05 September 2025

KRI Brawijaya-320 Tiba di Perairan Indonesia, Disambut Unsur Satkor Koarmada I

05 September 2025

KRI Brawijaya-320, fregat terbaru TNI AL ketika memasuki Indonesia (photos: Koarmada 2)

TNI AL Koarmada II -- Operasi penyeberangan KRI Brawijaya-320 pada etape ke-6 resmi memasuki wilayah perairan Indonesia. Kedatangan kapal perang terbaru TNI AL ini disambut oleh unsur Satuan Kapal Eskorta (Satkor) Koarmada I, yaitu KRI Sultan Thaha Syaifuddin-376 (KRI STS-376) dan KRI Lambung Mangkurat-374 (KRI LAM-374), di Perairan Selat Sunda. Kamis(4/9).


Sebagai bentuk penyambutan, dilaksanakan berbagai serial latihan yang melibatkan Air Joining Procedure bersama unsur udara pesawat CN-235, komunikasi isyarat Flaghoist, serta formasi kebanggaan Jaladhipa. Seluruh rangkaian berlangsung dengan penuh semangat dan disiplin tinggi, mencerminkan profesionalisme prajurit Jalasena.


Kehadiran KRI Brawijaya-320 yang baru saja menempuh pelayaran panjang dari Italia menjadi simbol kebanggaan sekaligus penambah kekuatan alutsista TNI AL. Momentum latihan bersama unsur Satkor Koarmada I juga menegaskan soliditas armada laut dalam menjaga kedaulatan perairan Nusantara.


Sebagai penutup, digelar Sail Past yang sarat makna, di mana KRI Brawijaya-320 melaju di lambung kanan KRI STS-376 dan KRI LAM-374. Prosesi ini diwarnai penghormatan antar unsur, lambaian tangan, serta ucapan selamat datang, menandai tonggak bersejarah kembalinya KRI Brawijaya-320 menginjakkan haluan di tanah air.

63 komentar:

  1. Legal Grey Zones in “Offsets” & “Consultancy Fees”
    • Commissions to middlemen are often disguised as:
    o Offset programs (e.g., promising technology transfer, training, local jobs).
    o Consultancy fees for “facilitating” deals.
    o Logistics or IT support contracts.
    • These make it appear legitimate on paper, even if the services provided are minimal or irrelevant.
    Why it continues: Because the practice can be masked under legal business terms, it becomes difficult to prove corruption.
    ________________________________________
    Institutionalized Culture of Corruption
    • In Malondesh, the role of middlemen has been entrenched since the 1980s–1990s when large defense contracts (MiG-29s, patrol boats, submarines) first involved commissions.
    • Once established, it became a “standard practice” in defense procurement.
    • Military officers are aware of it but cannot override political leaders who approve procurement.
    Why it continues: Corruption in procurement has become part of the status quo — changing it would threaten entrenched interests.
    ________________________________________
    Limited Domestic Defense Industry Capacity
    • Malondesh does not have a strong indigenous defense industry compared to countries like Singapore.
    • This weakness forces Malondesh to import most major weapons (jets, submarines, ships, tanks).
    • Because imports are complex, middlemen exploit the situation by presenting themselves as “essential” facilitators.
    Why it continues: Without a robust local defense industry, Malondesh depends on foreign deals, which middlemen dominate.
    ________________________________________
    Short-Term Political Gains Over Long-Term Military Needs
    • Defense deals are often politically timed (e.g., before elections) to show “progress” in military modernization.
    • Politicians prioritize contracts that reward allies or fund political campaigns instead of long-term military requirements.
    • Middlemen are crucial to channel funds quickly and quietly.
    Why it continues: Political survival often outweighs genuine defense needs.
    ________________________________________
    ✅ Summary
    Middlemen continue to exist in Malondeshn defense procurement because of:
    1. Political patronage → Contracts reward allies.
    2. Opaque, secretive procurement → No transparency.
    3. Weak oversight → Parliament & auditors lack power.
    4. Foreign supplier practices → They accept middlemen as part of the deal.
    5. Legal disguise → Commissions hidden as consultancy or offsets.
    6. Entrenched corruption culture → Seen as “normal.”
    7. Weak local defense industry → Dependence on imports makes intermediaries seem necessary.
    8. Political short-termism → Leaders use procurement for power, not military readiness.

    BalasHapus
  2. πŸ’° MIDDLEMEN & COMMISSIONS IN MALONDESHN Armed Forces Procurement
    1. What Are Middlemen in Defense Deals?
    • In defense procurement, middlemen (sometimes called agents, consultants, or brokers) act as intermediaries between the Malondeshn government/military and foreign defense suppliers (e.g., shipbuilders, aircraft manufacturers, arms companies).
    • In theory, they are supposed to:
    o Facilitate negotiations.
    o Provide local expertise.
    o Smoothen bureaucracy.
    • In practice, they often inflate costs, demand commissions, and channel kickbacks to political figures or officials.
    ________________________________________
    2. How Middlemen Work in Malondeshn Defense Procurement
    1. Foreign Supplier → Local Agent
    o A foreign company selling jets, submarines, or ships is required (sometimes unofficially) to use a Malondeshn intermediary.
    2. Mark-Up & Commission
    o The agent adds commission fees (5–15% or more) on top of the real price.
    o These inflated costs are hidden under “consultancy services” or “offset agreements.”
    3. Kickbacks
    o Part of the commission is allegedly funneled to politicians, senior officials, or linked companies to secure the contract.
    4. Result
    o Malondesh ends up paying far above market price for equipment.
    o The military gets fewer assets for the same budget.
    ________________________________________
    3. Examples of Middlemen in Malondeshn Defense Scandals
    🟒 a. The Scorpène Submarine Deal (2002)
    • Malondesh purchased two ScorpΓ¨ne-class submarines from French company DCNS (now Naval Group) worth about RM 4.3 billion (~USD 1 billion).
    • A Malondeshn company, Perimekar Sdn Bhd, acted as the “support services provider.”
    • Perimekar received RM 500 million (≈ USD 120 million) in “commissions.”
    • French investigations later revealed this was effectively kickbacks disguised as consultancy fees, with allegations that money was funneled to Malondeshn political elites.
    Impact: Malondesh got the submarines, but at a heavily inflated price — while international corruption investigations damaged Malondesh reputation.
    ________________________________________
    🟒 b. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal (2011–present)
    • The RM 9 billion contract to build 6 Gowind-class ships involved subcontracting and changes in design.
    • Reports suggest multiple layers of subcontractors and consultants, many linked to politically connected firms.
    • Payments were made for “consultancy” and “IT systems” that had little to do with shipbuilding.
    • Some of these contracts were allegedly ways to siphon money out of the project.
    Impact: Billions spent, zero ships delivered by 2025. The use of middlemen and subcontractors directly contributed to the collapse of the program.
    ________________________________________
    🟒 c. Fighter Jet & Helicopter Purchases
    • Past deals for MiG-29s (1990s), Su-30MKMs (2000s), and helicopters (2010s) also involved agents.
    • Allegations:
    o Overpricing of spare parts.
    o Long-term maintenance contracts given to politically linked firms.
    o Kickbacks hidden in “service fees.”
    ________________________________________
    4. Why Middlemen Are a Problem in Malondesh
    1. Inflated Costs
    o Commissions can push prices 20–30% higher than international norms.
    2. Reduced Military Capability
    o With the same budget, Malondesh buys fewer ships, jets, or vehicles.
    3. Encourages Corruption
    o Middlemen often act as money channels for bribes.
    4. Weak Accountability
    o These commissions are often hidden in classified “national security” budgets, so Parliament and public auditors cannot fully track them.
    5. Foreign Dependence
    o Malondesh has limited domestic defense industry capacity, making it vulnerable to manipulation by foreign suppliers and local agents.

    BalasHapus
  3. ⚠️ CORRUPTION & PROCUREMENT SCANDALS IN THE MALONDESHN ARMED FORCES
    1. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
    This is the largest defense procurement scandal in Malondesh’s history.
    • Background
    o In 2011, Malondesh signed a contract worth RM 9 billion (≈ USD 2.1 billion) with Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS) to build 6 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) for the Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN).
    o These ships, based on the French Gowind-class frigate design, were meant to modernize the Navy and secure the South China Sea.
    • Problems
    o Despite the contract, not a single ship was delivered by 2025, even though billions were already paid.
    o Reports revealed design changes, mismanagement, poor oversight, and possible corruption.
    o The Navy originally wanted the Sigma-class design (Dutch), but the government switched to the French design without military input.
    o Funds were allegedly misused for unrelated purchases (e.g., IT systems, consultancy fees).
    • Impact
    o RMN is left with an aging fleet while neighbors are modernizing.
    o Malondesh lost at least a decade of naval modernization.
    o Public confidence in the government’s ability to handle defense procurement is shaken.
    ________________________________________
    2. Submarine Procurement Issues (2002)
    • Malondesh purchased two ScorpΓ¨ne-class submarines from France in a deal worth RM 4.3 billion (≈ USD 1 billion).
    • The deal was marred by allegations of kickbacks and bribery involving Malondeshn officials and French suppliers.
    • A high-profile corruption scandal in France (known as the ScorpΓ¨ne scandal) linked Malondeshn intermediaries to illegal payments.
    • Additionally, when the submarines arrived in 2009, one of them had technical defects and could not dive for months.
    Impact:
    • While the submarines are now operational, the scandal tarnished the project and raised concerns about costs vs capability.
    ________________________________________
    3. MIG-29 and Sukhoi Su-30MKM Maintenance Issues
    • Malondesh bought 18 MiG-29s in the 1990s and later 18 Su-30MKMs (2007).
    • Corruption allegations emerged around maintenance contracts and spare parts procurement, with accusations of inflated costs.
    • The MiG-29s were retired early in 2017 due to high costs and low availability — seen by critics as a waste of taxpayer money.
    ________________________________________
    4. Other Reported Issues
    • Helicopter Procurement Delays (MD530G “Little Birds”)
    o Ordered in 2016 (RM 300 million).
    o Delivery delayed for years; helicopters only arrived in 2022.
    o Critics claimed the deal was overpriced and non-transparent.
    • Radar & Surveillance Systems
    o Some radar projects were criticized for overpricing and favoritism in awarding contracts.
    ________________________________________
    5. Structural Causes of Corruption in Defense Procurement
    1. Weak Oversight
    o Parliament and independent bodies have limited access to detailed defense procurement information (often classified under “national security”).
    2. Political Influence
    o Major contracts are often awarded to companies linked to politicians or government-linked corporations (GLCs).
    3. Opaque Procurement Process
    o Tenders are often not competitive. Direct negotiations and political considerations override military requirements.
    4. Middlemen & Commissions
    o Use of intermediaries in defense deals creates opportunities for kickbacks.

