The sea parade force formed V, A and diamond shapes on the sea (photo: HCHQ)
Naval forces parade at sea (photo: HCHQ)
Naval forces parade at sea (photo: Toa Lo Doc Lap)
Naval forces parade at sea (photo: Toa Lo Doc Lap)
Naval forces parade at sea (photo: Toa Lo Doc Lap)
The 1241.8 fast attack missile boat (photo: QCHQ)
The 1241RE missile boat (photo: Soha)
Vietnam Navy parades at sea to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the August Revolution and National Day September 2
In the solemn and proud atmosphere of the 80th anniversary of the successful August Revolution and the National Day of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, this morning (September 2), in the sea of Cam Ranh (Khanh Hoa province), the Navy presided over the parade of armed forces at sea.
This morning (September 2), joining the atmosphere of the Parade and March in Hanoi, in Cam Ranh sea area (Khanh Hoa province), the Parade at sea with the participation of the Vietnam People's Navy, Vietnam Coast Guard, Border Guard, Standing Militia Fleet and many modern vehicles and equipment.
From the first wooden canoes, the armed forces at sea have grown stronger and advanced to modernity. The squadrons of aircraft, warships, submarines, and state-of-the-art patrol boats are capable of long-term combat in all weather conditions, equipped with missiles, torpedoes, high-tech weapons, with strong destructive power, long range, multi-target attack, effectively destroying targets on land, in the air, at sea and underground targets. This is the core force, a solid steel shield at the forefront, protecting the sacred sovereignty of the sea and islands of the Fatherland.
The commanding officer of the sea parade forces was the Command Ship 015 - Tran Hung Dao, commanded by Rear Admiral Nguyen Van Bach, Deputy Commander - Chief of Staff of the Navy; also attending were Major General Tran Ngoc Huu, Deputy Commander of the Border Guard, Head of the Vietnam Coast Guard Command and representatives of the participating forces.
Naval forces parade at sea (photo: Toa Lo Doc Lap)
At the same time as the flag-raising ceremony at Ba Dinh Square, the fleets of ships and aircraft participating in the parade held a flag-raising ceremony at sea.
The image of the red flag flying at sea is an indomitable symbol of national will and pride, affirming the responsibility to inherit and promote the heroic traditions of previous generations. (NhanDan)
Kilo 636 submarine squadron participates in sea parade (photo: QCHQ)
First Parade at Sea: Submarines and missile frigates appear majestically
This is the first time Vietnam has organized a parade of armed forces at sea.
The Gepard 3.9 missile frigate of the Vietnam People's Navy (photo: QCHQ)
The sea parade took place at Cam Ranh military base (Khanh Hoa) and was broadcast live on the main screen at Ba Dinh Square (Hanoi).
Project 159 anti-submarine frigate (photo: QCHQ)
The parade at sea featured the Kilo 636 submarine, missile frigates, missile boats, anti-submarine frigates, various types of coast guard, fisheries surveillance, military medical, border guard, maritime militia and helicopters.
The ships lined up to salute the flag and review the parade formation at sea in A, V, and diamond formations.
The Navy said that from the first armed canoes in its establishment, the armed forces at sea now have many modern and diverse aircraft and ships, such as seaplanes, maritime patrol aircraft, anti-submarine helicopters, Kilo 630 submarines, missile frigates, fast attack missile boats, gunboats, torpedo boats, patrol boats, submarine hunters, minesweepers, multi-purpose patrol boats, multi-purpose rescue boats, multi-purpose transport ships, etc.
The TT-400TP Artillery Ship (photo: VietDefense)
All affirm that we have the ability to fight effectively, contributing to firmly protecting the sovereignty of the sea and islands of the Fatherland in the new period. (TuoiTre)
📌 1. What Are Policy Flip-Flops?
BalasHapusPolicy flip-flops in Malondesh defense mean:
• Frequent changes in plans, programs, and procurement priorities.
• Caused by government changes, minister reshuffles, or shifting political agendas.
• Leads to cancellations, re-tendering, or redesigning programs.
• Results in years of delays, wasted funds, and capability gaps.
________________________________________
📌 2. Drivers of Policy Flip-Flops
a. Frequent Political Changes
• Since 2018: Malondesh had 5 prime ministers in 7 years (Najib → Mahathir → Muhyiddin → Ismail Sabri → Anwar).
• Each PM/defense minister reviews and changes defense priorities.
• Example: The same program (fighter jets, navy ships) can be launched, paused, revived, or cancelled multiple times.
________________________________________
b. Short-Term Focus
• Politicians prioritize 5-year election cycles over 15–20 year defense modernization.
• Programs requiring long-term funding commitments (e.g., fighter jets, submarines, frigates) get disrupted.
________________________________________
c. Budget Pressures
• High national debt (69% of GDP in 2025).
• Defense is seen as “non-essential”, so big-ticket programs are often the first to be cut or postponed.
• Leads to repeated “defer until later” cycles.
________________________________________
d. Corruption & Scandals
• When scandals erupt (e.g., LCS RM9 billion scandal), programs face:
o Audits, suspensions, parliamentary probes.
o Restructuring or even outright cancellation.
• Creates uncertainty for ongoing and future procurement.
________________________________________
📌 3. Examples of Policy Flip-Flops
✈️ Fighter Jet Replacement (MRCA Program)
• 2007–2010: Plan to replace MiG-29 with new fighters.
• Candidates: Rafale, Typhoon, Gripen, Super Hornet, Su-35.
• 2015: Najib government delayed due to budget.
• 2018: Mahathir cancelled, shifted to cheaper LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).
• 2022: RMAF selected Korean FA-50 → but deliveries only from 2026.
⏳ Result: 20 years later, still no MRCA. MiG-29 retired with no replacement.
________________________________________
🚢 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program
• 2011: Najib government approved 6 ships (RM9 billion).
• 2018: PH government halted payments due to mismanagement.
• 2020: PN government restarted program with restructuring.
• 2023–2025: Still no ship delivered.
⏳ Result: Program flip-flopped between “go-ahead” and “pause”, now 14 years with 0 ships.
________________________________________
🚁 Helicopter Procurement
• Malaysia planned medium-lift helicopter replacements (Nuri).
• 2017: Nuri retired suddenly → capability gap.
• 2019: Mahathir’s government cancelled immediate purchase, shifted to leasing option.
• 2022: Army announced leasing 4 Black Hawks → contract collapsed due to disputes.
⏳ Result: Years without adequate helicopters.
________________________________________
🪖 Army Armored Vehicles
• 1980s Condor APCs still in use.
• AV-8 Gempita ordered (2011) → only 257 built, production ended.
• Plan for new wheeled APC → repeatedly delayed.
⏳ Result: Army still operates outdated vehicles because replacement kept shifting.
________________________________________
📌 4. Consequences of Policy Flip-Flops
1. Capability Gaps
o Air Force without MRCA fighters.
o Navy without new frigates.
o Army using outdated artillery and APCs.
2. Wasted Money
o Billions spent on projects that stall or fail (e.g., LCS, helicopter leasing).
3. Industry Instability
o Local companies cannot plan or invest because contracts keep shifting.
o Leads to failures like Boustead Naval Shipyard.
4. Loss of Credibility
o Foreign suppliers lose trust in Malondesh.
o Military loses confidence that promised equipment will ever arrive.
😝😝😝😝😝😝😝😝😝
Ngebul gitu yaa...
BalasHapusThe 1241RE missile boat
BalasHapus-----
Gentongnye gde amir haha!🤭😄🤭
Rudal P-20, diameter 2 kali Exocet, tapi panjang sedikit lebih pendek.
Hapussi tambun kilo emang ganteng bingit ...
BalasHapusandai gak ada caatsa, kilo kita gak perluw ngumpet di brunei yak haha!🤫😉🤫
Pssssttt...udah jangan buka rahasia lagi oom...
HapusIntinya percaya aja apa yang ada di kalender
Kih..kih..kih
tinggal lengkapin lpd, tanker & destro cakep dahh paradenya haha!👍🥳👍
BalasHapusNomor lambung tanker mereka mirip sama punya kita. Paling ukuran yg beda, tanker mereka panjang 53m.
HapusNGAMUK🔥 LAGI donk nyet haha!😋😁😋
BalasHapusGaspol jitenci nich haha!😉😉😉
RI 1 lg di sono, jadi nich jiten di dp in haha!🤑🥳🤑
senang lagiiiiii kita, bahagia
seblah Kalah Lagiiiii...jauuuhhh haha!🤣🤣🤣
⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️
https://www.intelligenceonline.com/country/indonesia
Khas orang kaya..oom
HapusSuka > beli, ga pake lama
Kebanyakan drama > Skip!
Ahahahahaaiiiyy...😁😃🤟
J10C Come to papa
BalasHapusLebih tertarik sama Pr. 159 yg ditunjukan, yaitu HQ-09 dan HQ-17. Bawa torpedo 533mm. Sedikit lebih banyak dari FPB57 NAV II kita.
BalasHapusSemakin hampirrr...
BalasHapus======
Presiden Indonesia, Prabowo Subianto, akan menghadiri parade militer besar di Beijing pada 3 September, dengan membawa hadiah yang sangat berharga: dimulainya kembali kontrak pembelian jet tempur Tiongkok. Pengiriman pesawat J-10 pertama buatan Tiongkok kini dijadwalkan pada tahun 2026. Beberapa sumber yang dekat dengan Angkatan Udara Indonesia telah mengonfirmasi hal ini kepada Intelligence Online.
Kontrak tersebut mencakup 42 pesawat, yang dibuat oleh Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group (CAIG). Pilot dari Tentara Pembebasan Rakyat (PLA) akan melatih pilot Indonesia, sebagaimana dikonfirmasi oleh Menteri Pertahanan Indonesia, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, pada awal Juni. Pesawat-pesawat ini nantinya akan terbang bersama 42 pesawat Rafale Prancis pertama yang dibeli Indonesia pada tahun 2022.
PT PAL.....pinoy sudah tanya tu mana kapal mereka bila mau siap....HAHAHHAHA
BalasHapus1. Economic Pressures
HapusDeclining oil revenues: Malaysia’s traditional income from oil has shrunk, reducing government revenue.
Depreciation of the ringgit: A weaker currency increases the cost of importing military equipment, especially from Western and Korean suppliers.
Competing national priorities: Funds are diverted to healthcare, education, and subsidies, limiting defense allocations.
2. Budget Allocation Breakdown (2024)
Category Amount (RM) % of Total Budget
Total Defense Budget RM19.73 billion 100%
Salaries & Allowances RM8.2 billion ~41%
Procurement RM5.71 billion ~29%
Operations & Logistics RM5.82 billion ~30%
Over 40% of the budget goes to personnel costs, leaving limited room for modernization.
3. Procurement Challenges
Most procurement funds are tied to progressive payments for existing contracts (e.g. FA-50 jets, A400M upgrades).
New acquisitions are often delayed or scaled down due to lack of multi-year funding commitments.
Domestic defense industry is dependent on foreign OEMs, limiting cost control and self-reliance.
4. Political Reluctance
Successive governments have avoided cutting other sectors to boost defense spending.
No major reforms to reduce manpower or restructure the armed forces for efficiency.
Defense budgeting lacks long-term strategic planning, making modernization reactive rather than proactive.
5. Operational Cost Burden
Malaysia’s military assets (e.g. Su-30MKM, Scorpène submarines) are expensive to maintain.
Fuel, spares, housing, and logistics consume a large portion of the budget, limiting capital investment.
📌 1. Budget Size in Absolute Terms
Hapus• Malondesh’s defense budget (2024–2025 estimates) is roughly RM15–18 billion/year (~USD 3.5–4.0 billion).
• For a country with ~32 million people and a sizeable military, this is relatively small, especially for modernization programs.
• Comparison with regional neighbors:
Country Budget (approx.) % of GDP
Malondesh RM15–18B (~$4B) ~1%
Singapore RM70B (~$16B) ~3%
Indonesia RM60B (~$13B) ~0.8%
Thailand RM35–40B (~$8–9B) ~1.2%
Vietnam RM40–45B (~$9B) ~2%
👉 Malondesh spends far less in absolute terms than Singapore or Indonesia, and even its GDP percentage is low.
________________________________________
📌 2. Causes of Small Budget
a. Limited Fiscal Space
• Malondesh has high public debt (~69% of GDP) and large annual deficits.
• Revenue collection is constrained due to:
o GST abolished 2018 → RM15–20B revenue lost per year
o Heavy dependence on volatile oil & gas revenues
• Consequently, the government must prioritize social programs, subsidies, and civil service salaries over defense.
b. Perceived Low Threat
• Malondesh sees itself as geographically secure, facing no direct high-intensity threat.
• Politically, it’s easier to allocate more funds to welfare than to defense.
c. Political Short-Termism
• Defense modernization takes decades to complete, but politicians prefer quick-return spending (cash aid, subsidies, infrastructure projects).
________________________________________
📌 3. Effects of Small Budget
a. Limited Procurement
• Malondesh cannot purchase enough modern platforms:
o Fighter jets, frigates, submarines, armored vehicles
• Leads to piecemeal acquisition rather than coherent modernization.
b. Maintenance & Spare Parts Shortages
• Small O&M allocation → aircraft, ships, and vehicles are grounded.
• Examples:
o Only ~4 of 18 Su-30MKMs airworthy at one point
o Navy relies on 1980s corvettes due to LCS delays
c. Low Training Hours
• Pilots and soldiers get fewer flight hours, exercises, and field deployments.
• Readiness and operational effectiveness decline.
d. Personnel vs Capability Imbalance
• Large manpower (110,000 active personnel) consumes 60% of the budget, leaving little for equipment.
• Malondesh ends up with many troops but outdated weapons
📌 1. Budget Size in Absolute Terms
Hapus• Malondesh’s defense budget (2024–2025 estimates) is roughly RM15–18 billion/year (~USD 3.5–4.0 billion).
• For a country with ~32 million people and a sizeable military, this is relatively small, especially for modernization programs.
• Comparison with regional neighbors:
Country Budget (approx.) % of GDP
Malondesh RM15–18B (~$4B) ~1%
Singapore RM70B (~$16B) ~3%
Indonesia RM60B (~$13B) ~0.8%
Thailand RM35–40B (~$8–9B) ~1.2%
Vietnam RM40–45B (~$9B) ~2%
👉 Malondesh spends far less in absolute terms than Singapore or Indonesia, and even its GDP percentage is low.
________________________________________
📌 2. Causes of Small Budget
a. Limited Fiscal Space
• Malondesh has high public debt (~69% of GDP) and large annual deficits.
• Revenue collection is constrained due to:
o GST abolished 2018 → RM15–20B revenue lost per year
o Heavy dependence on volatile oil & gas revenues
• Consequently, the government must prioritize social programs, subsidies, and civil service salaries over defense.
b. Perceived Low Threat
• Malondesh sees itself as geographically secure, facing no direct high-intensity threat.
• Politically, it’s easier to allocate more funds to welfare than to defense.
c. Political Short-Termism
• Defense modernization takes decades to complete, but politicians prefer quick-return spending (cash aid, subsidies, infrastructure projects).
________________________________________
📌 3. Effects of Small Budget
a. Limited Procurement
• Malondesh cannot purchase enough modern platforms:
o Fighter jets, frigates, submarines, armored vehicles
• Leads to piecemeal acquisition rather than coherent modernization.
b. Maintenance & Spare Parts Shortages
• Small O&M allocation → aircraft, ships, and vehicles are grounded.
• Examples:
o Only ~4 of 18 Su-30MKMs airworthy at one point
o Navy relies on 1980s corvettes due to LCS delays
c. Low Training Hours
• Pilots and soldiers get fewer flight hours, exercises, and field deployments.
• Readiness and operational effectiveness decline.
d. Personnel vs Capability Imbalance
• Large manpower (110,000 active personnel) consumes 60% of the budget, leaving little for equipment.
• Malondesh ends up with many troops but outdated weapons
📌 1. How the Budget Is Divided
Hapus• Annual defense budget: around RM15–18 billion.
• Distribution (typical year, Ministry of Defence reports):
o ~60% → Emoluments (salaries, allowances, pensions)
o ~20–25% → Operations & Maintenance (O&M: fuel, spare parts, training, exercises, repairs)
o ~15–20% → Development/Procurement (buying new weapons, infrastructure, modernization)
👉 This means more than half of the budget goes to people, not equipment.
________________________________________
📌 2. Why Salaries Are So High
a. Large Manpower Size
• Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF) = ~110,000 active personnel + ~50,000 reserves.
• This is relatively large compared to Malondesh’s small defense budget.
• Each soldier = salary, housing, medical, training, allowances → recurring cost every year.
b. Generous Benefits & Pensions
• Retired servicemen receive lifetime pensions (sometimes including dependents).
• Number of veterans keeps growing, making pensions a ballooning burden.
• In some years, pension spending alone is bigger than equipment spending.
c. Civil Service Culture
• Malondesh’s military is part of the broader civil service system, where public employment is politically protected.
• Downsizing the armed forces would mean laying off civil servants — politically sensitive.
________________________________________
📌 3. Consequences of Salary-Heavy Budget
a. Starves Modernization
• With only ~15–20% left for development, Malondesh cannot sustain large procurement programs.
• Example:
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program (RM9 billion) → consumed nearly a decade’s worth of procurement funds.
o Other projects (fighter replacement, new helicopters) keep getting postponed.
b. Weak Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
• Only ~20–25% for O&M means:
o Not enough spare parts for aircraft/ships.
o Limited flight hours for pilots.
o Fewer naval patrol days.
👉 Readiness suffers: equipment exists “on paper” but cannot be deployed.
c. Personnel vs Capability Imbalance
• Malondesh has a lot of soldiers but little firepower.
• Example:
o Army manpower is large, but many still ride 1980s Condor APCs.
o Air Force has trained pilots, but only a fraction of jets are flyable.
o Navy crews are available, but ships are too old or stuck in dock.
kesian....ada apa dengan INDIANESIA sekarang...warga MALAYSIA sedekah makanan ke warga INDIANESIA yang makin hidup susah kerana DEMO makin merebak.
BalasHapus📌 1. Limited Procurement & Modernization
Hapus• Malondesh’s annual defense budget (~RM15–18 billion, 1% of GDP) is insufficient for large-scale procurement.
• Effects:
o Fighter jets: MRCA replacement program delayed; RMAF still uses aging F/A-18D Hornets, Hawks, and Su-30MKMs with limited operational readiness.
o Navy: LCS project stalled for over a decade; old corvettes and patrol ships remain in service.
o Army: Many vehicles like Condor APCs and older artillery pieces are still in use because modernization is unaffordable.
• Result: Malondesh acquires equipment piecemeal instead of building a balanced, modern force.
________________________________________
📌 2. Underfunded Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
• Only ~20–25% of the budget is allocated to fuel, spare parts, repairs, training.
• Effects:
o Many aircraft and ships are grounded due to maintenance backlogs.
o Pilots and crews get fewer training hours, reducing readiness.
o Aging vehicles and ships wear out faster, accelerating obsolescence.
• Examples:
o Only ~4 of 18 Su-30MKMs were airworthy at one point.
o Navy relies on ships built in the 1980s due to delays in LCS delivery.
________________________________________
📌 3. Personnel vs Capability Imbalance
• ~60% of the budget goes to salaries and pensions.
• Consequences:
o Large manpower (110,000 active personnel) cannot be properly equipped.
o Military is “people-heavy but equipment-light,” limiting operational effectiveness.
• Soldiers are well-paid but often lack modern tools or transport, reducing combat effectiveness.
________________________________________
📌 4. Reduced Readiness
• Small budget and underfunding of O&M → low operational readiness:
o Aircraft, ships, and armored vehicles often not deployable.
o Training exercises are limited due to fuel and maintenance costs.
• Malondesh cannot sustain continuous deterrence or regional presence, unlike Singapore or Indonesia.
________________________________________
📌 5. Vulnerability to Regional Gap
• Neighbors (Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia) have invested more in modernization and readiness.
• Malondesh’s small budget → capability gap grows:
o Navy: fewer modern frigates and submarines.
o Air Force: fewer operational jets and limited air defense.
o Army: older vehicles, limited mobility.
________________________________________
📌 6. Delayed or Cancelled Programs
• Many projects are postponed indefinitely due to funding constraints:
o MRCA (fighter replacement)
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
o Armored vehicle upgrades and artillery modernization
• Stop-go procurement leads to wasted funds, inefficiency, and obsolescence.
📌 1. Malondesh Defence White Paper (DWP) 2019
Hapusa. Objective
• The DWP 2019 was intended as Malondesh’s first long-term defense roadmap.
