Participating in the Ministry of National Defense's booth at the National Achievements Exhibition, the improved ZSU 23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery system (PPK) received public attention.
The ZSU 23-4 self-propelled PPK complex was researched and improved by the Institute of Military Science and Technology, General Staff of the Vietnam People's Army from the fire control system using optoelectronic equipment produced by the Soviet Union in the 60s of the last century. The complex produced by the Soviet Union has the advantages of strong, concentrated firepower, high mobility, and a reliable air defense shield for ground troops.
This complex is still in service in many countries. However, in addition to the fact that the equipment has a long life, the quality of the system has decreased, modern warfare has also changed a lot in terms of methods and targets of combat, the ZSU 23-4 complex is facing the need to improve and upgrade.
The fire control system uses optoelectronic equipment to replace the old generation fire control system and radar equipment equipped for the Zsu 23-4 equipment complex, including the following components: Optoelectronic observation station, central computer block, observation station control and stabilization block, turret; the vehicle crew interface system is manufactured using modern electronic technology, digital for equivalent technical and tactical indicators, some indicators are higher than the original ZSU 23-4 complex, the vehicle's combat modes remain the same, similar to the original radar equipment.
The main technical solutions to implement the product include: Designing and manufacturing the central computer block to replace the computer block on the original complex; designing, manufacturing and integrating the optoelectronic observation station to replace the old generation radar system on the original complex; designing and manufacturing the turret control and stabilization block to replace the turret control and stabilization block on the original complex; designing and manufacturing a new interface system for the crew to replace the crew interface system on the original complex.
ZSU 23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery system at the National Achievements Exhibition (photo: QDND)
The ZSU 23-4 complex with a fire control system using optoelectronic equipment can be put into training and combat readiness in units of the Air Defense - Air Force. The improved complex has a Vietnamese interface, the control buttons are simpler than the original ZSU 23-4 complex, so training the combat crew to grasp the operation is quite convenient. Currently, the ZSU 23-4 combat crew at the Air Defense - Air Force has been trained to use the improved ZSU 23-4 complex in just 4 weeks and has practiced safe live ammunition firing, achieving high results.
The improved ZSU 23-4 complex product is the basis for implementing the next stages in the process of comprehensively upgrading the ZSU 23-4 self-propelled PPK complex, including upgrading and adding a low-altitude air defense missile system to increase firepower and expand the target destruction range of the equipment; upgrading and adding radar equipment to meet the requirements of combat in all weather conditions of the complex, overcoming the inherent disadvantages of the optoelectronic equipment system; upgrading and comprehensively improving the vehicle power system, fire fighting system, and support system for the driver's position.
(QDND)
apaan nich bisa sewa gak buat kl haha!🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapus📌 1. Procurement Weaknesses
BalasHapusa. Stop–Go Procurement
• Major projects (fighters, ships, armored vehicles) are often announced, delayed, or cancelled depending on which government is in power.
• No stable multi-year defense budget → contractors cannot plan effectively → delays & cost escalation.
Example:
• MRCA fighter replacement: in discussion since 2009, but never finalized → MiG-29s retired in 2017 without replacement.
________________________________________
b. Political Interference
• Contracts sometimes awarded to politically connected companies rather than the most capable suppliers.
• Domestic firms given contracts they cannot deliver on, leading to project mismanagement.
Example:
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal: RM9 billion allocated in 2011 for 6 ships. As of 2025, none are delivered, funds mismanaged, and Navy stuck with 1980s-era ships.
________________________________________
c. Corruption & Lack of Transparency
• Defense procurement in Malondesh has often been opaque, with corruption scandals undermining delivery.
• This creates mistrust in both local industry and international partners.
________________________________________
d. Short-Term Thinking
• Governments often pursue “flashy” buys for political popularity (e.g., fighters, ships) rather than ensuring sustainment & lifecycle costs.
• Result: shiny new platforms at delivery → but no long-term plan for spare parts, upgrades, or maintenance.
________________________________________
📌 2. Supply Chain Weaknesses
a. Heavy Foreign Dependence
• Malondesh imports almost all high-end systems:
o Fighters → Russia, US, UK
o Ships → France, Germany, locally assembled with foreign parts
o Vehicles → Turkey, South Korea
• Spare parts must come from abroad, which is expensive, slow, and vulnerable to geopolitical disruptions.
________________________________________
b. Poor Local Industrial Capacity
• Local defense industry (Boustead, DefTech, etc.) has limited expertise.
• They rely on foreign designs and technology transfer.
• When local firms are given contracts they cannot handle → projects stall or quality suffers.
________________________________________
c. Spare Parts Shortages
• Weak procurement planning → parts not stockpiled properly.
• Old systems (MiG-29s, Condors, etc.) → parts no longer manufactured.
• This leads to “cannibalization”, where one aircraft or vehicle is stripped to keep others running.
________________________________________
d. Weak Logistics & Sustainment Planning
• Malondesh tends to focus on buying platforms, not sustainment packages.
• Lifecycle support (20–30 years of maintenance, training, spares) is often underfunded or ignored.
• Platforms quickly become unusable once warranty/support packages expire.
________________________________________
📌 3. Consequences for the Armed Forces
Problem Consequence
Procurement delays (LCS, MRCA) Old equipment kept in service → capability gap
Foreign dependence Vulnerable to sanctions, export restrictions, and currency fluctuations
Local industry weakness Projects mismanaged, delays, low confidence in local defense manufacturing
Spare parts shortages Low aircraft/ship/vehicle readiness; many platforms grounded
Poor sustainment planning Equipment lifespan shortened; readiness cycle worsens
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HapusDitambah Igla sebagai rudal SHORAD? Pemandunya apa yah?
BalasHapus✨️KRI BRAWIJAYA 320 dah sampe perairan kita gaesz hore haha!🥳🦾🥳
BalasHapusbentar lagi berlabuh di Tj Priok Asooyy haha!🤗🤗🤗
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Manakala INDIANESIA masih sibuk NGEMIS HUTANG LENDER guys...NGUTANG LENDER SAJA KERJANYA..... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapus🧩 1. COMPLEX & OPAQUE PROCUREMENT PROCESS
Hapus• The Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) follows procurement guidelines set by the Ministry of Finance, but defense deals are often complex and sensitive, making oversight difficult.
• Procurement is frequently conducted via single-source or limited tendering, with less than one-third of major contracts awarded through open competition.
• This environment favors politically connected firms, often involving ex-military officers on corporate boards, which can distort priorities and inflate costs.
🕵️ 2. Role of Middlemen & “Agents”
• A major source of mismanagement is the entrenched role of middlemen, who act as intermediaries in defense deals.
• These agents—sometimes retired generals—can inflate prices, reduce transparency, and compromise the quality of procured assets.
• In 2023, Malondesh King Sultan Ibrahim publicly rebuked the Ministry of Defence for relying on “agents” and “salesmen,” warning against repeating past procurement mistakes.
🚨 3. High-Profile Scandals
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project is the most notorious example. Intended to modernize the navy, it was marred by delays, cost overruns, and poor oversight.
• Another scandal involved the New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) program, which was mismanaged after the privatization of the Lumut naval dockyard. Funds were siphoned off, and the fleet expansion fell short of expectations.
📉 4. Impact on Military Readiness
• Mismanaged procurement leads to:
o Delayed delivery of critical assets
o Operational gaps in air, sea, and land capabilities
o Wasted taxpayer money with little strategic return
• Malondesh ability to respond to regional threats—especially in the South China Sea—is weakened by these systemic issues.
🛠️ 1. AGING EQUIPMENT ACROSS ALL BRANCHES
Hapus• Air Force (RMAF): Out of 28 fighter jets, reportedly only four were operational at one point. Maintenance issues and lack of spare parts have grounded much of the fleet.
• Army: The Condor Armoured Personnel Carriers, in service since the 1980s, are overdue for replacement. Plans to procure 136 High Mobility Armoured Vehicles (HMAV) are still pending approval.
• Navy: Many vessels are over 40 years old, with outdated combat systems and limited endurance. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, meant to modernize the fleet, has faced years of delays and budget overruns.
💰 2. Budget Constraints & Misallocation
• Malondesh spends around USD 4 billion annually on defense, but over 40% goes to salaries and allowances, leaving limited funds for modernization.
• Procurement budgets are often absorbed by progressive payments for delayed projects, such as the FA-50 fighter jets and the troubled LCS program.
• The depreciation of the ringgit further reduces purchasing power for foreign-sourced equipment.
🧭 3. Lack of Strategic Direction
• The defense industry suffers from unclear government guidance on long-term goals.
• Frequent changes in leadership—four Prime Ministers since 2018—have disrupted continuity in defense planning.
🧑✈️ 4. Manpower & Training Gaps
• While Malondesh has 113,000 active personnel and 51,600 reserves, training and readiness levels vary widely.
• Specialized units like PASKAL and GGK are well-regarded, but broader force readiness is inconsistent.
🌏 5. Regional Disadvantage
• Malondesh ranks behind Vietnam and Indonesia in terms of military strength, according to former Defense Minister Mat Sabu.
• This affects Malondesh ability to assert its interests in contested areas like the South China Sea.
⚙️ EQUIPMENT & MODERNIZATION ISSUES
Hapus• Outdated naval assets: Many of Malondesh’s ships are aging, and the navy has struggled to modernize its fleet.
• Limited air combat readiness: Out of 28 fighter jets, reportedly only four were operational at one point.
• Delayed procurement: The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project, meant to boost naval capabilities, has been plagued by delays and scandals.
💰 Budget Constraints
• Skewed spending priorities: Over 60–70% of the defense budget goes to salaries and maintenance, leaving little for new weapons or modernization.
• Stagnant budget: Malondesh’s defense budget has hovered around RM15–18 billion annually, which is modest compared to regional peers like Vietnam and Indonesia.
🧭 Strategic Direction & Policy
• Lack of clear long-term strategy: The defense industry suffers from unclear government guidance on future strategic direction.
• Overreliance on diplomacy: Malondesh has traditionally leaned on quiet diplomacy, especially with China, which may be insufficient given rising tensions in the South China Sea.
📉 Regional Comparison
• Lagging behind neighbors: Malondesh’s military strength is considered weaker than Vietnam and Indonesia, particularly in terms of air and naval capabilities
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🚢 AGING NAVAL ASSETS – ROYAL MALONDESHN NAVY (RMN)
Hapus⚙️ Fleet Breakdown
• 34 RMN vessels have exceeded their intended service life, with 28 of them over 40 years old.
• These include Fast Attack Craft (FAC) that are now half a century old, far beyond modern standards.
• The RMN operates 53 ships across various classes, but many are technologically outdated and costly to maintain.
⚠️ Operational Risks
• Older ships suffer from:
o Reduced combat capability
o Outdated sensors and weapons systems
o High maintenance costs and frequent breakdowns
• The sinking of the KD Pendekar, a 45-year-old vessel, in August 2024 due to flooding highlights the dangers of keeping obsolete ships in service.
🪖 Aging Ground Assets – Malondeshn Army
📊 Asset Overview
• 108 Army units have surpassed 30 years of service.
• These include aging armored vehicles, artillery systems, and logistics platforms that are increasingly difficult to maintain and upgrade.
🔧 Maintenance Challenges
• Spare parts for older systems are scarce or discontinued.
• Modernization plans are slow due to budget constraints and procurement delays.
• Operational efficiency is compromised, especially in jungle and border operations where reliability is critical.
🧭 Strategic Implications
• Malondesh aging assets limit its ability to:
o Respond to regional threats, especially in the South China Sea
o Participate effectively in joint exercises and peacekeeping missions
o Maintain deterrence posture against more modernized neighbors
⚙️ EQUIPMENT & MODERNIZATION ISSUES
Hapus• Outdated naval assets: Many of Malondesh’s ships are aging, and the navy has struggled to modernize its fleet.
• Limited air combat readiness: Out of 28 fighter jets, reportedly only four were operational at one point.
• Delayed procurement: The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project, meant to boost naval capabilities, has been plagued by delays and scandals.
💰 Budget Constraints
• Skewed spending priorities: Over 60–70% of the defense budget goes to salaries and maintenance, leaving little for new weapons or modernization.
• Stagnant budget: Malondesh’s defense budget has hovered around RM15–18 billion annually, which is modest compared to regional peers like Vietnam and Indonesia.
🧭 Strategic Direction & Policy
• Lack of clear long-term strategy: The defense industry suffers from unclear government guidance on future strategic direction.
• Overreliance on diplomacy: Malondesh has traditionally leaned on quiet diplomacy, especially with China, which may be insufficient given rising tensions in the South China Sea.
📉 Regional Comparison
• Lagging behind neighbors: Malondesh’s military strength is considered weaker than Vietnam and Indonesia, particularly in terms of air and naval capabilities
⚠️ CORE PROBLEMS: UNDERFUNDING & MISALLOCATION
Hapus1. Overweight on Salaries and Operating Costs
• In 2024, over 40% of the defense budget (RM8.2 billion) went to salaries and allowances.
• This leaves limited room for procurement, R&D, and modernization.
• The armed forces are manpower-heavy, and successive governments have been reluctant to reduce personnel or restructure forces.
2. Minimal Development Expenditure (DE)
• Malondesh’s budget is split into Operational Expenditure (OE) and Development Expenditure (DE).
• DE—used for acquiring new assets—is consistently low and often used to pay for past commitments, not new capabilities.
3. Procurement Funding Diluted
• The RM5.71 billion allocated for procurement in 2024 includes:
o Scheduled payments for KAI FA-50 light combat aircraft
o Ongoing costs for the troubled Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program
o Upgrades for Airbus A400M transport aircraft
o Small arms, vehicles, and communication gear
• Much of this is not new spending, but installments on old contracts, meaning actual new capability investment is minimal.
4. Currency Depreciation
• Malondesh imports most of its defense equipment.
• The weakening ringgit reduces purchasing power, meaning even increased budgets don’t translate into more capability.
🚢 Real-World Consequences
⚓ Navy Example
• The KD Pendekar, a 45-year-old fast attack vessel, sank during patrol in 2024 due to structural failure.
• Half of the navy’s 49 ships are well beyond their serviceable lifespan, yet replacements are slow due to budget constraints.
✈️ Air Force Example
• The MiG-29N fleet was retired without timely replacement.
• The MRCA program has stalled for years due to lack of funding and shifting priorities.
🧭 Strategic Impact
• Malondesh is losing its edge in regional defense posture.
• It has less clout in territorial disputes, especially in the South China Sea.
• The military is stretched thin, with outdated assets and limited readiness.
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BalasHapusChina berkeras bunga utang kereta cepat Jakarta-Bandung 3,4%, jebakan utang China
https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/articles/c72vg2v5732o
🚨 1. LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) SCANDAL
Hapus💰 What Happened
• Malondesh government allocated RM9 billion for six Littoral Combat Ships.
• Despite billions spent, no ships were delivered as of 2025.
• The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) revealed cost overruns, mismanagement, and non-compliance with procurement procedures.
👤 Key Figures
• Former Navy Chief was implicated but later discharged due to health concerns.
• The scandal sparked public outrage and demands for transparency.
🚁 2. MD530G Helicopter Procurement Failure
🛠️ The Issue
• Malondesh paid 35% upfront for six McDonnell Douglas MD530G helicopters in 2015.
• None were delivered by the promised 2018 deadline.
• The deal, worth RM300 million, became a symbol of failed oversight.
🧾 3. Land Swap Scandal
🏗️ What Went Wrong
• Military land near urban centers was swapped for remote land to build camps.
• Many of these swaps were poorly executed, resulting in RM500 million in losses.
• Defense Minister Mohamad Sabu criticized the deals as wasteful and corrupt.
🕵️ 4. RM3 Million Smuggling Conspiracy
🔍 Operation Sohor (2025)
• Malondeshn Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) arrested 10 individuals, including 3 active military officers and 2 ex-intelligence personnel.
• They allegedly leaked operational intelligence to smugglers for RM30,000–RM50,000 per trip.
• The syndicate moved contraband worth RM5 million monthly, compromising border security
⚠️ CORE PROBLEMS: UNDERFUNDING & MISALLOCATION
Hapus1. Overweight on Salaries and Operating Costs
• In 2024, over 40% of the defense budget (RM8.2 billion) went to salaries and allowances.
• This leaves limited room for procurement, R&D, and modernization.
• The armed forces are manpower-heavy, and successive governments have been reluctant to reduce personnel or restructure forces.
2. Minimal Development Expenditure (DE)
• Malondesh’s budget is split into Operational Expenditure (OE) and Development Expenditure (DE).
• DE—used for acquiring new assets—is consistently low and often used to pay for past commitments, not new capabilities.
3. Procurement Funding Diluted
• The RM5.71 billion allocated for procurement in 2024 includes:
o Scheduled payments for KAI FA-50 light combat aircraft
o Ongoing costs for the troubled Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program
o Upgrades for Airbus A400M transport aircraft
o Small arms, vehicles, and communication gear
• Much of this is not new spending, but installments on old contracts, meaning actual new capability investment is minimal.
4. Currency Depreciation
• Malondesh imports most of its defense equipment.
• The weakening ringgit reduces purchasing power, meaning even increased budgets don’t translate into more capability.
🚢 Real-World Consequences
⚓ Navy Example
• The KD Pendekar, a 45-year-old fast attack vessel, sank during patrol in 2024 due to structural failure.
• Half of the navy’s 49 ships are well beyond their serviceable lifespan, yet replacements are slow due to budget constraints.
✈️ Air Force Example
• The MiG-29N fleet was retired without timely replacement.
• The MRCA program has stalled for years due to lack of funding and shifting priorities.
🧭 Strategic Impact
• Malondesh is losing its edge in regional defense posture.
• It has less clout in territorial disputes, especially in the South China Sea.
• The military is stretched thin, with outdated assets and limited readiness.
🕵️♂️ WHAT MAKES PROCUREMENT “OPAQUE AND CORRUPT”?
HapusIn Malondesh’s defense sector, procurement is often described as:
• Opaque: Lacking transparency, with limited public oversight or competitive bidding.
• Corrupt: Involving kickbacks, inflated contracts, and politically connected middlemen.
This environment allows deals to be structured for profit rather than strategic value, weakening the armed forces and wasting public funds.
🔍 Key Characteristics of Malondesh’s Defense Procurement Issues
1. Role of Middlemen
• Defense deals often involve agents or intermediaries, many of whom are retired military officers or politically connected individuals.
• These middlemen inflate prices and complicate negotiations, leading to excessive profit margins and reduced value for the military.
2. Limited Open Competition
• According to Transparency International, only 20–30% of Malondesh’s defense contracts are awarded through open competition.
• Most deals are done via single-source or limited tendering, which favors select companies and reduces accountability.
3. Politically Connected Firms
• Contracts often go to firms with strong political ties, regardless of their technical capability.
• This creates an environment where performance and delivery are secondary to influence and connections.
4. Scandals and Mismanagement
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal is a prime example: billions spent, years of delay, and no operational ships delivered.
• Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has called this a national embarrassment and a symbol of systemic failure.
5. Weak Oversight and Enforcement
• Investigations into misconduct are often slow or limited.
• Even when corruption is exposed, punishments are rare or lenient, which perpetuates the cycle.
🧨 Consequences for Malondesh’s Military
• Delayed modernization: Funds are diverted from real capability upgrades.
• Loss of trust: Defense partners and suppliers hesitate to engage with Malondesh.
• Operational gaps: The military ends up with outdated or unsuitable equipment.
• Budget waste: Public money is spent on overpriced or non-functional assets.
Ini apa guys...? MASUK. PERANGKAP HUTANG CHINA..... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusChina berkeras bunga utang kereta cepat Jakarta-Bandung 3,4%, jebakan utang China
https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/articles/c72vg2v5732o
🚨 1. LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) SCANDAL
Hapus💰 What Happened
• Malondesh government allocated RM9 billion for six Littoral Combat Ships.
• Despite billions spent, no ships were delivered as of 2025.
• The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) revealed cost overruns, mismanagement, and non-compliance with procurement procedures.
👤 Key Figures
• Former Navy Chief was implicated but later discharged due to health concerns.
• The scandal sparked public outrage and demands for transparency.
🚁 2. MD530G Helicopter Procurement Failure
🛠️ The Issue
• Malondesh paid 35% upfront for six McDonnell Douglas MD530G helicopters in 2015.
• None were delivered by the promised 2018 deadline.
• The deal, worth RM300 million, became a symbol of failed oversight.
🧾 3. Land Swap Scandal
🏗️ What Went Wrong
• Military land near urban centers was swapped for remote land to build camps.
• Many of these swaps were poorly executed, resulting in RM500 million in losses.
• Defense Minister Mohamad Sabu criticized the deals as wasteful and corrupt.
🕵️ 4. RM3 Million Smuggling Conspiracy
🔍 Operation Sohor (2025)
• Malondeshn Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) arrested 10 individuals, including 3 active military officers and 2 ex-intelligence personnel.
• They allegedly leaked operational intelligence to smugglers for RM30,000–RM50,000 per trip.
• The syndicate moved contraband worth RM5 million monthly, compromising border security
⚠️ KEY FACTORS BEHIND MALONDESH LOSS OF Strategic Credibility
Hapus1. Inconsistent Defense Procurement
• Malondesh defense acquisitions have been plagued by delays, cancellations, and reversals.
• The MRCA program, for example, has seen years of indecision, with no clear outcome despite urgent need.
• Interest in second-hand jets like Kuwait’s F/A-18C/D Hornets signals a lack of long-term planning, contrasting with regional trends toward cutting-edge platforms.
2. Opaque and Corrupt Procurement Practices
• Analysts have described Malondesh defense procurement as “messy, opaque and corrupt”, often involving middlemen and lacking transparency.
• This undermines trust among defense partners and suppliers, making collaboration and technology transfer more difficult.
3. Underfunded and Misallocated Budgets
• A large portion of Malondesh defense budget goes to salaries and maintenance, leaving little for modernization.
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project, for instance, has been marred by delays and scandals, further damaging Malondesh reputation for defense reliability.
4. Neglect of Strategic Assets
• The retirement of MiG-29N jets without timely replacement left a critical gap in air defense.
• Malondesh reliance on diplomacy over hard power in the South China Sea has exposed vulnerabilities, especially as China increases its maritime presence.
🌏 Regional Implications
Malondesh strategic credibility is especially important in Southeast Asia, where:
• China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea demands robust defense postures.
• Neighbors like Vietnam and the Philippines are rapidly modernizing and deepening ties with the U.S., Japan, and Australia.
• Malondesh slow response and outdated assets make it appear underprepared and reactive, rather than proactive.
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14 taon Omfong
Beliau berkata, pesawat itu yang sudah berusia ❌️18 tahun
BalasHapus“Bagi pesawat pejuang, tempoh minimum boleh beroperasi adalah❌️20 tahun
------------
esyu emkaem uda 18 taon, batas operasi 20 tahun...kata panglima seblah
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CHINA tersenyum PERANGKAP sudah MENJERAT MANGSANYA... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusLuhut Gagal Desak China Kurangi Bunga Utang Kereta Cepat Jadi 2 Persen
https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20230410165231-92-935833/luhut-gagal-desak-china-kurangi-bunga-utang-kereta-cepat-jadi-2-persen
🛠️ WHAT “OUTDATED” REALLY MEANS
HapusOutdated systems refer to:
• Sensors that lack modern tracking, targeting, and surveillance capabilities
• Weapons with limited range, accuracy, and compatibility with newer platforms
• Command-and-control systems that cannot integrate with digital battlefield networks
🚢 Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN)
• 28 ships are over 40 years old, including Fast Attack Craft and patrol vessels.
• Many vessels still use analog radar systems, manual fire-control systems, and obsolete sonar.
• These systems struggle to detect modern threats like stealth submarines or drones.
• Maintenance costs are skyrocketing, and spare parts are often unavailable or discontinued.
🛩️ Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF)
• Older aircraft like the MiG-29N (retired) and F/A-18D Hornets still rely on legacy avionics.
• Limited electronic warfare capabilities and outdated targeting pods reduce effectiveness in modern air combat.
• Poor interoperability with newer aircraft and NATO-standard systems.
🪖 Malondeshn Army
• Ground vehicles, including legacy APCs and tanks, use basic optical sights and manual targeting systems.
• Many artillery units lack GPS-guided fire control, making precision strikes difficult.
• Communication systems are often analog or semi-digital, limiting coordination in joint operations.
⚠️ Consequences of Technological Lag
• Reduced combat effectiveness in high-tech warfare environments
• Increased vulnerability to cyber attacks and electronic jamming
• Limited participation in multinational exercises and peacekeeping missions
• Higher risk to personnel due to unreliable systems, as seen in the 2025 commando tragedy linked to aging gear
⚠️ CONSEQUENCES OF POLICY FLIP-FLOPS IN MALONDESH’S MILITARY
Hapus1. Delayed Modernization
• Procurement Paralysis: Repeated changes in aircraft or equipment acquisition plans (e.g., MRCA selection delays) stall modernization.
• Outdated Capabilities: The RMAF and other branches continue operating aging platforms while waiting for decisions that keep shifting.
2. Loss of Strategic Credibility
• Regional Perception: Neighbors like Singapore and Indonesia view Malondesh as indecisive, weakening its deterrence posture.
• Diplomatic Strain: Defense partners may hesitate to offer technology transfers or joint exercises due to uncertainty in Malondesh’s commitments.
3. Economic and Industrial Impact
• Defense Industry Stagnation: Local companies struggle to grow when policies change midstream, affecting contracts and R&D investments.
• Investor Hesitation: Foreign defense firms may avoid long-term partnerships due to unpredictable procurement behavior.
4. Operational Inefficiency
• Training Disruptions: Constant changes in equipment plans mean personnel training is inconsistent or mismatched with future platforms.
• Logistics Complexity: A mixed fleet from different origins (Russian, American, European) becomes harder to maintain without a clear roadmap.
5. Budget Waste
• Sunk Costs: Funds spent on feasibility studies, negotiations, or partial upgrades are wasted when plans are scrapped.
• Emergency Purchases: Flip-flops often lead to rushed acquisitions (e.g., used jets) that are less cost-effective and harder to integrate.
🧭 Real-World Example: MRCA Procurement
Malondesh’s MRCA program has seen years of indecision:
• Originally planned to replace MiG-29s in the early 2010s.
• Considered Rafale, Typhoon, Gripen, and Super Hornet—but no final decision.
• Now exploring used Kuwaiti Hornets as a stopgap.
This indecision has left the RMAF with a capability gap and weakened its regional air power status.
🔧 1. MAINTENANCE BURDEN: AGING ASSETS, FRAGMENTED SUPPORT
Hapus⚙️ Structural Drivers
• Asset Age: As of late 2024, 171 military platforms across the Army, Navy, and Air Force have exceeded 30 years of service life. This includes:
o 108 Army vehicles and artillery systems
o 29 RMAF aircraft (e.g., F-5E, Hawk 208)
o 34 RMN vessels, including Fast Attack Craft over 40 years old
• Obsolescence: Many platforms are no longer supported by OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers), making spare parts scarce and costly.
💸 Economic Strain
• Maintenance consumes over 50% of the defense budget’s operational expenditure (OPEX), leaving limited room for modernization.
• Even with recent efforts to localize MRO (Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul) for fighter jets like the F/A-18, cost savings (~20%) are offset by the scale of aging fleets.
🧩 Outsourcing Challenges
• Malondesh has long outsourced support functions to private firms to reduce costs.
• However, lack of centralized oversight, inconsistent quality control, and limited technical depth in local vendors have led to delays and suboptimal readiness.
📡 2. Poor Interoperability: Platform Diversity, Command Silos
🛠️ Platform Fragmentation
• Malondesh military operates a highly diverse inventory sourced from:
o Western suppliers (US, UK, France)
o Eastern bloc (Russia, China)
o Regional partners (South Korea, Turkey)
• This results in incompatible communication systems, data links, and logistics chains. For example:
o Russian-made Su-30MKM fighters cannot seamlessly integrate with NATO-standard AWACS or datalink systems.
o Naval platforms lack unified combat management systems across classes.
🧠 Command & Control Gaps
• Joint operations are hindered by service-specific doctrines and siloed command structures.
• The absence of a Joint Operations Command with real-time data fusion limits Malondesh ability to conduct multi-domain operations.
🧪 Training & Simulation Deficiencies
• Lack of integrated simulation environments means personnel are trained on platform-specific systems, not joint mission profiles.
• Exercises like MALBATT and CARAT show progress, but interoperability remains tactical, not strategic.
📊 Summary Table: Maintenance vs. Interoperability Weaknesses
Dimension Maintenance Burden Poor Interoperability
Root Cause Aging assets, fragmented procurement Diverse suppliers, siloed doctrines
Budgetary Impact High OPEX, low modernization headroom Redundant systems, inefficient upgrades
Operational Impact Low readiness, frequent downtime Limited joint ops, weak situational awareness
Reform Challenges Weak vendor oversight, slow MRO localization No unified C4ISR architecture
CHINA tersenyum PERANGKAP sudah MENJERAT MANGSANYA... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusLuhut Gagal Desak China Kurangi Bunga Utang Kereta Cepat Jadi 2 Persen
https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20230410165231-92-935833/luhut-gagal-desak-china-kurangi-bunga-utang-kereta-cepat-jadi-2-persen
💸 1. POTENTIALLY HIGHER LONG-TERM COSTS
Hapus• Critics argue that leasing may cost more than outright purchase over time.
• For example, Poland purchased 32 AW149 helicopters for US$1.83 billion, while Malaysia is leasing 28 helicopters for RM16.5 billion (~US$3.5 billion) over 15 years.
• Leasing includes bundled services (maintenance, training, insurance), but the total cost may exceed the value of the helicopters themselves.
🕵️♂️ 2. Transparency & Procurement Concerns
• The deal was signed with Weststar Aviation, a private firm owned by a prominent businessman, raising questions about middlemen and lobbying.
• Past scandals in Malaysia’s defense procurement—like the LCS and MD530G helicopter failures—have made the public wary of opaque contracts and lack of competitive bidding.
🛠️ 3. Limited Sovereignty Over Assets
• Leased helicopters are not fully owned until the end of the contract, which may limit:
o Upgrades or modifications
o Deployment flexibility
o Integration with other military systems
• This could hinder Malaysia’s ability to adapt the fleet to evolving threats or mission needs.
🧭 4. Missed Opportunity for Local Industry Growth
• Purchasing helicopters could have supported local assembly, maintenance, and technology transfer, boosting Malaysia’s defense industry.
• Leasing centralizes operations under a private provider, reducing opportunities for domestic capability development.
⚠️ 5. Risk of Contractual Disputes or Service Interruptions
• If the leasing company fails to meet service-level agreements (e.g., 85% fleet availability), Malaysia may face operational gaps.
• Legal or financial disputes could delay missions or compromise national security.
🗣️ Public & Political Backlash
• Opposition leaders and defense experts have called the deal overpriced and strategically flawed, urging a review of procurement practices.
• The Prime Minister defended the lease as a way to avoid maintenance burdens, but critics say it reflects short-term budgeting over long-term planning.
🧱 1. Fragmented and Underdeveloped Defense Industry
Hapus• Malondesh defense industry is overseen by the Malondeshn Defence Industry Council (MDIC), established in 1999 and later expanded into MIDES.
• Despite having six strategic sectors (Aerospace, Maritime, Weaponry, Automotive, ICT, Common-user Equipment), the ecosystem lacks:
o A clear, enforceable blueprint
o Robust infrastructure
o Skilled manpower
• Many local firms are assemblers or subcontractors, not full-spectrum developers. For example, Malondesh still assembles M4 carbines under license, while Indonesia and Singapore produce their own rifles (SS1 and SAR-21 respectively).
Impact: Malondesh cannot independently design, produce, or sustain core military systems.
🧠 2. Minimal R&D and Technology Investment
• Indigenous R&D in areas like combat management systems (CMS), sensors, and autonomous platforms is nascent and underfunded.
• Studies show that Malondesh lacks structured tendering policies and technology readiness frameworks to support local innovation.
• AI, cyber warfare, and surveillance systems are still in early-stage development, with no operational deployment.
Impact: Malondesh falls behind in emerging tech domains critical to modern warfare.
🔄 3. Dependence on Foreign OEMs for Strategic Systems
• Malondesh imports nearly all major platforms:
o Aircraft: Su-30MKM (Russia), FA-50 (South Korea), Hawk (UK)
o Naval systems: Scorpène submarines (France), LCS (French-German design)
o Missiles: Starstreak (UK), MICA (France), Exocet (France)
• There are no indigenous missile programs, no local radar production, and no domestic armored vehicle design.
Impact: Strategic vulnerability in times of embargo, conflict, or supply chain disruption.
📉 4. Policy Gaps and Execution Failures
• Malondesh has published defense blueprints and industrial strategies, but implementation is weak due to:
o Budget constraints
o Lack of political continuity
o Limited private-sector incentives
• Even promising initiatives like the 15-to-5 naval transformation plan have stalled due to procurement scandals and delivery failures.
Impact: Indigenous capability remains aspirational, not operational.
📊 Summary Table: Weaknesses in Indigenous Capability Development
Dimension Description Strategic Impact
Industrial base Fragmented, lacks full-spectrum development No self-reliance in core systems
R&D investment Minimal funding, weak frameworks Falls behind in emerging technologies
Foreign dependency Imports all major platforms and weapons Vulnerable to external shocks
Policy execution Strong on paper, weak in practice Stalled programs and missed timelines
🧭 Strategic Consequences
• Malondesh cannot scale or sustain its military without foreign support.
• It lacks the ability to customize systems to local needs, export defense products, or build strategic depth.
• In contrast, countries like Indonesia (Pindad, PT PAL), Vietnam (Z111 Factory), and Singapore (ST Engineering) have made significant strides in indigenous capability
gagal memiliki kreta whooshhh
BalasHapusTukang Kensel klaim kaya haha!🤣🤣🤣
kahsiyan kena denda $ 100jt
ekonomi menguncup cup Kalah Lagiii...haha!😋😋😋
⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️
HSR project cancelled as Singapore could not agree with changes proposed by Malaysia
https://theedgemalaysia.com/article/singapore-says-hsr-link-agreement-malaysia-be-terminated
Beda Kasta Pasti haha!😆😆😆
BalasHapusHIGH SPEED TRAIN= 350km
ECRL= 120km
sorii yeee kita pemegang jalur kreta terpanjang sekawan, 3 pulau lho haha!👏👍👏
seblah tuw jalur pendek aja NGUTANG haha!🤥🤣🤥
jalur rel terpanjang se kawasan haha!👍🔥👍
BalasHapusP. Sulawesi =109 km
P. Sumatera = 1863 km
P. Jawa = 4882 km
lah seblah ituw pendek saja, uda ditipu 30 tahun Utang kalo lancar haha!🤣🤣🤣
ehh rm 55 ke 140 bn 3x lipat..modal dengkul ini mah haha!🤪🤥🤪
---------
Indonesia punya 6.927 km jalur kereta api aktif per 2024
nergu🎰kasino genting cuman ranking 5?
noh buka ndiri haha!😝😝😝
https://goodstats.id/infographic/indonesia-miliki-jalur-ka-terpanjang-di-asean-LDlDy
ECRL 2016 $18 bn= RM 55 bn pake Utang 30 Tahun jadi RM140bn...
BalasHapusajegile 3x lipat gaeez bunga/interest aja Ngerih haha!☠️🥶☠️
warganyet 1cc tetap senang Ditipu haha!🤣🍌🤣
⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️
Published October 31, 2016
Updated November 1, 2016
BEIJING — China will build and provide financing for Malaysia’s East Coast Rail Link (ECRL), a ❌️RM55 billion (S$18.3 billion) rail project spanning four states, said a senior Malaysian official on Monday (Oct 31), as Prime Minister Najib Razak arrived in Beijing for a week-long visit.
https://www.todayonline.com/world/asia/china-build-and-finance-msias-s183b-east-coast-rail-link-project
-----
“This railway project is very costly. More than ❌️RM55 billion and it will take us 30 years to repay the loan. We will be saddled with a lot of interest which in the end will amount to ❌️RM140 billion
https://theedgemalaysia.com/article/dr-mahathir-ecrl-project-continue-if-price-right
“This railway project is very costly. More than ❌️RM55 billion and it will take us 30 years to repay the loan. We will be saddled with a lot of interest which in the end will amount to ❌️RM140 billion
BalasHapushttps://theedgemalaysia.com/article/dr-mahathir-ecrl-project-continue-if-price-right
------
warganyet PANIK🥶ECRL murah aja 30 tahun UTANG, dari 55 ke 140 bn
ehh ituw kalo lancar..kalo rugi bisa 300 tahun Ngutang haha!😆😆😆
BEZA KASTA.... Padahal panjang rel Whoosh hanya sepanjang 143KM... itu terlalu pendek sudah buat INDIANESIA RUGI TRILIUNAN setiap tahun.... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusMALAYSIA ECRL - 665KM
INDIANESIA WHOOSH - 143KM
📣 1. PROCUREMENT SCANDALS FUEL PUBLIC DISTRUST
HapusLittoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
• The RM9 billion LCS project became a lightning rod for criticism when no ships were delivered despite billions spent.
• Media outlets and the Public Accounts Committee exposed mismanagement, cost overruns, and non-compliance, triggering public outrage and parliamentary scrutiny.
MD530G Helicopter Failure
• Malaysia paid RM112 million upfront for six helicopters that were never delivered on time.
• The media labeled it a “ghost fleet,” and citizens questioned the lack of accountability.
👑 2. Royal Intervention Amplifies Criticism
• King Sultan Ibrahim, also Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, publicly condemned the procurement of 35-year-old Black Hawk helicopters, calling them “flying coffins.”
• His rebuke—“If you don’t know the price, ask me first”—went viral, reinforcing public frustration over opaque and overpriced deals.
🕵️♂️ 3. Smuggling Conspiracy Exposes Internal Corruption
• In Operation Sohor (2025), MACC arrested military intelligence officers for leaking classified data to smugglers.
• Media reports revealed the syndicate earned RM5 million monthly, with officers receiving RM30,000–RM50,000 per trip.
• The scandal was widely covered, with headlines like “Civil Service Corruption Crisis” and “Where is Akmal Saleh?” fueling public anger.
🧑⚖️ 4. Abuse Cases at Military Institutions
• A 2024 bullying case at Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia (UPNM) reignited outrage when a cadet suffered multiple fractures after being stomped by a senior.
• Media coverage highlighted a pattern of hazing and abuse, prompting demands for institutional reform and stricter oversight.
📱 5. Social Media & Grassroots Pressure
• Platforms like Twitter and TikTok have become battlegrounds for public discourse, with hashtags like #ReformATM and #MilitaryTransparency trending during major scandals.
• Independent media and citizen journalists have played a key role in exposing misconduct, bypassing traditional gatekeepers.
🛠️ Impact on Policy & Reform
• The backlash has led to:
o Cancellation of controversial deals
o Promises of procurement reform
o Greater scrutiny of defense budgets and contractor relationships
• However, many Malaysians remain skeptical, citing deep-rooted patronage networks and slow institutional change
💰 1. Budget Composition Skewed Toward Salaries and Maintenance
Hapus• In 2024, Malondesh allocated RM19.73 billion (~USD 4.16 billion) for defense.
o RM8.2 billion (~41.5%) went to salaries and allowances.
o RM5.8 billion was earmarked for maintenance and asset upkeep.
