministers in 7 years (Najib → Mahathir → Muhyiddin → Ismail Sabri → Anwar).
• Each PM/defense minister reviews and changes defense priorities.
• Example: The same program (fighter jets, navy ships) can be launched, paused, revived, or cancelled multiple times.
________________________________________
b. Short-Term Focus
• Politicians prioritize 5-year election cycles over 15–20 year defense modernization.
• Programs requiring long-term funding commitments (e.g., fighter jets, submarines, frigates) get disrupted.
________________________________________
c. Budget Pressures
• High national debt (69% of GDP in 2025).
• Defense is seen as “non-essential”, so big-ticket programs are often the first to be cut or postponed.
• Leads to repeated “defer until later” cycles.
________________________________________
d. Corruption & Scandals
• When scandals erupt (e.g., LCS RM9 billion scandal), programs face:
o Audits, suspensions, parliamentary probes.
o Restructuring or even outright cancellation.
• Creates uncertainty for ongoing and future procurement.
________________________________________
📌 3. Examples of Policy Flip-Flops
✈️ Fighter Jet Replacement (MRCA Program)
• 2007–2010: Plan to replace MiG-29 with new fighters.
• Candidates: Rafale, Typhoon, Gripen, Super Hornet, Su-35.
• 2015: Najib government delayed due to budget.
• 2018: Mahathir cancelled, shifted to cheaper LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).
• 2022: RMAF selected Korean FA-50 → but deliveries only from 2026.
⏳ Result: 20 years later, still no MRCA. MiG-29 retired with no replacement.
________________________________________
🚢 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program
• 2011: Najib government approved 6 ships (RM9 billion).
• 2018: PH government halted payments due to mismanagement.
• 2020: PN government restarted program with restructuring.
• 2023–2025: Still no ship delivered.
⏳ Result: Program flip-flopped between “go-ahead” and “pause”, now 14 years with 0 ships.
________________________________________
🚁 Helicopter Procurement
• Malondesh planned medium-lift helicopter replacements (Nuri).
• 2017: Nuri retired suddenly → capability gap.
• 2019: Mahathir’s government cancelled immediate purchase, shifted to leasing option.
• 2022: Army announced leasing 4 Black Hawks → contract collapsed due to disputes.
⏳ Result: Years without adequate helicopters.
________________________________________
🪖 Army Armored Vehicles
• 1980s Condor APCs still in use.
• AV-8 Gempita ordered (2011) → only 257 built, production ended.
• Plan for new wheeled APC → repeatedly delayed.
⏳ Result: Army still operates outdated vehicles because replacement kept shifting.
________________________________________
📌 4. Consequences of Policy Flip-Flops
1. Capability Gaps
o Air Force without MRCA fighters.
o Navy without new frigates.
o Army using outdated artillery and APCs.
2. Wasted Money
o Billions spent on projects that stall or fail (e.g., LCS, helicopter leasing).
3. Industry Instability
o Local companies cannot plan or invest because contracts keep shifting.
o Leads to failures like Boustead Naval Shipyard.
4. Loss of Credibility
o Foreign suppliers lose trust in Malondesh.
o Military loses confidence that promised equipment will ever arrive.
📌 1. What Are Policy Flip-Flops?
HapusPolicy flip-flops in Malondesh’s defense mean:
• Frequent changes in plans, programs, and procurement priorities.
• Caused by government changes, minister reshuffles, or shifting political agendas.
• Leads to cancellations, re-tendering, or redesigning programs.
• Results in years of delays, wasted funds, and capability gaps.
________________________________________
📌 2. Drivers of Policy Flip-Flops
a. Frequent Political Changes
• Since 2018: Malondesh had 5 prime ministers in 7 years (Najib → Mahathir → Muhyiddin → Ismail Sabri → Anwar).
• Each PM/defense minister reviews and changes defense priorities.
• Example: The same program (fighter jets, navy ships) can be launched, paused, revived, or cancelled multiple times.
________________________________________
b. Short-Term Focus
• Politicians prioritize 5-year election cycles over 15–20 year defense modernization.
• Programs requiring long-term funding commitments (e.g., fighter jets, submarines, frigates) get disrupted.
________________________________________
c. Budget Pressures
• High national debt (69% of GDP in 2025).
• Defense is seen as “non-essential”, so big-ticket programs are often the first to be cut or postponed.
• Leads to repeated “defer until later” cycles.
________________________________________
d. Corruption & Scandals
• When scandals erupt (e.g., LCS RM9 billion scandal), programs face:
o Audits, suspensions, parliamentary probes.
o Restructuring or even outright cancellation.
• Creates uncertainty for ongoing and future procurement.
________________________________________
📌 3. Examples of Policy Flip-Flops
✈️ Fighter Jet Replacement (MRCA Program)
• 2007–2010: Plan to replace MiG-29 with new fighters.
• Candidates: Rafale, Typhoon, Gripen, Super Hornet, Su-35.
• 2015: Najib government delayed due to budget.
• 2018: Mahathir cancelled, shifted to cheaper LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).
• 2022: RMAF selected Korean FA-50 → but deliveries only from 2026.
⏳ Result: 20 years later, still no MRCA. MiG-29 retired with no replacement.
________________________________________
🚢 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program
• 2011: Najib government approved 6 ships (RM9 billion).
• 2018: PH government halted payments due to mismanagement.
• 2020: PN government restarted program with restructuring.
• 2023–2025: Still no ship delivered.
⏳ Result: Program flip-flopped between “go-ahead” and “pause”, now 14 years with 0 ships.
________________________________________
🚁 Helicopter Procurement
• Malondesh planned medium-lift helicopter replacements (Nuri).
• 2017: Nuri retired suddenly → capability gap.
• 2019: Mahathir’s government cancelled immediate purchase, shifted to leasing option.
• 2022: Army announced leasing 4 Black Hawks → contract collapsed due to disputes.
⏳ Result: Years without adequate helicopters.
________________________________________
🪖 Army Armored Vehicles
• 1980s Condor APCs still in use.
• AV-8 Gempita ordered (2011) → only 257 built, production ended.
• Plan for new wheeled APC → repeatedly delayed.
⏳ Result: Army still operates outdated vehicles because replacement kept shifting.
________________________________________
📌 4. Consequences of Policy Flip-Flops
1. Capability Gaps
o Air Force without MRCA fighters.
o Navy without new frigates.
o Army using outdated artillery and APCs.
2. Wasted Money
o Billions spent on projects that stall or fail (e.g., LCS, helicopter leasing).
3. Industry Instability
o Local companies cannot plan or invest because contracts keep shifting.
o Leads to failures like Boustead Naval Shipyard.
4. Loss of Credibility
o Foreign suppliers lose trust in Malondesh.
o Military loses confidence that promised equipment will ever arrive.
📌 1. Chronic Underfunding
Hapus• Malondesh spends ~1% of GDP on defense (2023–2025: around RM16–19 billion).
• By comparison:
o Singapore: ~3% of GDP
o Indonesia: ~1.2–1.3% but rising
• The small “envelope” means:
o Not enough money for procurement + operations + maintenance simultaneously.
o Programs get stretched for decades, cancelled, or reduced in scale.
o Even when announced, many projects end up shelved.
________________________________________
📌 2. Political Instability & Short-Termism
• Since 2018, Malondesh has had 5 prime ministers in 7 years → policies keep changing.
• Each new government “re-evaluates” defense programs, often pausing or cancelling them.
• Politicians see defense as low priority compared to subsidies, social spending, and debt repayment.
• Long-term defense plans (like the Defense White Paper 2019) collapse because they require 10–15 years of consistent execution, which Malondesh’s politics cannot provide.
________________________________________
📌 3. Budget Distribution Problems
• Even the small budget is poorly allocated:
o ~50–60% on salaries and pensions.
o ~20–30% on operations & maintenance.
o <20% left for procurement/modernization.
• Effect: Malondesh maintains a large but under-equipped force → many personnel, few modern assets.
________________________________________
📌 4. Weak Local Defense Industry
• Malondesh relies on foreign technology and local assembly (e.g., AV-8 Gempita, LCS).
• Local firms often have political ties, not technical competence.
• Results in scandals and failures (e.g., Littoral Combat Ship – RM9 billion, zero ships delivered).
• No strong exports → cannot sustain industry with economies of scale.
________________________________________
📌 5. Procurement Delays, Cancellations & Scandals
• Major programs (fighters, ships, artillery) delayed for 10–20 years.
• Scandals (LCS, helicopter purchases) erode public and political trust.
• Frequent “resetting” of programs → capability gaps widen.
• Example: MRCA program to replace MiG-29 has been discussed since 2007, still no aircraft by 2025.
________________________________________
📌 6. Operational & Maintenance Weakness
• Many platforms cannot be sustained:
o Su-30MKM fighter availability often <50%.
o Submarines require costly foreign maintenance.
o Condor APCs from 1980s still in service because replacements delayed.
• Spare parts supply chain weak → long downtime for equipment.
________________________________________
📌 7. External Dependence
• Malondesh buys from multiple suppliers (Russia, US, Europe, China, Korea).
• Creates logistics nightmare → incompatible spare parts, training, and support.
• Unlike Singapore (which standardizes on Western tech), Malondesh struggles with interoperability.
________________________________________
📌 8. Public Perception & Priorities
• Ordinary Malondeshns often see defense spending as “wasteful”.
• Scandals reinforce belief that defense = corruption.
• Governments focus instead on subsidies, civil service pay, and development projects to win votes.
• Defense is always sacrificed first when budget pressures rise.
________________________________________
📌 9. Consequences: Why Malondesh Stays Stuck
• Capability gaps in all services:
o Air Force: fighter gap, weak surveillance.
o Navy: LCS delays, only 2 submarines, no amphibious capability.
o Army: outdated artillery, APCs, no attack helicopters.
• Low readiness: Many assets grounded or unavailable.
• Falling behind neighbors:
o Singapore maintains cutting-edge military.
o Indonesia accelerating modernization.
o Vietnam expanding navy & air force for South China Sea.
• Malondesh risks becoming a “hollow force”: large on paper, weak in reality.
1. Economic Pressures
BalasHapus• Declining oil revenues: Malondesh’s traditional income from oil has shrunk, reducing government revenue.
• Depreciation of the ringgit: A weaker currency increases the cost of importing military equipment, especially from Western and Korean suppliers.
• Competing national priorities: Funds are diverted to healthcare, education, and subsidies, limiting defense allocations.
2. Budget Allocation Breakdown (2024)
Category Amount (RM) % of Total Budget
Total Defense Budget RM19.73 billion 100%
Salaries & Allowances RM8.2 billion ~41%
Procurement RM5.71 billion ~29%
Operations & Logistics RM5.82 billion ~30%
Over 40% of the budget goes to personnel costs, leaving limited room for modernization.
3. Procurement Challenges
• Most procurement funds are tied to progressive payments for existing contracts (e.g. FA-50 jets, A400M upgrades).
• New acquisitions are often delayed or scaled down due to lack of multi-year funding commitments.
• Domestic defense industry is dependent on foreign OEMs, limiting cost control and self-reliance.
4. Political Reluctance
• Successive governments have avoided cutting other sectors to boost defense spending.
• No major reforms to reduce manpower or restructure the armed forces for efficiency.
• Defense budgeting lacks long-term strategic planning, making modernization reactive rather than proactive.
5. Operational Cost Burden
• Malondesh’s military assets (e.g. Su-30MKM, Scorpène submarines) are expensive to maintain.
• Fuel, spares, housing, and logistics consume a large portion of the budget, limiting capital investment.
1. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Project
BalasHapus• Initial Cost and Delays: The LCS project, initially budgeted at RM6 billion, has experienced substantial delays and cost escalations. The project, which was supposed to deliver six ships, has been reduced to five, with the total cost now exceeding RM11 billion .
• Overspending and Misallocation: A Public Accounts Committee (PAC) report revealed that RM400 million of the funds were used to settle debts from a previous patrol vessel project, and 15% of the equipment purchased became obsolete due to prolonged storage
• Progress and Future Plans: As of recent updates, the LCS project has achieved 72.43% completion across all five vessels, with the first ship expected to be delivered by 2026
________________________________________
2. New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) Program
• Cost Overruns: The NGPV program, initially planned for 27 vessels, faced significant cost overruns, with the final expenditure reaching RM6.75 billion, up from the original RM5.35 billion .
• Quality Issues: The Kedah-class NGPVs suffered from technical problems, quality issues, and delays, leading to the cancellation of the program and a reduction in the number of vessels delivered .
________________________________________
3. Scorpène Submarine Deal
• Increased Costs: The procurement of two Scorpène-class submarines, initially contracted at RM4.3 billion, experienced cost increases due to delays and mismanagement, raising concerns about the efficiency of the procurement process .
• Corruption Allegations: The deal has been associated with corruption allegations, further complicating the project's financial and operational outcomes .
________________________________________
4. Black Hawk Helicopter Procurement
• Controversial Deal: A deal for the purchase of Black Hawk helicopters was scrapped after the Malondeshn King intervened, criticizing the procurement of outdated equipment at high costs
• Safety Concerns: The decision followed a fatal helicopter collision involving naval officers, highlighting the risks associated with outdated military equipment.
________________________________________
5. General Factors Contributing to Delays and Cost Overruns
• Poor Planning and Oversight: Inadequate project planning and lack of stringent oversight have been identified as key factors leading to delays and budget overruns in military procurement .
• Political Interference: Political considerations and interference have often influenced procurement decisions, sometimes at the expense of operational requirements and cost-effectiveness.
• Corruption and Mismanagement: Instances of corruption and mismanagement have further exacerbated the financial and operational challenges in defense procurement.
===========
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
📌 1. Fighter Fleet Problems
BalasHapusCurrent Fighters (as of 2025):
• 8 F/A-18D Hornets (bought in 1997)
o Aging, need mid-life upgrades, limited strike range.
• 18 Su-30MKM Flankers (delivered 2007–2009)
o Powerful but plagued by maintenance and spare parts issues.
o Many often grounded → at times less than 50% readiness.
• MB-339CM trainers/light attack jets (old, limited combat role).
👉 Compared to neighbors:
• Singapore → >60 F-15SGs & upgraded F-16Vs, buying F-35s.
• Indonesia → >30 Su-27/30s, buying Rafales & F-15EX.
• Vietnam → 36+ Su-30MK2Vs.
👉 Malondesh’s fighter fleet is tiny and partially unserviceable, limiting air superiority.
________________________________________
📌 2. The MiG-29 Failure
• Malondesh bought 18 MiG-29Ns in the 1990s.
• Retired early (2015) due to:
o High operating cost.
o Reliability issues.
o Poor logistics support from Russia.
• Replacement program (“MRCA”) delayed for over a decade because of budget constraints and political indecision.
👉 Result: Fighter numbers dropped sharply → “air power gap” still not fixed.
________________________________________
📌 3. Transport & Airlift
• C-130 Hercules fleet (14 units) → old but reliable, used for logistics & disaster relief.
• A400M Atlas (4 units, delivered 2015–2017)
• Gap: Malondesh lacks enough airlift to rapidly reinforce East Malondesh (Sabah & Sarawak).
________________________________________
📌 4. Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) Weakness
• Currently uses Beechcraft King Air B200Ts → outdated and limited range.
• Malondesh faces constant Chinese Coast Guard intrusion in South China Sea, but has no dedicated long-range MPA fleet.
• Boeing P-8 Poseidon (used by US, Australia, India) is far beyond Malondesh’s budget.
👉 Weak maritime domain awareness → navy operations suffer too.
________________________________________
📌 5. Helicopter Fleet
• Nuri helicopters (Sikorsky S-61) retired in 2019 due to age.
• Replacement delayed — Army and Air Force face lift helicopter shortage.
• Only a few AW139 and EC725 Cougar are available, limiting troop transport and search & rescue (SAR).
________________________________________
📌 6. Air Defense & Radar
• Malondesh has no long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
• Relies only on short-range man-portable systems (MANPADS) and some older gun-based defenses.
• Radar coverage is patchy, especially over the South China Sea.
👉 Meaning: Malondeshn airspace is vulnerable to intrusion by modern air forces.
________________________________________
📌 7. Procurement Delays & Budget Issues
• Fighter replacement program (MRCA → Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) has been discussed since 2010s, but still no decision due to budget politics.
• Plans for KAI FA-50 light fighters (up to 36 units) finally approved in 2023, but delivery will stretch into late 2020s.
• No clear roadmap for 5th-generation fighters (like F-35 or KF-21).
________________________________________
📌 8. Training & Readiness
• Flight hours per pilot are low (due to budget and fuel costs).
• Many pilots get less than half the NATO-recommended hours.
• Limits skill in complex missions (air-to-air combat, night operations).
• Dependence on foreign exercises with US, Australia, Singapore to maintain training standards.
________________________________________
📌 9. Structural Weakness
• Too many bases spread across Peninsular and East Malondesh → increases costs, reduces efficiency.
• Lack of aerial refueling tankers → fighters cannot sustain long-range missions.
• Weak electronic warfare and drone capabilities compared to modern peers.
________________________________________
📌 10. Consequences
1. Weak air deterrence → cannot challenge China’s PLA Air Force or even regional peers.
2. Limited support for Navy/Army → few aircraft for close air support or maritime patrol.
3. Aging platforms → constant readiness problems, high maintenance costs.
4. Dependence on foreign partners → for training, spares, and even operational backup
📌 1. Malondesh Defense Budget in Absolute Terms
BalasHapus• Over the past decade (2015–2025), Malondesh defense allocation has hovered around:
o RM15–19 billion annually (≈ USD 3.2–4.0 billion).
• 2024 Budget: ~RM19.7 billion (~USD 4.2B).
• 2025: projected to stay roughly flat, given limited fiscal space and high national debt.
________________________________________
📌 2. Why This is Small in Absolute Terms
• While 1% of GDP looks modest, the total envelope in ringgit is also small compared to regional peers:
Country (2024 est.) Defense Budget (USD) Population Notes
Singapore ~$12.5B 6M Spends 3–4% GDP; much higher per capita.
Indonesia ~$9.5B 280M 1–1.2% GDP, but larger economy gives bigger envelope.
Thailand ~$7B 70M 1.2% GDP.
Philippines ~$5.3B 115M Rising due to South China Sea focus.