• Goals:
o Identify threats and security priorities (maritime security, terrorism, cyber, regional tensions).
o Outline modernization plans for Navy, Air Force, and Army through 2030.
o Provide guidance for procurement, O&M, and capability building.
b. Proposed Approach
• 10-year horizon (2021–2030) for modernization.
• Emphasis on:
o Upgrading aging ships, aircraft, and armored vehicles.
o Strengthening maritime and air defense.
o Developing cyber, UAV, and special operations capabilities.
c. Failure Reasons
1. Political Collapse
o Pakatan Harapan government fell in 2020.
o DWP implementation depended on continuity of political support, which disappeared.
2. No Legal/Institutional Backing
o Unlike Singapore or Indonesia, Malondesh has no law forcing successive governments to follow the plan.
3. Short-Term Budgeting
o Malondesh still allocates budgets year-by-year, leaving little certainty for multi-year projects.
4. Budget Constraints
o Small overall defense budget (~1% of GDP) → most plans remained aspirational.
5. Result
o Modernization projects delayed or cancelled.
o Navy still waits for LCS ships, Air Force stuck with aging jets, Army using 1980s APCs.
👉 DWP became a paper plan with little real impact.
________________________________________
📌 2. Indonesia Minimum Essential Force (MEF)
a. Objective
• MEF (Minimum Essential Force) is Indonesia’s long-term military modernization plan, started in 2004.
• Goals:
o Achieve a minimum level of capability to defend the country.
o Develop integrated capabilities across Army, Navy, Air Force.
o Plan modernization in phases over decades.
b. Implementation Approach
• Multi-phase program:
o MEF I (2004–2009): Procurement of basic platforms, focus on territorial defense.
o MEF II (2010–2014): Expand fleet, improve air defense.
o MEF III (2015–2024): Focus on advanced assets (fighters, submarines, naval combatants).
• Legally recognized: MEF has multi-year funding plans, independent of short-term political changes.
• Result:
o Indonesian Navy expanded with new frigates, corvettes, submarines.
o Air Force replaced aging fighters and increased UAV capabilities.
o Army received modern APCs, artillery, and transport vehicles.
📌 1. Budget Size in Absolute Terms
Hapus• Malondesh’s defense budget (2024–2025 estimates) is roughly RM15–18 billion/year (~USD 3.5–4.0 billion).
• For a country with ~32 million people and a sizeable military, this is relatively small, especially for modernization programs.
• Comparison with regional neighbors:
Country Budget (approx.) % of GDP
Malondesh RM15–18B (~$4B) ~1%
Singapore RM70B (~$16B) ~3%
Indonesia RM60B (~$13B) ~0.8%
Thailand RM35–40B (~$8–9B) ~1.2%
Vietnam RM40–45B (~$9B) ~2%
👉 Malondesh spends far less in absolute terms than Singapore or Indonesia, and even its GDP percentage is low.
________________________________________
📌 2. Causes of Small Budget
a. Limited Fiscal Space
• Malondesh has high public debt (~69% of GDP) and large annual deficits.
• Revenue collection is constrained due to:
o GST abolished 2018 → RM15–20B revenue lost per year
o Heavy dependence on volatile oil & gas revenues
• Consequently, the government must prioritize social programs, subsidies, and civil service salaries over defense.
b. Perceived Low Threat
• Malondesh sees itself as geographically secure, facing no direct high-intensity threat.
• Politically, it’s easier to allocate more funds to welfare than to defense.
c. Political Short-Termism
• Defense modernization takes decades to complete, but politicians prefer quick-return spending (cash aid, subsidies, infrastructure projects).
________________________________________
📌 3. Effects of Small Budget
a. Limited Procurement
• Malondesh cannot purchase enough modern platforms:
o Fighter jets, frigates, submarines, armored vehicles
• Leads to piecemeal acquisition rather than coherent modernization.
b. Maintenance & Spare Parts Shortages
• Small O&M allocation → aircraft, ships, and vehicles are grounded.
• Examples:
o Only ~4 of 18 Su-30MKMs airworthy at one point
o Navy relies on 1980s corvettes due to LCS delays
c. Low Training Hours
• Pilots and soldiers get fewer flight hours, exercises, and field deployments.
• Readiness and operational effectiveness decline.
d. Personnel vs Capability Imbalance
• Large manpower (110,000 active personnel) consumes 60% of the budget, leaving little for equipment.
• Malondesh ends up with many troops but outdated weapons
Ada malaydesh sakit hati...tuu
BalasHapusKih..kih..kih..😛🤪🇧🇩👎
Malay berminat beli Hornet bertenaga Nuklir Om...Kata Si Gempur....
HapusLUNAS.....Raja Malaydesh sudah tanya tu mana kapal KD Meherejelele bila mau siap....HAHAHHAHA
BalasHapus🤣🤣😂😁😃🤪😛🇧🇩👎
📌 1. Limited Procurement & Modernization
BalasHapus• Malondesh’s annual defense budget (~RM15–18 billion, 1% of GDP) is insufficient for large-scale procurement.
• Effects:
o Fighter jets: MRCA replacement program delayed; RMAF still uses aging F/A-18D Hornets, Hawks, and Su-30MKMs with limited operational readiness.
o Navy: LCS project stalled for over a decade; old corvettes and patrol ships remain in service.
o Army: Many vehicles like Condor APCs and older artillery pieces are still in use because modernization is unaffordable.
• Result: Malondesh acquires equipment piecemeal instead of building a balanced, modern force.
________________________________________
📌 2. Underfunded Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
• Only ~20–25% of the budget is allocated to fuel, spare parts, repairs, training.
• Effects:
o Many aircraft and ships are grounded due to maintenance backlogs.
o Pilots and crews get fewer training hours, reducing readiness.
o Aging vehicles and ships wear out faster, accelerating obsolescence.
• Examples:
o Only ~4 of 18 Su-30MKMs were airworthy at one point.
o Navy relies on ships built in the 1980s due to delays in LCS delivery.
________________________________________
📌 3. Personnel vs Capability Imbalance
• ~60% of the budget goes to salaries and pensions.
• Consequences:
o Large manpower (110,000 active personnel) cannot be properly equipped.
o Military is “people-heavy but equipment-light,” limiting operational effectiveness.
• Soldiers are well-paid but often lack modern tools or transport, reducing combat effectiveness.
________________________________________
📌 4. Reduced Readiness
• Small budget and underfunding of O&M → low operational readiness:
o Aircraft, ships, and armored vehicles often not deployable.
o Training exercises are limited due to fuel and maintenance costs.
• Malondesh cannot sustain continuous deterrence or regional presence, unlike Singapore or Indonesia.
________________________________________
📌 5. Vulnerability to Regional Gap
• Neighbors (Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia) have invested more in modernization and readiness.
• Malondesh’s small budget → capability gap grows:
o Navy: fewer modern frigates and submarines.
o Air Force: fewer operational jets and limited air defense.
o Army: older vehicles, limited mobility.
________________________________________
📌 6. Delayed or Cancelled Programs
• Many projects are postponed indefinitely due to funding constraints:
o MRCA (fighter replacement)
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
o Armored vehicle upgrades and artillery modernization
• Stop-go procurement leads to wasted funds, inefficiency, and obsolescence.
Parah INDIANESIA.....HAHAAHHA
BalasHapusEkonom Prediksi Kerugian Ekonomi Akibat Demo Sentuh Rp9 Triliun
https://www.bola.net/news/ekonom-prediksi-kerugian-ekonomi-akibat-demo-sentuh-rp9-triliun-4a9f74.html
1. Overdependence on Foreign OEMs
Hapus• Malondesh relies heavily on international suppliers for critical components, systems, and platforms.
• This includes aircraft avionics, naval combat systems, and armored vehicle parts.
• Any delay or disruption from these OEMs—due to geopolitical tensions, export controls, or production backlogs—directly stalls Malondeshn projects.
2. Limited Local Manufacturing Capability
• Domestic defense firms mostly handle maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO), not full-scale production.
• Indigenous capabilities are focused on small arms, logistics vehicles, and basic electronics—not advanced systems like radar, missiles, or propulsion.
• This creates a dependency loop, where even minor upgrades require foreign input.
3. Fragmented Supply Chain Ecosystem
• Malondesh defense supply chain lacks integration and coordination between stakeholders.
• Poor visibility across upstream (OEMs) and downstream (end users) leads to inefficiencies.
• Absence of a centralized strategic procurement framework weakens resilience during crises or delays.
4. Custom Design & Integration Challenges
• Malondesh often requests custom configurations (e.g., in the LCS project), which complicates integration of foreign systems.
• OEMs must redesign or adapt components, leading to technical mismatches and longer lead times.
5. Lack of Economies of Scale
• Malondesh relatively small order volumes make it less attractive to global OEMs.
• This results in higher unit costs, longer delivery timelines, and lower priority in production queues.
6. Policy & Bureaucratic Delays
• Procurement processes are slow and opaque, with frequent changes in specifications and leadership.
• Delays in contract approvals, payment schedules, and regulatory compliance further disrupt supply timelines.
🔧 Example: LCS Project Impact
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program suffered from delayed component deliveries, incompatible systems, and OEM withdrawal, all linked to poor supply chain coordination2.
• Result: RM6 billion spent, zero ships delivered as of 2025.
1. Overdependence on Foreign OEMs
Hapus• Malondesh relies heavily on international suppliers for critical components, systems, and platforms.
• This includes aircraft avionics, naval combat systems, and armored vehicle parts.
• Any delay or disruption from these OEMs—due to geopolitical tensions, export controls, or production backlogs—directly stalls Malondeshn projects.
2. Limited Local Manufacturing Capability
• Domestic defense firms mostly handle maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO), not full-scale production.
• Indigenous capabilities are focused on small arms, logistics vehicles, and basic electronics—not advanced systems like radar, missiles, or propulsion.
• This creates a dependency loop, where even minor upgrades require foreign input.
3. Fragmented Supply Chain Ecosystem
• Malondesh defense supply chain lacks integration and coordination between stakeholders.
• Poor visibility across upstream (OEMs) and downstream (end users) leads to inefficiencies.
• Absence of a centralized strategic procurement framework weakens resilience during crises or delays.
4. Custom Design & Integration Challenges
• Malondesh often requests custom configurations (e.g., in the LCS project), which complicates integration of foreign systems.
• OEMs must redesign or adapt components, leading to technical mismatches and longer lead times.
5. Lack of Economies of Scale
• Malondesh relatively small order volumes make it less attractive to global OEMs.
• This results in higher unit costs, longer delivery timelines, and lower priority in production queues.
6. Policy & Bureaucratic Delays
• Procurement processes are slow and opaque, with frequent changes in specifications and leadership.
• Delays in contract approvals, payment schedules, and regulatory compliance further disrupt supply timelines.
🔧 Example: LCS Project Impact
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program suffered from delayed component deliveries, incompatible systems, and OEM withdrawal, all linked to poor supply chain coordination2.
• Result: RM6 billion spent, zero ships delivered as of 2025.
1. Limited Defense Budget Allocation
HapusMalondesh historically allocates a relatively modest portion of its national budget to defense. While exact figures vary yearly, defense spending generally hovers around 1.2%–1.5% of GDP, which is lower than many neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. This limited allocation constrains the military’s ability to fund:
• Procurement of advanced weapons systems
• Research and development (R&D)
• Infrastructure maintenance and upgrades
• Personnel training and welfare
________________________________________
2. High Operational Costs vs. Budget
Even with a modest defense budget, a significant portion goes toward salaries, pensions, and day-to-day operations, leaving limited funds for modernization programs. For instance:
• Military personnel costs (salaries, benefits, retirement pay) consume a large share of the budget.
• Routine operational expenses such as fuel, maintenance, and logistics reduce available funds for new equipment.
This means that Malondesh often faces trade-offs between maintaining existing forces and acquiring new capabilities.
________________________________________
3. Competition with Domestic Priorities
Malondesh faces multiple domestic financial priorities, including:
• Education and healthcare
• Infrastructure development
• Social welfare programs
These competing priorities make it politically and economically difficult to significantly increase defense spending, even when modernization is needed.
________________________________________
4. Dependency on Foreign Technology
Malondesh relies heavily on foreign suppliers for advanced military hardware, which is expensive. Limited financial resources make it challenging to:
• Procure large quantities of modern equipment
• Maintain sophisticated systems
• Engage in long-term defense research or develop indigenous capabilities
As a result, Malondesh often acquires second-hand equipment or delays procurement programs.
________________________________________
5. Impact on Modernization and Strategic Readiness
The financial constraints directly influence Malondesh’s military readiness:
• Aging Equipment: Existing platforms (ships, aircraft, and vehicles) are kept operational beyond their intended lifespan due to budget constraints.
• Delayed Modernization: Planned acquisitions, such as advanced fighter jets, naval vessels, or air defense systems, are often postponed.
• Limited Training and Exercises: Reduced funds for joint exercises, international cooperation, and troop training can affect operational effectiveness.
________________________________________
6. Political and Economic Uncertainties
Fluctuating oil revenues, global economic conditions, and political changes affect budget allocations. Defense funding is often reactive rather than strategic, meaning modernization projects may stall if economic growth slows or budget priorities shift.
________________________________________
Summary:
Financial limitations in Malondesh’s military are primarily caused by modest defense budget allocations, high operational costs, competing domestic priorities, reliance on costly foreign technology, and economic/political uncertainties. These factors collectively constrain modernization, maintenance, and strategic readiness, leaving the armed forces with aging equipment and delayed capability development.
Makin BAHAYA.......
BalasHapusBukan Cuma DPR, Gerombolan Remaja Bersenjata Tajam Jarah Rumah Sri Mulyani Bersama Ribuan Massa: Ngeri Banget...
https://lombokpost.jawapos.com/metropolis/1506508550/bukan-cuma-dpr-gerombolan-remaja-bersenjata-tajam-jarah-rumah-sri-mulyani-bersama-ribuan-massa-ngeri-banget
1. Procurement Mismanagement
Hapus• The project began in 2011, with a contract awarded to Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS) to build 6 ships.
• By 2022, despite RM6.08 billion already spent, not a single ship had been delivered.
• Poor oversight and lack of accountability led to cost overruns and schedule slippage.
2. Design Changes Midway
• The original plan was to use the MEKO A-100 design from France.
• Midway, the Navy requested changes to combat systems and sensors, causing delays in integration and testing.
• These changes required re-certification and re-engineering, adding years to the timeline.
3. Supply Chain & OEM Issues
• Delays in receiving components from Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) disrupted construction schedules.
• Some systems were not delivered on time, while others were incompatible with the revised ship design.
4. Financial Overruns
Metric Original Plan Current Status
Total Cost RM9 billion RM11.22 billion
Ships Ordered 6 5 (1 cancelled)
Completion Timeline 2019–2023 2026–2029
The cost ballooned by RM2.22 billion, forcing the government to scale down the number of ships.
5. Political & Institutional Delays
• Multiple changes in government between 2018–2022 led to policy uncertainty.
• Investigations by the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) revealed serious lapses in governance.
• The project was temporarily frozen, then restarted under a restructured plan.
6. Impact on National Security
• Experts warn that the delay leaves Malondesh vulnerable in its maritime zones, especially in the South China Sea.
• The Navy lacks modern surface combatants to replace aging ships like the KD Kasturi and KD Lekir
1. Aging Fleet & Capability Gaps
Hapus• Many ships, like the KD Kasturi and KD Lekir, are over 30 years old, with limited combat capability.
• Malondesh lacks modern anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platforms and long-range missile systems, leaving gaps in deterrence.
• The fleet is not equipped to handle high-tempo operations or multi-domain threats.
2. LCS Procurement Scandal & Delays
• The RM11 billion Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has been plagued by:
o Procurement mismanagement
o Political interference
o Technical delays
• As of 2025, only 72% progress has been made, with the first ship expected to begin sea trials in December 2025.
• This delay leaves Malondesh without modern surface combatants for coastal and EEZ defense.
3. Fragmented Fleet Structure
• RMN operates too many ship classes, complicating logistics, training, and maintenance.
• The 15-to-5 Transformation Plan aims to consolidate the fleet into five core classes, but implementation is slow.
• Fragmentation leads to supply chain inefficiencies and higher operational costs.
4. Budgetary Constraints
• Defense spending is insufficient to support rapid modernization.
• High personnel costs consume over 40% of the defense budget, leaving limited funds for procurement and upgrades.
• Malondesh’s navy modernization is often delayed or scaled down due to fiscal pressures.
5. Limited Maritime Surveillance & Deterrence
• Malondesh faces frequent incursions by foreign vessels, especially in the South China Sea.
• Lack of long-range radars, UAVs, and submarine detection systems weakens maritime domain awareness.
• The Navy is stretched thin across Peninsular and East Malondesh, with limited ability to respond quickly.
6. Geopolitical Pressure & Strategic Vulnerability
• Malondesh’s neutral foreign policy limits its access to strategic alliances like AUKUS or QUAD.
• Rising Chinese assertiveness and illegal fishing by Vietnamese vessels challenge Malondesh’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
• Without a credible naval deterrent, Malondesh risks losing strategic influence in regional waters.
🧭 Summary Table
Problem Area Impact on RMN
Aging Fleet Reduced combat readiness
LCS Delays No modern surface combatants
Fragmented Ship Classes Inefficient logistics & maintenance
Budget Constraints Slow modernization
Weak Maritime Surveillance Vulnerable EEZ & coastlines
Strategic Isolation Limited deterrence in South China Sea
1. Overview
HapusMalondesh armed forces, Angkatan Tentera Malondesh (ATM), operate under limited budgets. Over the decades, this has led to prolonged use of older military equipment and delays in modernizing their forces. These challenges impact operational readiness, capabilities, and strategic deterrence.
________________________________________
2. Ageing Equipment
“Ageing equipment” refers to military hardware that has outlived its intended operational lifespan or requires extensive maintenance to remain functional.
Examples in Malondesh:
1. Air Force (TUDM / Tentera Udara Diraja Malondesh)
o MiG-29s and F-5E Tiger IIs: Some aircraft are over 30 years old.
o Maintenance costs increase with age, and spare parts become harder to source.
o Operational readiness is reduced; fewer aircraft are available for exercises or patrols.
2. Navy (TLDM / Tentera Laut Diraja Malondesh)
o Kasturi-class frigates and older Perdana-class patrol vessels are decades old.
o Ships need constant upkeep; older vessels have limited combat capabilities compared to modern ships.
3. Army (TDM / Tentera Darat Malondesh)
o Condor armored vehicles and old artillery systems are still in service.
o Modern threats like asymmetric warfare or rapid deployment require more advanced, mobile systems.
Consequences of Ageing Equipment
• Higher maintenance costs: More resources go into keeping old hardware operational.
• Reduced combat effectiveness: Outdated technology may be inferior to neighboring militaries’ systems.
• Operational limitations: Older platforms may be slower, less reliable, or incompatible with modern communication and weapon systems.
________________________________________
3. Delayed Modernization
“Delayed modernization” occurs when planned upgrades or new acquisitions are postponed, usually due to budget constraints, bureaucratic issues, or changing priorities.
Examples in Malondesh:
1. Air Force
o Replacement of aging fighters like MiG-29s and F-5E has been delayed.
o New acquisitions like the Su-30MKM and M346 trainers are fewer than initially planned.
2. Navy
o Plans for new frigates, submarines, and multi-role combat ships are often slow-moving or downscaled.
o Patrol vessels are prioritized over high-end warships due to cost constraints.
3. Army
o Modern armored vehicles and artillery acquisition programs face delays, affecting mobility and firepower.
o Emphasis is placed on upgrading existing equipment rather than full-scale replacement.
Causes of Delayed Modernization
• Limited defense budget: Malondesh allocates ~1.5–2% of GDP to defense. High-cost projects compete with other national priorities.
• Procurement bureaucracy: Complex procurement processes slow down acquisition.
• Foreign dependence: Reliance on imported equipment leads to delays in deliveries.
• Strategic threat assessment: Malondesh relatively low external threat level reduces urgency for rapid modernization.
________________________________________
4. Impacts
1. Operational Readiness
o Fewer active platforms are available due to maintenance of old systems.
2. Capability Gap
o Aging systems may lack advanced radar, missile systems, or networked command capabilities.
3. Regional Competitiveness
o Malondesh may lag behind neighbors like Singapore or Thailand in modern warfare technology.
4. Financial Burden
o Continuous repair and patching of old equipment may ultimately cost more than timely modernization.