    BalasHapus
  4. ⚔️ OUTDATED EQUIPMENT & MODERNIZATION Delays in the Malondeshn Armed Forces
    Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF)
    The Air Force is the most affected branch in terms of aging assets.
    • Fighter Jets
    o Malondesh retired its MiG-29 Fulcrums in 2017 due to high maintenance costs and lack of spare parts.
    o Current frontline fighters:
     Sukhoi Su-30MKM (18 units, delivered 2007–2009): Still capable, but availability is low because of expensive maintenance and reliance on Russian parts.
     F/A-18D Hornet (8 units, delivered 1997): Effective but old; parts are harder to obtain.
    o Planned Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) program (replacement fighters) has been delayed for more than a decade due to budget constraints and political indecision.
    • Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Gap
    o Malondesh needs cheaper jets for training and patrols.
    o After years of delay, Malondesh finally selected the FA-50 light combat aircraft from South Korea in 2023, with deliveries only expected from 2026 onward.
    o Until then, there is a serious capability gap.
    • Transport & Surveillance Aircraft
    o C-130 Hercules (operational since 1970s–80s) still serve as the backbone for transport, though some have been refurbished.
    o Maritime patrol aircraft are lacking — Malondesh depends on small Beechcraft King Air planes, which are outdated and limited in range.
    Summary:
    The RMAF struggles with a shrinking and aging fighter fleet, slow replacement programs, and gaps in maritime surveillance.

    BalasHapus
  5. punyak kita datang 33 knot hore haha!πŸ‘πŸ₯³πŸ‘
    Aset Baruw...Gempar Kawasan haha!πŸš€πŸ¦ΎπŸš€
    Full Wepon haha!πŸš€πŸš€πŸš€

    warganyet PANIKπŸ₯Ά

    BalasHapus
  6. wuiihhh PPA datang semakin ciut lcs haha!🀣🀣🀣
    kahsiyan kapal darat tak dianggap, abisnya SALAH FOTONG penuh drama ...last last Utang tak bayar...Emir Kuwait Marahhh πŸ”₯ haha!😝😝😝

    BalasHapus
  7. PPA 143meter kapal kombatan Terbesar & Tercepat saat ini di kawasan haha!🦾🦾🦾
    Full Wepon, siyap acak2 ambalat haha!πŸš€☠️πŸš€

    mana negh warganyet kl, keluar donk kalo brani haha!πŸ˜‚πŸ˜‚πŸ˜‚
    kahsiyan tak punyak HSR, KENSELBLAGI denda $"100 juta oleh mantan propinsi, aduhhh Malyu

    BalasHapus
  8. ✅️hobart klas 147m Osi versi panjang
    ✅️alvaro de bazan 146m Espanyola versi Ori
    ✅️Fridtjof Nansen klas 134m Norwagio versi Pahe haha!🀭🀭🀭

    semua dari disain F100 buatan navantia.
    disain terbaruw F110 bonifaz klas bentar lagi dikomisikan untuk ganti F100 alvaro de bazan
    dan Norwagio pilih type 26 pengganti Fridtjof Nansen klas, versi pendek 134m

    wahh artinya pasar frigat bekas makin banyak stok
    ✅️fremm, maestrale dr itali
    ✅️type 23 klas britis
    ✅️anzac klas osi
    ✅️Fridtjof Nansen klas norwagio
    ✅️dzp klas belande
    ✅️la fayette klas prancis
    ✅️alvari de bazan

    begh..sebanyak seganteng ini..kcuali maes & type 23 ama anzac haha!πŸ€­πŸ˜„πŸ€­
    makin banyak pilihan, kita comot yg mana?
    silakan pilih favorit kleian gaesz haha!πŸ˜‰πŸ˜‰πŸ˜‰

    Eittt setelah AH140, PPA, ISTIF, masi ada target $hopping frigat lagi si FDI hore haha!πŸ€—πŸ€‘πŸ€—
    mogami tampaknya di coret, bisa jadi lanjut sekenan aduhay...
    kebutuhan frigat masi banyak lowong nich haha!πŸ˜‰πŸ˜‰πŸ˜‰

    BalasHapus
  9. Sayang gak lewat Selat Malaka bisa dekat3 Pelabuhan Lumut Perak...geber2 dan coba meriam 127 mm biar Maharaja Lelah ambrol dan lekiu tenggelam ketakutan.. πŸ‡²πŸ‡ΎπŸ€‘πŸ€‘πŸ€‘

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. MERIAM...? ingat ini WW2 ke...? Belum sampai sudah makan misil HARPOON tu.... 🀣🀣🀣

      Hapus
    2. ada VLS A50 masa gak liat, butakah haha!🀣🀣🀣
      ehh vls mica, nsm mana? uda 14 taon masi aja KOSONG lcs haha!πŸ˜‚πŸ˜‚πŸ˜‚

      Hapus
    3. πŸ’Έ 1. LONG-TERM FINANCIAL BURDEN
      • Malondesh RM16.5 billion lease for 28 helicopters over 15 years may cost more than outright purchase.
      • For comparison, Poland bought 32 AW149 helicopters for US$1.83 billion, while Malondesh is leasing fewer units for nearly double the price.
      • Critics argue that bundled services (maintenance, training, insurance) inflate the cost, creating a hidden financial strain over time.
      πŸ› ️ 2. Limited Control Over Assets
      • Leased helicopters are not fully owned until the end of the contract.
      • This restricts Malondesh ability to:
      o Upgrade systems
      o Reconfigure for new missions
      o Integrate with other platforms
      • Strategic flexibility is compromised, especially in emergencies or regional conflicts.
      🧭 3. Missed Opportunity for Local Industry Growth
      • Leasing bypasses local manufacturing, assembly, and maintenance, which could have boosted Malondesh defense industry.
      • No significant technology transfer or job creation occurs under private leasing arrangements.
      • This weakens Malondesh long-term goal of defense self-reliance.
      πŸ•΅️‍♂️ 4. Procurement Transparency Risks
      • The deal was awarded to Weststar Aviation, a private firm, raising concerns about middlemen and lobbying.
      • Past scandals (e.g., LCS and MD530G) have made the public wary of opaque procurement processes.
      • Leasing may reduce upfront corruption risks, but it doesn’t eliminate contractual opacity.
      ⚠️ 5. Strategic Dependency
      • Malondesh becomes dependent on private contractors for asset readiness and maintenance.
      • If the contractor fails to meet service-level agreements (e.g., 85% fleet availability), national security could be compromised.
      • Legal or financial disputes could delay operations or ground critical assets.
      πŸ—£️ Political & Public Backlash
      • Opposition leaders and defense experts have criticized the lease as overpriced and strategically flawed.
      • The government defends it as a way to avoid upfront costs and ensure faster deployment, but the debate continues in Parliament and among analysts

      Hapus
    4. πŸ’Έ 1. LONG-TERM FINANCIAL BURDEN
      • Malondesh RM16.5 billion lease for 28 helicopters over 15 years may cost more than outright purchase.
      • For comparison, Poland bought 32 AW149 helicopters for US$1.83 billion, while Malondesh is leasing fewer units for nearly double the price.
      • Critics argue that bundled services (maintenance, training, insurance) inflate the cost, creating a hidden financial strain over time.
      πŸ› ️ 2. Limited Control Over Assets
      • Leased helicopters are not fully owned until the end of the contract.
      • This restricts Malondesh ability to:
      o Upgrade systems
      o Reconfigure for new missions
      o Integrate with other platforms
      • Strategic flexibility is compromised, especially in emergencies or regional conflicts.
      🧭 3. Missed Opportunity for Local Industry Growth
      • Leasing bypasses local manufacturing, assembly, and maintenance, which could have boosted Malondesh defense industry.
      • No significant technology transfer or job creation occurs under private leasing arrangements.
      • This weakens Malondesh long-term goal of defense self-reliance.
      πŸ•΅️‍♂️ 4. Procurement Transparency Risks
      • The deal was awarded to Weststar Aviation, a private firm, raising concerns about middlemen and lobbying.
      • Past scandals (e.g., LCS and MD530G) have made the public wary of opaque procurement processes.
      • Leasing may reduce upfront corruption risks, but it doesn’t eliminate contractual opacity.
      ⚠️ 5. Strategic Dependency
      • Malondesh becomes dependent on private contractors for asset readiness and maintenance.
      • If the contractor fails to meet service-level agreements (e.g., 85% fleet availability), national security could be compromised.
      • Legal or financial disputes could delay operations or ground critical assets.
      πŸ—£️ Political & Public Backlash
      • Opposition leaders and defense experts have criticized the lease as overpriced and strategically flawed.
      • The government defends it as a way to avoid upfront costs and ensure faster deployment, but the debate continues in Parliament and among analysts