• That leaves less than RM6 billion for all other needs—including procurement, R&D, and infrastructure.
Impact: The lion’s share of the budget sustains personnel and legacy systems, leaving little for new combat capabilities.
📦 2. Procurement Budget Includes Legacy Payments
• The RM5.71 billion procurement allocation in 2024 isn’t entirely for new systems. It includes:
o Scheduled payments for previously signed contracts (e.g. FA-50 jets from South Korea, A400M upgrades).
o Progressive payments for delayed projects like the Maharaja Lela-class Littoral Combat Ships.
o Small-scale purchases (e.g. small arms, radios, support vehicles).
Impact: The actual discretionary funding for new combat platforms is far lower than it appears on paper.
📉 3. Currency Depreciation Erodes Purchasing Power
• Malondesh sources most of its advanced systems from foreign OEMs (e.g. France, UK, South Korea).
• The depreciation of the ringgit against major currencies means that even modest increases in nominal budget do not translate into real gains.
Impact: Malondesh pays more for the same equipment, reducing the volume and quality of new acquisitions.
🧱 4. No Multi-Year Strategic Investment Framework
• Unlike Singapore or South Korea, Malondesh lacks a ring-fenced capital investment stream for defense.
• Each year’s procurement is subject to political negotiation and fiscal trade-offs, with no guaranteed continuity.
• This discourages long-term programs like missile development, drone fleets, or integrated air defense systems.
Impact: Strategic programs are fragmented, delayed, or abandoned mid-cycle.
📊 Summary Table: Why Funding for New Combat Systems Is Thin
Factor Description Strategic Impact
Budget skew 60–70% spent on salaries and maintenance Minimal room for new acquisitions
Legacy obligations Procurement includes old contracts and delayed projects New systems get crowded out
Currency depreciation Ringgit weakens against USD/EUR Reduces real purchasing power
No strategic investment model No multi-year capital planning Limits continuity and ambition
Itu tandanya infrastruktur Indonesia lebih maju kehadapan berbanding infrastruktur malaydesh 😂🤣
HapusJadi bahan ketawa jiran guys.... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusRugi Triliunan Rupiah Tiap Tahun, DPR Khawatir KAI Bangkrut Gara-gara Kelola Kereta Whoosh
https://www.inilah.com/rugi-triliunan-rupiah-tiap-tahun-dpr-khawatir-kai-bangkrut-gara-gara-kelola-kereta-whoosh
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
===================
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
"Pinjaman ini digunakan untuk melunasi DEBT matang sebesar RM20.6 miliar, dengan sisa RM49,9 miliar menutupi defisit dan masa jatuh tempo DEBT di masa depan," kata MOF.
---
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Pada tahun 2023, pinjaman baru Kerajaan Persekutuan MALONDESH mencapai RM1.173 triliun, naik 8,6% dari tahun 2022.
Rincian pinjaman
• Pinjaman baru Kerajaan Persekutuan MALONDESH pada tahun 2023 naik RM92,918 miliar
• Rasio utang terhadap PDB MALONDESH pada tahun 2023 mencapai 64,3%
---
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Kah Woh menjelaskan pada tahun lalu, kerajaan ada membuat pinjaman yang meningkat sebanyak 11.6 peratus daripada RM194.5 bilion pada tahun sebelumnya. Daripada jumlah itu, beliau berkata 52.4 peratus atau RM113.7 bilion digunakan untuk membayar prinsipal pinjaman matang.
---
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Sejumlah RM98.058 bilion atau 50.4 peratus daripada pinjaman baharu berjumlah RM194.555 bilion yang dibuat kerajaan pada tahun lalu digunakan untuk bayaran balik prinsipal pinjaman yang matang.
---
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Jabatan Audit Negara (JAN) bimbang dengan tindakan kerajaan menggunakan hampir 60 peratus pinjaman baharu untuk membayar DEBT sedia ada pada tahun lalu, berbanding bagi perbelanjaan pembangunan.
---
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Laporan Ketua Audit Negara mengenai Penyata Kewangan Kerajaan Persekutuan 2018 mendapati sejumlah 59 peratus pinjaman baharu kerajaan dibuat untuk membayar DEBT kerajaan terdahulu
---
2018 = OPEN DONASI
2018 = OPEN DONASI
2018 = OPEN DONASI
Kementerian Keuangan MALONDESH pada hari Rabu membuka rekening donasi supaya masyarakat dapat menyumbang untuk membantu negara membayar utang yang mencapai 1 triliun ringgit (US$ 250,8 miliar) atau 80 persen dari PDB
💸 1. Budget Breakdown: Overweight on Operational Costs
Hapus• In 2024, Malondesh allocated RM19.73 billion (~USD 4.16 billion) for defense.
o Salaries and allowances alone accounted for RM8.2 billion (~41.5%).
o Maintenance and asset upkeep received RM5.8 billion in 2025.
• That leaves less than RM6 billion for all other needs—including procurement, R&D, infrastructure, and strategic programs.
Impact: The budget is heavily skewed toward sustaining the current force rather than building future capabilities.
🧱 2. Procurement Funding Is Thin and Fragmented
• The RM5.71 billion allocated for procurement in 2024 includes:
o Scheduled payments for existing contracts (e.g. FA-50 jets, A400M upgrades, LCS ships)
o Small-scale purchases like communication gear, vehicles, and small arms
• Due to ringgit depreciation and reliance on foreign suppliers, real purchasing power is eroded.
Impact: Malondesh struggles to fund new combat systems, let alone strategic platforms like missiles, drones, or ISR networks.
🧰 3. Maintenance of Aging Assets Is Costly and Inefficient
• Much of the RM5.8 billion maintenance budget goes to keeping legacy platforms operational, some over 30–40 years old.
• Example: The Navy’s Condor APCs and older patrol vessels require frequent repairs, yet offer limited tactical value.
Impact: High sunk costs in outdated systems reduce the ability to invest in transformative technologies.
🧠 4. No Dedicated Strategic Investment Stream
• Malondesh lacks a multi-year capital investment framework for defense.
• Unlike Singapore or South Korea, there’s no ring-fenced funding for:
o Missile development
o Cyber warfare
o Space-based surveillance
o Indigenous defense R&D
Impact: Strategic programs are ad hoc, underfunded, and vulnerable to political shifts.
📊 Summary Table: How Budget Crowds Out Combat Capability
Category Allocation (2024–2025) Strategic Impact
Salaries & Allowances RM8.2B (~41.5%) Limits flexibility for modernization
Maintenance & Upkeep RM5.8B Sustains aging platforms, not upgrades
Procurement (net new) RM5.71B (incl. legacy contracts) Thin funding for new combat systems
R&D / Strategic Programs Negligible No indigenous capability development
💰 1. Budget Composition: Operational vs Development
Hapus• In 2025, Malondesh allocated RM21.2 billion to the Ministry of Defence.
o Operational Expenditure (OPEX): RM13.36 billion (~63%) — covers salaries, pensions, allowances, and day-to-day operations.
o Development Expenditure (DE): RM7.49 billion (~37%) — intended for asset acquisition, infrastructure, and modernization.
Impact: The bulk of funding goes to sustaining the status quo, not building future capabilities.
👥 2. Personnel Costs Dominate Spending
• Salaries, pensions, and welfare programs for active-duty personnel and veterans consume over half of OPEX.
• Initiatives like RKAT housing repairs, pension adjustments, and cost-of-living allowances are important for morale but crowd out capital investment.
• Malondesh armed forces have a relatively large administrative footprint compared to its combat strength.
Impact: High fixed costs reduce flexibility for strategic procurement or force restructuring.
🔧 3. Maintenance Over Modernization
• RM5.8 billion in 2025 was earmarked for maintenance, repair, and acquisition of military assets.
• However, most of this goes to keeping aging platforms operational, not acquiring new ones.
• Example: The Royal Malondeshn Navy spends heavily on maintaining ships that are 30–40 years old, with minimal upgrades.
Impact: Funds are spent on patching legacy systems rather than leapfrogging to modern technologies.
📉 4. Low R&D and Capability Investment
• Malondesh allocates negligible funding to defense R&D, indigenous production, or strategic systems (e.g. missiles, cyber, ISR).
• Unlike peers such as Indonesia or Vietnam, Malondesh has no major co-development programs or defense industrial offsets.
Impact: Malondesh remains dependent on foreign suppliers and lacks autonomy in capability planning.
📊 Summary Table: Budget Allocation Weaknesses
Category Description Strategic Impact
Operational Expenditure RM13.36B for salaries, pensions, and operations Limits modernization and flexibility
Personnel Costs High welfare and admin spending Crowds out combat capability investment
Maintenance Focus RM5.8B for upkeep of aging assets Sustains outdated platforms
Low R&D Investment Minimal funding for innovation or strategic systems No indigenous capability development
💰 1. Budget Composition: Operational vs Development
Hapus• In 2025, Malondesh allocated RM21.2 billion to the Ministry of Defence.
o Operational Expenditure (OPEX): RM13.36 billion (~63%) — covers salaries, pensions, allowances, and day-to-day operations.
o Development Expenditure (DE): RM7.49 billion (~37%) — intended for asset acquisition, infrastructure, and modernization.
Impact: The bulk of funding goes to sustaining the status quo, not building future capabilities.
👥 2. Personnel Costs Dominate Spending
• Salaries, pensions, and welfare programs for active-duty personnel and veterans consume over half of OPEX.
• Initiatives like RKAT housing repairs, pension adjustments, and cost-of-living allowances are important for morale but crowd out capital investment.
• Malondesh armed forces have a relatively large administrative footprint compared to its combat strength.
Impact: High fixed costs reduce flexibility for strategic procurement or force restructuring.
🔧 3. Maintenance Over Modernization
• RM5.8 billion in 2025 was earmarked for maintenance, repair, and acquisition of military assets.
• However, most of this goes to keeping aging platforms operational, not acquiring new ones.
• Example: The Royal Malondeshn Navy spends heavily on maintaining ships that are 30–40 years old, with minimal upgrades.
Impact: Funds are spent on patching legacy systems rather than leapfrogging to modern technologies.
📉 4. Low R&D and Capability Investment
• Malondesh allocates negligible funding to defense R&D, indigenous production, or strategic systems (e.g. missiles, cyber, ISR).
• Unlike peers such as Indonesia or Vietnam, Malondesh has no major co-development programs or defense industrial offsets.
Impact: Malondesh remains dependent on foreign suppliers and lacks autonomy in capability planning.
📊 Summary Table: Budget Allocation Weaknesses
Category Description Strategic Impact
Operational Expenditure RM13.36B for salaries, pensions, and operations Limits modernization and flexibility
Personnel Costs High welfare and admin spending Crowds out combat capability investment
Maintenance Focus RM5.8B for upkeep of aging assets Sustains outdated platforms
Low R&D Investment Minimal funding for innovation or strategic systems No indigenous capability development
Itu tandanya infrastruktur Indonesia lebih maju kehadapan berbanding infrastruktur malaydesh 😂🤣
HapusJadi bahan ketawa jiran guys.... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusRugi Triliunan Rupiah Tiap Tahun, DPR Khawatir KAI Bangkrut Gara-gara Kelola Kereta Whoosh
https://www.inilah.com/rugi-triliunan-rupiah-tiap-tahun-dpr-khawatir-kai-bangkrut-gara-gara-kelola-kereta-whoosh
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN = MARCH 2025 .....
RM 1.65 TRILLION = 84.3% OF GDP
RM 1.65 TRILLION = 84.3% OF GDP
RM 1.65 TRILLION = 84.3% OF GDP
MARCH 2025 — deputy finance minister. KUALA LUMPUR (Aug 13): Malondesh's household debt stood at RM1. 65 trillion as of end-March 2025, equivalent to 84.3% of gross domestic product (GDP) as at end-March 2025, a level that remains elevated but is balanced by strong household assets.
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
TIDAK BAYAR DEBT
TIDAK BAYAR DEBT
TIDAK BAYAR DEBT
“Kalau dikira daripada peratus, (DEBT) 82 peratus daripada KDNK (Keluaran Dalam Negara Kasar) dan untuk DEBT kerajaan persekutuan sudah mencecah 60.4 peratus. “Ini bermakna bayaran khidmat DEBT banyak…hanya membayar faedah bukan bayar DEBT tertunggak,” kata Anwar lagi
😝 😝 😝 😝 😝
🚫 1. No Long-Range Strike Systems
Hapus• Malondesh does not possess ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or standoff precision-guided munitions.
• Its air force lacks platforms capable of launching deep-strike missions. The Su-30MKM fighters have range and payload potential, but Malondesh has not equipped them with long-range strike munitions like Kh-59 or BrahMos.
• Naval assets are similarly limited—no ship-launched cruise missiles or land-attack capabilities exist.
Impact: Malondesh cannot credibly threaten retaliation against adversaries beyond its borders, reducing its strategic leverage.
🛡️ 2. Deterrence by Denial, Not Punishment
• Malondesh defense doctrine emphasizes “concentric deterrence”, focusing on denial rather than punishment.
• This means the strategy is built around preventing aggression, not retaliating against it.
• While this suits peacetime stability, it’s increasingly inadequate in a region where China, Vietnam, and the Philippines are investing in deterrence-by-punishment capabilities.
Impact: Malondesh lacks escalation control and cannot impose costs on adversaries, weakening its deterrent posture.
💸 3. Budget Priorities Undermine Capability Development
• Over 60–70% of Malondesh defense budget goes to salaries, maintenance, and operations.
• This leaves minimal room for R&D, procurement of advanced weapons, or strategic force development.
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal and delays have further eroded trust and diverted resources from strategic programs.
Impact: Malondesh is stuck in a cycle of maintaining legacy systems rather than investing in future capabilities.
🌐 4. No Indigenous Missile or Strategic Weapons Program
• Unlike regional peers such as Indonesia (which is co-developing missiles with Turkey) or Vietnam (which fields Russian cruise missiles), Malondesh has no domestic missile development program.
• It also lacks partnerships for co-production or licensed manufacturing of strategic weapons.
Impact: Total dependence on foreign suppliers; no autonomy in strategic force planning.
📊 Summary Table: Strategic Strike & Deterrence Weaknesses
Weakness Description Strategic Impact
No long-range strike systems No cruise, ballistic, or standoff weapons Cannot retaliate or shape adversary behavior
Denial-based doctrine Focus on defense, not punishment Weak deterrence posture
Budget constraints Most funds go to salaries and maintenance No room for strategic force development
No indigenous capability No missile R&D or co-production High dependency, low autonomy
🔧 1. Fragmented and Underdeveloped MRO Infrastructure
Hapus• Malondesh defense MRO sector is technically shallow, with most local firms focused on commercial aviation, not military-grade systems.
• Despite having over 200 aerospace companies, only a handful are equipped to handle complex military platforms like fighter jets, naval combat systems, or armored vehicles.
• The defense MRO ecosystem lacks dedicated facilities for:
o Engine overhauls (especially for Su-30MKM and Hawk aircraft)
o Combat system integration
o Naval propulsion and sensor maintenance
Impact: Military platforms face long downtimes and must rely on foreign OEMs for critical servicing.
🧱 2. Slow Localization and Limited Technical Depth
• Malondesh has made partial progress in localizing MRO for platforms like the F/A-18D Hornet, but most high-end servicing still requires foreign technical assistance.
• There is no national MRO roadmap aligned with defense modernization goals, unlike countries like Turkey or South Korea that have built robust domestic ecosystems through tech transfer and industrial offsets.
• Local firms lack access to classified schematics, proprietary software, and advanced diagnostic tools needed for full-spectrum support.
Impact: Strategic dependence persists, and Malondesh cannot sustain its fleet autonomously during crises or embargoes.
🕵️ 3. Weak Vendor Oversight and Governance
• The 2025 Auditor-General’s Report flagged major lapses in vendor management:
o RM162.75 million in late penalties were not collected
o RM1.42 million in fines were never imposed for delayed maintenance
• Contracts are often awarded to politically connected firms without rigorous performance benchmarks or technical vetting.
• Oversight is fragmented across MINDEF, the Ministry of Finance, and service branches, leading to diffused accountability.
Impact: Maintenance quality is inconsistent, costs are inflated, and readiness suffers.
📉 4. Obsolete Platforms and Spare Part Bottlenecks
• Malondesh inventory includes 171 platforms over 30 years old, many of which require parts that are:
o No longer manufactured
o Sourced from defunct suppliers
o Incompatible with newer systems
• RM384.5 million was lost due to 1.62 million unused spare parts that no longer matched operational needs.
Impact: Maintenance becomes reactive and inefficient, with high sunk costs and low operational returns.
📊 Summary Table: MRO Asset Weaknesses in Malondeshn Military
Weakness Area Description Strategic Impact
Infrastructure gaps Few facilities for military-grade MRO Long downtimes, foreign dependency
Slow localization Limited tech transfer, no unified roadmap No autonomy in fleet sustainment
Vendor oversight Poor contract enforcement, inflated costs Inconsistent quality, low accountability
Spare part obsolescence Aging platforms, mismatched inventory Budget waste, reduced readiness
🧭 Strategic Consequences
• Malondesh ability to sustain combat operations over time is compromised.
• Without robust MRO capabilities, even newly acquired platforms (e.g. FA-50 jets, LCS ships) risk becoming high-cost liabilities.
• Regional peers like Indonesia and Singapore are investing in integrated MRO hubs, giving them a long-term readiness advantage.
Itu tandanya infrastruktur Indonesia lebih maju kehadapan berbanding infrastruktur malaydesh 😂🤣
Hapus665 kilometer pendek sekali di sini BANYAK 2x lipat lebih panjang haha!🤗🤗🤗
BalasHapusEcrl kereta lamban bayar mahal, Utang 30 tahun bunga Besar 3x lipat...fiks kena debt trap haha!🤣🤣🤣
jalur rel terpanjang se kawasan haha!👍🔥👍
BalasHapusP. Sulawesi =109 km
P. Sumatera = 1863 km
P. Jawa = 4882 km
lah seblah ituw pendek saja, uda ditipu 30 tahun Utang kalo lancar haha!🤣🤣🤣
ehh rm 55 ke 140 bn 3x lipat..modal dengkul ini mah haha!🤪🤥🤪
---------
Indonesia punya 6.927 km jalur kereta api aktif per 2024
nergu🎰kasino genting cuman ranking 5?
noh buka ndiri haha!😝😝😝
https://goodstats.id/infographic/indonesia-miliki-jalur-ka-terpanjang-di-asean-LDlDy
Beda Kasta Pasti haha!😆😆😆
BalasHapusKereta kita Super Cepat
HIGH SPEED TRAIN WHOOSH = 350km
ECRL= 120km
hadeooo Pelannn...
sorii yeee kita pemegang jalur kreta terpanjang sekawan, 3 pulau lho haha!👏👍👏
seblah tuw jalur pendek aja NGUTANG haha!🤥🤣🤥
ECRL 665 kilometer pendek sekali di sini BANYAK 2x lipat lebih panjang haha!🤗🤗🤗
BalasHapusEcrl kereta lamban bayar mahal, Utang 30 tahun bunga Besar 3x lipat...fiks kena debt trap haha!🤣🤣🤣
Pinjam rm 55bn, bayar utang rm140 bn..paraahh
eittt kereta cepat kita HST WHOOSH uda selesai dari 2023...mantap haha!👍🦾👍
BalasHapus⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️
https://youtube.com/watch?v=n2SwnzA31uU&pp=ygUWd2hvb3NoIHRyYWluIGluZG9uZXNpYQ%3D%3D
lah ECRL...delay delay...last last kensel haha!🤣🤣🤣
Utang 30 tahun bunga 3x lipat..dari rm 55bn ke rm140bn...fanasss🔥🔥🔥
eitt ituw kat tun m haha!👍👍👍
Biar Fakta berbicara.... Syukur ada warga MALAYSIA bantu jika tidak Whoosh HUTANG tu akan MANGKRAK lagi parah.... 🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusPelancong Malaysia ‘selamatkan’ kereta api laju Indonesia dari kerugian
https://thereporter.my/pelancong-malaysia-selamatkan-whoosh-indonesia/
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
===================
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
"Pinjaman ini digunakan untuk melunasi DEBT matang sebesar RM20.6 miliar, dengan sisa RM49,9 miliar menutupi defisit dan masa jatuh tempo DEBT di masa depan," kata MOF.
---
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Pada tahun 2023, pinjaman baru Kerajaan Persekutuan MALONDESH mencapai RM1.173 triliun, naik 8,6% dari tahun 2022.
Rincian pinjaman
• Pinjaman baru Kerajaan Persekutuan MALONDESH pada tahun 2023 naik RM92,918 miliar
• Rasio utang terhadap PDB MALONDESH pada tahun 2023 mencapai 64,3%
---
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Kah Woh menjelaskan pada tahun lalu, kerajaan ada membuat pinjaman yang meningkat sebanyak 11.6 peratus daripada RM194.5 bilion pada tahun sebelumnya. Daripada jumlah itu, beliau berkata 52.4 peratus atau RM113.7 bilion digunakan untuk membayar prinsipal pinjaman matang.
---
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Sejumlah RM98.058 bilion atau 50.4 peratus daripada pinjaman baharu berjumlah RM194.555 bilion yang dibuat kerajaan pada tahun lalu digunakan untuk bayaran balik prinsipal pinjaman yang matang.
---
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Jabatan Audit Negara (JAN) bimbang dengan tindakan kerajaan menggunakan hampir 60 peratus pinjaman baharu untuk membayar DEBT sedia ada pada tahun lalu, berbanding bagi perbelanjaan pembangunan.
---
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Laporan Ketua Audit Negara mengenai Penyata Kewangan Kerajaan Persekutuan 2018 mendapati sejumlah 59 peratus pinjaman baharu kerajaan dibuat untuk membayar DEBT kerajaan terdahulu
---
2018 = OPEN DONASI
2018 = OPEN DONASI
2018 = OPEN DONASI
Kementerian Keuangan MALONDESH pada hari Rabu membuka rekening donasi supaya masyarakat dapat menyumbang untuk membantu negara membayar utang yang mencapai 1 triliun ringgit (US$ 250,8 miliar) atau 80 persen dari PDB
🚫 1. Limited Missile Inventory and Range
Hapus• The Malondeshn Army currently fields only short-range air defense systems, notably the Starstreak and aging Rapier missiles.
• These systems are effective only within 5–7 km, offering minimal protection against modern aircraft, drones, or cruise missiles.
• Malondesh lacks medium- and long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), leaving critical infrastructure and forward bases vulnerable.
Impact: Inability to defend against high-altitude or standoff threats; poor layered defense architecture.
🛠️ 2. Delayed Modernization and Funding Gaps
• Although Malondesh has published requirements for new Ground-Based Air Defence (GBAD) systems, no funding has been allocated.
• Proposed systems like MBDA’s MICA VL NG and EMADS (CAMM) offer 40+ km range and advanced seekers, but remain unprocured.
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program includes VL MICA missiles, but the ships themselves are years behind schedule, delaying missile deployment.
Impact: Strategic plans remain theoretical; operational readiness is compromised by procurement delays.
🔄 3. Fragmented Missile Ecosystem
• Malondesh missile systems are sourced from multiple foreign suppliers (UK, France, Russia), resulting in:
o Interoperability issues
o Complex logistics and maintenance
o Training burdens across platforms
• No indigenous missile production capability exists, and local defense industry lacks integration with global supply chains.
Impact: High dependency on foreign vendors; low sustainability in prolonged conflict scenarios.
📉 4. No Strategic Strike or Deterrent Capability
• Malondesh does not possess ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or standoff precision-guided munitions.
• This absence limits its ability to:
o Strike high-value targets beyond its borders
o Deter adversaries with credible retaliation
o Support joint operations with regional partners
Impact: Malondesh remains a defensive-only actor, unable to shape regional dynamics or respond asymmetrically.
📊 Summary Table: Missile Capability Weaknesses
Weakness Description Strategic Impact
Short-range inventory Only Starstreak and Rapier systems in service Vulnerable to modern air threats
Procurement delays No funding for new GBAD systems; LCS delays Reduced readiness and deterrence
Fragmented ecosystem Multiple suppliers, no local production Poor interoperability and sustainment
No strike capability No cruise or ballistic missiles Limited strategic options and deterrence
🚢 1. Aging Fleet Beyond Serviceable Lifespan
Hapus• As of 2025, over half of RMN’s 49 ships are operating beyond their designed lifespan, some exceeding 40–45 years2.
• Example: The KD Pendekar, commissioned in 1979, sank in 2024 after colliding with an underwater object—experts cited wear and tear as a contributing factor.
• Naval experts warn that vessels typically have a 20–25 year lifespan, after which structural integrity and system reliability degrade significantly.
Impact: Increased risk of mechanical failure, reduced combat effectiveness, and safety hazards for personnel.
🔧 2. Delayed Replacement and Procurement Failures
• Malondesh planned to acquire 18 new vessels, but only 4 have been delivered as of mid-2025.
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, intended to modernize the fleet, has been plagued by delays, mismanagement, and corruption.
• The Auditor-General’s report revealed continued reliance on outdated ships due to non-delivery of replacements.
Impact: Strategic gaps in patrol coverage, reduced deterrence, and overreliance on aging platforms.
🧱 3. Obsolete Systems and Spare Part Incompatibility
• RMN has incurred RM384.5 million in losses from 1.62 million unused spare parts that are no longer compatible with its ships.
• Many vessels use legacy systems from diverse foreign suppliers (France, UK, Italy, Germany), making interoperability and maintenance complex.
Impact: High maintenance costs, long repair cycles, and logistical inefficiencies.
🌊 4. Limited Deterrence and Strategic Reach
• Malondesh maritime domain spans over 500,000 sq km, yet its aging fleet lacks the endurance and sensor range to patrol effectively.
• Analysts warn that RMN’s current posture offers insufficient deterrence against rising threats, especially from China’s naval and coast guard presence.
Impact: Reduced strategic options for defense planners and vulnerability in contested waters.
📊 Summary Table: Key Weaknesses of Malondeshn Navy Vessels
Weakness Description Strategic Impact
Aging platforms Over half the fleet >40 years old High failure risk, low combat value
Procurement delays Only 4 of 18 planned ships delivered Capability gaps, reduced patrol reach
Obsolete systems Legacy tech, incompatible spare parts Maintenance burden, poor interoperability
Limited deterrence Inadequate coverage of vast maritime domain Strategic vulnerability in South China Sea
Itu tandanya infrastruktur Indonesia lebih maju kehadapan berbanding infrastruktur malaydesh 😂🤣
HapusBiar Fakta berbicara.... Syukur ada warga MALAYSIA bantu jika tidak Whoosh HUTANG tu akan MANGKRAK lagi parah.... 🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusPelancong Malaysia ‘selamatkan’ kereta api laju Indonesia dari kerugian
https://thereporter.my/pelancong-malaysia-selamatkan-whoosh-indonesia/
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
===================
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
"Pinjaman ini digunakan untuk melunasi DEBT matang sebesar RM20.6 miliar, dengan sisa RM49,9 miliar menutupi defisit dan masa jatuh tempo DEBT di masa depan," kata MOF.
---
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Pada tahun 2023, pinjaman baru Kerajaan Persekutuan MALONDESH mencapai RM1.173 triliun, naik 8,6% dari tahun 2022.
Rincian pinjaman
• Pinjaman baru Kerajaan Persekutuan MALONDESH pada tahun 2023 naik RM92,918 miliar
• Rasio utang terhadap PDB MALONDESH pada tahun 2023 mencapai 64,3%
---
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Kah Woh menjelaskan pada tahun lalu, kerajaan ada membuat pinjaman yang meningkat sebanyak 11.6 peratus daripada RM194.5 bilion pada tahun sebelumnya. Daripada jumlah itu, beliau berkata 52.4 peratus atau RM113.7 bilion digunakan untuk membayar prinsipal pinjaman matang.
---
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Sejumlah RM98.058 bilion atau 50.4 peratus daripada pinjaman baharu berjumlah RM194.555 bilion yang dibuat kerajaan pada tahun lalu digunakan untuk bayaran balik prinsipal pinjaman yang matang.
---
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Jabatan Audit Negara (JAN) bimbang dengan tindakan kerajaan menggunakan hampir 60 peratus pinjaman baharu untuk membayar DEBT sedia ada pada tahun lalu, berbanding bagi perbelanjaan pembangunan.
---
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Laporan Ketua Audit Negara mengenai Penyata Kewangan Kerajaan Persekutuan 2018 mendapati sejumlah 59 peratus pinjaman baharu kerajaan dibuat untuk membayar DEBT kerajaan terdahulu
---
2018 = OPEN DONASI
2018 = OPEN DONASI
2018 = OPEN DONASI
Kementerian Keuangan MALONDESH pada hari Rabu membuka rekening donasi supaya masyarakat dapat menyumbang untuk membantu negara membayar utang yang mencapai 1 triliun ringgit (US$ 250,8 miliar) atau 80 persen dari PDB
📣 1. PROCUREMENT SCANDALS FUEL PUBLIC DISTRUST
HapusLittoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
• The RM9 billion LCS project became a lightning rod for criticism when no ships were delivered despite billions spent.
• Media outlets and the Public Accounts Committee exposed mismanagement, cost overruns, and non-compliance, triggering public outrage and parliamentary scrutiny.
MD530G Helicopter Failure
• Malaysia paid RM112 million upfront for six helicopters that were never delivered on time.
• The media labeled it a “ghost fleet,” and citizens questioned the lack of accountability.
👑 2. Royal Intervention Amplifies Criticism
• King Sultan Ibrahim, also Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, publicly condemned the procurement of 35-year-old Black Hawk helicopters, calling them “flying coffins.”
• His rebuke—“If you don’t know the price, ask me first”—went viral, reinforcing public frustration over opaque and overpriced deals.
🕵️♂️ 3. Smuggling Conspiracy Exposes Internal Corruption
• In Operation Sohor (2025), MACC arrested military intelligence officers for leaking classified data to smugglers.
• Media reports revealed the syndicate earned RM5 million monthly, with officers receiving RM30,000–RM50,000 per trip.
• The scandal was widely covered, with headlines like “Civil Service Corruption Crisis” and “Where is Akmal Saleh?” fueling public anger.
🧑⚖️ 4. Abuse Cases at Military Institutions
• A 2024 bullying case at Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia (UPNM) reignited outrage when a cadet suffered multiple fractures after being stomped by a senior.
• Media coverage highlighted a pattern of hazing and abuse, prompting demands for institutional reform and stricter oversight.
📱 5. Social Media & Grassroots Pressure
• Platforms like Twitter and TikTok have become battlegrounds for public discourse, with hashtags like #ReformATM and #MilitaryTransparency trending during major scandals.
• Independent media and citizen journalists have played a key role in exposing misconduct, bypassing traditional gatekeepers.
🛠️ Impact on Policy & Reform
• The backlash has led to:
o Cancellation of controversial deals
o Promises of procurement reform
o Greater scrutiny of defense budgets and contractor relationships
• However, many Malaysians remain skeptical, citing deep-rooted patronage networks and slow institutional change
🕴️ 1. Entrenched Role of Middlemen
Hapus• Defense contracts are frequently brokered by agents or intermediaries, many of whom are retired military officers or politically connected individuals.
• These middlemen often act as gatekeepers between the Ministry of Defence and foreign suppliers, adding layers of cost and complexity.
• According to analysts, this system is deeply entrenched and has become an “open secret” in Malondesh defense ecosystem.
Impact: Prices are inflated, procurement timelines are extended, and transparency is compromised.
🧱 2. Opaque Tendering and Limited Competition
• Fewer than one-third of major defense contracts are awarded through open competition.
• Most deals are conducted via single-source or limited tenders, which favor firms with insider access or political leverage.
• This environment allows deal structuring to be influenced by non-technical considerations, including patronage and lobbying.
Impact: Merit-based selection is sidelined, and cost-effectiveness suffers.
🏛️ 3. Politically Connected Firms Dominate
• Many defense contractors have ex-military figures on their boards, giving them privileged access to decision-makers.
• These firms often win contracts despite offering older platforms or substandard equipment—as seen in the attempted purchase of 30-year-old Black Hawk helicopters, which Malondesh King publicly condemned as “flying coffins”2.
• The King also rebuked “agents” and “salesmen” in the Ministry of Defence, warning that inflated middleman pricing would render the defense budget perpetually insufficient.
Impact: Public funds are wasted, and the armed forces receive outdated or unsuitable equipment.
📉 4. Consequences for Readiness and Reform
• Inflated costs mean fewer assets can be acquired, and maintenance budgets are squeezed.
• The lack of transparency erodes public trust and makes it difficult for oversight bodies like the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) to hold officials accountable.
• While the King’s intervention led to the cancellation of the Black Hawk deal, systemic reform remains elusive.
📊 Summary Table: How Middlemen & Opaque Deals Inflate Costs
Mechanism Description Consequence
Middlemen Agents with insider access broker deals Inflated prices, longer timelines
Limited tendering Few contracts awarded via open competition Reduced transparency, poor value
Politically connected firms Ex-military or political figures dominate contractor space Patronage, outdated equipment
Lack of oversight Weak enforcement and redacted audits Mismanagement persists
Itu tandanya infrastruktur Indonesia lebih maju kehadapan berbanding infrastruktur malaydesh 😂🤣
HapusHamiwowww..Hamiwowww Melambaiii
BalasHapusUcap gutbai pada warganyet kl gaesz, sebentar lagi ⛔️TAMAT haha!👻🔥👻
⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️
Tanah Melayu Tamat 10 Tahun Lagi - Tun. Dr. Mahathir Mohamad
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=myv-SPwjKL8&pp=ygUXTWFoYXRpciB0YW1hdCBtYWxheXNpYSA%3D
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
===================
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
"Pinjaman ini digunakan untuk melunasi DEBT matang sebesar RM20.6 miliar, dengan sisa RM49,9 miliar menutupi defisit dan masa jatuh tempo DEBT di masa depan," kata MOF.
---
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Pada tahun 2023, pinjaman baru Kerajaan Persekutuan MALONDESH mencapai RM1.173 triliun, naik 8,6% dari tahun 2022.
Rincian pinjaman
• Pinjaman baru Kerajaan Persekutuan MALONDESH pada tahun 2023 naik RM92,918 miliar
• Rasio utang terhadap PDB MALONDESH pada tahun 2023 mencapai 64,3%
---
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Kah Woh menjelaskan pada tahun lalu, kerajaan ada membuat pinjaman yang meningkat sebanyak 11.6 peratus daripada RM194.5 bilion pada tahun sebelumnya. Daripada jumlah itu, beliau berkata 52.4 peratus atau RM113.7 bilion digunakan untuk membayar prinsipal pinjaman matang.
---
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Sejumlah RM98.058 bilion atau 50.4 peratus daripada pinjaman baharu berjumlah RM194.555 bilion yang dibuat kerajaan pada tahun lalu digunakan untuk bayaran balik prinsipal pinjaman yang matang.
---
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Jabatan Audit Negara (JAN) bimbang dengan tindakan kerajaan menggunakan hampir 60 peratus pinjaman baharu untuk membayar DEBT sedia ada pada tahun lalu, berbanding bagi perbelanjaan pembangunan.
---
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Laporan Ketua Audit Negara mengenai Penyata Kewangan Kerajaan Persekutuan 2018 mendapati sejumlah 59 peratus pinjaman baharu kerajaan dibuat untuk membayar DEBT kerajaan terdahulu
---
2018 = OPEN DONASI
2018 = OPEN DONASI
2018 = OPEN DONASI
Kementerian Keuangan MALONDESH pada hari Rabu membuka rekening donasi supaya masyarakat dapat menyumbang untuk membantu negara membayar utang yang mencapai 1 triliun ringgit (US$ 250,8 miliar) atau 80 persen dari PDB
Bukan HIGH SPEED TRAIN ECRL negri🎰kasino genting adalah 100% Utang
BalasHapus3X lebih mahal dari WHOOOSH haha!🤣🤣🤣
biasalah warganyet kl mudah di tipu apalagi tipe m...kasi fisank beres haha!🍌🍌🍌
Majoriti dari MALAYSIA.... Kalau ditolak jumlah Ratusan ribu tu dari MALAYSIA... Jangan jangan sudah TUTUP tu WHOOSH kerana Rugi yang lagi parah... 🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapus528 Ribu Warga Asing Menumpang Whoosh, Mayoritas Asal Malaysia
https://www.metrotvnews.com/read/NrWCoe5A-528-ribu-warga-asing-menumpang-whoosh-mayoritas-asal-malaysia
📣 1. PROCUREMENT SCANDALS FUEL PUBLIC DISTRUST
HapusLittoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
• The RM9 billion LCS project became a lightning rod for criticism when no ships were delivered despite billions spent.
• Media outlets and the Public Accounts Committee exposed mismanagement, cost overruns, and non-compliance, triggering public outrage and parliamentary scrutiny.
MD530G Helicopter Failure
• Malaysia paid RM112 million upfront for six helicopters that were never delivered on time.
• The media labeled it a “ghost fleet,” and citizens questioned the lack of accountability.
👑 2. Royal Intervention Amplifies Criticism
• King Sultan Ibrahim, also Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, publicly condemned the procurement of 35-year-old Black Hawk helicopters, calling them “flying coffins.”
• His rebuke—“If you don’t know the price, ask me first”—went viral, reinforcing public frustration over opaque and overpriced deals.
🕵️♂️ 3. Smuggling Conspiracy Exposes Internal Corruption
• In Operation Sohor (2025), MACC arrested military intelligence officers for leaking classified data to smugglers.
• Media reports revealed the syndicate earned RM5 million monthly, with officers receiving RM30,000–RM50,000 per trip.
• The scandal was widely covered, with headlines like “Civil Service Corruption Crisis” and “Where is Akmal Saleh?” fueling public anger.
🧑⚖️ 4. Abuse Cases at Military Institutions
• A 2024 bullying case at Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia (UPNM) reignited outrage when a cadet suffered multiple fractures after being stomped by a senior.
• Media coverage highlighted a pattern of hazing and abuse, prompting demands for institutional reform and stricter oversight.
📱 5. Social Media & Grassroots Pressure
• Platforms like Twitter and TikTok have become battlegrounds for public discourse, with hashtags like #ReformATM and #MilitaryTransparency trending during major scandals.
• Independent media and citizen journalists have played a key role in exposing misconduct, bypassing traditional gatekeepers.
🛠️ Impact on Policy & Reform
• The backlash has led to:
o Cancellation of controversial deals
o Promises of procurement reform
o Greater scrutiny of defense budgets and contractor relationships
• However, many Malaysians remain skeptical, citing deep-rooted patronage networks and slow institutional change
🚀 1. Accelerated Modernization by Neighbors
Hapus• Singapore maintains one of the most technologically advanced militaries in Southeast Asia, with investments in F-15SG fighters, submarines, and integrated air defense systems.
• Indonesia has ramped up procurement of Rafale jets, frigates, and drones, aiming for a more balanced tri-service force.