________________________________________
5. Summary
• Ageing Equipment: Military platforms (aircraft, ships, vehicles) are decades old, expensive to maintain, and less effective.
• Delayed Modernization: New acquisitions or upgrades are postponed due to budget, bureaucracy, and strategic prioritization.
• Overall Effect: Malondesh maintains a capable but moderately modernized military, with limitations in high-end operations, regional power projection, and technological parity.
1. Overview of Malondesh’s Military Budget
HapusMalondesh’s armed forces are collectively called Angkatan Tentera Malondesh (ATM), which includes:
• Tentera Darat (Army)
• Tentera Laut (Navy)
• Tentera Udara (Air Force)
The military budget comes from the national budget, which is approved annually by the government. Historically, Malondesh allocates around 1.5% to 2% of its GDP to defense, which is lower than regional neighbors like Singapore (~3% of GDP) or Thailand (~2.5% of GDP).
________________________________________
2. Reasons for Budgetary Constraints
Several factors contribute to limits on Malondesh’s military spending:
1. Economic Priorities
o Malondesh has competing priorities like infrastructure, healthcare, education, and social programs.
o Defense often has to share funding with these critical sectors, especially during economic slowdowns or crises like the COVID-19 pandemic.
2. Low GDP Proportion Allocation
o Defense spending is not a large share of GDP, meaning ATM must operate efficiently with limited resources.
3. Cost of Modernization
o Modern weapons systems (jets, naval ships, missile defense) are very expensive.
o Limited budgets often force Malondesh to prioritize maintenance over new acquisitions.
4. Debt and Fiscal Policy Constraints
o The government manages national debt levels and budget deficits, which restricts discretionary spending, including military upgrades.
5. Regional Security Assessment
o Malondesh generally faces lower direct military threats compared to neighbors like the Philippines or Singapore, so it may choose cost-effective defense rather than high-tech military expansion.
________________________________________
3. Impact of Budgetary Constraints
Budget limits have several practical effects on Malondesh’s armed forces:
1. Delayed Modernization
o Acquisition of advanced aircraft, naval ships, and weapon systems may be postponed or scaled down.
o Example: Procurement of new fighter jets or submarines can take decades from planning to delivery.
2. Maintenance Challenges
o Aging equipment sometimes cannot be replaced, leading to higher maintenance costs and operational limitations.
o Some aircraft or naval vessels may be grounded due to lack of spare parts or funding.
3. Operational Readiness
o Limited funds can affect training exercises, personnel numbers, and military readiness.
o The military may focus on territorial defense and counter-insurgency, rather than high-tech, long-range capabilities.
4. Dependence on Foreign Suppliers
o Malondesh often relies on imports of military hardware, which can be costly and subject to international politics.
________________________________________
4. Examples of Budget-Related Decisions
• Air Force: Delays in acquiring modern fighter jets due to high costs; focus on upgrading older MiG-29s and Sukhoi Su-30s.
• Navy: Limited new ship acquisitions; focus on patrol vessels for maritime security instead of expensive frigates.
• Army: Equipment modernization is gradual; focus on light arms, armored vehicles, and special forces rather than full mechanized upgrades.
________________________________________
5. Conclusion
Malondesh’s military faces budgetary constraints due to a combination of economic priorities, limited GDP allocation, modernization costs, and debt management. While ATM remains capable for regional defense and internal security, high-end modernization and rapid expansion are restricted, requiring strategic prioritization of resources.
warga MALAYSIA sedekah makanan kepada warga INDIANESIA.....kerana rakyat sebelah makin sengsara
BalasHapusWujud Solidaritas, Warganet Malaysia Ramai Ramai Pesan Makanan di Ojol
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aRP5qeo5VD4
1. Procurement Mismanagement
Hapus• The project began in 2011, with a contract awarded to Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS) to build 6 ships.
• By 2022, despite RM6.08 billion already spent, not a single ship had been delivered.
• Poor oversight and lack of accountability led to cost overruns and schedule slippage.
2. Design Changes Midway
• The original plan was to use the MEKO A-100 design from France.
• Midway, the Navy requested changes to combat systems and sensors, causing delays in integration and testing.
• These changes required re-certification and re-engineering, adding years to the timeline.
3. Supply Chain & OEM Issues
• Delays in receiving components from Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) disrupted construction schedules.
• Some systems were not delivered on time, while others were incompatible with the revised ship design.
4. Financial Overruns
Metric Original Plan Current Status
Total Cost RM9 billion RM11.22 billion
Ships Ordered 6 5 (1 cancelled)
Completion Timeline 2019–2023 2026–2029
The cost ballooned by RM2.22 billion, forcing the government to scale down the number of ships.
5. Political & Institutional Delays
• Multiple changes in government between 2018–2022 led to policy uncertainty.
• Investigations by the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) revealed serious lapses in governance.
• The project was temporarily frozen, then restarted under a restructured plan.
6. Impact on National Security
• Experts warn that the delay leaves Malondesh vulnerable in its maritime zones, especially in the South China Sea.
• The Navy lacks modern surface combatants to replace aging ships like the KD Kasturi and KD Lekir
1. Overview of Malondesh’s Military Budget
HapusMalondesh’s armed forces are collectively called Angkatan Tentera Malondesh (ATM), which includes:
• Tentera Darat (Army)
• Tentera Laut (Navy)
• Tentera Udara (Air Force)
The military budget comes from the national budget, which is approved annually by the government. Historically, Malondesh allocates around 1.5% to 2% of its GDP to defense, which is lower than regional neighbors like Singapore (~3% of GDP) or Thailand (~2.5% of GDP).
________________________________________
2. Reasons for Budgetary Constraints
Several factors contribute to limits on Malondesh’s military spending:
1. Economic Priorities
o Malondesh has competing priorities like infrastructure, healthcare, education, and social programs.
o Defense often has to share funding with these critical sectors, especially during economic slowdowns or crises like the COVID-19 pandemic.
2. Low GDP Proportion Allocation
o Defense spending is not a large share of GDP, meaning ATM must operate efficiently with limited resources.
3. Cost of Modernization
o Modern weapons systems (jets, naval ships, missile defense) are very expensive.
o Limited budgets often force Malondesh to prioritize maintenance over new acquisitions.
4. Debt and Fiscal Policy Constraints
o The government manages national debt levels and budget deficits, which restricts discretionary spending, including military upgrades.
5. Regional Security Assessment
o Malondesh generally faces lower direct military threats compared to neighbors like the Philippines or Singapore, so it may choose cost-effective defense rather than high-tech military expansion.
________________________________________
3. Impact of Budgetary Constraints
Budget limits have several practical effects on Malondesh’s armed forces:
1. Delayed Modernization
o Acquisition of advanced aircraft, naval ships, and weapon systems may be postponed or scaled down.
o Example: Procurement of new fighter jets or submarines can take decades from planning to delivery.
2. Maintenance Challenges
o Aging equipment sometimes cannot be replaced, leading to higher maintenance costs and operational limitations.
o Some aircraft or naval vessels may be grounded due to lack of spare parts or funding.
3. Operational Readiness
o Limited funds can affect training exercises, personnel numbers, and military readiness.
o The military may focus on territorial defense and counter-insurgency, rather than high-tech, long-range capabilities.
4. Dependence on Foreign Suppliers
o Malondesh often relies on imports of military hardware, which can be costly and subject to international politics.
________________________________________
4. Examples of Budget-Related Decisions
• Air Force: Delays in acquiring modern fighter jets due to high costs; focus on upgrading older MiG-29s and Sukhoi Su-30s.
• Navy: Limited new ship acquisitions; focus on patrol vessels for maritime security instead of expensive frigates.
• Army: Equipment modernization is gradual; focus on light arms, armored vehicles, and special forces rather than full mechanized upgrades.
________________________________________
5. Conclusion
Malondesh’s military faces budgetary constraints due to a combination of economic priorities, limited GDP allocation, modernization costs, and debt management. While ATM remains capable for regional defense and internal security, high-end modernization and rapid expansion are restricted, requiring strategic prioritization of resources.
1. Overview of Malondesh’s Military Budget
HapusMalondesh’s armed forces are collectively called Angkatan Tentera Malondesh (ATM), which includes:
• Tentera Darat (Army)
• Tentera Laut (Navy)
• Tentera Udara (Air Force)
The military budget comes from the national budget, which is approved annually by the government. Historically, Malondesh allocates around 1.5% to 2% of its GDP to defense, which is lower than regional neighbors like Singapore (~3% of GDP) or Thailand (~2.5% of GDP).
________________________________________
2. Reasons for Budgetary Constraints
Several factors contribute to limits on Malondesh’s military spending:
1. Economic Priorities
o Malondesh has competing priorities like infrastructure, healthcare, education, and social programs.
o Defense often has to share funding with these critical sectors, especially during economic slowdowns or crises like the COVID-19 pandemic.
2. Low GDP Proportion Allocation
o Defense spending is not a large share of GDP, meaning ATM must operate efficiently with limited resources.
3. Cost of Modernization
o Modern weapons systems (jets, naval ships, missile defense) are very expensive.
o Limited budgets often force Malondesh to prioritize maintenance over new acquisitions.
4. Debt and Fiscal Policy Constraints
o The government manages national debt levels and budget deficits, which restricts discretionary spending, including military upgrades.
5. Regional Security Assessment
o Malondesh generally faces lower direct military threats compared to neighbors like the Philippines or Singapore, so it may choose cost-effective defense rather than high-tech military expansion.
________________________________________
3. Impact of Budgetary Constraints
Budget limits have several practical effects on Malondesh’s armed forces:
1. Delayed Modernization
o Acquisition of advanced aircraft, naval ships, and weapon systems may be postponed or scaled down.
o Example: Procurement of new fighter jets or submarines can take decades from planning to delivery.
2. Maintenance Challenges
o Aging equipment sometimes cannot be replaced, leading to higher maintenance costs and operational limitations.
o Some aircraft or naval vessels may be grounded due to lack of spare parts or funding.
3. Operational Readiness
o Limited funds can affect training exercises, personnel numbers, and military readiness.
o The military may focus on territorial defense and counter-insurgency, rather than high-tech, long-range capabilities.
4. Dependence on Foreign Suppliers
o Malondesh often relies on imports of military hardware, which can be costly and subject to international politics.
________________________________________
4. Examples of Budget-Related Decisions
• Air Force: Delays in acquiring modern fighter jets due to high costs; focus on upgrading older MiG-29s and Sukhoi Su-30s.
• Navy: Limited new ship acquisitions; focus on patrol vessels for maritime security instead of expensive frigates.
• Army: Equipment modernization is gradual; focus on light arms, armored vehicles, and special forces rather than full mechanized upgrades.
________________________________________
5. Conclusion
Malondesh’s military faces budgetary constraints due to a combination of economic priorities, limited GDP allocation, modernization costs, and debt management. While ATM remains capable for regional defense and internal security, high-end modernization and rapid expansion are restricted, requiring strategic prioritization of resources.
1. Procurement and Equipment Weaknesses
Hapusa. Delays in Procurement
• Projects like the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) programs have faced years of delays.
• LCS project, valued at RM9 billion, has seen zero completed ships after massive spending.
• Delays reduce operational readiness and compromise the Navy’s ability to safeguard maritime borders.
b. Cost Overruns
• Mismanagement and overbudgeting are common; e.g., the LCS project has overspent by over RM1.4 billion, partly to cover liabilities from past failed projects.
• Cost overruns often stem from political interference, corruption, and poor project planning.
c. Aging and Inadequate Equipment
• Acquisition of decades-old Black Hawk helicopters drew royal criticism as "flying coffins."
• Many MAF systems are obsolete, reducing combat effectiveness and increasing maintenance costs.
________________________________________
2. Corruption and Cronyism
• High-level officials and intermediaries often profit from military contracts (e.g., Scorpène submarine scandal).
• Cronyism results in:
o Contracts awarded without transparent tenders.
o Selection of unsuitable or overpriced equipment.
• This erodes public trust and inflates defense expenditure without improving capability.
________________________________________
3. Lack of Transparency and Oversight
• Official Secrets Act 1972 and limited parliamentary oversight create opaque decision-making.
• Tender processes often bypass public scrutiny, enabling mismanagement and corruption.
• Examples:
o LCS project: partial shell companies used for siphoning funds.
o Scorpène deal: commissions and possible bribery unaccounted for in official records.
________________________________________
4. Human Resource and Training Challenges
• Insufficient training and outdated doctrines reduce operational efficiency.
• MAF faces difficulty retaining skilled personnel in technical fields (e.g., naval engineering, aviation maintenance).
• Limited joint exercises with advanced foreign militaries reduce interoperability and experience.
________________________________________
5. Strategic and Policy Weaknesses
• Defence policy is sometimes reactive rather than proactive.
• Limited domestic defense production capability leads to dependence on foreign suppliers, often exacerbating delays and cost overruns.
• Politically driven procurement decisions may override strategic military needs.
________________________________________
Conclusion
The weaknesses of the Malondeshn Armed Forces are interconnected, combining operational, financial, and governance shortcomings:
1. Operational Readiness: Compromised by outdated and delayed equipment.
2. Financial Mismanagement: Overspending and corruption reduce the value of defense budgets.
3. Governance and Transparency Gaps: Lack of accountability allows systemic inefficiency.
4. Human Capital Challenges: Training and retention issues impede force modernization.
Implications:
• National security is at risk, particularly in maritime defense and rapid-response operations.
• Public funds are wasted without meaningful improvements in capability.
warga MALAYSIA sedekah makanan kepada warga INDIANESIA.....kerana rakyat sebelah makin sengsara
BalasHapusWujud Solidaritas, Warganet Malaysia Ramai Ramai Pesan Makanan di Ojol
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aRP5qeo5VD4
1. Aging Fleet & Capability Gaps
Hapus• Many ships, like the KD Kasturi and KD Lekir, are over 30 years old, with limited combat capability.
• Malondesh lacks modern anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platforms and long-range missile systems, leaving gaps in deterrence.
• The fleet is not equipped to handle high-tempo operations or multi-domain threats.
2. LCS Procurement Scandal & Delays
• The RM11 billion Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has been plagued by:
o Procurement mismanagement
o Political interference
o Technical delays
• As of 2025, only 72% progress has been made, with the first ship expected to begin sea trials in December 2025.
• This delay leaves Malondesh without modern surface combatants for coastal and EEZ defense.
3. Fragmented Fleet Structure
• RMN operates too many ship classes, complicating logistics, training, and maintenance.
• The 15-to-5 Transformation Plan aims to consolidate the fleet into five core classes, but implementation is slow.
• Fragmentation leads to supply chain inefficiencies and higher operational costs.
4. Budgetary Constraints
• Defense spending is insufficient to support rapid modernization.
• High personnel costs consume over 40% of the defense budget, leaving limited funds for procurement and upgrades.
• Malondesh’s navy modernization is often delayed or scaled down due to fiscal pressures.
5. Limited Maritime Surveillance & Deterrence
• Malondesh faces frequent incursions by foreign vessels, especially in the South China Sea.
• Lack of long-range radars, UAVs, and submarine detection systems weakens maritime domain awareness.
• The Navy is stretched thin across Peninsular and East Malondesh, with limited ability to respond quickly.
6. Geopolitical Pressure & Strategic Vulnerability
• Malondesh’s neutral foreign policy limits its access to strategic alliances like AUKUS or QUAD.
• Rising Chinese assertiveness and illegal fishing by Vietnamese vessels challenge Malondesh’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
• Without a credible naval deterrent, Malondesh risks losing strategic influence in regional waters.
🧭 Summary Table
Problem Area Impact on RMN
Aging Fleet Reduced combat readiness
LCS Delays No modern surface combatants
Fragmented Ship Classes Inefficient logistics & maintenance
Budget Constraints Slow modernization
Weak Maritime Surveillance Vulnerable EEZ & coastlines
Strategic Isolation Limited deterrence in South China Sea
1. Scorpène Submarine Scandal (2002 Onward)
Hapus• Malondesh procured two Scorpène-class submarines and one Agosta-class submarine for RM4.5 billion via Perimekar Sdn Bhd, a company with no track record, tied to defense analyst Abdul Razak Baginda. Perimekar received RM510 million in commissions—around 11% of the deal value
• French investigators implicated key figures, including members of DCNS/Naval Group, in bribery and misuse of corporate assets
• This case also interwove with a tragic murder: Altantuyaa Shaariibuugiin, a translator allegedly involved in the deal, was murdered amid claims she demanded a commission. Baginda was acquitted of the conspiracy charges in Malondesh, but French courts later charged him with corruption and misappropriation
________________________________________
2. Little Bird (MD530G) Helicopter Contract (2016)
• A RM321 million deal for six light attack helicopters collapsed due to delivery failures and substandard adherence to specifications.
• After a MACC probe, the Attorney General’s Chambers opted not to prosecute, prompting public outrage.
“No further action will be taken… typical. Corruption from top to bottom.”
________________________________________
3. New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) Scandal (1990s–2000s)
• The project aimed to replace aging patrol crafts with 27 Meko 100-designed ships. PSC-ND, a politically linked company, secured the contract.
• Only six vessels were completed, and delays and financial mismanagement ballooned costs from RM5.35 billion to RM6.75 billion.
• PSC-ND fell into debt and was absorbed by Boustead Holdings, becoming Boustead Naval Shipyard
________________________________________
4. Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) Fiasco
• In the late 1990s, an UMNO-linked firm was contracted for six OPVs at RM4.9 billion. Only two were delivered, fraught with defects.
• Payments reached RM4.26 billion for merely RM2.87 billion worth of work completed—a 48% overpayment. Late penalties were waived by government directive.
________________________________________
5. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal (2011–Present)
• Valued at RM9 billion, the LCS project delivered zero ships despite over RM6 billion disbursed
• The Royal Malondeshn Navy preferred the Dutch-designed Sigma class, but the decision was overridden to adopt the French Gowind class—aligned with Boustead’s interests
• MACC investigations revealed shell companies were used to siphon off at least RM23 million for fake technical services, linked to high-ranking officials
• There were also allegations of circular flow of funds benefitting a core network of political and contractor cronies
• PAC uncovered RM1.4 billion in cost overruns, and RM400 million was used to repay liabilities from past failed projects
• The public and parliament now clamour for a Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI) to fully investigate the scandal
• Commentary reflects deep frustration:
“Before everyone gets their pitchforks out… First 2 ships supposed to deliver in 2020. Now none delivered… How much go into pocket of officials?”
________________________________________
6. Public Accountability & Civil Society Response
• The Consumers’ Association of Penang (CAP) has urged the establishment of an RCI, warning that these scandals jeopardize national security and sovereignty
• The patterns underscore systemic failure—from opaque deals, lack of accountability, and misuse of public funds.
• In August 2025, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim called for "graft-free procurement" in defense, emphasizing transparency and favoring G2G (government-to-government) deals over intermediaries ________________________________________
Summary Table: High-Impact Scandals
Scandal Key Issues
Scorpène Submarine Deal Commissions, corruption, murder linked to procurement
MD530G Helicopters Failed deliveries, no legal accountability
NGPV Program Delays, cost overruns, company collapse
OPV Deal Defective deliveries, huge financial losses
LCS Project No deliveries, massive overspending, shell companies
1. Cronyism & Middleman Influence in Defence Deals
Hapus• Middlemen & Agents
Analysts and civil society highlight how defence procurement often involves politically connected intermediaries—sometimes retired military officers—who earn hefty commissions and influence decisions. These agents contribute to inflated costs and undermine transparency.
• Lack of Open Competition
Fewer than one-third of major defence contracts are awarded through open competition, creating a system that favors these intermediaries and their affiliated firms
________________________________________
2. High-Profile Procurement Scandals
a) Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Project
• Awarded via direct negotiation, ignoring naval preference. Despite RM6 billion disbursed, zero ships delivered. Cost ballooned to RM11.2 billion.
• Investigations revealed overlapping key figures implicated previously in the Scorpene submarine scandal—suggesting systemic manipulation.c
• Critics say accountability remains elusive, even as oversight committees were formed.
b) Scorpene Submarine Deal (2002)
• A massive RM4.5 billion deal saw RM510 million paid as commissions to politically linked intermediaries. Ship performance issues followed.
c) New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) Program
• Awarded to a firm tied to political cronies; suffered major delays, cost overruns, and unpaid contractors. PAC uncovered corruption, leading to institutional restructuring.
d) Little Bird Helicopters (MD530G)
• A RM321 million contract in 2016 failed to deliver timely. Procurement bypassed technical benchmarks, lacked military specs, and ended with no prosecutions despite MACC scrutiny.