Malondesh ~$4.0B 34M ~0.9–1% GDP, lowest absolute spend among major ASEAN states.
👉 Malondesh absolute spending is the lowest among middle-sized ASEAN militaries, despite having major maritime security needs in the South China Sea.
________________________________________
📌 3. Effect of a Small Absolute Budget
Even if % of GDP rises slightly, the absolute ringgit amount remains too small to:
a. Fund Modern Procurement
• Fighter jets, frigates, and submarines are multi-billion RM projects.
• Example: 6 LCS Gowind frigates → RM9 billion+ (but still incomplete).
• With only RM19B annual budget, one major program can consume the entire procurement budget for years.
b. Support Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
• Fuel, spare parts, training, logistics are expensive.
• A small total envelope means O&M is constantly underfunded → low readiness.
c. Currency Weakness Effect
• Most modern weapons are priced in USD or EUR.
• Ringgit depreciation (RM4.7–4.8 per USD in 2025) shrinks buying power even further.
• What looks like RM19B is really only USD 4B, compared to Singapore’s USD 12B.
d. Crowding Out by Salaries
• Out of RM19B defense budget:
o ~70% goes to salaries, pensions, allowances.
o Only ~20–25% available for development & procurement.
• In absolute terms: less than RM4–5B/year for modernization.
________________________________________
📌 4. Strategic Impact
1. Procurement Delays → Malondesh can’t afford large-scale upgrades (MRCA fighter replacement, LCS frigates).
2. Training Cuts → limited fuel/ammo for exercises.
3. Capability Gap with Neighbors widens:
o Singapore buys F-35s, new submarines.
o Indonesia expands fighter fleet and naval assets.
o Philippines accelerates modernization with US/Japan support.
o Malondesh remains stagnant.
📌 1. What Policy Flip-Flops Mean in Procurement
BalasHapusIn Malondesh’s case:
• A procurement program is announced, then delayed, cancelled, or changed.
• Often re-started later under different specs, suppliers, or budget levels.
• Result: equipment arrives 10–20 years late — or never at all.
These flip-flops waste money, damage credibility, and create long gaps in capabilities.
________________________________________
📌 2. Key Drivers of Procurement Flip-Flops
1. Frequent Government Changes → new prime minister or defense minister wants to review/restart.
2. Budget Constraints → once economy slows, defense is first to be cut.
3. Scandals/Corruption → programs frozen or restructured.
4. Shifting Priorities → suddenly focus on cheaper “interim” solutions.
5. Lack of Multi-Year Funding → no guarantee a program survives beyond one budget cycle.
________________________________________
📌 3. Case Studies of Procurement Flip-Flops
✈️ MRCA Fighter Program
• 2007: Malondesh starts plan to replace MiG-29 (retired 2017).
• 2010–2015: Bidders included Rafale, Eurofighter, Gripen, Su-35, F/A-18E.
• 2015: Najib defers due to budget.
• 2018: Mahathir cancels MRCA, shifts to LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).
• 2021: RMAF issues tender → 2023 chooses FA-50 (Korea).
• Flip-Flop Outcome: 20 years of talk, still no MRCA fleet by 2025. Only stopgap FA-50 arriving 2026.
________________________________________
🚢 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
• 2011: Approved → 6 ships (RM9b).
• 2014–2018: Delays + corruption scandals.
• 2019: PH gov stops payments pending audit.
• 2020: PN gov restarts but restructures.
• 2022: Again reviewed, delivery pushed to 2029.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: After 14 years, 0 ships delivered, billions sunk.
________________________________________
🚁 Helicopter Replacement (Nuri/Medium-Lift)
• 2017: Nuri retired abruptly → big air mobility gap.
• 2018–2019: PH gov cancels procurement, proposes leasing option.
• 2021: Leasing plan with 12 helicopters → downsized to 4 Black Hawks.
• 2023: Contract collapses due to dispute.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: Still no medium-lift replacement by 2025. Army depends on ad-hoc leased platforms.
________________________________________
🪖 Army Armored Vehicles
• 1980s-era Condor APCs still in service.
• 2011: Order for 257 AV-8 Gempita → delivered but overpriced.
• Plan for new 4x4 and 6x6 vehicles → multiple tenders cancelled, restarted, then frozen.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: Malondesh lacks a coherent APC fleet, stuck with old Condors.
________________________________________
🔭 Radar & Air Defense Systems
• Plans for new air defense radars since mid-2000s.
• 2015: Deferred.
• 2020: Restarted → selected Thales GM403.
• 2022: Procurement delayed again due to budget reallocation.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: Still no nationwide radar coverage in 2025.
________________________________________
📌 4. Patterns of Flip-Flops
• Announce Big Program (fighters, ships, subs).
• Budget Tightens or Political Change → program postponed.
• Resurrect as Smaller/Interim Program (e.g., MRCA → LCA).
• New Scandal or Government Change → program cancelled again.
• Restart under new specs → wasting years.
This cycle explains why Malondesh still operates:
• 1980s Condors, 1960s artillery, 1990s fighters, 1970s patrol boats.
________________________________________
📌 5. Consequences of Procurement Flip-Flops
1. Capability Gaps → no MRCA fighters, no new frigates, limited helicopters.
2. Rising Costs → delays increase price (e.g., LCS cost ballooned while no ship delivered).
3. Loss of Credibility → foreign suppliers distrust Malondeshn contracts.
4. Industry Collapse → local defense firms (e.g., Boustead) plagued by scandal, unable to sustain work.
5. Operational Weakness → RMAF, RMN, and Army cannot modernize at regional pace
📌 1. What Are Policy Flip-Flops?
BalasHapusPolicy flip-flops in Malondesh’s defense mean:
• Frequent changes in plans, programs, and procurement priorities.
• Caused by government changes, minister reshuffles, or shifting political agendas.
• Leads to cancellations, re-tendering, or redesigning programs.
• Results in years of delays, wasted funds, and capability gaps.
________________________________________
📌 2. Drivers of Policy Flip-Flops
a. Frequent Political Changes
• Since 2018: Malondesh had 5 prime ministers in 7 years (Najib → Mahathir → Muhyiddin → Ismail Sabri → Anwar).
• Each PM/defense minister reviews and changes defense priorities.
• Example: The same program (fighter jets, navy ships) can be launched, paused, revived, or cancelled multiple times.
________________________________________
b. Short-Term Focus
• Politicians prioritize 5-year election cycles over 15–20 year defense modernization.
• Programs requiring long-term funding commitments (e.g., fighter jets, submarines, frigates) get disrupted.
________________________________________
c. Budget Pressures
• High national debt (69% of GDP in 2025).
• Defense is seen as “non-essential”, so big-ticket programs are often the first to be cut or postponed.
• Leads to repeated “defer until later” cycles.
________________________________________
d. Corruption & Scandals
• When scandals erupt (e.g., LCS RM9 billion scandal), programs face:
o Audits, suspensions, parliamentary probes.
o Restructuring or even outright cancellation.
• Creates uncertainty for ongoing and future procurement.
________________________________________
📌 3. Examples of Policy Flip-Flops
✈️ Fighter Jet Replacement (MRCA Program)
• 2007–2010: Plan to replace MiG-29 with new fighters.
• Candidates: Rafale, Typhoon, Gripen, Super Hornet, Su-35.
• 2015: Najib government delayed due to budget.
• 2018: Mahathir cancelled, shifted to cheaper LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).
• 2022: RMAF selected Korean FA-50 → but deliveries only from 2026.
⏳ Result: 20 years later, still no MRCA. MiG-29 retired with no replacement.
________________________________________
🚢 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program
• 2011: Najib government approved 6 ships (RM9 billion).
• 2018: PH government halted payments due to mismanagement.
• 2020: PN government restarted program with restructuring.
• 2023–2025: Still no ship delivered.
⏳ Result: Program flip-flopped between “go-ahead” and “pause”, now 14 years with 0 ships.
________________________________________
🚁 Helicopter Procurement
• Malondesh planned medium-lift helicopter replacements (Nuri).
• 2017: Nuri retired suddenly → capability gap.
• 2019: Mahathir’s government cancelled immediate purchase, shifted to leasing option.
• 2022: Army announced leasing 4 Black Hawks → contract collapsed due to disputes.
⏳ Result: Years without adequate helicopters.
________________________________________
🪖 Army Armored Vehicles
• 1980s Condor APCs still in use.
• AV-8 Gempita ordered (2011) → only 257 built, production ended.
• Plan for new wheeled APC → repeatedly delayed.
⏳ Result: Army still operates outdated vehicles because replacement kept shifting.
________________________________________
📌 4. Consequences of Policy Flip-Flops
1. Capability Gaps
o Air Force without MRCA fighters.
o Navy without new frigates.
o Army using outdated artillery and APCs.
2. Wasted Money
o Billions spent on projects that stall or fail (e.g., LCS, helicopter leasing).
3. Industry Instability
o Local companies cannot plan or invest because contracts keep shifting.
o Leads to failures like Boustead Naval Shipyard.
4. Loss of Credibility
o Foreign suppliers lose trust in Malondesh.
o Military loses confidence that promised equipment will ever arrive.
🔑 CRUCIAL PROBLEMS OF THE MALONDESHN ARMED FORCES (MAF)
Hapus1. Aging Equipment & Modernization Gap
• Many core assets of the Malondeshn Army, Navy, and Air Force are decades old.
o The Air Force still relies heavily on older aircraft (MiG-29s were retired, Su-30MKM and F/A-18D are still key but aging).
o The Navy faces delays in the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, leaving maritime security compromised.
o The Army’s armored vehicles and artillery are in need of modernization.
• Problem: Modernization plans exist (e.g., "Force 2055" blueprint), but budget cuts, procurement delays, and political interference hinder progress.
________________________________________
2. Budget Constraints
• Defense spending in Malondesh is below 1.5% of GDP, lower than regional peers like Singapore (~3%) or Thailand (~1.5%).
• This budget is insufficient to support modernization, training, and maintenance.
• High dependency on imports for major assets (submarines, jets, ships) increases costs.
• Problem: MAF struggles to maintain a balance between modernization and day-to-day operational readiness.
________________________________________
3. Maritime Security Challenges
• Malondesh has one of the world’s busiest sea lanes — the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea (SCS).
• Issues:
o Chinese encroachment in Malondesh’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (especially near Luconia Shoals).
o Piracy, illegal fishing, and smuggling in the Strait of Malacca.
o Territorial overlap with neighbors (Philippines and Indonesia).
• Problem: Navy and Coast Guard (MMEA) assets are overstretched, with insufficient ships and patrol capabilities.
________________________________________
4. Manpower & Recruitment Issues
• Malondesh has a relatively small professional force (~110,000 active personnel).
• Recruitment faces challenges due to:
o Low pay and benefits compared to private sector jobs.
o Limited career development opportunities.
o Younger generations less interested in military careers.
• Problem: Difficulty in retaining skilled personnel (especially pilots, engineers, cyber specialists).
________________________________________
5. Inter-Service Coordination
• The three branches (Army, Navy, Air Force) often operate independently, with limited joint operations capability.
• The lack of integrated command structures reduces operational efficiency in complex missions (counter-insurgency, disaster relief, maritime disputes).
• Problem: Modern warfare demands jointness (land, sea, air, cyber, space), which MAF is still developing.
________________________________________
6. Dependence on Foreign Technology & Maintenance
• Malondesh lacks a strong domestic defense industry.
• Heavy reliance on imports (France for submarines, Russia for jets, South Korea for ships, etc.) makes maintenance costly and vulnerable to supplier politics.
• Example: Spare parts for MiG-29s were hard to source, leading to their retirement.
• Problem: Limited self-reliance in defense production.
________________________________________
7. Cybersecurity & Hybrid Threats
• Malondesh faces risks from cyber espionage, disinformation, and hybrid warfare, especially related to South China Sea disputes.
• Cyber defense capabilities are still underdeveloped compared to regional players like Singapore.
• Problem: Vulnerability in information warfare undermines national security.
________________________________________
8. Internal Politics & Procurement Scandals
• Defense procurement is often criticized for corruption, cost overruns, and political interference.
• Example: The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal delayed naval modernization.
• Problem: Corruption erodes public trust, delays modernization, and wastes resources.
🔑 CRUCIAL PROBLEMS OF THE MALONDESHN ARMED FORCES (MAF)
BalasHapus1. Aging Equipment & Modernization Gap
• Many core assets of the Malondeshn Army, Navy, and Air Force are decades old.
o The Air Force still relies heavily on older aircraft (MiG-29s were retired, Su-30MKM and F/A-18D are still key but aging).
o The Navy faces delays in the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, leaving maritime security compromised.
o The Army’s armored vehicles and artillery are in need of modernization.
• Problem: Modernization plans exist (e.g., "Force 2055" blueprint), but budget cuts, procurement delays, and political interference hinder progress.
________________________________________
2. Budget Constraints
• Defense spending in Malondesh is below 1.5% of GDP, lower than regional peers like Singapore (~3%) or Thailand (~1.5%).
• This budget is insufficient to support modernization, training, and maintenance.
• High dependency on imports for major assets (submarines, jets, ships) increases costs.
• Problem: MAF struggles to maintain a balance between modernization and day-to-day operational readiness.
________________________________________
3. Maritime Security Challenges
• Malondesh has one of the world’s busiest sea lanes — the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea (SCS).
• Issues:
o Chinese encroachment in Malondesh’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (especially near Luconia Shoals).
o Piracy, illegal fishing, and smuggling in the Strait of Malacca.
o Territorial overlap with neighbors (Philippines and Indonesia).
• Problem: Navy and Coast Guard (MMEA) assets are overstretched, with insufficient ships and patrol capabilities.
________________________________________
4. Manpower & Recruitment Issues
• Malondesh has a relatively small professional force (~110,000 active personnel).
• Recruitment faces challenges due to:
o Low pay and benefits compared to private sector jobs.
o Limited career development opportunities.
o Younger generations less interested in military careers.
• Problem: Difficulty in retaining skilled personnel (especially pilots, engineers, cyber specialists).
________________________________________
5. Inter-Service Coordination
• The three branches (Army, Navy, Air Force) often operate independently, with limited joint operations capability.
• The lack of integrated command structures reduces operational efficiency in complex missions (counter-insurgency, disaster relief, maritime disputes).
• Problem: Modern warfare demands jointness (land, sea, air, cyber, space), which MAF is still developing.
________________________________________
6. Dependence on Foreign Technology & Maintenance
• Malondesh lacks a strong domestic defense industry.
• Heavy reliance on imports (France for submarines, Russia for jets, South Korea for ships, etc.) makes maintenance costly and vulnerable to supplier politics.
• Example: Spare parts for MiG-29s were hard to source, leading to their retirement.
• Problem: Limited self-reliance in defense production.
________________________________________
7. Cybersecurity & Hybrid Threats
• Malondesh faces risks from cyber espionage, disinformation, and hybrid warfare, especially related to South China Sea disputes.
• Cyber defense capabilities are still underdeveloped compared to regional players like Singapore.
• Problem: Vulnerability in information warfare undermines national security.
________________________________________
8. Internal Politics & Procurement Scandals
• Defense procurement is often criticized for corruption, cost overruns, and political interference.
• Example: The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal delayed naval modernization.
• Problem: Corruption erodes public trust, delays modernization, and wastes resources.
⚔️ OUTDATED EQUIPMENT & MODERNIZATION Delays in the Malondeshn Armed Forces
BalasHapusRoyal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF)
The Air Force is the most affected branch in terms of aging assets.
• Fighter Jets
o Malondesh retired its MiG-29 Fulcrums in 2017 due to high maintenance costs and lack of spare parts.
o Current frontline fighters:
Sukhoi Su-30MKM (18 units, delivered 2007–2009): Still capable, but availability is low because of expensive maintenance and reliance on Russian parts.
F/A-18D Hornet (8 units, delivered 1997): Effective but old; parts are harder to obtain.
o Planned Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) program (replacement fighters) has been delayed for more than a decade due to budget constraints and political indecision.
• Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Gap
o Malondesh needs cheaper jets for training and patrols.
o After years of delay, Malondesh finally selected the FA-50 light combat aircraft from South Korea in 2023, with deliveries only expected from 2026 onward.
o Until then, there is a serious capability gap.
• Transport & Surveillance Aircraft
o C-130 Hercules (operational since 1970s–80s) still serve as the backbone for transport, though some have been refurbished.
o Maritime patrol aircraft are lacking — Malondesh depends on small Beechcraft King Air planes, which are outdated and limited in range.
⚠️ CORRUPTION & PROCUREMENT SCANDALS IN THE MALONDESHN ARMED FORCES
BalasHapus1. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
This is the largest defense procurement scandal in Malondesh’s history.
• Background
o In 2011, Malondesh signed a contract worth RM 9 billion (≈ USD 2.1 billion) with Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS) to build 6 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) for the Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN).
o These ships, based on the French Gowind-class frigate design, were meant to modernize the Navy and secure the South China Sea.
• Problems
o Despite the contract, not a single ship was delivered by 2025, even though billions were already paid.
o Reports revealed design changes, mismanagement, poor oversight, and possible corruption.
o The Navy originally wanted the Sigma-class design (Dutch), but the government switched to the French design without military input.
o Funds were allegedly misused for unrelated purchases (e.g., IT systems, consultancy fees).
• Impact
o RMN is left with an aging fleet while neighbors are modernizing.
o Malondesh lost at least a decade of naval modernization.
o Public confidence in the government’s ability to handle defense procurement is shaken.
________________________________________
2. Submarine Procurement Issues (2002)
• Malondesh purchased two Scorpène-class submarines from France in a deal worth RM 4.3 billion (≈ USD 1 billion).
• The deal was marred by allegations of kickbacks and bribery involving Malondeshn officials and French suppliers.
• A high-profile corruption scandal in France (known as the Scorpène scandal) linked Malondeshn intermediaries to illegal payments.
• Additionally, when the submarines arrived in 2009, one of them had technical defects and could not dive for months.
Impact:
• While the submarines are now operational, the scandal tarnished the project and raised concerns about costs vs capability.
________________________________________
3. MIG-29 and Sukhoi Su-30MKM Maintenance Issues
• Malondesh bought 18 MiG-29s in the 1990s and later 18 Su-30MKMs (2007).
• Corruption allegations emerged around maintenance contracts and spare parts procurement, with accusations of inflated costs.