• Vietnam has focused on asymmetric capabilities, acquiring Kilo-class submarines, coastal missile systems, and modernizing its air defense.
• Philippines is deepening defense ties with the US, Japan, and Australia, acquiring BrahMos missiles and upgrading its naval fleet.
Result: Malondesh risks falling behind in both conventional and hybrid warfare capabilities2.
📉 2. Malondesh Budget Bottleneck
• Malondesh defense budget has stagnated at RM15–18 billion annually, with 60–70% spent on salaries and maintenance, leaving little for modernization.
• Major projects like the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program have been plagued by delays and scandals, further eroding trust and capability.
Result: While neighbors invest in future-ready systems, Malondesh struggles to maintain legacy platforms.
🌊 3. Strategic Exposure in the South China Sea
• China’s coast guard and maritime militia have repeatedly entered Malondesh Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), testing its maritime sovereignty.
• Malondesh aging naval fleet—28 of 34 vessels are over 40 years old—limits its ability to respond effectively.
Result: Malondesh deterrence posture is weakened, especially in contested maritime zones.
🧭 4. Diplomatic vs. Hard Power Approach
• Malondesh has traditionally relied on quiet diplomacy and ASEAN mechanisms to manage regional tensions.
• However, the geopolitical landscape is shifting toward hard power signaling, with countries like the Philippines and Vietnam adopting more assertive defense postures.
Result: Malondesh soft approach is increasingly outpaced by neighbors who combine diplomacy with credible military strength.
📊 Summary Table: Malondesh vs. Regional Peers
Country Modernization Focus Strategic Advantage Over Malondesh
Singapore High-tech platforms, integrated C4ISR Superior air/naval integration
Indonesia Balanced tri-service upgrades Larger force, expanding reach
Vietnam Asymmetric coastal defense Strong deterrence in South China Sea
Philippines Allied-backed modernization Rapid capability growth, joint exercises
Malondesh Aging inventory, budget constraints Limited deterrence, slow procurement
🧓 1. Aging Components Beyond Service Life
Hapus• As of 2024, 171 military assets across the Army, Navy, and Air Force have exceeded 30 years of service2.
• Many platforms—like the Royal Malondeshn Navy’s Fast Attack Craft (FAC)—are over 40 years old, with some approaching 50 years.
• These assets were designed for past-era threats and technologies, and their mechanical systems are now prone to fatigue, corrosion, and failure.
Result: Even routine operations carry elevated risk of malfunction, requiring constant patchwork maintenance.
🌴 2. Tropical Climate Accelerates Wear
• Malondesh’s hot, humid, and saline environment is particularly harsh on military hardware:
o Metal fatigue and corrosion are accelerated, especially in naval vessels and aircraft.
o Rubber seals, electronics, and hydraulics degrade faster under tropical heat and moisture.
• The Navy has acknowledged that many vessels no longer meet modern standards due to environmental degradation.
Result: Maintenance cycles shorten, costs rise, and reliability drops.
🔧 3. Obsolete Systems and Spare Parts Shortage
• Many legacy platforms rely on foreign OEMs that have ceased production or support.
• Spare parts must be sourced internationally, often at inflated prices and long lead times.
• In some cases, technicians resort to cannibalizing other units or fabricating parts locally—neither of which guarantees reliability.
Result: Delays in repairs, reduced fleet availability, and compromised safety.
⚠️ 4. Operational Incidents and Safety Risks
• A tragic example: In July 2025, a Malondeshn commando died during a maritime exercise due to suspected failure of aging diving equipment.
• The Army Chief confirmed that the gear was “rather old,” prompting a full audit of equipment lifecycle and maintenance protocols.
Result: Legacy systems not only reduce readiness—they pose direct risks to personnel.
📊 Summary Table: Breakdown Drivers in Malondeshn Military
Factor Description Operational Impact
Aging components Platforms >30–50 years old, beyond design limits Frequent failures, low reliability
Tropical wear Heat, humidity, salt accelerate degradation Shorter maintenance cycles
Obsolete systems Legacy tech, no OEM support Spare part shortages, delays
Safety incidents Equipment failures linked to fatal accidents Personnel risk, public scrutiny
Itu tandanya infrastruktur Indonesia lebih maju kehadapan berbanding infrastruktur malaydesh 😂🤣
HapusBiar Fakta berbicara..... MALAYSIA SELAMATKAN WHOOSH INDIANESIA dari Rugi lagi PARAH... 🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapus528 Ribu Warga Asing Menumpang Whoosh, Mayoritas Asal Malaysia
https://www.metrotvnews.com/read/NrWCoe5A-528-ribu-warga-asing-menumpang-whoosh-mayoritas-asal-malaysia
📣 1. PROCUREMENT SCANDALS FUEL PUBLIC DISTRUST
HapusLittoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
• The RM9 billion LCS project became a lightning rod for criticism when no ships were delivered despite billions spent.
• Media outlets and the Public Accounts Committee exposed mismanagement, cost overruns, and non-compliance, triggering public outrage and parliamentary scrutiny.
MD530G Helicopter Failure
• Malaysia paid RM112 million upfront for six helicopters that were never delivered on time.
• The media labeled it a “ghost fleet,” and citizens questioned the lack of accountability.
👑 2. Royal Intervention Amplifies Criticism
• King Sultan Ibrahim, also Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, publicly condemned the procurement of 35-year-old Black Hawk helicopters, calling them “flying coffins.”
• His rebuke—“If you don’t know the price, ask me first”—went viral, reinforcing public frustration over opaque and overpriced deals.
🕵️♂️ 3. Smuggling Conspiracy Exposes Internal Corruption
• In Operation Sohor (2025), MACC arrested military intelligence officers for leaking classified data to smugglers.
• Media reports revealed the syndicate earned RM5 million monthly, with officers receiving RM30,000–RM50,000 per trip.
• The scandal was widely covered, with headlines like “Civil Service Corruption Crisis” and “Where is Akmal Saleh?” fueling public anger.
🧑⚖️ 4. Abuse Cases at Military Institutions
• A 2024 bullying case at Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia (UPNM) reignited outrage when a cadet suffered multiple fractures after being stomped by a senior.
• Media coverage highlighted a pattern of hazing and abuse, prompting demands for institutional reform and stricter oversight.
📱 5. Social Media & Grassroots Pressure
• Platforms like Twitter and TikTok have become battlegrounds for public discourse, with hashtags like #ReformATM and #MilitaryTransparency trending during major scandals.
• Independent media and citizen journalists have played a key role in exposing misconduct, bypassing traditional gatekeepers.
🛠️ Impact on Policy & Reform
• The backlash has led to:
o Cancellation of controversial deals
o Promises of procurement reform
o Greater scrutiny of defense budgets and contractor relationships
• However, many Malaysians remain skeptical, citing deep-rooted patronage networks and slow institutional change
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
===================
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
"Pinjaman ini digunakan untuk melunasi DEBT matang sebesar RM20.6 miliar, dengan sisa RM49,9 miliar menutupi defisit dan masa jatuh tempo DEBT di masa depan," kata MOF.
---
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Pada tahun 2023, pinjaman baru Kerajaan Persekutuan MALONDESH mencapai RM1.173 triliun, naik 8,6% dari tahun 2022.
Rincian pinjaman
• Pinjaman baru Kerajaan Persekutuan MALONDESH pada tahun 2023 naik RM92,918 miliar
• Rasio utang terhadap PDB MALONDESH pada tahun 2023 mencapai 64,3%
---
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Kah Woh menjelaskan pada tahun lalu, kerajaan ada membuat pinjaman yang meningkat sebanyak 11.6 peratus daripada RM194.5 bilion pada tahun sebelumnya. Daripada jumlah itu, beliau berkata 52.4 peratus atau RM113.7 bilion digunakan untuk membayar prinsipal pinjaman matang.
---
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Sejumlah RM98.058 bilion atau 50.4 peratus daripada pinjaman baharu berjumlah RM194.555 bilion yang dibuat kerajaan pada tahun lalu digunakan untuk bayaran balik prinsipal pinjaman yang matang.
---
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Jabatan Audit Negara (JAN) bimbang dengan tindakan kerajaan menggunakan hampir 60 peratus pinjaman baharu untuk membayar DEBT sedia ada pada tahun lalu, berbanding bagi perbelanjaan pembangunan.
---
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Laporan Ketua Audit Negara mengenai Penyata Kewangan Kerajaan Persekutuan 2018 mendapati sejumlah 59 peratus pinjaman baharu kerajaan dibuat untuk membayar DEBT kerajaan terdahulu
---
2018 = OPEN DONASI
2018 = OPEN DONASI
2018 = OPEN DONASI
Kementerian Keuangan MALONDESH pada hari Rabu membuka rekening donasi supaya masyarakat dapat menyumbang untuk membantu negara membayar utang yang mencapai 1 triliun ringgit (US$ 250,8 miliar) atau 80 persen dari PDB
🧓 1. Obsolete Systems and Aging Platforms
Hapus• As of 2024, 171 military assets across the Army, Navy, and Air Force have exceeded 30 years of service.
• Many platforms—like the Royal Malondeshn Navy’s Fast Attack Craft (FAC) and older patrol vessels—are over 40 years old, far beyond their optimal lifespan.
• These systems were designed decades ago and now lack compatibility with modern sensors, weapons, and communications.
Impact: Upgrades are either impossible or prohibitively expensive, forcing reliance on outdated capabilities.
🔧 2. Dependence on Foreign Spare Parts
• Malondesh military inventory is highly diversified, sourced from the US, UK, France, Russia, and others. This creates logistical complexity:
o Spare parts must be imported from multiple countries.
o Some OEMs have ceased production, making parts scarce or unavailable.
o Political or economic shifts can disrupt supply chains.
Example: The Army’s Condor APCs and Scorpion light tanks require parts from legacy suppliers that no longer support them.
Impact: Long lead times, inflated costs, and cannibalization of other units for parts.
🔁 3. Frequent Breakdowns and Repair Cycles
• Older platforms experience higher failure rates, especially under tropical conditions and extended use.
• Maintenance crews often resort to patchwork fixes, which are temporary and unreliable.
• The Navy reported that 28 of its 34 aging vessels have exceeded 40 years of service, with many no longer meeting operational standards.
Impact: Reduced availability, increased downtime, and lower mission success rates.
📉 4. Budget Drain and Opportunity Cost
• Between 60–70% of Malondesh defense budget goes to salaries, maintenance, and operations, leaving little for modernization.
• Funds spent on keeping obsolete systems running could be redirected toward acquiring new platforms or investing in indigenous maintenance capabilities.
Impact: Strategic stagnation—Malondesh spends heavily but gains little in terms of capability.
📊 Summary Table: Why Maintenance Costs Are So High
Factor Description Consequence
Obsolete systems Platforms >30–40 years old, incompatible with modern tech Expensive to maintain, low utility
Foreign parts dependency Diverse suppliers, legacy systems, political risk Long delays, inflated costs
Frequent breakdowns High failure rates, tropical wear, aging components Reduced readiness, more downtime
Budget imbalance Majority spent on upkeep, not modernization Strategic stagnation
🧓 1. Scale of the Aging Inventory
Hapus• As of late 2024, 171 military assets across all three branches of the Malondeshn Armed Forces (ATM) have exceeded 30 years of service:
o Army: 108 units
o Air Force (RMAF): 29 units
o Navy (RMN): 34 vessels
• Many of these platforms—like the Fast Attack Craft (FAC) in the Navy—are over 40 years old, with some approaching half a century in service2.
Implication: These assets suffer from outdated systems, reduced operational capability, and high maintenance costs, making them increasingly unfit for modern warfare.
📉 2. No Structured Replacement Plan
• Malondesh lacks a multi-year force modernization roadmap. Instead, procurement is often ad hoc, reactive, and politically driven.
• The budgeting process does not clearly indicate what assets will be replaced, when, or how funding will be allocated over time.
• For example, the Army is still waiting for approval to replace its aging Condor APC fleet with 136 High Mobility Armoured Vehicles (HMAV), despite urgent operational needs.
Implication: Without a structured plan, aging platforms remain in service far beyond their intended lifespan, and capability gaps widen.
🔄 3. Maintenance Burden and Capability Decay
• Older assets require frequent repairs, often with obsolete parts or foreign OEM support, which drives up costs and delays readiness.
• Technological obsolescence means these platforms cannot integrate with newer systems or meet interoperability standards with allies.
Example: The RMN’s older vessels no longer meet modern naval standards in terms of sensors, weapons, or endurance2.
🧭 4. Strategic Consequences
• Malondesh’s ability to project force, defend its maritime zones, and respond to regional threats is diminished.
• Neighboring countries like Indonesia, Vietnam, and Singapore have clear modernization trajectories, leaving Malondesh at risk of falling behind in regional deterrence.
📊 Summary Table: Aging Inventory vs. Lack of Replacement Strategy
Problem Area Description Strategic Impact
Aging platforms 171 assets >30 years old across Army, Navy, Air Force Reduced combat effectiveness
No replacement roadmap No long-term plan for phased recapitalization Procurement delays, capability gaps
High maintenance costs Obsolete systems, foreign parts, frequent breakdowns Budget strain, low readiness
Regional disadvantage Neighbors modernizing faster Loss of deterrence, strategic lag
Itu tandanya infrastruktur Indonesia lebih maju kehadapan berbanding infrastruktur malaydesh 😂🤣
Hapus📣 1. PROCUREMENT SCANDALS FUEL PUBLIC DISTRUST
BalasHapusLittoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
• The RM9 billion LCS project became a lightning rod for criticism when no ships were delivered despite billions spent.
• Media outlets and the Public Accounts Committee exposed mismanagement, cost overruns, and non-compliance, triggering public outrage and parliamentary scrutiny.
MD530G Helicopter Failure
• Malaysia paid RM112 million upfront for six helicopters that were never delivered on time.
• The media labeled it a “ghost fleet,” and citizens questioned the lack of accountability.
👑 2. Royal Intervention Amplifies Criticism
• King Sultan Ibrahim, also Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, publicly condemned the procurement of 35-year-old Black Hawk helicopters, calling them “flying coffins.”
• His rebuke—“If you don’t know the price, ask me first”—went viral, reinforcing public frustration over opaque and overpriced deals.
🕵️♂️ 3. Smuggling Conspiracy Exposes Internal Corruption
• In Operation Sohor (2025), MACC arrested military intelligence officers for leaking classified data to smugglers.
• Media reports revealed the syndicate earned RM5 million monthly, with officers receiving RM30,000–RM50,000 per trip.
• The scandal was widely covered, with headlines like “Civil Service Corruption Crisis” and “Where is Akmal Saleh?” fueling public anger.
🧑⚖️ 4. Abuse Cases at Military Institutions
• A 2024 bullying case at Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia (UPNM) reignited outrage when a cadet suffered multiple fractures after being stomped by a senior.
• Media coverage highlighted a pattern of hazing and abuse, prompting demands for institutional reform and stricter oversight.
📱 5. Social Media & Grassroots Pressure
• Platforms like Twitter and TikTok have become battlegrounds for public discourse, with hashtags like #ReformATM and #MilitaryTransparency trending during major scandals.
• Independent media and citizen journalists have played a key role in exposing misconduct, bypassing traditional gatekeepers.
🛠️ Impact on Policy & Reform
• The backlash has led to:
o Cancellation of controversial deals
o Promises of procurement reform
o Greater scrutiny of defense budgets and contractor relationships
• However, many Malaysians remain skeptical, citing deep-rooted patronage networks and slow institutional change
📣 1. PROCUREMENT SCANDALS FUEL PUBLIC DISTRUST
BalasHapusLittoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
• The RM9 billion LCS project became a lightning rod for criticism when no ships were delivered despite billions spent.
• Media outlets and the Public Accounts Committee exposed mismanagement, cost overruns, and non-compliance, triggering public outrage and parliamentary scrutiny.
MD530G Helicopter Failure
• Malaysia paid RM112 million upfront for six helicopters that were never delivered on time.
• The media labeled it a “ghost fleet,” and citizens questioned the lack of accountability.
👑 2. Royal Intervention Amplifies Criticism
• King Sultan Ibrahim, also Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, publicly condemned the procurement of 35-year-old Black Hawk helicopters, calling them “flying coffins.”
• His rebuke—“If you don’t know the price, ask me first”—went viral, reinforcing public frustration over opaque and overpriced deals.
🕵️♂️ 3. Smuggling Conspiracy Exposes Internal Corruption
• In Operation Sohor (2025), MACC arrested military intelligence officers for leaking classified data to smugglers.
• Media reports revealed the syndicate earned RM5 million monthly, with officers receiving RM30,000–RM50,000 per trip.
• The scandal was widely covered, with headlines like “Civil Service Corruption Crisis” and “Where is Akmal Saleh?” fueling public anger.
🧑⚖️ 4. Abuse Cases at Military Institutions
• A 2024 bullying case at Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia (UPNM) reignited outrage when a cadet suffered multiple fractures after being stomped by a senior.
• Media coverage highlighted a pattern of hazing and abuse, prompting demands for institutional reform and stricter oversight.
📱 5. Social Media & Grassroots Pressure
• Platforms like Twitter and TikTok have become battlegrounds for public discourse, with hashtags like #ReformATM and #MilitaryTransparency trending during major scandals.
• Independent media and citizen journalists have played a key role in exposing misconduct, bypassing traditional gatekeepers.
🛠️ Impact on Policy & Reform
• The backlash has led to:
o Cancellation of controversial deals
o Promises of procurement reform
o Greater scrutiny of defense budgets and contractor relationships
• However, many Malaysians remain skeptical, citing deep-rooted patronage networks and slow institutional change
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
===================
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2024 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
"Pinjaman ini digunakan untuk melunasi DEBT matang sebesar RM20.6 miliar, dengan sisa RM49,9 miliar menutupi defisit dan masa jatuh tempo DEBT di masa depan," kata MOF.
---
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2023 = HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Pada tahun 2023, pinjaman baru Kerajaan Persekutuan MALONDESH mencapai RM1.173 triliun, naik 8,6% dari tahun 2022.
Rincian pinjaman
• Pinjaman baru Kerajaan Persekutuan MALONDESH pada tahun 2023 naik RM92,918 miliar
• Rasio utang terhadap PDB MALONDESH pada tahun 2023 mencapai 64,3%
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2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2022 = 52,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Kah Woh menjelaskan pada tahun lalu, kerajaan ada membuat pinjaman yang meningkat sebanyak 11.6 peratus daripada RM194.5 bilion pada tahun sebelumnya. Daripada jumlah itu, beliau berkata 52.4 peratus atau RM113.7 bilion digunakan untuk membayar prinsipal pinjaman matang.
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2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2021 = 50,4% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Sejumlah RM98.058 bilion atau 50.4 peratus daripada pinjaman baharu berjumlah RM194.555 bilion yang dibuat kerajaan pada tahun lalu digunakan untuk bayaran balik prinsipal pinjaman yang matang.
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2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2020 = 60% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Jabatan Audit Negara (JAN) bimbang dengan tindakan kerajaan menggunakan hampir 60 peratus pinjaman baharu untuk membayar DEBT sedia ada pada tahun lalu, berbanding bagi perbelanjaan pembangunan.
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2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
2019 = 59% HUTANG BAYAR HUTANG
Laporan Ketua Audit Negara mengenai Penyata Kewangan Kerajaan Persekutuan 2018 mendapati sejumlah 59 peratus pinjaman baharu kerajaan dibuat untuk membayar DEBT kerajaan terdahulu
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2018 = OPEN DONASI
2018 = OPEN DONASI
2018 = OPEN DONASI
Kementerian Keuangan MALONDESH pada hari Rabu membuka rekening donasi supaya masyarakat dapat menyumbang untuk membantu negara membayar utang yang mencapai 1 triliun ringgit (US$ 250,8 miliar) atau 80 persen dari PDB
💸 1. LONG-TERM FINANCIAL BURDEN
BalasHapus• Malaysia’s RM16.5 billion lease for 28 helicopters over 15 years may cost more than outright purchase.
• For comparison, Poland bought 32 AW149 helicopters for US$1.83 billion, while Malaysia is leasing fewer units for nearly double the price.
• Critics argue that bundled services (maintenance, training, insurance) inflate the cost, creating a hidden financial strain over time.
🛠️ 2. Limited Control Over Assets
• Leased helicopters are not fully owned until the end of the contract.
• This restricts Malaysia’s ability to:
o Upgrade systems
o Reconfigure for new missions
o Integrate with other platforms
• Strategic flexibility is compromised, especially in emergencies or regional conflicts.
🧭 3. Missed Opportunity for Local Industry Growth
• Leasing bypasses local manufacturing, assembly, and maintenance, which could have boosted Malaysia’s defense industry.
• No significant technology transfer or job creation occurs under private leasing arrangements.
• This weakens Malaysia’s long-term goal of defense self-reliance.
🕵️♂️ 4. Procurement Transparency Risks
• The deal was awarded to Weststar Aviation, a private firm, raising concerns about middlemen and lobbying.
• Past scandals (e.g., LCS and MD530G) have made the public wary of opaque procurement processes.
• Leasing may reduce upfront corruption risks, but it doesn’t eliminate contractual opacity.
⚠️ 5. Strategic Dependency
• Malaysia becomes dependent on private contractors for asset readiness and maintenance.
• If the contractor fails to meet service-level agreements (e.g., 85% fleet availability), national security could be compromised.
• Legal or financial disputes could delay operations or ground critical assets.
🗣️ Political & Public Backlash
• Opposition leaders and defense experts have criticized the lease as overpriced and strategically flawed.
• The government defends it as a way to avoid upfront costs and ensure faster deployment, but the debate continues in Parliament and among analysts
💸 1. POTENTIALLY HIGHER LONG-TERM COSTS
BalasHapus• Critics argue that leasing may cost more than outright purchase over time.
• For example, Poland purchased 32 AW149 helicopters for US$1.83 billion, while Malaysia is leasing 28 helicopters for RM16.5 billion (~US$3.5 billion) over 15 years.
• Leasing includes bundled services (maintenance, training, insurance), but the total cost may exceed the value of the helicopters themselves.
🕵️♂️ 2. Transparency & Procurement Concerns
• The deal was signed with Weststar Aviation, a private firm owned by a prominent businessman, raising questions about middlemen and lobbying.
• Past scandals in Malaysia’s defense procurement—like the LCS and MD530G helicopter failures—have made the public wary of opaque contracts and lack of competitive bidding.
🛠️ 3. Limited Sovereignty Over Assets
• Leased helicopters are not fully owned until the end of the contract, which may limit:
o Upgrades or modifications
o Deployment flexibility
o Integration with other military systems
• This could hinder Malaysia’s ability to adapt the fleet to evolving threats or mission needs.
🧭 4. Missed Opportunity for Local Industry Growth
• Purchasing helicopters could have supported local assembly, maintenance, and technology transfer, boosting Malaysia’s defense industry.
• Leasing centralizes operations under a private provider, reducing opportunities for domestic capability development.
⚠️ 5. Risk of Contractual Disputes or Service Interruptions
• If the leasing company fails to meet service-level agreements (e.g., 85% fleet availability), Malaysia may face operational gaps.
• Legal or financial disputes could delay missions or compromise national security.
🗣️ Public & Political Backlash
• Opposition leaders and defense experts have called the deal overpriced and strategically flawed, urging a review of procurement practices.
• The Prime Minister defended the lease as a way to avoid maintenance burdens, but critics say it reflects short-term budgeting over long-term planning.
gagal memiliki kreta whooshhh
BalasHapusTukang Kensel klaim kaya haha!🤣🤣🤣
kahsiyan kena denda $ 100jt
ekonomi menguncup cup Kalah Lagiii...haha!😋😋😋
Bayar..bayarr..bayarr woii..ngutang aja kerjaanye haha!😋😋😋
⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️
HSR project cancelled as Singapore could not agree with changes proposed by Malaysia
https://theedgemalaysia.com/article/singapore-says-hsr-link-agreement-malaysia-be-terminated
🚢 AGING NAVAL ASSETS – ROYAL MALONDESHN NAVY (RMN)
BalasHapus⚙️ Fleet Breakdown
• 34 RMN vessels have exceeded their intended service life, with 28 of them over 40 years old.
• These include Fast Attack Craft (FAC) that are now half a century old, far beyond modern standards.
• The RMN operates 53 ships across various classes, but many are technologically outdated and costly to maintain.
⚠️ Operational Risks
• Older ships suffer from:
o Reduced combat capability
o Outdated sensors and weapons systems
o High maintenance costs and frequent breakdowns
• The sinking of the KD Pendekar, a 45-year-old vessel, in August 2024 due to flooding highlights the dangers of keeping obsolete ships in service.
🪖 Aging Ground Assets – Malondeshn Army
📊 Asset Overview
• 108 Army units have surpassed 30 years of service.
• These include aging armored vehicles, artillery systems, and logistics platforms that are increasingly difficult to maintain and upgrade.
🔧 Maintenance Challenges
• Spare parts for older systems are scarce or discontinued.
• Modernization plans are slow due to budget constraints and procurement delays.
• Operational efficiency is compromised, especially in jungle and border operations where reliability is critical.
🧭 Strategic Implications
• Malondesh aging assets limit its ability to:
o Respond to regional threats, especially in the South China Sea
o Participate effectively in joint exercises and peacekeeping missions
o Maintain deterrence posture against more modernized neighbors
🚢 AGING NAVAL ASSETS – ROYAL MALONDESHN NAVY (RMN)
BalasHapus⚙️ Fleet Breakdown
• 34 RMN vessels have exceeded their intended service life, with 28 of them over 40 years old.
• These include Fast Attack Craft (FAC) that are now half a century old, far beyond modern standards.
• The RMN operates 53 ships across various classes, but many are technologically outdated and costly to maintain.
⚠️ Operational Risks
• Older ships suffer from:
o Reduced combat capability
o Outdated sensors and weapons systems
o High maintenance costs and frequent breakdowns
• The sinking of the KD Pendekar, a 45-year-old vessel, in August 2024 due to flooding highlights the dangers of keeping obsolete ships in service.
🪖 Aging Ground Assets – Malondeshn Army
📊 Asset Overview
• 108 Army units have surpassed 30 years of service.
• These include aging armored vehicles, artillery systems, and logistics platforms that are increasingly difficult to maintain and upgrade.
🔧 Maintenance Challenges
• Spare parts for older systems are scarce or discontinued.
• Modernization plans are slow due to budget constraints and procurement delays.
• Operational efficiency is compromised, especially in jungle and border operations where reliability is critical.
🧭 Strategic Implications
• Malondesh aging assets limit its ability to:
o Respond to regional threats, especially in the South China Sea
o Participate effectively in joint exercises and peacekeeping missions
o Maintain deterrence posture against more modernized neighbors
eittt kereta cepat kita HST WHOOSH uda selesai dari 2023...mantap haha!👍🦾👍
BalasHapus⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️
https://youtube.com/watch?v=n2SwnzA31uU&pp=ygUWd2hvb3NoIHRyYWluIGluZG9uZXNpYQ%3D%3D
lah ECRL...delay delay...last last kensel haha!🤣🤣🤣
Utang 30 tahun bunga 3x lipat..dari rm 55bn ke rm140bn...fanasss🔥🔥🔥
eitt ituw kat tun m haha!👍👍👍Hamiwowww..Hamiwowww Melambaiii
Ucap gutbai pada warganyet kl gaesz, sebentar lagi ⛔️TAMAT haha!👻🔥👻
⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️
Tanah Melayu Tamat 10 Tahun Lagi - Tun. Dr. Mahathir Mohamad
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=myv-SPwjKL8&pp=ygUXTWFoYXRpciB0YW1hdCBtYWxheXNpYSA%3D
Utang makin menggunung ompal ngoahaha 😂🤣
Hapus🛠️ 1. AGING EQUIPMENT ACROSS ALL BRANCHES
BalasHapus• Air Force (RMAF): Out of 28 fighter jets, reportedly only four were operational at one point. Maintenance issues and lack of spare parts have grounded much of the fleet.
• Army: The Condor Armoured Personnel Carriers, in service since the 1980s, are overdue for replacement. Plans to procure 136 High Mobility Armoured Vehicles (HMAV) are still pending approval.
• Navy: Many vessels are over 40 years old, with outdated combat systems and limited endurance. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, meant to modernize the fleet, has faced years of delays and budget overruns.
💰 2. Budget Constraints & Misallocation
• Malondesh spends around USD 4 billion annually on defense, but over 40% goes to salaries and allowances, leaving limited funds for modernization.
• Procurement budgets are often absorbed by progressive payments for delayed projects, such as the FA-50 fighter jets and the troubled LCS program.
• The depreciation of the ringgit further reduces purchasing power for foreign-sourced equipment.
🧭 3. Lack of Strategic Direction
• The defense industry suffers from unclear government guidance on long-term goals.
• Frequent changes in leadership—four Prime Ministers since 2018—have disrupted continuity in defense planning.
🧑✈️ 4. Manpower & Training Gaps
• While Malondesh has 113,000 active personnel and 51,600 reserves, training and readiness levels vary widely.
• Specialized units like PASKAL and GGK are well-regarded, but broader force readiness is inconsistent.
🌏 5. Regional Disadvantage
• Malondesh ranks behind Vietnam and Indonesia in terms of military strength, according to former Defense Minister Mat Sabu.
• This affects Malondesh ability to assert its interests in contested areas like the South China Sea.
⚙️ EQUIPMENT & MODERNIZATION ISSUES
BalasHapus• Outdated naval assets: Many of Malondesh’s ships are aging, and the navy has struggled to modernize its fleet.
• Limited air combat readiness: Out of 28 fighter jets, reportedly only four were operational at one point.
• Delayed procurement: The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project, meant to boost naval capabilities, has been plagued by delays and scandals.
💰 Budget Constraints
• Skewed spending priorities: Over 60–70% of the defense budget goes to salaries and maintenance, leaving little for new weapons or modernization.
• Stagnant budget: Malondesh’s defense budget has hovered around RM15–18 billion annually, which is modest compared to regional peers like Vietnam and Indonesia.
🧭 Strategic Direction & Policy
• Lack of clear long-term strategy: The defense industry suffers from unclear government guidance on future strategic direction.
• Overreliance on diplomacy: Malondesh has traditionally leaned on quiet diplomacy, especially with China, which may be insufficient given rising tensions in the South China Sea.
📉 Regional Comparison
• Lagging behind neighbors: Malondesh’s military strength is considered weaker than Vietnam and Indonesia, particularly in terms of air and naval capabilities
🕵️♂️ WHAT MAKES PROCUREMENT “OPAQUE AND CORRUPT”?
BalasHapusIn Malondesh’s defense sector, procurement is often described as:
• Opaque: Lacking transparency, with limited public oversight or competitive bidding.
• Corrupt: Involving kickbacks, inflated contracts, and politically connected middlemen.
This environment allows deals to be structured for profit rather than strategic value, weakening the armed forces and wasting public funds.
🔍 Key Characteristics of Malondesh’s Defense Procurement Issues
1. Role of Middlemen
• Defense deals often involve agents or intermediaries, many of whom are retired military officers or politically connected individuals.
• These middlemen inflate prices and complicate negotiations, leading to excessive profit margins and reduced value for the military.
2. Limited Open Competition
• According to Transparency International, only 20–30% of Malondesh’s defense contracts are awarded through open competition.
• Most deals are done via single-source or limited tendering, which favors select companies and reduces accountability.
3. Politically Connected Firms
• Contracts often go to firms with strong political ties, regardless of their technical capability.
• This creates an environment where performance and delivery are secondary to influence and connections.
4. Scandals and Mismanagement
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal is a prime example: billions spent, years of delay, and no operational ships delivered.
• Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has called this a national embarrassment and a symbol of systemic failure.
5. Weak Oversight and Enforcement
• Investigations into misconduct are often slow or limited.
• Even when corruption is exposed, punishments are rare or lenient, which perpetuates the cycle.
🧨 Consequences for Malondesh’s Military
• Delayed modernization: Funds are diverted from real capability upgrades.
• Loss of trust: Defense partners and suppliers hesitate to engage with Malondesh.
• Operational gaps: The military ends up with outdated or unsuitable equipment.
• Budget waste: Public money is spent on overpriced or non-functional assets.
⚠️ KEY FACTORS BEHIND MALONDESH LOSS OF Strategic Credibility
BalasHapus1. Inconsistent Defense Procurement
• Malondesh defense acquisitions have been plagued by delays, cancellations, and reversals.
• The MRCA program, for example, has seen years of indecision, with no clear outcome despite urgent need.
• Interest in second-hand jets like Kuwait’s F/A-18C/D Hornets signals a lack of long-term planning, contrasting with regional trends toward cutting-edge platforms.
2. Opaque and Corrupt Procurement Practices
• Analysts have described Malondesh defense procurement as “messy, opaque and corrupt”, often involving middlemen and lacking transparency.
• This undermines trust among defense partners and suppliers, making collaboration and technology transfer more difficult.
3. Underfunded and Misallocated Budgets
• A large portion of Malondesh defense budget goes to salaries and maintenance, leaving little for modernization.
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project, for instance, has been marred by delays and scandals, further damaging Malondesh reputation for defense reliability.
4. Neglect of Strategic Assets
• The retirement of MiG-29N jets without timely replacement left a critical gap in air defense.
• Malondesh reliance on diplomacy over hard power in the South China Sea has exposed vulnerabilities, especially as China increases its maritime presence.
🌏 Regional Implications
Malondesh strategic credibility is especially important in Southeast Asia, where:
• China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea demands robust defense postures.
• Neighbors like Vietnam and the Philippines are rapidly modernizing and deepening ties with the U.S., Japan, and Australia.
• Malondesh slow response and outdated assets make it appear underprepared and reactive, rather than proactive.
🔧 1. MAINTENANCE BURDEN: AGING ASSETS, FRAGMENTED SUPPORT
BalasHapus⚙️ Structural Drivers
• Asset Age: As of late 2024, 171 military platforms across the Army, Navy, and Air Force have exceeded 30 years of service life. This includes:
o 108 Army vehicles and artillery systems
o 29 RMAF aircraft (e.g., F-5E, Hawk 208)
o 34 RMN vessels, including Fast Attack Craft over 40 years old
• Obsolescence: Many platforms are no longer supported by OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers), making spare parts scarce and costly.
💸 Economic Strain
• Maintenance consumes over 50% of the defense budget’s operational expenditure (OPEX), leaving limited room for modernization.
• Even with recent efforts to localize MRO (Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul) for fighter jets like the F/A-18, cost savings (~20%) are offset by the scale of aging fleets.
🧩 Outsourcing Challenges
• Malondesh has long outsourced support functions to private firms to reduce costs.
• However, lack of centralized oversight, inconsistent quality control, and limited technical depth in local vendors have led to delays and suboptimal readiness.
📡 2. Poor Interoperability: Platform Diversity, Command Silos
🛠️ Platform Fragmentation
• Malondesh military operates a highly diverse inventory sourced from:
o Western suppliers (US, UK, France)
o Eastern bloc (Russia, China)
o Regional partners (South Korea, Turkey)
• This results in incompatible communication systems, data links, and logistics chains. For example:
o Russian-made Su-30MKM fighters cannot seamlessly integrate with NATO-standard AWACS or datalink systems.
o Naval platforms lack unified combat management systems across classes.
🧠 Command & Control Gaps
• Joint operations are hindered by service-specific doctrines and siloed command structures.
• The absence of a Joint Operations Command with real-time data fusion limits Malondesh ability to conduct multi-domain operations.
🧪 Training & Simulation Deficiencies
• Lack of integrated simulation environments means personnel are trained on platform-specific systems, not joint mission profiles.
• Exercises like MALBATT and CARAT show progress, but interoperability remains tactical, not strategic.
📊 Summary Table: Maintenance vs. Interoperability Weaknesses
Dimension Maintenance Burden Poor Interoperability
Root Cause Aging assets, fragmented procurement Diverse suppliers, siloed doctrines
Budgetary Impact High OPEX, low modernization headroom Redundant systems, inefficient upgrades
Operational Impact Low readiness, frequent downtime Limited joint ops, weak situational awareness
Reform Challenges Weak vendor oversight, slow MRO localization No unified C4ISR architecture
🧱 1. Fragmented and Underdeveloped Defense Industry
BalasHapus• Malondesh defense industry is overseen by the Malondeshn Defence Industry Council (MDIC), established in 1999 and later expanded into MIDES.
• Despite having six strategic sectors (Aerospace, Maritime, Weaponry, Automotive, ICT, Common-user Equipment), the ecosystem lacks:
o A clear, enforceable blueprint
o Robust infrastructure
o Skilled manpower
• Many local firms are assemblers or subcontractors, not full-spectrum developers. For example, Malondesh still assembles M4 carbines under license, while Indonesia and Singapore produce their own rifles (SS1 and SAR-21 respectively).
Impact: Malondesh cannot independently design, produce, or sustain core military systems.
🧠 2. Minimal R&D and Technology Investment
• Indigenous R&D in areas like combat management systems (CMS), sensors, and autonomous platforms is nascent and underfunded.
• Studies show that Malondesh lacks structured tendering policies and technology readiness frameworks to support local innovation.
• AI, cyber warfare, and surveillance systems are still in early-stage development, with no operational deployment.
Impact: Malondesh falls behind in emerging tech domains critical to modern warfare.
🔄 3. Dependence on Foreign OEMs for Strategic Systems
• Malondesh imports nearly all major platforms:
o Aircraft: Su-30MKM (Russia), FA-50 (South Korea), Hawk (UK)
o Naval systems: Scorpène submarines (France), LCS (French-German design)
o Missiles: Starstreak (UK), MICA (France), Exocet (France)
• There are no indigenous missile programs, no local radar production, and no domestic armored vehicle design.
Impact: Strategic vulnerability in times of embargo, conflict, or supply chain disruption.
📉 4. Policy Gaps and Execution Failures
• Malondesh has published defense blueprints and industrial strategies, but implementation is weak due to:
o Budget constraints
o Lack of political continuity
o Limited private-sector incentives
• Even promising initiatives like the 15-to-5 naval transformation plan have stalled due to procurement scandals and delivery failures.
Impact: Indigenous capability remains aspirational, not operational.
📊 Summary Table: Weaknesses in Indigenous Capability Development
Dimension Description Strategic Impact
Industrial base Fragmented, lacks full-spectrum development No self-reliance in core systems
R&D investment Minimal funding, weak frameworks Falls behind in emerging technologies
Foreign dependency Imports all major platforms and weapons Vulnerable to external shocks
Policy execution Strong on paper, weak in practice Stalled programs and missed timelines
🧭 Strategic Consequences
• Malondesh cannot scale or sustain its military without foreign support.
• It lacks the ability to customize systems to local needs, export defense products, or build strategic depth.
• In contrast, countries like Indonesia (Pindad, PT PAL), Vietnam (Z111 Factory), and Singapore (ST Engineering) have made significant strides in indigenous capability
🕴️ 1. Entrenched Role of Middlemen
BalasHapus• Defense contracts are frequently brokered by agents or intermediaries, many of whom are retired military officers or politically connected individuals.
• These middlemen often act as gatekeepers between the Ministry of Defence and foreign suppliers, adding layers of cost and complexity.