      Hapus
    5. πŸ› ️ WHAT “OUTDATED” REALLY MEANS
      Outdated systems refer to:
      • Sensors that lack modern tracking, targeting, and surveillance capabilities
      • Weapons with limited range, accuracy, and compatibility with newer platforms
      • Command-and-control systems that cannot integrate with digital battlefield networks
      🚒 Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN)
      • 28 ships are over 40 years old, including Fast Attack Craft and patrol vessels.
      • Many vessels still use analog radar systems, manual fire-control systems, and obsolete sonar.
      • These systems struggle to detect modern threats like stealth submarines or drones.
      • Maintenance costs are skyrocketing, and spare parts are often unavailable or discontinued.
      πŸ›©️ Royal Malondeshn Air Force (RMAF)
      • Older aircraft like the MiG-29N (retired) and F/A-18D Hornets still rely on legacy avionics.
      • Limited electronic warfare capabilities and outdated targeting pods reduce effectiveness in modern air combat.
      • Poor interoperability with newer aircraft and NATO-standard systems.
      πŸͺ– Malondeshn Army
      • Ground vehicles, including legacy APCs and tanks, use basic optical sights and manual targeting systems.
      • Many artillery units lack GPS-guided fire control, making precision strikes difficult.
      • Communication systems are often analog or semi-digital, limiting coordination in joint operations.
      ⚠️ Consequences of Technological Lag
      • Reduced combat effectiveness in high-tech warfare environments
      • Increased vulnerability to cyber attacks and electronic jamming
      • Limited participation in multinational exercises and peacekeeping missions
      • Higher risk to personnel due to unreliable systems, as seen in the 2025 commando tragedy linked to aging gear

      Hapus
    6. Memang Gempur punya missile harpoon πŸ‡²πŸ‡ΎπŸ€‘πŸ€‘πŸ€‘kapal belum jadi sudah sembang ejek2... Hornetnya meletup... cuma punya hornet 7 biji..kapal perang tak punya yg canggih... gak tahu diri.... malaydesh miskin.

      Hapus
  10. target SHOPPING kita Umazing haha!πŸ€—πŸ‘πŸ€—
    ✅️36 frigat
    ✅️4 destro...Pawer haha!πŸ¦ΎπŸš€πŸ¦Ύ

    https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/05/ksal-tni-al-berupaya-rampungkan-renstra.html?m=1

    seblah tuw paper 15-5 doank, shopping NOL..lcs Mangkrak Abadi haha!🀣🀣🀣

    BalasHapus
  11. Wooww... Kapal PPA NGUTANG LENDER Hanya ada meriam je guys.... 🀣🀣🀣🀣

    Masa tidak disiasat.... Kapal HUTANG sebesar 1.25 Billion tu hanya ada MERIAM ... 🀣🀣🀣

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. πŸ’Έ 1. LONG-TERM FINANCIAL BURDEN
      • Malondesh RM16.5 billion lease for 28 helicopters over 15 years may cost more than outright purchase.
      • For comparison, Poland bought 32 AW149 helicopters for US$1.83 billion, while Malondesh is leasing fewer units for nearly double the price.
      • Critics argue that bundled services (maintenance, training, insurance) inflate the cost, creating a hidden financial strain over time.
      πŸ› ️ 2. Limited Control Over Assets
      • Leased helicopters are not fully owned until the end of the contract.
      • This restricts Malondesh ability to:
      o Upgrade systems
      o Reconfigure for new missions
      o Integrate with other platforms
      • Strategic flexibility is compromised, especially in emergencies or regional conflicts.
      🧭 3. Missed Opportunity for Local Industry Growth
      • Leasing bypasses local manufacturing, assembly, and maintenance, which could have boosted Malondesh defense industry.
      • No significant technology transfer or job creation occurs under private leasing arrangements.
      • This weakens Malondesh long-term goal of defense self-reliance.
      πŸ•΅️‍♂️ 4. Procurement Transparency Risks
      • The deal was awarded to Weststar Aviation, a private firm, raising concerns about middlemen and lobbying.
      • Past scandals (e.g., LCS and MD530G) have made the public wary of opaque procurement processes.
      • Leasing may reduce upfront corruption risks, but it doesn’t eliminate contractual opacity.
      ⚠️ 5. Strategic Dependency
      • Malondesh becomes dependent on private contractors for asset readiness and maintenance.
      • If the contractor fails to meet service-level agreements (e.g., 85% fleet availability), national security could be compromised.
      • Legal or financial disputes could delay operations or ground critical assets.
      πŸ—£️ Political & Public Backlash
      • Opposition leaders and defense experts have criticized the lease as overpriced and strategically flawed.
      • The government defends it as a way to avoid upfront costs and ensure faster deployment, but the debate continues in Parliament and among analysts

      Hapus
    2. 🚨 1. LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) SCANDAL
      πŸ’° What Happened
      • Malondesh government allocated RM9 billion for six Littoral Combat Ships.
      • Despite billions spent, no ships were delivered as of 2025.
      • The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) revealed cost overruns, mismanagement, and non-compliance with procurement procedures.
      πŸ‘€ Key Figures
      • Former Navy Chief was implicated but later discharged due to health concerns.
      • The scandal sparked public outrage and demands for transparency.
      🚁 2. MD530G Helicopter Procurement Failure
      πŸ› ️ The Issue
      • Malondesh paid 35% upfront for six McDonnell Douglas MD530G helicopters in 2015.
      • None were delivered by the promised 2018 deadline.
      • The deal, worth RM300 million, became a symbol of failed oversight.
      🧾 3. Land Swap Scandal
      πŸ—️ What Went Wrong
      • Military land near urban centers was swapped for remote land to build camps.
      • Many of these swaps were poorly executed, resulting in RM500 million in losses.
      • Defense Minister Mohamad Sabu criticized the deals as wasteful and corrupt.
      πŸ•΅️ 4. RM3 Million Smuggling Conspiracy
      πŸ” Operation Sohor (2025)
      • Malondeshn Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) arrested 10 individuals, including 3 active military officers and 2 ex-intelligence personnel.
      • They allegedly leaked operational intelligence to smugglers for RM30,000–RM50,000 per trip.
      • The syndicate moved contraband worth RM5 million monthly, compromising border security

      Hapus
    3. 🚨 1. LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) SCANDAL
      πŸ’° What Happened
      • Malondesh government allocated RM9 billion for six Littoral Combat Ships.
      • Despite billions spent, no ships were delivered as of 2025.
      • The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) revealed cost overruns, mismanagement, and non-compliance with procurement procedures.
      πŸ‘€ Key Figures
      • Former Navy Chief was implicated but later discharged due to health concerns.
      • The scandal sparked public outrage and demands for transparency.
      🚁 2. MD530G Helicopter Procurement Failure
      πŸ› ️ The Issue
      • Malondesh paid 35% upfront for six McDonnell Douglas MD530G helicopters in 2015.
      • None were delivered by the promised 2018 deadline.
      • The deal, worth RM300 million, became a symbol of failed oversight.
      🧾 3. Land Swap Scandal
      πŸ—️ What Went Wrong
      • Military land near urban centers was swapped for remote land to build camps.
      • Many of these swaps were poorly executed, resulting in RM500 million in losses.
      • Defense Minister Mohamad Sabu criticized the deals as wasteful and corrupt.
      πŸ•΅️ 4. RM3 Million Smuggling Conspiracy
      πŸ” Operation Sohor (2025)
      • Malondeshn Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) arrested 10 individuals, including 3 active military officers and 2 ex-intelligence personnel.
      • They allegedly leaked operational intelligence to smugglers for RM30,000–RM50,000 per trip.
      • The syndicate moved contraband worth RM5 million monthly, compromising border security

      Hapus
    4. 🚒 AGING NAVAL ASSETS – ROYAL MALONDESHN NAVY (RMN)
      ⚙️ Fleet Breakdown
      • 34 RMN vessels have exceeded their intended service life, with 28 of them over 40 years old.
      • These include Fast Attack Craft (FAC) that are now half a century old, far beyond modern standards.
      • The RMN operates 53 ships across various classes, but many are technologically outdated and costly to maintain.
      ⚠️ Operational Risks
      • Older ships suffer from:
      o Reduced combat capability
      o Outdated sensors and weapons systems
      o High maintenance costs and frequent breakdowns
      • The sinking of the KD Pendekar, a 45-year-old vessel, in August 2024 due to flooding highlights the dangers of keeping obsolete ships in service.
      πŸͺ– Aging Ground Assets – Malondeshn Army
      πŸ“Š Asset Overview
      • 108 Army units have surpassed 30 years of service.
      • These include aging armored vehicles, artillery systems, and logistics platforms that are increasingly difficult to maintain and upgrade.
      πŸ”§ Maintenance Challenges
      • Spare parts for older systems are scarce or discontinued.
      • Modernization plans are slow due to budget constraints and procurement delays.
      • Operational efficiency is compromised, especially in jungle and border operations where reliability is critical.
      🧭 Strategic Implications
      • Malondesh aging assets limit its ability to:
      o Respond to regional threats, especially in the South China Sea
      o Participate effectively in joint exercises and peacekeeping missions
      o Maintain deterrence posture against more modernized neighbors