• Public frustration is palpable:
“No further action will be taken over alleged corruption… typical. Corruption from top to bottom.”
e) SIBMAS Armoured Vehicles (1980s)
• Tender allegedly rigged to favor SIBMAS despite failure to meet specs; final product was heavier, underpowered, and underutilized.
f) Missing Jet Engines (2007)
• Two F-5E jet engines were stolen from RMAF stores; individually linked to procurement corruption during Najib’s tenure. They surfaced in Uruguay later.
________________________________________
3. Mismanagement & Systemic Procurement Failures
• Audit Findings on Gempita Armoured Vehicles
RM162.75 million in penalties for late delivery went unclaimed; maintenance contracts worth RM107 million were fragmented to evade procurement controls.
• Wasted Naval Spare Parts
Auditor-General reported RM384 million worth of unused spare parts for the navy. Public reaction via Reddit reflects widespread disillusionment:
“So much for that expense is kickbacks? 90 percent?”
________________________________________
4. Institutional Weaknesses & Reform Efforts
• The Consumers Association of Penang (CAP) has advocated for a Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI) to address 40 years of defence procurement scandals and institutional failures.
• Transparency International Malondesh (TI-M) has criticized recurrent procurement irregularities (e.g., poor contract evaluation, bypassed controls, fragmented tenders) as symptoms of systemic governance breakdown.
• In August 2025, Parliament passed the Government Procurement Bill, aiming to standardize procedures, penalize wrongdoing, and reduce rent-seeking—yet civil society warns about potential loopholes giving ministers excessive power.
• Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has emphasized a "graft-free" defence procurement approach, advocating Government-to-Government (G2G) deals over intermediated ones to reduce corruption and improve transparency.
________________________________________
Summary Overview
Issue Manifestation
Cronyism & Agent Influence Backdoor deals, inflated costs, sidelined military preferences
Scandals LCS, Scorpene, NGPV, MD530G, SIBMAS, missing jet engines
Mismanagement & Waste Unclaimed penalties, unused assets, botched delivery
Institutional Weakness Weak oversight, fragmented tenders, audit warnings disregarded
Reform Initiatives PAC scrutiny, RCI advocacy, new Procurement Bill, push for G2G
Keadaan INDIANESIA makin BAHAYA...PENJARAHAN di mana mana....
BalasHapusVIRAL! DIDUGA RUMAH SRI MULYANI DAN PUAN MAHARANI JUGA JADI SASARAN GERUDUK MASSA?!
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=kRRPmr4XFK0&pp=ygUXcnVtYWggc3JpIG11bHlhbmkgYmFrYXI%3D
1. Aging Fleet & Capability Gaps
Hapus• Many ships, like the KD Kasturi and KD Lekir, are over 30 years old, with limited combat capability.
• Malondesh lacks modern anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platforms and long-range missile systems, leaving gaps in deterrence.
• The fleet is not equipped to handle high-tempo operations or multi-domain threats.
2. LCS Procurement Scandal & Delays
• The RM11 billion Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has been plagued by:
o Procurement mismanagement
o Political interference
o Technical delays
• As of 2025, only 72% progress has been made, with the first ship expected to begin sea trials in December 2025.
• This delay leaves Malondesh without modern surface combatants for coastal and EEZ defense.
3. Fragmented Fleet Structure
• RMN operates too many ship classes, complicating logistics, training, and maintenance.
• The 15-to-5 Transformation Plan aims to consolidate the fleet into five core classes, but implementation is slow.
• Fragmentation leads to supply chain inefficiencies and higher operational costs.
4. Budgetary Constraints
• Defense spending is insufficient to support rapid modernization.
• High personnel costs consume over 40% of the defense budget, leaving limited funds for procurement and upgrades.
• Malondesh’s navy modernization is often delayed or scaled down due to fiscal pressures.
5. Limited Maritime Surveillance & Deterrence
• Malondesh faces frequent incursions by foreign vessels, especially in the South China Sea.
• Lack of long-range radars, UAVs, and submarine detection systems weakens maritime domain awareness.
• The Navy is stretched thin across Peninsular and East Malondesh, with limited ability to respond quickly.
6. Geopolitical Pressure & Strategic Vulnerability
• Malondesh’s neutral foreign policy limits its access to strategic alliances like AUKUS or QUAD.
• Rising Chinese assertiveness and illegal fishing by Vietnamese vessels challenge Malondesh’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
• Without a credible naval deterrent, Malondesh risks losing strategic influence in regional waters.
🧭 Summary Table
Problem Area Impact on RMN
Aging Fleet Reduced combat readiness
LCS Delays No modern surface combatants
Fragmented Ship Classes Inefficient logistics & maintenance
Budget Constraints Slow modernization
Weak Maritime Surveillance Vulnerable EEZ & coastlines
Strategic Isolation Limited deterrence in South China Sea
1. UH-60A Black Hawk Helicopter Lease (May 2023 – November 2024)
Hapus• Background: In May 2023, Malondesh’s Ministry of Defence signed a five-year RM187 million lease deal for four UH-60A Black Hawk helicopters with Aerotree Defence and Services
• Delays & Contract Issues: The first helicopter, initially due in November 2023, was repeatedly delayed—extended to April 2024, then to October 30
• Cancellation: After the October deadline passed without delivery, the contract was officially cancelled in November 2024
• Royal Intervention: Sultan Ibrahim publicly opposed the deal, warning against “flying coffins”—over 30-year-old helicopters unsuitable for service
• Aftermath: A fresh tender for leasing alternative helicopters was launched in August 2025. The Ministry will evaluate proposals and consider factors such as helicopter type, age, leasing cost; the tender closes in September
________________________________________
2. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Project (2011–Present)
• Project Overview: Awarded in 2011, the RM9.13 billion LCS contract with Boustead Naval Shipyard aimed to deliver six warships. However, by August 2022, none had been delivered despite two-thirds of payment being made (~RM6 billion)
• Delays & Cost Overruns: As of mid-2025, completion was at 72.9% against a target of 76.1% The total cost ballooned to approximately RM11.2 billion under revised agreements
• Scrutiny and Reforms: The project drew heavy criticism from Malondesh’s parliamentary PAC and triggered calls for a Royal Commission of Inquiry A project oversight committee was later set up to improve delivery and accountability
________________________________________
3. Multiple Smaller Contract Cancellations (Early 2023)
• Measure for Transparency: In January 2023, the Defence Ministry cancelled five procurement contracts—spanning supplies, services, and infrastructure—to combat potential financial leakage and align with government emphasis on open tenders and value for money
________________________________________
4. Armoured Vehicle Procurement Irregularities (Mid-2025)
• Delivery Penalties & Contract Splits: The Auditor-General’s report uncovered major delays in claiming RM162.75 million in penalties for late Gempita armoured vehicle deliveries. It also flagged contract splitting worth RM107.54 million and late service penalties of RM1.42 million left unclaimed
________________________________________
5. Expert Insights on Procurement Failures
• Cronyism & Mismanagement: Analysts point to cronyism, financial mismanagement, and lack of expertise behind repeated procurement delays and cancellations—including the offshore patrol vessel and Black Hawk contracts
________________________________________
6. Leadership Response & Reforms
• King’s Reprimand: Sultan Ibrahim’s public condemnation of “nonsensical and unacceptable” procurement deals marks an unusually active supervisory stance by the monarch
• Prime Minister’s Push for Transparency: PM Anwar Ibrahim has emphasized transparency, discouraging dependence on agents, and favoring government-to-government arrangements. He cited the LCS debacle as calling for procurement reform
• Procurement Bill: In August 2025, a Government Procurement Bill was tabled, making violations of tender laws prosecutable and aiming to institutionalize transparency across government procurement—while still exempting defense procurements requiring confidentiality
📌 1. What “Deterrence” Means
Hapus• Deterrence = convincing a potential adversary that attacking you will be too costly.
• Effective deterrence requires:
1. Credible combat power (modern weapons, trained forces).
2. Readiness (forces operational at short notice).
3. Clear strategy (political will to use military force).
👉 Malondesh lacks all three.
________________________________________
📌 2. Small & Obsolete Armed Forces
• Army (TDM): Still uses 1980s-era armored vehicles and artillery. No long-range rockets or modern air defense.
• Navy (TLDM):
o Only 2 Scorpène submarines (limited readiness).
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal left Malondesh without new ships for over a decade.
o Fleet shrinking as old ships decommission faster than new ones arrive.
• Air Force (RMAF/TUDM):
o Only ~26 combat jets (Su-30MKM + F/A-18D), many often grounded.
o No long-range SAMs, tankers, or AWACS.
o Pilots have low training hours.
👉 Malondesh cannot credibly threaten retaliation if attacked.
________________________________________
📌 3. China in the South China Sea
• Chinese Coast Guard & Navy regularly enter Malondesh’s EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone).
• Malondesh responds only with diplomatic protests & small patrols.
• No credible deterrence:
o No modern MPAs (maritime patrol aircraft).
o Weak naval presence.
o No anti-ship missile coverage to deter Chinese fleets.
👉 China does not take Malondesh’s military seriously.
________________________________________
📌 4. Budget Too Small
• Malondesh spends ~1% of GDP on defense — one of the lowest in ASEAN.
• More than half goes to salaries & pensions, not weapons or readiness.
• Modernization projects delayed or cancelled (LCS, MRCA fighter replacement, Nuri helicopter replacement).
👉 Military cannot modernize fast enough to maintain deterrence.
________________________________________
📌 5. Weak Defense Industry
• Malondesh cannot produce its own modern fighters, warships, or missiles.
• Dependent on imports → delays, corruption, and cost overruns.
• Example: Boustead LCS scandal wasted billions, leaving Navy with no new ships.
👉 Without a strong local industry, deterrence = permanently dependent on foreign suppliers.
________________________________________
📌 6. Low Training & Readiness
• Pilots fly ~100 hours/year or less (NATO standard = 180+).
• Ships sail less due to fuel and maintenance limits.
• Army does limited joint/combined exercises because of budget.
• Many assets grounded for lack of spare parts.
👉 Even if weapons exist, they cannot be deployed effectively.
________________________________________
📌 7. No Strategic Doctrine
• Malondesh’s 2019 Defense White Paper acknowledged threats but failed to provide long-term funding or a clear modernization path.
• Governments keep flip-flopping procurement plans (MiG-29 replacement delayed >10 years).
• Political leaders avoid strong defense postures → prefer diplomacy.
👉 Adversaries know Malondesh lacks willpower to escalate militarily.
________________________________________
📌 8. Comparison with Neighbors
• Singapore: Credible deterrence with 100+ modern fighters, Leopard 2 tanks, advanced submarines, long-range SAMs.
• Vietnam: Deterrence against China with large Su-30 fleet, strong coastal missile defenses.
• Indonesia: Expanding deterrence with Rafales, F-15EX, submarines.
• Malondesh: Stuck with old equipment, no long-range strike capability.
👉 Neighbors can deter aggression. Malondesh cannot.
________________________________________
📌 9. Consequences of No Deterrence
1. China ignores Malondesh’s protests in South China Sea.
2. Piracy & illegal fishing remain constant in Malondeshn waters.
3. Dependence on allies (US, Australia, Singapore) for exercises, surveillance, and training.
4. Strategic vulnerability: If a conflict breaks out, Malondesh risks losing Sabah/Sarawak or control of EEZ.
5. Loss of credibility: Regional powers see Malondesh as the “soft” military of ASEAN.
Woiii .................PT PAL.....pinoy sudah tanya tu mana kapal mereka bila mau siap....HAHAHHAHA
BalasHapus1. Aging Fleet & Capability Gaps
Hapus• Many ships, like the KD Kasturi and KD Lekir, are over 30 years old, with limited combat capability.
• Malondesh lacks modern anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platforms and long-range missile systems, leaving gaps in deterrence.
• The fleet is not equipped to handle high-tempo operations or multi-domain threats.
2. LCS Procurement Scandal & Delays
• The RM11 billion Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has been plagued by:
o Procurement mismanagement
o Political interference
o Technical delays
• As of 2025, only 72% progress has been made, with the first ship expected to begin sea trials in December 2025.
• This delay leaves Malondesh without modern surface combatants for coastal and EEZ defense.
3. Fragmented Fleet Structure
• RMN operates too many ship classes, complicating logistics, training, and maintenance.
• The 15-to-5 Transformation Plan aims to consolidate the fleet into five core classes, but implementation is slow.
• Fragmentation leads to supply chain inefficiencies and higher operational costs.
4. Budgetary Constraints
• Defense spending is insufficient to support rapid modernization.
• High personnel costs consume over 40% of the defense budget, leaving limited funds for procurement and upgrades.
• Malondesh’s navy modernization is often delayed or scaled down due to fiscal pressures.
5. Limited Maritime Surveillance & Deterrence
• Malondesh faces frequent incursions by foreign vessels, especially in the South China Sea.
• Lack of long-range radars, UAVs, and submarine detection systems weakens maritime domain awareness.
• The Navy is stretched thin across Peninsular and East Malondesh, with limited ability to respond quickly.
6. Geopolitical Pressure & Strategic Vulnerability
• Malondesh’s neutral foreign policy limits its access to strategic alliances like AUKUS or QUAD.
• Rising Chinese assertiveness and illegal fishing by Vietnamese vessels challenge Malondesh’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
• Without a credible naval deterrent, Malondesh risks losing strategic influence in regional waters.
🧭 Summary Table
Problem Area Impact on RMN
Aging Fleet Reduced combat readiness
LCS Delays No modern surface combatants
Fragmented Ship Classes Inefficient logistics & maintenance
Budget Constraints Slow modernization
Weak Maritime Surveillance Vulnerable EEZ & coastlines
Strategic Isolation Limited deterrence in South China Sea
📌 1. Air Force (RMAF)
Hapusa. MiG-29 Replacement / MRCA Program
• Planned: Since 2007, Malondesh has sought replacements for its aging MiG-29 Fulcrums.
• Options considered: Rafale (France), Eurofighter Typhoon (UK), Gripen (Sweden), F/A-18 (US).
• Status: Repeatedly delayed, suspended, and re-announced due to budget constraints and changing governments.
• Impact:
o MiG-29 retired in 2017 → fighter gap remains.
o RMAF left relying on only 18 Su-30MKM and 8 F/A-18D, both aging.
o MRCA “shelved” and replaced with smaller Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) plan (FA-50 from South Korea, delivery starting 2026).
________________________________________
b. Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA)
• Planned: Requirement identified since early 2000s to monitor South China Sea and piracy.
• Status: Delayed nearly 20 years.
• Only in 2023 was the Leonardo ATR-72 MPA selected (delivery by 2026).
• Impact:
o Malondesh had no dedicated MPA fleet for decades, relying on converted transport aircraft and UAVs.
o Limited maritime surveillance → weakness in South China Sea patrols.
________________________________________
📌 2. Navy (RMN)
a. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
• Planned: 2011, RM9 billion for 6 Gowind-class ships (local build by Boustead Naval Shipyard).
• Status: By 2025, zero ships delivered.
o Design changes, corruption, mismanagement, and cost overruns stalled the project.
• Impact:
o Navy still depends on old Kedah-class (2006) and even older corvettes from the 1980s.
o Weakens ability to secure South China Sea claims.
________________________________________
b. Multi-Role Support Ship (MRSS)
• Planned: Amphibious ship program since 2000s.
• Status: Cancelled/postponed multiple times due to budget.
• Impact:
o RMN has no large amphibious lift → limited ability to move troops/equipment in regional crises.
________________________________________
c. Second Batch of Scorpène Submarines
• Planned: Expansion to 4 submarines.
• Status: Shelved due to cost.
• Impact:
o Malondesh stuck with just 2 Scorpènes (delivered 2009–2010), insufficient for wide maritime area.
________________________________________
📌 3. Army (TDM)
a. Self-Propelled Howitzers (SPH)
• Planned: SPH requirement since early 2000s (to replace old towed artillery).
• Status: Program repeatedly delayed. Korea’s K9 Thunder shortlisted in 2020s, but no final contract.
• Impact: Army artillery remains outdated → reduced firepower compared to Indonesia, Singapore.
________________________________________
b. Armored Vehicle Programs
• AV-8 Gempita: Entered production in 2014, but scaled down from 257 planned units due to cost.
• Condor APC Replacement: Long planned, but repeatedly delayed → Condors from the 1980s still in service.
________________________________________
c. Rotary Wing (Helicopters)
• Army Aviation requested more utility and attack helicopters.
• Programs for attack helicopters (AH-1Z, T129, etc.) discussed but cancelled/delayed.
• Impact: Army lacks dedicated attack helicopter capability, unlike Indonesia.
________________________________________
📌 4. Reasons for Delay/Failure
1. Budget constraints → defense stuck at ~1% of GDP.
2. Political instability → 5 prime ministers between 2018–2025, each with shifting priorities.
3. Corruption & mismanagement → especially visible in LCS.
4. Overreliance on foreign suppliers → negotiations stall or get too expensive.
5. Short-termism → lack of 10–15 year strategic procurement planning.
________________________________________
📌 5. Consequences
• Capability gaps:
o Air surveillance weak (delayed MPAs, fighter gap).
o Maritime security weak (LCS delay, only 2 submarines).
o Ground firepower weak (delayed SPH, old APCs).
• Readiness reduced: much equipment obsolete, with few modern replacements.
• Regional imbalance: Neighbors like Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam modernize faster, leaving Malondesh behind.
📌 1. Overview of Malondesh’s Local Defense Industry
Hapus• Malondesh has several state-linked defense companies like Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS), DefTech, SME Ordnance, ATSC (Aerospace Technology Systems Corporation).
• However, compared to Singapore’s ST Engineering or Indonesia’s PT Pindad/PT PAL/PT Dirgantara, Malondesh’s industry is:
o Small in scale
o Heavily dependent on foreign technology transfer
o Politically influenced
o Limited in R&D capacity
________________________________________
📌 2. Structural Weaknesses
a. Overdependence on Foreign Technology
• Local companies rarely design or develop indigenous platforms.
• Instead, they assemble or license-build:
o AV-8 Gempita → Turkish FNSS design
o LCS Gowind-class → French Naval Group design
o DefTech trucks/APCs → based on imported chassis
• This makes Malondesh vulnerable when foreign partners withdraw or when funding for ToT (Transfer of Technology) dries up.
________________________________________
b. Limited R&D and Innovation
• Defense R&D budgets are tiny (well under 1% of defense spending).
• No serious indigenous aircraft, ship, or armored vehicle program has emerged.
• Malondesh lacks the ecosystem (universities + defense labs + industry partnerships) that Singapore and South Korea used to build self-reliant industries.
________________________________________
c. Project Mismanagement
• Local companies given prestige projects beyond their capacity.
• Example:
o Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS) with the RM9 billion Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program.
o BNS failed to deliver even 1 ship by 2025, despite billions spent.
o Poor project management, design changes, and alleged corruption highlight the weakness of local capability.
________________________________________
d. Small Market Size
• Malondesh’s defense budget is low (~1% of GDP).
• Domestic orders are too small to sustain a strong local industry.
• Example: DefTech’s AV-8 Gempita → only ~250 ordered, not enough to support large-scale production.
• Without export markets, companies cannot achieve economies of scale.
________________________________________
e. Political Interference
• Contracts often awarded to politically connected firms rather than those with genuine expertise.
• Results in cost overruns, low quality, and weak accountability.
• Defense industry becomes a tool for patronage, not capability.
________________________________________
f. Weak Supply Chain
• Malondesh imports engines, avionics, weapons, electronics → only basic assembly done locally.
• Spare parts often need to be ordered from Europe, the US, or Russia → long delays, high costs.
________________________________________
📌 3. Examples of Weakness in Action
1. LCS Program (Boustead Naval Shipyard)
o RM9 billion contract (2011) → no ships delivered by 2025.
o Demonstrates limits of local project management.
2. AV-8 Gempita (DefTech)
o Based on Turkish design.
o Good vehicle, but overpriced (RM30 million per unit) due to local production inefficiencies.
o No exports → production ends after Malondeshn order.
3. SME Ordnance (Small Arms)
o Tried producing M4 rifles under license.
o Quality issues and low output.
o Malondesh still imports small arms and ammo in bulk.
4. ATSC (Aircraft Maintenance)
o Handles Su-30MKM maintenance.
o Limited capability; many spare parts still need to come from Russia.
o Readiness rates remain low.
________________________________________
📌 4. Consequences for the Armed Forces
• Procurement Delays: Local firms cannot deliver on time.
• Higher Costs: Local assembly often more expensive than imports.