• The MiG-29s were retired early in 2017 due to high costs and low availability — seen by critics as a waste of taxpayer money.
________________________________________
4. Other Reported Issues
• Helicopter Procurement Delays (MD530G “Little Birds”)
o Ordered in 2016 (RM 300 million).
o Delivery delayed for years; helicopters only arrived in 2022.
o Critics claimed the deal was overpriced and non-transparent.
• Radar & Surveillance Systems
o Some radar projects were criticized for overpricing and favoritism in awarding contracts.
________________________________________
5. Structural Causes of Corruption in Defense Procurement
1. Weak Oversight
o Parliament and independent bodies have limited access to detailed defense procurement information (often classified under “national security”).
2. Political Influence
o Major contracts are often awarded to companies linked to politicians or government-linked corporations (GLCs).
3. Opaque Procurement Process
o Tenders are often not competitive. Direct negotiations and political considerations override military requirements.
4. Middlemen & Commissions
o Use of intermediaries in defense deals creates opportunities for kickbacks.
⚔️ Key Problems of the Malondeshn Armed Forces
BalasHapus________________________________________
1. Outdated Equipment → Modernization Delayed for Decades
• Air Force (RMAF):
o Retired MiG-29s in 2017 due to high costs.
o Current frontline jets: Su-30MKM (2007) and F/A-18D Hornet (1997) — small fleet, aging, and expensive to maintain.
o Still waiting for FA-50 light combat aircraft, deliveries only starting in 2026.
o Weak surveillance capability → lacks modern maritime patrol aircraft and AWACS.
• Navy (RMN):
o Many ships date from the 1980s–90s (Lekiu-class frigates, Kasturi-class corvettes).
o Only 2 Scorpène submarines, insufficient to cover Malondesh vast waters.
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal froze modernization — billions spent, no ships delivered.
• Army:
o Still operates Condor APCs from the 1980s.
o AV8 Gempita is modern but only partially deployed.
o Lacks modern long-range artillery and medium/long-range air defense systems.
Impact: The MAF has been stuck with aging platforms, while neighbors upgrade to Rafales, F-35s, Gripens, modern submarines, and frigates. Malondesh risks being outclassed in any regional confrontation.
________________________________________
2. Low Defense Budget → Insufficient for High-Tech Upgrades
• Malondesh spends only 1.0–1.5% of GDP on defense.
o Singapore spends ~3%, Vietnam ~2.3%, Thailand ~1.5%.
• Of this budget, more than half goes to salaries, pensions, and operations → leaving little for modernization.
• Modern assets (jets, ships, submarines) require long-term investment, but Malondesh often cuts or delays purchases due to economic pressures.
• Example: MRCA fighter program (to replace MiG-29s) has been delayed for over a decade.
Impact: Malondesh cannot keep pace with regional military spending. Modernization becomes piecemeal, leaving gaps in readiness and deterrence.
________________________________________
3. Maritime Security Challenges → China & Piracy Overstretch the Navy
• South China Sea (SCS):
o China’s Coast Guard and Navy frequently intrude into Malondesh EEZ, especially around Luconia Shoals.
o Malondesh has overlapping maritime claims with China, Vietnam, and the Philippines.
• Strait of Malacca:
o One of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.
o Vulnerable to piracy, smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal fishing.
• Navy Limitations:
o Small, aging fleet cannot patrol both SCS and Malacca Strait effectively.
o Relies heavily on offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) that lack strong firepower.
o Only 2 submarines → insufficient deterrent against China or other navies.
Impact: Malondesh struggles to enforce sovereignty over its waters. The Navy is stretched thin, unable to cover vast sea areas against both traditional (China) and non-traditional (piracy) threats.
________________________________________
✅ Summary / Conclusion
The Malondeshn Armed Forces face three interconnected problems:
1. Outdated Equipment: Modernization stalled for decades, leaving MAF dependent on aging jets, ships, and vehicles.
2. Low Defense Budget: Limited funding prevents the acquisition of high-tech assets, keeping Malondesh behind regional peers.
3. Maritime Security Challenges: A small, overstretched Navy struggles to protect Malondesh EEZ in the South China Sea and secure the Strait of Malacca.
📌 Conclusion: Unless Malondesh increases defense spending, reforms procurement, and accelerates modernization, the MAF risks becoming a force capable only of low-intensity domestic missions, not one prepared to defend national sovereignty against regional powers like China or match its Southeast Asian neighbors.
Both companies will join forces to deploy an end-to-end system including space and ground segment in Indonesia. This Earth Observation constellation includes optical and radar satellites seamlessly integrated and operated through a multi-mission ground segment in which Telespazio (Leonardo 67%, Thales 33 %) is contributing. Thales Alenia Space operationally proven solutions are powered by Artificial Intelligence to guarantee fast system responsiveness and enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capability. The constellation will be operated by PT Len to satisfy the MoD’s requirements regarding Indonesia’s safety and sovereignty.
BalasHapusIn conjunction with Thales Alenia Space, PT Len will develop a multimission ground segment system to provide control, maintenance, data processing, and analytic functions for the Defense Satellite System. Additionally, PT Len will grant the MoD access to the existing high revisit Earth observation satellite constellation through a partnership with BlackSky. This service will provide early ISR satellite capability for the MoD and Indonesian National Armed Forces prior to the Defense Satellite System operation.
Ada Qualified Vendor:
1. THALES ALENIA SPACE
2. BLACKSKY
3. PT. LEN
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HIGH SPEED TRAIN WHOOSH = 350km
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⚔️ Key Problems of the Malondeshn Armed Forces
Hapus________________________________________
1. Outdated Equipment → Modernization Delayed for Decades
• Air Force (RMAF):
o Retired MiG-29s in 2017 due to high costs.
o Current frontline jets: Su-30MKM (2007) and F/A-18D Hornet (1997) — small fleet, aging, and expensive to maintain.
o Still waiting for FA-50 light combat aircraft, deliveries only starting in 2026.
o Weak surveillance capability → lacks modern maritime patrol aircraft and AWACS.
• Navy (RMN):
o Many ships date from the 1980s–90s (Lekiu-class frigates, Kasturi-class corvettes).
o Only 2 Scorpène submarines, insufficient to cover Malondesh vast waters.
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal froze modernization — billions spent, no ships delivered.
• Army:
o Still operates Condor APCs from the 1980s.
o AV8 Gempita is modern but only partially deployed.
o Lacks modern long-range artillery and medium/long-range air defense systems.
Impact: The MAF has been stuck with aging platforms, while neighbors upgrade to Rafales, F-35s, Gripens, modern submarines, and frigates. Malondesh risks being outclassed in any regional confrontation.
________________________________________
2. Low Defense Budget → Insufficient for High-Tech Upgrades
• Malondesh spends only 1.0–1.5% of GDP on defense.
o Singapore spends ~3%, Vietnam ~2.3%, Thailand ~1.5%.
• Of this budget, more than half goes to salaries, pensions, and operations → leaving little for modernization.
• Modern assets (jets, ships, submarines) require long-term investment, but Malondesh often cuts or delays purchases due to economic pressures.
• Example: MRCA fighter program (to replace MiG-29s) has been delayed for over a decade.
Impact: Malondesh cannot keep pace with regional military spending. Modernization becomes piecemeal, leaving gaps in readiness and deterrence.
________________________________________
3. Maritime Security Challenges → China & Piracy Overstretch the Navy
• South China Sea (SCS):
o China’s Coast Guard and Navy frequently intrude into Malondesh EEZ, especially around Luconia Shoals.
o Malondesh has overlapping maritime claims with China, Vietnam, and the Philippines.
• Strait of Malacca:
o One of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.
o Vulnerable to piracy, smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal fishing.
• Navy Limitations:
o Small, aging fleet cannot patrol both SCS and Malacca Strait effectively.
o Relies heavily on offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) that lack strong firepower.
o Only 2 submarines → insufficient deterrent against China or other navies.
Impact: Malondesh struggles to enforce sovereignty over its waters. The Navy is stretched thin, unable to cover vast sea areas against both traditional (China) and non-traditional (piracy) threats.
________________________________________
✅ Summary / Conclusion
The Malondeshn Armed Forces face three interconnected problems:
1. Outdated Equipment: Modernization stalled for decades, leaving MAF dependent on aging jets, ships, and vehicles.
2. Low Defense Budget: Limited funding prevents the acquisition of high-tech assets, keeping Malondesh behind regional peers.
3. Maritime Security Challenges: A small, overstretched Navy struggles to protect Malondesh EEZ in the South China Sea and secure the Strait of Malacca.
📌 Conclusion: Unless Malondesh increases defense spending, reforms procurement, and accelerates modernization, the MAF risks becoming a force capable only of low-intensity domestic missions, not one prepared to defend national sovereignty against regional powers like China or match its Southeast Asian neighbors.
✈️ REDUCED AIR POWER
HapusMalondesh’s Air Force (RMAF) is falling behind in Southeast Asia’s fast-changing air combat environment.
Current Situation
• Retired MiG-29s (2017) → left a gap in frontline fighters.
• Su-30MKM (18 units) → capable, but plagued by low serviceability due to reliance on Russian parts and high maintenance costs.
• F/A-18D Hornet (8 units) → effective, but small fleet (from 1997).
• Transport & surveillance aircraft → aging Hercules C-130s and very limited maritime patrol capability.
• Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) → Malondesh ordered 18 FA-50s from South Korea, but deliveries will only start in 2026.
Problems
• Fighter fleet is too small and partly obsolete.
• No long-range air defense systems → vulnerable to modern missile and drone warfare.
• No modern AWACS (Airborne Warning & Control System).
Regional Comparison
• Singapore: Operates F-15SGs and F-16Vs, ordered F-35Bs (5th-gen stealth).
• Indonesia: Ordered 42 Rafales and 24 F-15EX jets; also considering KF-21 future fighter.
• Thailand: Operates Gripen C/D jets with modern datalink capability.
👉 Malondesh’s Risk: Falls behind in both numbers and technology. In a regional conflict, its Air Force could struggle to defend airspace, provide close air support, or deter aggressors.
⚓ NAVAL WEAKNESS
HapusMALONDESH FACES SERIOUS MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND STRAIT OF MALACCA, BUT ITS NAVY (RMN) IS UNDER-EQUIPPED.
Current Situation
• Major combatants:
o 2 Lekiu-class frigates (1990s).
o 2 Kasturi-class corvettes (1980s).
o 6 Kedah-class offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) — lightly armed.
• Submarines: Only 2 Scorpène-class (delivered 2009).
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: RM 9 billion spent since 2011, but 0 ships delivered as of 2025 due to corruption scandal.
• Patrol assets: Insufficient to cover Malondesh’s huge EEZ (exclusive economic zone).
Problems
• Aging fleet; many ships near obsolescence.
• Insufficient firepower against regional navies.
• Small submarine force with limited availability.
• LCS scandal delayed modernization by more than a decade.
Regional Comparison
• Singapore: Formidable-class stealth frigates, modern OPVs, strong missile capability, and expanding submarine fleet.
• Indonesia: Expanding fleet with SIGMA-class frigates, Nagapasa submarines, and new OPVs.
• Vietnam: 6 modern Kilo-class submarines from Russia + upgraded frigates.
• China (in South China Sea): Deploys coast guard and navy ships near Malondesh’s EEZ regularly.
👉 Malondesh’s Risk: Cannot effectively protect its EEZ against Chinese incursions, illegal fishing, or smuggling. Lacks deterrence against neighbors with stronger navies.
🪖 ARMY GAPS — VULNERABLE TO MODERN COMBINED-ARMS WARFARE
HapusMalondesh’s Current Situation
• Armored Vehicles
o Still operates Condor APCs (1980s).
o New AV8 Gempita (Turkish FNSS partnership) in service, but deliveries are slow and numbers limited.
• Artillery & Firepower
o Mix of old towed artillery and a few self-propelled systems.
o No modern Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) compared to neighbors.
• Air Defense
o Extremely weak: relies mainly on MANPADS (Igla, Starstreak) for short-range defense.
o No medium or long-range SAMs, leaving Malondeshn forces and infrastructure vulnerable to modern air strikes.
• Infantry
o Professional and experienced (notably in counterinsurgency), but under-equipped for high-intensity, modern warfare.
Regional Comparison
• Singapore: Strong mechanized force, Leopard 2 tanks, advanced artillery (PzH2000), Iron Dome-derived air defense.
• Indonesia: Expanding heavy armor, artillery, and air defense systems (NASAMS, S-300, etc.).
• Thailand: Upgrading tanks and artillery with Chinese and Ukrainian systems.
Implications
• In a high-intensity war, Malondeshn Army units would struggle against modern mechanized forces.
• Lack of air defense means Malondesh cannot protect key bases, cities, or troops from airstrikes or drones.
• Malondesh risks being confined to low-intensity operations (counterinsurgency, peacekeeping), while lacking credibility in regional conflicts.
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BalasHapusSengketa Satelit Kemenhan, Yusril Sebut Navayo Ajukan Penyitaan Aset Indonesia di Perancis
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/03/20/15515151/sengketa-satelit-kemenhan-yusril-sebut-navayo-ajukan-penyitaan-aset?page=all
⚔️ Key Problems of the Malondeshn Armed Forces
Hapus________________________________________
1. Outdated Equipment → Modernization Delayed for Decades
• Air Force (RMAF):
o Retired MiG-29s in 2017 due to high costs.
o Current frontline jets: Su-30MKM (2007) and F/A-18D Hornet (1997) — small fleet, aging, and expensive to maintain.
o Still waiting for FA-50 light combat aircraft, deliveries only starting in 2026.
o Weak surveillance capability → lacks modern maritime patrol aircraft and AWACS.
• Navy (RMN):
o Many ships date from the 1980s–90s (Lekiu-class frigates, Kasturi-class corvettes).
o Only 2 Scorpène submarines, insufficient to cover Malondesh vast waters.
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal froze modernization — billions spent, no ships delivered.
• Army:
o Still operates Condor APCs from the 1980s.
o AV8 Gempita is modern but only partially deployed.
o Lacks modern long-range artillery and medium/long-range air defense systems.
Impact: The MAF has been stuck with aging platforms, while neighbors upgrade to Rafales, F-35s, Gripens, modern submarines, and frigates. Malondesh risks being outclassed in any regional confrontation.
________________________________________
2. Low Defense Budget → Insufficient for High-Tech Upgrades
• Malondesh spends only 1.0–1.5% of GDP on defense.
o Singapore spends ~3%, Vietnam ~2.3%, Thailand ~1.5%.
• Of this budget, more than half goes to salaries, pensions, and operations → leaving little for modernization.
• Modern assets (jets, ships, submarines) require long-term investment, but Malondesh often cuts or delays purchases due to economic pressures.
• Example: MRCA fighter program (to replace MiG-29s) has been delayed for over a decade.
Impact: Malondesh cannot keep pace with regional military spending. Modernization becomes piecemeal, leaving gaps in readiness and deterrence.
________________________________________
3. Maritime Security Challenges → China & Piracy Overstretch the Navy
• South China Sea (SCS):
o China’s Coast Guard and Navy frequently intrude into Malondesh EEZ, especially around Luconia Shoals.
o Malondesh has overlapping maritime claims with China, Vietnam, and the Philippines.
• Strait of Malacca:
o One of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.
o Vulnerable to piracy, smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal fishing.
• Navy Limitations:
o Small, aging fleet cannot patrol both SCS and Malacca Strait effectively.
o Relies heavily on offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) that lack strong firepower.
o Only 2 submarines → insufficient deterrent against China or other navies.
Impact: Malondesh struggles to enforce sovereignty over its waters. The Navy is stretched thin, unable to cover vast sea areas against both traditional (China) and non-traditional (piracy) threats.
________________________________________
✅ Summary / Conclusion
The Malondeshn Armed Forces face three interconnected problems:
1. Outdated Equipment: Modernization stalled for decades, leaving MAF dependent on aging jets, ships, and vehicles.
2. Low Defense Budget: Limited funding prevents the acquisition of high-tech assets, keeping Malondesh behind regional peers.
3. Maritime Security Challenges: A small, overstretched Navy struggles to protect Malondesh EEZ in the South China Sea and secure the Strait of Malacca.
📌 Conclusion: Unless Malondesh increases defense spending, reforms procurement, and accelerates modernization, the MAF risks becoming a force capable only of low-intensity domestic missions, not one prepared to defend national sovereignty against regional powers like China or match its Southeast Asian neighbors.
⚠️ Crucial Problems of the Malondeshn Armed Forces
Hapus________________________________________
Outdated Equipment & Modernization Delays
• Many of Malondesh major platforms are 30–40 years old:
o Army still operates Condor APCs (1980s).
o Navy relies on Lekiu-class frigates (1990s) and Kasturi-class corvettes (1980s).
o Air Force’s frontline jets are limited to Su-30MKMs (2007) and F/A-18Ds (1997).
• Modernization plans like the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program and MRCA fighter jet replacement have been delayed for over a decade.
• Result: MAF cannot match regional peers who are buying F-35s (Singapore), Rafales (Indonesia), Gripens (Thailand), and new submarines (Vietnam).
________________________________________
Low Defense Budget Compared to Needs
• Malondesh spends only ~1.0–1.5% of GDP on defense.
o Lower than Singapore (~3%), Vietnam (~2.3%), Thailand (~1.5%).
• Budget prioritizes salaries and pensions, leaving little for modernization.
• Procurement of high-tech systems (jets, frigates, missile defense) is constantly delayed due to lack of funds.
• Result: MAF struggles to maintain readiness and replace aging equipment.
________________________________________
Maritime Security Challenges in the Strait of Malacca & South China Sea
• Malondesh has one of the largest Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in Southeast Asia (~334,000 km²).
• Challenges:
o China’s Coast Guard & Navy regularly intrude near Luconia Shoals.
o Piracy, smuggling, and illegal fishing in the Strait of Malacca.
o Overlapping claims with neighbors (Philippines & Indonesia).
• Navy and Coast Guard (MMEA) lack enough ships to patrol effectively.
• Result: Malondesh struggles to enforce sovereignty over its maritime territory.
________________________________________
Recruitment & Retention Issues
• Active personnel: ~110,000, but facing manpower challenges.
• Problems:
o Low pay and benefits compared to private sector.
o Younger generation less interested in military careers.
o Difficulty retaining skilled personnel (pilots, engineers, cyber specialists).