      Hapus
  12. Kapal PPA nya hanya sebatas GUN BOAT FFNBW OMPONG guys.... 🀣🀣🀣

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. πŸ“£ 1. PROCUREMENT SCANDALS FUEL PUBLIC DISTRUST
      Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Scandal
      • The RM9 billion LCS project became a lightning rod for criticism when no ships were delivered despite billions spent.
      • Media outlets and the Public Accounts Committee exposed mismanagement, cost overruns, and non-compliance, triggering public outrage and parliamentary scrutiny.
      MD530G Helicopter Failure
      • Malondesh paid RM112 million upfront for six helicopters that were never delivered on time.
      • The media labeled it a “ghost fleet,” and citizens questioned the lack of accountability.
      πŸ‘‘ 2. Royal Intervention Amplifies Criticism
      • King Sultan Ibrahim, also Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, publicly condemned the procurement of 35-year-old Black Hawk helicopters, calling them “flying coffins.”
      • His rebuke—“If you don’t know the price, ask me first”—went viral, reinforcing public frustration over opaque and overpriced deals.
      πŸ•΅️‍♂️ 3. Smuggling Conspiracy Exposes Internal Corruption
      • In Operation Sohor (2025), MACC arrested military intelligence officers for leaking classified data to smugglers.
      • Media reports revealed the syndicate earned RM5 million monthly, with officers receiving RM30,000–RM50,000 per trip.
      • The scandal was widely covered, with headlines like “Civil Service Corruption Crisis” and “Where is Akmal Saleh?” fueling public anger.
      πŸ§‘‍⚖️ 4. Abuse Cases at Military Institutions
      • A 2024 bullying case at Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malondesh (UPNM) reignited outrage when a cadet suffered multiple fractures after being stomped by a senior.
      • Media coverage highlighted a pattern of hazing and abuse, prompting demands for institutional reform and stricter oversight.
      πŸ“± 5. Social Media & Grassroots Pressure
      • Platforms like Twitter and TikTok have become battlegrounds for public discourse, with hashtags like #ReformATM and #MilitaryTransparency trending during major scandals.
      • Independent media and citizen journalists have played a key role in exposing misconduct, bypassing traditional gatekeepers.
      πŸ› ️ Impact on Policy & Reform
      • The backlash has led to:
      o Cancellation of controversial deals
      o Promises of procurement reform
      o Greater scrutiny of defense budgets and contractor relationships
      • However, many Malondeshns remain skeptical, citing deep-rooted patronage networks and slow institutional change

      Hapus
    2. 🧩 1. COMPLEX & OPAQUE PROCUREMENT PROCESS
      • The Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) follows procurement guidelines set by the Ministry of Finance, but defense deals are often complex and sensitive, making oversight difficult.
      • Procurement is frequently conducted via single-source or limited tendering, with less than one-third of major contracts awarded through open competition.
      • This environment favors politically connected firms, often involving ex-military officers on corporate boards, which can distort priorities and inflate costs.
      πŸ•΅️ 2. Role of Middlemen & “Agents”
      • A major source of mismanagement is the entrenched role of middlemen, who act as intermediaries in defense deals.
      • These agents—sometimes retired generals—can inflate prices, reduce transparency, and compromise the quality of procured assets.
      • In 2023, Malondesh King Sultan Ibrahim publicly rebuked the Ministry of Defence for relying on “agents” and “salesmen,” warning against repeating past procurement mistakes.
      🚨 3. High-Profile Scandals
      • The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project is the most notorious example. Intended to modernize the navy, it was marred by delays, cost overruns, and poor oversight.
      • Another scandal involved the New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) program, which was mismanaged after the privatization of the Lumut naval dockyard. Funds were siphoned off, and the fleet expansion fell short of expectations.
      πŸ“‰ 4. Impact on Military Readiness
      • Mismanaged procurement leads to:
      o Delayed delivery of critical assets
      o Operational gaps in air, sea, and land capabilities
      o Wasted taxpayer money with little strategic return
      • Malondesh ability to respond to regional threats—especially in the South China Sea—is weakened by these systemic issues.

      Hapus
    3. πŸ› ️ 1. AGING EQUIPMENT ACROSS ALL BRANCHES
      • Air Force (RMAF): Out of 28 fighter jets, reportedly only four were operational at one point. Maintenance issues and lack of spare parts have grounded much of the fleet.
      • Army: The Condor Armoured Personnel Carriers, in service since the 1980s, are overdue for replacement. Plans to procure 136 High Mobility Armoured Vehicles (HMAV) are still pending approval.
      • Navy: Many vessels are over 40 years old, with outdated combat systems and limited endurance. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, meant to modernize the fleet, has faced years of delays and budget overruns.
      πŸ’° 2. Budget Constraints & Misallocation
      • Malondesh spends around USD 4 billion annually on defense, but over 40% goes to salaries and allowances, leaving limited funds for modernization.
      • Procurement budgets are often absorbed by progressive payments for delayed projects, such as the FA-50 fighter jets and the troubled LCS program.
      • The depreciation of the ringgit further reduces purchasing power for foreign-sourced equipment.
      🧭 3. Lack of Strategic Direction
      • The defense industry suffers from unclear government guidance on long-term goals.
      • Frequent changes in leadership—four Prime Ministers since 2018—have disrupted continuity in defense planning.
      πŸ§‘‍✈️ 4. Manpower & Training Gaps
      • While Malondesh has 113,000 active personnel and 51,600 reserves, training and readiness levels vary widely.
      • Specialized units like PASKAL and GGK are well-regarded, but broader force readiness is inconsistent.
      🌏 5. Regional Disadvantage
      • Malondesh ranks behind Vietnam and Indonesia in terms of military strength, according to former Defense Minister Mat Sabu.
      • This affects Malondesh ability to assert its interests in contested areas like the South China Sea.

      Hapus
    4. Lah maharaja lelah masih ompong, kiu-kiu sudah GUN BOAT MASIH BISA SEMBANG EJEK2....GOBLOK SEKALI NIH GEMPUR....πŸ‡²πŸ‡ΎπŸ€‘πŸ€‘πŸ€‘πŸ΅

      Hapus
  13. kocak seblah bikin white paper 15-5 tapi berdasar aset jaman lampau...NGAKAK lah duniya haha!πŸ˜†πŸ˜†πŸ˜†

    teknologi selaluw apdet tiap saat contoh kapal muda belia osi belum apa2 apgred

    lah sepupu osi tuw, kapal Rongsok, teknologi obselit, bodi Salah Fotong masi aja lanjut...bahan tertawaan Duniya haha!😝😝😝

    BalasHapus
  14. MISKIN.... 🀣🀣🀣


    Utang BBM Triliunan Rupiah TNI AL ke Pertamina Minta Diputihkan, Permintaan Dinilai Tidak Logis

    https://kbr.id/berita/nasional/utang-bbm-triliunan-rupiah-tni-al-ke-pertamina-minta-diputihkan-permintaan-dinilai-tidak-logis

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. Structural Causes of Modernization Delays
      Why does modernization lag behind?
      1. Budget Constraints
      o Defense budget is below 1.5% of GDP.
      o Modern jets, ships, and tanks are expensive, and Malondesh must prioritize social and economic programs.
      2. Procurement Scandals & Mismanagement
      o The LCS scandal is the biggest example: billions spent, no ships delivered.
      o Procurement decisions often influenced by politics instead of operational needs.
      3. Over-Reliance on Foreign Suppliers
      o Lack of a strong domestic defense industry means Malondesh must import equipment.
      o Currency fluctuations and sanctions (e.g., Russia) complicate maintenance.
      4. Shifting Political Priorities

      Hapus
    2. ⚙️ EQUIPMENT & MODERNIZATION ISSUES
      • Outdated naval assets: Many of Malondesh’s ships are aging, and the navy has struggled to modernize its fleet.
      • Limited air combat readiness: Out of 28 fighter jets, reportedly only four were operational at one point.
      • Delayed procurement: The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project, meant to boost naval capabilities, has been plagued by delays and scandals.
      πŸ’° Budget Constraints
      • Skewed spending priorities: Over 60–70% of the defense budget goes to salaries and maintenance, leaving little for new weapons or modernization.
      • Stagnant budget: Malondesh’s defense budget has hovered around RM15–18 billion annually, which is modest compared to regional peers like Vietnam and Indonesia.
      🧭 Strategic Direction & Policy
      • Lack of clear long-term strategy: The defense industry suffers from unclear government guidance on future strategic direction.
      • Overreliance on diplomacy: Malondesh has traditionally leaned on quiet diplomacy, especially with China, which may be insufficient given rising tensions in the South China Sea.
      πŸ“‰ Regional Comparison
      • Lagging behind neighbors: Malondesh’s military strength is considered weaker than Vietnam and Indonesia, particularly in terms of air and naval capabilities

      Hapus
    3. ⚙️ EQUIPMENT & MODERNIZATION ISSUES
      • Outdated naval assets: Many of Malondesh’s ships are aging, and the navy has struggled to modernize its fleet.
      • Limited air combat readiness: Out of 28 fighter jets, reportedly only four were operational at one point.
      • Delayed procurement: The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project, meant to boost naval capabilities, has been plagued by delays and scandals.
      πŸ’° Budget Constraints
      • Skewed spending priorities: Over 60–70% of the defense budget goes to salaries and maintenance, leaving little for new weapons or modernization.
      • Stagnant budget: Malondesh’s defense budget has hovered around RM15–18 billion annually, which is modest compared to regional peers like Vietnam and Indonesia.
      🧭 Strategic Direction & Policy
      • Lack of clear long-term strategy: The defense industry suffers from unclear government guidance on future strategic direction.
      • Overreliance on diplomacy: Malondesh has traditionally leaned on quiet diplomacy, especially with China, which may be insufficient given rising tensions in the South China Sea.
      πŸ“‰ Regional Comparison
      • Lagging behind neighbors: Malondesh’s military strength is considered weaker than Vietnam and Indonesia, particularly in terms of air and naval capabilities

      Hapus
  15. Bayar HUTANG BBM KAPAL PERANG tu dulu ya.... 🀣🀣🀣


    KSAL Ungkap TNI AL Punya Tunggakan Bahan Bakar Triliunan Rupiah ke Pertamina

    https://www.tempo.co/politik/ksal-ungkap-tni-al-punya-tunggakan-bahan-bakar-triliunan-rupiah-ke-pertamina-1277426

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. Structural Causes of Modernization Delays
      Why does modernization lag behind?
      1. Budget Constraints
      o Defense budget is below 1.5% of GDP.
      o Modern jets, ships, and tanks are expensive, and Malondesh must prioritize social and economic programs.
      2. Procurement Scandals & Mismanagement
      o The LCS scandal is the biggest example: billions spent, no ships delivered.
      o Procurement decisions often influenced by politics instead of operational needs.
      3. Over-Reliance on Foreign Suppliers
      o Lack of a strong domestic defense industry means Malondesh must import equipment.
      o Currency fluctuations and sanctions (e.g., Russia) complicate maintenance.
      4. Shifting Political Priorities