• According to analysts, this system is deeply entrenched and has become an “open secret” in Malondesh defense ecosystem.
Impact: Prices are inflated, procurement timelines are extended, and transparency is compromised.
🧱 2. Opaque Tendering and Limited Competition
• Fewer than one-third of major defense contracts are awarded through open competition.
• Most deals are conducted via single-source or limited tenders, which favor firms with insider access or political leverage.
• This environment allows deal structuring to be influenced by non-technical considerations, including patronage and lobbying.
Impact: Merit-based selection is sidelined, and cost-effectiveness suffers.
🏛️ 3. Politically Connected Firms Dominate
• Many defense contractors have ex-military figures on their boards, giving them privileged access to decision-makers.
• These firms often win contracts despite offering older platforms or substandard equipment—as seen in the attempted purchase of 30-year-old Black Hawk helicopters, which Malondesh King publicly condemned as “flying coffins”2.
• The King also rebuked “agents” and “salesmen” in the Ministry of Defence, warning that inflated middleman pricing would render the defense budget perpetually insufficient.
Impact: Public funds are wasted, and the armed forces receive outdated or unsuitable equipment.
📉 4. Consequences for Readiness and Reform
• Inflated costs mean fewer assets can be acquired, and maintenance budgets are squeezed.
• The lack of transparency erodes public trust and makes it difficult for oversight bodies like the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) to hold officials accountable.
• While the King’s intervention led to the cancellation of the Black Hawk deal, systemic reform remains elusive.
📊 Summary Table: How Middlemen & Opaque Deals Inflate Costs
Mechanism Description Consequence
Middlemen Agents with insider access broker deals Inflated prices, longer timelines
Limited tendering Few contracts awarded via open competition Reduced transparency, poor value
Politically connected firms Ex-military or political figures dominate contractor space Patronage, outdated equipment
Lack of oversight Weak enforcement and redacted audits Mismanagement persists
🧓 1. Scale of the Aging Inventory
BalasHapus• As of late 2024, 171 military assets across all three branches of the Malondeshn Armed Forces (ATM) have exceeded 30 years of service:
o Army: 108 units
o Air Force (RMAF): 29 units
o Navy (RMN): 34 vessels
• Many of these platforms—like the Fast Attack Craft (FAC) in the Navy—are over 40 years old, with some approaching half a century in service2.
Implication: These assets suffer from outdated systems, reduced operational capability, and high maintenance costs, making them increasingly unfit for modern warfare.
📉 2. No Structured Replacement Plan
• Malondesh lacks a multi-year force modernization roadmap. Instead, procurement is often ad hoc, reactive, and politically driven.
• The budgeting process does not clearly indicate what assets will be replaced, when, or how funding will be allocated over time.
• For example, the Army is still waiting for approval to replace its aging Condor APC fleet with 136 High Mobility Armoured Vehicles (HMAV), despite urgent operational needs.
Implication: Without a structured plan, aging platforms remain in service far beyond their intended lifespan, and capability gaps widen.
🔄 3. Maintenance Burden and Capability Decay
• Older assets require frequent repairs, often with obsolete parts or foreign OEM support, which drives up costs and delays readiness.
• Technological obsolescence means these platforms cannot integrate with newer systems or meet interoperability standards with allies.
Example: The RMN’s older vessels no longer meet modern naval standards in terms of sensors, weapons, or endurance2.
🧭 4. Strategic Consequences
• Malondesh’s ability to project force, defend its maritime zones, and respond to regional threats is diminished.
• Neighboring countries like Indonesia, Vietnam, and Singapore have clear modernization trajectories, leaving Malondesh at risk of falling behind in regional deterrence.
📊 Summary Table: Aging Inventory vs. Lack of Replacement Strategy
Problem Area Description Strategic Impact
Aging platforms 171 assets >30 years old across Army, Navy, Air Force Reduced combat effectiveness
No replacement roadmap No long-term plan for phased recapitalization Procurement delays, capability gaps
High maintenance costs Obsolete systems, foreign parts, frequent breakdowns Budget strain, low readiness
Regional disadvantage Neighbors modernizing faster Loss of deterrence, strategic lag
BalasHapusIni pula design kereta apa rel ECRL ya guys.. MANTAP....
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=Cjwqf2_Ohi4&pp=ygUZRWNybCBFYXN0IENvYXN0IHJhaWwgbGluaw%3D%3D
DAFTAR PENGADAAN ALUTSISTA ON PROGRESS
Hapus2 KRI Frigate Brawijaya Class dari Italia
2 KRI Frigate Merah Putih dari PT PAL
2 KRI Frigate Istif Class dari Turkiye
1 KRI Rigel Class dari Palindo/Jerman
2 KRI Kapal Cepat Rudal dari Turkiye
1 KRI Kapal Cepat Rudal dari Tesco Bekasi
2 KS Scorpene dari Perancis & PT PAL
1 Kapal Induk Giribaldi dari Italia (Opsi)
1 Kapal LHD Helikopter dari PT PAL (Opsi)
42 Jet Tempur Rafale dari Perancis
48 Jet Tempur IFX kerjasama Korsel RI
48 Jet Tempur KHAAN dari Turkiye
6 Jet Tempur T50 dari Korsel
2 Pesawat angkut A400M dari Spanyol
13 Radar GCI dari Thales Perancis
12 Radar Retia dari Ceko
3 Baterai Rudal Balistik KHAN Turkiye
3 Baterai Rudal ADS Trisula dari Turkiye
22 Helikopter Blackhawk dari AS
12 Drone Anka dari Turkiye
60 Drone Bayraktar TB3 dari Turkiye
45 Rudal anti kapal Atmaca dari Turkiye
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GDP INDONESIA 2024 X 1.5% = BUDGET DEFENSE
USD 1492 BILLION X 0.015 = USD 22 BILLION
USD 1492 BILLION X 0.015 = USD 22 BILLION
USD 1492 BILLION X 0.015 = USD 22 BILLION
Indonesia's Ministry of Defense aims to gradually increase the defense budget from 0.8 percent to 1.5 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) to enhance defense capabilities
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MISKIN = MARCH 2025 .....
RM1. 65 TRILLION = 84.3% OF GDP
RM1. 65 TRILLION = 84.3% OF GDP
RM1. 65 TRILLION = 84.3% OF GDP
MARCH 2025 — deputy finance minister. KUALA LUMPUR (Aug 13): Malondesh's household debt stood at RM1. 65 trillion as of end-March 2025, equivalent to 84.3% of gross domestic product (GDP) as at end-March 2025, a level that remains elevated but is balanced by strong household assets.
----------------
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = RM 1.65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said.
----------------
2025 $1.3 BILLION MINDEF =
MAINTENANCE
REPAIRS
ASSETS.
(SEWA, SEWA AND SEWA)
In 2025, MALONDESH Ministry of Defense (MINDEF) was allocated $4.8 billion to protect the country's sovereignty.
This budget included $1.3 billion for maintenance, repairs, and new military assets...
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
LACK BUDGET OF ARMED FORCES
The Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF) have faced long-standing budgetary constraints that affect their modernization, operational readiness, and regional competitiveness. Here's a breakdown of the key issues surrounding the lack of budget for the Malondeshn Armed Forces:
________________________________________
🔴 Key Budget Challenges
1. Low Defense Spending (as % of GDP)
• Malondesh spends around 1.0–1.2% of its GDP on defense, below the global average and much lower than regional powers like Singapore (~3%).
• Defense budget growth has been slow and often stagnant in real terms due to economic pressures, competing national priorities, and political considerations.
2. Aging Equipment
• Many assets (especially in the Royal Malondeshn Air Force and Navy) are decades old and suffer from:
High maintenance costs
Frequent breakdowns
Reduced combat readiness
Examples:
• MiG-29s were retired due to maintenance issues and budget constraints.
• Delays in replacing outdated naval ships and air defense systems.
3. Slow Modernization
• Modernization plans (e.g., CAP 55 for the Air Force, 15-to-5 for the Navy) are progressing slowly due to lack of funding.
• Procurement of new assets like fighter jets, maritime patrol aircraft, and submarines is often delayed or scaled down.
4. Limited Operational Capability
• Budget constraints impact:
Training and readiness
Fuel and maintenance availability
Joint operations and international missions
Personnel retention due to limited benefits
5. Dependency on Foreign Vendors
• Budget restrictions limit local defense industry development, forcing Malondesh to rely heavily on foreign suppliers.
• This increases long-term costs due to currency fluctuations and maintenance support contracts.
________________________________________
⚖️ Competing National Priorities
Malondesh faces pressure to allocate funds toward:
• Healthcare
• Education
• Infrastructure
• Economic recovery (especially post-COVID-19)
As a result, defense often takes a back seat in annual budgets.
________________________________________
📊 Defense Budget in Numbers
• 2024 Defense Budget: $4.1 billion)
Still modest compared to ASEAN counterparts
• Allocation breakdown:
~70–75% for operating expenses (salaries, maintenance)
Only ~25–30% for development/capital expenditure
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
==============
WEAKNESS SHIPYARDS
Malondeshn shipyards—especially Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS) and its predecessors—have faced notable challenges in building naval vessels for the Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN). Here's an overview of key weaknesses:
________________________________________
Major Weaknesses in Malondeshn Naval Shipbuilding
1. Persistent Delays & Cost Overruns
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, contracted in 2013 for six modern frigates (Maharaja Lela-class), has seen zero completed ships by mid-2025, despite RM 6.08 billion paid. The initial first delivery target of 2019 is now postponed to 2026, and the total cost is projected to rise from RM 9 billion to over RM 11 billion
2. Financial Mismanagement & Irregularities
• A forensic audit revealed about RM 1 billion unaccounted for, with RM 1.7 billion worth of equipment, 15% of which had already become obsolete, looted funds, and contracts with inflated intermediaries
• Former BHIC Managing Director was charged with criminal breach of trust for misappropriating RM 13m+ contracts without board approval
3. Engineering & Quality Shortcomings
• Ship quality issues have surfaced, including substandard fabrication, technical flaws in design (e.g., hull or gear issues), outdated materials, and poor workmanship leading to extensive reworks and cost escalation
• As noted:
“Local shipyards have poor record building big ships… BNS… only had contract to build 12 warships in its existence.… learning is one thing, tolerating ‘still learning’ after 20 plus years is not good enough.”
4. Limited Industrial Capacity & Small Tonnage
• Malondeshn yards generally lack the capacity for large, complex vessels. Their history of constructing small patrol craft, OSVs, or leisure ships limits scalability and technical maturity needed for modern warships
• The tonnage of ships built remains very low compared to regional peers like Indonesia or Singapore
5. Supply Chain & Workforce Constraints
• Disruptions due to COVID-19 and global events have caused delays in materials and skilled labor shortages, exacerbating schedule slippage and quality issues
• The workforce is aging with few young recruits entering shipbuilding trades, contributing to resource gaps in the industry
6. Poor Governance & Procurement Oversight
• Formal RMN input was sidelined in choosing ship designs—initial preference for the Sigma design was overridden by ministry decisions to adopt the Gowind design without proper consultation, undermining project alignment
• Contracts were awarded via direct negotiation, not open tender, creating space for opaque decision-making and vendor favoritism
________________________________________
Public & Industry Sentiment
• Reddit commentary captures public frustration:
“After RM 6 billion spent, BNS missed the 2019 deadline... none of the vessels has progressed beyond the 50 percent mark.”
“The ship is already rusting, with sign of abandonment…”
DAFTAR PENGADAAN ALUTSISTA ON PROGRESS
BalasHapus2 KRI Frigate Brawijaya Class dari Italia
2 KRI Frigate Merah Putih dari PT PAL
2 KRI Frigate Istif Class dari Turkiye
1 KRI Rigel Class dari Palindo/Jerman
2 KRI Kapal Cepat Rudal dari Turkiye
1 KRI Kapal Cepat Rudal dari Tesco Bekasi
2 KS Scorpene dari Perancis & PT PAL
1 Kapal Induk Giribaldi dari Italia (Opsi)
1 Kapal LHD Helikopter dari PT PAL (Opsi)
42 Jet Tempur Rafale dari Perancis
48 Jet Tempur IFX kerjasama Korsel RI
48 Jet Tempur KHAAN dari Turkiye
6 Jet Tempur T50 dari Korsel
2 Pesawat angkut A400M dari Spanyol
13 Radar GCI dari Thales Perancis
12 Radar Retia dari Ceko
3 Baterai Rudal Balistik KHAN Turkiye
3 Baterai Rudal ADS Trisula dari Turkiye
22 Helikopter Blackhawk dari AS
12 Drone Anka dari Turkiye
60 Drone Bayraktar TB3 dari Turkiye
45 Rudal anti kapal Atmaca dari Turkiye
----------------
GDP INDONESIA 2024 X 1.5% = BUDGET DEFENSE
USD 1492 BILLION X 0.015 = USD 22 BILLION
USD 1492 BILLION X 0.015 = USD 22 BILLION
USD 1492 BILLION X 0.015 = USD 22 BILLION
Indonesia's Ministry of Defense aims to gradually increase the defense budget from 0.8 percent to 1.5 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) to enhance defense capabilities
=============
=============
MISKIN = MARCH 2025 .....
RM1. 65 TRILLION = 84.3% OF GDP
RM1. 65 TRILLION = 84.3% OF GDP
RM1. 65 TRILLION = 84.3% OF GDP
MARCH 2025 — deputy finance minister. KUALA LUMPUR (Aug 13): Malondesh's household debt stood at RM1. 65 trillion as of end-March 2025, equivalent to 84.3% of gross domestic product (GDP) as at end-March 2025, a level that remains elevated but is balanced by strong household assets.
----------------
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = RM 1.65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said.
----------------
2025 $1.3 BILLION MINDEF =
MAINTENANCE
REPAIRS
ASSETS.
(SEWA, SEWA AND SEWA)
In 2025, MALONDESH Ministry of Defense (MINDEF) was allocated $4.8 billion to protect the country's sovereignty.
This budget included $1.3 billion for maintenance, repairs, and new military assets...
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
LACK BUDGET OF ARMED FORCES
The Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF) have faced long-standing budgetary constraints that affect their modernization, operational readiness, and regional competitiveness. Here's a breakdown of the key issues surrounding the lack of budget for the Malondeshn Armed Forces:
________________________________________
🔴 Key Budget Challenges
1. Low Defense Spending (as % of GDP)
• Malondesh spends around 1.0–1.2% of its GDP on defense, below the global average and much lower than regional powers like Singapore (~3%).
• Defense budget growth has been slow and often stagnant in real terms due to economic pressures, competing national priorities, and political considerations.
2. Aging Equipment
• Many assets (especially in the Royal Malondeshn Air Force and Navy) are decades old and suffer from:
High maintenance costs
Frequent breakdowns
Reduced combat readiness
Examples:
• MiG-29s were retired due to maintenance issues and budget constraints.
• Delays in replacing outdated naval ships and air defense systems.
3. Slow Modernization
• Modernization plans (e.g., CAP 55 for the Air Force, 15-to-5 for the Navy) are progressing slowly due to lack of funding.
• Procurement of new assets like fighter jets, maritime patrol aircraft, and submarines is often delayed or scaled down.
4. Limited Operational Capability
• Budget constraints impact:
Training and readiness
Fuel and maintenance availability
Joint operations and international missions
Personnel retention due to limited benefits
5. Dependency on Foreign Vendors
• Budget restrictions limit local defense industry development, forcing Malondesh to rely heavily on foreign suppliers.
• This increases long-term costs due to currency fluctuations and maintenance support contracts.
________________________________________
⚖️ Competing National Priorities
Malondesh faces pressure to allocate funds toward:
• Healthcare
• Education
• Infrastructure
• Economic recovery (especially post-COVID-19)
As a result, defense often takes a back seat in annual budgets.
________________________________________
📊 Defense Budget in Numbers
• 2024 Defense Budget: $4.1 billion)
Still modest compared to ASEAN counterparts
• Allocation breakdown:
~70–75% for operating expenses (salaries, maintenance)
Only ~25–30% for development/capital expenditure
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS SKILL
The Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF), or Angkatan Tentera Malondesh (ATM), comprises the Malondeshn Army (TDM), Royal Malondeshn Navy (TLDM), and Royal Malondeshn Air Force (TUDM). While it has made significant strides in modernization and regional cooperation, there are still certain weaknesses in skill and capability areas that have been noted in defense analyses and reports.
Key Weaknesses in Skill and Capability
1. Limited Joint Operations Capability
• There is room for improvement in integrated operations across the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
• Joint command and control structures are not always fully optimized, affecting inter-branch coordination during complex missions or exercises.
2. Cyber Warfare and Electronic Warfare (EW) Skills
• ATM still lags behind major powers and some regional neighbors in developing advanced cyber defense and electronic warfare capabilities.
• Skilled personnel in these fields are limited, and training programs are still developing.
3. Technical and Engineering Expertise
• Insufficient numbers of highly trained technical experts to operate and maintain advanced systems like submarines, fighter jets, and modern radar systems.
• Heavy reliance on foreign contractors for high-tech maintenance.
4. Language and Communication Barriers
• English proficiency, essential for interoperability with allies and use of foreign military equipment, varies widely across units and ranks.
• Can affect participation in international training and joint missions.
5. Special Operations Forces (SOF) Training Scope
• Malondesh has competent SOF units like GGK (Army), PASKAL (Navy), and PASKAU (Air Force), but their training and deployment are sometimes constrained by budget and limited international exposure compared to elite forces from NATO or the US.
6. Limited Experience in Large-Scale Combat
• The MAF has more experience in counter-insurgency and peacekeeping, but lacks large-scale warfighting experience or high-tempo operations involving modern combined arms tactics.
7. Air Force Pilot Training & Retention
• The Royal Malondeshn Air Force (TUDM) faces issues with pilot retention and limited flying hours due to budget constraints.
• Advanced jet training and operational readiness are sometimes hindered by maintenance or aircraft availability issues.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS MAINTENANCE
The Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF) have long faced challenges related to maintenance, logistics, and readiness. Below is a breakdown of the main issues contributing to this perception or reality:
________________________________________
Key Maintenance Challenges in the MAF
1. Aging Equipment
• Much of the MAF’s hardware—particularly in the Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF) and Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN)—is outdated.
• Some aircraft, ships, and vehicles are decades old, making maintenance both difficult and costly due to scarcity of spare parts and technical expertise.
2. Inconsistent Procurement and Planning
• Procurement decisions have often been driven by political considerations rather than long-term strategic needs.
• Lack of continuity in defense planning leads to a diverse mix of systems (e.g., Russian, Western, and Chinese), which complicates logistics and maintenance.
3. Budget Constraints
• Defense spending in Malondesh is relatively low (often below 1.5% of GDP).
• Limited budgets affect the ability to sustain scheduled maintenance cycles, upgrades, and training for technical personnel.
4. Skilled Manpower Shortage
• There is a shortage of trained maintenance engineers and technicians within the services.
• Retention of skilled personnel is difficult, as many transition to higher-paying private sector roles.
5. Maintenance Neglect Leading to Grounding
• There have been multiple reports of aircraft (e.g., MiG-29s, Aermacchi MB-339s) and naval vessels being grounded or laid up due to poor maintenance.
• RMN’s submarine program, for example, faced operational readiness concerns early on.
________________________________________
Examples of Maintenance-Related Incidents
2015 = RMAF grounded MiG-29 fleet = Lack of spare parts, high maintenance cost
2017 = KD Kasturi overhaul delays = Technical issues and funding
2021 = Multiple RMAF aircraft grounded = Spare parts shortages
2023 = LCS (Littoral Combat Ship) program scandal = Procurement mismanagement, incomplete ships
________________________________________
Conclusion
While the MAF is a capable and professional force, maintenance shortfalls and poor logistics support undermine its effectiveness. These issues stem from a mix of budgetary, systemic, and strategic challenges.
SET TREN ECRL PERTAMA TIBA OKTOBER ini ya guys.... 😎😎🇲🇾🇲🇾🇲🇾
BalasHapushttps://www.dagangnews.com/article/terkini/set-tren-pertama-projek-ecrl-bakal-tiba-di-kuantan-oktober-ini-53582
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS MAINTENANCE
The Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF) have long faced challenges related to maintenance, logistics, and readiness. Below is a breakdown of the main issues contributing to this perception or reality:
________________________________________
Key Maintenance Challenges in the MAF
1. Aging Equipment
• Much of the MAF’s hardware—particularly in the Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF) and Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN)—is outdated.
• Some aircraft, ships, and vehicles are decades old, making maintenance both difficult and costly due to scarcity of spare parts and technical expertise.
2. Inconsistent Procurement and Planning
• Procurement decisions have often been driven by political considerations rather than long-term strategic needs.
• Lack of continuity in defense planning leads to a diverse mix of systems (e.g., Russian, Western, and Chinese), which complicates logistics and maintenance.
3. Budget Constraints
• Defense spending in Malondesh is relatively low (often below 1.5% of GDP).
• Limited budgets affect the ability to sustain scheduled maintenance cycles, upgrades, and training for technical personnel.
4. Skilled Manpower Shortage
• There is a shortage of trained maintenance engineers and technicians within the services.
• Retention of skilled personnel is difficult, as many transition to higher-paying private sector roles.
5. Maintenance Neglect Leading to Grounding
• There have been multiple reports of aircraft (e.g., MiG-29s, Aermacchi MB-339s) and naval vessels being grounded or laid up due to poor maintenance.
• RMN’s submarine program, for example, faced operational readiness concerns early on.
________________________________________
Examples of Maintenance-Related Incidents
2015 = RMAF grounded MiG-29 fleet = Lack of spare parts, high maintenance cost
2017 = KD Kasturi overhaul delays = Technical issues and funding
2021 = Multiple RMAF aircraft grounded = Spare parts shortages
2023 = LCS (Littoral Combat Ship) program scandal = Procurement mismanagement, incomplete ships
________________________________________
Conclusion
While the MAF is a capable and professional force, maintenance shortfalls and poor logistics support undermine its effectiveness. These issues stem from a mix of budgetary, systemic, and strategic challenges.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS MAINTENANCE
The Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF) have long faced challenges related to maintenance, logistics, and readiness. Below is a breakdown of the main issues contributing to this perception or reality:
________________________________________
Key Maintenance Challenges in the MAF
1. Aging Equipment
• Much of the MAF’s hardware—particularly in the Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF) and Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN)—is outdated.
• Some aircraft, ships, and vehicles are decades old, making maintenance both difficult and costly due to scarcity of spare parts and technical expertise.
2. Inconsistent Procurement and Planning
• Procurement decisions have often been driven by political considerations rather than long-term strategic needs.
• Lack of continuity in defense planning leads to a diverse mix of systems (e.g., Russian, Western, and Chinese), which complicates logistics and maintenance.
3. Budget Constraints
• Defense spending in Malondesh is relatively low (often below 1.5% of GDP).
• Limited budgets affect the ability to sustain scheduled maintenance cycles, upgrades, and training for technical personnel.
4. Skilled Manpower Shortage
• There is a shortage of trained maintenance engineers and technicians within the services.
• Retention of skilled personnel is difficult, as many transition to higher-paying private sector roles.
5. Maintenance Neglect Leading to Grounding
• There have been multiple reports of aircraft (e.g., MiG-29s, Aermacchi MB-339s) and naval vessels being grounded or laid up due to poor maintenance.
• RMN’s submarine program, for example, faced operational readiness concerns early on.
________________________________________
Examples of Maintenance-Related Incidents
2015 = RMAF grounded MiG-29 fleet = Lack of spare parts, high maintenance cost
2017 = KD Kasturi overhaul delays = Technical issues and funding
2021 = Multiple RMAF aircraft grounded = Spare parts shortages
2023 = LCS (Littoral Combat Ship) program scandal = Procurement mismanagement, incomplete ships
________________________________________
Conclusion
While the MAF is a capable and professional force, maintenance shortfalls and poor logistics support undermine its effectiveness. These issues stem from a mix of budgetary, systemic, and strategic challenges.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS MISSILES ASSETS
Missiles are a critical part of modern military capability, and the Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF) have invested in a variety of missile systems across their army, navy, and air force. However, there are some notable weaknesses and limitations in Malondesh's missile capabilities when compared to regional powers like China, Singapore, or even Vietnam.
Key Weaknesses in Malondeshn Missile Capabilities:
1. Limited Indigenous Missile Development
• Malondesh relies heavily on foreign suppliers (e.g., Russia, China, France, and the U.S.) for its missile systems.
• This makes the country vulnerable to supply chain disruptions, technology embargoes, or political shifts.
2. Short to Medium Range Focus
• Most of Malondesh’s missile systems are short- to medium-range, such as:
o Exocet MM40 Block 2/3 (anti-ship)
o Starstreak (short-range air defense)
o Jernas (Rapier) (short-range air defense)
o Seawolf (naval short-range SAM, older generation)
• There is no long-range missile deterrence, either in the form of:
o Ballistic Missiles
o Cruise Missiles with strategic reach
o Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)
3. Limited Air Defense Coverage
• The Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF) lacks a layered and integrated air defense network.
• No medium- or long-range SAM systems like:
o S-300/S-400 (Russia)
o Patriot (USA)
o Aster 30 (Europe)
• Vulnerable to saturation missile or drone attacks.
4. Naval Missile Gaps
• Some Malondeshn Navy ships still operate with older missile systems or have missile slots not fully equipped.
• Ships like the Laksamana-class corvettes are aging and face missile system obsolescence.
• Lack of vertical launch system (VLS) on many platforms limits multi-role missile capabilities.
5. No Strategic Missile Deterrent
• Unlike some neighbors, Malondesh does not possess:
o Land-attack cruise missiles (LACM)
o Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) missiles
o Submarine-launched missiles
• This limits Malondesh’s ability to deter or respond to strategic threats beyond its immediate borders.
6. Dependence on Multinational Exercises and Alliances
• While Malondesh participates in exercises like CARAT, RIMPAC, and FPDA, its missile doctrine is still defensive and reactive, not designed for power projection.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS MISSILES ASSETS
Missiles are a critical part of modern military capability, and the Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF) have invested in a variety of missile systems across their army, navy, and air force. However, there are some notable weaknesses and limitations in Malondesh's missile capabilities when compared to regional powers like China, Singapore, or even Vietnam.
Key Weaknesses in Malondeshn Missile Capabilities:
1. Limited Indigenous Missile Development
• Malondesh relies heavily on foreign suppliers (e.g., Russia, China, France, and the U.S.) for its missile systems.
• This makes the country vulnerable to supply chain disruptions, technology embargoes, or political shifts.
2. Short to Medium Range Focus
• Most of Malondesh’s missile systems are short- to medium-range, such as:
o Exocet MM40 Block 2/3 (anti-ship)
o Starstreak (short-range air defense)
o Jernas (Rapier) (short-range air defense)
o Seawolf (naval short-range SAM, older generation)
• There is no long-range missile deterrence, either in the form of:
o Ballistic Missiles
o Cruise Missiles with strategic reach
o Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)
3. Limited Air Defense Coverage
• The Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF) lacks a layered and integrated air defense network.
• No medium- or long-range SAM systems like:
o S-300/S-400 (Russia)
o Patriot (USA)
o Aster 30 (Europe)
• Vulnerable to saturation missile or drone attacks.
4. Naval Missile Gaps
• Some Malondeshn Navy ships still operate with older missile systems or have missile slots not fully equipped.
• Ships like the Laksamana-class corvettes are aging and face missile system obsolescence.
• Lack of vertical launch system (VLS) on many platforms limits multi-role missile capabilities.
5. No Strategic Missile Deterrent
• Unlike some neighbors, Malondesh does not possess:
o Land-attack cruise missiles (LACM)
o Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) missiles
o Submarine-launched missiles
• This limits Malondesh’s ability to deter or respond to strategic threats beyond its immediate borders.
6. Dependence on Multinational Exercises and Alliances
• While Malondesh participates in exercises like CARAT, RIMPAC, and FPDA, its missile doctrine is still defensive and reactive, not designed for power projection.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS ARMORED ASSETS
The Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF), while possessing a range of armored assets, face several challenges and limitations in their tank and armored warfare capabilities. These weaknesses can be categorized into strategic, operational, and technical areas:
________________________________________
1. Limited Number of Main Battle Tanks (MBTs)
• Inventory: Malondesh operates around 48 PT-91M Pendekar tanks, which are modernized Polish versions of the Soviet T-72.
• Weakness: This number is small by regional standards, limiting Malondesh’s ability to deploy heavy armor across multiple fronts or sustain prolonged high-intensity operations.
________________________________________
2. Aging Platforms and Modernization Issues
• The PT-91M, while upgraded, is based on an older Soviet-era design (T-72). It lacks some of the survivability and firepower features found in newer MBTs like the Leopard 2A7 or K2 Black Panther.
• Upgrades: Modernization has been slow, and budget constraints have hampered efforts to acquire more advanced armor.
________________________________________
3. Lack of Indigenous Tank Production
• Malondesh relies on foreign suppliers (notably Poland and previously Russia) for tanks and spare parts, which can pose logistical and geopolitical vulnerabilities.
• Indigenous development is mostly limited to light armored vehicles and support platforms.
________________________________________
4. Limited Combined Arms Capability
• The integration of tanks with mechanized infantry, artillery, and air support is not as well developed as in more advanced militaries.
• Training and joint operations involving armor are less frequent, affecting real combat readiness.
________________________________________
5. Terrain Limitations
• Much of Malondesh’s terrain (jungle, swamp, mountains) is not favorable to tank operations, which limits the strategic value of tanks.
• Tanks can be vulnerable to ambushes in such environments, particularly from well-equipped irregular forces.
________________________________________
6. Logistical Constraints
• Supporting MBTs in Malondesh’s tropical, humid climate requires robust logistics, including maintenance, spare parts, and fuel. This poses a strain during prolonged deployments or in remote areas.
________________________________________
7. Budgetary Constraints
• Defense spending is relatively low, hovering around 1–1.5% of GDP.
• Competing national priorities have limited Malondesh's ability to expand or upgrade its armored force substantially.
________________________________________
8. No Active Anti-Tank Doctrine or Systems
• Malondesh lacks a robust network of modern anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) or active protection systems (APS) for its tanks, making them vulnerable to modern threats like drones, ATGMs, and loitering munitions.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS LMS B1
WEAKNESS LMS B2
Here are some of the key weaknesses and limitations associated with the LMS Batch 2 (LMSB2) vessels of the Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN), as they relate to their design, acquisition, and operational capability:
________________________________________
Background: LMS Batch 1 Issues
The previous Batch 1 Keris class LMS ships, built in China and commissioned between 2020–2022, encountered significant problems:
• Combat system and sensor deficiencies: Chinese supplied subsystems—radar, electro optical trackers, ESM, combat management systems—underperformed during operational use
• Under armed and limited combat roles: Armed only with a 30 mm cannon and twin heavy machine guns, offering minimal surface or air defense capability
• Poor seakeeping and small size: At ~68 m, they had low endurance and were not seaworthy enough in bad weather
• Reliability concerns: The navy expressed dissatisfaction with the quality and dependability of these vessels
These issues prompted a shift in LMSB2 specifications toward larger, more capable corvettes.
________________________________________
LMS Batch 2: Emerging Weaknesses
1. Lack of Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) Capability
Despite being based on the Turkish Ada class corvette, LMSB2 reportedly will not include sonar or torpedoes, effectively removing ASW capability from its operational profile
2. Compromise on Combat Capability to Cut Costs
Sources suggest LMSB2 is likely a "cheaper variant"—selecting less advanced sensors and weapons to lower system costs. This economic trade off could impact future upgradeability and mission effectiveness
3. Still Limited Weapon Loadout (Compared to Full Corvette)
While new specs include a 57 mm gun, anti ship missiles, twin 30 mm systems, and potential air defense missiles, LMSB2 lacks full three dimensional warfare capability or ASW sensors—meaning it still falls short of high intensity combat expectations
4. Larger Size May Undermine Littoral Agility
Batch 2 vessels will be around 95 m and ~2,000–2,500 t, significantly larger than Batch 1, which can affect maneuverability in confined littoral zones and carry higher operating costs. Critics argue these should be categorized as OPVs rather than "mission specific LMS"
5. Fleet Maintenance Complexity
Selecting foreign designs (Ada, Sigma, FCX, C92, HDC 2000) may increase heterogeneity of fleet platforms—creating logistical and training challenges and defeating ambitions of fleet standardization under the 15 to 5 transformation plan
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS MISSILES ASSETS
Missiles are a critical part of modern military capability, and the Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF) have invested in a variety of missile systems across their army, navy, and air force. However, there are some notable weaknesses and limitations in Malondesh's missile capabilities when compared to regional powers like China, Singapore, or even Vietnam.
Key Weaknesses in Malondeshn Missile Capabilities:
1. Limited Indigenous Missile Development
• Malondesh relies heavily on foreign suppliers (e.g., Russia, China, France, and the U.S.) for its missile systems.
• This makes the country vulnerable to supply chain disruptions, technology embargoes, or political shifts.
2. Short to Medium Range Focus
• Most of Malondesh’s missile systems are short- to medium-range, such as:
o Exocet MM40 Block 2/3 (anti-ship)
o Starstreak (short-range air defense)
o Jernas (Rapier) (short-range air defense)
o Seawolf (naval short-range SAM, older generation)
• There is no long-range missile deterrence, either in the form of:
o Ballistic Missiles
o Cruise Missiles with strategic reach
o Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)
3. Limited Air Defense Coverage
• The Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF) lacks a layered and integrated air defense network.
• No medium- or long-range SAM systems like:
o S-300/S-400 (Russia)
o Patriot (USA)
o Aster 30 (Europe)
• Vulnerable to saturation missile or drone attacks.
4. Naval Missile Gaps
• Some Malondeshn Navy ships still operate with older missile systems or have missile slots not fully equipped.
• Ships like the Laksamana-class corvettes are aging and face missile system obsolescence.
• Lack of vertical launch system (VLS) on many platforms limits multi-role missile capabilities.
5. No Strategic Missile Deterrent
• Unlike some neighbors, Malondesh does not possess:
o Land-attack cruise missiles (LACM)
o Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) missiles
o Submarine-launched missiles
• This limits Malondesh’s ability to deter or respond to strategic threats beyond its immediate borders.
6. Dependence on Multinational Exercises and Alliances
• While Malondesh participates in exercises like CARAT, RIMPAC, and FPDA, its missile doctrine is still defensive and reactive, not designed for power projection.
100 Tahun.....? PARAH..... 🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusProyek Jokowi "Whoosh" Bisa Jadi Beban Rakyat Selama 100 Tahun
https://www.kompasiana.com/rudi81564/68b5a214ed6415052179d116/proyek-jokowi-whoosh-bisa-jadi-beban-rakyat-selama-100-tahun
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS ARMORED ASSETS
The Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF), while possessing a range of armored assets, face several challenges and limitations in their tank and armored warfare capabilities. These weaknesses can be categorized into strategic, operational, and technical areas:
________________________________________
1. Limited Number of Main Battle Tanks (MBTs)
• Inventory: Malondesh operates around 48 PT-91M Pendekar tanks, which are modernized Polish versions of the Soviet T-72.
• Weakness: This number is small by regional standards, limiting Malondesh’s ability to deploy heavy armor across multiple fronts or sustain prolonged high-intensity operations.
________________________________________
2. Aging Platforms and Modernization Issues
• The PT-91M, while upgraded, is based on an older Soviet-era design (T-72). It lacks some of the survivability and firepower features found in newer MBTs like the Leopard 2A7 or K2 Black Panther.
• Upgrades: Modernization has been slow, and budget constraints have hampered efforts to acquire more advanced armor.
________________________________________
3. Lack of Indigenous Tank Production
• Malondesh relies on foreign suppliers (notably Poland and previously Russia) for tanks and spare parts, which can pose logistical and geopolitical vulnerabilities.
• Indigenous development is mostly limited to light armored vehicles and support platforms.
________________________________________
4. Limited Combined Arms Capability
• The integration of tanks with mechanized infantry, artillery, and air support is not as well developed as in more advanced militaries.
• Training and joint operations involving armor are less frequent, affecting real combat readiness.
________________________________________
5. Terrain Limitations
• Much of Malondesh’s terrain (jungle, swamp, mountains) is not favorable to tank operations, which limits the strategic value of tanks.
• Tanks can be vulnerable to ambushes in such environments, particularly from well-equipped irregular forces.
________________________________________
6. Logistical Constraints
• Supporting MBTs in Malondesh’s tropical, humid climate requires robust logistics, including maintenance, spare parts, and fuel. This poses a strain during prolonged deployments or in remote areas.
________________________________________
7. Budgetary Constraints
• Defense spending is relatively low, hovering around 1–1.5% of GDP.
• Competing national priorities have limited Malondesh's ability to expand or upgrade its armored force substantially.
________________________________________
8. No Active Anti-Tank Doctrine or Systems
• Malondesh lacks a robust network of modern anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) or active protection systems (APS) for its tanks, making them vulnerable to modern threats like drones, ATGMs, and loitering munitions.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS ARMORED ASSETS
The Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF), while possessing a range of armored assets, face several challenges and limitations in their tank and armored warfare capabilities. These weaknesses can be categorized into strategic, operational, and technical areas:
________________________________________
1. Limited Number of Main Battle Tanks (MBTs)
• Inventory: Malondesh operates around 48 PT-91M Pendekar tanks, which are modernized Polish versions of the Soviet T-72.
• Weakness: This number is small by regional standards, limiting Malondesh’s ability to deploy heavy armor across multiple fronts or sustain prolonged high-intensity operations.
________________________________________
2. Aging Platforms and Modernization Issues
• The PT-91M, while upgraded, is based on an older Soviet-era design (T-72). It lacks some of the survivability and firepower features found in newer MBTs like the Leopard 2A7 or K2 Black Panther.
• Upgrades: Modernization has been slow, and budget constraints have hampered efforts to acquire more advanced armor.
________________________________________
3. Lack of Indigenous Tank Production
• Malondesh relies on foreign suppliers (notably Poland and previously Russia) for tanks and spare parts, which can pose logistical and geopolitical vulnerabilities.
• Indigenous development is mostly limited to light armored vehicles and support platforms.
________________________________________
4. Limited Combined Arms Capability
• The integration of tanks with mechanized infantry, artillery, and air support is not as well developed as in more advanced militaries.
• Training and joint operations involving armor are less frequent, affecting real combat readiness.
________________________________________
5. Terrain Limitations
• Much of Malondesh’s terrain (jungle, swamp, mountains) is not favorable to tank operations, which limits the strategic value of tanks.
• Tanks can be vulnerable to ambushes in such environments, particularly from well-equipped irregular forces.
________________________________________
6. Logistical Constraints
• Supporting MBTs in Malondesh’s tropical, humid climate requires robust logistics, including maintenance, spare parts, and fuel. This poses a strain during prolonged deployments or in remote areas.
________________________________________
7. Budgetary Constraints
• Defense spending is relatively low, hovering around 1–1.5% of GDP.
• Competing national priorities have limited Malondesh's ability to expand or upgrade its armored force substantially.
________________________________________
8. No Active Anti-Tank Doctrine or Systems
• Malondesh lacks a robust network of modern anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) or active protection systems (APS) for its tanks, making them vulnerable to modern threats like drones, ATGMs, and loitering munitions.