• Low Readiness: Spare parts and upgrades delayed.
• Capability Gaps: Programs like MRSS (amphibious ships), SPH (artillery), or fighter jets stuck because local firms cannot handle complexity.
1. Aging Fleet & Capability Gaps
BalasHapus• Many ships, like the KD Kasturi and KD Lekir, are over 30 years old, with limited combat capability.
• Malondesh lacks modern anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platforms and long-range missile systems, leaving gaps in deterrence.
• The fleet is not equipped to handle high-tempo operations or multi-domain threats.
2. LCS Procurement Scandal & Delays
• The RM11 billion Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has been plagued by:
o Procurement mismanagement
o Political interference
o Technical delays
• As of 2025, only 72% progress has been made, with the first ship expected to begin sea trials in December 2025.
• This delay leaves Malondesh without modern surface combatants for coastal and EEZ defense.
3. Fragmented Fleet Structure
• RMN operates too many ship classes, complicating logistics, training, and maintenance.
• The 15-to-5 Transformation Plan aims to consolidate the fleet into five core classes, but implementation is slow.
• Fragmentation leads to supply chain inefficiencies and higher operational costs.
4. Budgetary Constraints
• Defense spending is insufficient to support rapid modernization.
• High personnel costs consume over 40% of the defense budget, leaving limited funds for procurement and upgrades.
• Malondesh’s navy modernization is often delayed or scaled down due to fiscal pressures.
5. Limited Maritime Surveillance & Deterrence
• Malondesh faces frequent incursions by foreign vessels, especially in the South China Sea.
• Lack of long-range radars, UAVs, and submarine detection systems weakens maritime domain awareness.
• The Navy is stretched thin across Peninsular and East Malondesh, with limited ability to respond quickly.
6. Geopolitical Pressure & Strategic Vulnerability
• Malondesh’s neutral foreign policy limits its access to strategic alliances like AUKUS or QUAD.
• Rising Chinese assertiveness and illegal fishing by Vietnamese vessels challenge Malondesh’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
• Without a credible naval deterrent, Malondesh risks losing strategic influence in regional waters.
🧭 Summary Table
Problem Area Impact on RMN
Aging Fleet Reduced combat readiness
LCS Delays No modern surface combatants
Fragmented Ship Classes Inefficient logistics & maintenance
Budget Constraints Slow modernization
Weak Maritime Surveillance Vulnerable EEZ & coastlines
Strategic Isolation Limited deterrence in South China Sea
1. Limited Defense Budget Allocation
BalasHapusMalondesh historically allocates a relatively modest portion of its national budget to defense. While exact figures vary yearly, defense spending generally hovers around 1.2%–1.5% of GDP, which is lower than many neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. This limited allocation constrains the military’s ability to fund:
• Procurement of advanced weapons systems
• Research and development (R&D)
• Infrastructure maintenance and upgrades
• Personnel training and welfare
________________________________________
2. High Operational Costs vs. Budget
Even with a modest defense budget, a significant portion goes toward salaries, pensions, and day-to-day operations, leaving limited funds for modernization programs. For instance:
• Military personnel costs (salaries, benefits, retirement pay) consume a large share of the budget.
• Routine operational expenses such as fuel, maintenance, and logistics reduce available funds for new equipment.
This means that Malondesh often faces trade-offs between maintaining existing forces and acquiring new capabilities.
________________________________________
3. Competition with Domestic Priorities
Malondesh faces multiple domestic financial priorities, including:
• Education and healthcare
• Infrastructure development
• Social welfare programs
These competing priorities make it politically and economically difficult to significantly increase defense spending, even when modernization is needed.
________________________________________
4. Dependency on Foreign Technology
Malondesh relies heavily on foreign suppliers for advanced military hardware, which is expensive. Limited financial resources make it challenging to:
• Procure large quantities of modern equipment
• Maintain sophisticated systems
• Engage in long-term defense research or develop indigenous capabilities
As a result, Malondesh often acquires second-hand equipment or delays procurement programs.
________________________________________
5. Impact on Modernization and Strategic Readiness
The financial constraints directly influence Malondesh’s military readiness:
• Aging Equipment: Existing platforms (ships, aircraft, and vehicles) are kept operational beyond their intended lifespan due to budget constraints.
• Delayed Modernization: Planned acquisitions, such as advanced fighter jets, naval vessels, or air defense systems, are often postponed.
• Limited Training and Exercises: Reduced funds for joint exercises, international cooperation, and troop training can affect operational effectiveness.
________________________________________
6. Political and Economic Uncertainties
Fluctuating oil revenues, global economic conditions, and political changes affect budget allocations. Defense funding is often reactive rather than strategic, meaning modernization projects may stall if economic growth slows or budget priorities shift.
________________________________________
Summary:
Financial limitations in Malondesh’s military are primarily caused by modest defense budget allocations, high operational costs, competing domestic priorities, reliance on costly foreign technology, and economic/political uncertainties. These factors collectively constrain modernization, maintenance, and strategic readiness, leaving the armed forces with aging equipment and delayed capability development.
1. Cronyism & Middleman Influence in Defence Deals
BalasHapus• Middlemen & Agents
Analysts and civil society highlight how defence procurement often involves politically connected intermediaries—sometimes retired military officers—who earn hefty commissions and influence decisions. These agents contribute to inflated costs and undermine transparency.
• Lack of Open Competition
Fewer than one-third of major defence contracts are awarded through open competition, creating a system that favors these intermediaries and their affiliated firms
________________________________________
2. High-Profile Procurement Scandals
a) Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Project
• Awarded via direct negotiation, ignoring naval preference. Despite RM6 billion disbursed, zero ships delivered. Cost ballooned to RM11.2 billion.
• Investigations revealed overlapping key figures implicated previously in the Scorpene submarine scandal—suggesting systemic manipulation.c
• Critics say accountability remains elusive, even as oversight committees were formed.
b) Scorpene Submarine Deal (2002)
• A massive RM4.5 billion deal saw RM510 million paid as commissions to politically linked intermediaries. Ship performance issues followed.
c) New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) Program
• Awarded to a firm tied to political cronies; suffered major delays, cost overruns, and unpaid contractors. PAC uncovered corruption, leading to institutional restructuring.
d) Little Bird Helicopters (MD530G)
• A RM321 million contract in 2016 failed to deliver timely. Procurement bypassed technical benchmarks, lacked military specs, and ended with no prosecutions despite MACC scrutiny.
• Public frustration is palpable:
“No further action will be taken over alleged corruption… typical. Corruption from top to bottom.”
e) SIBMAS Armoured Vehicles (1980s)
• Tender allegedly rigged to favor SIBMAS despite failure to meet specs; final product was heavier, underpowered, and underutilized.
f) Missing Jet Engines (2007)
• Two F-5E jet engines were stolen from RMAF stores; individually linked to procurement corruption during Najib’s tenure. They surfaced in Uruguay later.
________________________________________
3. Mismanagement & Systemic Procurement Failures
• Audit Findings on Gempita Armoured Vehicles
RM162.75 million in penalties for late delivery went unclaimed; maintenance contracts worth RM107 million were fragmented to evade procurement controls.
• Wasted Naval Spare Parts
Auditor-General reported RM384 million worth of unused spare parts for the navy. Public reaction via Reddit reflects widespread disillusionment:
“So much for that expense is kickbacks? 90 percent?”
________________________________________
4. Institutional Weaknesses & Reform Efforts
• The Consumers Association of Penang (CAP) has advocated for a Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI) to address 40 years of defence procurement scandals and institutional failures.
• Transparency International Malondesh (TI-M) has criticized recurrent procurement irregularities (e.g., poor contract evaluation, bypassed controls, fragmented tenders) as symptoms of systemic governance breakdown.
• In August 2025, Parliament passed the Government Procurement Bill, aiming to standardize procedures, penalize wrongdoing, and reduce rent-seeking—yet civil society warns about potential loopholes giving ministers excessive power.
• Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has emphasized a "graft-free" defence procurement approach, advocating Government-to-Government (G2G) deals over intermediated ones to reduce corruption and improve transparency.
________________________________________
Summary Overview
Issue Manifestation
Cronyism & Agent Influence Backdoor deals, inflated costs, sidelined military preferences
Scandals LCS, Scorpene, NGPV, MD530G, SIBMAS, missing jet engines
Mismanagement & Waste Unclaimed penalties, unused assets, botched delivery
Institutional Weakness Weak oversight, fragmented tenders, audit warnings disregarded
Reform Initiatives PAC scrutiny, RCI advocacy, new Procurement Bill, push for G2G
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BalasHapusWujud Solidaritas, Warganet Malaysia Ramai Ramai Pesan Makanan di Ojol
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aRP5qeo5VD4
📌 1. Overview of Malondesh’s Local Defense Industry
Hapus• Malondesh has several state-linked defense companies like Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS), DefTech, SME Ordnance, ATSC (Aerospace Technology Systems Corporation).
• However, compared to Singapore’s ST Engineering or Indonesia’s PT Pindad/PT PAL/PT Dirgantara, Malondesh’s industry is:
o Small in scale
o Heavily dependent on foreign technology transfer
o Politically influenced
o Limited in R&D capacity
________________________________________
📌 2. Structural Weaknesses
a. Overdependence on Foreign Technology
• Local companies rarely design or develop indigenous platforms.
• Instead, they assemble or license-build:
o AV-8 Gempita → Turkish FNSS design
o LCS Gowind-class → French Naval Group design
o DefTech trucks/APCs → based on imported chassis
• This makes Malondesh vulnerable when foreign partners withdraw or when funding for ToT (Transfer of Technology) dries up.
________________________________________
b. Limited R&D and Innovation
• Defense R&D budgets are tiny (well under 1% of defense spending).
• No serious indigenous aircraft, ship, or armored vehicle program has emerged.
• Malondesh lacks the ecosystem (universities + defense labs + industry partnerships) that Singapore and South Korea used to build self-reliant industries.
________________________________________
c. Project Mismanagement
• Local companies given prestige projects beyond their capacity.
• Example:
o Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS) with the RM9 billion Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program.
o BNS failed to deliver even 1 ship by 2025, despite billions spent.
o Poor project management, design changes, and alleged corruption highlight the weakness of local capability.
________________________________________
d. Small Market Size
• Malondesh’s defense budget is low (~1% of GDP).
• Domestic orders are too small to sustain a strong local industry.
• Example: DefTech’s AV-8 Gempita → only ~250 ordered, not enough to support large-scale production.
• Without export markets, companies cannot achieve economies of scale.
________________________________________
e. Political Interference
• Contracts often awarded to politically connected firms rather than those with genuine expertise.
• Results in cost overruns, low quality, and weak accountability.
• Defense industry becomes a tool for patronage, not capability.
________________________________________
f. Weak Supply Chain
• Malondesh imports engines, avionics, weapons, electronics → only basic assembly done locally.
• Spare parts often need to be ordered from Europe, the US, or Russia → long delays, high costs.
________________________________________
📌 3. Examples of Weakness in Action
1. LCS Program (Boustead Naval Shipyard)
o RM9 billion contract (2011) → no ships delivered by 2025.
o Demonstrates limits of local project management.
2. AV-8 Gempita (DefTech)
o Based on Turkish design.
o Good vehicle, but overpriced (RM30 million per unit) due to local production inefficiencies.
o No exports → production ends after Malondeshn order.
3. SME Ordnance (Small Arms)
o Tried producing M4 rifles under license.
o Quality issues and low output.
o Malondesh still imports small arms and ammo in bulk.
4. ATSC (Aircraft Maintenance)
o Handles Su-30MKM maintenance.
o Limited capability; many spare parts still need to come from Russia.
o Readiness rates remain low.
________________________________________
📌 4. Consequences for the Armed Forces
• Procurement Delays: Local firms cannot deliver on time.
• Higher Costs: Local assembly often more expensive than imports.
• Low Readiness: Spare parts and upgrades delayed.
• Capability Gaps: Programs like MRSS (amphibious ships), SPH (artillery), or fighter jets stuck because local firms cannot handle complexity.
📌 1. Chronic Underfunding
Hapus• Malondesh spends ~1% of GDP on defense (2023–2025: around RM16–19 billion).
• By comparison:
o Singapore: ~3% of GDP
o Indonesia: ~1.2–1.3% but rising
• The small “envelope” means:
o Not enough money for procurement + operations + maintenance simultaneously.
o Programs get stretched for decades, cancelled, or reduced in scale.
o Even when announced, many projects end up shelved.
________________________________________
📌 2. Political Instability & Short-Termism
• Since 2018, Malondesh has had 5 prime ministers in 7 years → policies keep changing.
• Each new government “re-evaluates” defense programs, often pausing or cancelling them.
• Politicians see defense as low priority compared to subsidies, social spending, and debt repayment.
• Long-term defense plans (like the Defense White Paper 2019) collapse because they require 10–15 years of consistent execution, which Malondesh’s politics cannot provide.
________________________________________
📌 3. Budget Distribution Problems
• Even the small budget is poorly allocated:
o ~50–60% on salaries and pensions.
o ~20–30% on operations & maintenance.
o <20% left for procurement/modernization.
• Effect: Malondesh maintains a large but under-equipped force → many personnel, few modern assets.
________________________________________
📌 4. Weak Local Defense Industry
• Malondesh relies on foreign technology and local assembly (e.g., AV-8 Gempita, LCS).
• Local firms often have political ties, not technical competence.
• Results in scandals and failures (e.g., Littoral Combat Ship – RM9 billion, zero ships delivered).
• No strong exports → cannot sustain industry with economies of scale.
________________________________________
📌 5. Procurement Delays, Cancellations & Scandals
• Major programs (fighters, ships, artillery) delayed for 10–20 years.
• Scandals (LCS, helicopter purchases) erode public and political trust.
• Frequent “resetting” of programs → capability gaps widen.
• Example: MRCA program to replace MiG-29 has been discussed since 2007, still no aircraft by 2025.
________________________________________
📌 6. Operational & Maintenance Weakness
• Many platforms cannot be sustained:
o Su-30MKM fighter availability often <50%.
o Submarines require costly foreign maintenance.
o Condor APCs from 1980s still in service because replacements delayed.
• Spare parts supply chain weak → long downtime for equipment.
________________________________________
📌 7. External Dependence
• Malondesh buys from multiple suppliers (Russia, US, Europe, China, Korea).
• Creates logistics nightmare → incompatible spare parts, training, and support.
• Unlike Singapore (which standardizes on Western tech), Malondesh struggles with interoperability.
________________________________________
📌 8. Public Perception & Priorities
• Ordinary Malondeshns often see defense spending as “wasteful”.
• Scandals reinforce belief that defense = corruption.
• Governments focus instead on subsidies, civil service pay, and development projects to win votes.
• Defense is always sacrificed first when budget pressures rise.
________________________________________
📌 9. Consequences: Why Malondesh Stays Stuck
• Capability gaps in all services:
o Air Force: fighter gap, weak surveillance.
o Navy: LCS delays, only 2 submarines, no amphibious capability.
o Army: outdated artillery, APCs, no attack helicopters.
• Low readiness: Many assets grounded or unavailable.
• Falling behind neighbors:
o Singapore maintains cutting-edge military.
o Indonesia accelerating modernization.
o Vietnam expanding navy & air force for South China Sea.
• Malondesh risks becoming a “hollow force”: large on paper, weak in reality.
📌 1. Malondeshn Armed Forces (ATM) Structure
Hapus• Army (TDM) → largest service, but light and poorly mechanized.
• Navy (TLDM) → overstretched, with too few warships to patrol massive waters.
• Air Force (RMAF/TUDM) → very small, with limited combat aircraft and surveillance capability.
Overall → ATM is small in size and outdated in technology.
________________________________________
📌 2. Army (TDM) – Outdated & Lightly Armed
• Tanks & Armor:
o No modern Main Battle Tanks (MBTs).
o Relies mostly on PT-91M Pendekar (Polish MBT, ~2000s tech, inferior to Leopard 2 or T-90).
o Many armored vehicles (Condor, Sibmas) date back to the 1980s.
• Artillery:
o Mostly old Oto Melara 105mm howitzers, with limited 155mm systems.
o No long-range rocket artillery (MLRS) like Indonesia (ASTROS) or Singapore (HIMARS).
• Air Defense:
o Only short-range MANPADS (Igla, Starstreak).
o No medium- or long-range SAMs → airspace exposed.
• Helicopters:
o Nuri (Sikorsky S-61A) retired without full replacement.
o Limited utility/attack helicopter capability.
👉 Problem: The Army is big in manpower (~80,000) but under-armed compared to regional standards.
________________________________________
📌 3. Navy (TLDM) – Shrinking & Aging
• Frigates/Corvettes:
o Only 2 Lekiu-class (1990s), and 4 Laksamana-class corvettes (1980s Italian ships).
o All nearing end-of-life.
• Submarines:
o 2 Scorpène-class (KD Tunku Abdul Rahman, KD Tun Razak).
o Aging, with high maintenance costs.
o Cannot cover both Peninsular & East Malondesh simultaneously.
• Patrol Vessels:
o Many are small, slow, and aging (Kasturi-class corvettes, Handalan-class FACs from the 1970s).
• New ships delayed:
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal: 6 planned Gowind-class frigates, 0 delivered since 2011.
👉 Problem: The Navy is too small to secure Malondesh South China Sea EEZ or counter Chinese presence.
________________________________________
📌 4. Air Force (RMAF/TUDM) – Very Small Fleet
• Fighters:
o ~18 Su-30MKM (but many often grounded due to maintenance issues).
o ~8 F/A-18D Hornets (aging, no replacements yet).
o MiG-29 fleet retired with no direct replacement.
o Only 36 FA-50 light fighters on order (delivery starting mid-2020s).
• Air Defense:
o No long-range SAMs, no integrated IADS.
o Airspace relies on fighters only.
• Surveillance/Support:
o Limited AEW&C (Airborne Early Warning & Control).
o Few aerial tankers → no long-range endurance.
• Transport/Helicopters:
o Small fleet of C-130s and CN-235s.
o Heavy dependence on aging Nuri helicopters (retired, with gaps in capability).
👉 Problem: The Air Force is tiny compared to neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam).
________________________________________
📌 5. Why “Small & Obsolete” Matters
• Cannot project power: ATM lacks long-range strike, strong navy, or heavy armor.
• Poor deterrence: Enemies know Malondesh cannot respond effectively.
• Maintenance burden: Old equipment costs more to keep running than buying new.
• Capability gaps:
o No long-range air defense.
o No modern drones for ISR/strike.
o No sufficient submarine fleet.
o Weak sealift/airlift for East Malondesh defense.
________________________________________
📌 6. Regional Comparison
• Singapore: 100+ F-15/16 fighters, Leopard 2 tanks, Formidable-class frigates, submarines, HIMARS, long-range SAMs.
• Indonesia: Expanding with Rafale, F-15EX, submarines, frigates, rocket artillery.
• Vietnam: Strong Su-30 fleet, Bastion-P coastal missile batteries, Kilo-class submarines.
• Malondesh:
o ~26 operational fighters.
o 2 submarines.
o No long-range SAMs or modern coastal defense systems.
o Aging ships & vehicles.
👉 Malondesh is the weakest among the mid-tier ASEAN militaries.
________________________________________
📌 7. Core Reason: Budget & Political Will
• Defense budget ~1% of GDP → not enough for modernization.
• Half of budget spent on salaries/pensions → leaves little for procurement.
• Procurement scandals (LCS, helicopter deals) wasted billions.
• Political leaders prioritize subsidies & populism over defense.
📌 1. What Are Policy Flip-Flops?
BalasHapusPolicy flip-flops in Malondesh’s defense mean:
• Frequent changes in plans, programs, and procurement priorities.
• Caused by government changes, minister reshuffles, or shifting political agendas.
• Leads to cancellations, re-tendering, or redesigning programs.
• Results in years of delays, wasted funds, and capability gaps.
________________________________________
📌 2. Drivers of Policy Flip-Flops
a. Frequent Political Changes
• Since 2018: Malondesh had 5 prime ministers in 7 years (Najib → Mahathir → Muhyiddin → Ismail Sabri → Anwar).
• Each PM/defense minister reviews and changes defense priorities.
• Example: The same program (fighter jets, navy ships) can be launched, paused, revived, or cancelled multiple times.
________________________________________
b. Short-Term Focus
• Politicians prioritize 5-year election cycles over 15–20 year defense modernization.
• Programs requiring long-term funding commitments (e.g., fighter jets, submarines, frigates) get disrupted.
________________________________________
c. Budget Pressures
• High national debt (69% of GDP in 2025).