      Hapus
    2. πŸ•΅️‍♂️ WHAT MAKES PROCUREMENT “OPAQUE AND CORRUPT”?
      In Malondesh’s defense sector, procurement is often described as:
      • Opaque: Lacking transparency, with limited public oversight or competitive bidding.
      • Corrupt: Involving kickbacks, inflated contracts, and politically connected middlemen.
      This environment allows deals to be structured for profit rather than strategic value, weakening the armed forces and wasting public funds.
      πŸ” Key Characteristics of Malondesh’s Defense Procurement Issues
      1. Role of Middlemen
      • Defense deals often involve agents or intermediaries, many of whom are retired military officers or politically connected individuals.
      • These middlemen inflate prices and complicate negotiations, leading to excessive profit margins and reduced value for the military.
      2. Limited Open Competition
      • According to Transparency International, only 20–30% of Malondesh’s defense contracts are awarded through open competition.
      • Most deals are done via single-source or limited tendering, which favors select companies and reduces accountability.
      3. Politically Connected Firms
      • Contracts often go to firms with strong political ties, regardless of their technical capability.
      • This creates an environment where performance and delivery are secondary to influence and connections.
      4. Scandals and Mismanagement
      • The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal is a prime example: billions spent, years of delay, and no operational ships delivered.
      • Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has called this a national embarrassment and a symbol of systemic failure.
      5. Weak Oversight and Enforcement
      • Investigations into misconduct are often slow or limited.
      • Even when corruption is exposed, punishments are rare or lenient, which perpetuates the cycle.
      🧨 Consequences for Malondesh’s Military
      • Delayed modernization: Funds are diverted from real capability upgrades.
      • Loss of trust: Defense partners and suppliers hesitate to engage with Malondesh.
      • Operational gaps: The military ends up with outdated or unsuitable equipment.
      • Budget waste: Public money is spent on overpriced or non-functional assets

      Hapus
    3. ⚠️ KEY FACTORS BEHIND MALONDESH LOSS OF Strategic Credibility
      1. Inconsistent Defense Procurement
      • Malondesh defense acquisitions have been plagued by delays, cancellations, and reversals.
      • The MRCA program, for example, has seen years of indecision, with no clear outcome despite urgent need.
      • Interest in second-hand jets like Kuwait’s F/A-18C/D Hornets signals a lack of long-term planning, contrasting with regional trends toward cutting-edge platforms.
      2. Opaque and Corrupt Procurement Practices
      • Analysts have described Malondesh defense procurement as “messy, opaque and corrupt”, often involving middlemen and lacking transparency.
      • This undermines trust among defense partners and suppliers, making collaboration and technology transfer more difficult.
      3. Underfunded and Misallocated Budgets
      • A large portion of Malondesh defense budget goes to salaries and maintenance, leaving little for modernization.
      • The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project, for instance, has been marred by delays and scandals, further damaging Malondesh reputation for defense reliability.
      4. Neglect of Strategic Assets
      • The retirement of MiG-29N jets without timely replacement left a critical gap in air defense.
      • Malondesh reliance on diplomacy over hard power in the South China Sea has exposed vulnerabilities, especially as China increases its maritime presence.
      🌏 Regional Implications
      Malondesh strategic credibility is especially important in Southeast Asia, where:
      • China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea demands robust defense postures.
      • Neighbors like Vietnam and the Philippines are rapidly modernizing and deepening ties with the U.S., Japan, and Australia.
      • Malondesh slow response and outdated assets make it appear underprepared and reactive, rather than proactive.

      Hapus
  16. Royal Malondeshn Navy (RMN)
    The Navy faces serious modernization delays despite being tasked with defending one of the busiest and most contested waters in the world.
    • Surface Combatants
    o The Navy’s main combat ships (frigates and corvettes) are old:
     Kasturi-class corvettes (built in the 1980s).
     Lekiu-class frigates (commissioned in the 1990s).
    o Malondesh planned 6 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) under the Gowind-class project, but the program is stuck in scandal and delay.
     As of 2025, none have been delivered, despite being launched in 2017.
     This has left the Navy with capability gaps in modern surface warfare.
    • Submarines
    o Two Scorpène-class submarines (delivered 2009) are modern but represent a very small force.
    o Limited availability due to high operational costs and technical issues.
    • Patrol Assets
    o Coastal patrol relies on smaller, aging ships.
    o With Chinese ships regularly entering Malondesh EEZ, current assets are insufficient to cover vast maritime zones.
    Summary:
    The RMN is overstretched, with modernization paralyzed by the LCS scandal, leaving Malondesh with too few modern ships to secure its waters.
    ________________________________________
    Malondeshn Army
    The Army is somewhat better equipped than the Navy and Air Force, but still faces delays in modernization.
    • Armored Vehicles
    o Still relies on Condor armored personnel carriers (German origin, from 1980s).
    o The newer AV8 Gempita (local production with Turkish FNSS partnership) is being delivered, but the rollout is slow and numbers are limited.
    • Artillery
    o Mix of old towed artillery pieces and some modern self-propelled systems.
    o Procurement of new artillery systems has been repeatedly delayed.
    • Air Defense
    o Malondesh air defense is very limited (mainly short-range MANPADS like Igla).
    o No medium or long-range air defense system has been acquired, leaving the country vulnerable to modern air threats.
    Summary:
    The Army is modernizing piecemeal but lacks strong air defense and heavy firepower, relying heavily on outdated armored vehicles and artillery.

    BalasHapus
  17. πŸ’Έ 1. POTENTIALLY HIGHER LONG-TERM COSTS
    • Critics argue that leasing may cost more than outright purchase over time.
    • For example, Poland purchased 32 AW149 helicopters for US$1.83 billion, while Malondesh is leasing 28 helicopters for RM16.5 billion (~US$3.5 billion) over 15 years.
    • Leasing includes bundled services (maintenance, training, insurance), but the total cost may exceed the value of the helicopters themselves.
    πŸ•΅️‍♂️ 2. Transparency & Procurement Concerns
    • The deal was signed with Weststar Aviation, a private firm owned by a prominent businessman, raising questions about middlemen and lobbying.
    • Past scandals in Malondesh defense procurement—like the LCS and MD530G helicopter failures—have made the public wary of opaque contracts and lack of competitive bidding.
    πŸ› ️ 3. Limited Sovereignty Over Assets
    • Leased helicopters are not fully owned until the end of the contract, which may limit:
    o Upgrades or modifications
    o Deployment flexibility
    o Integration with other military systems
    • This could hinder Malondesh ability to adapt the fleet to evolving threats or mission needs.
    🧭 4. Missed Opportunity for Local Industry Growth
    • Purchasing helicopters could have supported local assembly, maintenance, and technology transfer, boosting Malondesh defense industry.
    • Leasing centralizes operations under a private provider, reducing opportunities for domestic capability development.
    ⚠️ 5. Risk of Contractual Disputes or Service Interruptions
    • If the leasing company fails to meet service-level agreements (e.g., 85% fleet availability), Malondesh may face operational gaps.
    • Legal or financial disputes could delay missions or compromise national security.
    πŸ—£️ Public & Political Backlash
    • Opposition leaders and defense experts have called the deal overpriced and strategically flawed, urging a review of procurement practices.
    • The Prime Minister defended the lease as a way to avoid maintenance burdens, but critics say it reflects short-term budgeting over long-term planning.

    BalasHapus
  18. ✨️KRI BRAWIJAYA 320
    FULL WEPON haha!πŸ¦ΎπŸš€πŸ¦Ύ

    VLS A50 Aster nampak gagah dan meriam 127 wowwww
    ⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️
    https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2025/05/calon-awak-kri-brawijaya-320.html?sc=1751860669204&m=1#c1126006473292358489


    warganyet kl ketar ketir, KALAH LAGIIIII haha😡‍πŸ’«πŸ˜­πŸ˜΅‍πŸ’«

    BalasHapus
  19. ⚠️ KEY FACTORS BEHIND MALONDESH LOSS OF Strategic Credibility
    1. Inconsistent Defense Procurement
    • Malondesh defense acquisitions have been plagued by delays, cancellations, and reversals.
    • The MRCA program, for example, has seen years of indecision, with no clear outcome despite urgent need.
    • Interest in second-hand jets like Kuwait’s F/A-18C/D Hornets signals a lack of long-term planning, contrasting with regional trends toward cutting-edge platforms.
    2. Opaque and Corrupt Procurement Practices
    • Analysts have described Malondesh defense procurement as “messy, opaque and corrupt”, often involving middlemen and lacking transparency.
    • This undermines trust among defense partners and suppliers, making collaboration and technology transfer more difficult.
    3. Underfunded and Misallocated Budgets
    • A large portion of Malondesh defense budget goes to salaries and maintenance, leaving little for modernization.
    • The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project, for instance, has been marred by delays and scandals, further damaging Malondesh reputation for defense reliability.
    4. Neglect of Strategic Assets
    • The retirement of MiG-29N jets without timely replacement left a critical gap in air defense.
    • Malondesh reliance on diplomacy over hard power in the South China Sea has exposed vulnerabilities, especially as China increases its maritime presence.
    🌏 Regional Implications
    Malondesh strategic credibility is especially important in Southeast Asia, where:
    • China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea demands robust defense postures.
    • Neighbors like Vietnam and the Philippines are rapidly modernizing and deepening ties with the U.S., Japan, and Australia.
    • Malondesh slow response and outdated assets make it appear underprepared and reactive, rather than proactive.

    BalasHapus
  20. Komentar ini telah dihapus oleh pengarang.