100 Tahun.....? PARAH..... 🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusProyek Jokowi "Whoosh" Bisa Jadi Beban Rakyat Selama 100 Tahun
https://www.kompasiana.com/rudi81564/68b5a214ed6415052179d116/proyek-jokowi-whoosh-bisa-jadi-beban-rakyat-selama-100-tahun
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS MALONDESH AIR FORCES
Malondesh's air force, officially known as the Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF), has several strengths but also faces a number of key weaknesses and challenges. These are based on public defense analyses, expert commentary, and open-source information as of recent years.
Key Weaknesses of the Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF):
------------
1. Aging Aircraft Fleet
• MiG-29s: These have been retired due to high maintenance costs and limited effectiveness.
• F/A-18D Hornets: Still operational but aging.
• SU-30MKMs: Require significant maintenance, and some have faced operational readiness issues due to lack of spare parts and support.
------------
2. Limited Fleet Size
• Malondesh operates a relatively small number of combat aircraft, limiting its ability to project power or maintain a credible deterrent in the region.
• The country lacks strategic airlift capacity, making it harder to respond quickly to crises.
------------
3. Modernization Delays
• RMAF modernization programs have suffered from delays and budget constraints.
• The Multirole Combat Aircraft (MRCA) replacement program has been postponed multiple times, leaving capability gaps.
------------
4. Logistical and Maintenance Challenges
• Heavy reliance on foreign suppliers (Russia, U.S., and Europe) creates issues with interoperability and spare parts availability.
• Maintenance costs and delays impact aircraft readiness and mission capability.
------------
5. Limited Indigenous Defense Industry
• Malondesh has limited local aerospace manufacturing or support capability.
• It depends on external partners for upgrades, parts, training, and weapons integration.
------------
6. Insufficient Force Multipliers
• The RMAF lacks a comprehensive airborne early warning (AEW&C) system.
• Limited use of drones, electronic warfare (EW), and ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) capabilities reduces situational awareness.
------------
7. Geopolitical Pressures and Resource Constraints
• Regional tensions in the South China Sea require stronger capabilities than currently available.
• Defense budgets are constrained due to domestic priorities and economic conditions.
------------
8. Pilot Training and Retention
• Budget limitations can impact pilot training hours.
• Retaining skilled pilots and technical personnel can be challenging due to better pay in the private sector or other government roles.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
NO MEMBER G20
NO MEMBER BRICS
Malondesh can potentially become a member of BRICS or the G20, but there are political, economic, and strategic reasons why it has not joined either group so far. Let’s look at both groups separately.
________________________________________
G20 (Group of Twenty)
✅ What is the G20?
• A group of the world’s 19 largest economies + the EU.
• Formed to discuss global economic and financial policy.
• Members include the US, China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, etc.
❌ Why Malondesh is not a member:
1. Economic Size:
Malondesh’s economy is significantly smaller than G20 members.
The G20 mostly includes the largest economies by GDP or influence.
2. ASEAN Representation:
Indonesia (the largest Southeast Asian economy) already represents ASEAN in the G20.
G20 typically avoids duplication from the same region.
3. Membership is Fixed:
The G20 has remained relatively stable in membership since its creation.
It’s a closed group — there’s no formal application process or expansion mechanism.
________________________________________
BRICS
✅ What is BRICS?
• A group of emerging economies aiming to challenge Western-dominated institutions (like the IMF and World Bank).
• Recently expanded to include countries like Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, etc.
❌ Why Malondesh hasn’t joined BRICS:
1. Non-aligned Foreign Policy:
Malondesh maintains a neutral, non-aligned stance in global politics.
Joining BRICS might signal a shift toward a China-Russia bloc, which Malondesh may wish to avoid.
2. Geopolitical Calculations:
BRICS has geopolitical implications (especially in rivalry with the West).
Malondesh values its ties with both Western countries and China, and may not want to upset the balance.
3. Malondesh Has Not Applied (Yet):
Membership in BRICS is by invitation/application.
Malondesh has not made moves to formally apply or express strong interest in joining.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS ARMORED ASSETS
The Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF), while possessing a range of armored assets, face several challenges and limitations in their tank and armored warfare capabilities. These weaknesses can be categorized into strategic, operational, and technical areas:
________________________________________
1. Limited Number of Main Battle Tanks (MBTs)
• Inventory: Malondesh operates around 48 PT-91M Pendekar tanks, which are modernized Polish versions of the Soviet T-72.
• Weakness: This number is small by regional standards, limiting Malondesh’s ability to deploy heavy armor across multiple fronts or sustain prolonged high-intensity operations.
________________________________________
2. Aging Platforms and Modernization Issues
• The PT-91M, while upgraded, is based on an older Soviet-era design (T-72). It lacks some of the survivability and firepower features found in newer MBTs like the Leopard 2A7 or K2 Black Panther.
• Upgrades: Modernization has been slow, and budget constraints have hampered efforts to acquire more advanced armor.
________________________________________
3. Lack of Indigenous Tank Production
• Malondesh relies on foreign suppliers (notably Poland and previously Russia) for tanks and spare parts, which can pose logistical and geopolitical vulnerabilities.
• Indigenous development is mostly limited to light armored vehicles and support platforms.
________________________________________
4. Limited Combined Arms Capability
• The integration of tanks with mechanized infantry, artillery, and air support is not as well developed as in more advanced militaries.
• Training and joint operations involving armor are less frequent, affecting real combat readiness.
________________________________________
5. Terrain Limitations
• Much of Malondesh’s terrain (jungle, swamp, mountains) is not favorable to tank operations, which limits the strategic value of tanks.
• Tanks can be vulnerable to ambushes in such environments, particularly from well-equipped irregular forces.
________________________________________
6. Logistical Constraints
• Supporting MBTs in Malondesh’s tropical, humid climate requires robust logistics, including maintenance, spare parts, and fuel. This poses a strain during prolonged deployments or in remote areas.
________________________________________
7. Budgetary Constraints
• Defense spending is relatively low, hovering around 1–1.5% of GDP.
• Competing national priorities have limited Malondesh's ability to expand or upgrade its armored force substantially.
________________________________________
8. No Active Anti-Tank Doctrine or Systems
• Malondesh lacks a robust network of modern anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) or active protection systems (APS) for its tanks, making them vulnerable to modern threats like drones, ATGMs, and loitering munitions.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS MALONDESH PROCUREMENT
Procurement weaknesses in the Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF) have been highlighted over the years in various government audits, media investigations, and academic studies. These weaknesses often stem from a combination of systemic, structural, and operational issues.
Key Weaknesses in MAF Procuremen
1. Lack of Transparency
Many defense procurements are classified under national security, limiting public scrutiny.
Closed or restricted tenders are common, reducing competition and increasing the risk of corruption or favoritism.
2. Corruption and Mismanagement
Allegations and cases involving high-level corruption in defense procurement (e.g., the Scorpène submarine scandal).
Inflated costs and questionable deals without proper due diligence or cost-benefit analysis.
3. Political Interference
Procurement decisions sometimes reflect political priorities rather than military needs.
Projects awarded to politically connected companies, regardless of capability.
4. Lack of Strategic Planning
Procurement not always aligned with long-term defense strategy or operational requirements.
Reactive rather than proactive planning, leading to mismatched or obsolete equipment.
5. Poor Maintenance and Lifecycle Management
Insufficient budgeting and planning for maintenance, upgrades, and training.
Resulting in equipment quickly becoming non-operational or under-utilized.
6. Weak Oversight and Accountability
Limited oversight by Parliament or independent bodies on defense spending.
Auditor-General’s reports have highlighted irregularities, but follow-up actions are often limited.
7. Limited Local Industry Capability
Over-reliance on foreign suppliers due to underdeveloped domestic defense manufacturing.
Local offset programs sometimes fail to deliver real capability or transfer of technology.
8. Fragmented Procurement Process
Involvement of multiple agencies (Ministry of Defence, armed services, contractors), leading to inefficiencies and lack of coordination
Dari awal WHOOSH sudah RUGI ya guys itu FAKTA.... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusMISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS MALONDESH ARMED FORCES
The Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF), like any military organization, faces a variety of challenges and weaknesses. These issues span across strategic, structural, logistical, and operational dimensions. Below are some of the commonly cited weaknesses and trouble areas faced by the MAF:
------------
1. Budget Constraints
• Limited Defense Spending: Malondesh maintains a relatively modest defense budget compared to regional powers like Singapore, Indonesia, or Thailand.
• Delayed Procurement: Budget limitations often delay the acquisition of new platforms, weapons systems, and modernization efforts.
• Maintenance Issues: Older equipment may not be properly maintained due to funding gaps.
------------
2. Aging and Outdated Equipment
• Obsolete Platforms: Much of the Malondeshn Army, Navy (RMN), and Air Force (RMAF) still use aging equipment, such as old tanks, fighter jets (e.g., MiG-29s, which have been retired), and naval vessels.
• Logistical Support: Difficulties in securing parts and support for legacy systems affect readiness and operational capabilities.
------------
3. Capability Gaps
• Air Power Deficiencies: Limited numbers of combat aircraft, AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), and aerial refueling capabilities hamper the RMAF’s operational reach.
• Naval Shortcomings: The RMN faces challenges in maritime domain awareness and anti-submarine warfare, crucial in the South China Sea context.
• Cyber and EW (Electronic Warfare): Malondesh is still developing capabilities in cyber defense and electronic warfare compared to more advanced militaries.
------------
4. Interoperability and Joint Operations
• Lack of Integration: While efforts are underway to improve jointness among the Army, Navy, and Air Force, coordination and interoperability remain inconsistent.
• Command Structure: Differences in doctrine and training among services sometimes hinder joint operational effectiveness.
------------
5. Human Resource Challenges
• Recruitment and Retention: Difficulty in attracting high-quality recruits and retaining skilled personnel due to better civilian career opportunities.
• Training Limitations: Budget restrictions can limit training frequency, scope, and international exercises.
------------
6. Procurement and Corruption Concerns
• Lack of Transparency: Past procurement deals have faced allegations of mismanagement or corruption, such as the Scorpène submarine scandal.
• Inefficiency: Poor planning or inconsistent defense procurement policies sometimes result in incompatible or unnecessary systems.
------------
7. Geopolitical and Strategic Limitations
• South China Sea Tensions: Malondesh lacks the military heft to counter more assertive regional actors like China in contested maritime areas.
• Non-Aligned Posture: Malondesh’s neutral foreign policy limits its ability to form strong military alliances, although it does participate in regional security dialogues
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESSES OF THE FA-50 LIGHT COMBAT AIRCRAFT
________________________________________
1. Limited Radar and Sensor Capabilities
• Older variants of the FA-50 lack an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, which is standard in most modern fighters.
• Earlier models use mechanically scanned radars (like EL/M-2032), which are less capable in tracking multiple targets and operating in electronic warfare environments.
Note: Newer versions (e.g., FA-50 Block 20 or Golden Eagle variants) are being upgraded with AESA radar, but these are still being rolled out.
________________________________________
2. No Internal Gun on Some Versions
• Some configurations of the FA-50 (particularly early export models) lack an internal 20mm cannon, reducing close-in combat and strafing capabilities.
________________________________________
3. Limited Weapon Payload
• Payload capacity is about 4,500 kg, significantly less than fighters like the F-16 (which carries around 7,700+ kg).
• This limits the number and types of weapons it can carry, especially for extended strike missions.
________________________________________
4. No Afterburning Supercruise
• The FA-50 uses the F404-GE-102 engine, which is powerful but doesn't allow for supercruise (sustained supersonic flight without afterburners).
• Top speed is around Mach 1.5, which is sufficient for its class but not competitive with high-end fighters like the Rafale or F-35.
________________________________________
5. No Stealth Features
• Unlike 5th-generation aircraft (e.g., F-35 or J-20), the FA-50 has no stealth shaping or radar-absorbing materials.
• This makes it vulnerable to modern air defense systems and radar-guided threats.
________________________________________
6. Basic Electronic Warfare (EW) Suite
• Its EW suite is relatively basic, especially in earlier versions.
• Lacks advanced self-protection jammers or towed decoys, making it less survivable in contested airspace.
________________________________________
7. Shorter Range and Endurance
• Has a combat radius of ~1,800 km with external fuel, but this is still limited compared to full-sized multirole fighters.
• This constrains its operational use without aerial refueling (which is not standard on all FA-50s).
________________________________________
8. Limited Multirole Capability (in base versions)
• While capable of basic air-to-air and air-to-ground roles, it lacks some high-end mission systems needed for:
o SEAD/DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses)
o Long-range interdiction
o Maritime strike (somewhat limited)
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS MALONDESH PROCUREMENT
Procurement weaknesses in the Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF) have been highlighted over the years in various government audits, media investigations, and academic studies. These weaknesses often stem from a combination of systemic, structural, and operational issues.
Key Weaknesses in MAF Procuremen
1. Lack of Transparency
Many defense procurements are classified under national security, limiting public scrutiny.
Closed or restricted tenders are common, reducing competition and increasing the risk of corruption or favoritism.
2. Corruption and Mismanagement
Allegations and cases involving high-level corruption in defense procurement (e.g., the Scorpène submarine scandal).
Inflated costs and questionable deals without proper due diligence or cost-benefit analysis.
3. Political Interference
Procurement decisions sometimes reflect political priorities rather than military needs.
Projects awarded to politically connected companies, regardless of capability.
4. Lack of Strategic Planning
Procurement not always aligned with long-term defense strategy or operational requirements.
Reactive rather than proactive planning, leading to mismatched or obsolete equipment.
5. Poor Maintenance and Lifecycle Management
Insufficient budgeting and planning for maintenance, upgrades, and training.
Resulting in equipment quickly becoming non-operational or under-utilized.
6. Weak Oversight and Accountability
Limited oversight by Parliament or independent bodies on defense spending.
Auditor-General’s reports have highlighted irregularities, but follow-up actions are often limited.
7. Limited Local Industry Capability
Over-reliance on foreign suppliers due to underdeveloped domestic defense manufacturing.
Local offset programs sometimes fail to deliver real capability or transfer of technology.
8. Fragmented Procurement Process
Involvement of multiple agencies (Ministry of Defence, armed services, contractors), leading to inefficiencies and lack of coordination
100 Tahun.....? PARAH..... 🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusProyek Jokowi "Whoosh" Bisa Jadi Beban Rakyat Selama 100 Tahun
https://www.kompasiana.com/rudi81564/68b5a214ed6415052179d116/proyek-jokowi-whoosh-bisa-jadi-beban-rakyat-selama-100-tahun
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
SCANDALS
Here’s a detailed overview of major scandals involving the Malondeshn Armed Forces (Angkatan Tentera Malondesh), particularly focused on procurement corruption, asset mismanagement, and internal misconduct:
________________________________________
⚖️ 1. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Procurement Scandal
• In 2011–2013, the Ministry of Defence signed a RM9 billion contract with Boustead Naval Shipyard to deliver six French-made LCS. By 2025, no vessel was completed, despite RM6 billion in payments
• Former Navy Chief Ahmad Ramli Mohd Nor was charged with criminal breach of trust over unauthorised payments, though granted a discharge not amounting to acquittal in March 2025 due to medical unfitness for trial
• Transparency groups and civil society have called for a Royal Commission of Inquiry to investigate institutional failures in defence procurement spanning decades
________________________________________
🚢 2. Naval and Patrol Vessel Controversies
• The New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) project in the 1990s was a major fiasco: only six out of 27 vessels were built at a ballooned cost of RM6.75 billion, and many remained incomplete following company insolvency
• The Scorpene submarine deal in 2002 involved twin submarines and one Agosta model, with a staggering RM510 million in commission fees going to politically connected intermediaries, and the deal later linked to the murder of Altantuyaa Shaariibuugiin. French courts began investigations as recent as 2025
________________________________________
🛫 3. Missing Jet Engines Incident (2007)
• Two jet engines for F 5E Tiger II jets disappeared from RMAF stores in 2007 under Defence leadership of then minister Najib Razak. They were later recovered in Uruguay. Multiple officers, including a brigadier general, were dismissed
________________________________________
🧑💼 4. Corruption Charges Against Armed Forces Officers
• In 2020, two senior ATM officers—Colonel Che Ahmad Idris and Brigadier General Mohammed Feizol Anuar—were charged with receiving bribes tied to Defence Ministry contracting. Che Ahmad was later acquitted in 2024 due to insufficient evidence
________________________________________
🏛️ 5. Broader Institutional Concerns
• Transparency International and advocacy groups have repeatedly highlighted systemic corruption risk in defence procurement, placing Malondesh in the “very high risk” category due to weak oversight, secrecy, and rent-seeking by politically linked firms
• CAP Penang described how poor procurement practices and unaccountable structures have persisted for 40 years, harming both military readiness and national sovereignty
• Civil society groups like C4 Center and SUARAM pushed for transparency and investigations into both the Scorpene and LCS scandals, calling for legal cooperation with French and German authorities
PROBLEMS BUDGET MALONDESH ARMED FORCES
HapusThe Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF) faces several budget-related challenges that affect its operational readiness, modernization efforts, and overall capabilities. These problems can be categorized into a few key areas:
________________________________________
1. Limited Defense Budget
Malondesh allocates a relatively small percentage of its GDP to defense (usually around 1%–1.2%), compared to regional peers like Singapore, Indonesia, or Thailand. This constrains:
• Procurement of new equipment
• Modernization of aging assets
• Research and development (R&D)
• Training and maintenance costs
________________________________________
2. Aging Equipment and Delayed Modernization
Many of the MAF's platforms—especially in the air force and navy—are outdated:
• The Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF) has faced difficulties replacing its aging fighter fleet (e.g., MiG-29s).
• The Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN) is still waiting on the delayed Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) project.
• Budget constraints have delayed or scaled back modernization plans, such as the CAP 55 plan (RMAF) and the 15-to-5 transformation plan (RMN).
________________________________________
3. Cost Overruns and Procurement Delays
High-profile defense procurement projects have been plagued by financial mismanagement and delays:
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal is a major example: Over RM6 billion spent, yet no ships delivered as of mid-2020s.
• These issues lead to wastage of public funds and reduce confidence in defense planning and execution.
________________________________________
4. Operational Sustainability
Operating and maintaining aging or diverse platforms is costly:
• Spare parts and maintenance for obsolete systems are expensive.
• Logistics chains become inefficient due to platform diversity (especially with mixed Russian, American, and European systems).
• Budget limitations affect regular maintenance, training hours, and readiness.
________________________________________
5. Dependence on Foreign Suppliers
Malondesh's limited defense industrial base forces heavy reliance on foreign suppliers, which:
• Is costly in foreign exchange terms.
• Limits sovereign control over essential technologies.
• Increases vulnerability to geopolitical pressures (e.g., US export controls).
________________________________________
6. Underinvestment in Personnel Welfare
Budgetary focus on procurement sometimes sidelines:
• Welfare, housing, and pay for armed forces personnel
• Post-service support for veterans
• Training and skill development
This affects recruitment, morale, and retention of skilled personnel.
________________________________________
7. Competing National Priorities
Defense spending competes with pressing domestic needs:
• Healthcare, education, and subsidies take precedence in national budgets.
• Political leadership often defers defense spending to avoid public backlash.
________________________________________
8. Lack of Transparency and Strategic Planning
• Weak parliamentary oversight over defense spending.
• Poor communication of long-term defense strategy and capability needs to the public.
• Political interference in procurement decisions.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
NO MEMBER G20
NO MEMBER BRICS
Malondesh can potentially become a member of BRICS or the G20, but there are political, economic, and strategic reasons why it has not joined either group so far. Let’s look at both groups separately.
________________________________________
G20 (Group of Twenty)
✅ What is the G20?
• A group of the world’s 19 largest economies + the EU.
• Formed to discuss global economic and financial policy.
• Members include the US, China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, etc.
❌ Why Malondesh is not a member:
1. Economic Size:
Malondesh’s economy is significantly smaller than G20 members.
The G20 mostly includes the largest economies by GDP or influence.
2. ASEAN Representation:
Indonesia (the largest Southeast Asian economy) already represents ASEAN in the G20.
G20 typically avoids duplication from the same region.
3. Membership is Fixed:
The G20 has remained relatively stable in membership since its creation.
It’s a closed group — there’s no formal application process or expansion mechanism.
________________________________________
BRICS
✅ What is BRICS?
• A group of emerging economies aiming to challenge Western-dominated institutions (like the IMF and World Bank).
• Recently expanded to include countries like Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, etc.
❌ Why Malondesh hasn’t joined BRICS:
1. Non-aligned Foreign Policy:
Malondesh maintains a neutral, non-aligned stance in global politics.
Joining BRICS might signal a shift toward a China-Russia bloc, which Malondesh may wish to avoid.
2. Geopolitical Calculations:
BRICS has geopolitical implications (especially in rivalry with the West).
Malondesh values its ties with both Western countries and China, and may not want to upset the balance.
3. Malondesh Has Not Applied (Yet):
Membership in BRICS is by invitation/application.
Malondesh has not made moves to formally apply or express strong interest in joining.
100 Tahun.....? PARAH..... 🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusProyek Jokowi "Whoosh" Bisa Jadi Beban Rakyat Selama 100 Tahun
https://www.kompasiana.com/rudi81564/68b5a214ed6415052179d116/proyek-jokowi-whoosh-bisa-jadi-beban-rakyat-selama-100-tahun
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
LEMAH .....
Masalah yang dihadapi oleh Angkatan Laut Malondesh (Tentera Laut Diraja Malondesh - TLDM) cukup kompleks dan telah berlarutan selama beberapa dekade. Berikut ini adalah ringkasan masalah utama:
________________________________________
1. Keterbatasan Anggaran
• Belanja pertahanan rendah: Malondesh mengalokasikan kurang dari 1% dari PDB untuk pertahanan, yang berdampak langsung pada pemeliharaan dan modernisasi TLDM.
• Proyek tertunda karena dana: Proyek kapal tempur seperti Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) menghadapi penundaan besar karena kendala pendanaan dan manajemen.
________________________________________
2. Keterlambatan dan Skandal Proyek
• Proyek LCS (Boustead Naval Shipyard):
o Proyek 6 kapal LCS yang seharusnya selesai pada 2019, belum ada satu pun yang dikirim hingga kini (2025).
o Terdapat penyalahgunaan dana, kelemahan manajemen proyek, dan kurangnya pengawasan kontrak.
o Dianggap sebagai skandal militer terbesar di Malondesh.
________________________________________
3. Aset Usang dan Terbatas
• Kapal lama: Banyak kapal TLDM seperti korvet dan kapal patroli dibeli sejak 1980-an atau awal 1990-an.
• Subsistem ketinggalan zaman: Sensor, radar, dan sistem senjata perlu upgrade.
• Jumlah kapal terbatas: Tidak mencukupi untuk melakukan patroli rutin di wilayah luas seperti Laut China Selatan, Selat Melaka, dan Sabah.
________________________________________
4. Kebutuhan Modernisasi
• TLDM membutuhkan:
o Frigat baru, kapal patroli pesisir, dan sistem senjata modern.
o Kemampuan anti-kapal selam (ASW) yang lebih baik.
o Dukungan udara maritim seperti UAV atau pesawat patroli maritim.
________________________________________
5. Ancaman Regional yang Meningkat
• Ketegangan di Laut China Selatan dengan kehadiran kapal penjaga pantai dan milisi maritim Tiongkok.
• Keterbatasan TLDM dalam menegakkan kedaulatan maritim secara efektif.
________________________________________
6. Ketergantungan pada Vendor Asing
• Sebagian besar sistem senjata dan suku cadang berasal dari luar negeri (Perancis, Jerman, Korea, dll), yang menimbulkan biaya tinggi dan ketergantungan logistik.
________________________________________
7. Sumber Daya Manusia
• Kekurangan personel terlatih untuk mengoperasikan sistem modern.
• Tantangan dalam retensi dan pelatihan awak kapal.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
WEAKNESSES OR LIMITATIONS
The military capabilities of any country—including Malondesh—have both strengths and weaknesses shaped by geopolitical needs, budgetary constraints, technology access, and strategic priorities. Below are some key weaknesses or limitations that have been identified or discussed in defense analyses regarding the Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF):
________________________________________
1. Budget Constraints
• Limited defense spending: Malondesh allocates a relatively modest percentage of GDP (~1% to 1.5%) to defense.
• Impact: Limits modernization, procurement of advanced systems, and sustained operational readiness.
________________________________________
2. Aging Equipment & Delayed Modernization
• Many platforms (especially in the air force and navy) are aging and have outdated technology.
Air Force: MiG-29s were retired without immediate replacements.
o Navy: Some ships are 30+ years old and lack modern combat systems.
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program delays have hampered naval modernization.
________________________________________
3. Limited Force Projection Capability
• Air & naval power projection beyond Malondesh’s immediate region is limited.
• Insufficient strategic airlift and naval assets to support long-range deployments or high-tempo operations.
________________________________________
4. Logistics & Maintenance Challenges
• Reliance on a diverse range of foreign suppliers (e.g., Western, Russian, Chinese systems) complicates maintenance and logistics.
• Inconsistent spare part availability and high upkeep costs.
________________________________________
5. Inadequate Joint Operations & Interoperability
• Historically, weak joint operations doctrine between the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
• Efforts are being made to improve this, but integration still lags behind modern standards.
________________________________________
6. Manpower & Training Gaps
• Limited high-tech training compared to more advanced militaries.
• Challenges in attracting and retaining top technical talent, especially for cyber and electronic warfare units.
________________________________________
7. Cybersecurity and EW Vulnerabilities
• Still developing capabilities in cyber warfare and electronic warfare (EW).
• Vulnerable to sophisticated cyber attacks from state and non-state actors.
________________________________________
8. Maritime Surveillance & Defense Gaps
• South China Sea claims require strong maritime surveillance, but current ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) assets are limited.
• Inadequate coverage of vast maritime zones, especially in the East Malondeshn EEZ.
________________________________________
9. Dependence on Foreign Technology
• Heavily reliant on imports for most major defense platforms and weapon systems.
• Limited domestic defense industry capacity for high-end manufacturing or R&D.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it saidS
=============
KELEMAHAN AIR FORCE
Berikut beberapa kelemahan utama yang kerap disorot pada Angkatan Udara Diraja Malondesh (RMAF):
1. Keterbatasan Anggaran dan Modernisasi Tertunda
Sejak dekade 2010-an, porsi belanja pertahanan Malondesh menurun dari 1,5 % PDB pada 2010 menjadi sekitar 1 % pada 2020. Akibatnya, banyak program modernisasi—termasuk pengadaan MRCA (Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) lanjutan dan sistem AWACS—sering tertunda atau dibekukan karena kekurangan dana
2. Armada Tempur dan Pemeliharaan yang Usang
• Su-30MKM: Pasokan suku cadang terbatas—terutama di tengah gangguan rantai pasok Rusia pasca-invasi Ukraina—mengakibatkan kesiapan terbang yang menurun drastis.
• MiG-29 & F-5: Pesawat veteran ini sudah melewati jam terbang optimal dan menuntut pemeliharaan intensif; banyak insiden di akhir 1990-an dan awal 2000-an yang menunjukkan kerentanan teknis
3. Tantangan Lingkungan Tropis
Iklim tropis dengan kelembapan tinggi mempercepat korosi pada struktur pesawat—terutama yang berbahan aluminium seri 2024—sehingga fatigue life menurun dan risiko kegagalan material meningkat
4. Kapasitas Pengawasan dan Transportasi Udara Terbatas
• AWACS & Radar: RMAF belum memiliki platform AWACS sendiri, bergantung pada radar ground-based yang baru mulai ditingkatkan sejak 2019–2025, sehingga cakupan AWACS masih sangat terbatas
• Pengangkut A400M: Meski sudah ada, jumlahnya (empat unit) masih relatif kecil untuk mendukung proyeksi kekuatan dan bantuan kemanusiaan di wilayah luas Malondesh.
5. Kualitas Pelatihan dan Tenaga Terampil
.prasangka umum dalam analisis militerAnggaran yang ketat berdampak pada frekuensi latihan tempur dan jam terbang pilot. Ini berpotensi menurunkan kesiapan operasional dan kemampuan manuver taktis dalam skenario peperangan modern
6. Interferensi Politik dan Isu Korupsi
Beberapa laporan menyinggung intervensi politik dalam proses pengadaan dan dugaan praktik korupsi, yang dapat memperlambat atau mempersulit realisasi program vital RMAF
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS MALONDESH ARMED FORCES
The Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF), like any military organization, faces a variety of challenges and weaknesses. These issues span across strategic, structural, logistical, and operational dimensions. Below are some of the commonly cited weaknesses and trouble areas faced by the MAF:
------------
1. Budget Constraints
• Limited Defense Spending: Malondesh maintains a relatively modest defense budget compared to regional powers like Singapore, Indonesia, or Thailand.
• Delayed Procurement: Budget limitations often delay the acquisition of new platforms, weapons systems, and modernization efforts.
• Maintenance Issues: Older equipment may not be properly maintained due to funding gaps.
------------
2. Aging and Outdated Equipment
• Obsolete Platforms: Much of the Malondeshn Army, Navy (RMN), and Air Force (RMAF) still use aging equipment, such as old tanks, fighter jets (e.g., MiG-29s, which have been retired), and naval vessels.
• Logistical Support: Difficulties in securing parts and support for legacy systems affect readiness and operational capabilities.
------------
3. Capability Gaps
• Air Power Deficiencies: Limited numbers of combat aircraft, AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), and aerial refueling capabilities hamper the RMAF’s operational reach.
• Naval Shortcomings: The RMN faces challenges in maritime domain awareness and anti-submarine warfare, crucial in the South China Sea context.
• Cyber and EW (Electronic Warfare): Malondesh is still developing capabilities in cyber defense and electronic warfare compared to more advanced militaries.
------------
4. Interoperability and Joint Operations
• Lack of Integration: While efforts are underway to improve jointness among the Army, Navy, and Air Force, coordination and interoperability remain inconsistent.
• Command Structure: Differences in doctrine and training among services sometimes hinder joint operational effectiveness.
------------
5. Human Resource Challenges
• Recruitment and Retention: Difficulty in attracting high-quality recruits and retaining skilled personnel due to better civilian career opportunities.
• Training Limitations: Budget restrictions can limit training frequency, scope, and international exercises.
------------
6. Procurement and Corruption Concerns
• Lack of Transparency: Past procurement deals have faced allegations of mismanagement or corruption, such as the Scorpène submarine scandal.
• Inefficiency: Poor planning or inconsistent defense procurement policies sometimes result in incompatible or unnecessary systems.
------------
7. Geopolitical and Strategic Limitations
• South China Sea Tensions: Malondesh lacks the military heft to counter more assertive regional actors like China in contested maritime areas.
• Non-Aligned Posture: Malondesh’s neutral foreign policy limits its ability to form strong military alliances, although it does participate in regional security dialogues
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAKNESS MALONDESH ARMED FORCES
The Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF), like any military organization, faces a variety of challenges and weaknesses. These issues span across strategic, structural, logistical, and operational dimensions. Below are some of the commonly cited weaknesses and trouble areas faced by the MAF:
------------
1. Budget Constraints
• Limited Defense Spending: Malondesh maintains a relatively modest defense budget compared to regional powers like Singapore, Indonesia, or Thailand.
• Delayed Procurement: Budget limitations often delay the acquisition of new platforms, weapons systems, and modernization efforts.
• Maintenance Issues: Older equipment may not be properly maintained due to funding gaps.
------------
2. Aging and Outdated Equipment
• Obsolete Platforms: Much of the Malondeshn Army, Navy (RMN), and Air Force (RMAF) still use aging equipment, such as old tanks, fighter jets (e.g., MiG-29s, which have been retired), and naval vessels.
• Logistical Support: Difficulties in securing parts and support for legacy systems affect readiness and operational capabilities.
------------
3. Capability Gaps
• Air Power Deficiencies: Limited numbers of combat aircraft, AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), and aerial refueling capabilities hamper the RMAF’s operational reach.
• Naval Shortcomings: The RMN faces challenges in maritime domain awareness and anti-submarine warfare, crucial in the South China Sea context.
• Cyber and EW (Electronic Warfare): Malondesh is still developing capabilities in cyber defense and electronic warfare compared to more advanced militaries.
------------
4. Interoperability and Joint Operations
• Lack of Integration: While efforts are underway to improve jointness among the Army, Navy, and Air Force, coordination and interoperability remain inconsistent.
• Command Structure: Differences in doctrine and training among services sometimes hinder joint operational effectiveness.
------------
5. Human Resource Challenges
• Recruitment and Retention: Difficulty in attracting high-quality recruits and retaining skilled personnel due to better civilian career opportunities.
• Training Limitations: Budget restrictions can limit training frequency, scope, and international exercises.
------------
6. Procurement and Corruption Concerns
• Lack of Transparency: Past procurement deals have faced allegations of mismanagement or corruption, such as the Scorpène submarine scandal.
• Inefficiency: Poor planning or inconsistent defense procurement policies sometimes result in incompatible or unnecessary systems.
------------
7. Geopolitical and Strategic Limitations
• South China Sea Tensions: Malondesh lacks the military heft to counter more assertive regional actors like China in contested maritime areas.
• Non-Aligned Posture: Malondesh’s neutral foreign policy limits its ability to form strong military alliances, although it does participate in regional security dialogues
100 Tahun.....? PARAH..... 🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusProyek Jokowi "Whoosh" Bisa Jadi Beban Rakyat Selama 100 Tahun
https://www.kompasiana.com/rudi81564/68b5a214ed6415052179d116/proyek-jokowi-whoosh-bisa-jadi-beban-rakyat-selama-100-tahun
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAK
WEAK
WEAK
Here are some possible reasons behind the perception of MAF being weaker compared to others:
________________________________________
1. Limited Defense Budget
• Malondesh’s defense spending is modest compared to regional players.
• Budget constraints limit acquisition of modern hardware, long-range capabilities, and extensive R&D.
2. Aging Equipment
• Some branches (like the Royal Malondeshn Air Force and Navy) still rely on older platforms like MiG-29s (retired) or Lekiu-class frigates.
• Modernization programs (e.g., LCS ships, MRCA jets) have faced delays or cancellations.
3. Small Force Size
• Manpower and hardware numbers are significantly smaller than countries like Indonesia or Vietnam.
• The country maintains a modest-sized professional military rather than a large conscripted one.
4. Strategic Doctrine
• Malondesh follows a non-aggressive, defensive doctrine, focused on sovereignty, peacekeeping, and regional cooperation.
• The country emphasizes diplomacy and ASEAN frameworks over military projection.
5. Procurement & Project Delays
• High-profile projects like the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program have suffered from delays and mismanagement, hurting public confidence in the military.
6. Limited Combat Experience
• The MAF has not been involved in major wars since the communist insurgency and the Confrontation with Indonesia.
• This is a good thing for national peace, but it may affect perceptions of readiness.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it saidS
=============
KELEMAHAN NAVY..
Kelemahan Angkatan Laut Malondesh (Tentera Laut Diraja Malondesh/TLDM) dapat dianalisis dari beberapa aspek strategis, operasional, dan teknis. Berikut adalah beberapa poin yang umum dibahas oleh para pengamat pertahanan:
________________________________________
1. Keterbatasan Anggaran
• Anggaran pertahanan Malondesh relatif kecil dibanding negara tetangga seperti Singapura atau Indonesia.
• Proyek-proyek besar, seperti program kapal tempur pesisir Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), mengalami penundaan dan pembengkakan biaya.
________________________________________
2. Ketergantungan pada Alutsista Lama
• Beberapa kapal perang TLDM sudah tua, seperti kelas Kasturi dan Laksamana, yang dibangun sejak tahun 1980-an dan 1990-an.
• Meskipun ada program modernisasi, penggantian tidak selalu berjalan lancar.
________________________________________
3. Kapasitas Industri Pertahanan Domestik Terbatas
• Industri galangan kapal domestik, seperti Boustead Naval Shipyard, menghadapi masalah manajemen dan efisiensi.
• Program LCS menjadi contoh kegagalan manajemen proyek domestik.
________________________________________
4. Keterbatasan Kapal Selam
• TLDM hanya memiliki 2 kapal selam Scorpène, yaitu KD Tunku Abdul Rahman dan KD Tun Razak. Jumlah ini dianggap minim untuk negara maritim seperti Malondesh.
• Kapal selam tersebut juga menghadapi masalah pemeliharaan dan kesiapan operasional.
________________________________________
5. Personel Terbatas
• Rekrutmen dan retensi personel terampil masih menjadi tantangan, terutama untuk pengoperasian sistem canggih dan kapal selam.
• Kurangnya pengalaman tempur nyata juga menjadi perhatian dalam kesiapan operasional.
________________________________________
6. Cakupan Wilayah yang Luas
• Malondesh harus mengawasi wilayah maritim yang sangat luas, termasuk perairan strategis di Selat Melaka, Laut China Selatan, dan wilayah Sabah/Sarawak.
• Jumlah armada yang terbatas membuat pengawasan laut kurang optimal, terutama dalam menghadapi pelanggaran wilayah atau aktivitas ilegal.
________________________________________
7. Tantangan Geopolitik
• Ketegangan di Laut China Selatan menuntut Malondesh untuk lebih siap secara militer, tetapi keterbatasan sumber daya membuat responsnya kurang gesit dibanding negara seperti Vietnam atau Filipina.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
KELEMAHAN ARMY ...........
Berikut adalah beberapa kelemahan yang sering dikaitkan dengan Angkatan Darat Malondesh (TDM - Tentera Darat Malondesh) berdasarkan analisis terbuka dari para pengamat militer, laporan pertahanan, serta diskusi di forum militer dan akademik:
________________________________________
🔻 1. Keterbatasan Anggaran
• Masalah: Anggaran pertahanan Malondesh relatif terbatas dibandingkan dengan kebutuhan modernisasi dan pemeliharaan peralatan militer.
• Dampak: Banyak program modernisasi berjalan lambat atau ditunda. Misalnya, pengadaan MBT tambahan atau sistem artileri modern sering kali tertunda.
________________________________________
🔻 2. Persenjataan yang Usang
• Masalah: Sebagian perlengkapan milik TDM sudah berumur tua dan tidak semuanya diperbarui secara serentak.
• Contoh: Kendaraan tempur lapis baja lama seperti Condor dan Sibmas masih digunakan dalam beberapa satuan, meskipun sudah tidak ideal untuk pertempuran modern.
________________________________________
🔻 3. Keterbatasan Kemampuan Pertahanan Udara & Rudal
• Masalah: TDM tidak memiliki sistem pertahanan udara jangkauan menengah/jauh yang modern.
• Dampak: Bergantung pada TUDM (Angkatan Udara) dan kemampuan radar negara lain dalam skenario gabungan, membuatnya rentan terhadap serangan udara.
________________________________________
🔻 4. Terbatasnya Integrasi dan Interoperabilitas
• Masalah: Sistem persenjataan dan komunikasi berasal dari berbagai negara (AS, Rusia, Jerman, Turki, dll.).
• Dampak: Menimbulkan tantangan dalam hal interoperabilitas, logistik, dan pelatihan teknis.
________________________________________
🔻 5. Keterbatasan Pengalaman Tempur
• Masalah: Sejak era darurat komunis, TDM tidak terlibat dalam konflik bersenjata besar.