• Defense is seen as “non-essential”, so big-ticket programs are often the first to be cut or postponed.
• Leads to repeated “defer until later” cycles.
________________________________________
d. Corruption & Scandals
• When scandals erupt (e.g., LCS RM9 billion scandal), programs face:
o Audits, suspensions, parliamentary probes.
o Restructuring or even outright cancellation.
• Creates uncertainty for ongoing and future procurement.
________________________________________
📌 3. Examples of Policy Flip-Flops
✈️ Fighter Jet Replacement (MRCA Program)
• 2007–2010: Plan to replace MiG-29 with new fighters.
• Candidates: Rafale, Typhoon, Gripen, Super Hornet, Su-35.
• 2015: Najib government delayed due to budget.
• 2018: Mahathir cancelled, shifted to cheaper LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).
• 2022: RMAF selected Korean FA-50 → but deliveries only from 2026.
⏳ Result: 20 years later, still no MRCA. MiG-29 retired with no replacement.
________________________________________
🚢 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program
• 2011: Najib government approved 6 ships (RM9 billion).
• 2018: PH government halted payments due to mismanagement.
• 2020: PN government restarted program with restructuring.
• 2023–2025: Still no ship delivered.
⏳ Result: Program flip-flopped between “go-ahead” and “pause”, now 14 years with 0 ships.
________________________________________
🚁 Helicopter Procurement
• Malondesh planned medium-lift helicopter replacements (Nuri).
• 2017: Nuri retired suddenly → capability gap.
• 2019: Mahathir’s government cancelled immediate purchase, shifted to leasing option.
• 2022: Army announced leasing 4 Black Hawks → contract collapsed due to disputes.
⏳ Result: Years without adequate helicopters.
________________________________________
🪖 Army Armored Vehicles
• 1980s Condor APCs still in use.
• AV-8 Gempita ordered (2011) → only 257 built, production ended.
• Plan for new wheeled APC → repeatedly delayed.
⏳ Result: Army still operates outdated vehicles because replacement kept shifting.
________________________________________
📌 4. Consequences of Policy Flip-Flops
1. Capability Gaps
o Air Force without MRCA fighters.
o Navy without new frigates.
o Army using outdated artillery and APCs.
2. Wasted Money
o Billions spent on projects that stall or fail (e.g., LCS, helicopter leasing).
3. Industry Instability
o Local companies cannot plan or invest because contracts keep shifting.
o Leads to failures like Boustead Naval Shipyard.
4. Loss of Credibility
o Foreign suppliers lose trust in Malondesh.
o Military loses confidence that promised equipment will ever arrive.
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https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=kRRPmr4XFK0&pp=ygUXcnVtYWggc3JpIG11bHlhbmkgYmFrYXI%3D
📌 1. What Policy Flip-Flops Mean in Procurement
HapusIn Malondesh’s case:
• A procurement program is announced, then delayed, cancelled, or changed.
• Often re-started later under different specs, suppliers, or budget levels.
• Result: equipment arrives 10–20 years late — or never at all.
These flip-flops waste money, damage credibility, and create long gaps in capabilities.
________________________________________
📌 2. Key Drivers of Procurement Flip-Flops
1. Frequent Government Changes → new prime minister or defense minister wants to review/restart.
2. Budget Constraints → once economy slows, defense is first to be cut.
3. Scandals/Corruption → programs frozen or restructured.
4. Shifting Priorities → suddenly focus on cheaper “interim” solutions.
5. Lack of Multi-Year Funding → no guarantee a program survives beyond one budget cycle.
________________________________________
📌 3. Case Studies of Procurement Flip-Flops
✈️ MRCA Fighter Program
• 2007: Malondesh starts plan to replace MiG-29 (retired 2017).
• 2010–2015: Bidders included Rafale, Eurofighter, Gripen, Su-35, F/A-18E.
• 2015: Najib defers due to budget.
• 2018: Mahathir cancels MRCA, shifts to LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).
• 2021: RMAF issues tender → 2023 chooses FA-50 (Korea).
• Flip-Flop Outcome: 20 years of talk, still no MRCA fleet by 2025. Only stopgap FA-50 arriving 2026.
________________________________________
🚢 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
• 2011: Approved → 6 ships (RM9b).
• 2014–2018: Delays + corruption scandals.
• 2019: PH gov stops payments pending audit.
• 2020: PN gov restarts but restructures.
• 2022: Again reviewed, delivery pushed to 2029.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: After 14 years, 0 ships delivered, billions sunk.
________________________________________
🚁 Helicopter Replacement (Nuri/Medium-Lift)
• 2017: Nuri retired abruptly → big air mobility gap.
• 2018–2019: PH gov cancels procurement, proposes leasing option.
• 2021: Leasing plan with 12 helicopters → downsized to 4 Black Hawks.
• 2023: Contract collapses due to dispute.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: Still no medium-lift replacement by 2025. Army depends on ad-hoc leased platforms.
________________________________________
🪖 Army Armored Vehicles
• 1980s-era Condor APCs still in service.
• 2011: Order for 257 AV-8 Gempita → delivered but overpriced.
• Plan for new 4x4 and 6x6 vehicles → multiple tenders cancelled, restarted, then frozen.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: Malondesh lacks a coherent APC fleet, stuck with old Condors.
________________________________________
🔭 Radar & Air Defense Systems
• Plans for new air defense radars since mid-2000s.
• 2015: Deferred.
• 2020: Restarted → selected Thales GM403.
• 2022: Procurement delayed again due to budget reallocation.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: Still no nationwide radar coverage in 2025.
________________________________________
📌 4. Patterns of Flip-Flops
• Announce Big Program (fighters, ships, subs).
• Budget Tightens or Political Change → program postponed.
• Resurrect as Smaller/Interim Program (e.g., MRCA → LCA).
• New Scandal or Government Change → program cancelled again.
• Restart under new specs → wasting years.
This cycle explains why Malondesh still operates:
• 1980s Condors, 1960s artillery, 1990s fighters, 1970s patrol boats.
________________________________________
📌 5. Consequences of Procurement Flip-Flops
1. Capability Gaps → no MRCA fighters, no new frigates, limited helicopters.
2. Rising Costs → delays increase price (e.g., LCS cost ballooned while no ship delivered).
3. Loss of Credibility → foreign suppliers distrust Malondeshn contracts.
4. Industry Collapse → local defense firms (e.g., Boustead) plagued by scandal, unable to sustain work.
5. Operational Weakness → RMAF, RMN, and Army cannot modernize at regional pace
📌 1. What Policy Flip-Flops Mean in Procurement
HapusIn Malondesh’s case:
• A procurement program is announced, then delayed, cancelled, or changed.
• Often re-started later under different specs, suppliers, or budget levels.
• Result: equipment arrives 10–20 years late — or never at all.
These flip-flops waste money, damage credibility, and create long gaps in capabilities.
________________________________________
📌 2. Key Drivers of Procurement Flip-Flops
1. Frequent Government Changes → new prime minister or defense minister wants to review/restart.
2. Budget Constraints → once economy slows, defense is first to be cut.
3. Scandals/Corruption → programs frozen or restructured.
4. Shifting Priorities → suddenly focus on cheaper “interim” solutions.
5. Lack of Multi-Year Funding → no guarantee a program survives beyond one budget cycle.
________________________________________
📌 3. Case Studies of Procurement Flip-Flops
✈️ MRCA Fighter Program
• 2007: Malondesh starts plan to replace MiG-29 (retired 2017).
• 2010–2015: Bidders included Rafale, Eurofighter, Gripen, Su-35, F/A-18E.
• 2015: Najib defers due to budget.
• 2018: Mahathir cancels MRCA, shifts to LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).
• 2021: RMAF issues tender → 2023 chooses FA-50 (Korea).
• Flip-Flop Outcome: 20 years of talk, still no MRCA fleet by 2025. Only stopgap FA-50 arriving 2026.
________________________________________
🚢 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
• 2011: Approved → 6 ships (RM9b).
• 2014–2018: Delays + corruption scandals.
• 2019: PH gov stops payments pending audit.
• 2020: PN gov restarts but restructures.
• 2022: Again reviewed, delivery pushed to 2029.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: After 14 years, 0 ships delivered, billions sunk.
________________________________________
🚁 Helicopter Replacement (Nuri/Medium-Lift)
• 2017: Nuri retired abruptly → big air mobility gap.
• 2018–2019: PH gov cancels procurement, proposes leasing option.
• 2021: Leasing plan with 12 helicopters → downsized to 4 Black Hawks.
• 2023: Contract collapses due to dispute.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: Still no medium-lift replacement by 2025. Army depends on ad-hoc leased platforms.
________________________________________
🪖 Army Armored Vehicles
• 1980s-era Condor APCs still in service.
• 2011: Order for 257 AV-8 Gempita → delivered but overpriced.
• Plan for new 4x4 and 6x6 vehicles → multiple tenders cancelled, restarted, then frozen.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: Malondesh lacks a coherent APC fleet, stuck with old Condors.
________________________________________
🔭 Radar & Air Defense Systems
• Plans for new air defense radars since mid-2000s.
• 2015: Deferred.
• 2020: Restarted → selected Thales GM403.
• 2022: Procurement delayed again due to budget reallocation.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: Still no nationwide radar coverage in 2025.
________________________________________
📌 4. Patterns of Flip-Flops
• Announce Big Program (fighters, ships, subs).
• Budget Tightens or Political Change → program postponed.
• Resurrect as Smaller/Interim Program (e.g., MRCA → LCA).
• New Scandal or Government Change → program cancelled again.
• Restart under new specs → wasting years.
This cycle explains why Malondesh still operates:
• 1980s Condors, 1960s artillery, 1990s fighters, 1970s patrol boats.
________________________________________
📌 5. Consequences of Procurement Flip-Flops
1. Capability Gaps → no MRCA fighters, no new frigates, limited helicopters.
2. Rising Costs → delays increase price (e.g., LCS cost ballooned while no ship delivered).
3. Loss of Credibility → foreign suppliers distrust Malondeshn contracts.
4. Industry Collapse → local defense firms (e.g., Boustead) plagued by scandal, unable to sustain work.
5. Operational Weakness → RMAF, RMN, and Army cannot modernize at regional pace
📌 1. Why Training Hours Matter
Hapus• Training hours = the amount of time pilots, sailors, soldiers spend actively practicing their skills.
• In modern militaries, high training tempo is crucial to:
o Keep proficiency with complex equipment.
o Build unit cohesion.
o Maintain combat readiness.
If training hours fall below international standards, equipment becomes almost useless in real combat.
________________________________________
📌 2. Malondesh’s Low Training Hours – Causes
✈️ Air Force (RMAF)
• Fighter pilots should have 150–180 flight hours per year (NATO standard).
• Many RMAF pilots only get 60–80 hours annually due to:
o Limited fuel budget.
o Spare parts shortages.
o Aircraft availability problems (MiG-29 retired, Su-30 often grounded).
________________________________________
🚢 Navy (RMN)
• Warships should spend 90–120 days at sea per year to maintain readiness.
• RMN vessels average 30–50 days at sea, far below requirement.
• Reasons:
o Budget cuts for fuel and logistics.
o Maintenance backlogs (many patrol vessels >40 years old).
o LCS program delays leaving capability gaps.
________________________________________
🪖 Army (TDM)
• Modern armies conduct large-scale combined arms exercises regularly.
• TDM focuses on small-scale, low-cost jungle training instead.
• Limited live-fire, armored maneuvers, or joint training with air/navy units.
• Fuel & ammunition budgets are often capped → less field time.
________________________________________
📌 3. Impact of Low Training Hours
a. Skill Degradation
• Pilots risk losing combat proficiency (dogfighting, weapons delivery).
• Sailors struggle with complex operations (anti-submarine warfare, missile defense).
• Soldiers lack practice in modern combined-arms tactics.
________________________________________
b. Safety Risks
• Low training hours lead to higher accident rates.
• Example: RMAF has had multiple crashes (Hawk, Nuri) linked partly to training gaps & maintenance issues.
________________________________________
c. Reduced Interoperability
• Joint operations (Air–Land–Sea) require constant practice.
• Without adequate exercises, coordination is weak.
• Limits Malondesh’s ability to operate with allies (e.g., Five Power Defence Arrangements with Singapore, UK, Australia, New Zealand).
________________________________________
d. Wasted Equipment Investment
• Even when Malondesh buys modern platforms (e.g., Su-30MKM, Scorpène submarines), lack of training hours means underutilization.
• Submarine crews need at least 150 sea-days per year → RMN Scorpènes often achieve far less.
________________________________________
e. Morale & Retention Problems
• Professional soldiers want to train and improve.
• When budgets restrict them to desk duty or symbolic exercises, morale falls.
• Leads to difficulties in retaining skilled pilots and officers, who may leave for commercial jobs.
________________________________________
📌 4. Strategic Consequences
• Malondesh’s forces appear large on paper, but real combat readiness is low.
• In a crisis (e.g., South China Sea standoff), Malondesh may struggle to deploy capable units quickly.
• Neighbors like Singapore and Australia maintain much higher training hours → widening readiness gap.
________________________________________
📌 5. Comparison
• Singapore: RSAF pilots log ~180+ hours/year, Navy ships 100+ days at sea, Army runs constant joint training.
• Indonesia: Still prioritizes major exercises (Super Garuda Shield with US).
• Malondesh: Keeps training mostly low-intensity & symbolic due to budget fuel/ammo limits.
________________________________________
✅ Summary
Low training hours in Malondesh’s military mean pilots, sailors, and soldiers lose proficiency, creating safety risks, poor interoperability, and low readiness. The issue stems from tight budgets, limited fuel/ammo allocations, and poor maintenance availability. The result: even when Malondesh buys modern weapons, they cannot be used to their full potential
📌 1. Malondesh Defense Budget in Absolute Terms
Hapus• Over the past decade (2015–2025), Malondesh defense allocation has hovered around:
o RM15–19 billion annually (≈ USD 3.2–4.0 billion).
• 2024 Budget: ~RM19.7 billion (~USD 4.2B).
• 2025: projected to stay roughly flat, given limited fiscal space and high national debt.
________________________________________
📌 2. Why This is Small in Absolute Terms
• While 1% of GDP looks modest, the total envelope in ringgit is also small compared to regional peers:
Country (2024 est.) Defense Budget (USD) Population Notes
Singapore ~$12.5B 6M Spends 3–4% GDP; much higher per capita.
Indonesia ~$9.5B 280M 1–1.2% GDP, but larger economy gives bigger envelope.
Thailand ~$7B 70M 1.2% GDP.
Philippines ~$5.3B 115M Rising due to South China Sea focus.
Malondesh ~$4.0B 34M ~0.9–1% GDP, lowest absolute spend among major ASEAN states.
👉 Malondesh absolute spending is the lowest among middle-sized ASEAN militaries, despite having major maritime security needs in the South China Sea.
________________________________________
📌 3. Effect of a Small Absolute Budget
Even if % of GDP rises slightly, the absolute ringgit amount remains too small to:
a. Fund Modern Procurement
• Fighter jets, frigates, and submarines are multi-billion RM projects.
• Example: 6 LCS Gowind frigates → RM9 billion+ (but still incomplete).
• With only RM19B annual budget, one major program can consume the entire procurement budget for years.
b. Support Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
• Fuel, spare parts, training, logistics are expensive.
• A small total envelope means O&M is constantly underfunded → low readiness.
c. Currency Weakness Effect
• Most modern weapons are priced in USD or EUR.
• Ringgit depreciation (RM4.7–4.8 per USD in 2025) shrinks buying power even further.
• What looks like RM19B is really only USD 4B, compared to Singapore’s USD 12B.
d. Crowding Out by Salaries
• Out of RM19B defense budget:
o ~70% goes to salaries, pensions, allowances.
o Only ~20–25% available for development & procurement.
• In absolute terms: less than RM4–5B/year for modernization.
________________________________________
📌 4. Strategic Impact
1. Procurement Delays → Malondesh can’t afford large-scale upgrades (MRCA fighter replacement, LCS frigates).
2. Training Cuts → limited fuel/ammo for exercises.
3. Capability Gap with Neighbors widens:
o Singapore buys F-35s, new submarines.
o Indonesia expands fighter fleet and naval assets.
o Philippines accelerates modernization with US/Japan support.
o Malondesh remains stagnant.
1. Overweight on Operating Expenditure
Hapus• Over 40% of Malondesh defence budget goes to salaries, pensions, and allowances.
• This leaves limited room for capital expenditure (procurement, upgrades, R&D).
• Example: In 2024, RM8.2 billion was allocated for personnel costs, while only RM5.71 billion went to procurement.
2. Fragmented Procurement Planning
• The Ministry of Defence lacks a clear multi-year procurement roadmap.
• Funding is often allocated year-to-year, making it hard to commit to long-term modernization projects.
• This leads to delays, cost overruns, and underutilized platforms (e.g. the Littoral Combat Ship fiasco).
3. Political Hesitation to Rebalance
• Successive governments have been unwilling to cut personnel costs or restructure the armed forces.
• Reducing manpower or retiring outdated equipment is politically sensitive, especially with veterans and civil service unions.
4. Currency Depreciation & Import Dependence
• Malondesh imports most of its defence equipment.
• The weak ringgit erodes purchasing power, so even increased budgets don’t translate into real capability gains.
5. Multi-Year Commitments Hidden in Annual Budgets
• Annual allocations include progressive payments for past procurements (e.g. FA-50 jets, A400M upgrades).
• These payments crowd out new investments, creating the illusion of fresh funding when it’s actually backlog servicing.
📊 Budget Allocation Snapshot (2024)
Category Allocation (RM) % of Total Budget
Personnel Costs 8.2 billion ~41%
Procurement 5.71 billion ~29%
Operations & Training ~3.5 billion ~18%
Miscellaneous ~2.3 billion ~12%
🔍 Consequences of the Chronic Allocation Problem
• Delayed modernization: RMN, RMAF, and Army struggle to replace aging platforms.
• Capability gaps: Limited readiness for maritime threats, cyber warfare, and regional deterrence.
• Low regional competitiveness: Malondesh lags behind Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam in defence tech and force structure
📌 1. What Policy Flip-Flops Mean in Procurement
BalasHapusIn Malondesh’s case:
• A procurement program is announced, then delayed, cancelled, or changed.
• Often re-started later under different specs, suppliers, or budget levels.
• Result: equipment arrives 10–20 years late — or never at all.
These flip-flops waste money, damage credibility, and create long gaps in capabilities.
________________________________________
📌 2. Key Drivers of Procurement Flip-Flops
1. Frequent Government Changes → new prime minister or defense minister wants to review/restart.
2. Budget Constraints → once economy slows, defense is first to be cut.
3. Scandals/Corruption → programs frozen or restructured.
4. Shifting Priorities → suddenly focus on cheaper “interim” solutions.
5. Lack of Multi-Year Funding → no guarantee a program survives beyond one budget cycle.
________________________________________
📌 3. Case Studies of Procurement Flip-Flops
✈️ MRCA Fighter Program
• 2007: Malondesh starts plan to replace MiG-29 (retired 2017).
• 2010–2015: Bidders included Rafale, Eurofighter, Gripen, Su-35, F/A-18E.
• 2015: Najib defers due to budget.
• 2018: Mahathir cancels MRCA, shifts to LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).
• 2021: RMAF issues tender → 2023 chooses FA-50 (Korea).
• Flip-Flop Outcome: 20 years of talk, still no MRCA fleet by 2025. Only stopgap FA-50 arriving 2026.
________________________________________
🚢 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
• 2011: Approved → 6 ships (RM9b).
• 2014–2018: Delays + corruption scandals.
• 2019: PH gov stops payments pending audit.
• 2020: PN gov restarts but restructures.
• 2022: Again reviewed, delivery pushed to 2029.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: After 14 years, 0 ships delivered, billions sunk.
________________________________________
🚁 Helicopter Replacement (Nuri/Medium-Lift)
• 2017: Nuri retired abruptly → big air mobility gap.
• 2018–2019: PH gov cancels procurement, proposes leasing option.
• 2021: Leasing plan with 12 helicopters → downsized to 4 Black Hawks.
• 2023: Contract collapses due to dispute.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: Still no medium-lift replacement by 2025. Army depends on ad-hoc leased platforms.
________________________________________
🪖 Army Armored Vehicles
• 1980s-era Condor APCs still in service.
• 2011: Order for 257 AV-8 Gempita → delivered but overpriced.
• Plan for new 4x4 and 6x6 vehicles → multiple tenders cancelled, restarted, then frozen.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: Malondesh lacks a coherent APC fleet, stuck with old Condors.