    BalasHapus
  21. Kashiyan warganyet aset selaluw KALAH LAGIIIIII haha!πŸ˜πŸ˜†πŸ˜

    ○Frigat kita punyak TRIO AH140, PPA, ISTIF
    ○Jet Tempur kita punyak TRIO RAFALE, BORAMAE, KAAN

    jangan tanya HELI ATAK, UCAV, MERAD, SPH apalagi rudal Balistik macam KHAN...mana punyak negri🎰kasino gentinf, bajet kecil bibir tebel..pembual halu haha!πŸ€₯πŸ˜‹πŸ€₯

    BalasHapus
  22. NGPVs > LCS > OPV > LMS= FFBNW OMPONG MISKIN
    ANWAR = ASTONISHED SHIPS
    ANWAR = ASTONISHED SHIPS
    ANWAR = ASTONISHED SHIPS
    Anwar said he had been astonished to see a navy frigate dating from the 1970s on display at the recent LIMA maritime and aerospace expo in Langkawi.
    “I want to salute these ships but I don’t know where to put my face. The last frigate (on display at LIMA) was from 1998,” he said
    ---------------
    TUA BANGKA 2025 – 1953 = 72 UMUR KAPAL
    KAPAL 1953 = LEBIH TUA DARI NEGARA
    KAPAL 1953 = LEBIH TUA DARI NEGARA
    KAPAL 1953 = LEBIH TUA DARI NEGARA
    Launched 9 September 1953 Completed 9 September 1954 The ship was transferred to the Royal Malayan Navy on 1 April 1958, being renamed Sri Perlis. Following transfer, Sri Perlis' 40mm Bofors gun and minesweeping gear was removed and replaced by three 20 mm Oerlikon cannon
    ---------------
    NGEMIS KAPAL 1967
    NGEMIS KAPAL 1967
    NGEMIS KAPAL 1967
    The post stated that among his achievements in the MMEA were that he was the team leader for a suitability study on absorbing the US Coast Guard cutter – USCG Decisive. Checks on the US Coast Guard website showed that Decisive– a Reliance class cutter – was laid in 1967 and commissioned in 1968
    -----
    NGEMIS KAPAL 1968
    NGEMIS KAPAL 1968
    NGEMIS KAPAL 1968
    USCGC Steadfast (WMEC-623) was a United States Coast Guard medium endurance cutter in commission for 56 years. Commissioned in 1968, Steadfast was home ported in St. Petersburg, Florida for her first 24 years of service...
    ---------------
    TUNDUK BRITISH = JAGA BUCKINGHAM
    TUNDUK BRITISH = JAGA BUCKINGHAM
    TUNDUK BRITISH = JAGA BUCKINGHAM
    Tugasan untuk berkawal di istana berusia lebih 250 tahun itu digalas penuh rasa tanggungjawab oleh setiap anggota RAMD. MALONDESH yang pernah dijajah British pada suatu masa dahulu diiktiraf kerana mempunyai barisan tentera yang berketrampilan,.
    ---------
    DITOLAK WARGA LEBANON
    DITOLAK WARGA LEBANON
    DITOLAK WARGA LEBANON
    BUKTI DISERANG WARGA LEBANON
    BUKTI DILEMPARI BATU WARGA LEBANON
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d0h0NrZ1NwQ
    ---------
    DITOLAK ARAB SAUDI
    DITOLAK ARAB SAUDI
    DITOLAK ARAB SAUDI
    Kegagalan Anwar untuk bertemu putera mahkota Mohammed bukanlah kegagalan diplomatik pertama yang dialami oleh seorang pemimpin MALONDESH sejak beberapa tahun kebelakangan ini.
    ---------
    DITOLAK EU
    DITOLAK EU
    DITOLAK EU
    EU PALM OIL CURBS - NO RAFALE
    MALONDESH says EU palm oil curbs may undermine France's fighter jet bid.......
    on Thursday the European Union's decision to curb imports of the commodity could undermine France's hopes of winning one of Asia's biggest fighter plane deals.

    BalasHapus
  23. LMS B2 = FFBNW DOWNGRADE HISAR OPV NO ASW
    PRODUK DALAM NEGERI 2009-2024
    HASIL PROGRAM MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FORCE (MEF) TNI AL. ASET KAPAL PERANG STRIKING FORCE TNI AL
    KAPAL CEPAT RUDAL PRODUK PT PAL =
    1. KRI Kapak 625
    2. KRI Panah 626
    3. KRI Kerambit 627
    4. KRI Sampari 628
    5. KRI Tombak 629
    6. KRI Halasan 630
    KAPAL CEPAT RUDAL PRODUK SWASTA NASIONAL =
    1. KRI Clurit 641
    2. KRI Kujang 642
    3. KRI Beladau 643
    4. KRI Alamang 644
    5. KRI Surik 645
    6. KRI Siwar 646
    7. KRI Parang 647
    8. KRI Terapang 648
    9. KRI Golok (Trimaran) 688
    KAPAL PATROLI CEPAT PRODUK SWASTA NASIONAL =
    1. KRI Pari 849
    2. KRI Sembilang 850
    3. KRI Sidat 851
    4. KRI Cakalang 852
    5. KRI Tatihu 853
    6. KRI Layaran 854
    7. KRI Madidihang 855
    8. KRI Kurau 856
    9. KRI Torani 860
    10. KRI Lepu 861
    11. KRI Albakora 867
    12. KRI Bubara 868
    13. KRI Gulamah 869
    14. KRI Posepa 870
    15. KRI Escolar 871
    16. KRI Karotang 872
    17. KRI Mata Bongsang 873
    18. KRI Dorang 874
    19. KRI Bawal 875
    20. KRI Tuna 876
    21. KRI Marlin 877
    22. KRI Butana 878
    23. KRI Selar 879
    24. KRI Hampala 880
    25. KRI Lumba-Lumba 881
    KAPAL KORVET PRODUK SWASTA NASIONAL =
    1. KRI VVIP Bung Karno 369
    2. KRI Bung Hatta 370
    3. KRI Raja Ali Fisabilillah 391
    4. KRI Lukas Rumkoren 392
    ASET KAPAL PERANG SUPPORTING FORCE TNI AL PRODUKSI DALAM NEGERI
    KAPAL LOGISTIK PRODUK SWASTA NASIONAL =
    1. KRI Dumai 904
    2. KRI Tarakan 905
    3. KRI Bontang 906
    4. KRI Balongan 907
    KAPAL LPD (LANDING PLATFORM DOCK) PRODUK PT PAL =
    1. KRI Semarang 594
    2. KRI Dr. Wahidin Sudirohusodo 991
    3. KRI Dr. Rajiman Wedyodiningrat 992
    KAPAL PEMETAAN BAWAH AIR PRODUK SWASTA NASIONAL =
    1. KRI Pollux 935
    KAPAL SELAM TRANSFER TEKNOLOGI KORSEL-PT PAL =
    1. KRI Nagapasa 403
    2. KRI Ardadedali 404
    3. KRI Alugoro 405
    ===========
    ===========
    LCS = FFBNW MANGKRAK 15 YEARS
    LCS USD 4,74 BILLION/5 UNIT = USD 948 MILLION/UNIT ]
    • USD 948 JUTA (EXCLUDING AMMO) = FFBNW = DELAYED
    -NO NSM.
    -NO VL MICA.
    -NO TORPEDO RINGAN.
    -NO SECONDARY GUNS.
    -NO BOFORS MK3.
    -----------
    PRICE DESTROYER DAN FREGAT =
    -KDX 3 CLASS/SEJONG USD 900 JUTA/UNIT
    -TYPE 052D CLASS USD 500-600 JUTA.
    -TYPE 055 CLASS USD 920 JUTA.
    -------------
    KEDAH = FFBNW NO MISSILE SINCE 2025=2009 : 17 YAERS GUNBOAT
    In June 2006, after a total of 18 months of delays, the Royal MALONDESH Navy commissioned KD Kedah, followed by a second hull, KD Pahang in August of the same year, and a third hull, KD Perak on 12 November 2007. By July 2009, six vessels had been launched.
    -------------
    THHE OPV 2 DAN OPV 3 = FFBNW TAMAT
    THHE OPV 2 DAN OPV 3 = FFBNW TAMAT
    THHE OPV 2 DAN OPV 3 = FFBNW TAMAT
    Beliau berkata keputusan itu dipersetujui oleh Kabinet pada 22 Mac 2024 sebelum ia dilaksanakan

    BalasHapus
  24. PPA telah sampai...
    semakin Sakit Djiwa para warganyet kl haha!πŸ€ͺπŸ€ͺπŸ€ͺ
    FAAANNAASSSSSπŸ”₯KALAH LAGIIIIIII...

    BalasHapus
  25. PPA telah sampai...
    semakin Sakit Djiwa para warganyet kl haha!πŸ€ͺπŸ€ͺπŸ€ͺ
    FAAANNAASSSSSπŸ”₯KALAH LAGIIIIIII...

    BalasHapus
    Balasan
    1. LCS 2x lipat PPA tiada jadi 15 tahun om @palu gada ..........