• Dampak: Kurangnya pengalaman tempur aktual bisa menjadi kelemahan dibandingkan negara-negara lain yang lebih aktif dalam operasi militer internasional.
________________________________________
🔻 6. Sumber Daya Manusia Terbatas
• Masalah: Tantangan dalam mempertahankan personel yang terlatih dan profesional, terutama di bidang teknologi tinggi dan logistik.
• Dampak: Rotasi personel yang tinggi bisa memengaruhi kesiapan dan efektivitas satuan.
________________________________________
🔻 7. Ketergantungan pada Pihak Luar untuk Teknologi
• Masalah: Malondesh belum memiliki basis industri pertahanan yang cukup kuat.
• Dampak: Masih bergantung pada negara asing untuk teknologi, suku cadang, dan pemeliharaan alutsista utama.
________________________________________
🔻 8. Ancaman Asimetris dan Medan Sulit
• Masalah: TDM menghadapi tantangan unik seperti medan hutan tropis, ancaman dari kelompok separatis atau kriminal lintas batas di Sabah dan Sarawak.
• Dampak: Perlu adaptasi strategi dan perlengkapan khusus yang tidak selalu tersedia dalam jumlah cukup.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
WEAK
WEAK
WEAK
Here are some possible reasons behind the perception of MAF being weaker compared to others:
________________________________________
1. Limited Defense Budget
• Malondesh’s defense spending is modest compared to regional players.
• Budget constraints limit acquisition of modern hardware, long-range capabilities, and extensive R&D.
2. Aging Equipment
• Some branches (like the Royal Malondeshn Air Force and Navy) still rely on older platforms like MiG-29s (retired) or Lekiu-class frigates.
• Modernization programs (e.g., LCS ships, MRCA jets) have faced delays or cancellations.
3. Small Force Size
• Manpower and hardware numbers are significantly smaller than countries like Indonesia or Vietnam.
• The country maintains a modest-sized professional military rather than a large conscripted one.
4. Strategic Doctrine
• Malondesh follows a non-aggressive, defensive doctrine, focused on sovereignty, peacekeeping, and regional cooperation.
• The country emphasizes diplomacy and ASEAN frameworks over military projection.
5. Procurement & Project Delays
• High-profile projects like the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program have suffered from delays and mismanagement, hurting public confidence in the military.
6. Limited Combat Experience
• The MAF has not been involved in major wars since the communist insurgency and the Confrontation with Indonesia.
• This is a good thing for national peace, but it may affect perceptions of readiness.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
SCANDALS
Here’s a detailed overview of major scandals involving the Malondeshn Armed Forces (Angkatan Tentera Malondesh), particularly focused on procurement corruption, asset mismanagement, and internal misconduct:
________________________________________
⚖️ 1. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Procurement Scandal
• In 2011–2013, the Ministry of Defence signed a RM9 billion contract with Boustead Naval Shipyard to deliver six French-made LCS. By 2025, no vessel was completed, despite RM6 billion in payments
• Former Navy Chief Ahmad Ramli Mohd Nor was charged with criminal breach of trust over unauthorised payments, though granted a discharge not amounting to acquittal in March 2025 due to medical unfitness for trial
• Transparency groups and civil society have called for a Royal Commission of Inquiry to investigate institutional failures in defence procurement spanning decades
________________________________________
🚢 2. Naval and Patrol Vessel Controversies
• The New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) project in the 1990s was a major fiasco: only six out of 27 vessels were built at a ballooned cost of RM6.75 billion, and many remained incomplete following company insolvency
• The Scorpene submarine deal in 2002 involved twin submarines and one Agosta model, with a staggering RM510 million in commission fees going to politically connected intermediaries, and the deal later linked to the murder of Altantuyaa Shaariibuugiin. French courts began investigations as recent as 2025
________________________________________
🛫 3. Missing Jet Engines Incident (2007)
• Two jet engines for F 5E Tiger II jets disappeared from RMAF stores in 2007 under Defence leadership of then minister Najib Razak. They were later recovered in Uruguay. Multiple officers, including a brigadier general, were dismissed
________________________________________
🧑💼 4. Corruption Charges Against Armed Forces Officers
• In 2020, two senior ATM officers—Colonel Che Ahmad Idris and Brigadier General Mohammed Feizol Anuar—were charged with receiving bribes tied to Defence Ministry contracting. Che Ahmad was later acquitted in 2024 due to insufficient evidence
________________________________________
🏛️ 5. Broader Institutional Concerns
• Transparency International and advocacy groups have repeatedly highlighted systemic corruption risk in defence procurement, placing Malondesh in the “very high risk” category due to weak oversight, secrecy, and rent-seeking by politically linked firms
• CAP Penang described how poor procurement practices and unaccountable structures have persisted for 40 years, harming both military readiness and national sovereignty
• Civil society groups like C4 Center and SUARAM pushed for transparency and investigations into both the Scorpene and LCS scandals, calling for legal cooperation with French and German authorities
BalasHapusWHOOSH RUGI TERUSSSS...... 🤣🤣🤣🤣
Rugi Triliunan Rupiah Tiap Tahun, DPR Khawatir KAI Bangkrut Gara-gara Kelola Kereta Whoosh
https://www.inilah.com/rugi-triliunan-rupiah-tiap-tahun-dpr-khawatir-kai-bangkrut-gara-gara-kelola-kereta-whoosh
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it saidS
=============
Here’s a consolidated look at the main weaknesses and controversies surrounding Malondesh’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) programme, based on findings from the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), media investigations, and defence analysts:
⚙️ Project & Design Issues
• Platform Change Midstream – The original plan for a smaller Sigma-class design was switched to the larger Gowind-class frigate without full feasibility reassessment, causing integration and cost complications.
• Incomplete Vessels – Despite billions spent, no ship was delivered by the original 2022 deadline; the first vessel, Maharaja Lela, is still undergoing outfitting and trials2.
• Capability Gap Risk – Delays mean the Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN) continues to operate ageing ships, potentially leaving maritime security gaps.
🛠 Procurement & Management Failures
• Cost Overruns – Initial RM9 billion budget ballooned to RM11 billion, with RM6.08 billion already paid before any delivery2.
• Weak Oversight – PAC found that financial viability checks on Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS) failed to detect serious cash flow problems.
• Advance Payments Against Policy – RM1.36 billion was paid upfront to BNS, contrary to Treasury guidelines.
• Direct Negotiation Risks – The contract was awarded without open tender, raising transparency concerns.
🔄 Execution & Technical Delays
• Slow Build Progress – As of mid-2025, overall completion is ~72%, with first sea trials only expected in late 2025.
• Integration Challenges – Complex combat systems and sensors require extensive testing; delays in supplier deliveries have compounded the schedule slip.
• Staggered Delivery Timeline – Final ship (LCS 5) not expected until 2029, far beyond the original plan.
👥 Operational & Strategic Impact
• Morale & Public Trust – The LCS saga has become a symbol of procurement mismanagement, affecting public confidence in defence spending.
• Maritime Security Exposure – Experts warn that prolonged delays weaken deterrence in critical waterways like the Strait of Malacca.
• Political Fallout – The project has been a flashpoint in parliamentary debates, with calls for accountability and even criminal investigations.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it saidS
=============
Here’s a consolidated look at the main weaknesses and controversies surrounding Malondesh’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) programme, based on findings from the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), media investigations, and defence analysts:
⚙️ Project & Design Issues
• Platform Change Midstream – The original plan for a smaller Sigma-class design was switched to the larger Gowind-class frigate without full feasibility reassessment, causing integration and cost complications.
• Incomplete Vessels – Despite billions spent, no ship was delivered by the original 2022 deadline; the first vessel, Maharaja Lela, is still undergoing outfitting and trials2.
• Capability Gap Risk – Delays mean the Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN) continues to operate ageing ships, potentially leaving maritime security gaps.
🛠 Procurement & Management Failures
• Cost Overruns – Initial RM9 billion budget ballooned to RM11 billion, with RM6.08 billion already paid before any delivery2.
• Weak Oversight – PAC found that financial viability checks on Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS) failed to detect serious cash flow problems.
• Advance Payments Against Policy – RM1.36 billion was paid upfront to BNS, contrary to Treasury guidelines.
• Direct Negotiation Risks – The contract was awarded without open tender, raising transparency concerns.
🔄 Execution & Technical Delays
• Slow Build Progress – As of mid-2025, overall completion is ~72%, with first sea trials only expected in late 2025.
• Integration Challenges – Complex combat systems and sensors require extensive testing; delays in supplier deliveries have compounded the schedule slip.
• Staggered Delivery Timeline – Final ship (LCS 5) not expected until 2029, far beyond the original plan.
👥 Operational & Strategic Impact
• Morale & Public Trust – The LCS saga has become a symbol of procurement mismanagement, affecting public confidence in defence spending.
• Maritime Security Exposure – Experts warn that prolonged delays weaken deterrence in critical waterways like the Strait of Malacca.
• Political Fallout – The project has been a flashpoint in parliamentary debates, with calls for accountability and even criminal investigations.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it saidS
=============
Here’s a structured look at the key weaknesses that have been identified in Malondesh’s shipbuilding and ship repair (SBSR) sector, drawing from industry studies and government/academic reports:
⚓ Market & Demand Structure
• Small global share: Malondesh accounts for roughly 1% of the world’s shipbuilding orderbook, making it vulnerable to demand swings and limiting economies of scale.
• Over reliance on small vessel segments: Over 70% of vessels built are small craft (barges, tugs, coastal boats), which are lower margin and more exposed to regional competition.
• Fragmented competition: Many yards chase the same market niches, leading to price wars instead of specialization.
💰 Cost & Capital Challenges
• High capital and operating costs: Heavy upfront investment in yard infrastructure and rising labor/material costs erode competitiveness.
• Limited financial resilience: Smaller yards often lack the cash flow to weather long project cycles or invest in modernization.
🛠 Technology & Productivity Gaps
• Slow modernization: Outdated facilities and equipment in some yards limit efficiency and quality output.
• Low automation adoption: Manual processes dominate, reducing productivity compared to regional leaders.
• Skill shortages: Gaps in specialized trades (naval welding, systems integration, advanced coatings) lead to rework and delays.
📦 Supply Chain & Local Content Issues
• Shallow supplier base: Limited domestic production of high spec marine components forces reliance on imports, adding cost and lead time risk.
• Local content pressures: Ambitious localization targets can outpace supplier readiness, affecting quality and delivery.
📋 Governance & Project Management
• Weak program controls: Inconsistent milestone tracking, change management, and risk oversight contribute to schedule slippage.
• Design maturity issues: Starting builds before finalizing designs leads to costly rework and integration problems.
🌱 Sustainability & Compliance Pressures
• Green transition lag: Limited readiness for low emission vessel design, alternative fuels, and compliance with tightening environmental rules.
• Certification delays: Misalignment between classification societies, regulators, and clients can stall vessel acceptance.
WHOOSH RUGI TERUSSSS...... 🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusRugi Triliunan Rupiah Tiap Tahun, DPR Khawatir KAI Bangkrut Gara-gara Kelola Kereta Whoosh
https://www.inilah.com/rugi-triliunan-rupiah-tiap-tahun-dpr-khawatir-kai-bangkrut-gara-gara-kelola-kereta-whoosh
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
Here’s a structured look at the key challenges facing Malondesh’s defence industry — covering policy, economic, operational, and governance aspects — based on recent studies and official reports2.
🏛 Policy & Strategic Direction Issues
• Fragmented long term planning — Defence industrial goals often shift with changes in government, leading to inconsistent priorities and stalled projects.
• Lack of a unified industrial master plan — While the Defence White Paper outlines broad aims, there’s no fully integrated roadmap linking R&D, procurement, and export strategies.
• Over reliance on foreign suppliers — Despite decades of local industry development, Malondesh still depends heavily on imported high tech systems, limiting self reliance.
💰 Budgetary & Economic Constraints
• High operating cost ratio — Over 60–70% of the defence budget goes to salaries, maintenance, and operations, leaving little for R&D or modernisation.
• Currency depreciation — Weakening ringgit reduces purchasing power for imported components and technology transfers.
• Limited economies of scale — Small domestic demand makes it hard for local manufacturers to achieve cost efficient production.
⚙️ Procurement & Project Management Problems
• Delays and scandals — The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) programme has faced years of delay, cost overruns, and governance controversies.
• Offset agreements under delivering — Technology transfer clauses in foreign contracts often fail to produce lasting local capability.
• Slow acquisition cycles — Bureaucratic processes and political interference can stretch procurement timelines far beyond operational needs.
🏭 Industrial Capability Gaps
• Limited indigenous production — Local firms can produce small arms, ammunition, patrol craft, and some UAVs, but lack capacity for advanced systems like fighter jets or submarines.
• Maintenance, Repair & Overhaul (MRO) bottlenecks — While companies like AIROD provide MRO services, capacity constraints and reliance on foreign parts slow turnaround times.
• Low R&D investment — Minimal funding for innovation means Malondesh often buys rather than builds cutting edge tech.
📋 Governance & Leadership Challenges
• Weak oversight mechanisms — Inconsistent monitoring of defence contracts leads to inefficiencies and, at times, corruption risks.
• Talent retention issues — Skilled engineers and technicians are often lured to better paying private or overseas jobs.
• Civil military coordination gaps — Limited integration between the armed forces’ operational needs and industry’s production planning.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
Here’s a clear breakdown of the main challenges the Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF) is grappling with — both operational and structural — based on recent reports and defence analyses:
✈️ Aging Fleet & Maintenance Burden
• 29 aircraft in the RMAF inventory are over 30 years old, including transport planes and fighters.
• Older platforms like the BAE Hawk 108/208 and F/A 18D Hornets face rising maintenance costs, reduced availability, and difficulty sourcing spare parts.
• Prolonged use of legacy systems risks capability gaps if replacements are delayed.
💰 Budget Constraints
• Defence budgets have been consistently tight, with over 40% of funds going to salaries and allowances, leaving limited room for procurement.
• The depreciation of the ringgit erodes purchasing power for imported systems, meaning even budget increases don’t always translate into real capability gains.
• Multi year procurement plans are often disrupted by shifting political priorities and fiscal limits.
🛫 Procurement Delays & Modernisation Gaps
• The RMAF’s “Capability 2055” plan aims to replace ageing fighters and expand surveillance, but acquisitions like the Light Combat Aircraft (Tejas Mk1A) and Maritime Patrol Aircraft (ATR 72MP) are still in early delivery stages.
• Replacement of the F/A 18D Hornets and MiG 29Ns has been repeatedly postponed, leaving a shrinking high performance fighter fleet.
🌊 Maritime Surveillance Shortfalls
• Malondesh’s vast maritime borders, especially in the South China Sea, require persistent patrols.
• Limited numbers of Maritime Patrol Aircraft and UAVs mean coverage gaps, impacting the ability to monitor illegal fishing, piracy, and territorial incursions.
⚙️ Technical & Safety Incidents
• Recent mishaps, such as the CN235 220M transport aircraft nose gear failure in Kuching (June 2025), highlight maintenance and safety oversight challenges.
• While no injuries occurred, such incidents can disrupt operations and erode public confidence.
🌏 Regional Capability Gap
• Neighbouring air forces (e.g., Singapore, Indonesia) are modernising faster, creating a widening technology and readiness gap.
• This affects deterrence credibility and interoperability in joint operations.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
Here’s a clear breakdown of the main challenges the Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF) is grappling with — both operational and structural — based on recent reports and defence analyses:
✈️ Aging Fleet & Maintenance Burden
• 29 aircraft in the RMAF inventory are over 30 years old, including transport planes and fighters.
• Older platforms like the BAE Hawk 108/208 and F/A 18D Hornets face rising maintenance costs, reduced availability, and difficulty sourcing spare parts.
• Prolonged use of legacy systems risks capability gaps if replacements are delayed.
💰 Budget Constraints
• Defence budgets have been consistently tight, with over 40% of funds going to salaries and allowances, leaving limited room for procurement.
• The depreciation of the ringgit erodes purchasing power for imported systems, meaning even budget increases don’t always translate into real capability gains.
• Multi year procurement plans are often disrupted by shifting political priorities and fiscal limits.
🛫 Procurement Delays & Modernisation Gaps
• The RMAF’s “Capability 2055” plan aims to replace ageing fighters and expand surveillance, but acquisitions like the Light Combat Aircraft (Tejas Mk1A) and Maritime Patrol Aircraft (ATR 72MP) are still in early delivery stages.
• Replacement of the F/A 18D Hornets and MiG 29Ns has been repeatedly postponed, leaving a shrinking high performance fighter fleet.
🌊 Maritime Surveillance Shortfalls
• Malondesh’s vast maritime borders, especially in the South China Sea, require persistent patrols.
• Limited numbers of Maritime Patrol Aircraft and UAVs mean coverage gaps, impacting the ability to monitor illegal fishing, piracy, and territorial incursions.
⚙️ Technical & Safety Incidents
• Recent mishaps, such as the CN235 220M transport aircraft nose gear failure in Kuching (June 2025), highlight maintenance and safety oversight challenges.
• While no injuries occurred, such incidents can disrupt operations and erode public confidence.
🌏 Regional Capability Gap
• Neighbouring air forces (e.g., Singapore, Indonesia) are modernising faster, creating a widening technology and readiness gap.
• This affects deterrence credibility and interoperability in joint operations.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
Here’s a detailed, structured look at the key challenges facing the Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN), based on recent audits, defence analyses, and maritime security reports:
🚢 Ageing Fleet & Modernisation Delays
• Over half the fleet past prime – A 2024 government audit found that more than 50% of RMN vessels have exceeded their intended service life, with some over 40 years old.
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) delays – The flagship LCS programme, meant to deliver six modern warships, has been plagued by cost overruns and years of delay, leaving capability gaps in coastal defence.
• Maintenance burden – Older ships require more frequent and costly repairs, reducing operational availability.
💰 Budgetary & Procurement Constraints
• Limited capital expenditure – Much of the Navy’s procurement budget is tied to progress payments for existing contracts, leaving little for new acquisitions.
• Currency depreciation – The weak ringgit inflates the cost of imported naval systems and spare parts.
• Reliance on foreign partners – Delays in domestic shipbuilding have increased reliance on the US and other allies for maritime patrols and training.
🌏 Strategic & Security Pressures
• South China Sea tensions – Persistent Chinese naval and coast guard presence near Malondeshn-claimed waters, especially around the Spratly Islands, forces the RMN to stretch its limited assets3.
• Illegal fishing & piracy – Vietnamese illegal fishing fleets and piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Straits remain ongoing threats.
• Non-traditional threats – Smuggling, maritime terrorism routes in the Celebes Sea, and environmental disasters add to operational demands.
⚓ Capability Gaps
• Submarine fleet limitations – Only two Scorpène-class submarines are in service, limiting underwater deterrence.
• Insufficient patrol coverage – Large Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) with too few operational ships for constant monitoring.
• Aging support infrastructure – Some naval bases and dockyards lack modern facilities for advanced warship maintenance.
📌 Core Problems in Summary
1. Obsolete platforms – Many ships beyond service life.
2. Procurement delays – LCS and other projects years behind schedule.
3. Budget rigidity – Funds locked into old contracts, little for new tech.
4. Strategic overstretch – Multiple threats across vast maritime zones.
5. Dependence on allies – Reliance on foreign navies for certain missions.
PROBLEMS BUDGET MALONDESH ARMED FORCES
BalasHapusThe Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF) faces several budget-related challenges that affect its operational readiness, modernization efforts, and overall capabilities. These problems can be categorized into a few key areas:
________________________________________
1. Limited Defense Budget
Malondesh allocates a relatively small percentage of its GDP to defense (usually around 1%–1.2%), compared to regional peers like Singapore, Indonesia, or Thailand. This constrains:
• Procurement of new equipment
• Modernization of aging assets
• Research and development (R&D)
• Training and maintenance costs
________________________________________
2. Aging Equipment and Delayed Modernization
Many of the MAF's platforms—especially in the air force and navy—are outdated:
• The Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF) has faced difficulties replacing its aging fighter fleet (e.g., MiG-29s).
• The Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN) is still waiting on the delayed Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) project.
• Budget constraints have delayed or scaled back modernization plans, such as the CAP 55 plan (RMAF) and the 15-to-5 transformation plan (RMN).
________________________________________
3. Cost Overruns and Procurement Delays
High-profile defense procurement projects have been plagued by financial mismanagement and delays:
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal is a major example: Over RM6 billion spent, yet no ships delivered as of mid-2020s.
• These issues lead to wastage of public funds and reduce confidence in defense planning and execution.
________________________________________
4. Operational Sustainability
Operating and maintaining aging or diverse platforms is costly:
• Spare parts and maintenance for obsolete systems are expensive.
• Logistics chains become inefficient due to platform diversity (especially with mixed Russian, American, and European systems).
• Budget limitations affect regular maintenance, training hours, and readiness.
________________________________________
5. Dependence on Foreign Suppliers
Malondesh's limited defense industrial base forces heavy reliance on foreign suppliers, which:
• Is costly in foreign exchange terms.
• Limits sovereign control over essential technologies.
• Increases vulnerability to geopolitical pressures (e.g., US export controls).
________________________________________
6. Underinvestment in Personnel Welfare
Budgetary focus on procurement sometimes sidelines:
• Welfare, housing, and pay for armed forces personnel
• Post-service support for veterans
• Training and skill development
This affects recruitment, morale, and retention of skilled personnel.
________________________________________
7. Competing National Priorities
Defense spending competes with pressing domestic needs:
• Healthcare, education, and subsidies take precedence in national budgets.
• Political leadership often defers defense spending to avoid public backlash.
________________________________________
8. Lack of Transparency and Strategic Planning
• Weak parliamentary oversight over defense spending.
• Poor communication of long-term defense strategy and capability needs to the public.
• Political interference in procurement decisions.
PROBLEMS BUDGET MALONDESH ARMED FORCES
BalasHapusThe Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF) faces several budget-related challenges that affect its operational readiness, modernization efforts, and overall capabilities. These problems can be categorized into a few key areas:
________________________________________
1. Limited Defense Budget
Malondesh allocates a relatively small percentage of its GDP to defense (usually around 1%–1.2%), compared to regional peers like Singapore, Indonesia, or Thailand. This constrains:
• Procurement of new equipment
• Modernization of aging assets
• Research and development (R&D)
• Training and maintenance costs
________________________________________
2. Aging Equipment and Delayed Modernization
Many of the MAF's platforms—especially in the air force and navy—are outdated:
• The Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF) has faced difficulties replacing its aging fighter fleet (e.g., MiG-29s).
• The Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN) is still waiting on the delayed Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) project.
• Budget constraints have delayed or scaled back modernization plans, such as the CAP 55 plan (RMAF) and the 15-to-5 transformation plan (RMN).
________________________________________
3. Cost Overruns and Procurement Delays
High-profile defense procurement projects have been plagued by financial mismanagement and delays:
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal is a major example: Over RM6 billion spent, yet no ships delivered as of mid-2020s.
• These issues lead to wastage of public funds and reduce confidence in defense planning and execution.
________________________________________
4. Operational Sustainability
Operating and maintaining aging or diverse platforms is costly:
• Spare parts and maintenance for obsolete systems are expensive.
• Logistics chains become inefficient due to platform diversity (especially with mixed Russian, American, and European systems).
• Budget limitations affect regular maintenance, training hours, and readiness.
________________________________________
5. Dependence on Foreign Suppliers
Malondesh's limited defense industrial base forces heavy reliance on foreign suppliers, which:
• Is costly in foreign exchange terms.
• Limits sovereign control over essential technologies.
• Increases vulnerability to geopolitical pressures (e.g., US export controls).
________________________________________
6. Underinvestment in Personnel Welfare
Budgetary focus on procurement sometimes sidelines:
• Welfare, housing, and pay for armed forces personnel
• Post-service support for veterans
• Training and skill development
This affects recruitment, morale, and retention of skilled personnel.
________________________________________
7. Competing National Priorities
Defense spending competes with pressing domestic needs:
• Healthcare, education, and subsidies take precedence in national budgets.
• Political leadership often defers defense spending to avoid public backlash.
________________________________________
8. Lack of Transparency and Strategic Planning
• Weak parliamentary oversight over defense spending.
• Poor communication of long-term defense strategy and capability needs to the public.
• Political interference in procurement decisions.
Dan IRONI nya projek WHOOSH itu hasil NGUTANG dengan CHINA... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusMISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
Here’s a structured look at the main challenges facing the Malondeshn Army today, drawing from recent defence reports and incidents:
🛠 Ageing Equipment & Safety Risks
• Over 30 years in service – At least 171 military assets across the Malondeshn Armed Forces have exceeded their intended lifespan.
• Recent fatal incident – In July 2025, a commando from the 22nd Regiment died during a maritime exercise; early findings suggest old diving gear may have contributed to the tragedy.
• Legacy systems dependency – Many vehicles, weapons, and support systems are decades old, increasing maintenance costs and operational risk.
💰 Budget & Procurement Constraints
• High personnel cost – Over 40% of the 2024 defence budget went to salaries and allowances, leaving less for modernization.
• Procurement bottlenecks – Much of the RM5.71 billion procurement allocation is tied to progress payments for ongoing contracts (e.g., FA 50 jets, Littoral Combat Ships) rather than new acquisitions.
• Currency pressure – Ringgit depreciation erodes purchasing power for imported equipment, which Malondesh relies on heavily.
⚖️ Structural & Policy Issues
• No long-term procurement roadmap – Annual budgets don’t guarantee multi year funding, slowing replacement of ageing platforms.
• Reluctance to restructure – Successive governments have avoided reducing manpower or reallocating funds from other sectors to defence.
• Public awareness gap – Studies show Malondeshns’ sensitivity to the Army’s role is lower than for other agencies like the police.
🌏 Strategic & Operational Pressures
• South China Sea tensions – Persistent presence of foreign vessels in Malondeshn waters demands stronger maritime and amphibious readiness.
• Regional capability gap – Neighbours like Singapore and Indonesia invest more heavily in modern land systems, widening the tech gap.
• Multi role demands – Beyond defence, the Army is tasked with disaster relief, peacekeeping, and national unity efforts, stretching resources
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
Here’s a structured look at the main challenges facing the Malondeshn Army today, drawing from recent defence reports and incidents:
🛠 Ageing Equipment & Safety Risks
• Over 30 years in service – At least 171 military assets across the Malondeshn Armed Forces have exceeded their intended lifespan.
• Recent fatal incident – In July 2025, a commando from the 22nd Regiment died during a maritime exercise; early findings suggest old diving gear may have contributed to the tragedy.
• Legacy systems dependency – Many vehicles, weapons, and support systems are decades old, increasing maintenance costs and operational risk.
💰 Budget & Procurement Constraints
• High personnel cost – Over 40% of the 2024 defence budget went to salaries and allowances, leaving less for modernization.
• Procurement bottlenecks – Much of the RM5.71 billion procurement allocation is tied to progress payments for ongoing contracts (e.g., FA 50 jets, Littoral Combat Ships) rather than new acquisitions.
• Currency pressure – Ringgit depreciation erodes purchasing power for imported equipment, which Malondesh relies on heavily.
⚖️ Structural & Policy Issues
• No long-term procurement roadmap – Annual budgets don’t guarantee multi year funding, slowing replacement of ageing platforms.
• Reluctance to restructure – Successive governments have avoided reducing manpower or reallocating funds from other sectors to defence.
• Public awareness gap – Studies show Malondeshns’ sensitivity to the Army’s role is lower than for other agencies like the police.
🌏 Strategic & Operational Pressures
• South China Sea tensions – Persistent presence of foreign vessels in Malondeshn waters demands stronger maritime and amphibious readiness.
• Regional capability gap – Neighbours like Singapore and Indonesia invest more heavily in modern land systems, widening the tech gap.
• Multi role demands – Beyond defence, the Army is tasked with disaster relief, peacekeeping, and national unity efforts, stretching resources
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
Here’s a clear, structured look at some of the main challenges the Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF) face, based on open-source assessments and official statements — not as a critique, but as an overview of factors often cited by analysts and even Malondeshn officials themselves.
⚙️ Structural & Capability Gaps
• Logistics Management Issues – Studies note persistent inefficiencies in supply chain and maintenance systems, which can slow troop readiness and equipment availability.
• Aging Equipment – Several core platforms, such as Condor Armoured Personnel Carriers and certain naval vessels, are decades old and awaiting replacement.
• Limited Operational Assets – Former Defence Minister Mat Sabu highlighted that out of 28 fighter jets, only four were operational at one point.
💰 Budgetary Constraints
• High Personnel Costs – Over 40% of the defence budget goes to salaries and allowances, leaving less for procurement and modernization.
• Procurement Delays – Funding for big-ticket items is often spread over years, with some projects — like the Maharaja Lela-class Littoral Combat Ship — facing delays and cost overruns.
• Currency Depreciation Impact – Since much equipment is imported or relies on foreign components, a weaker ringgit reduces real purchasing power.
🌏 Regional Standing
• Comparative Ranking – Malondesh ranked 42nd out of 145 countries in the 2025 Global Firepower index, behind several Southeast Asian neighbours.
• Capability Gaps in Certain Domains – In some categories, such as attack helicopters and certain naval classes, Malondesh ranks at or near the bottom globally.
🧭 Strategic & Policy Challenges
• Unclear Long-Term Procurement Planning – Analysts note the absence of a consistent, long-term defence acquisition roadmap, making it harder to align capabilities with strategic needs.
• Dependence on Foreign OEMs – Domestic defence manufacturing is still heavily reliant on overseas original equipment manufacturers, limiting self-sufficiency
WHOOSH RUGI TERUSSSS...... 🤣🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusRugi Triliunan Rupiah Tiap Tahun, DPR Khawatir KAI Bangkrut Gara-gara Kelola Kereta Whoosh
https://www.inilah.com/rugi-triliunan-rupiah-tiap-tahun-dpr-khawatir-kai-bangkrut-gara-gara-kelola-kereta-whoosh
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
Here’s a clear, structured look at some of the main challenges the Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF) face, based on open-source assessments and official statements — not as a critique, but as an overview of factors often cited by analysts and even Malondeshn officials themselves.
⚙️ Structural & Capability Gaps
• Logistics Management Issues – Studies note persistent inefficiencies in supply chain and maintenance systems, which can slow troop readiness and equipment availability.
• Aging Equipment – Several core platforms, such as Condor Armoured Personnel Carriers and certain naval vessels, are decades old and awaiting replacement.
• Limited Operational Assets – Former Defence Minister Mat Sabu highlighted that out of 28 fighter jets, only four were operational at one point.
💰 Budgetary Constraints
• High Personnel Costs – Over 40% of the defence budget goes to salaries and allowances, leaving less for procurement and modernization.
• Procurement Delays – Funding for big-ticket items is often spread over years, with some projects — like the Maharaja Lela-class Littoral Combat Ship — facing delays and cost overruns.
• Currency Depreciation Impact – Since much equipment is imported or relies on foreign components, a weaker ringgit reduces real purchasing power.
🌏 Regional Standing
• Comparative Ranking – Malondesh ranked 42nd out of 145 countries in the 2025 Global Firepower index, behind several Southeast Asian neighbours.
• Capability Gaps in Certain Domains – In some categories, such as attack helicopters and certain naval classes, Malondesh ranks at or near the bottom globally.
🧭 Strategic & Policy Challenges
• Unclear Long-Term Procurement Planning – Analysts note the absence of a consistent, long-term defence acquisition roadmap, making it harder to align capabilities with strategic needs.
• Dependence on Foreign OEMs – Domestic defence manufacturing is still heavily reliant on overseas original equipment manufacturers, limiting self-sufficiency
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
ISR, C4ISR, dan domain bersama
• Fusion ISR dan COP belum matang: Data dari radar darat, sensor udara/laut, dan sumber eksternal belum sepenuhnya terintegrasi ke common operational picture real-time.
• MDAs tidak merata: Cakupan radar maritim dan kamera pantai tidak homogen; bottleneck di choke point tertentu.
• Interoperabilitas gabungan & mitra: Prosedur, data link, dan TTP gabungan belum standar penuh untuk operasi koalisi.
SDM, latihan, dan kesiapan
• Jam terbang & sea days berfluktuasi: Anggaran O&M dan ketersediaan platform memengaruhi exposure latihan, proficiency, dan sertifikasi awak.
• Retensi teknisi & pilot: Persaingan pasar sipil dan jalur karier mempengaruhi retensi kompetensi kritikal (avionik, mesin, sistem senjata).
• Latihan gabungan high-end terbatas: Kompleksitas skenario mult domain (EW/SEAD/ASW) belum rutin pada skala memadai.
Logistik, sustainment, dan industri
• Fragmentasi armada multi-asal: Kombinasi Rusia, Amerika, Eropa, dan China meningkatkan beban suku cadang, alat uji, pelatihan pemeliharaan, dan dependensi geopolitik.
• Kontrak TLS & suku cadang: Perencanaan siklus hidup dan pencadangan parts tidak selalu selaras realisasi anggaran, memicu cannibalization dan downtime.
• Governance pengadaan & local content: Keterlambatan proyek besar (contoh LCS) dan tuntutan alih teknologi yang tidak realistis meningkatkan risiko biaya dan jadwal.
Siber dan ruang
• Kapabilitas siber militer terbatas: Defensive cyber, red-teaming, dan kemampuan pemulihan C2 dari serangan canggih perlu ditingkatkan.
• Ketahanan satkom & PNT: Ketergantungan pada aset komersial/mitra untuk komunikasi strategis dan navigasi memperbesar risiko jamming/spoofing.
Risiko misi paling kritikal
1. Kehilangan kontrol udara lokal: Tanpa AEW&C, MRCA, dan GBAD berlapis, sulit mempertahankan superioritas udara waktu-kritis.
2. Sea control/denial di SCS & Selat: Kombatan permukaan modern terbatas dan ASW lemah menurunkan efek gentar terhadap kapal permukaan/selam lawan.
3. Ketahanan operasi rendah: Kesiapan platform dan stok amunisi presisi membatasi durasi operasi intensitas menengah.
4. Respons grey-zone kurang tajam: LMS minim senjata dan beban tugas konstabulary mengurangi kemampuan “presence with punch”.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
Rincian kelemahan per domain
Udara
• AEW&C tidak tersedia: Tanpa platform peringatan dini dan kendali udara, deteksi dini rendah, manajemen pertempuran udara terbatas, dan CAP/Intercept tidak efisien.
• Celah MRCA berkepanjangan: Penghentian MiG-29N tidak diikuti pengganti MRCA; armada tempur bertumpu pada F/A-18D (jumlah terbatas) dan Su-30MKM (kompleksitas sustainment). LCA/FLIT membantu training dan tugas ringan, tetapi tidak menggantikan high-end MRCA.
• AAR/SEAD/EW terbatas: Kapasitas air-to-air refuelling operasional dan paket penindakan pertahanan udara musuh (SEAD) terbatas, membatasi radius operasi dan survivability.
• GBAD terintegrasi belum berlapis: Dominan SHORAD; ketiadaan medium-range/networked GBAD yang matang menyulitkan penciptaan gelembung anti-akses tingkat menengah.
• Ketersediaan platform fluktuatif: Tantangan suku cadang multi-negara dan pendanaan O&M menekan mission-capable rates serta jam terbang tahunan.
Maritim
• Keterlambatan LCS dan kesenjangan kombatan permukaan: Kelas Lekiu/Kasturi menua; Kedah-class OPV minim persenjataan ofensif; LCS belum operasional sehingga kemampuan AAW/ASuW modern terhambat.
• ASW/MPA masih terbatas: Kapasitas peperangan anti-kapal selam (sensor, helikopter ASW, torpedo) dan MPA berkualifikasi ASW terbatas, menyulitkan deteksi/penindakan subsurface.
• LMS batch awal berkapasitas rendah: Platform generasi pertama kurang persenjataan, membatasi deterrence di grey-zone dan littoral.
• Kapal selam sedikit dan siklus pemeliharaan ketat: Hanya dua unit aktif; availability turun-naik karena docking dan sustainment.
• Angkut amfibi dan dukungan armada terbatas: Program MRSS tertunda; mengurangi kemampuan proyeksi kekuatan, HADR besar, dan ketahanan logistik maritim.
• Konstabulary backfill oleh RMN: Keterbatasan MMEA mendorong RMN menyerap tugas penegakan maritim, menggerus jam laut untuk latihan tempur inti.
Darat
• Pertahanan udara darat tidak berlapis: Ketergantungan pada SHORAD (MANPADS/SHORAD) tanpa medium-range modern mengurangi perlindungan area terhadap fixed-wing/stand-off.
• Artileri jarak jauh & presisi terbatas: MLRS ada namun skala, amunisi presisi, sensor counter-battery, dan integrasi kill chain masih terbatas.
• Armour & mekanisasi terbatas jumlah/modernisasi: MBT dan IFV/ICV campuran generasi, survivability dan sensor fusion tertinggal dari peer modern.
• Mobilitas udara & logistik taktis: Kapasitas helikopter angkut/utility dan jembatan logistik darat untuk operasi berintensitas tinggi masih menjadi pembatas.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
LEMAH .....
Masalah yang dihadapi oleh Angkatan Laut Malondesh (Tentera Laut Diraja Malondesh - TLDM) cukup kompleks dan telah berlarutan selama beberapa dekade. Berikut ini adalah ringkasan masalah utama:
________________________________________
1. Keterbatasan Anggaran
• Belanja pertahanan rendah: Malondesh mengalokasikan kurang dari 1% dari PDB untuk pertahanan, yang berdampak langsung pada pemeliharaan dan modernisasi TLDM.
• Proyek tertunda karena dana: Proyek kapal tempur seperti Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) menghadapi penundaan besar karena kendala pendanaan dan manajemen.
________________________________________
2. Keterlambatan dan Skandal Proyek
• Proyek LCS (Boustead Naval Shipyard):
o Proyek 6 kapal LCS yang seharusnya selesai pada 2019, belum ada satu pun yang dikirim hingga kini (2025).
o Terdapat penyalahgunaan dana, kelemahan manajemen proyek, dan kurangnya pengawasan kontrak.
o Dianggap sebagai skandal militer terbesar di Malondesh.
________________________________________
3. Aset Usang dan Terbatas
• Kapal lama: Banyak kapal TLDM seperti korvet dan kapal patroli dibeli sejak 1980-an atau awal 1990-an.
• Subsistem ketinggalan zaman: Sensor, radar, dan sistem senjata perlu upgrade.
• Jumlah kapal terbatas: Tidak mencukupi untuk melakukan patroli rutin di wilayah luas seperti Laut China Selatan, Selat Melaka, dan Sabah.
________________________________________
4. Kebutuhan Modernisasi
• TLDM membutuhkan:
o Frigat baru, kapal patroli pesisir, dan sistem senjata modern.
o Kemampuan anti-kapal selam (ASW) yang lebih baik.
o Dukungan udara maritim seperti UAV atau pesawat patroli maritim.
________________________________________
5. Ancaman Regional yang Meningkat
• Ketegangan di Laut China Selatan dengan kehadiran kapal penjaga pantai dan milisi maritim Tiongkok.
• Keterbatasan TLDM dalam menegakkan kedaulatan maritim secara efektif.