________________________________________
🔭 Radar & Air Defense Systems
• Plans for new air defense radars since mid-2000s.
• 2015: Deferred.
• 2020: Restarted → selected Thales GM403.
• 2022: Procurement delayed again due to budget reallocation.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: Still no nationwide radar coverage in 2025.
________________________________________
📌 4. Patterns of Flip-Flops
• Announce Big Program (fighters, ships, subs).
• Budget Tightens or Political Change → program postponed.
• Resurrect as Smaller/Interim Program (e.g., MRCA → LCA).
• New Scandal or Government Change → program cancelled again.
• Restart under new specs → wasting years.
This cycle explains why Malondesh still operates:
• 1980s Condors, 1960s artillery, 1990s fighters, 1970s patrol boats.
________________________________________
📌 5. Consequences of Procurement Flip-Flops
1. Capability Gaps → no MRCA fighters, no new frigates, limited helicopters.
2. Rising Costs → delays increase price (e.g., LCS cost ballooned while no ship delivered).
3. Loss of Credibility → foreign suppliers distrust Malondeshn contracts.
4. Industry Collapse → local defense firms (e.g., Boustead) plagued by scandal, unable to sustain work.
5. Operational Weakness → RMAF, RMN, and Army cannot modernize at regional pace
📌 1. What Policy Flip-Flops Mean in Procurement
BalasHapusIn Malondesh’s case:
• A procurement program is announced, then delayed, cancelled, or changed.
• Often re-started later under different specs, suppliers, or budget levels.
• Result: equipment arrives 10–20 years late — or never at all.
These flip-flops waste money, damage credibility, and create long gaps in capabilities.
________________________________________
📌 2. Key Drivers of Procurement Flip-Flops
1. Frequent Government Changes → new prime minister or defense minister wants to review/restart.
2. Budget Constraints → once economy slows, defense is first to be cut.
3. Scandals/Corruption → programs frozen or restructured.
4. Shifting Priorities → suddenly focus on cheaper “interim” solutions.
5. Lack of Multi-Year Funding → no guarantee a program survives beyond one budget cycle.
________________________________________
📌 3. Case Studies of Procurement Flip-Flops
✈️ MRCA Fighter Program
• 2007: Malondesh starts plan to replace MiG-29 (retired 2017).
• 2010–2015: Bidders included Rafale, Eurofighter, Gripen, Su-35, F/A-18E.
• 2015: Najib defers due to budget.
• 2018: Mahathir cancels MRCA, shifts to LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).
• 2021: RMAF issues tender → 2023 chooses FA-50 (Korea).
• Flip-Flop Outcome: 20 years of talk, still no MRCA fleet by 2025. Only stopgap FA-50 arriving 2026.
________________________________________
🚢 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
• 2011: Approved → 6 ships (RM9b).
• 2014–2018: Delays + corruption scandals.
• 2019: PH gov stops payments pending audit.
• 2020: PN gov restarts but restructures.
• 2022: Again reviewed, delivery pushed to 2029.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: After 14 years, 0 ships delivered, billions sunk.
________________________________________
🚁 Helicopter Replacement (Nuri/Medium-Lift)
• 2017: Nuri retired abruptly → big air mobility gap.
• 2018–2019: PH gov cancels procurement, proposes leasing option.
• 2021: Leasing plan with 12 helicopters → downsized to 4 Black Hawks.
• 2023: Contract collapses due to dispute.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: Still no medium-lift replacement by 2025. Army depends on ad-hoc leased platforms.
________________________________________
🪖 Army Armored Vehicles
• 1980s-era Condor APCs still in service.
• 2011: Order for 257 AV-8 Gempita → delivered but overpriced.
• Plan for new 4x4 and 6x6 vehicles → multiple tenders cancelled, restarted, then frozen.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: Malondesh lacks a coherent APC fleet, stuck with old Condors.
________________________________________
🔭 Radar & Air Defense Systems
• Plans for new air defense radars since mid-2000s.
• 2015: Deferred.
• 2020: Restarted → selected Thales GM403.
• 2022: Procurement delayed again due to budget reallocation.
• Flip-Flop Outcome: Still no nationwide radar coverage in 2025.
________________________________________
📌 4. Patterns of Flip-Flops
• Announce Big Program (fighters, ships, subs).
• Budget Tightens or Political Change → program postponed.
• Resurrect as Smaller/Interim Program (e.g., MRCA → LCA).
• New Scandal or Government Change → program cancelled again.
• Restart under new specs → wasting years.
This cycle explains why Malondesh still operates:
• 1980s Condors, 1960s artillery, 1990s fighters, 1970s patrol boats.
________________________________________
📌 5. Consequences of Procurement Flip-Flops
1. Capability Gaps → no MRCA fighters, no new frigates, limited helicopters.
2. Rising Costs → delays increase price (e.g., LCS cost ballooned while no ship delivered).
3. Loss of Credibility → foreign suppliers distrust Malondeshn contracts.
4. Industry Collapse → local defense firms (e.g., Boustead) plagued by scandal, unable to sustain work.
5. Operational Weakness → RMAF, RMN, and Army cannot modernize at regional pace
📌 1. Why Training Hours Matter
BalasHapus• Training hours = the amount of time pilots, sailors, soldiers spend actively practicing their skills.
• In modern militaries, high training tempo is crucial to:
o Keep proficiency with complex equipment.
o Build unit cohesion.
o Maintain combat readiness.
If training hours fall below international standards, equipment becomes almost useless in real combat.
________________________________________
📌 2. Malondesh’s Low Training Hours – Causes
✈️ Air Force (RMAF)
• Fighter pilots should have 150–180 flight hours per year (NATO standard).
• Many RMAF pilots only get 60–80 hours annually due to:
o Limited fuel budget.
o Spare parts shortages.
o Aircraft availability problems (MiG-29 retired, Su-30 often grounded).
________________________________________
🚢 Navy (RMN)
• Warships should spend 90–120 days at sea per year to maintain readiness.
• RMN vessels average 30–50 days at sea, far below requirement.
• Reasons:
o Budget cuts for fuel and logistics.
o Maintenance backlogs (many patrol vessels >40 years old).
o LCS program delays leaving capability gaps.
________________________________________
🪖 Army (TDM)
• Modern armies conduct large-scale combined arms exercises regularly.
• TDM focuses on small-scale, low-cost jungle training instead.
• Limited live-fire, armored maneuvers, or joint training with air/navy units.
• Fuel & ammunition budgets are often capped → less field time.
________________________________________
📌 3. Impact of Low Training Hours
a. Skill Degradation
• Pilots risk losing combat proficiency (dogfighting, weapons delivery).
• Sailors struggle with complex operations (anti-submarine warfare, missile defense).
• Soldiers lack practice in modern combined-arms tactics.
________________________________________
b. Safety Risks
• Low training hours lead to higher accident rates.
• Example: RMAF has had multiple crashes (Hawk, Nuri) linked partly to training gaps & maintenance issues.
________________________________________
c. Reduced Interoperability
• Joint operations (Air–Land–Sea) require constant practice.
• Without adequate exercises, coordination is weak.
• Limits Malondesh’s ability to operate with allies (e.g., Five Power Defence Arrangements with Singapore, UK, Australia, New Zealand).
________________________________________
d. Wasted Equipment Investment
• Even when Malondesh buys modern platforms (e.g., Su-30MKM, Scorpène submarines), lack of training hours means underutilization.
• Submarine crews need at least 150 sea-days per year → RMN Scorpènes often achieve far less.
________________________________________
e. Morale & Retention Problems
• Professional soldiers want to train and improve.
• When budgets restrict them to desk duty or symbolic exercises, morale falls.
• Leads to difficulties in retaining skilled pilots and officers, who may leave for commercial jobs.
________________________________________
📌 4. Strategic Consequences
• Malondesh’s forces appear large on paper, but real combat readiness is low.
• In a crisis (e.g., South China Sea standoff), Malondesh may struggle to deploy capable units quickly.
• Neighbors like Singapore and Australia maintain much higher training hours → widening readiness gap.
________________________________________
📌 5. Comparison
• Singapore: RSAF pilots log ~180+ hours/year, Navy ships 100+ days at sea, Army runs constant joint training.
• Indonesia: Still prioritizes major exercises (Super Garuda Shield with US).
• Malondesh: Keeps training mostly low-intensity & symbolic due to budget fuel/ammo limits.
________________________________________
✅ Summary
Low training hours in Malondesh’s military mean pilots, sailors, and soldiers lose proficiency, creating safety risks, poor interoperability, and low readiness. The issue stems from tight budgets, limited fuel/ammo allocations, and poor maintenance availability. The result: even when Malondesh buys modern weapons, they cannot be used to their full potential
📌 1. Malondesh Defense Budget in Absolute Terms
BalasHapus• Over the past decade (2015–2025), Malondesh defense allocation has hovered around:
o RM15–19 billion annually (≈ USD 3.2–4.0 billion).
• 2024 Budget: ~RM19.7 billion (~USD 4.2B).
• 2025: projected to stay roughly flat, given limited fiscal space and high national debt.
________________________________________
📌 2. Why This is Small in Absolute Terms
• While 1% of GDP looks modest, the total envelope in ringgit is also small compared to regional peers:
Country (2024 est.) Defense Budget (USD) Population Notes
Singapore ~$12.5B 6M Spends 3–4% GDP; much higher per capita.
Indonesia ~$9.5B 280M 1–1.2% GDP, but larger economy gives bigger envelope.
Thailand ~$7B 70M 1.2% GDP.
Philippines ~$5.3B 115M Rising due to South China Sea focus.
Malondesh ~$4.0B 34M ~0.9–1% GDP, lowest absolute spend among major ASEAN states.
👉 Malondesh absolute spending is the lowest among middle-sized ASEAN militaries, despite having major maritime security needs in the South China Sea.
________________________________________
📌 3. Effect of a Small Absolute Budget
Even if % of GDP rises slightly, the absolute ringgit amount remains too small to:
a. Fund Modern Procurement
• Fighter jets, frigates, and submarines are multi-billion RM projects.
• Example: 6 LCS Gowind frigates → RM9 billion+ (but still incomplete).
• With only RM19B annual budget, one major program can consume the entire procurement budget for years.
b. Support Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
• Fuel, spare parts, training, logistics are expensive.
• A small total envelope means O&M is constantly underfunded → low readiness.
c. Currency Weakness Effect
• Most modern weapons are priced in USD or EUR.
• Ringgit depreciation (RM4.7–4.8 per USD in 2025) shrinks buying power even further.
• What looks like RM19B is really only USD 4B, compared to Singapore’s USD 12B.
d. Crowding Out by Salaries
• Out of RM19B defense budget:
o ~70% goes to salaries, pensions, allowances.
o Only ~20–25% available for development & procurement.
• In absolute terms: less than RM4–5B/year for modernization.
________________________________________
📌 4. Strategic Impact
1. Procurement Delays → Malondesh can’t afford large-scale upgrades (MRCA fighter replacement, LCS frigates).
2. Training Cuts → limited fuel/ammo for exercises.
3. Capability Gap with Neighbors widens:
o Singapore buys F-35s, new submarines.
o Indonesia expands fighter fleet and naval assets.
o Philippines accelerates modernization with US/Japan support.
o Malondesh remains stagnant.
📌 1. What is the “Chronic Allocation Problem”?
BalasHapusMalondesh defense budget suffers from structural imbalances:
• ~70% → Salaries, pensions, allowances.
• ~20–25% → Operations & maintenance (O&M).
• <10% → Development (procurement, modernization).
This pattern has persisted for decades, regardless of who is in power. It’s “chronic” because it doesn’t change year to year — it is baked into Malondesh defense system.
________________________________________
📌 2. Why So Skewed?
1. Large manpower-heavy force → Army dominates with many personnel, each entitled to allowances & pensions.
2. Political incentives → Governments prefer to expand or protect jobs and welfare (pensions, veterans’ benefits) rather than invest in long-term modernization.
3. Rigid financial system → Once salaries & pensions are committed, they are “locked in,” leaving procurement squeezed.
4. Weak multi-year planning → Budgets are annual, so each year O&M & salaries get priority over new projects.
________________________________________
📌 3. Effects on the Armed Forces
✈️ Air Force (RMAF)
• Insufficient flying hours → pilots often below NATO standards.
• Can’t afford to maintain multiple fleets (Su-30, F/A-18D, Hawks).
• Retirement of MiG-29 left gap, but MRCA replacement delayed decades due to budget.
________________________________________
🚢 Navy (RMN)
• Modernization projects (e.g., LCS frigates) stalled because there’s no steady development funding.
• Existing fleet spends fewer days at sea due to limited fuel allocations.
• Submarines (Scorpène) struggle with high operational costs.
________________________________________
🪖 Army (TDM)
• Personnel-heavy structure consumes most of the salary budget.
• Modernization of armored vehicles, artillery, and air defense delayed.
• Training often limited to small-scale jungle exercises (cheap but outdated for modern warfare).
________________________________________
📌 4. Macro-Level Consequences
1. Modernization Paralysis
o Malondesh buys one “prestige project” (e.g., Scorpène, Su-30, LCS) but can’t follow through with sustainment.
o No continuous upgrade pipeline.
2. Readiness Erosion
o Without sufficient O&M funding, equipment availability drops.
o Spare parts shortages → many assets grounded or idle.
3. Capability Gaps Widen
o Neighbors move ahead with systematic modernization (Singapore F-35, Indonesia MEF).
o Malondesh falls behind, unable to replace aging fleets.
4. Low Return on Investment
o Billions spent on prestige platforms, but underutilized due to fuel & training cuts.
o Example: Su-30MKM — advanced but rarely flown compared to RSAF F-15SG or RTAF Gripens.
5. Morale & Retention Issues
o Soldiers see little investment in training or new kit.
o Skilled personnel (especially pilots, engineers) leave for commercial jobs.
________________________________________
📌 5. Strategic Impact
• South China Sea: Malondesh has claims but can’t patrol effectively.
• Counterterrorism: Army is manpower-heavy but lacks modern surveillance & rapid deployment assets.
• Alliances: Limits Malondesh credibility in joint exercises (FPDA, ASEAN).
• Defense Diplomacy: Malondesh often seen as “talking big, acting small” in regional security.
1. Overweight on Operating Expenditure
BalasHapus• Over 40% of Malondesh defence budget goes to salaries, pensions, and allowances.
• This leaves limited room for capital expenditure (procurement, upgrades, R&D).
• Example: In 2024, RM8.2 billion was allocated for personnel costs, while only RM5.71 billion went to procurement.
2. Fragmented Procurement Planning
• The Ministry of Defence lacks a clear multi-year procurement roadmap.
• Funding is often allocated year-to-year, making it hard to commit to long-term modernization projects.
• This leads to delays, cost overruns, and underutilized platforms (e.g. the Littoral Combat Ship fiasco).
3. Political Hesitation to Rebalance
• Successive governments have been unwilling to cut personnel costs or restructure the armed forces.
• Reducing manpower or retiring outdated equipment is politically sensitive, especially with veterans and civil service unions.
4. Currency Depreciation & Import Dependence
• Malondesh imports most of its defence equipment.
• The weak ringgit erodes purchasing power, so even increased budgets don’t translate into real capability gains.
5. Multi-Year Commitments Hidden in Annual Budgets
• Annual allocations include progressive payments for past procurements (e.g. FA-50 jets, A400M upgrades).
• These payments crowd out new investments, creating the illusion of fresh funding when it’s actually backlog servicing.
📊 Budget Allocation Snapshot (2024)
Category Allocation (RM) % of Total Budget
Personnel Costs 8.2 billion ~41%
Procurement 5.71 billion ~29%
Operations & Training ~3.5 billion ~18%
Miscellaneous ~2.3 billion ~12%
🔍 Consequences of the Chronic Allocation Problem
• Delayed modernization: RMN, RMAF, and Army struggle to replace aging platforms.
• Capability gaps: Limited readiness for maritime threats, cyber warfare, and regional deterrence.
• Low regional competitiveness: Malondesh lags behind Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam in defence tech and force structure
NGERI UTANG MALON SANGAT MENGGUNUNG 🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusSetiap penduduk MALON mempunyai UTANG rata2 RM 47.000
Setiap penduduk MALON dibebani UTANG KERAJAAN sekitar RM 37.000
NGERI ...
🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣
Pada akhir kuartal pertama 2025 (Maret 2025), total utang rumah tangga Malaysia adalah RM 1,65 triliun atau setara 84,3% dari PDB, sedangkan utang pemerintah persekutuan mencapai RM 1,3 triliun pada akhir Juni 2025, naik dari RM 1,25 triliun pada akhir 2024. Utang pemerintah terhadap PDB diperkirakan akan mencapai 69% pada akhir 2025.
PUR UTANGMU BERAPA? JANGAN LUPA BAYAR YA .....
BalasHapus🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣
PURR
BalasHapusLCS MANA YA
14 TAHUN HASIL ZERO
Wooiiii....PT PAL...kapal pesanan pinoy bila mau siap....??? HAHAHAHAHA
BalasHapusTenang pur, sesuai jadwal
HapusGak DELAY seperti LCS
🤣🤣🤣🥱🥱
bila mau siap woooiiiiii.....HAHAHAHAH
Hapus🧨 1. Lack of Transparency and Oversight
HapusLimited Competitive Tendering: Fewer than 30% of major defense contracts are awarded through open competition. Most deals are single-source or limited tenders, often favoring politically connected firms.
Opaque Contract Structures: Many contracts lack public disclosure of terms, pricing, or delivery milestones, making it difficult to track progress or detect irregularities.
🕴️ 2. Role of Middlemen and Politically Connected Agents
Procurement is often mediated by retired military officers or politically linked intermediaries, who act as “agents” or “salesmen” within the Ministry of Defence.
These middlemen inflate prices, obscure accountability, and steer contracts toward preferred vendors—sometimes with little regard for capability or quality.
The King of Malaysia recently rebuked this practice, calling out the use of “flying coffins” (referring to outdated helicopters) and warning that inflated middleman pricing would exhaust the defense budget.
🚨 3. Major Scandals: Case Studies
A. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
RM9 billion allocated for six ships; none delivered as of 2025.
Investigations revealed mismanagement, payment irregularities, and involvement of figures linked to the earlier Scorpene submarine scandal.
The Armed Forces Pension Fund (LTAT) was implicated in channeling illegal commissions.
B. Scorpene Submarine Scandal
French court proceedings exposed kickbacks and illegal commissions tied to Malaysia’s purchase of two submarines in 2002.
Former PM Najib Razak, who was defense minister at the time, was linked to the deal and later convicted in unrelated corruption cases.
C. MD530G Helicopter Deal
Malaysia paid 35% of the contract value for six helicopters in 2015, but none were delivered by 2018.
The deal was flagged for irregularities, and the Defense Ministry lodged a report with the anti-graft agency.
🧭 4. Systemic Weaknesses That Enable Scandals
Weakness Impact
No centralized procurement authority Fragmented decision-making, poor oversight
Political interference Contracts awarded based on connections, not merit
Weak audit enforcement Delayed or suppressed findings, limited accountability
Budget opacity Hard to trace payments, detect overpricing or ghost assets
🔄 5. Consequences for Military Readiness
Delayed modernization: Platforms like the LCS and helicopters remain undelivered.
Eroded trust: OEMs and foreign partners view Malaysia as a high-risk client.
Operational gaps: Forces operate with aging equipment while waiting for replacements.
Public backlash: Scandals undermine public confidence in defense institutions.
🧨 1. Lack of Transparency and Oversight
HapusLimited Competitive Tendering: Fewer than 30% of major defense contracts are awarded through open competition. Most deals are single-source or limited tenders, often favoring politically connected firms.
Opaque Contract Structures: Many contracts lack public disclosure of terms, pricing, or delivery milestones, making it difficult to track progress or detect irregularities.
🕴️ 2. Role of Middlemen and Politically Connected Agents
Procurement is often mediated by retired military officers or politically linked intermediaries, who act as “agents” or “salesmen” within the Ministry of Defence.
These middlemen inflate prices, obscure accountability, and steer contracts toward preferred vendors—sometimes with little regard for capability or quality.
The King of Malaysia recently rebuked this practice, calling out the use of “flying coffins” (referring to outdated helicopters) and warning that inflated middleman pricing would exhaust the defense budget.
🚨 3. Major Scandals: Case Studies
A. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
RM9 billion allocated for six ships; none delivered as of 2025.
Investigations revealed mismanagement, payment irregularities, and involvement of figures linked to the earlier Scorpene submarine scandal.