• Aging force → fewer young recruits, some early retirements.
• Result: Talent drain weakens technical arms of the military.
________________________________________
Weak Inter-Service Integration
• Army, Navy, and Air Force often operate independently.
• Malondesh lacks a strong Joint Command system like the U.S. or Singapore.
• Limited ability to conduct complex, multi-domain operations (e.g., joint land-sea-air campaigns).
• Training and exercises are improving but still service-centric.
• Result: Reduced efficiency in responding to hybrid or conventional threats.
🪖 ARMY GAPS
HapusTHE MALONDESHN ARMY REMAINS HEAVILY MANPOWER-BASED BUT LACKS MODERN HEAVY FIREPOWER AND AIR DEFENSE.
Current Situation
• Armored vehicles:
o Still uses Condor APCs (1980s).
o AV8 Gempita (modern, joint Malondeshn-Turkish design) introduced but in limited numbers.
• Artillery: Mix of old towed guns and some self-propelled howitzers; lacks long-range precision systems.
• Air defense:
o Only short-range MANPADS (Igla, Starstreak).
o No medium or long-range SAMs (surface-to-air missiles).
• Helicopters: Slow delivery of light attack helicopters (MD530G).
Problems
• Army lacks modern combined-arms capability (armor + artillery + air defense).
• Vulnerable to airstrikes, drones, and missile attacks because of weak air defense.
• Heavy reliance on light infantry → good for counterinsurgency, weak in high-intensity warfare.
Regional Comparison
• Singapore: Fully mechanized army with Leopard 2 tanks, modern artillery, HIMARS rocket systems, and I-Hawk SAMs.
• Indonesia: Leopard 2 tanks, CAESAR howitzers, NASAMS air defense.
• Thailand: VT-4 tanks from China, Gripen air cover, strong artillery.
👉 Malondesh’s Risk: In a conventional war, the Malondeshn Army could not sustain modern combined-arms warfare and would rely on defensive, guerrilla-style tactics.
⚠️ Crucial Problems of the Malondeshn Armed Forces
BalasHapus________________________________________
Outdated Equipment & Modernization Delays
• Many of Malondesh major platforms are 30–40 years old:
o Army still operates Condor APCs (1980s).
o Navy relies on Lekiu-class frigates (1990s) and Kasturi-class corvettes (1980s).
o Air Force’s frontline jets are limited to Su-30MKMs (2007) and F/A-18Ds (1997).
• Modernization plans like the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program and MRCA fighter jet replacement have been delayed for over a decade.
• Result: MAF cannot match regional peers who are buying F-35s (Singapore), Rafales (Indonesia), Gripens (Thailand), and new submarines (Vietnam).
________________________________________
Low Defense Budget Compared to Needs
• Malondesh spends only ~1.0–1.5% of GDP on defense.
o Lower than Singapore (~3%), Vietnam (~2.3%), Thailand (~1.5%).
• Budget prioritizes salaries and pensions, leaving little for modernization.
• Procurement of high-tech systems (jets, frigates, missile defense) is constantly delayed due to lack of funds.
• Result: MAF struggles to maintain readiness and replace aging equipment.
________________________________________
Maritime Security Challenges in the Strait of Malacca & South China Sea
• Malondesh has one of the largest Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in Southeast Asia (~334,000 km²).
• Challenges:
o China’s Coast Guard & Navy regularly intrude near Luconia Shoals.
o Piracy, smuggling, and illegal fishing in the Strait of Malacca.
o Overlapping claims with neighbors (Philippines & Indonesia).
• Navy and Coast Guard (MMEA) lack enough ships to patrol effectively.
• Result: Malondesh struggles to enforce sovereignty over its maritime territory.
________________________________________
Recruitment & Retention Issues
• Active personnel: ~110,000, but facing manpower challenges.
• Problems:
o Low pay and benefits compared to private sector.
o Younger generation less interested in military careers.
o Difficulty retaining skilled personnel (pilots, engineers, cyber specialists).
• Aging force → fewer young recruits, some early retirements.
• Result: Talent drain weakens technical arms of the military.
________________________________________
Weak Inter-Service Integration
• Army, Navy, and Air Force often operate independently.
• Malondesh lacks a strong Joint Command system like the U.S. or Singapore.
• Limited ability to conduct complex, multi-domain operations (e.g., joint land-sea-air campaigns).
• Training and exercises are improving but still service-centric.
• Result: Reduced efficiency in responding to hybrid or conventional threats.
Dependence on Foreign Defense Suppliers
BalasHapus• Malondesh imports nearly all high-tech defense equipment:
o Jets from Russia, U.S., South Korea.
o Submarines & ships from France.
o Armored vehicles in partnership with Turkey.
• Spare parts and upgrades depend on foreign suppliers, making maintenance costly and vulnerable to sanctions or political disputes.
• Example: MiG-29s retired early due to lack of spare parts.
• Result: Malondesh has limited strategic autonomy in defense.
________________________________________
Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities
• Malondesh faces cyber threats from state actors, hackers, and extremist groups.
• Weaknesses:
o Limited investment in cyber defense.
o Few trained cyber specialists.
o Weak integration of cyber defense with traditional military operations.
• Rising threat of hybrid warfare (information warfare, disinformation, espionage) in South China Sea disputes.
• Result: Malondesh risks having its critical systems disrupted in a conflict.
________________________________________
Corruption & Procurement Scandals
• Defense procurement plagued by corruption and mismanagement:
o Scorpène Submarine Deal (2002): RM 500 million in commissions.
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal (2011–present): RM 9 billion spent, no ships delivered as of 2025.
• Middlemen and commissions inflate costs, reduce the number of assets purchased.
• Political interference often overrides military requirements.
• Result: Billions wasted, modernization delayed, public trust eroded.
________________________________________
Overstretch Due to Non-Traditional Roles
• MAF frequently tasked with:
o Disaster relief (floods, earthquakes).
o Border control (illegal migrants, smuggling).
o Counterterrorism (Abu Sayyaf threat in Sabah).
o Pandemic support (COVID-19 operations).
• These tasks divert focus and resources from conventional defense.
• With limited assets, balancing both traditional and non-traditional roles is difficult.
• Result: Military readiness for external threats is weakened.
________________________________________
✅ Summary
The Malondeshn Armed Forces face nine interconnected problems:
1. Outdated equipment → modernization delayed for decades.
2. Low defense budget → insufficient for high-tech upgrades.
3. Maritime security challenges → China & piracy overstretch Navy.
4. Recruitment & retention issues → talent drain in technical fields.
5. Weak inter-service integration → poor joint operations capability.
6. Dependence on foreign suppliers → costly, politically risky.
7. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities → exposed to hybrid threats.
8. Corruption & scandals → billions wasted, modernization crippled.
9. Overstretch from non-traditional roles → weak focus on external defense.
🪖 ARMY GAPS
BalasHapusTHE MALONDESHN ARMY REMAINS HEAVILY MANPOWER-BASED BUT LACKS MODERN HEAVY FIREPOWER AND AIR DEFENSE.
Current Situation
• Armored vehicles:
o Still uses Condor APCs (1980s).
o AV8 Gempita (modern, joint Malondeshn-Turkish design) introduced but in limited numbers.
• Artillery: Mix of old towed guns and some self-propelled howitzers; lacks long-range precision systems.
• Air defense:
o Only short-range MANPADS (Igla, Starstreak).
o No medium or long-range SAMs (surface-to-air missiles).
• Helicopters: Slow delivery of light attack helicopters (MD530G).
Problems
• Army lacks modern combined-arms capability (armor + artillery + air defense).
• Vulnerable to airstrikes, drones, and missile attacks because of weak air defense.
• Heavy reliance on light infantry → good for counterinsurgency, weak in high-intensity warfare.
Regional Comparison
• Singapore: Fully mechanized army with Leopard 2 tanks, modern artillery, HIMARS rocket systems, and I-Hawk SAMs.
• Indonesia: Leopard 2 tanks, CAESAR howitzers, NASAMS air defense.
• Thailand: VT-4 tanks from China, Gripen air cover, strong artillery.
👉 Malondesh’s Risk: In a conventional war, the Malondeshn Army could not sustain modern combined-arms warfare and would rely on defensive, guerrilla-style tactics.
1. ✈️ REDUCED AIR POWER — FALLING BEHIND REGIONAL PEERS
BalasHapusMalondesh’s Current Situation
• Fighter Jets
o Sukhoi Su-30MKM (18 units, delivered 2007–2009): Capable multirole jets, but maintenance is costly and availability rates are low (reports suggest sometimes only half are operational).
o F/A-18D Hornets (8 units, delivered 1997): Reliable but aging; spare parts are harder to source.
o MiG-29s were retired in 2017 due to high costs and obsolescence.
• Maritime Patrol & AEW (Airborne Early Warning): Malondesh lacks modern long-range surveillance aircraft, relying on small Beechcraft King Air planes. This leaves huge blind spots in maritime and airspace monitoring.
• LCA Program: Malondesh signed a deal for FA-50 Light Combat Aircraft (South Korea) in 2023, but deliveries only start in 2026.
Regional Comparison
• Singapore
o Already operates F-15SG (advanced Strike Eagle variant).
o Purchased F-35B stealth fighters (delivery in late 2020s).
o Has advanced AEW&C aircraft (G550 CAEW).
o Clear qualitative superiority.
• Indonesia
o Acquiring 42 Rafale multirole fighters (first deliveries around 2026).
o Operates modern Sukhoi Su-27/30 and is buying F-15EX.
• Thailand
o Operates Gripen C/D fighters with Saab 340 AEW, giving them a networked advantage.
• Philippines (often weaker)
o Buying F-16Vs or Gripen for modernization.
Implications
• Malondesh risks being outmatched in air combat by all its immediate neighbors (except currently the Philippines).
• Limited surveillance and patrol aircraft mean Malondesh cannot monitor its skies or EEZ effectively.
• Without new MRCA (Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) acquisitions, Malondesh may lose deterrence credibility in the region.
Akibat INDIANESIA TAK MAMPU BAYAR SEWA... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusKalah Sengketa soal Satelit Kemenhan, Indonesia Wajib Bayar 24,1 Juta Dollar AS ke Navayo
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/03/21/05092061/kalah-sengketa-soal-satelit-kemenhan-indonesia-wajib-bayar-241-juta-dollar?page=all
🚄 What Is the ECRL?
Hapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
• While fears of a debt trap persist, analysts suggest Malondesh’s fiscal position is strong enough to manage the revised terms.
• The project is seen as a balancing act between economic development and sovereign financial prudence
😝ECRL = BRI CHINA = HUTANG😝
🚄 What Is the ECRL?
Hapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
• While fears of a debt trap persist, analysts suggest Malondesh’s fiscal position is strong enough to manage the revised terms.
• The project is seen as a balancing act between economic development and sovereign financial prudence
😝ECRL = BRI CHINA = HUTANG😝
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
===================
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
"Pinjaman ini digunakan untuk melunasi DEBT matang sebesar RM20.6 miliar, dengan sisa RM49,9 miliar menutupi defisit dan masa jatuh tempo DEBT di masa depan," kata MOF.
---
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Pada tahun 2023, pinjaman baru Kerajaan Persekutuan MALONDESH mencapai RM1.173 triliun, naik 8,6% dari tahun 2022.
Rincian pinjaman
• Pinjaman baru Kerajaan Persekutuan MALONDESH pada tahun 2023 naik RM92,918 miliar
• Rasio utang terhadap PDB MALONDESH pada tahun 2023 mencapai 64,3%
---
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Kah Woh menjelaskan pada tahun lalu, kerajaan ada membuat pinjaman yang meningkat sebanyak 11.6 peratus daripada RM194.5 bilion pada tahun sebelumnya. Daripada jumlah itu, beliau berkata 52.4 peratus atau RM113.7 bilion digunakan untuk membayar prinsipal pinjaman matang.
---
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Sejumlah RM98.058 bilion atau 50.4 peratus daripada pinjaman baharu berjumlah RM194.555 bilion yang dibuat kerajaan pada tahun lalu digunakan untuk bayaran balik prinsipal pinjaman yang matang.
---
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Jabatan Audit Negara (JAN) bimbang dengan tindakan kerajaan menggunakan hampir 60 peratus pinjaman baharu untuk membayar DEBT sedia ada pada tahun lalu, berbanding bagi perbelanjaan pembangunan.
---
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Laporan Ketua Audit Negara mengenai Penyata Kewangan Kerajaan Persekutuan 2018 mendapati sejumlah 59 peratus pinjaman baharu kerajaan dibuat untuk membayar DEBT kerajaan terdahulu
---
2018 = OPEN DONASI
2018 = OPEN DONASI
2018 = OPEN DONASI
Kementerian Keuangan MALONDESH pada hari Rabu membuka rekening donasi supaya masyarakat dapat menyumbang untuk membantu negara membayar utang yang mencapai 1 triliun ringgit (US$ 250,8 miliar) atau 80 persen dari PDB
⚓ NAVAL WEAKNESS
HapusMALONDESH FACES SERIOUS MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND STRAIT OF MALACCA, BUT ITS NAVY (RMN) IS UNDER-EQUIPPED.
Current Situation
• Major combatants:
o 2 Lekiu-class frigates (1990s).
o 2 Kasturi-class corvettes (1980s).
o 6 Kedah-class offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) — lightly armed.
• Submarines: Only 2 Scorpène-class (delivered 2009).
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: RM 9 billion spent since 2011, but 0 ships delivered as of 2025 due to corruption scandal.
• Patrol assets: Insufficient to cover Malondesh’s huge EEZ (exclusive economic zone).
Problems
• Aging fleet; many ships near obsolescence.
• Insufficient firepower against regional navies.
• Small submarine force with limited availability.
• LCS scandal delayed modernization by more than a decade.
Regional Comparison
• Singapore: Formidable-class stealth frigates, modern OPVs, strong missile capability, and expanding submarine fleet.
• Indonesia: Expanding fleet with SIGMA-class frigates, Nagapasa submarines, and new OPVs.
• Vietnam: 6 modern Kilo-class submarines from Russia + upgraded frigates.
• China (in South China Sea): Deploys coast guard and navy ships near Malondesh’s EEZ regularly.
👉 Malondesh’s Risk: Cannot effectively protect its EEZ against Chinese incursions, illegal fishing, or smuggling. Lacks deterrence against neighbors with stronger navies.
Akibat INDIANESIA TAK MAMPU BAYAR SEWA... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusKalah Sengketa soal Satelit Kemenhan, Indonesia Wajib Bayar 24,1 Juta Dollar AS ke Navayo
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/03/21/05092061/kalah-sengketa-soal-satelit-kemenhan-indonesia-wajib-bayar-241-juta-dollar?page=all
🚄 What Is the ECRL?
Hapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
• While fears of a debt trap persist, analysts suggest Malondesh’s fiscal position is strong enough to manage the revised terms.
• The project is seen as a balancing act between economic development and sovereign financial prudence
😝ECRL = BRI CHINA = HUTANG😝
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
===================
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
"Pinjaman ini digunakan untuk melunasi DEBT matang sebesar RM20.6 miliar, dengan sisa RM49,9 miliar menutupi defisit dan masa jatuh tempo DEBT di masa depan," kata MOF.
---
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Pada tahun 2023, pinjaman baru Kerajaan Persekutuan MALONDESH mencapai RM1.173 triliun, naik 8,6% dari tahun 2022.
Rincian pinjaman
• Pinjaman baru Kerajaan Persekutuan MALONDESH pada tahun 2023 naik RM92,918 miliar
• Rasio utang terhadap PDB MALONDESH pada tahun 2023 mencapai 64,3%
---
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Kah Woh menjelaskan pada tahun lalu, kerajaan ada membuat pinjaman yang meningkat sebanyak 11.6 peratus daripada RM194.5 bilion pada tahun sebelumnya. Daripada jumlah itu, beliau berkata 52.4 peratus atau RM113.7 bilion digunakan untuk membayar prinsipal pinjaman matang.
---
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Sejumlah RM98.058 bilion atau 50.4 peratus daripada pinjaman baharu berjumlah RM194.555 bilion yang dibuat kerajaan pada tahun lalu digunakan untuk bayaran balik prinsipal pinjaman yang matang.
---
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Jabatan Audit Negara (JAN) bimbang dengan tindakan kerajaan menggunakan hampir 60 peratus pinjaman baharu untuk membayar DEBT sedia ada pada tahun lalu, berbanding bagi perbelanjaan pembangunan.
---
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Laporan Ketua Audit Negara mengenai Penyata Kewangan Kerajaan Persekutuan 2018 mendapati sejumlah 59 peratus pinjaman baharu kerajaan dibuat untuk membayar DEBT kerajaan terdahulu
---
2018 = OPEN DONASI
2018 = OPEN DONASI
2018 = OPEN DONASI
Kementerian Keuangan MALONDESH pada hari Rabu membuka rekening donasi supaya masyarakat dapat menyumbang untuk membantu negara membayar utang yang mencapai 1 triliun ringgit (US$ 250,8 miliar) atau 80 persen dari PDB
✈️ REDUCED AIR POWER
HapusMalondesh’s Air Force (RMAF) is falling behind in Southeast Asia’s fast-changing air combat environment.
Current Situation
• Retired MiG-29s (2017) → left a gap in frontline fighters.
• Su-30MKM (18 units) → capable, but plagued by low serviceability due to reliance on Russian parts and high maintenance costs.
• F/A-18D Hornet (8 units) → effective, but small fleet (from 1997).
• Transport & surveillance aircraft → aging Hercules C-130s and very limited maritime patrol capability.
• Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) → Malondesh ordered 18 FA-50s from South Korea, but deliveries will only start in 2026.
Problems
• Fighter fleet is too small and partly obsolete.
• No long-range air defense systems → vulnerable to modern missile and drone warfare.
• No modern AWACS (Airborne Warning & Control System).
Regional Comparison
• Singapore: Operates F-15SGs and F-16Vs, ordered F-35Bs (5th-gen stealth).
• Indonesia: Ordered 42 Rafales and 24 F-15EX jets; also considering KF-21 future fighter.
• Thailand: Operates Gripen C/D jets with modern datalink capability.
👉 Malondesh’s Risk: Falls behind in both numbers and technology. In a regional conflict, its Air Force could struggle to defend airspace, provide close air support, or deter aggressors.