________________________________________
6. Ketergantungan pada Vendor Asing
• Sebagian besar sistem senjata dan suku cadang berasal dari luar negeri (Perancis, Jerman, Korea, dll), yang menimbulkan biaya tinggi dan ketergantungan logistik.
________________________________________
7. Sumber Daya Manusia
• Kekurangan personel terlatih untuk mengoperasikan sistem modern.
• Tantangan dalam retensi dan pelatihan awak kapal.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
LEMAH .....
Masalah yang dihadapi oleh Angkatan Laut Malondesh (Tentera Laut Diraja Malondesh - TLDM) cukup kompleks dan telah berlarutan selama beberapa dekade. Berikut ini adalah ringkasan masalah utama:
________________________________________
1. Keterbatasan Anggaran
• Belanja pertahanan rendah: Malondesh mengalokasikan kurang dari 1% dari PDB untuk pertahanan, yang berdampak langsung pada pemeliharaan dan modernisasi TLDM.
• Proyek tertunda karena dana: Proyek kapal tempur seperti Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) menghadapi penundaan besar karena kendala pendanaan dan manajemen.
________________________________________
2. Keterlambatan dan Skandal Proyek
• Proyek LCS (Boustead Naval Shipyard):
o Proyek 6 kapal LCS yang seharusnya selesai pada 2019, belum ada satu pun yang dikirim hingga kini (2025).
o Terdapat penyalahgunaan dana, kelemahan manajemen proyek, dan kurangnya pengawasan kontrak.
o Dianggap sebagai skandal militer terbesar di Malondesh.
________________________________________
3. Aset Usang dan Terbatas
• Kapal lama: Banyak kapal TLDM seperti korvet dan kapal patroli dibeli sejak 1980-an atau awal 1990-an.
• Subsistem ketinggalan zaman: Sensor, radar, dan sistem senjata perlu upgrade.
• Jumlah kapal terbatas: Tidak mencukupi untuk melakukan patroli rutin di wilayah luas seperti Laut China Selatan, Selat Melaka, dan Sabah.
________________________________________
4. Kebutuhan Modernisasi
• TLDM membutuhkan:
o Frigat baru, kapal patroli pesisir, dan sistem senjata modern.
o Kemampuan anti-kapal selam (ASW) yang lebih baik.
o Dukungan udara maritim seperti UAV atau pesawat patroli maritim.
________________________________________
5. Ancaman Regional yang Meningkat
• Ketegangan di Laut China Selatan dengan kehadiran kapal penjaga pantai dan milisi maritim Tiongkok.
• Keterbatasan TLDM dalam menegakkan kedaulatan maritim secara efektif.
________________________________________
6. Ketergantungan pada Vendor Asing
• Sebagian besar sistem senjata dan suku cadang berasal dari luar negeri (Perancis, Jerman, Korea, dll), yang menimbulkan biaya tinggi dan ketergantungan logistik.
________________________________________
7. Sumber Daya Manusia
• Kekurangan personel terlatih untuk mengoperasikan sistem modern.
• Tantangan dalam retensi dan pelatihan awak kapal.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
WEAKNESSES OR LIMITATIONS
The military capabilities of any country—including Malondesh—have both strengths and weaknesses shaped by geopolitical needs, budgetary constraints, technology access, and strategic priorities. Below are some key weaknesses or limitations that have been identified or discussed in defense analyses regarding the Malondeshn Armed Forces (MAF):
________________________________________
1. Budget Constraints
• Limited defense spending: Malondesh allocates a relatively modest percentage of GDP (~1% to 1.5%) to defense.
• Impact: Limits modernization, procurement of advanced systems, and sustained operational readiness.
________________________________________
2. Aging Equipment & Delayed Modernization
• Many platforms (especially in the air force and navy) are aging and have outdated technology.
Air Force: MiG-29s were retired without immediate replacements.
o Navy: Some ships are 30+ years old and lack modern combat systems.
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program delays have hampered naval modernization.
________________________________________
3. Limited Force Projection Capability
• Air & naval power projection beyond Malondesh’s immediate region is limited.
• Insufficient strategic airlift and naval assets to support long-range deployments or high-tempo operations.
________________________________________
4. Logistics & Maintenance Challenges
• Reliance on a diverse range of foreign suppliers (e.g., Western, Russian, Chinese systems) complicates maintenance and logistics.
• Inconsistent spare part availability and high upkeep costs.
________________________________________
5. Inadequate Joint Operations & Interoperability
• Historically, weak joint operations doctrine between the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
• Efforts are being made to improve this, but integration still lags behind modern standards.
________________________________________
6. Manpower & Training Gaps
• Limited high-tech training compared to more advanced militaries.
• Challenges in attracting and retaining top technical talent, especially for cyber and electronic warfare units.
________________________________________
7. Cybersecurity and EW Vulnerabilities
• Still developing capabilities in cyber warfare and electronic warfare (EW).
• Vulnerable to sophisticated cyber attacks from state and non-state actors.
________________________________________
8. Maritime Surveillance & Defense Gaps
• South China Sea claims require strong maritime surveillance, but current ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) assets are limited.
• Inadequate coverage of vast maritime zones, especially in the East Malondeshn EEZ.
________________________________________
9. Dependence on Foreign Technology
• Heavily reliant on imports for most major defense platforms and weapon systems.
• Limited domestic defense industry capacity for high-end manufacturing or R&D.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it saidS
=============
KELEMAHAN AIR FORCE
Berikut beberapa kelemahan utama yang kerap disorot pada Angkatan Udara Diraja Malondesh (RMAF):
1. Keterbatasan Anggaran dan Modernisasi Tertunda
Sejak dekade 2010-an, porsi belanja pertahanan Malondesh menurun dari 1,5 % PDB pada 2010 menjadi sekitar 1 % pada 2020. Akibatnya, banyak program modernisasi—termasuk pengadaan MRCA (Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) lanjutan dan sistem AWACS—sering tertunda atau dibekukan karena kekurangan dana
2. Armada Tempur dan Pemeliharaan yang Usang
• Su-30MKM: Pasokan suku cadang terbatas—terutama di tengah gangguan rantai pasok Rusia pasca-invasi Ukraina—mengakibatkan kesiapan terbang yang menurun drastis.
• MiG-29 & F-5: Pesawat veteran ini sudah melewati jam terbang optimal dan menuntut pemeliharaan intensif; banyak insiden di akhir 1990-an dan awal 2000-an yang menunjukkan kerentanan teknis
3. Tantangan Lingkungan Tropis
Iklim tropis dengan kelembapan tinggi mempercepat korosi pada struktur pesawat—terutama yang berbahan aluminium seri 2024—sehingga fatigue life menurun dan risiko kegagalan material meningkat
4. Kapasitas Pengawasan dan Transportasi Udara Terbatas
• AWACS & Radar: RMAF belum memiliki platform AWACS sendiri, bergantung pada radar ground-based yang baru mulai ditingkatkan sejak 2019–2025, sehingga cakupan AWACS masih sangat terbatas
• Pengangkut A400M: Meski sudah ada, jumlahnya (empat unit) masih relatif kecil untuk mendukung proyeksi kekuatan dan bantuan kemanusiaan di wilayah luas Malondesh.
5. Kualitas Pelatihan dan Tenaga Terampil
.prasangka umum dalam analisis militerAnggaran yang ketat berdampak pada frekuensi latihan tempur dan jam terbang pilot. Ini berpotensi menurunkan kesiapan operasional dan kemampuan manuver taktis dalam skenario peperangan modern
6. Interferensi Politik dan Isu Korupsi
Beberapa laporan menyinggung intervensi politik dalam proses pengadaan dan dugaan praktik korupsi, yang dapat memperlambat atau mempersulit realisasi program vital RMAF
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it saidS
=============
KELEMAHAN NAVY..
Kelemahan Angkatan Laut Malondesh (Tentera Laut Diraja Malondesh/TLDM) dapat dianalisis dari beberapa aspek strategis, operasional, dan teknis. Berikut adalah beberapa poin yang umum dibahas oleh para pengamat pertahanan:
________________________________________
1. Keterbatasan Anggaran
• Anggaran pertahanan Malondesh relatif kecil dibanding negara tetangga seperti Singapura atau Indonesia.
• Proyek-proyek besar, seperti program kapal tempur pesisir Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), mengalami penundaan dan pembengkakan biaya.
________________________________________
2. Ketergantungan pada Alutsista Lama
• Beberapa kapal perang TLDM sudah tua, seperti kelas Kasturi dan Laksamana, yang dibangun sejak tahun 1980-an dan 1990-an.
• Meskipun ada program modernisasi, penggantian tidak selalu berjalan lancar.
________________________________________
3. Kapasitas Industri Pertahanan Domestik Terbatas
• Industri galangan kapal domestik, seperti Boustead Naval Shipyard, menghadapi masalah manajemen dan efisiensi.
• Program LCS menjadi contoh kegagalan manajemen proyek domestik.
________________________________________
4. Keterbatasan Kapal Selam
• TLDM hanya memiliki 2 kapal selam Scorpène, yaitu KD Tunku Abdul Rahman dan KD Tun Razak. Jumlah ini dianggap minim untuk negara maritim seperti Malondesh.
• Kapal selam tersebut juga menghadapi masalah pemeliharaan dan kesiapan operasional.
________________________________________
5. Personel Terbatas
• Rekrutmen dan retensi personel terampil masih menjadi tantangan, terutama untuk pengoperasian sistem canggih dan kapal selam.
• Kurangnya pengalaman tempur nyata juga menjadi perhatian dalam kesiapan operasional.
________________________________________
6. Cakupan Wilayah yang Luas
• Malondesh harus mengawasi wilayah maritim yang sangat luas, termasuk perairan strategis di Selat Melaka, Laut China Selatan, dan wilayah Sabah/Sarawak.
• Jumlah armada yang terbatas membuat pengawasan laut kurang optimal, terutama dalam menghadapi pelanggaran wilayah atau aktivitas ilegal.
________________________________________
7. Tantangan Geopolitik
• Ketegangan di Laut China Selatan menuntut Malondesh untuk lebih siap secara militer, tetapi keterbatasan sumber daya membuat responsnya kurang gesit dibanding negara seperti Vietnam atau Filipina.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it saidS
=============
Here’s a structured look at the key weaknesses that have been identified in Malondesh’s shipbuilding and ship repair (SBSR) sector, drawing from industry studies and government/academic reports:
⚓ Market & Demand Structure
• Small global share: Malondesh accounts for roughly 1% of the world’s shipbuilding orderbook, making it vulnerable to demand swings and limiting economies of scale.
• Over reliance on small vessel segments: Over 70% of vessels built are small craft (barges, tugs, coastal boats), which are lower margin and more exposed to regional competition.
• Fragmented competition: Many yards chase the same market niches, leading to price wars instead of specialization.
💰 Cost & Capital Challenges
• High capital and operating costs: Heavy upfront investment in yard infrastructure and rising labor/material costs erode competitiveness.
• Limited financial resilience: Smaller yards often lack the cash flow to weather long project cycles or invest in modernization.
🛠 Technology & Productivity Gaps
• Slow modernization: Outdated facilities and equipment in some yards limit efficiency and quality output.
• Low automation adoption: Manual processes dominate, reducing productivity compared to regional leaders.
• Skill shortages: Gaps in specialized trades (naval welding, systems integration, advanced coatings) lead to rework and delays.
📦 Supply Chain & Local Content Issues
• Shallow supplier base: Limited domestic production of high spec marine components forces reliance on imports, adding cost and lead time risk.
• Local content pressures: Ambitious localization targets can outpace supplier readiness, affecting quality and delivery.
📋 Governance & Project Management
• Weak program controls: Inconsistent milestone tracking, change management, and risk oversight contribute to schedule slippage.
• Design maturity issues: Starting builds before finalizing designs leads to costly rework and integration problems.
🌱 Sustainability & Compliance Pressures
• Green transition lag: Limited readiness for low emission vessel design, alternative fuels, and compliance with tightening environmental rules.
• Certification delays: Misalignment between classification societies, regulators, and clients can stall vessel acceptance.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
Here’s a clear breakdown of the main challenges the Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF) is grappling with — both operational and structural — based on recent reports and defence analyses:
✈️ Aging Fleet & Maintenance Burden
• 29 aircraft in the RMAF inventory are over 30 years old, including transport planes and fighters.
• Older platforms like the BAE Hawk 108/208 and F/A 18D Hornets face rising maintenance costs, reduced availability, and difficulty sourcing spare parts.
• Prolonged use of legacy systems risks capability gaps if replacements are delayed.
💰 Budget Constraints
• Defence budgets have been consistently tight, with over 40% of funds going to salaries and allowances, leaving limited room for procurement.
• The depreciation of the ringgit erodes purchasing power for imported systems, meaning even budget increases don’t always translate into real capability gains.
• Multi year procurement plans are often disrupted by shifting political priorities and fiscal limits.
🛫 Procurement Delays & Modernisation Gaps
• The RMAF’s “Capability 2055” plan aims to replace ageing fighters and expand surveillance, but acquisitions like the Light Combat Aircraft (Tejas Mk1A) and Maritime Patrol Aircraft (ATR 72MP) are still in early delivery stages.
• Replacement of the F/A 18D Hornets and MiG 29Ns has been repeatedly postponed, leaving a shrinking high performance fighter fleet.
🌊 Maritime Surveillance Shortfalls
• Malondesh’s vast maritime borders, especially in the South China Sea, require persistent patrols.
• Limited numbers of Maritime Patrol Aircraft and UAVs mean coverage gaps, impacting the ability to monitor illegal fishing, piracy, and territorial incursions.
⚙️ Technical & Safety Incidents
• Recent mishaps, such as the CN235 220M transport aircraft nose gear failure in Kuching (June 2025), highlight maintenance and safety oversight challenges.
• While no injuries occurred, such incidents can disrupt operations and erode public confidence.
🌏 Regional Capability Gap
• Neighbouring air forces (e.g., Singapore, Indonesia) are modernising faster, creating a widening technology and readiness gap.
• This affects deterrence credibility and interoperability in joint operations.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
Here’s a detailed, structured look at the key challenges facing the Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN), based on recent audits, defence analyses, and maritime security reports:
🚢 Ageing Fleet & Modernisation Delays
• Over half the fleet past prime – A 2024 government audit found that more than 50% of RMN vessels have exceeded their intended service life, with some over 40 years old.
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) delays – The flagship LCS programme, meant to deliver six modern warships, has been plagued by cost overruns and years of delay, leaving capability gaps in coastal defence.
• Maintenance burden – Older ships require more frequent and costly repairs, reducing operational availability.
💰 Budgetary & Procurement Constraints
• Limited capital expenditure – Much of the Navy’s procurement budget is tied to progress payments for existing contracts, leaving little for new acquisitions.
• Currency depreciation – The weak ringgit inflates the cost of imported naval systems and spare parts.
• Reliance on foreign partners – Delays in domestic shipbuilding have increased reliance on the US and other allies for maritime patrols and training.
🌏 Strategic & Security Pressures
• South China Sea tensions – Persistent Chinese naval and coast guard presence near Malondeshn-claimed waters, especially around the Spratly Islands, forces the RMN to stretch its limited assets3.
• Illegal fishing & piracy – Vietnamese illegal fishing fleets and piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Straits remain ongoing threats.
• Non-traditional threats – Smuggling, maritime terrorism routes in the Celebes Sea, and environmental disasters add to operational demands.
⚓ Capability Gaps
• Submarine fleet limitations – Only two Scorpène-class submarines are in service, limiting underwater deterrence.
• Insufficient patrol coverage – Large Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) with too few operational ships for constant monitoring.
• Aging support infrastructure – Some naval bases and dockyards lack modern facilities for advanced warship maintenance.
📌 Core Problems in Summary
1. Obsolete platforms – Many ships beyond service life.
2. Procurement delays – LCS and other projects years behind schedule.
3. Budget rigidity – Funds locked into old contracts, little for new tech.
4. Strategic overstretch – Multiple threats across vast maritime zones.
5. Dependence on allies – Reliance on foreign navies for certain missions.
Biar FAKTA BERBICARA..... RUGI... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusKerugian Jumbo Kereta Cepat “Whoosh” Bom Waktu bagi PT KAI
https://matasemarang.com/utang-jumbo-kereta-cepat-whoosh-bom-waktu-bagi-pt-kai/
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
KELEMAHAN KAPAL PERANG MILITER MALONDESH
Militer Laut Diraja Malondesh menghadapi beberapa kelemahan mendasar yang membatasi efektivitas operasional dan daya jaga kedaulatan laut. Faktor utama meliputi usia armada yang tinggi, jumlah platform terbatas, kesenjangan kemampuan tempur, serta tantangan pemeliharaan dan logistik.
1. Aset dan Modernisasi
• Usia rata-rata kapal melebihi 30 tahun, memicu frekuensi kegagalan sistem dan tenggelamnya KD Pendekar akibat kebocoran ruang mesin pada Agustus 2024.
• Hanya memiliki 6 fregat utama (Lekiu-class dan Maharaja Lela-class) untuk mengawaki lebih dari 4.600 km garis pantai.
• Rencana pengadaan Maharaja Lela-class terhambat gangguan rantai pasok dan anggaran, memperpanjang keterbatasan jumlah unit tempur.
2. Kekuatan Tempur dan Sensor
• Kapasitas penembakan rudal anti-kapal terbatas pada sistem peluncur jarak menengah; tidak ada rudal jelajah anti-kapal jarak jauh.
• Sistem pertahanan udara kapal sebagian besar hanya mengandalkan peluncur rudal MICA VL (16 sel), tanpa VLS terintegrasi untuk ancaman berlapis.
• Sensor sonar aktif/pasif pada kapal selam Scorpene-class belum dilengkapi towed array sonar, mengurangi jangkauan deteksi kapal selam musuh.
3. Pemeliharaan, Logistik, dan Industri
• Kapasitas galangan nasional untuk perawatan tengah-umur (mid-life upgrade) terbatas; sebagian besar kapal diperbaiki di luar negeri dengan lead time > 6 bulan.
• Sistem manajemen suku cadang terfragmentasi, menyebabkan stok critical-spare part sering kosong.
• Anggaran operasional dan pemeliharaan (O&M) hanya 15-18% dari total alokasi Angkatan Laut, di bawah standar ideal 20-25%.
4. Interoperabilitas dan Jaringan
• Belum ada sistem C4I terpadu antar kapal dan pesawat patroli untuk datalink real-time; setiap platform menggunakan protokol berbeda.
• Latihan bersama (multilateral exercises) terbatas pada skala korvet dan frigat; belum pernah full-spectrum joint exercise dengan platform HMS/US Navy.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
Here’s a structured look at the main challenges facing the Malondeshn Army today, drawing from recent defence reports and incidents:
🛠 Ageing Equipment & Safety Risks
• Over 30 years in service – At least 171 military assets across the Malondeshn Armed Forces have exceeded their intended lifespan.
• Recent fatal incident – In July 2025, a commando from the 22nd Regiment died during a maritime exercise; early findings suggest old diving gear may have contributed to the tragedy.
• Legacy systems dependency – Many vehicles, weapons, and support systems are decades old, increasing maintenance costs and operational risk.
💰 Budget & Procurement Constraints
• High personnel cost – Over 40% of the 2024 defence budget went to salaries and allowances, leaving less for modernization.
• Procurement bottlenecks – Much of the RM5.71 billion procurement allocation is tied to progress payments for ongoing contracts (e.g., FA 50 jets, Littoral Combat Ships) rather than new acquisitions.
• Currency pressure – Ringgit depreciation erodes purchasing power for imported equipment, which Malondesh relies on heavily.
⚖️ Structural & Policy Issues
• No long-term procurement roadmap – Annual budgets don’t guarantee multi year funding, slowing replacement of ageing platforms.
• Reluctance to restructure – Successive governments have avoided reducing manpower or reallocating funds from other sectors to defence.
• Public awareness gap – Studies show Malondeshns’ sensitivity to the Army’s role is lower than for other agencies like the police.
🌏 Strategic & Operational Pressures
• South China Sea tensions – Persistent presence of foreign vessels in Malondeshn waters demands stronger maritime and amphibious readiness.
• Regional capability gap – Neighbours like Singapore and Indonesia invest more heavily in modern land systems, widening the tech gap.
• Multi role demands – Beyond defence, the Army is tasked with disaster relief, peacekeeping, and national unity efforts, stretching resources
Biar FAKTA BERBICARA..... RUGI... 🤣🤣🤣
BalasHapusKerugian Jumbo Kereta Cepat “Whoosh” Bom Waktu bagi PT KAI
https://matasemarang.com/utang-jumbo-kereta-cepat-whoosh-bom-waktu-bagi-pt-kai/
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
Rincian kelemahan per domain
Udara
• AEW&C tidak tersedia: Tanpa platform peringatan dini dan kendali udara, deteksi dini rendah, manajemen pertempuran udara terbatas, dan CAP/Intercept tidak efisien.
• Celah MRCA berkepanjangan: Penghentian MiG-29N tidak diikuti pengganti MRCA; armada tempur bertumpu pada F/A-18D (jumlah terbatas) dan Su-30MKM (kompleksitas sustainment). LCA/FLIT membantu training dan tugas ringan, tetapi tidak menggantikan high-end MRCA.
• AAR/SEAD/EW terbatas: Kapasitas air-to-air refuelling operasional dan paket penindakan pertahanan udara musuh (SEAD) terbatas, membatasi radius operasi dan survivability.
• GBAD terintegrasi belum berlapis: Dominan SHORAD; ketiadaan medium-range/networked GBAD yang matang menyulitkan penciptaan gelembung anti-akses tingkat menengah.
• Ketersediaan platform fluktuatif: Tantangan suku cadang multi-negara dan pendanaan O&M menekan mission-capable rates serta jam terbang tahunan.
Maritim
• Keterlambatan LCS dan kesenjangan kombatan permukaan: Kelas Lekiu/Kasturi menua; Kedah-class OPV minim persenjataan ofensif; LCS belum operasional sehingga kemampuan AAW/ASuW modern terhambat.
• ASW/MPA masih terbatas: Kapasitas peperangan anti-kapal selam (sensor, helikopter ASW, torpedo) dan MPA berkualifikasi ASW terbatas, menyulitkan deteksi/penindakan subsurface.
• LMS batch awal berkapasitas rendah: Platform generasi pertama kurang persenjataan, membatasi deterrence di grey-zone dan littoral.
• Kapal selam sedikit dan siklus pemeliharaan ketat: Hanya dua unit aktif; availability turun-naik karena docking dan sustainment.
• Angkut amfibi dan dukungan armada terbatas: Program MRSS tertunda; mengurangi kemampuan proyeksi kekuatan, HADR besar, dan ketahanan logistik maritim.
• Konstabulary backfill oleh RMN: Keterbatasan MMEA mendorong RMN menyerap tugas penegakan maritim, menggerus jam laut untuk latihan tempur inti.
Darat
• Pertahanan udara darat tidak berlapis: Ketergantungan pada SHORAD (MANPADS/SHORAD) tanpa medium-range modern mengurangi perlindungan area terhadap fixed-wing/stand-off.
• Artileri jarak jauh & presisi terbatas: MLRS ada namun skala, amunisi presisi, sensor counter-battery, dan integrasi kill chain masih terbatas.
• Armour & mekanisasi terbatas jumlah/modernisasi: MBT dan IFV/ICV campuran generasi, survivability dan sensor fusion tertinggal dari peer modern.
• Mobilitas udara & logistik taktis: Kapasitas helikopter angkut/utility dan jembatan logistik darat untuk operasi berintensitas tinggi masih menjadi pembatas.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
Rincian kelemahan per domain
Udara
• AEW&C tidak tersedia: Tanpa platform peringatan dini dan kendali udara, deteksi dini rendah, manajemen pertempuran udara terbatas, dan CAP/Intercept tidak efisien.
• Celah MRCA berkepanjangan: Penghentian MiG-29N tidak diikuti pengganti MRCA; armada tempur bertumpu pada F/A-18D (jumlah terbatas) dan Su-30MKM (kompleksitas sustainment). LCA/FLIT membantu training dan tugas ringan, tetapi tidak menggantikan high-end MRCA.
• AAR/SEAD/EW terbatas: Kapasitas air-to-air refuelling operasional dan paket penindakan pertahanan udara musuh (SEAD) terbatas, membatasi radius operasi dan survivability.
• GBAD terintegrasi belum berlapis: Dominan SHORAD; ketiadaan medium-range/networked GBAD yang matang menyulitkan penciptaan gelembung anti-akses tingkat menengah.
• Ketersediaan platform fluktuatif: Tantangan suku cadang multi-negara dan pendanaan O&M menekan mission-capable rates serta jam terbang tahunan.
Maritim
• Keterlambatan LCS dan kesenjangan kombatan permukaan: Kelas Lekiu/Kasturi menua; Kedah-class OPV minim persenjataan ofensif; LCS belum operasional sehingga kemampuan AAW/ASuW modern terhambat.
• ASW/MPA masih terbatas: Kapasitas peperangan anti-kapal selam (sensor, helikopter ASW, torpedo) dan MPA berkualifikasi ASW terbatas, menyulitkan deteksi/penindakan subsurface.
• LMS batch awal berkapasitas rendah: Platform generasi pertama kurang persenjataan, membatasi deterrence di grey-zone dan littoral.
• Kapal selam sedikit dan siklus pemeliharaan ketat: Hanya dua unit aktif; availability turun-naik karena docking dan sustainment.
• Angkut amfibi dan dukungan armada terbatas: Program MRSS tertunda; mengurangi kemampuan proyeksi kekuatan, HADR besar, dan ketahanan logistik maritim.
• Konstabulary backfill oleh RMN: Keterbatasan MMEA mendorong RMN menyerap tugas penegakan maritim, menggerus jam laut untuk latihan tempur inti.
Darat
• Pertahanan udara darat tidak berlapis: Ketergantungan pada SHORAD (MANPADS/SHORAD) tanpa medium-range modern mengurangi perlindungan area terhadap fixed-wing/stand-off.
• Artileri jarak jauh & presisi terbatas: MLRS ada namun skala, amunisi presisi, sensor counter-battery, dan integrasi kill chain masih terbatas.
• Armour & mekanisasi terbatas jumlah/modernisasi: MBT dan IFV/ICV campuran generasi, survivability dan sensor fusion tertinggal dari peer modern.
• Mobilitas udara & logistik taktis: Kapasitas helikopter angkut/utility dan jembatan logistik darat untuk operasi berintensitas tinggi masih menjadi pembatas.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
KELEMAHAN KAPAL PERANG MILITER MALONDESH
Militer Laut Diraja Malondesh menghadapi beberapa kelemahan mendasar yang membatasi efektivitas operasional dan daya jaga kedaulatan laut. Faktor utama meliputi usia armada yang tinggi, jumlah platform terbatas, kesenjangan kemampuan tempur, serta tantangan pemeliharaan dan logistik.
1. Aset dan Modernisasi
• Usia rata-rata kapal melebihi 30 tahun, memicu frekuensi kegagalan sistem dan tenggelamnya KD Pendekar akibat kebocoran ruang mesin pada Agustus 2024.
• Hanya memiliki 6 fregat utama (Lekiu-class dan Maharaja Lela-class) untuk mengawaki lebih dari 4.600 km garis pantai.
• Rencana pengadaan Maharaja Lela-class terhambat gangguan rantai pasok dan anggaran, memperpanjang keterbatasan jumlah unit tempur.
2. Kekuatan Tempur dan Sensor
• Kapasitas penembakan rudal anti-kapal terbatas pada sistem peluncur jarak menengah; tidak ada rudal jelajah anti-kapal jarak jauh.
• Sistem pertahanan udara kapal sebagian besar hanya mengandalkan peluncur rudal MICA VL (16 sel), tanpa VLS terintegrasi untuk ancaman berlapis.
• Sensor sonar aktif/pasif pada kapal selam Scorpene-class belum dilengkapi towed array sonar, mengurangi jangkauan deteksi kapal selam musuh.
3. Pemeliharaan, Logistik, dan Industri
• Kapasitas galangan nasional untuk perawatan tengah-umur (mid-life upgrade) terbatas; sebagian besar kapal diperbaiki di luar negeri dengan lead time > 6 bulan.
• Sistem manajemen suku cadang terfragmentasi, menyebabkan stok critical-spare part sering kosong.
• Anggaran operasional dan pemeliharaan (O&M) hanya 15-18% dari total alokasi Angkatan Laut, di bawah standar ideal 20-25%.
4. Interoperabilitas dan Jaringan
• Belum ada sistem C4I terpadu antar kapal dan pesawat patroli untuk datalink real-time; setiap platform menggunakan protokol berbeda.
• Latihan bersama (multilateral exercises) terbatas pada skala korvet dan frigat; belum pernah full-spectrum joint exercise dengan platform HMS/US Navy.
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
BalasHapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
Rincian kelemahan per domain
Udara
• AEW&C tidak tersedia: Tanpa platform peringatan dini dan kendali udara, deteksi dini rendah, manajemen pertempuran udara terbatas, dan CAP/Intercept tidak efisien.
• Celah MRCA berkepanjangan: Penghentian MiG-29N tidak diikuti pengganti MRCA; armada tempur bertumpu pada F/A-18D (jumlah terbatas) dan Su-30MKM (kompleksitas sustainment). LCA/FLIT membantu training dan tugas ringan, tetapi tidak menggantikan high-end MRCA.
• AAR/SEAD/EW terbatas: Kapasitas air-to-air refuelling operasional dan paket penindakan pertahanan udara musuh (SEAD) terbatas, membatasi radius operasi dan survivability.
• GBAD terintegrasi belum berlapis: Dominan SHORAD; ketiadaan medium-range/networked GBAD yang matang menyulitkan penciptaan gelembung anti-akses tingkat menengah.
• Ketersediaan platform fluktuatif: Tantangan suku cadang multi-negara dan pendanaan O&M menekan mission-capable rates serta jam terbang tahunan.
Maritim
• Keterlambatan LCS dan kesenjangan kombatan permukaan: Kelas Lekiu/Kasturi menua; Kedah-class OPV minim persenjataan ofensif; LCS belum operasional sehingga kemampuan AAW/ASuW modern terhambat.
• ASW/MPA masih terbatas: Kapasitas peperangan anti-kapal selam (sensor, helikopter ASW, torpedo) dan MPA berkualifikasi ASW terbatas, menyulitkan deteksi/penindakan subsurface.
• LMS batch awal berkapasitas rendah: Platform generasi pertama kurang persenjataan, membatasi deterrence di grey-zone dan littoral.
• Kapal selam sedikit dan siklus pemeliharaan ketat: Hanya dua unit aktif; availability turun-naik karena docking dan sustainment.
• Angkut amfibi dan dukungan armada terbatas: Program MRSS tertunda; mengurangi kemampuan proyeksi kekuatan, HADR besar, dan ketahanan logistik maritim.
• Konstabulary backfill oleh RMN: Keterbatasan MMEA mendorong RMN menyerap tugas penegakan maritim, menggerus jam laut untuk latihan tempur inti.
Darat
• Pertahanan udara darat tidak berlapis: Ketergantungan pada SHORAD (MANPADS/SHORAD) tanpa medium-range modern mengurangi perlindungan area terhadap fixed-wing/stand-off.
• Artileri jarak jauh & presisi terbatas: MLRS ada namun skala, amunisi presisi, sensor counter-battery, dan integrasi kill chain masih terbatas.
• Armour & mekanisasi terbatas jumlah/modernisasi: MBT dan IFV/ICV campuran generasi, survivability dan sensor fusion tertinggal dari peer modern.
• Mobilitas udara & logistik taktis: Kapasitas helikopter angkut/utility dan jembatan logistik darat untuk operasi berintensitas tinggi masih menjadi pembatas.
Syukur ada MALAYSIA yang Selamatkan Whoosh.....😎😎🇲🇾🇲🇾🇲🇾
BalasHapusMISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
KELEMAHAN ARMADA TEMPUR MILITER MALONDESH
Secara ringkas, kelemahan utama armada tempur Angkatan Laut Malondesh (TLDM) terletak pada jumlah dan komposisi kapal yang terbatas, kesiapan operasional yang dipengaruhi usia platform, dukungan logistik yang kurang memadai, sistem persenjataan dan sensor yang belum terintegrasi penuh, serta keterbatasan anggaran yang menghambat modernisasi.
1. Jumlah dan Komposisi Kapal Terbatas
• TLDM hanya mengoperasikan sekitar 100 kapal perang aktif, jauh di bawah tetangga regional seperti Indonesia yang memiliki 331 unit.
• Dari total tersebut, hanya 2 kapal selam, 2 frigat, dan 6 korvet—jumlah yang minim untuk menjaga kehadiran di perairan Selat Malaka dan Laut China Selatan.
2. Usia Platform dan Kesiapan Operasi
• Banyak kapal utama (misalnya kelas Kasturi dan Lekiu) telah melampaui usia desain 25–30 tahun, sehingga sering masuk dockyard untuk perbaikan struktural dan overhaul mesin.
• Littoral Mission Ship (LMS) kelas Keris dan Kerambit relatif baru, tetapi dirancang untuk patroli ringan, bukan pertempuran jarak jauh atau operasi bersama dengan armada besar.
3. Dukungan Logistik dan Sustainment
• Tidak ada kapal logistik (replenishment ship) berkapasitas besar, sehingga operasi di laut lepas hanya bergantung pada kapal tunda dan fasilitas di pangkalan pantai.
• Dependensi tinggi pada suku cadang dan dukungan teknis dari pemasok luar (UE, Korea Selatan), membuat jadwal perawatan mudah terganggu jika ada kendala impor.
4. Sistem Persenjataan dan Sensor
• Persenjataan anti-kapal permukaan (ASuW) terbatas pada rudal C-802, tanpa platform peluncur vertikal (VLS) untuk rudal antikapal atau permukaan udara.
• Belum ada sistem Integrated Mast dengan AESA radar dan ESM/ECM yang terpusat, sehingga titik buta dalam deteksi ancaman udara dan kapal selam masih cukup luas.
5. Sumber Daya Manusia dan Pelatihan
• Kru kapal berjumlah kecil dan jam terbang operasi jauh lebih rendah dibandingkan armada negara tetangga.
• Program latihan antarkapal (fleet exercise) masih berkutat pada skala regional ASEAN, belum memasukkan pelatihan joint task force dengan mitra utama di Indo-Pasifik.
6. Keterbatasan Anggaran dan Modernisasi
• Anggaran pertahanan Malondesh sekitar 4,8 miliar USD per tahun, hanya sedikit di atas separuh alokasi Indonesia, sehingga sulit mendanai proyek besar seperti fregat baru atau kapal selam tambahan.
• Program Maharaja Lela–class frigate yang direkayasa bersama Perancis mengalami beberapa kali penundaan serah terima, menunda penambahan kapal berkemampuan AAW (Anti-Air Warfare).
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
As of June 2025, Malondesh's federal government debt was RM 1.3 trillion, up from RM 1.25 trillion at the end of 2024, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 69% by the end of 2025. Simultaneously, household debt reached RM 1.65 trillion in March 2025, representing 84.3% of GDP, but this level is considered manageable due to strong household financial assets, which are 2.1 times higher than the total debt.
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023. In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018). “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said
=============
KELEMAHAN ARMADA TEMPUR MILITER MALONDESH
Secara ringkas, kelemahan utama armada tempur Angkatan Laut Malondesh (TLDM) terletak pada jumlah dan komposisi kapal yang terbatas, kesiapan operasional yang dipengaruhi usia platform, dukungan logistik yang kurang memadai, sistem persenjataan dan sensor yang belum terintegrasi penuh, serta keterbatasan anggaran yang menghambat modernisasi.
1. Jumlah dan Komposisi Kapal Terbatas
• TLDM hanya mengoperasikan sekitar 100 kapal perang aktif, jauh di bawah tetangga regional seperti Indonesia yang memiliki 331 unit.
• Dari total tersebut, hanya 2 kapal selam, 2 frigat, dan 6 korvet—jumlah yang minim untuk menjaga kehadiran di perairan Selat Malaka dan Laut China Selatan.
2. Usia Platform dan Kesiapan Operasi
• Banyak kapal utama (misalnya kelas Kasturi dan Lekiu) telah melampaui usia desain 25–30 tahun, sehingga sering masuk dockyard untuk perbaikan struktural dan overhaul mesin.
• Littoral Mission Ship (LMS) kelas Keris dan Kerambit relatif baru, tetapi dirancang untuk patroli ringan, bukan pertempuran jarak jauh atau operasi bersama dengan armada besar.
3. Dukungan Logistik dan Sustainment
• Tidak ada kapal logistik (replenishment ship) berkapasitas besar, sehingga operasi di laut lepas hanya bergantung pada kapal tunda dan fasilitas di pangkalan pantai.
• Dependensi tinggi pada suku cadang dan dukungan teknis dari pemasok luar (UE, Korea Selatan), membuat jadwal perawatan mudah terganggu jika ada kendala impor.
4. Sistem Persenjataan dan Sensor
• Persenjataan anti-kapal permukaan (ASuW) terbatas pada rudal C-802, tanpa platform peluncur vertikal (VLS) untuk rudal antikapal atau permukaan udara.
• Belum ada sistem Integrated Mast dengan AESA radar dan ESM/ECM yang terpusat, sehingga titik buta dalam deteksi ancaman udara dan kapal selam masih cukup luas.
5. Sumber Daya Manusia dan Pelatihan
• Kru kapal berjumlah kecil dan jam terbang operasi jauh lebih rendah dibandingkan armada negara tetangga.
• Program latihan antarkapal (fleet exercise) masih berkutat pada skala regional ASEAN, belum memasukkan pelatihan joint task force dengan mitra utama di Indo-Pasifik.
6. Keterbatasan Anggaran dan Modernisasi
• Anggaran pertahanan Malondesh sekitar 4,8 miliar USD per tahun, hanya sedikit di atas separuh alokasi Indonesia, sehingga sulit mendanai proyek besar seperti fregat baru atau kapal selam tambahan.
• Program Maharaja Lela–class frigate yang direkayasa bersama Perancis mengalami beberapa kali penundaan serah terima, menunda penambahan kapal berkemampuan AAW (Anti-Air Warfare).
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
KELEMAHAN KEMAMPUAN TEMPUR MILITER MALONDESH
Malondesh menghadapi beberapa kelemahan struktur dan operasional yang menurunkan efektivitas tempur di berbagai domain, antara lain:
• pertahanan udara yang terbatas
• kekuatan personel dan alutsista darat relatif kecil
• armada laut yang minim
• anggaran dan pemeliharaan yang terkendala
• keterbatasan inter¬ope¬rabilitas serta sistem komando dan kendali yang belum memadai
1. Pertahanan Udara
• Malondesh hanya memiliki sekitar 12 pesawat tempur aktif, dan total armada udara 135 pesawat, jauh lebih kecil dibanding tetangga seperti Indonesia yang mengoperasikan 34 pesawat tempur dari total 459 skuadron udara.
• Sebagian jet tempur F/A-18C/D Hornet dibeli bekas pakai Kuwait, memunculkan keraguan atas kesiapan dan keandalan melawan ancaman modern.