The Armed Forces Pension Fund (LTAT) was implicated in channeling illegal commissions.
B. Scorpene Submarine Scandal
French court proceedings exposed kickbacks and illegal commissions tied to Malaysia’s purchase of two submarines in 2002.
Former PM Najib Razak, who was defense minister at the time, was linked to the deal and later convicted in unrelated corruption cases.
C. MD530G Helicopter Deal
Malaysia paid 35% of the contract value for six helicopters in 2015, but none were delivered by 2018.
The deal was flagged for irregularities, and the Defense Ministry lodged a report with the anti-graft agency.
🧭 4. Systemic Weaknesses That Enable Scandals
Weakness Impact
No centralized procurement authority Fragmented decision-making, poor oversight
Political interference Contracts awarded based on connections, not merit
Weak audit enforcement Delayed or suppressed findings, limited accountability
Budget opacity Hard to trace payments, detect overpricing or ghost assets
🔄 5. Consequences for Military Readiness
Delayed modernization: Platforms like the LCS and helicopters remain undelivered.
Eroded trust: OEMs and foreign partners view Malaysia as a high-risk client.
Operational gaps: Forces operate with aging equipment while waiting for replacements.
Public backlash: Scandals undermine public confidence in defense institutions.
🧨 1. Lack of Transparency and Oversight
Hapus• Limited Competitive Tendering: Fewer than 30% of major defense contracts are awarded through open competition. Most deals are single-source or limited tenders, often favoring politically connected firms.
• Opaque Contract Structures: Many contracts lack public disclosure of terms, pricing, or delivery milestones, making it difficult to track progress or detect irregularities.
🕴️ 2. Role of Middlemen and Politically Connected Agents
• Procurement is often mediated by retired military officers or politically linked intermediaries, who act as “agents” or “salesmen” within the Ministry of Defence.
• These middlemen inflate prices, obscure accountability, and steer contracts toward preferred vendors—sometimes with little regard for capability or quality.
• The King of Malondesh recently rebuked this practice, calling out the use of “flying coffins” (referring to outdated helicopters) and warning that inflated middleman pricing would exhaust the defense budget.
🚨 3. Major Scandals: Case Studies
A. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
• RM9 billion allocated for six ships; none delivered as of 2025.
• Investigations revealed mismanagement, payment irregularities, and involvement of figures linked to the earlier Scorpene submarine scandal.
• The Armed Forces Pension Fund (LTAT) was implicated in channeling illegal commissions.
B. Scorpene Submarine Scandal
• French court proceedings exposed kickbacks and illegal commissions tied to Malondesh’s purchase of two submarines in 2002.
• Former PM Najib Razak, who was defense minister at the time, was linked to the deal and later convicted in unrelated corruption cases.
C. MD530G Helicopter Deal
• Malondesh paid 35% of the contract value for six helicopters in 2015, but none were delivered by 2018.
• The deal was flagged for irregularities, and the Defense Ministry lodged a report with the anti-graft agency.
🧭 4. Systemic Weaknesses That Enable Scandals
Weakness Impact
No centralized procurement authority Fragmented decision-making, poor oversight
Political interference Contracts awarded based on connections, not merit
Weak audit enforcement Delayed or suppressed findings, limited accountability
Budget opacity Hard to trace payments, detect overpricing or ghost assets
🔄 5. Consequences for Military Readiness
• Delayed modernization: Platforms like the LCS and helicopters remain undelivered.
• Eroded trust: OEMs and foreign partners view Malondesh as a high-risk client.
• Operational gaps: Forces operate with aging equipment while waiting for replacements.
• Public backlash: Scandals undermine public confidence in defense institutions.
Tenang pur, siap sesuai permintaan Pinoy
HapusKejar saja Lunas yang proyek LCS DELAY lagi
BUBAR 2030 semakin NYATA....HAHAHAHA
BalasHapus🧨 1. Lack of Transparency and Oversight
HapusLimited Competitive Tendering: Fewer than 30% of major defense contracts are awarded through open competition. Most deals are single-source or limited tenders, often favoring politically connected firms.
Opaque Contract Structures: Many contracts lack public disclosure of terms, pricing, or delivery milestones, making it difficult to track progress or detect irregularities.
🕴️ 2. Role of Middlemen and Politically Connected Agents
Procurement is often mediated by retired military officers or politically linked intermediaries, who act as “agents” or “salesmen” within the Ministry of Defence.
These middlemen inflate prices, obscure accountability, and steer contracts toward preferred vendors—sometimes with little regard for capability or quality.
The King of Malaysia recently rebuked this practice, calling out the use of “flying coffins” (referring to outdated helicopters) and warning that inflated middleman pricing would exhaust the defense budget.
🚨 3. Major Scandals: Case Studies
A. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
RM9 billion allocated for six ships; none delivered as of 2025.
Investigations revealed mismanagement, payment irregularities, and involvement of figures linked to the earlier Scorpene submarine scandal.
The Armed Forces Pension Fund (LTAT) was implicated in channeling illegal commissions.
B. Scorpene Submarine Scandal
French court proceedings exposed kickbacks and illegal commissions tied to Malaysia’s purchase of two submarines in 2002.
Former PM Najib Razak, who was defense minister at the time, was linked to the deal and later convicted in unrelated corruption cases.
C. MD530G Helicopter Deal
Malaysia paid 35% of the contract value for six helicopters in 2015, but none were delivered by 2018.
The deal was flagged for irregularities, and the Defense Ministry lodged a report with the anti-graft agency.
🧭 4. Systemic Weaknesses That Enable Scandals
Weakness Impact
No centralized procurement authority Fragmented decision-making, poor oversight
Political interference Contracts awarded based on connections, not merit
Weak audit enforcement Delayed or suppressed findings, limited accountability
Budget opacity Hard to trace payments, detect overpricing or ghost assets
🔄 5. Consequences for Military Readiness
Delayed modernization: Platforms like the LCS and helicopters remain undelivered.
Eroded trust: OEMs and foreign partners view Malaysia as a high-risk client.
Operational gaps: Forces operate with aging equipment while waiting for replacements.
Public backlash: Scandals undermine public confidence in defense institutions.
🧨 1. Lack of Transparency and Oversight
Hapus• Limited Competitive Tendering: Fewer than 30% of major defense contracts are awarded through open competition. Most deals are single-source or limited tenders, often favoring politically connected firms.
• Opaque Contract Structures: Many contracts lack public disclosure of terms, pricing, or delivery milestones, making it difficult to track progress or detect irregularities.
🕴️ 2. Role of Middlemen and Politically Connected Agents
• Procurement is often mediated by retired military officers or politically linked intermediaries, who act as “agents” or “salesmen” within the Ministry of Defence.
• These middlemen inflate prices, obscure accountability, and steer contracts toward preferred vendors—sometimes with little regard for capability or quality.
• The King of Malondesh recently rebuked this practice, calling out the use of “flying coffins” (referring to outdated helicopters) and warning that inflated middleman pricing would exhaust the defense budget.
🚨 3. Major Scandals: Case Studies
A. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
• RM9 billion allocated for six ships; none delivered as of 2025.
• Investigations revealed mismanagement, payment irregularities, and involvement of figures linked to the earlier Scorpene submarine scandal.
• The Armed Forces Pension Fund (LTAT) was implicated in channeling illegal commissions.
B. Scorpene Submarine Scandal
• French court proceedings exposed kickbacks and illegal commissions tied to Malondesh’s purchase of two submarines in 2002.
• Former PM Najib Razak, who was defense minister at the time, was linked to the deal and later convicted in unrelated corruption cases.
C. MD530G Helicopter Deal
• Malondesh paid 35% of the contract value for six helicopters in 2015, but none were delivered by 2018.
• The deal was flagged for irregularities, and the Defense Ministry lodged a report with the anti-graft agency.
🧭 4. Systemic Weaknesses That Enable Scandals
Weakness Impact
No centralized procurement authority Fragmented decision-making, poor oversight
Political interference Contracts awarded based on connections, not merit
Weak audit enforcement Delayed or suppressed findings, limited accountability
Budget opacity Hard to trace payments, detect overpricing or ghost assets
🔄 5. Consequences for Military Readiness
• Delayed modernization: Platforms like the LCS and helicopters remain undelivered.
• Eroded trust: OEMs and foreign partners view Malondesh as a high-risk client.
• Operational gaps: Forces operate with aging equipment while waiting for replacements.
• Public backlash: Scandals undermine public confidence in defense institutions.
🧨 1. Lack of Transparency and Oversight
Hapus• Limited Competitive Tendering: Fewer than 30% of major defense contracts are awarded through open competition. Most deals are single-source or limited tenders, often favoring politically connected firms.
• Opaque Contract Structures: Many contracts lack public disclosure of terms, pricing, or delivery milestones, making it difficult to track progress or detect irregularities.
🕴️ 2. Role of Middlemen and Politically Connected Agents
• Procurement is often mediated by retired military officers or politically linked intermediaries, who act as “agents” or “salesmen” within the Ministry of Defence.
• These middlemen inflate prices, obscure accountability, and steer contracts toward preferred vendors—sometimes with little regard for capability or quality.
• The King of Malondesh recently rebuked this practice, calling out the use of “flying coffins” (referring to outdated helicopters) and warning that inflated middleman pricing would exhaust the defense budget.
🚨 3. Major Scandals: Case Studies
A. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
• RM9 billion allocated for six ships; none delivered as of 2025.
• Investigations revealed mismanagement, payment irregularities, and involvement of figures linked to the earlier Scorpene submarine scandal.
• The Armed Forces Pension Fund (LTAT) was implicated in channeling illegal commissions.
B. Scorpene Submarine Scandal
• French court proceedings exposed kickbacks and illegal commissions tied to Malondesh’s purchase of two submarines in 2002.
• Former PM Najib Razak, who was defense minister at the time, was linked to the deal and later convicted in unrelated corruption cases.
C. MD530G Helicopter Deal
• Malondesh paid 35% of the contract value for six helicopters in 2015, but none were delivered by 2018.
• The deal was flagged for irregularities, and the Defense Ministry lodged a report with the anti-graft agency.
🧭 4. Systemic Weaknesses That Enable Scandals
Weakness Impact
No centralized procurement authority Fragmented decision-making, poor oversight
Political interference Contracts awarded based on connections, not merit
Weak audit enforcement Delayed or suppressed findings, limited accountability
Budget opacity Hard to trace payments, detect overpricing or ghost assets
🔄 5. Consequences for Military Readiness
• Delayed modernization: Platforms like the LCS and helicopters remain undelivered.
• Eroded trust: OEMs and foreign partners view Malondesh as a high-risk client.
• Operational gaps: Forces operate with aging equipment while waiting for replacements.
• Public backlash: Scandals undermine public confidence in defense institutions.
🧾 1. Delayed or Suppressed Audit Findings
Hapus• The Auditor-General’s Reports, which are meant to expose irregularities in defense spending, often face delays in publication or are selectively tabled in Parliament.
• Some findings are redacted or softened before release, especially when they involve politically sensitive contracts or high-ranking officials.
• For example, the 2025 Auditor-General’s Report revealed that RM162.75 million in penalties for late delivery of GEMPITA vehicles were never collected, and RM1.42 million in fines were never imposed2.
Impact: Delayed audits allow problems to fester, and suppressed findings prevent public scrutiny or corrective action.
🕵️ 2. Limited Enforcement of Audit Recommendations
• Although the Auditor-General routinely issues recommendations, ministries and agencies often fail to implement them.
• In 2025, only a fraction of the 22 audit recommendations across seven ministries were acted upon, despite covering RM48.87 billion in programs.
• The Ministry of Defence was flagged for fragmenting maintenance contracts to bypass procurement controls, yet no disciplinary action was taken.
Impact: Without enforcement, audits become symbolic rather than corrective.
🧱 3. Structural Weaknesses in Oversight Mechanisms
• Malaysia lacks an independent defense procurement oversight body. Oversight is split between the Ministry of Finance, Prime Minister’s Department, and MINDEF itself—creating conflicts of interest.
• Internal audit units within the Armed Forces are under-resourced and lack authority to challenge senior leadership.
• There’s no legal requirement for real-time audit tracking or public disclosure of contract performance.
Impact: Oversight is fragmented, reactive, and vulnerable to political interference.
🔄 4. Culture of Impunity and Political Protection
• High-profile scandals (e.g. LCS, Scorpene submarines) have rarely led to convictions or full asset recovery.
• Procurement agents and contractors with political ties often avoid prosecution, even when audit reports implicate them.
• Transparency International Malaysia has called this a “culture of impunity”, where systemic failures are normalized.
Impact: Accountability is undermined, and corruption risks remain entrenched.
📊 Summary Table: Audit Weaknesses and Their Consequences
Audit Weakness Consequence for Military Procurement
Delayed or redacted reports Public unaware of mismanagement
Poor enforcement of recommendations No corrective action taken
Fragmented oversight Conflicts of interest, weak governance
Political protection No accountability for procurement failures
🧨 1. Lack of Transparency and Oversight
Hapus• Limited Competitive Tendering: Fewer than 30% of major defense contracts are awarded through open competition. Most deals are single-source or limited tenders, often favoring politically connected firms.
• Opaque Contract Structures: Many contracts lack public disclosure of terms, pricing, or delivery milestones, making it difficult to track progress or detect irregularities.
🕴️ 2. Role of Middlemen and Politically Connected Agents
• Procurement is often mediated by retired military officers or politically linked intermediaries, who act as “agents” or “salesmen” within the Ministry of Defence.
• These middlemen inflate prices, obscure accountability, and steer contracts toward preferred vendors—sometimes with little regard for capability or quality.
• The King of Malondesh recently rebuked this practice, calling out the use of “flying coffins” (referring to outdated helicopters) and warning that inflated middleman pricing would exhaust the defense budget.
🚨 3. Major Scandals: Case Studies
A. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
• RM9 billion allocated for six ships; none delivered as of 2025.
• Investigations revealed mismanagement, payment irregularities, and involvement of figures linked to the earlier Scorpene submarine scandal.
• The Armed Forces Pension Fund (LTAT) was implicated in channeling illegal commissions.
B. Scorpene Submarine Scandal
• French court proceedings exposed kickbacks and illegal commissions tied to Malondesh’s purchase of two submarines in 2002.
• Former PM Najib Razak, who was defense minister at the time, was linked to the deal and later convicted in unrelated corruption cases.
C. MD530G Helicopter Deal
• Malondesh paid 35% of the contract value for six helicopters in 2015, but none were delivered by 2018.
• The deal was flagged for irregularities, and the Defense Ministry lodged a report with the anti-graft agency.
🧭 4. Systemic Weaknesses That Enable Scandals
Weakness Impact
No centralized procurement authority Fragmented decision-making, poor oversight
Political interference Contracts awarded based on connections, not merit
Weak audit enforcement Delayed or suppressed findings, limited accountability
Budget opacity Hard to trace payments, detect overpricing or ghost assets
🔄 5. Consequences for Military Readiness
• Delayed modernization: Platforms like the LCS and helicopters remain undelivered.
• Eroded trust: OEMs and foreign partners view Malondesh as a high-risk client.
• Operational gaps: Forces operate with aging equipment while waiting for replacements.
• Public backlash: Scandals undermine public confidence in defense institutions.
Bayar dulu UTANG mu pur .....
BalasHapus🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣
NGERI UTANG MALON SANGAT MENGGUNUNG 🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusSetiap penduduk MALON mempunyai UTANG rata2 RM 47.000
Setiap penduduk MALON dibebani UTANG KERAJAAN sekitar RM 37.000
NGERI ...
🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣
Pada akhir kuartal pertama 2025 (Maret 2025), total utang rumah tangga Malaysia adalah RM 1,65 triliun atau setara 84,3% dari PDB, sedangkan utang pemerintah persekutuan mencapai RM 1,3 triliun pada akhir Juni 2025, naik dari RM 1,25 triliun pada akhir 2024. Utang pemerintah terhadap PDB diperkirakan akan mencapai 69% pada akhir 2025.
Ternyata banyak juga UTANG mu pur
BalasHapusRM 47.000 per orang
🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🥱🥱
🧨 1. Lack of Transparency and Oversight
BalasHapus• Limited Competitive Tendering: Fewer than 30% of major defense contracts are awarded through open competition. Most deals are single-source or limited tenders, often favoring politically connected firms.
• Opaque Contract Structures: Many contracts lack public disclosure of terms, pricing, or delivery milestones, making it difficult to track progress or detect irregularities.
🕴️ 2. Role of Middlemen and Politically Connected Agents
• Procurement is often mediated by retired military officers or politically linked intermediaries, who act as “agents” or “salesmen” within the Ministry of Defence.
• These middlemen inflate prices, obscure accountability, and steer contracts toward preferred vendors—sometimes with little regard for capability or quality.
• The King of Malondesh recently rebuked this practice, calling out the use of “flying coffins” (referring to outdated helicopters) and warning that inflated middleman pricing would exhaust the defense budget.
🚨 3. Major Scandals: Case Studies
A. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
• RM9 billion allocated for six ships; none delivered as of 2025.
• Investigations revealed mismanagement, payment irregularities, and involvement of figures linked to the earlier Scorpene submarine scandal.
• The Armed Forces Pension Fund (LTAT) was implicated in channeling illegal commissions.
B. Scorpene Submarine Scandal
• French court proceedings exposed kickbacks and illegal commissions tied to Malondesh’s purchase of two submarines in 2002.
• Former PM Najib Razak, who was defense minister at the time, was linked to the deal and later convicted in unrelated corruption cases.
C. MD530G Helicopter Deal
• Malondesh paid 35% of the contract value for six helicopters in 2015, but none were delivered by 2018.
• The deal was flagged for irregularities, and the Defense Ministry lodged a report with the anti-graft agency.
🧭 4. Systemic Weaknesses That Enable Scandals
Weakness Impact
No centralized procurement authority Fragmented decision-making, poor oversight
Political interference Contracts awarded based on connections, not merit
Weak audit enforcement Delayed or suppressed findings, limited accountability
Budget opacity Hard to trace payments, detect overpricing or ghost assets
🔄 5. Consequences for Military Readiness
• Delayed modernization: Platforms like the LCS and helicopters remain undelivered.
• Eroded trust: OEMs and foreign partners view Malondesh as a high-risk client.
• Operational gaps: Forces operate with aging equipment while waiting for replacements.
• Public backlash: Scandals undermine public confidence in defense institutions.
🧓 1. Aging Components Beyond Service Life
BalasHapus• As of 2024, 171 military assets across the Army, Navy, and Air Force have exceeded 30 years of service2.
• Many platforms—like the Royal Malondeshn Navy’s Fast Attack Craft (FAC)—are over 40 years old, with some approaching 50 years.
• These assets were designed for past-era threats and technologies, and their mechanical systems are now prone to fatigue, corrosion, and failure.
Result: Even routine operations carry elevated risk of malfunction, requiring constant patchwork maintenance.
🌴 2. Tropical Climate Accelerates Wear
• Malondesh’s hot, humid, and saline environment is particularly harsh on military hardware:
o Metal fatigue and corrosion are accelerated, especially in naval vessels and aircraft.
o Rubber seals, electronics, and hydraulics degrade faster under tropical heat and moisture.
• The Navy has acknowledged that many vessels no longer meet modern standards due to environmental degradation.
Result: Maintenance cycles shorten, costs rise, and reliability drops.
🔧 3. Obsolete Systems and Spare Parts Shortage
• Many legacy platforms rely on foreign OEMs that have ceased production or support.
• Spare parts must be sourced internationally, often at inflated prices and long lead times.
• In some cases, technicians resort to cannibalizing other units or fabricating parts locally—neither of which guarantees reliability.
Result: Delays in repairs, reduced fleet availability, and compromised safety.
⚠️ 4. Operational Incidents and Safety Risks
• A tragic example: In July 2025, a Malondeshn commando died during a maritime exercise due to suspected failure of aging diving equipment.
• The Army Chief confirmed that the gear was “rather old,” prompting a full audit of equipment lifecycle and maintenance protocols.
Result: Legacy systems not only reduce readiness—they pose direct risks to personnel.
📊 Summary Table: Breakdown Drivers in Malondeshn Military
Factor Description Operational Impact
Aging components Platforms >30–50 years old, beyond design limits Frequent failures, low reliability
Tropical wear Heat, humidity, salt accelerate degradation Shorter maintenance cycles
Obsolete systems Legacy tech, no OEM support Spare part shortages, delays
Safety incidents Equipment failures linked to fatal accidents Personnel risk, public scrutiny