      Hapus
  26. CARA MENIPU SULTAN - PSIM FAKE
    Jika pada peluncurannya tahun 2017 lalu kapal ini terlihat telah dilengkapi dengan modul PSIM, maka itu adalah modul PSIM palsu/fake yang dipasang untuk upacara peluncuran sebagaimana disampaikan dalam sidang PAC (Public Account Committe). Modul PSIM palsu ini kemudian dilepas saat kapal ini dipasangi hanggar.
    ==============
    DEBT 17 CREDITOR LCS =
    1. MTU Services Ingat Kawan (M) Sdn Bhd
    2. include Contraves Sdn Bhd
    3. Axima Concept SA
    4. Contraves Advanced Devices Sdn Bhd
    5. Contraves Electrodynamics Sdn Bhd and Tyco Fire
    6. Security & Services MALONDESH Sdn Bhd,
    7. iXblue SAS
    8. iXblue Sdn Bhd and Protank Mission Systems Sdn Bhd
    9. Bank Pembangunan MALONDESH Bhd
    10. AmBank Islamic Bhd
    11. AmBank (M) Bhd
    12. Affin Hwang Investment Bank Bhd
    13. Bank Muamalat MALONDESH Bhd
    14. Affin Bank Bhd
    15. Bank Kerjasama Rakyat MALONDESH Bhd
    16. Malayan Banking Bhd (Maybank)
    17. KUWAIT FINANCE HOUSE (MALONDESH) BHD.
    ==========
    SEWA 28 HELI = 119 HELI BARU :
    SEWA 28 HELI RM 16.8BN = USD 3.7BN/USD 3.700 JT DOLAR
    •HARGA HELI AW149 = USD 31 JUTA
    •28 UNITK X $ 31 JT= USD 857 JUTA
    •$ 3.700JT ÷ $ 31 JT = 119 HELI BARU
    ----
    4x LEBIH MAHAL SEWA DARIPADA BELI BARU =
    SEWA 15 TAHUN = RM16.8 BILION
    BELI BARU = RM3.954 BILION
    SEWAan selama 15 tahun dianggarkan mencecah RM16.8 bilion, jauh lebih tinggi berbanding kos pembelian helikopter serupa yang dianggarkan sekitar RM3.954 bilion.MALONDESH (ATM).
    ----
    KEYWORDS
    1 UNIT JAVELIN = 3 UNIT NLAW
    4.5 KM JAVELIN = 1 KM NLAW
    ---
    Javelin: Costs about US$80,000 per missile and has a maximum effective range of up to 4.5 kilometers
    The cost of an NLAW (Next-generation Light Anti-tank Weapon) unit generally around $30,000 to $33,000. It has a range of up to 1,000 meters and can destroy a tank in a single shot.
    ----
    KEYWORDS 1 UNIT APACHE = 13 UNIT MD530G
    -
    1. APACHE INDONESIA 8 UNIT HARGA USD 1.42 BILLION = USD 177.5 MILLION/UNIT
    -
    2. MD530G 6 UNIT HARGA USD 77.4 MILLION = USD 12,9 MILLION/UNIT
    -
    USD 177.5 MILLION/ USD 12,9 MILLION = 13 UNIT MD630G
    ------
    CHEAPEST VARIANT HISAR OPV
    -
    1. ADA CLASS PAKISTAN USD 1 MILYAR/4 = USD 250 JUTA PER UNIT
    -
    2. ADA CLASS UKRAINE USD 1 MILYAR/2 = USD 250 JUTA PER UNIT + UCAV SENILAI USD 500 JUTA
    -
    3. HISAR OPV CLASS (LMS B2) MALONDESH USD 530 JUTA /3 = USD 176,7 JUTA PER UNIT
    ------
    CHEAPEST VARIANT FA50
    -
    1. FA 50 GF (TA 50 BLOK II) 12 UNIT HARGA USD 705 JUTA ALIAS USD 58,75 JUTA/UNIT
    -
    2. FA 50 PL (BLOK 20) 36 UNIT HARGA USD 2300 JUTA ALIAS USD 63,89 JUTA/UNIT
    -
    3. FA 50M 18 UNIT HARGA USD 920 JUTA ALIAS USD 51,1 JUTA/UNIT
    ------
    ANKA OMPONG = WILL NOT BE EQUIPPED WITH ANY WEAPONRY
    MALONDESH to use Anka-S for Maritime Surveillance, and will NOt be equipped with any weaponry.
    ==============
    FACT :
    1. 1 UNIT APACHE = 13 UNIT MD530G
    2. 1 UNIT RAFALE = 4 UNIT FA50M
    3. 1 UNIT PPA = 3 UNIT LMS B2
    4. 1 UNIT SCORPENE IDN = 2 UNIT SCORPENE MALONDESH
    5. CN 235 US$ 27,50 JUTA = ATR 72 US$24.7 JUTA
    6. SEWA 28 HELI = 119 HELI BARU
    7. 4.5 KM JAVELIN = 1 KM NLAW
    8. ANKA ISR NOT ARMED
    NGPVs > LCS > OPV > LMS= FFBNW OMPONG MISKIN

    BalasHapus
  27. SIPRI LCS (FFBNW) =
    ENIGINE GERMAN = NOL = NO BERUK KLAIM GHOIB DELIVERED = NO ENGINE
    MICA FRANCE = NOL = NO BERUK KLAIM GHOIB DELIVERED = NO MICA
    FCS TNX ITALY = NOL = NO BERUK KLAIM GHOIB DELIVERED = NO FCS
    SMART NETHERLANDS = NOL = NO BERUK KLAIM GHOIB DELIVERED = NO SMART
    ==========
    LCS = FFBNW
    LCS USD 4,74 BILLION/5 UNIT = USD 948 MILLION/UNIT ]
    • USD 948 JUTA (EXCLUDING AMMO) = FFBNW = MANGKRAK DELAYED
    -NO NSM.
    -NO VL MICA.
    -NO TORPEDO RINGAN.
    -NO SECONDARY GUNS.
    -NO BOFORS MK3.
    -----------
    PRICE DESTROYER DAN FREGAT =
    -KDX 3 CLASS/SEJONG USD 900 JUTA/UNIT
    -TYPE 052D CLASS USD 500-600 JUTA.
    -TYPE 055 CLASS USD 920 JUTA.
    ==========
    EXCLUDING AMMO = FFBNW
    EXCLUDING AMMO = FFBNW
    EXCLUDING AMMO = FFBNW
    REVISED (FINAL): RM11.2B FOR 5 SHIPS
    (final agreed-upon contract price dealing with cost overruns)
    RM 2.24 billion (2023) per unit + ToT (ceiling) [or $948M (2023 inflation) or ~$700M (2011 forex) or ~$490M (2023 forex) (excluding ammo)
    Inflation adjustment roughly equivalent to $948 million in 2023 US dollars (excluding ammo)
    -------------
    REVISED (INITIAL): RM 9.128B FOR 5 SHIPS
    (initial figures using the original contract price in dealing with cost overruns)
    RM 1.8 billion (2011) per unit + ToT (ceiling) or $560 million per ship (excluding ammo)
    Inflation adjustment roughly equivalent to $758 million in 2023 US dollars (excluding ammo)
    -------------
    ORIGINAL: RM 9B FOR 6 SHIPS
    RM 1.5 billion (2011) per unit + ToT (ceiling) or $466 million per ship (excluding cost overruns and ammo)
    Inflation adjustment roughly equivalent to $631 million in 2023 US dollars (excluding cost overruns and ammo
    ==========
    PROBLEMS SHIPYARD = LCS OPV NGPVs FAILED
    PROBLEMS SHIPYARD = LCS OPV NGPVs FAILED
    PROBLEMS SHIPYARD = LCS OPV NGPVs FAILED
    Local shipyards have poor record building big ships. LCS is one, Kedah is the first. The MMEA OPV is the other one. No need to be a cheerleader about it and trying to play it safe. It’s bad then it’s bad. Can blame the system, blame the politicians, blame the lack of controls, blame the people, the fact remains the local shipyards failed to deliver, and it has cost RMN. Less we forget, BNS (from the days of PSC-ND) had more than 20+ years to learn building complex ships. Also, the shipbuilding pipeline is too limited to support a local industry, meaning there is no learning possible – BNS (and its predecessor PSC-ND) only had contract to build 12 warships in its existence. In fact, come 2030, after 30 years, if we’re lucky the shipyard would still only have built 11 ships. In contrast ST Engineering had more than 40 ships over 28 years and have confirmed 6 new ships out to 2030. Learning is one thing, tolerating “still learning” after 20 plus years is not good enough. Not recognising learning is not possible because of limited pipeline is another. Local shipyards have proven capable of building certain type of ships because of good pipeline, so good for them that they win those contract – they can learn over time to build bigger ships. But for now, no need to be a cheerleader for local shipyards pitching to win big ships for RMN and MMEA.
    NGPVs > LCS > OPV > LMS= FFBNW OMPONG MISKIN

    BalasHapus
  28. Indonesia Shopping PPA Paolo Thaon de Revel class 2 unit dengan skema Pinjaman Luar Negeri...Hasil Akhir: Nyata, Riil, dan Operasional


    Malondesh shopping 6 unit LCS Gowind class dengan skema Pinjaman Luar Negeri dan Dalam Negeri...Hasil Akhir: Tidak Ada 1 unit pun yang Selesai 100 % dan Operasional sejak 14 Tahun lalu First Steel Cutting.


    Ngerti KAAN bedanya, right???

    BalasHapus
  29. Indonesia Shopping PPA Paolo Thaon de Revel class 2 unit dengan skema Pinjaman Luar Negeri...Hasil Akhir: Nyata, Riil, dan Operasional


    Malondesh shopping 6 unit LCS Gowind class dengan skema Pinjaman Luar Negeri dan Dalam Negeri...Hasil Akhir: Tidak Ada 1 unit pun yang Selesai 100 % dan Operasional sejak 14 Tahun lalu First Steel Cutting.


    Ngerti KAAN bedanya, right???


    Netizen Indonesia tertawa terbahak-bahak dong

    WKWKWKWK
    HAHAHAHA

    BalasHapus
  30. Itu keren banget....KRI Brawijaya sudah tiba di Indonesia....

    Sebentar lagi akan sandar di Jakarta Port untuk Upacara Pengakuan dan Penugasan di Koarmada 2


    Estimasi KRI Prabu Siliwangi akan hadir di Indonesia bisa jadi akhir tahun 2025 atau awal tahun 2026


    Lanjutkan !!!!