⚓ NAVAL WEAKNESS
HapusMALONDESH FACES SERIOUS MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND STRAIT OF MALACCA, BUT ITS NAVY (RMN) IS UNDER-EQUIPPED.
Current Situation
• Major combatants:
o 2 Lekiu-class frigates (1990s).
o 2 Kasturi-class corvettes (1980s).
o 6 Kedah-class offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) — lightly armed.
• Submarines: Only 2 Scorpène-class (delivered 2009).
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: RM 9 billion spent since 2011, but 0 ships delivered as of 2025 due to corruption scandal.
• Patrol assets: Insufficient to cover Malondesh’s huge EEZ (exclusive economic zone).
Problems
• Aging fleet; many ships near obsolescence.
• Insufficient firepower against regional navies.
• Small submarine force with limited availability.
• LCS scandal delayed modernization by more than a decade.
Regional Comparison
• Singapore: Formidable-class stealth frigates, modern OPVs, strong missile capability, and expanding submarine fleet.
• Indonesia: Expanding fleet with SIGMA-class frigates, Nagapasa submarines, and new OPVs.
• Vietnam: 6 modern Kilo-class submarines from Russia + upgraded frigates.
• China (in South China Sea): Deploys coast guard and navy ships near Malondesh’s EEZ regularly.
👉 Malondesh’s Risk: Cannot effectively protect its EEZ against Chinese incursions, illegal fishing, or smuggling. Lacks deterrence against neighbors with stronger navies.
🚄 What Is the ECRL?
BalasHapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
• While fears of a debt trap persist, analysts suggest Malondesh’s fiscal position is strong enough to manage the revised terms.
• The project is seen as a balancing act between economic development and sovereign financial prudence
😝ECRL = BRI CHINA = HUTANG😝
INDIANESIA TAK BAYAR SEWA... MEMALUKAN... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusPeristiwa itu terjadi sekitar tahun 2015, ketika Indonesia menyewa satelit dan tidak memenuhi kewajiban bayar sesuai nilai sewa.
Hal ini menyebabkan Indonesia digugat di pengadilan arbitrase internasional sehingga harus membayarkan uang sewa dan biaya arbitrase dengan nilai fantastis.
Pada 9 Juli 2019, pengadilan arbitrase menjatuhkan putusan yang berakibat negara harus mengeluarkan pembayaran untuk sewa satelit.
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/03/21/05092061/kalah-sengketa-soal-satelit-kemenhan-indonesia-wajib-bayar-241-juta-dollar?page=all
🚄 What Is the ECRL?
Hapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
• While fears of a debt trap persist, analysts suggest Malondesh’s fiscal position is strong enough to manage the revised terms.
• The project is seen as a balancing act between economic development and sovereign financial prudence
😝ECRL = BRI CHINA = HUTANG😝
🚄 What Is the ECRL?
Hapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
• While fears of a debt trap persist, analysts suggest Malondesh’s fiscal position is strong enough to manage the revised terms.
• The project is seen as a balancing act between economic development and sovereign financial prudence
😝ECRL = BRI CHINA = HUTANG😝
🚄 What Is the ECRL?
Hapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
• While fears of a debt trap persist, analysts suggest Malondesh’s fiscal position is strong enough to manage the revised terms.
• The project is seen as a balancing act between economic development and sovereign financial prudence
😝ECRL = BRI CHINA = HUTANG😝
⚠️ Crucial Problems of the Malondeshn Armed Forces
Hapus________________________________________
Outdated Equipment & Modernization Delays
• Many of Malondesh major platforms are 30–40 years old:
o Army still operates Condor APCs (1980s).
o Navy relies on Lekiu-class frigates (1990s) and Kasturi-class corvettes (1980s).
o Air Force’s frontline jets are limited to Su-30MKMs (2007) and F/A-18Ds (1997).
• Modernization plans like the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program and MRCA fighter jet replacement have been delayed for over a decade.
• Result: MAF cannot match regional peers who are buying F-35s (Singapore), Rafales (Indonesia), Gripens (Thailand), and new submarines (Vietnam).
________________________________________
Low Defense Budget Compared to Needs
• Malondesh spends only ~1.0–1.5% of GDP on defense.
o Lower than Singapore (~3%), Vietnam (~2.3%), Thailand (~1.5%).
• Budget prioritizes salaries and pensions, leaving little for modernization.
• Procurement of high-tech systems (jets, frigates, missile defense) is constantly delayed due to lack of funds.
• Result: MAF struggles to maintain readiness and replace aging equipment.
________________________________________
Maritime Security Challenges in the Strait of Malacca & South China Sea
• Malondesh has one of the largest Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in Southeast Asia (~334,000 km²).
• Challenges:
o China’s Coast Guard & Navy regularly intrude near Luconia Shoals.
o Piracy, smuggling, and illegal fishing in the Strait of Malacca.
o Overlapping claims with neighbors (Philippines & Indonesia).
• Navy and Coast Guard (MMEA) lack enough ships to patrol effectively.
• Result: Malondesh struggles to enforce sovereignty over its maritime territory.
________________________________________
Recruitment & Retention Issues
• Active personnel: ~110,000, but facing manpower challenges.
• Problems:
o Low pay and benefits compared to private sector.
o Younger generation less interested in military careers.
o Difficulty retaining skilled personnel (pilots, engineers, cyber specialists).
• Aging force → fewer young recruits, some early retirements.
• Result: Talent drain weakens technical arms of the military.
________________________________________
Weak Inter-Service Integration
• Army, Navy, and Air Force often operate independently.
• Malondesh lacks a strong Joint Command system like the U.S. or Singapore.
• Limited ability to conduct complex, multi-domain operations (e.g., joint land-sea-air campaigns).
• Training and exercises are improving but still service-centric.
• Result: Reduced efficiency in responding to hybrid or conventional threats.
Dependence on Foreign Defense Suppliers
Hapus• Malondesh imports nearly all high-tech defense equipment:
o Jets from Russia, U.S., South Korea.
o Submarines & ships from France.
o Armored vehicles in partnership with Turkey.
• Spare parts and upgrades depend on foreign suppliers, making maintenance costly and vulnerable to sanctions or political disputes.
• Example: MiG-29s retired early due to lack of spare parts.
• Result: Malondesh has limited strategic autonomy in defense.
________________________________________
Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities
• Malondesh faces cyber threats from state actors, hackers, and extremist groups.
• Weaknesses:
o Limited investment in cyber defense.
o Few trained cyber specialists.
o Weak integration of cyber defense with traditional military operations.
• Rising threat of hybrid warfare (information warfare, disinformation, espionage) in South China Sea disputes.
• Result: Malondesh risks having its critical systems disrupted in a conflict.
________________________________________
Corruption & Procurement Scandals
• Defense procurement plagued by corruption and mismanagement:
o Scorpène Submarine Deal (2002): RM 500 million in commissions.
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal (2011–present): RM 9 billion spent, no ships delivered as of 2025.
• Middlemen and commissions inflate costs, reduce the number of assets purchased.
• Political interference often overrides military requirements.
• Result: Billions wasted, modernization delayed, public trust eroded.
________________________________________
Overstretch Due to Non-Traditional Roles
• MAF frequently tasked with:
o Disaster relief (floods, earthquakes).
o Border control (illegal migrants, smuggling).
o Counterterrorism (Abu Sayyaf threat in Sabah).
o Pandemic support (COVID-19 operations).
• These tasks divert focus and resources from conventional defense.
• With limited assets, balancing both traditional and non-traditional roles is difficult.
• Result: Military readiness for external threats is weakened.
________________________________________
✅ Summary
The Malondeshn Armed Forces face nine interconnected problems:
1. Outdated equipment → modernization delayed for decades.
2. Low defense budget → insufficient for high-tech upgrades.
3. Maritime security challenges → China & piracy overstretch Navy.
4. Recruitment & retention issues → talent drain in technical fields.
5. Weak inter-service integration → poor joint operations capability.
6. Dependence on foreign suppliers → costly, politically risky.
7. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities → exposed to hybrid threats.
8. Corruption & scandals → billions wasted, modernization crippled.
9. Overstretch from non-traditional roles → weak focus on external defense.
🚄 What Is the ECRL?
BalasHapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
• While fears of a debt trap persist, analysts suggest Malondesh’s fiscal position is strong enough to manage the revised terms.
• The project is seen as a balancing act between economic development and sovereign financial prudence
😝ECRL = BRI CHINA = HUTANG😝
INDIANESIA TAK BAYAR SEWA... MEMALUKAN... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusPeristiwa itu terjadi sekitar tahun 2015, ketika Indonesia menyewa satelit dan tidak memenuhi kewajiban bayar sesuai nilai sewa.
Hal ini menyebabkan Indonesia digugat di pengadilan arbitrase internasional sehingga harus membayarkan uang sewa dan biaya arbitrase dengan nilai fantastis.
Pada 9 Juli 2019, pengadilan arbitrase menjatuhkan putusan yang berakibat negara harus mengeluarkan pembayaran untuk sewa satelit.
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/03/21/05092061/kalah-sengketa-soal-satelit-kemenhan-indonesia-wajib-bayar-241-juta-dollar?page=all
🚄 What Is the ECRL?
Hapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
• While fears of a debt trap persist, analysts suggest Malondesh’s fiscal position is strong enough to manage the revised terms.
• The project is seen as a balancing act between economic development and sovereign financial prudence
😝ECRL = BRI CHINA = HUTANG😝
🚄 What Is the ECRL?
Hapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
• While fears of a debt trap persist, analysts suggest Malondesh’s fiscal position is strong enough to manage the revised terms.
• The project is seen as a balancing act between economic development and sovereign financial prudence
😝ECRL = BRI CHINA = HUTANG😝
🚄 What Is the ECRL?
Hapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
• While fears of a debt trap persist, analysts suggest Malondesh’s fiscal position is strong enough to manage the revised terms.
• The project is seen as a balancing act between economic development and sovereign financial prudence
😝ECRL = BRI CHINA = DEBT AND FINANCIAL CONCERNS CHINA😝
🚄 What Is the ECRL?
Hapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
• While fears of a debt trap persist, analysts suggest Malondesh’s fiscal position is strong enough to manage the revised terms.
• The project is seen as a balancing act between economic development and sovereign financial prudence
😝ECRL = BRI CHINA = DEBT AND FINANCIAL CONCERNS CHINA😝
⚔️ Key Problems of the Malondeshn Armed Forces
Hapus________________________________________
1. Outdated Equipment → Modernization Delayed for Decades
• Air Force (RMAF):
o Retired MiG-29s in 2017 due to high costs.
o Current frontline jets: Su-30MKM (2007) and F/A-18D Hornet (1997) — small fleet, aging, and expensive to maintain.
o Still waiting for FA-50 light combat aircraft, deliveries only starting in 2026.
o Weak surveillance capability → lacks modern maritime patrol aircraft and AWACS.
• Navy (RMN):
o Many ships date from the 1980s–90s (Lekiu-class frigates, Kasturi-class corvettes).
o Only 2 Scorpène submarines, insufficient to cover Malondesh vast waters.
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal froze modernization — billions spent, no ships delivered.
• Army:
o Still operates Condor APCs from the 1980s.
o AV8 Gempita is modern but only partially deployed.
o Lacks modern long-range artillery and medium/long-range air defense systems.
Impact: The MAF has been stuck with aging platforms, while neighbors upgrade to Rafales, F-35s, Gripens, modern submarines, and frigates. Malondesh risks being outclassed in any regional confrontation.
________________________________________
2. Low Defense Budget → Insufficient for High-Tech Upgrades
• Malondesh spends only 1.0–1.5% of GDP on defense.
o Singapore spends ~3%, Vietnam ~2.3%, Thailand ~1.5%.
• Of this budget, more than half goes to salaries, pensions, and operations → leaving little for modernization.
• Modern assets (jets, ships, submarines) require long-term investment, but Malondesh often cuts or delays purchases due to economic pressures.
• Example: MRCA fighter program (to replace MiG-29s) has been delayed for over a decade.
Impact: Malondesh cannot keep pace with regional military spending. Modernization becomes piecemeal, leaving gaps in readiness and deterrence.
________________________________________
3. Maritime Security Challenges → China & Piracy Overstretch the Navy
• South China Sea (SCS):
o China’s Coast Guard and Navy frequently intrude into Malondesh EEZ, especially around Luconia Shoals.
o Malondesh has overlapping maritime claims with China, Vietnam, and the Philippines.
• Strait of Malacca:
o One of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.
o Vulnerable to piracy, smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal fishing.
• Navy Limitations:
o Small, aging fleet cannot patrol both SCS and Malacca Strait effectively.
o Relies heavily on offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) that lack strong firepower.
o Only 2 submarines → insufficient deterrent against China or other navies.
Impact: Malondesh struggles to enforce sovereignty over its waters. The Navy is stretched thin, unable to cover vast sea areas against both traditional (China) and non-traditional (piracy) threats.
________________________________________
✅ Summary / Conclusion
The Malondeshn Armed Forces face three interconnected problems:
1. Outdated Equipment: Modernization stalled for decades, leaving MAF dependent on aging jets, ships, and vehicles.
2. Low Defense Budget: Limited funding prevents the acquisition of high-tech assets, keeping Malondesh behind regional peers.
3. Maritime Security Challenges: A small, overstretched Navy struggles to protect Malondesh EEZ in the South China Sea and secure the Strait of Malacca.
📌 Conclusion: Unless Malondesh increases defense spending, reforms procurement, and accelerates modernization, the MAF risks becoming a force capable only of low-intensity domestic missions, not one prepared to defend national sovereignty against regional powers like China or match its Southeast Asian neighbors.
🪖 ARMY GAPS — VULNERABLE TO MODERN COMBINED-ARMS WARFARE
HapusMalondesh’s Current Situation
• Armored Vehicles
o Still operates Condor APCs (1980s).
o New AV8 Gempita (Turkish FNSS partnership) in service, but deliveries are slow and numbers limited.
• Artillery & Firepower
o Mix of old towed artillery and a few self-propelled systems.
o No modern Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) compared to neighbors.
• Air Defense
o Extremely weak: relies mainly on MANPADS (Igla, Starstreak) for short-range defense.
o No medium or long-range SAMs, leaving Malondeshn forces and infrastructure vulnerable to modern air strikes.
• Infantry
o Professional and experienced (notably in counterinsurgency), but under-equipped for high-intensity, modern warfare.
Regional Comparison
• Singapore: Strong mechanized force, Leopard 2 tanks, advanced artillery (PzH2000), Iron Dome-derived air defense.
• Indonesia: Expanding heavy armor, artillery, and air defense systems (NASAMS, S-300, etc.).
• Thailand: Upgrading tanks and artillery with Chinese and Ukrainian systems.
Implications
• In a high-intensity war, Malondeshn Army units would struggle against modern mechanized forces.
• Lack of air defense means Malondesh cannot protect key bases, cities, or troops from airstrikes or drones.
• Malondesh risks being confined to low-intensity operations (counterinsurgency, peacekeeping), while lacking credibility in regional conflicts.
🚄 What Is the ECRL?
BalasHapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
• While fears of a debt trap persist, analysts suggest Malondesh’s fiscal position is strong enough to manage the revised terms.
• The project is seen as a balancing act between economic development and sovereign financial prudence
😝ECRL = BRI CHINA = HUTANG😝
🚄 What Is the ECRL?
BalasHapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
• While fears of a debt trap persist, analysts suggest Malondesh’s fiscal position is strong enough to manage the revised terms.
• The project is seen as a balancing act between economic development and sovereign financial prudence
😝ECRL = BRI CHINA = HUTANG😝
🚄 What Is the ECRL?
BalasHapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
• While fears of a debt trap persist, analysts suggest Malondesh’s fiscal position is strong enough to manage the revised terms.
• The project is seen as a balancing act between economic development and sovereign financial prudence
😝ECRL = BRI CHINA = DEBT AND FINANCIAL CONCERNS CHINA😝
🚄 What Is the ECRL?
BalasHapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
• While fears of a debt trap persist, analysts suggest Malondesh’s fiscal position is strong enough to manage the revised terms.
• The project is seen as a balancing act between economic development and sovereign financial prudence
😝ECRL = BRI CHINA = DEBT AND FINANCIAL CONCERNS CHINA😝
In conjunction with Thales Alenia Space, PT Len will develop a multimission ground segment system to provide control, maintenance, data processing, and analytic functions for the Defense Satellite System. Additionally, PT Len will grant the MoD access to the existing high revisit Earth observation satellite constellation through a partnership with BlackSky. This service will provide early ISR satellite capability for the MoD and Indonesian National Armed Forces prior to the Defense Satellite System operation.
BalasHapusAda Qualified Vendor:
1. THALES ALENIA SPACE
2. BLACKSKY
3. PT. LEN
https://www.thalesaleniaspace.com/en/press-releases/thales-alenia-space-signs-multi-satellite-contract-pt-len-industri-provide-radar-and
Lanjutkan Program Satelit Pertahanan Indonesia
1. ✈️ REDUCED AIR POWER — FALLING BEHIND REGIONAL PEERS
BalasHapusMalondesh’s Current Situation
• Fighter Jets
o Sukhoi Su-30MKM (18 units, delivered 2007–2009): Capable multirole jets, but maintenance is costly and availability rates are low (reports suggest sometimes only half are operational).
o F/A-18D Hornets (8 units, delivered 1997): Reliable but aging; spare parts are harder to source.
o MiG-29s were retired in 2017 due to high costs and obsolescence.
• Maritime Patrol & AEW (Airborne Early Warning): Malondesh lacks modern long-range surveillance aircraft, relying on small Beechcraft King Air planes. This leaves huge blind spots in maritime and airspace monitoring.
• LCA Program: Malondesh signed a deal for FA-50 Light Combat Aircraft (South Korea) in 2023, but deliveries only start in 2026.
Regional Comparison
• Singapore
o Already operates F-15SG (advanced Strike Eagle variant).
o Purchased F-35B stealth fighters (delivery in late 2020s).
o Has advanced AEW&C aircraft (G550 CAEW).
o Clear qualitative superiority.
• Indonesia
o Acquiring 42 Rafale multirole fighters (first deliveries around 2026).
o Operates modern Sukhoi Su-27/30 and is buying F-15EX.