• Sistem radar darat dan sistem SAM (Surface-to-Air Missile) terbatas; hanya ada empat radar GM400a baru yang akan ditempatkan, masih kurang untuk mencakup Semenanjung dan Malondesh Timur secara simultan.
2. Kekuatan Darat
• Jumlah personel aktif Angkatan Bersenjata Malondesh (ATM) sekitar 113.000, jauh di bawah cadangan pasukan aktif Indonesia (400.000) yang menunjukkan keterbatasan skala operasi darat besar–besaran.
• Alutsista lapis baja hanya terdiri dari 48 tank dan sekitar 13.500 kendaraan tempur lapis baja, berbanding 331 tank dan 20.440 kendaraan lapis baja milik Indonesia.
• Kapasitas daya tembak dan mobilitas lapangan minim jika dibandingkan dengan negara ASEAN lain yang terus modernisasi pasukan darat.
3. Kekuatan Laut
• Armada perang Malondesh sekitar 100 kapal: 2 kapal selam, 2 fregat, 6 korvet; Indonesia mengoperasikan 4 kapal selam, 7 fregat, 25 korvet dari total 331 kapal perang, menunjukkan kesenjangan kapabilitas maritim besar.
• Kapasitas projektil anti-kapal dan kemampuan patroli perairan laut dalam masih terbatas, menyulitkan Malondesh mempertahankan ZEE di Laut China Selatan dan Selat Malaka.
4. Anggaran & Pemeliharaan
• Anggaran pertahanan Malondesh sekitar US$ 247,5 miliar, hampir setengah dari alokasi Indonesia (US$ 440 miliar), membatasi pembelian alutsista baru dan program pemeliharaan jangka panjang.
• Ketergantungan pada peralatan bekas pakai dan kontrak pemeliharaan eksternal meningkatkan risiko downtime karena suku cadang sukar diperoleh dan mahal.
5. Interoperabilitas dan Sistem Komando
• Implementasi C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) belum terintegrasi penuh di ketiga matra, membatasi pertukaran data real-time dalam operasi gabungan.
• Latihan militer bilateral dan multilateral skalanya terbatas, sehingga ATM kurang pengalaman interaksi taktis dengan sistem dan taktik aliansi modern.
6. Rantai Logistik dan Dukungan Pangkalan
• Ketersediaan suku cadang kritis terpusat di vendor asing, mempengaruhi kecepatan perbaikan alutsista
BalasHapusBIAR FAKTA BERBICARA... 😎😎🇲🇾🇲🇾
528 Ribu Warga Asing Menumpang Whoosh, Mayoritas Asal Malaysia
https://www.metrotvnews.com/read/NrWCoe5A-528-ribu-warga-asing-menumpang-whoosh-mayoritas-asal-malaysia
MISKIN = OVERLIMITS DEBT
HapusGOVERNMENT DEBT : 69% of GDP
HOUSEHOLD DEBT : 84.3% of GDP
Federal Government Debt
• End of 2024: RM 1.25 trillion
• End of June 2025: RM 1.3 trillion
• Projected Debt-to-GDP: 69% by the end of 2025
Household Debt
• End of March 2025: RM 1.65 trillion or 84.3% of GDP
=============
MISKIN ......
DEBT MARCH 2025 = 1,65 TRILLION
DEBT 2024 = RM 1.63 TRILLION
DEBT 2023 = RM 1,53 TRILLION
DEBT 2022 = RM 1,45 TRILLION
DEBT 2021 = RM 1,38 TRILLION
DEBT 2020 = RM 1,32 TRILLION
DEBT 2019 = RM 1,25 TRILLION
DEBT 2018 = RM 1,19 TRILLION
=============
KELEMAHAN KEMAMPUAN TEMPUR MILITER MALONDESH
Malondesh menghadapi beberapa kelemahan struktur dan operasional yang menurunkan efektivitas tempur di berbagai domain, antara lain:
• pertahanan udara yang terbatas
• kekuatan personel dan alutsista darat relatif kecil
• armada laut yang minim
• anggaran dan pemeliharaan yang terkendala
• keterbatasan inter¬ope¬rabilitas serta sistem komando dan kendali yang belum memadai
1. Pertahanan Udara
• Malondesh hanya memiliki sekitar 12 pesawat tempur aktif, dan total armada udara 135 pesawat, jauh lebih kecil dibanding tetangga seperti Indonesia yang mengoperasikan 34 pesawat tempur dari total 459 skuadron udara.
• Sebagian jet tempur F/A-18C/D Hornet dibeli bekas pakai Kuwait, memunculkan keraguan atas kesiapan dan keandalan melawan ancaman modern.
• Sistem radar darat dan sistem SAM (Surface-to-Air Missile) terbatas; hanya ada empat radar GM400a baru yang akan ditempatkan, masih kurang untuk mencakup Semenanjung dan Malondesh Timur secara simultan.
2. Kekuatan Darat
• Jumlah personel aktif Angkatan Bersenjata Malondesh (ATM) sekitar 113.000, jauh di bawah cadangan pasukan aktif Indonesia (400.000) yang menunjukkan keterbatasan skala operasi darat besar–besaran.
• Alutsista lapis baja hanya terdiri dari 48 tank dan sekitar 13.500 kendaraan tempur lapis baja, berbanding 331 tank dan 20.440 kendaraan lapis baja milik Indonesia.
• Kapasitas daya tembak dan mobilitas lapangan minim jika dibandingkan dengan negara ASEAN lain yang terus modernisasi pasukan darat.
3. Kekuatan Laut
• Armada perang Malondesh sekitar 100 kapal: 2 kapal selam, 2 fregat, 6 korvet; Indonesia mengoperasikan 4 kapal selam, 7 fregat, 25 korvet dari total 331 kapal perang, menunjukkan kesenjangan kapabilitas maritim besar.
• Kapasitas projektil anti-kapal dan kemampuan patroli perairan laut dalam masih terbatas, menyulitkan Malondesh mempertahankan ZEE di Laut China Selatan dan Selat Malaka.
4. Anggaran & Pemeliharaan
• Anggaran pertahanan Malondesh sekitar US$ 247,5 miliar, hampir setengah dari alokasi Indonesia (US$ 440 miliar), membatasi pembelian alutsista baru dan program pemeliharaan jangka panjang.
• Ketergantungan pada peralatan bekas pakai dan kontrak pemeliharaan eksternal meningkatkan risiko downtime karena suku cadang sukar diperoleh dan mahal.
5. Interoperabilitas dan Sistem Komando
• Implementasi C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) belum terintegrasi penuh di ketiga matra, membatasi pertukaran data real-time dalam operasi gabungan.
• Latihan militer bilateral dan multilateral skalanya terbatas, sehingga ATM kurang pengalaman interaksi taktis dengan sistem dan taktik aliansi modern.
6. Rantai Logistik dan Dukungan Pangkalan
• Ketersediaan suku cadang kritis terpusat di vendor asing, mempengaruhi kecepatan perbaikan alutsista
📌 1. What O&M Covers
HapusOperations & Maintenance (O&M) includes:
• Fuel and consumables for aircraft, ships, and vehicles
• Spare parts for planes, ships, and vehicles
• Repairs and overhauls (preventive and corrective maintenance)
• Training exercises for personnel
• Operational readiness support (e.g., simulation, logistics)
Weak O&M means all of these areas are underfunded or poorly managed.
________________________________________
📌 2. Budget Constraints
• Only 20–25% of Malondesh’s small defense budget (~1% GDP) goes to O&M.
• Consequences:
o Aircraft grounded due to lack of fuel or spare parts
o Ships docked for extended periods awaiting repairs
o Vehicles idle in depots because they cannot be maintained
Example:
• RMAF Su-30MKM: at one point, only 4 of 18 fighters were airworthy due to spare parts shortages.
• Navy corvettes & patrol vessels from the 1980s continue in service because LCS delays mean there’s no replacement.
________________________________________
📌 3. Impact on Training
• O&M limitations reduce training opportunities:
o Pilots get fewer flight hours → degrade skills
o Naval crews sail less → operational proficiency drops
o Soldiers train less with heavy vehicles and artillery → less effective combat units
• Training shortfalls compound the readiness problem, even if equipment is technically available.
________________________________________
📌 4. Maintenance Culture Issues
• Maintenance is often reactive, not preventive:
o Equipment is used until breakdown, then repaired.
o Preventive maintenance (regular inspections, part replacements) is skipped to save costs.
• Consequence: equipment wears out faster, reducing lifespan and readiness.
________________________________________
📌 5. Spare Parts Shortages
• Many Malondeshn military systems are imported: Russia, France, US, Turkey.
• Budget shortfalls and procurement delays cause spare parts shortages, resulting in:
o Aircraft grounded
o Ships unable to sail
o Armored vehicles idle
• Some old platforms have parts no longer manufactured, forcing cannibalization of other units.
________________________________________
📌 6. Effects on Operational Readiness
Effect Example
Low aircraft readiness Only ~30–40% of fighter jets flyable
Naval limitations Fewer patrols; reliance on 1980s ships
Army mobility problems APCs, artillery under-maintained
Reduced training Crews and soldiers less combat-ready
Accelerated obsolescence Old equipment fails faster, forcing prolonged use
________________________________________
📌 7. Systemic Causes
1. Small overall budget → O&M underfunded
2. Salary-heavy allocation → majority of funds go to personnel
3. Political short-termism → O&M often deprioritized for visible projects
4. Procurement delays & scandals → new assets delayed, old ones overused
5. Limited local defense industry → spare parts must be imported, increasing cost & delays
📌 1. Limited Procurement & Modernization
Hapus• Malondesh’s annual defense budget (~RM15–18 billion, 1% of GDP) is insufficient for large-scale procurement.
• Effects:
o Fighter jets: MRCA replacement program delayed; RMAF still uses aging F/A-18D Hornets, Hawks, and Su-30MKMs with limited operational readiness.
o Navy: LCS project stalled for over a decade; old corvettes and patrol ships remain in service.
o Army: Many vehicles like Condor APCs and older artillery pieces are still in use because modernization is unaffordable.
• Result: Malondesh acquires equipment piecemeal instead of building a balanced, modern force.
________________________________________
📌 2. Underfunded Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
• Only ~20–25% of the budget is allocated to fuel, spare parts, repairs, training.
• Effects:
o Many aircraft and ships are grounded due to maintenance backlogs.
o Pilots and crews get fewer training hours, reducing readiness.
o Aging vehicles and ships wear out faster, accelerating obsolescence.
• Examples:
o Only ~4 of 18 Su-30MKMs were airworthy at one point.
o Navy relies on ships built in the 1980s due to delays in LCS delivery.
________________________________________
📌 3. Personnel vs Capability Imbalance
• ~60% of the budget goes to salaries and pensions.
• Consequences:
o Large manpower (110,000 active personnel) cannot be properly equipped.
o Military is “people-heavy but equipment-light,” limiting operational effectiveness.
• Soldiers are well-paid but often lack modern tools or transport, reducing combat effectiveness.
________________________________________
📌 4. Reduced Readiness
• Small budget and underfunding of O&M → low operational readiness:
o Aircraft, ships, and armored vehicles often not deployable.
o Training exercises are limited due to fuel and maintenance costs.
• Malondesh cannot sustain continuous deterrence or regional presence, unlike Singapore or Indonesia.
________________________________________
📌 5. Vulnerability to Regional Gap
• Neighbors (Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia) have invested more in modernization and readiness.
• Malondesh’s small budget → capability gap grows:
o Navy: fewer modern frigates and submarines.
o Air Force: fewer operational jets and limited air defense.
o Army: older vehicles, limited mobility.
________________________________________
📌 6. Delayed or Cancelled Programs
• Many projects are postponed indefinitely due to funding constraints:
o MRCA (fighter replacement)
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
o Armored vehicle upgrades and artillery modernization
• Stop-go procurement leads to wasted funds, inefficiency, and obsolescence.
BIAR FAKTA BERBICARA... 😎😎🇲🇾🇲🇾
BalasHapus528 Ribu Warga Asing Menumpang Whoosh, Mayoritas Asal Malaysia
https://www.metrotvnews.com/read/NrWCoe5A-528-ribu-warga-asing-menumpang-whoosh-mayoritas-asal-malaysia
📌 1. Procurement Weaknesses
Hapusa. Stop–Go Procurement
• Major projects (fighters, ships, armored vehicles) are often announced, delayed, or cancelled depending on which government is in power.
• No stable multi-year defense budget → contractors cannot plan effectively → delays & cost escalation.
Example:
• MRCA fighter replacement: in discussion since 2009, but never finalized → MiG-29s retired in 2017 without replacement.
________________________________________
b. Political Interference
• Contracts sometimes awarded to politically connected companies rather than the most capable suppliers.
• Domestic firms given contracts they cannot deliver on, leading to project mismanagement.
Example:
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal: RM9 billion allocated in 2011 for 6 ships. As of 2025, none are delivered, funds mismanaged, and Navy stuck with 1980s-era ships.
________________________________________
c. Corruption & Lack of Transparency
• Defense procurement in Malondesh has often been opaque, with corruption scandals undermining delivery.
• This creates mistrust in both local industry and international partners.
________________________________________
d. Short-Term Thinking
• Governments often pursue “flashy” buys for political popularity (e.g., fighters, ships) rather than ensuring sustainment & lifecycle costs.
• Result: shiny new platforms at delivery → but no long-term plan for spare parts, upgrades, or maintenance.
________________________________________
📌 2. Supply Chain Weaknesses
a. Heavy Foreign Dependence
• Malondesh imports almost all high-end systems:
o Fighters → Russia, US, UK
o Ships → France, Germany, locally assembled with foreign parts
o Vehicles → Turkey, South Korea
• Spare parts must come from abroad, which is expensive, slow, and vulnerable to geopolitical disruptions.
________________________________________
b. Poor Local Industrial Capacity
• Local defense industry (Boustead, DefTech, etc.) has limited expertise.
• They rely on foreign designs and technology transfer.
• When local firms are given contracts they cannot handle → projects stall or quality suffers.
________________________________________
c. Spare Parts Shortages
• Weak procurement planning → parts not stockpiled properly.
• Old systems (MiG-29s, Condors, etc.) → parts no longer manufactured.
• This leads to “cannibalization”, where one aircraft or vehicle is stripped to keep others running.
________________________________________
d. Weak Logistics & Sustainment Planning
• Malondesh tends to focus on buying platforms, not sustainment packages.
• Lifecycle support (20–30 years of maintenance, training, spares) is often underfunded or ignored.
• Platforms quickly become unusable once warranty/support packages expire.
________________________________________
📌 3. Consequences for the Armed Forces
Problem Consequence
Procurement delays (LCS, MRCA) Old equipment kept in service → capability gap
Foreign dependence Vulnerable to sanctions, export restrictions, and currency fluctuations
Local industry weakness Projects mismanaged, delays, low confidence in local defense manufacturing
Spare parts shortages Low aircraft/ship/vehicle readiness; many platforms grounded
📌 1. Procurement Weaknesses
Hapusa. Stop–Go Procurement
• Major projects (fighters, ships, armored vehicles) are often announced, delayed, or cancelled depending on which government is in power.
• No stable multi-year defense budget → contractors cannot plan effectively → delays & cost escalation.
Example:
• MRCA fighter replacement: in discussion since 2009, but never finalized → MiG-29s retired in 2017 without replacement.
________________________________________
b. Political Interference
• Contracts sometimes awarded to politically connected companies rather than the most capable suppliers.
• Domestic firms given contracts they cannot deliver on, leading to project mismanagement.
Example:
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal: RM9 billion allocated in 2011 for 6 ships. As of 2025, none are delivered, funds mismanaged, and Navy stuck with 1980s-era ships.
________________________________________
c. Corruption & Lack of Transparency
• Defense procurement in Malondesh has often been opaque, with corruption scandals undermining delivery.
• This creates mistrust in both local industry and international partners.
________________________________________
d. Short-Term Thinking
• Governments often pursue “flashy” buys for political popularity (e.g., fighters, ships) rather than ensuring sustainment & lifecycle costs.
• Result: shiny new platforms at delivery → but no long-term plan for spare parts, upgrades, or maintenance.
________________________________________
📌 2. Supply Chain Weaknesses
a. Heavy Foreign Dependence
• Malondesh imports almost all high-end systems:
o Fighters → Russia, US, UK
o Ships → France, Germany, locally assembled with foreign parts
o Vehicles → Turkey, South Korea
• Spare parts must come from abroad, which is expensive, slow, and vulnerable to geopolitical disruptions.
________________________________________
b. Poor Local Industrial Capacity
• Local defense industry (Boustead, DefTech, etc.) has limited expertise.
• They rely on foreign designs and technology transfer.
• When local firms are given contracts they cannot handle → projects stall or quality suffers.
________________________________________
c. Spare Parts Shortages
• Weak procurement planning → parts not stockpiled properly.
• Old systems (MiG-29s, Condors, etc.) → parts no longer manufactured.
• This leads to “cannibalization”, where one aircraft or vehicle is stripped to keep others running.
________________________________________
d. Weak Logistics & Sustainment Planning
• Malondesh tends to focus on buying platforms, not sustainment packages.
• Lifecycle support (20–30 years of maintenance, training, spares) is often underfunded or ignored.
• Platforms quickly become unusable once warranty/support packages expire.
________________________________________
📌 3. Consequences for the Armed Forces
Problem Consequence
Procurement delays (LCS, MRCA) Old equipment kept in service → capability gap
Foreign dependence Vulnerable to sanctions, export restrictions, and currency fluctuations
Local industry weakness Projects mismanaged, delays, low confidence in local defense manufacturing
Spare parts shortages Low aircraft/ship/vehicle readiness; many platforms grounded
📌 1. Procurement Overview
Hapus• Malondesh’s defense procurement is piecemeal, delayed, and often politically influenced.
• Limited modernization is the result of:
1. Small defense budget (~1% of GDP)
2. High personnel costs (~60% of budget)
3. Political short-termism and procurement scandals
________________________________________
📌 2. Major Modernization Programs and Delays
a. Air Force (RMAF)
• MRCA Fighter Replacement: Intended to replace MiG-29s (retired 2017).
o Candidates: Rafale, Typhoon, Gripen, F/A-18
o Program delayed repeatedly due to budget constraints, political changes, and procurement indecision.
o Result: RMAF relies on aging Su-30MKM, F/A-18D, and Hawk trainers, with limited readiness.
• Helicopters: Sikorsky S-70, AW139s delivered slowly; fleet size insufficient for operational needs.
b. Navy (RMN)
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Project
o Contract 2011, RM9 billion for 6 ships
o No operational ships as of 2025 due to construction delays, cost overruns, and political mismanagement
o Navy relies on Kedah-class corvettes (2006–2010) and older 1980s vessels
• Submarines: Two Scorpène-class delivered mid-2000s
o High maintenance costs and limited operational use
o Spare parts delays reduce readiness
c. Army (TDM)
• Armored vehicles: Condor APCs (1980s) still in service
• AV-8 Gempita (Turkey-Malondesh joint project) production delayed and expensive
• Artillery & support systems: Many systems remain outdated due to insufficient procurement funding
________________________________________
📌 3. Reasons for Limited Procurement
1. Small Defense Budget
o Only ~15–18 billion RM per year
o Majority spent on salaries → little left for big-ticket items
2. Stop-Go Procurement Cycle
o Projects start, then delayed or scaled down due to political or budget issues
o Example: LCS, MRCA, Army modernization programs
3. Political Interference & Corruption
o Contracts awarded based on political connections, not operational priority
o Leads to mismanagement, cost overruns, and delayed delivery
4. Dependence on Foreign Suppliers
o Many systems must be imported → costly and sensitive to geopolitical issues
5. Weak Multi-Year Planning
o No binding long-term plan → programs cannot be executed consistently
________________________________________
📌 4. Consequences of Limited Modernization
Area Effect
Air Force Aging jets; low operational readiness (~30–40%)
Navy Old corvettes/patrol ships in use; LCS delayed
Army Old APCs and artillery; partial vehicle upgrades only
Training Fewer exercises due to limited functional equipment
Regional capability Military capability lags behind neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam)
Strategic posture Limited deterrence and inability to sustain high-intensity operations
________________________________________
📌 5. Cumulative Effect
• Limited procurement + weak O&M + small budget + political short-termism = military stagnation
• Equipment remains obsolete, readiness is low, and modernization programs are repeatedly delayed or cancelled
📌 1. Procurement Weaknesses
BalasHapusa. Stop–Go Procurement
• Major projects (fighters, ships, armored vehicles) are often announced, delayed, or cancelled depending on which government is in power.
• No stable multi-year defense budget → contractors cannot plan effectively → delays & cost escalation.
Example:
• MRCA fighter replacement: in discussion since 2009, but never finalized → MiG-29s retired in 2017 without replacement.
________________________________________
b. Political Interference
• Contracts sometimes awarded to politically connected companies rather than the most capable suppliers.
• Domestic firms given contracts they cannot deliver on, leading to project mismanagement.
Example:
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal: RM9 billion allocated in 2011 for 6 ships. As of 2025, none are delivered, funds mismanaged, and Navy stuck with 1980s-era ships.
________________________________________
c. Corruption & Lack of Transparency
• Defense procurement in Malondesh has often been opaque, with corruption scandals undermining delivery.
• This creates mistrust in both local industry and international partners.
________________________________________
d. Short-Term Thinking
• Governments often pursue “flashy” buys for political popularity (e.g., fighters, ships) rather than ensuring sustainment & lifecycle costs.
• Result: shiny new platforms at delivery → but no long-term plan for spare parts, upgrades, or maintenance.
________________________________________
📌 2. Supply Chain Weaknesses
a. Heavy Foreign Dependence
• Malondesh imports almost all high-end systems:
o Fighters → Russia, US, UK
o Ships → France, Germany, locally assembled with foreign parts
o Vehicles → Turkey, South Korea
• Spare parts must come from abroad, which is expensive, slow, and vulnerable to geopolitical disruptions.
________________________________________
b. Poor Local Industrial Capacity
• Local defense industry (Boustead, DefTech, etc.) has limited expertise.
• They rely on foreign designs and technology transfer.
• When local firms are given contracts they cannot handle → projects stall or quality suffers.
________________________________________
c. Spare Parts Shortages
• Weak procurement planning → parts not stockpiled properly.
• Old systems (MiG-29s, Condors, etc.) → parts no longer manufactured.
• This leads to “cannibalization”, where one aircraft or vehicle is stripped to keep others running.
________________________________________
d. Weak Logistics & Sustainment Planning
• Malondesh tends to focus on buying platforms, not sustainment packages.
• Lifecycle support (20–30 years of maintenance, training, spares) is often underfunded or ignored.
• Platforms quickly become unusable once warranty/support packages expire.
________________________________________
📌 3. Consequences for the Armed Forces
Problem Consequence
Procurement delays (LCS, MRCA) Old equipment kept in service → capability gap
Foreign dependence Vulnerable to sanctions, export restrictions, and currency fluctuations
Local industry weakness Projects mismanaged, delays, low confidence in local defense manufacturing
Spare parts shortages Low aircraft/ship/vehicle readiness; many platforms grounded
📌 1. Procurement Weaknesses
BalasHapusa. Stop–Go Procurement
• Major projects (fighters, ships, armored vehicles) are often announced, delayed, or cancelled depending on which government is in power.
• No stable multi-year defense budget → contractors cannot plan effectively → delays & cost escalation.
Example:
• MRCA fighter replacement: in discussion since 2009, but never finalized → MiG-29s retired in 2017 without replacement.
________________________________________
b. Political Interference
• Contracts sometimes awarded to politically connected companies rather than the most capable suppliers.
• Domestic firms given contracts they cannot deliver on, leading to project mismanagement.
Example:
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal: RM9 billion allocated in 2011 for 6 ships. As of 2025, none are delivered, funds mismanaged, and Navy stuck with 1980s-era ships.
________________________________________
c. Corruption & Lack of Transparency
• Defense procurement in Malondesh has often been opaque, with corruption scandals undermining delivery.
• This creates mistrust in both local industry and international partners.
________________________________________
d. Short-Term Thinking
• Governments often pursue “flashy” buys for political popularity (e.g., fighters, ships) rather than ensuring sustainment & lifecycle costs.
• Result: shiny new platforms at delivery → but no long-term plan for spare parts, upgrades, or maintenance.
________________________________________
📌 2. Supply Chain Weaknesses
a. Heavy Foreign Dependence
• Malondesh imports almost all high-end systems:
o Fighters → Russia, US, UK
o Ships → France, Germany, locally assembled with foreign parts
o Vehicles → Turkey, South Korea
• Spare parts must come from abroad, which is expensive, slow, and vulnerable to geopolitical disruptions.
________________________________________
b. Poor Local Industrial Capacity
• Local defense industry (Boustead, DefTech, etc.) has limited expertise.
• They rely on foreign designs and technology transfer.
• When local firms are given contracts they cannot handle → projects stall or quality suffers.
________________________________________
c. Spare Parts Shortages
• Weak procurement planning → parts not stockpiled properly.
• Old systems (MiG-29s, Condors, etc.) → parts no longer manufactured.
• This leads to “cannibalization”, where one aircraft or vehicle is stripped to keep others running.
________________________________________
d. Weak Logistics & Sustainment Planning
• Malondesh tends to focus on buying platforms, not sustainment packages.
• Lifecycle support (20–30 years of maintenance, training, spares) is often underfunded or ignored.
• Platforms quickly become unusable once warranty/support packages expire.
________________________________________
📌 3. Consequences for the Armed Forces
Problem Consequence
Procurement delays (LCS, MRCA) Old equipment kept in service → capability gap
Foreign dependence Vulnerable to sanctions, export restrictions, and currency fluctuations
Local industry weakness Projects mismanaged, delays, low confidence in local defense manufacturing
Spare parts shortages Low aircraft/ship/vehicle readiness; many platforms grounded
📌 1. Procurement Overview
BalasHapus• Malondesh’s defense procurement is piecemeal, delayed, and often politically influenced.
• Limited modernization is the result of:
1. Small defense budget (~1% of GDP)
2. High personnel costs (~60% of budget)
3. Political short-termism and procurement scandals
________________________________________
📌 2. Major Modernization Programs and Delays
a. Air Force (RMAF)
• MRCA Fighter Replacement: Intended to replace MiG-29s (retired 2017).
o Candidates: Rafale, Typhoon, Gripen, F/A-18
o Program delayed repeatedly due to budget constraints, political changes, and procurement indecision.
o Result: RMAF relies on aging Su-30MKM, F/A-18D, and Hawk trainers, with limited readiness.
• Helicopters: Sikorsky S-70, AW139s delivered slowly; fleet size insufficient for operational needs.
b. Navy (RMN)
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Project
o Contract 2011, RM9 billion for 6 ships
o No operational ships as of 2025 due to construction delays, cost overruns, and political mismanagement
o Navy relies on Kedah-class corvettes (2006–2010) and older 1980s vessels
• Submarines: Two Scorpène-class delivered mid-2000s
o High maintenance costs and limited operational use
o Spare parts delays reduce readiness
c. Army (TDM)
• Armored vehicles: Condor APCs (1980s) still in service
• AV-8 Gempita (Turkey-Malondesh joint project) production delayed and expensive
• Artillery & support systems: Many systems remain outdated due to insufficient procurement funding
________________________________________
📌 3. Reasons for Limited Procurement
1. Small Defense Budget
o Only ~15–18 billion RM per year
o Majority spent on salaries → little left for big-ticket items
2. Stop-Go Procurement Cycle
o Projects start, then delayed or scaled down due to political or budget issues
o Example: LCS, MRCA, Army modernization programs
3. Political Interference & Corruption
o Contracts awarded based on political connections, not operational priority
o Leads to mismanagement, cost overruns, and delayed delivery
4. Dependence on Foreign Suppliers
o Many systems must be imported → costly and sensitive to geopolitical issues
5. Weak Multi-Year Planning
o No binding long-term plan → programs cannot be executed consistently
________________________________________
📌 4. Consequences of Limited Modernization
Area Effect
Air Force Aging jets; low operational readiness (~30–40%)
Navy Old corvettes/patrol ships in use; LCS delayed
Army Old APCs and artillery; partial vehicle upgrades only
Training Fewer exercises due to limited functional equipment
Regional capability Military capability lags behind neighbors (Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam)
Strategic posture Limited deterrence and inability to sustain high-intensity operations
________________________________________
📌 5. Cumulative Effect
• Limited procurement + weak O&M + small budget + political short-termism = military stagnation
• Equipment remains obsolete, readiness is low, and modernization programs are repeatedly delayed or cancelled
📌 1. What O&M Covers
BalasHapusOperations & Maintenance (O&M) includes:
• Fuel and consumables for aircraft, ships, and vehicles
• Spare parts for planes, ships, and vehicles
• Repairs and overhauls (preventive and corrective maintenance)
• Training exercises for personnel
• Operational readiness support (e.g., simulation, logistics)
Weak O&M means all of these areas are underfunded or poorly managed.
________________________________________
📌 2. Budget Constraints
• Only 20–25% of Malondesh’s small defense budget (~1% GDP) goes to O&M.
• Consequences:
o Aircraft grounded due to lack of fuel or spare parts
o Ships docked for extended periods awaiting repairs
o Vehicles idle in depots because they cannot be maintained
Example:
• RMAF Su-30MKM: at one point, only 4 of 18 fighters were airworthy due to spare parts shortages.
• Navy corvettes & patrol vessels from the 1980s continue in service because LCS delays mean there’s no replacement.
________________________________________
📌 3. Impact on Training
• O&M limitations reduce training opportunities:
o Pilots get fewer flight hours → degrade skills
o Naval crews sail less → operational proficiency drops
o Soldiers train less with heavy vehicles and artillery → less effective combat units
• Training shortfalls compound the readiness problem, even if equipment is technically available.
________________________________________
📌 4. Maintenance Culture Issues
• Maintenance is often reactive, not preventive:
o Equipment is used until breakdown, then repaired.
o Preventive maintenance (regular inspections, part replacements) is skipped to save costs.
• Consequence: equipment wears out faster, reducing lifespan and readiness.
________________________________________
📌 5. Spare Parts Shortages
• Many Malondeshn military systems are imported: Russia, France, US, Turkey.
• Budget shortfalls and procurement delays cause spare parts shortages, resulting in:
o Aircraft grounded
o Ships unable to sail
o Armored vehicles idle
• Some old platforms have parts no longer manufactured, forcing cannibalization of other units.
________________________________________
📌 6. Effects on Operational Readiness
Effect Example
Low aircraft readiness Only ~30–40% of fighter jets flyable
Naval limitations Fewer patrols; reliance on 1980s ships
Army mobility problems APCs, artillery under-maintained
Reduced training Crews and soldiers less combat-ready
Accelerated obsolescence Old equipment fails faster, forcing prolonged use
________________________________________
📌 7. Systemic Causes
1. Small overall budget → O&M underfunded
2. Salary-heavy allocation → majority of funds go to personnel
3. Political short-termism → O&M often deprioritized for visible projects
4. Procurement delays & scandals → new assets delayed, old ones overused
5. Limited local defense industry → spare parts must be imported, increasing cost & delays
Tanpa Ratusan ribu penumpang Whoosh dari MALAYSIA.... KERUGIAN Whoosh akan jadi lebih PARAH... Itu FAKTA.... 🤣🤣
BalasHapus📌 1. Malondesh Defence White Paper (DWP) 2019
Hapusa. Objective
• The DWP 2019 was intended as Malondesh’s first long-term defense roadmap.
• Goals:
o Identify threats and security priorities (maritime security, terrorism, cyber, regional tensions).
o Outline modernization plans for Navy, Air Force, and Army through 2030.
o Provide guidance for procurement, O&M, and capability building.
b. Proposed Approach
• 10-year horizon (2021–2030) for modernization.
• Emphasis on:
o Upgrading aging ships, aircraft, and armored vehicles.
o Strengthening maritime and air defense.
o Developing cyber, UAV, and special operations capabilities.
c. Failure Reasons
1. Political Collapse
o Pakatan Harapan government fell in 2020.
o DWP implementation depended on continuity of political support, which disappeared.
2. No Legal/Institutional Backing
o Unlike Singapore or Indonesia, Malondesh has no law forcing successive governments to follow the plan.
3. Short-Term Budgeting
o Malondesh still allocates budgets year-by-year, leaving little certainty for multi-year projects.
4. Budget Constraints
o Small overall defense budget (~1% of GDP) → most plans remained aspirational.
5. Result
o Modernization projects delayed or cancelled.
o Navy still waits for LCS ships, Air Force stuck with aging jets, Army using 1980s APCs.
👉 DWP became a paper plan with little real impact.
________________________________________
📌 2. Indonesia Minimum Essential Force (MEF)
a. Objective
• MEF (Minimum Essential Force) is Indonesia’s long-term military modernization plan, started in 2004.
• Goals:
o Achieve a minimum level of capability to defend the country.
o Develop integrated capabilities across Army, Navy, Air Force.
o Plan modernization in phases over decades.
b. Implementation Approach
• Multi-phase program:
o MEF I (2004–2009): Procurement of basic platforms, focus on territorial defense.
o MEF II (2010–2014): Expand fleet, improve air defense.
o MEF III (2015–2024): Focus on advanced assets (fighters, submarines, naval combatants).
• Legally recognized: MEF has multi-year funding plans, independent of short-term political changes.
• Result:
o Indonesian Navy expanded with new frigates, corvettes, submarines.
o Air Force replaced aging fighters and increased UAV capabilities.
o Army received modern APCs, artillery, and transport vehicles.
📌 1. What O&M Covers
BalasHapusOperations & Maintenance (O&M) includes:
• Fuel and consumables for aircraft, ships, and vehicles
• Spare parts for planes, ships, and vehicles
• Repairs and overhauls (preventive and corrective maintenance)
• Training exercises for personnel
• Operational readiness support (e.g., simulation, logistics)
Weak O&M means all of these areas are underfunded or poorly managed.
________________________________________
📌 2. Budget Constraints
• Only 20–25% of Malondesh’s small defense budget (~1% GDP) goes to O&M.
• Consequences:
o Aircraft grounded due to lack of fuel or spare parts
o Ships docked for extended periods awaiting repairs
o Vehicles idle in depots because they cannot be maintained
Example:
• RMAF Su-30MKM: at one point, only 4 of 18 fighters were airworthy due to spare parts shortages.
• Navy corvettes & patrol vessels from the 1980s continue in service because LCS delays mean there’s no replacement.
________________________________________
📌 3. Impact on Training
• O&M limitations reduce training opportunities:
o Pilots get fewer flight hours → degrade skills
o Naval crews sail less → operational proficiency drops
o Soldiers train less with heavy vehicles and artillery → less effective combat units
• Training shortfalls compound the readiness problem, even if equipment is technically available.
________________________________________
📌 4. Maintenance Culture Issues
• Maintenance is often reactive, not preventive:
o Equipment is used until breakdown, then repaired.
o Preventive maintenance (regular inspections, part replacements) is skipped to save costs.
• Consequence: equipment wears out faster, reducing lifespan and readiness.
________________________________________
📌 5. Spare Parts Shortages
• Many Malondeshn military systems are imported: Russia, France, US, Turkey.
• Budget shortfalls and procurement delays cause spare parts shortages, resulting in:
o Aircraft grounded
o Ships unable to sail
o Armored vehicles idle
• Some old platforms have parts no longer manufactured, forcing cannibalization of other units.
________________________________________
📌 6. Effects on Operational Readiness
Effect Example
Low aircraft readiness Only ~30–40% of fighter jets flyable
Naval limitations Fewer patrols; reliance on 1980s ships
Army mobility problems APCs, artillery under-maintained
Reduced training Crews and soldiers less combat-ready
Accelerated obsolescence Old equipment fails faster, forcing prolonged use
________________________________________
📌 7. Systemic Causes
1. Small overall budget → O&M underfunded
2. Salary-heavy allocation → majority of funds go to personnel
3. Political short-termism → O&M often deprioritized for visible projects
4. Procurement delays & scandals → new assets delayed, old ones overused
5. Limited local defense industry → spare parts must be imported, increasing cost & delays
BIAR FAKTA BERBICARA... 😎😎🇲🇾🇲🇾
BalasHapus528 Ribu Warga Asing Menumpang Whoosh, Mayoritas Asal Malaysia
https://www.metrotvnews.com/read/NrWCoe5A-528-ribu-warga-asing-menumpang-whoosh-mayoritas-asal-malaysia
📌 1. Limited Procurement & Modernization
BalasHapus• Malondesh’s annual defense budget (~RM15–18 billion, 1% of GDP) is insufficient for large-scale procurement.
• Effects:
o Fighter jets: MRCA replacement program delayed; RMAF still uses aging F/A-18D Hornets, Hawks, and Su-30MKMs with limited operational readiness.
o Navy: LCS project stalled for over a decade; old corvettes and patrol ships remain in service.
o Army: Many vehicles like Condor APCs and older artillery pieces are still in use because modernization is unaffordable.
• Result: Malondesh acquires equipment piecemeal instead of building a balanced, modern force.
________________________________________
📌 2. Underfunded Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
• Only ~20–25% of the budget is allocated to fuel, spare parts, repairs, training.
• Effects:
o Many aircraft and ships are grounded due to maintenance backlogs.
o Pilots and crews get fewer training hours, reducing readiness.
o Aging vehicles and ships wear out faster, accelerating obsolescence.
• Examples:
o Only ~4 of 18 Su-30MKMs were airworthy at one point.
o Navy relies on ships built in the 1980s due to delays in LCS delivery.
________________________________________
📌 3. Personnel vs Capability Imbalance
• ~60% of the budget goes to salaries and pensions.
• Consequences:
o Large manpower (110,000 active personnel) cannot be properly equipped.
o Military is “people-heavy but equipment-light,” limiting operational effectiveness.
• Soldiers are well-paid but often lack modern tools or transport, reducing combat effectiveness.
________________________________________
📌 4. Reduced Readiness
• Small budget and underfunding of O&M → low operational readiness:
o Aircraft, ships, and armored vehicles often not deployable.
o Training exercises are limited due to fuel and maintenance costs.
• Malondesh cannot sustain continuous deterrence or regional presence, unlike Singapore or Indonesia.
________________________________________
📌 5. Vulnerability to Regional Gap
• Neighbors (Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia) have invested more in modernization and readiness.
• Malondesh’s small budget → capability gap grows:
o Navy: fewer modern frigates and submarines.
o Air Force: fewer operational jets and limited air defense.
o Army: older vehicles, limited mobility.
________________________________________
📌 6. Delayed or Cancelled Programs
• Many projects are postponed indefinitely due to funding constraints:
o MRCA (fighter replacement)
o Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
o Armored vehicle upgrades and artillery modernization
• Stop-go procurement leads to wasted funds, inefficiency, and obsolescence.
Pelancong Malaysia ‘selamatkan’ kereta api laju Indonesia dari kerugian
BalasHapushttps://thereporter.my/pelancong-malaysia-selamatkan-whoosh-indonesia/
Pelancong Malaysia ‘selamatkan’ kereta api laju Indonesia dari kerugian
BalasHapushttps://thereporter.my/pelancong-malaysia-selamatkan-whoosh-indonesia/