• Thailand
o Operates Gripen C/D fighters with Saab 340 AEW, giving them a networked advantage.
• Philippines (often weaker)
o Buying F-16Vs or Gripen for modernization.
Implications
• Malondesh risks being outmatched in air combat by all its immediate neighbors (except currently the Philippines).
• Limited surveillance and patrol aircraft mean Malondesh cannot monitor its skies or EEZ effectively.
• Without new MRCA (Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) acquisitions, Malondesh may lose deterrence credibility in the region.
https://kcic.co.id/kcic-siaran-pers/capai-78-juta-penumpang-whoosh-kini-jadi-kereta-komuter-super-cepat/
BalasHapusJumlah total penumpang whoosh adalah 7.800.000 sampai Februari 2025
Jumlah penumpang Malaysia adalah 225.000
https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20250904134032-4-664274/warga-malaysia-suka-naik-kereta-cepat-whoosh-borong-tiket-rombongan
Artinya:
% Malondesh = 225.000 : 7.800.000 x 100% = 2,88%
Artinya:
Penumpang Indonesia yang Paling Banyak memakai kereta whoosh sekitar 95%
Malondesh GAGAL TOTAL NEGATIVE FRAMING terhadap INDONESIA LAGI....
Netizen Indonesia tertawa terbahak-bahak dong
WKWKWKWK
1. ✈️ REDUCED AIR POWER — FALLING BEHIND REGIONAL PEERS
BalasHapusMalondesh’s Current Situation
• Fighter Jets
o Sukhoi Su-30MKM (18 units, delivered 2007–2009): Capable multirole jets, but maintenance is costly and availability rates are low (reports suggest sometimes only half are operational).
o F/A-18D Hornets (8 units, delivered 1997): Reliable but aging; spare parts are harder to source.
o MiG-29s were retired in 2017 due to high costs and obsolescence.
• Maritime Patrol & AEW (Airborne Early Warning): Malondesh lacks modern long-range surveillance aircraft, relying on small Beechcraft King Air planes. This leaves huge blind spots in maritime and airspace monitoring.
• LCA Program: Malondesh signed a deal for FA-50 Light Combat Aircraft (South Korea) in 2023, but deliveries only start in 2026.
Regional Comparison
• Singapore
o Already operates F-15SG (advanced Strike Eagle variant).
o Purchased F-35B stealth fighters (delivery in late 2020s).
o Has advanced AEW&C aircraft (G550 CAEW).
o Clear qualitative superiority.
• Indonesia
o Acquiring 42 Rafale multirole fighters (first deliveries around 2026).
o Operates modern Sukhoi Su-27/30 and is buying F-15EX.
• Thailand
o Operates Gripen C/D fighters with Saab 340 AEW, giving them a networked advantage.
• Philippines (often weaker)
o Buying F-16Vs or Gripen for modernization.
Implications
• Malondesh risks being outmatched in air combat by all its immediate neighbors (except currently the Philippines).
• Limited surveillance and patrol aircraft mean Malondesh cannot monitor its skies or EEZ effectively.
• Without new MRCA (Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) acquisitions, Malondesh may lose deterrence credibility in the region.
🚄 What Is the ECRL?
BalasHapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
• While fears of a debt trap persist, analysts suggest Malondesh’s fiscal position is strong enough to manage the revised terms.
• The project is seen as a balancing act between economic development and sovereign financial prudence
😝ECRL = BRI CHINA = DEBT AND FINANCIAL CONCERNS CHINA😝
🚄 What Is the ECRL?
BalasHapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
😝ECRL = BRI CHINA = DEBT AND FINANCIAL CONCERNS CHINA😝
Australian Navy Upgrades Its Satellite Communications
BalasHapusThe Maritime Advanced SATCOM Terrestrial Infrastructure System (MASTIS) is removed from HMAS Sydney at Garden Island, NSW (photo: RAN)
The King Cobra and Cobra systems were selected as Navy’s primary and alternate SATCOM systems to replace MASTIS after 25 years.
---------
hobart klas baruw 5 taon dines uda apgred ajah, lah frigat tetangga kesayangan kiukiu 30 taon masi ori Analog haha!😁🤫😁
🧨 Case Study 1: 1MDB Scandal and Chinese Bailout Allegations
BalasHapus• 1Malondesh Development Berhad (1MDB) was a state investment fund launched in 2009.
• It became the center of a global corruption scandal, with over US$4.5 billion allegedly misappropriated.
• Investigative reports and whistleblower accounts suggest that Chinese state-linked firms were involved in inflated contracts and backdoor bailouts to cover 1MDB’s debts.
• Example: Two pipeline projects worth RM9.4 billion were paid upfront, but only 13% of the work was completed—raising suspicions that the funds were diverted to settle 1MDB obligations.
🚄 Case Study 2: East Coast Rail Link (ECRL)
• Originally valued at RM65.5 billion (US$20 billion), funded by Export-Import Bank of China.
• Suspended in 2018 due to cost concerns and renegotiated in 2019 to RM44 billion.
• Although the loan terms were softened, Malondesh still bears long-term repayment obligations, with interest payments exceeding RM500 million annually.
• Critics feared a debt trap, but Malondesh retained control over the project and renegotiated terms to reduce strategic risk.
🏗️ Other BRI Projects with Financial Exposure
Project Estimated Value Issues Raised
Melaka Gateway Port RM43 billion Suspended; concerns over transparency
Kuantan Industrial Park RM3.5 billion Joint venture; strategic location
Pipeline Projects RM9.4 billion Linked to 1MDB bailout allegations
📊 Summary
• Malondesh’s direct debt to China is limited, but project-based exposure—especially under BRI—has raised concerns about transparency, strategic control, and governance.
• The 1MDB scandal amplified fears of Chinese financial influence, though Malondesh has since taken steps to renegotiate and restructure key projects.
• The ECRL remains the largest BRI-linked debt, but its revised terms are considered fiscally sustainable.
🚄 Case Study 1: East Coast Rail Link (ECRL)
BalasHapus• Originally valued at RM65.5 billion (US$20 billion), funded by Export-Import Bank of China.
• Suspended in 2018 due to cost concerns and renegotiated in 2019 to RM44 billion.
• Although the loan terms were softened, Malondesh still bears long-term repayment obligations, with interest payments exceeding RM500 million annually.
Critics feared a debt trap, but Malondesh retained control over the project and renegotiated terms to reduce strategic risk
🧨 Case Study 2: 1MDB Scandal and Chinese Bailout Allegations
• 1Malondesh Development Berhad (1MDB) was a state investment fund launched in 2009.
• It became the center of a global corruption scandal, with over US$4.5 billion allegedly misappropriated.
• Investigative reports and whistleblower accounts suggest that Chinese state-linked firms were involved in inflated contracts and backdoor bailouts to cover 1MDB’s debts.
• Example: Two pipeline projects worth RM9.4 billion were paid upfront, but only 13% of the work was completed—raising suspicions that the funds were diverted to settle 1MDB obligations..
🏗️ Other BRI Projects with Financial Exposure
Project Estimated Value Issues Raised
Melaka Gateway Port RM43 billion Suspended; concerns over transparency
Kuantan Industrial Park RM3.5 billion Joint venture; strategic location
Pipeline Projects RM9.4 billion Linked to 1MDB bailout allegations
📊 Summary
• Malondesh’s direct debt to China is limited, but project-based exposure—especially under BRI—has raised concerns about transparency, strategic control, and governance.
• The 1MDB scandal amplified fears of Chinese financial influence, though Malondesh has since taken steps to renegotiate and restructure key projects.
INDIANESIA TAK BAYAR SEWA... MEMALUKAN... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusPeristiwa itu terjadi sekitar tahun 2015, ketika Indonesia menyewa satelit dan tidak memenuhi kewajiban bayar sesuai nilai sewa.
Hal ini menyebabkan Indonesia digugat di pengadilan arbitrase internasional sehingga harus membayarkan uang sewa dan biaya arbitrase dengan nilai fantastis.
Pada 9 Juli 2019, pengadilan arbitrase menjatuhkan putusan yang berakibat negara harus mengeluarkan pembayaran untuk sewa satelit.
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/03/21/05092061/kalah-sengketa-soal-satelit-kemenhan-indonesia-wajib-bayar-241-juta-dollar?page=all
🚄 Case Study 1: East Coast Rail Link (ECRL)
Hapus• Originally valued at RM65.5 billion (US$20 billion), funded by Export-Import Bank of China.
• Suspended in 2018 due to cost concerns and renegotiated in 2019 to RM44 billion.
• Although the loan terms were softened, Malondesh still bears long-term repayment obligations, with interest payments exceeding RM500 million annually.
Critics feared a debt trap, but Malondesh retained control over the project and renegotiated terms to reduce strategic risk
🧨 Case Study 2: 1MDB Scandal and Chinese Bailout Allegations
• 1Malondesh Development Berhad (1MDB) was a state investment fund launched in 2009.
• It became the center of a global corruption scandal, with over US$4.5 billion allegedly misappropriated.
• Investigative reports and whistleblower accounts suggest that Chinese state-linked firms were involved in inflated contracts and backdoor bailouts to cover 1MDB’s debts.
• Example: Two pipeline projects worth RM9.4 billion were paid upfront, but only 13% of the work was completed—raising suspicions that the funds were diverted to settle 1MDB obligations..
🏗️ Other BRI Projects with Financial Exposure
Project Estimated Value Issues Raised
Melaka Gateway Port RM43 billion Suspended; concerns over transparency
Kuantan Industrial Park RM3.5 billion Joint venture; strategic location
Pipeline Projects RM9.4 billion Linked to 1MDB bailout allegations
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
🚄 Case Study 1: East Coast Rail Link (ECRL)
Hapus• Originally valued at RM65.5 billion (US$20 billion), funded by Export-Import Bank of China.
• Suspended in 2018 due to cost concerns and renegotiated in 2019 to RM44 billion.
• Although the loan terms were softened, Malondesh still bears long-term repayment obligations, with interest payments exceeding RM500 million annually.
Critics feared a debt trap, but Malondesh retained control over the project and renegotiated terms to reduce strategic risk
🧨 Case Study 2: 1MDB Scandal and Chinese Bailout Allegations
• 1Malondesh Development Berhad (1MDB) was a state investment fund launched in 2009.
• It became the center of a global corruption scandal, with over US$4.5 billion allegedly misappropriated.
• Investigative reports and whistleblower accounts suggest that Chinese state-linked firms were involved in inflated contracts and backdoor bailouts to cover 1MDB’s debts.
• Example: Two pipeline projects worth RM9.4 billion were paid upfront, but only 13% of the work was completed—raising suspicions that the funds were diverted to settle 1MDB obligations..
🏗️ Other BRI Projects with Financial Exposure
Project Estimated Value Issues Raised
Melaka Gateway Port RM43 billion Suspended; concerns over transparency
Kuantan Industrial Park RM3.5 billion Joint venture; strategic location
Pipeline Projects RM9.4 billion Linked to 1MDB bailout allegations
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
🚄 Case Study 1: East Coast Rail Link (ECRL)
Hapus• Originally valued at RM65.5 billion (US$20 billion), funded by Export-Import Bank of China.
• Suspended in 2018 due to cost concerns and renegotiated in 2019 to RM44 billion.
• Although the loan terms were softened, Malondesh still bears long-term repayment obligations, with interest payments exceeding RM500 million annually.
Critics feared a debt trap, but Malondesh retained control over the project and renegotiated terms to reduce strategic risk
🧨 Case Study 2: 1MDB Scandal and Chinese Bailout Allegations
• 1Malondesh Development Berhad (1MDB) was a state investment fund launched in 2009.
• It became the center of a global corruption scandal, with over US$4.5 billion allegedly misappropriated.
• Investigative reports and whistleblower accounts suggest that Chinese state-linked firms were involved in inflated contracts and backdoor bailouts to cover 1MDB’s debts.
• Example: Two pipeline projects worth RM9.4 billion were paid upfront, but only 13% of the work was completed—raising suspicions that the funds were diverted to settle 1MDB obligations..
🏗️ Other BRI Projects with Financial Exposure
Project Estimated Value Issues Raised
Melaka Gateway Port RM43 billion Suspended; concerns over transparency
Kuantan Industrial Park RM3.5 billion Joint venture; strategic location
Pipeline Projects RM9.4 billion Linked to 1MDB bailout allegations
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
🚄 What Is the ECRL?
Hapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
😝ECRL = BRI CHINA = DEBT AND FINANCIAL CONCERNS CHINA😝
🚄 Case Study 1: East Coast Rail Link (ECRL)
• Originally valued at RM65.5 billion (US$20 billion), funded by Export-Import Bank of China.
• Suspended in 2018 due to cost concerns and renegotiated in 2019 to RM44 billion.
• Although the loan terms were softened, Malondesh still bears long-term repayment obligations, with interest payments exceeding RM500 million annually.
Critics feared a debt trap, but Malondesh retained control over the project and renegotiated terms to reduce strategic risk
🧨 Case Study 2: 1MDB Scandal and Chinese Bailout Allegations
• 1Malondesh Development Berhad (1MDB) was a state investment fund launched in 2009.
• It became the center of a global corruption scandal, with over US$4.5 billion allegedly misappropriated.
• Investigative reports and whistleblower accounts suggest that Chinese state-linked firms were involved in inflated contracts and backdoor bailouts to cover 1MDB’s debts.
• Example: Two pipeline projects worth RM9.4 billion were paid upfront, but only 13% of the work was completed—raising suspicions that the funds were diverted to settle 1MDB obligations..
🏗️ Other BRI Projects with Financial Exposure
Project Estimated Value Issues Raised
Melaka Gateway Port RM43 billion Suspended; concerns over transparency
Kuantan Industrial Park RM3.5 billion Joint venture; strategic location
Pipeline Projects RM9.4 billion Linked to 1MDB bailout allegations
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
🚄 What Is the ECRL?
Hapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
😝ECRL = BRI CHINA = DEBT AND FINANCIAL CONCERNS CHINA😝
⚠️ Crucial Problems of the Malondeshn Armed Forces
Hapus________________________________________
Outdated Equipment & Modernization Delays
• Many of Malondesh major platforms are 30–40 years old:
o Army still operates Condor APCs (1980s).
o Navy relies on Lekiu-class frigates (1990s) and Kasturi-class corvettes (1980s).
o Air Force’s frontline jets are limited to Su-30MKMs (2007) and F/A-18Ds (1997).
• Modernization plans like the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program and MRCA fighter jet replacement have been delayed for over a decade.
• Result: MAF cannot match regional peers who are buying F-35s (Singapore), Rafales (Indonesia), Gripens (Thailand), and new submarines (Vietnam).
________________________________________
Low Defense Budget Compared to Needs
• Malondesh spends only ~1.0–1.5% of GDP on defense.
o Lower than Singapore (~3%), Vietnam (~2.3%), Thailand (~1.5%).
• Budget prioritizes salaries and pensions, leaving little for modernization.
• Procurement of high-tech systems (jets, frigates, missile defense) is constantly delayed due to lack of funds.
• Result: MAF struggles to maintain readiness and replace aging equipment.
________________________________________
Maritime Security Challenges in the Strait of Malacca & South China Sea
• Malondesh has one of the largest Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in Southeast Asia (~334,000 km²).
• Challenges:
o China’s Coast Guard & Navy regularly intrude near Luconia Shoals.
o Piracy, smuggling, and illegal fishing in the Strait of Malacca.
o Overlapping claims with neighbors (Philippines & Indonesia).
• Navy and Coast Guard (MMEA) lack enough ships to patrol effectively.
• Result: Malondesh struggles to enforce sovereignty over its maritime territory.
________________________________________
Recruitment & Retention Issues
• Active personnel: ~110,000, but facing manpower challenges.
• Problems:
o Low pay and benefits compared to private sector.
o Younger generation less interested in military careers.
o Difficulty retaining skilled personnel (pilots, engineers, cyber specialists).
• Aging force → fewer young recruits, some early retirements.
• Result: Talent drain weakens technical arms of the military.
________________________________________
Weak Inter-Service Integration
• Army, Navy, and Air Force often operate independently.
• Malondesh lacks a strong Joint Command system like the U.S. or Singapore.
• Limited ability to conduct complex, multi-domain operations (e.g., joint land-sea-air campaigns).
• Training and exercises are improving but still service-centric.
• Result: Reduced efficiency in responding to hybrid or conventional threats.
🚄 Case Study 1: East Coast Rail Link (ECRL)
BalasHapus• Originally valued at RM65.5 billion (US$20 billion), funded by Export-Import Bank of China.
• Suspended in 2018 due to cost concerns and renegotiated in 2019 to RM44 billion.
• Although the loan terms were softened, Malondesh still bears long-term repayment obligations, with interest payments exceeding RM500 million annually.
Critics feared a debt trap, but Malondesh retained control over the project and renegotiated terms to reduce strategic risk
🧨 Case Study 2: 1MDB Scandal and Chinese Bailout Allegations
• 1Malondesh Development Berhad (1MDB) was a state investment fund launched in 2009.
• It became the center of a global corruption scandal, with over US$4.5 billion allegedly misappropriated.
• Investigative reports and whistleblower accounts suggest that Chinese state-linked firms were involved in inflated contracts and backdoor bailouts to cover 1MDB’s debts.
• Example: Two pipeline projects worth RM9.4 billion were paid upfront, but only 13% of the work was completed—raising suspicions that the funds were diverted to settle 1MDB obligations..
🏗️ Other BRI Projects with Financial Exposure
Project Estimated Value Issues Raised
Melaka Gateway Port RM43 billion Suspended; concerns over transparency
Kuantan Industrial Park RM3.5 billion Joint venture; strategic location
Pipeline Projects RM9.4 billion Linked to 1MDB bailout allegations
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
🚄 Case Study 1: East Coast Rail Link (ECRL)
BalasHapus• Originally valued at RM65.5 billion (US$20 billion), funded by Export-Import Bank of China.
• Suspended in 2018 due to cost concerns and renegotiated in 2019 to RM44 billion.
• Although the loan terms were softened, Malondesh still bears long-term repayment obligations, with interest payments exceeding RM500 million annually.
Critics feared a debt trap, but Malondesh retained control over the project and renegotiated terms to reduce strategic risk
🧨 Case Study 2: 1MDB Scandal and Chinese Bailout Allegations
• 1Malondesh Development Berhad (1MDB) was a state investment fund launched in 2009.
• It became the center of a global corruption scandal, with over US$4.5 billion allegedly misappropriated.
• Investigative reports and whistleblower accounts suggest that Chinese state-linked firms were involved in inflated contracts and backdoor bailouts to cover 1MDB’s debts.
• Example: Two pipeline projects worth RM9.4 billion were paid upfront, but only 13% of the work was completed—raising suspicions that the funds were diverted to settle 1MDB obligations..
🏗️ Other BRI Projects with Financial Exposure
Project Estimated Value Issues Raised
Melaka Gateway Port RM43 billion Suspended; concerns over transparency
Kuantan Industrial Park RM3.5 billion Joint venture; strategic location
Pipeline Projects RM9.4 billion Linked to 1MDB bailout allegations
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
GOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
Kalau MISKIN... Jangan SEWA ya..... 🤣🤣🤡🤡
BalasHapus🚄 What Is the ECRL?
Hapus• Initially launched in 2016 under Malondesh’s previous government as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Constructed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), with financing largely from Export-Import Bank of China.
💰 Debt and Financial Concerns
• The original cost was RM65.5 billion (approx. US$20 billion), with RM500 million in annual interest alone.
• Critics feared Malondesh could fall into a “debt trap”, where repayment obligations would strain national finances.
• In 2018–2019, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended and renegotiated the project, citing:
o Excessive cost
o Unfavorable loan terms
o Lack of transparency in contracts2
🔄 Cancellation and Renegotiation
• Mahathir announced the temporary cancellation of ECRL and two gas pipeline projects during a visit to Beijing in 20183.
• He emphasized that Malondesh couldn’t afford the projects at the time and sought to reduce national debt, which had ballooned to RM1 trillion (approx. US$250 billion).
• China reportedly understood Malondesh’s position, and negotiations continued to revise the scope and cost.
✅ Revised Project Status
• The project was revived in 2019 with a reduced cost of RM44 billion, and a shortened route to cut expenses.
• Construction resumed, with completion now targeted for December 2026, and operations expected to begin in January 2027.
• Malondesh also launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) alongside ECRL to boost local benefits, such as industrial parks and logistics hubs.
🇲🇾 Strategic Implications
• The ECRL remains one of the largest BRI projects outside China.
😝ECRL = BRI CHINA = DEBT AND FINANCIAL CONCERNS CHINA😝
⚔️ Key Problems of the Malondeshn Armed Forces
Hapus________________________________________
1. Outdated Equipment → Modernization Delayed for Decades
• Air Force (RMAF):
o Retired MiG-29s in 2017 due to high costs.
o Current frontline jets: Su-30MKM (2007) and F/A-18D Hornet (1997) — small fleet, aging, and expensive to maintain.
o Still waiting for FA-50 light combat aircraft, deliveries only starting in 2026.
o Weak surveillance capability → lacks modern maritime patrol aircraft and AWACS.
• Navy (RMN):
o Many ships date from the 1980s–90s (Lekiu-class frigates, Kasturi-class corvettes).
o Only 2 Scorpène submarines, insufficient to cover Malondesh vast waters.
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal froze modernization — billions spent, no ships delivered.
• Army:
o Still operates Condor APCs from the 1980s.
o AV8 Gempita is modern but only partially deployed.
o Lacks modern long-range artillery and medium/long-range air defense systems.
Impact: The MAF has been stuck with aging platforms, while neighbors upgrade to Rafales, F-35s, Gripens, modern submarines, and frigates. Malondesh risks being outclassed in any regional confrontation.
________________________________________
2. Low Defense Budget → Insufficient for High-Tech Upgrades
• Malondesh spends only 1.0–1.5% of GDP on defense.
o Singapore spends ~3%, Vietnam ~2.3%, Thailand ~1.5%.
• Of this budget, more than half goes to salaries, pensions, and operations → leaving little for modernization.
• Modern assets (jets, ships, submarines) require long-term investment, but Malondesh often cuts or delays purchases due to economic pressures.
• Example: MRCA fighter program (to replace MiG-29s) has been delayed for over a decade.
Impact: Malondesh cannot keep pace with regional military spending. Modernization becomes piecemeal, leaving gaps in readiness and deterrence.
________________________________________
3. Maritime Security Challenges → China & Piracy Overstretch the Navy
• South China Sea (SCS):
o China’s Coast Guard and Navy frequently intrude into Malondesh EEZ, especially around Luconia Shoals.
o Malondesh has overlapping maritime claims with China, Vietnam, and the Philippines.
• Strait of Malacca:
o One of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.
o Vulnerable to piracy, smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal fishing.
• Navy Limitations:
o Small, aging fleet cannot patrol both SCS and Malacca Strait effectively.
o Relies heavily on offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) that lack strong firepower.
o Only 2 submarines → insufficient deterrent against China or other navies.
Impact: Malondesh struggles to enforce sovereignty over its waters. The Navy is stretched thin, unable to cover vast sea areas against both traditional (China) and non-traditional (piracy) threats.
________________________________________
✅ Summary / Conclusion
The Malondeshn Armed Forces face three interconnected problems:
1. Outdated Equipment: Modernization stalled for decades, leaving MAF dependent on aging jets, ships, and vehicles.
2. Low Defense Budget: Limited funding prevents the acquisition of high-tech assets, keeping Malondesh behind regional peers.
3. Maritime Security Challenges: A small, overstretched Navy struggles to protect Malondesh EEZ in the South China Sea and secure the Strait of Malacca.
📌 Conclusion: Unless Malondesh increases defense spending, reforms procurement, and accelerates modernization, the MAF risks becoming a force capable only of low-intensity domestic missions, not one prepared to defend national sovereignty against regional powers like China or match its Southeast Asian neighbors.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
===================
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
"Pinjaman ini digunakan untuk melunasi DEBT matang sebesar RM20.6 miliar, dengan sisa RM49,9 miliar menutupi defisit dan masa jatuh tempo DEBT di masa depan," kata MOF.
---
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Pada tahun 2023, pinjaman baru Kerajaan Persekutuan MALONDESH mencapai RM1.173 triliun, naik 8,6% dari tahun 2022.
Rincian pinjaman
• Pinjaman baru Kerajaan Persekutuan MALONDESH pada tahun 2023 naik RM92,918 miliar
• Rasio utang terhadap PDB MALONDESH pada tahun 2023 mencapai 64,3%
---
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Kah Woh menjelaskan pada tahun lalu, kerajaan ada membuat pinjaman yang meningkat sebanyak 11.6 peratus daripada RM194.5 bilion pada tahun sebelumnya. Daripada jumlah itu, beliau berkata 52.4 peratus atau RM113.7 bilion digunakan untuk membayar prinsipal pinjaman matang.
---
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Sejumlah RM98.058 bilion atau 50.4 peratus daripada pinjaman baharu berjumlah RM194.555 bilion yang dibuat kerajaan pada tahun lalu digunakan untuk bayaran balik prinsipal pinjaman yang matang.
---
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Jabatan Audit Negara (JAN) bimbang dengan tindakan kerajaan menggunakan hampir 60 peratus pinjaman baharu untuk membayar DEBT sedia ada pada tahun lalu, berbanding bagi perbelanjaan pembangunan.
---
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Laporan Ketua Audit Negara mengenai Penyata Kewangan Kerajaan Persekutuan 2018 mendapati sejumlah 59 peratus pinjaman baharu kerajaan dibuat untuk membayar DEBT kerajaan terdahulu
---
2018 = OPEN DONASI
2018 = OPEN DONASI
2018 = OPEN DONASI
Kementerian Keuangan MALONDESH pada hari Rabu membuka rekening donasi supaya masyarakat dapat menyumbang untuk membantu negara membayar utang yang mencapai 1 triliun ringgit (US$ 250,8 miliar) atau 80 persen dari PDB
Dependence on Foreign Defense Suppliers
BalasHapus• Malondesh imports nearly all high-tech defense equipment:
o Jets from Russia, U.S., South Korea.
o Submarines & ships from France.
o Armored vehicles in partnership with Turkey.
• Spare parts and upgrades depend on foreign suppliers, making maintenance costly and vulnerable to sanctions or political disputes.
• Example: MiG-29s retired early due to lack of spare parts.
• Result: Malondesh has limited strategic autonomy in defense.
________________________________________
Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities
• Malondesh faces cyber threats from state actors, hackers, and extremist groups.
• Weaknesses:
o Limited investment in cyber defense.
o Few trained cyber specialists.
o Weak integration of cyber defense with traditional military operations.
• Rising threat of hybrid warfare (information warfare, disinformation, espionage) in South China Sea disputes.
• Result: Malondesh risks having its critical systems disrupted in a conflict.
________________________________________
Corruption & Procurement Scandals
• Defense procurement plagued by corruption and mismanagement:
o Scorpène Submarine Deal (2002): RM 500 million in commissions.
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal (2011–present): RM 9 billion spent, no ships delivered as of 2025.
• Middlemen and commissions inflate costs, reduce the number of assets purchased.
• Political interference often overrides military requirements.
• Result: Billions wasted, modernization delayed, public trust eroded.
________________________________________
Overstretch Due to Non-Traditional Roles
• MAF frequently tasked with:
o Disaster relief (floods, earthquakes).
o Border control (illegal migrants, smuggling).
o Counterterrorism (Abu Sayyaf threat in Sabah).
o Pandemic support (COVID-19 operations).
• These tasks divert focus and resources from conventional defense.
• With limited assets, balancing both traditional and non-traditional roles is difficult.
• Result: Military readiness for external threats is weakened.
________________________________________
✅ Summary
The Malondeshn Armed Forces face nine interconnected problems:
1. Outdated equipment → modernization delayed for decades.
2. Low defense budget → insufficient for high-tech upgrades.
3. Maritime security challenges → China & piracy overstretch Navy.
4. Recruitment & retention issues → talent drain in technical fields.
5. Weak inter-service integration → poor joint operations capability.
6. Dependence on foreign suppliers → costly, politically risky.
7. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities → exposed to hybrid threats.
8. Corruption & scandals → billions wasted, modernization crippled.
9. Overstretch from non-traditional roles → weak focus on external defense.
INDIANESIA TAK BAYAR SEWA... MEMALUKAN... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusPeristiwa itu terjadi sekitar tahun 2015, ketika Indonesia menyewa satelit dan tidak memenuhi kewajiban bayar sesuai nilai sewa.
Hal ini menyebabkan Indonesia digugat di pengadilan arbitrase internasional sehingga harus membayarkan uang sewa dan biaya arbitrase dengan nilai fantastis.
Pada 9 Juli 2019, pengadilan arbitrase menjatuhkan putusan yang berakibat negara harus mengeluarkan pembayaran untuk sewa satelit.
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/03/21/05092061/kalah-sengketa-soal-satelit-kemenhan-indonesia-wajib-bayar-241-juta-dollar?page=all
🪖 ARMY GAPS — VULNERABLE TO MODERN COMBINED-ARMS WARFARE
HapusMalondesh’s Current Situation
• Armored Vehicles
o Still operates Condor APCs (1980s).
o New AV8 Gempita (Turkish FNSS partnership) in service, but deliveries are slow and numbers limited.
• Artillery & Firepower
o Mix of old towed artillery and a few self-propelled systems.
o No modern Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) compared to neighbors.
• Air Defense
o Extremely weak: relies mainly on MANPADS (Igla, Starstreak) for short-range defense.
o No medium or long-range SAMs, leaving Malondeshn forces and infrastructure vulnerable to modern air strikes.
• Infantry
o Professional and experienced (notably in counterinsurgency), but under-equipped for high-intensity, modern warfare.
Regional Comparison
• Singapore: Strong mechanized force, Leopard 2 tanks, advanced artillery (PzH2000), Iron Dome-derived air defense.
• Indonesia: Expanding heavy armor, artillery, and air defense systems (NASAMS, S-300, etc.).
• Thailand: Upgrading tanks and artillery with Chinese and Ukrainian systems.
Implications
• In a high-intensity war, Malondeshn Army units would struggle against modern mechanized forces.
• Lack of air defense means Malondesh cannot protect key bases, cities, or troops from airstrikes or drones.
• Malondesh risks being confined to low-intensity operations (counterinsurgency, peacekeeping), while lacking credibility in regional conflicts.
1. ✈️ REDUCED AIR POWER — FALLING BEHIND REGIONAL PEERS
HapusMalondesh’s Current Situation
• Fighter Jets
o Sukhoi Su-30MKM (18 units, delivered 2007–2009): Capable multirole jets, but maintenance is costly and availability rates are low (reports suggest sometimes only half are operational).
o F/A-18D Hornets (8 units, delivered 1997): Reliable but aging; spare parts are harder to source.
o MiG-29s were retired in 2017 due to high costs and obsolescence.
• Maritime Patrol & AEW (Airborne Early Warning): Malondesh lacks modern long-range surveillance aircraft, relying on small Beechcraft King Air planes. This leaves huge blind spots in maritime and airspace monitoring.
• LCA Program: Malondesh signed a deal for FA-50 Light Combat Aircraft (South Korea) in 2023, but deliveries only start in 2026.
Regional Comparison
• Singapore
o Already operates F-15SG (advanced Strike Eagle variant).
o Purchased F-35B stealth fighters (delivery in late 2020s).
o Has advanced AEW&C aircraft (G550 CAEW).
o Clear qualitative superiority.
• Indonesia
o Acquiring 42 Rafale multirole fighters (first deliveries around 2026).
o Operates modern Sukhoi Su-27/30 and is buying F-15EX.
• Thailand
o Operates Gripen C/D fighters with Saab 340 AEW, giving them a networked advantage.
• Philippines (often weaker)
o Buying F-16Vs or Gripen for modernization.
Implications
• Malondesh risks being outmatched in air combat by all its immediate neighbors (except currently the Philippines).
• Limited surveillance and patrol aircraft mean Malondesh cannot monitor its skies or EEZ effectively.
• Without new MRCA (Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) acquisitions, Malondesh may lose deterrence credibility in the region.
🚢 NAVAL WEAKNESS — STRUGGLES TO PROTECT ITS EEZ FROM CHINA
HapusMalondesh’s Current Situation
• Fleet Composition
o 2 Lekiu-class frigates (1990s).
o 2 Kasturi-class corvettes (1980s).
o 2 Scorpène-class submarines (delivered 2009, but high maintenance costs).
o Several patrol vessels, many aging and under-armed.
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program
o Planned 6 modern Gowind-class ships.
o As of 2025: 0 delivered, due to scandal and delays.
• Maritime Domain Awareness
o Limited long-range radar coverage and maritime patrol aircraft.
Threats in EEZ
• South China Sea (SCS):
o China regularly sends coast guard and naval vessels into Malondesh’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), especially around Luconia Shoals and James Shoal.
o Chinese vessels are larger, more heavily armed, and often operate in groups.
• Strait of Malacca:
o World’s busiest sea lane.
o Piracy, smuggling, and illegal fishing require constant patrols.
Regional Comparison
• Singapore: Has modern Formidable-class frigates, Independence-class littoral ships, submarines, and a strong modernization pace.
• Indonesia: Expanding its navy with new frigates and submarines (Nagapasa-class).
• Thailand: Operates Chinese-built frigates and even purchased a Yuan-class submarine (yet to be delivered).
Implications
• Malondesh cannot effectively patrol its EEZ or deter Chinese incursions.
• Without the LCS, the RMN lacks modern surface combatants.
• Risk: Malondesh becomes the weak link in the South China Sea dispute, dependent on diplomacy and allies instead of naval power
BAYAR SEWA WOIIII.... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusKalah Sengketa soal Satelit Kemenhan, Indonesia Wajib Bayar 24,1 Juta Dollar AS ke Navayo
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/03/21/05092061/kalah-sengketa-soal-satelit-kemenhan-indonesia-wajib-bayar-241-juta-dollar?page=all
⚓ NAVAL WEAKNESS
HapusMALONDESH FACES SERIOUS MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND STRAIT OF MALACCA, BUT ITS NAVY (RMN) IS UNDER-EQUIPPED.
Current Situation
• Major combatants:
o 2 Lekiu-class frigates (1990s).
o 2 Kasturi-class corvettes (1980s).
o 6 Kedah-class offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) — lightly armed.
• Submarines: Only 2 Scorpène-class (delivered 2009).
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: RM 9 billion spent since 2011, but 0 ships delivered as of 2025 due to corruption scandal.
• Patrol assets: Insufficient to cover Malondesh’s huge EEZ (exclusive economic zone).
Problems
• Aging fleet; many ships near obsolescence.
• Insufficient firepower against regional navies.
• Small submarine force with limited availability.
• LCS scandal delayed modernization by more than a decade.
Regional Comparison
• Singapore: Formidable-class stealth frigates, modern OPVs, strong missile capability, and expanding submarine fleet.
• Indonesia: Expanding fleet with SIGMA-class frigates, Nagapasa submarines, and new OPVs.
• Vietnam: 6 modern Kilo-class submarines from Russia + upgraded frigates.
• China (in South China Sea): Deploys coast guard and navy ships near Malondesh’s EEZ regularly.
👉 Malondesh’s Risk: Cannot effectively protect its EEZ against Chinese incursions, illegal fishing, or smuggling. Lacks deterrence against neighbors with stronger navies.
🚢 NAVAL WEAKNESS — STRUGGLES TO PROTECT ITS EEZ FROM CHINA
HapusMalondesh’s Current Situation
• Fleet Composition
o 2 Lekiu-class frigates (1990s).
o 2 Kasturi-class corvettes (1980s).
o 2 Scorpène-class submarines (delivered 2009, but high maintenance costs).
o Several patrol vessels, many aging and under-armed.
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program
o Planned 6 modern Gowind-class ships.
o As of 2025: 0 delivered, due to scandal and delays.
• Maritime Domain Awareness
o Limited long-range radar coverage and maritime patrol aircraft.
Threats in EEZ
• South China Sea (SCS):
o China regularly sends coast guard and naval vessels into Malondesh’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), especially around Luconia Shoals and James Shoal.
o Chinese vessels are larger, more heavily armed, and often operate in groups.
• Strait of Malacca:
o World’s busiest sea lane.
o Piracy, smuggling, and illegal fishing require constant patrols.
Regional Comparison
• Singapore: Has modern Formidable-class frigates, Independence-class littoral ships, submarines, and a strong modernization pace.
• Indonesia: Expanding its navy with new frigates and submarines (Nagapasa-class).
• Thailand: Operates Chinese-built frigates and even purchased a Yuan-class submarine (yet to be delivered).
Implications
• Malondesh cannot effectively patrol its EEZ or deter Chinese incursions.
• Without the LCS, the RMN lacks modern surface combatants.
• Risk: Malondesh becomes the weak link in the South China Sea dispute, dependent on diplomacy and allies instead of naval power
✈️ REDUCED AIR POWER
BalasHapusMalondesh’s Air Force (RMAF) is falling behind in Southeast Asia’s fast-changing air combat environment.
Current Situation
• Retired MiG-29s (2017) → left a gap in frontline fighters.
• Su-30MKM (18 units) → capable, but plagued by low serviceability due to reliance on Russian parts and high maintenance costs.
• F/A-18D Hornet (8 units) → effective, but small fleet (from 1997).
• Transport & surveillance aircraft → aging Hercules C-130s and very limited maritime patrol capability.
• Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) → Malondesh ordered 18 FA-50s from South Korea, but deliveries will only start in 2026.
Problems
• Fighter fleet is too small and partly obsolete.
• No long-range air defense systems → vulnerable to modern missile and drone warfare.
• No modern AWACS (Airborne Warning & Control System).
Regional Comparison
• Singapore: Operates F-15SGs and F-16Vs, ordered F-35Bs (5th-gen stealth).
• Indonesia: Ordered 42 Rafales and 24 F-15EX jets; also considering KF-21 future fighter.
• Thailand: Operates Gripen C/D jets with modern datalink capability.
👉 Malondesh’s Risk: Falls behind in both numbers and technology. In a regional conflict, its Air Force could struggle to defend airspace, provide close air support, or deter aggressors.
🪖 ARMY GAPS
BalasHapusTHE MALONDESHN ARMY REMAINS HEAVILY MANPOWER-BASED BUT LACKS MODERN HEAVY FIREPOWER AND AIR DEFENSE.
Current Situation
• Armored vehicles:
o Still uses Condor APCs (1980s).
o AV8 Gempita (modern, joint Malondeshn-Turkish design) introduced but in limited numbers.
• Artillery: Mix of old towed guns and some self-propelled howitzers; lacks long-range precision systems.
• Air defense:
o Only short-range MANPADS (Igla, Starstreak).
o No medium or long-range SAMs (surface-to-air missiles).
• Helicopters: Slow delivery of light attack helicopters (MD530G).
Problems
• Army lacks modern combined-arms capability (armor + artillery + air defense).
• Vulnerable to airstrikes, drones, and missile attacks because of weak air defense.
• Heavy reliance on light infantry → good for counterinsurgency, weak in high-intensity warfare.
Regional Comparison
• Singapore: Fully mechanized army with Leopard 2 tanks, modern artillery, HIMARS rocket systems, and I-Hawk SAMs.
• Indonesia: Leopard 2 tanks, CAESAR howitzers, NASAMS air defense.
• Thailand: VT-4 tanks from China, Gripen air cover, strong artillery.
👉 Malondesh’s Risk: In a conventional war, the Malondeshn Army could not sustain modern combined-arms warfare and would rely on defensive, guerrilla-style tactics.
1. ✈️ REDUCED AIR POWER — FALLING BEHIND REGIONAL PEERS
BalasHapusMalondesh’s Current Situation
• Fighter Jets
o Sukhoi Su-30MKM (18 units, delivered 2007–2009): Capable multirole jets, but maintenance is costly and availability rates are low (reports suggest sometimes only half are operational).
o F/A-18D Hornets (8 units, delivered 1997): Reliable but aging; spare parts are harder to source.
o MiG-29s were retired in 2017 due to high costs and obsolescence.
• Maritime Patrol & AEW (Airborne Early Warning): Malondesh lacks modern long-range surveillance aircraft, relying on small Beechcraft King Air planes. This leaves huge blind spots in maritime and airspace monitoring.
• LCA Program: Malondesh signed a deal for FA-50 Light Combat Aircraft (South Korea) in 2023, but deliveries only start in 2026.
Regional Comparison
• Singapore
o Already operates F-15SG (advanced Strike Eagle variant).
o Purchased F-35B stealth fighters (delivery in late 2020s).
o Has advanced AEW&C aircraft (G550 CAEW).
o Clear qualitative superiority.
• Indonesia
o Acquiring 42 Rafale multirole fighters (first deliveries around 2026).
o Operates modern Sukhoi Su-27/30 and is buying F-15EX.
• Thailand
o Operates Gripen C/D fighters with Saab 340 AEW, giving them a networked advantage.
• Philippines (often weaker)
o Buying F-16Vs or Gripen for modernization.
Implications
• Malondesh risks being outmatched in air combat by all its immediate neighbors (except currently the Philippines).
• Limited surveillance and patrol aircraft mean Malondesh cannot monitor its skies or EEZ effectively.
• Without new MRCA (Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) acquisitions, Malondesh may lose deterrence credibility in the region.
BAYAR SEWA WOIIII.... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusKalah Sengketa soal Satelit Kemenhan, Indonesia Wajib Bayar 24,1 Juta Dollar AS ke Navayo
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/03/21/05092061/kalah-sengketa-soal-satelit-kemenhan-indonesia-wajib-bayar-241-juta-dollar?page=all
Legal Grey Zones in “Offsets” & “Consultancy Fees”
Hapus• Commissions to middlemen are often disguised as:
o Offset programs (e.g., promising technology transfer, training, local jobs).
o Consultancy fees for “facilitating” deals.
o Logistics or IT support contracts.
• These make it appear legitimate on paper, even if the services provided are minimal or irrelevant.
Why it continues: Because the practice can be masked under legal business terms, it becomes difficult to prove corruption.
________________________________________
Institutionalized Culture of Corruption
• In Malondesh, the role of middlemen has been entrenched since the 1980s–1990s when large defense contracts (MiG-29s, patrol boats, submarines) first involved commissions.
• Once established, it became a “standard practice” in defense procurement.
• Military officers are aware of it but cannot override political leaders who approve procurement.
Why it continues: Corruption in procurement has become part of the status quo — changing it would threaten entrenched interests.
________________________________________
Limited Domestic Defense Industry Capacity
• Malondesh does not have a strong indigenous defense industry compared to countries like Singapore.
• This weakness forces Malondesh to import most major weapons (jets, submarines, ships, tanks).
• Because imports are complex, middlemen exploit the situation by presenting themselves as “essential” facilitators.
Why it continues: Without a robust local defense industry, Malondesh depends on foreign deals, which middlemen dominate.
________________________________________
Short-Term Political Gains Over Long-Term Military Needs
• Defense deals are often politically timed (e.g., before elections) to show “progress” in military modernization.
• Politicians prioritize contracts that reward allies or fund political campaigns instead of long-term military requirements.
• Middlemen are crucial to channel funds quickly and quietly.
Why it continues: Political survival often outweighs genuine defense needs.
________________________________________
✅ Summary
Middlemen continue to exist in Malondeshn defense procurement because of:
1. Political patronage → Contracts reward allies.
2. Opaque, secretive procurement → No transparency.
3. Weak oversight → Parliament & auditors lack power.
4. Foreign supplier practices → They accept middlemen as part of the deal.
5. Legal disguise → Commissions hidden as consultancy or offsets.
6. Entrenched corruption culture → Seen as “normal.”
7. Weak local defense industry → Dependence on imports makes intermediaries seem necessary.
8. Political short-termism → Leaders use procurement for power, not military readiness
💰 MIDDLEMEN & COMMISSIONS IN MALONDESHN Armed Forces Procurement
Hapus1. What Are Middlemen in Defense Deals?
• In defense procurement, middlemen (sometimes called agents, consultants, or brokers) act as intermediaries between the Malondeshn government/military and foreign defense suppliers (e.g., shipbuilders, aircraft manufacturers, arms companies).
• In theory, they are supposed to:
o Facilitate negotiations.
o Provide local expertise.
o Smoothen bureaucracy.
• In practice, they often inflate costs, demand commissions, and channel kickbacks to political figures or officials.
________________________________________
2. How Middlemen Work in Malondeshn Defense Procurement
1. Foreign Supplier → Local Agent
o A foreign company selling jets, submarines, or ships is required (sometimes unofficially) to use a Malondeshn intermediary.
2. Mark-Up & Commission
o The agent adds commission fees (5–15% or more) on top of the real price.
o These inflated costs are hidden under “consultancy services” or “offset agreements.”
3. Kickbacks
o Part of the commission is allegedly funneled to politicians, senior officials, or linked companies to secure the contract.
4. Result
o Malondesh ends up paying far above market price for equipment.
o The military gets fewer assets for the same budget.
________________________________________
3. Examples of Middlemen in Malondeshn Defense Scandals
🟢 a. The Scorpène Submarine Deal (2002)
• Malondesh purchased two Scorpène-class submarines from French company DCNS (now Naval Group) worth about RM 4.3 billion (~USD 1 billion).
• A Malondeshn company, Perimekar Sdn Bhd, acted as the “support services provider.”
• Perimekar received RM 500 million (≈ USD 120 million) in “commissions.”
• French investigations later revealed this was effectively kickbacks disguised as consultancy fees, with allegations that money was funneled to Malondeshn political elites.
Impact: Malondesh got the submarines, but at a heavily inflated price — while international corruption investigations damaged Malondesh reputation.
________________________________________
🟢 b. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal (2011–present)
• The RM 9 billion contract to build 6 Gowind-class ships involved subcontracting and changes in design.
• Reports suggest multiple layers of subcontractors and consultants, many linked to politically connected firms.
• Payments were made for “consultancy” and “IT systems” that had little to do with shipbuilding.
• Some of these contracts were allegedly ways to siphon money out of the project.
Impact: Billions spent, zero ships delivered by 2025. The use of middlemen and subcontractors directly contributed to the collapse of the program.
________________________________________
🟢 c. Fighter Jet & Helicopter Purchases
• Past deals for MiG-29s (1990s), Su-30MKMs (2000s), and helicopters (2010s) also involved agents.
• Allegations:
o Overpricing of spare parts.
o Long-term maintenance contracts given to politically linked firms.
o Kickbacks hidden in “service fees.”
________________________________________
4. Why Middlemen Are a Problem in Malondesh
1. Inflated Costs
o Commissions can push prices 20–30% higher than international norms.
2. Reduced Military Capability
o With the same budget, Malondesh buys fewer ships, jets, or vehicles.
3. Encourages Corruption
o Middlemen often act as money channels for bribes.
4. Weak Accountability
o These commissions are often hidden in classified “national security” budgets, so Parliament and public auditors cannot fully track them.
5. Foreign Dependence
o Malondesh has limited domestic defense industry capacity, making it vulnerable to manipulation by foreign suppliers and local agents.
Parah MISKIN... SEWA SAJA GAGAL DIBAYAR... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusLegal Grey Zones in “Offsets” & “Consultancy Fees”
Hapus• Commissions to middlemen are often disguised as:
o Offset programs (e.g., promising technology transfer, training, local jobs).
o Consultancy fees for “facilitating” deals.
o Logistics or IT support contracts.
• These make it appear legitimate on paper, even if the services provided are minimal or irrelevant.
Why it continues: Because the practice can be masked under legal business terms, it becomes difficult to prove corruption.
________________________________________
Institutionalized Culture of Corruption
• In Malondesh, the role of middlemen has been entrenched since the 1980s–1990s when large defense contracts (MiG-29s, patrol boats, submarines) first involved commissions.
• Once established, it became a “standard practice” in defense procurement.
• Military officers are aware of it but cannot override political leaders who approve procurement.
Why it continues: Corruption in procurement has become part of the status quo — changing it would threaten entrenched interests.
________________________________________
Limited Domestic Defense Industry Capacity
• Malondesh does not have a strong indigenous defense industry compared to countries like Singapore.
• This weakness forces Malondesh to import most major weapons (jets, submarines, ships, tanks).
• Because imports are complex, middlemen exploit the situation by presenting themselves as “essential” facilitators.
Why it continues: Without a robust local defense industry, Malondesh depends on foreign deals, which middlemen dominate.
________________________________________
Short-Term Political Gains Over Long-Term Military Needs
• Defense deals are often politically timed (e.g., before elections) to show “progress” in military modernization.
• Politicians prioritize contracts that reward allies or fund political campaigns instead of long-term military requirements.
• Middlemen are crucial to channel funds quickly and quietly.
Why it continues: Political survival often outweighs genuine defense needs.
________________________________________
✅ Summary
Middlemen continue to exist in Malondeshn defense procurement because of:
1. Political patronage → Contracts reward allies.
2. Opaque, secretive procurement → No transparency.
3. Weak oversight → Parliament & auditors lack power.
4. Foreign supplier practices → They accept middlemen as part of the deal.
5. Legal disguise → Commissions hidden as consultancy or offsets.
6. Entrenched corruption culture → Seen as “normal.”
7. Weak local defense industry → Dependence on imports makes intermediaries seem necessary.
8. Political short-termism → Leaders use procurement for power, not military readiness
🔎 WHY MIDDLEMEN CONTINUE TO EXIST IN MALONDESH’S MILITARY PROCUREMENT
BalasHapusPolitical Patronage & Cronyism
• Many defense-linked companies in Malondesh are controlled by politically connected individuals or government-linked corporations (GLCs).
• Acting as a “middleman” for a defense deal is not just business — it’s a reward system for political loyalty.
• Example: In the Scorpène submarine scandal, Perimekar Sdn Bhd (the middleman company) was owned by individuals linked to political elites.
Why it continues: Political elites benefit financially and maintain power by distributing contracts to allies.
________________________________________
Opaque Procurement Process (Lack of Transparency)
• Defense contracts in Malondesh are often classified as “national security matters”, meaning details are hidden from Parliament, auditors, and the public.
• Procurement is frequently done through direct negotiations instead of competitive open tenders.
• This secrecy makes it easy to insert middlemen under the label of “consultants,” “logistics providers,” or “offset partners.”
Why it continues: The secrecy shields middlemen from scrutiny, allowing commissions and inflated costs to persist.
________________________________________
Weak Oversight & Accountability
• Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and the Auditor-General can only partially review defense contracts due to security classifications.
• Military officers often have little power to question political decisions — final procurement authority lies with the Ministry of Defence and Cabinet, where politics dominates.
• Anti-corruption bodies (like MACC) rarely investigate defense procurement deeply because cases are complex, sensitive, and involve powerful figures.
Why it continues: Oversight bodies lack the legal and political power to stop or expose middleman practices.
________________________________________
Foreign Supplier Requirements
• Many foreign defense companies prefer or are required to use local partners when selling to Malondesh.
• The justification:
o To handle local bureaucracy.
o To provide after-sales service.
o To manage offsets (technology transfer, training).
• In practice, these “local partners” often act as middlemen who extract commissions rather than provide real technical services.
Why it continues: The system is normalized — foreign suppliers accept it as “the cost of doing business in Malondesh.”
💰 MIDDLEMEN & COMMISSIONS IN MALONDESHN Armed Forces Procurement
BalasHapus1. What Are Middlemen in Defense Deals?
• In defense procurement, middlemen (sometimes called agents, consultants, or brokers) act as intermediaries between the Malondeshn government/military and foreign defense suppliers (e.g., shipbuilders, aircraft manufacturers, arms companies).
• In theory, they are supposed to:
o Facilitate negotiations.
o Provide local expertise.
o Smoothen bureaucracy.
• In practice, they often inflate costs, demand commissions, and channel kickbacks to political figures or officials.
________________________________________
2. How Middlemen Work in Malondeshn Defense Procurement
1. Foreign Supplier → Local Agent
o A foreign company selling jets, submarines, or ships is required (sometimes unofficially) to use a Malondeshn intermediary.
2. Mark-Up & Commission
o The agent adds commission fees (5–15% or more) on top of the real price.
o These inflated costs are hidden under “consultancy services” or “offset agreements.”
3. Kickbacks
o Part of the commission is allegedly funneled to politicians, senior officials, or linked companies to secure the contract.
4. Result
o Malondesh ends up paying far above market price for equipment.
o The military gets fewer assets for the same budget.
________________________________________
3. Examples of Middlemen in Malondeshn Defense Scandals
🟢 a. The Scorpène Submarine Deal (2002)
• Malondesh purchased two Scorpène-class submarines from French company DCNS (now Naval Group) worth about RM 4.3 billion (~USD 1 billion).
• A Malondeshn company, Perimekar Sdn Bhd, acted as the “support services provider.”
• Perimekar received RM 500 million (≈ USD 120 million) in “commissions.”
• French investigations later revealed this was effectively kickbacks disguised as consultancy fees, with allegations that money was funneled to Malondeshn political elites.
Impact: Malondesh got the submarines, but at a heavily inflated price — while international corruption investigations damaged Malondesh reputation.
________________________________________
🟢 b. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal (2011–present)
• The RM 9 billion contract to build 6 Gowind-class ships involved subcontracting and changes in design.
• Reports suggest multiple layers of subcontractors and consultants, many linked to politically connected firms.
• Payments were made for “consultancy” and “IT systems” that had little to do with shipbuilding.
• Some of these contracts were allegedly ways to siphon money out of the project.
Impact: Billions spent, zero ships delivered by 2025. The use of middlemen and subcontractors directly contributed to the collapse of the program.
________________________________________
🟢 c. Fighter Jet & Helicopter Purchases
• Past deals for MiG-29s (1990s), Su-30MKMs (2000s), and helicopters (2010s) also involved agents.
• Allegations:
o Overpricing of spare parts.
o Long-term maintenance contracts given to politically linked firms.
o Kickbacks hidden in “service fees.”
________________________________________
4. Why Middlemen Are a Problem in Malondesh
1. Inflated Costs
o Commissions can push prices 20–30% higher than international norms.
2. Reduced Military Capability
o With the same budget, Malondesh buys fewer ships, jets, or vehicles.
3. Encourages Corruption
o Middlemen often act as money channels for bribes.
4. Weak Accountability
o These commissions are often hidden in classified “national security” budgets, so Parliament and public auditors cannot fully track them.
5. Foreign Dependence
o Malondesh has limited domestic defense industry capacity, making it vulnerable to manipulation by foreign suppliers and local agents.