    BalasHapus
  31. CARA MENIPU SULTAN - PSIM FAKE
    Jika pada peluncurannya tahun 2017 lalu kapal ini terlihat telah dilengkapi dengan modul PSIM, maka itu adalah modul PSIM palsu/fake yang dipasang untuk upacara peluncuran sebagaimana disampaikan dalam sidang PAC (Public Account Committe). Modul PSIM palsu ini kemudian dilepas saat kapal ini dipasangi hanggar.
    ==============
    DEBT 17 CREDITOR LCS =
    1. MTU Services Ingat Kawan (M) Sdn Bhd
    2. include Contraves Sdn Bhd
    3. Axima Concept SA
    4. Contraves Advanced Devices Sdn Bhd
    5. Contraves Electrodynamics Sdn Bhd and Tyco Fire
    6. Security & Services MALONDESH Sdn Bhd,
    7. iXblue SAS
    8. iXblue Sdn Bhd and Protank Mission Systems Sdn Bhd
    9. Bank Pembangunan MALONDESH Bhd
    10. AmBank Islamic Bhd
    11. AmBank (M) Bhd
    12. Affin Hwang Investment Bank Bhd
    13. Bank Muamalat MALONDESH Bhd
    14. Affin Bank Bhd
    15. Bank Kerjasama Rakyat MALONDESH Bhd
    16. Malayan Banking Bhd (Maybank)
    17. KUWAIT FINANCE HOUSE (MALONDESH) BHD.
    ==========
    SEWA 28 HELI = 119 HELI BARU :
    SEWA 28 HELI RM 16.8BN = USD 3.7BN/USD 3.700 JT DOLAR
    •HARGA HELI AW149 = USD 31 JUTA
    •28 UNITK X $ 31 JT= USD 857 JUTA
    •$ 3.700JT ÷ $ 31 JT = 119 HELI BARU
    ----
    4x LEBIH MAHAL SEWA DARIPADA BELI BARU =
    SEWA 15 TAHUN = RM16.8 BILION
    BELI BARU = RM3.954 BILION
    SEWAan selama 15 tahun dianggarkan mencecah RM16.8 bilion, jauh lebih tinggi berbanding kos pembelian helikopter serupa yang dianggarkan sekitar RM3.954 bilion.MALONDESH (ATM).
    ----
    KEYWORDS
    1 UNIT JAVELIN = 3 UNIT NLAW
    4.5 KM JAVELIN = 1 KM NLAW
    ---
    Javelin: Costs about US$80,000 per missile and has a maximum effective range of up to 4.5 kilometers
    The cost of an NLAW (Next-generation Light Anti-tank Weapon) unit generally around $30,000 to $33,000. It has a range of up to 1,000 meters and can destroy a tank in a single shot.
    ----
    KEYWORDS 1 UNIT APACHE = 13 UNIT MD530G
    -
    1. APACHE INDONESIA 8 UNIT HARGA USD 1.42 BILLION = USD 177.5 MILLION/UNIT
    -
    2. MD530G 6 UNIT HARGA USD 77.4 MILLION = USD 12,9 MILLION/UNIT
    -
    USD 177.5 MILLION/ USD 12,9 MILLION = 13 UNIT MD630G
    ------
    CHEAPEST VARIANT HISAR OPV
    -
    1. ADA CLASS PAKISTAN USD 1 MILYAR/4 = USD 250 JUTA PER UNIT
    -
    2. ADA CLASS UKRAINE USD 1 MILYAR/2 = USD 250 JUTA PER UNIT + UCAV SENILAI USD 500 JUTA
    -
    3. HISAR OPV CLASS (LMS B2) MALONDESH USD 530 JUTA /3 = USD 176,7 JUTA PER UNIT
    ------
    CHEAPEST VARIANT FA50
    -
    1. FA 50 GF (TA 50 BLOK II) 12 UNIT HARGA USD 705 JUTA ALIAS USD 58,75 JUTA/UNIT
    -
    2. FA 50 PL (BLOK 20) 36 UNIT HARGA USD 2300 JUTA ALIAS USD 63,89 JUTA/UNIT
    -
    3. FA 50M 18 UNIT HARGA USD 920 JUTA ALIAS USD 51,1 JUTA/UNIT
    ------
    ANKA OMPONG = WILL NOT BE EQUIPPED WITH ANY WEAPONRY
    MALONDESH to use Anka-S for Maritime Surveillance, and will NOt be equipped with any weaponry.
    ==============
    FACT :
    1. 1 UNIT APACHE = 13 UNIT MD530G
    2. 1 UNIT RAFALE = 4 UNIT FA50M
    3. 1 UNIT PPA = 3 UNIT LMS B2
    4. 1 UNIT SCORPENE IDN = 2 UNIT SCORPENE MALONDESH
    5. CN 235 US$ 27,50 JUTA = ATR 72 US$24.7 JUTA
    6. SEWA 28 HELI = 119 HELI BARU
    7. 4.5 KM JAVELIN = 1 KM NLAW
    8. ANKA ISR NOT ARMED
    NGPVs > LCS > OPV > LMS= FFBNW OMPONG MISKIN

    BalasHapus
  32. KUWAIT FINANCE HOUSE = EXIT BANKRUPT
    KUWAIT FINANCE HOUSE = EXIT BANKRUPT
    KUWAIT FINANCE HOUSE = EXIT BANKRUPT
    MALONDESH's first foreign Islamic bank Kuwait Finance House (MALONDESH) Bhd (KFH MALONDESH) is exiting MALONDESH after 19 years of operation.
    --------------
    FOOD CRISIS
    RICE CRISIS
    Meanwhile, the minister noted that in MALONDESH, rice scarcity has triggered panic among members of the public as dwindling stocks led to price increases, while the cost of imported rice has placed an additional burden on the people.
    The conditions in MALONDESH showed that disruption in food stocks can cause social unrest. Food is not merely a basic need for the people but also a key factor in national stability,” he stressed.
    -----------
    300.000 LOST JOBS
    300.000 LOST JOBS
    300.000 LOST JOBS
    Almost 300,000 lost their jobs in the last 4 years, Dewan Rakyat told Deputy human resources minister Abdul Rahman Mohamad says various programmes have been introduced to tackle underemployment. total of 293,639 workers lost their jobs between 2020 and Sept 26, with the manufacturing sector recording the highest number of layoffs at 75,615
    --------------
    PETRONAS PAY PGN
    PETRONAS PAY PGN
    PETRONAS PAY PGN
    Afiliasi Pertamina Gas Negara alias PGN (PGAS) menang gugatan atas Petronas Carigali Muriah Limited (PCML), dan PLN. Itu setelah ICC International Court of Arbitration, Hong Kong, menghukum Petronas. Oleh karena itu, Petronas harus memPAY kepada Kalimantan Jawa Gas (KJG).
    --------------
    30.000 JOBS CUT PETRONAS
    30.000 JOBS CUT PETRONAS
    30.000 JOBS CUT PETRONAS
    MALONDESH's state energy firm Petronas will reduce its workforce to ensure its long-term survival amid increasing challenges in the global operating environment
    --------------
    30.000 JOBS CUT GOVERMENTS
    30.000 JOBS CUT GOVERMENTS
    30.000 JOBS CUT GOVERMENTS
    The MALONDESH government’s decision to terminate 30,000 contract staff without a school-leaving certification has drawn backlash from the country’s public service union, which said the sudden end to long careers working for the state lacks compassion.
    ===================
    DATA STATISTA 2029-2020 : INCREASE DEBT
    DATA STATISTA 2029-2020 : INCREASE DEBT
    2029 = 438,09 BILLION USD
    2028 = 412,2 BILLION USD
    2027 = 386,51 BILLION USD
    2026 = 362,19 BILLION USD
    2025 = 338,75 BILLION USD
    2024 = 316,15 BILLION USD
    2023 = 293,83 BILLION USD
    2022 = 271,49 BILLION USD
    2021 = 247,49 BILLION USD
    2020 = 221,49 BILLION USD
    ------------------
    BNM = HOUSEHOLD DEBT IS ONE OF THE HIGHEST IN THE ASEAN ......
    MALONDESH household DEBT is one of the highest in the ASEAN region. Against this backdrop, Bank Negara MALONDESH (BNM) safeguards financial stability by monitoring and regulating the lending activity of all financial institutions in MALONDESH, among other things......
    NGPVs > LCS > OPV > LMS= FFBNW OMPONG MISKIN
    😝😝😝😝😝😝😝😝😝😝😝😝

    BalasHapus
  33. DEBT 17 CREDITOR LCS =
    1. MTU Services Ingat Kawan (M) Sdn Bhd
    2. include Contraves Sdn Bhd
    3. Axima Concept SA
    4. Contraves Advanced Devices Sdn Bhd
    5. Contraves Electrodynamics Sdn Bhd and Tyco Fire
    6. Security & Services MALONDESH Sdn Bhd,
    7. iXblue SAS
    8. iXblue Sdn Bhd and Protank Mission Systems Sdn Bhd
    9. Bank Pembangunan MALONDESH Bhd
    10. AmBank Islamic Bhd
    11. AmBank (M) Bhd
    12. Affin Hwang Investment Bank Bhd
    13. Bank Muamalat MALONDESH Bhd
    14. Affin Bank Bhd
    15. Bank Kerjasama Rakyat MALONDESH Bhd
    16. Malayan Banking Bhd (Maybank)
    17. KUWAIT FINANCE HOUSE (MALONDESH) BHD.
    ===================
    FACT LCS 2025 - 2011 = 15 YEARS
    LAUGHING STOCK TO THE WORLD
    LAUGHING STOCK TO THE WORLD
    LAUGHING STOCK TO THE WORLD
    LAUGHING STOCK TO THE WORLD
    Defence Minister DSU Mohamad Hasan - By building five ships, each vessel will cost around RM2.2 billion to RM2.4 billion, he said adding that he has no idea the amount needed to build the other three. “If we were to build only two ships, it will cost around RM4.5 billion each, making it the world’s most expensive ship for its class and make us a laughing-stock to the world”
    ===================
    FACT NOT YET DELIVERED :
    LCS RM12.4 BILLION /5 UNIT = RM2,48 PER UNIT
    LCS RM12.4 BILLION /5 UNIT = RM2,48 PER UNIT
    LCS RM12.4 BILLION /5 UNIT = RM2,48 PER UNIT
    LCS RM12.4 BILLION /5 UNIT = RM2,48 PER UNIT
    The cost of the project is now RM12.4 billion. This is because Ocean Sunshine Bhd (OSB) – the government owned company set up to take over BNS will be paying the BHIC and LTAT (the previous owner of BNS) some RM1.2 billion in liabilities and DEBT.
    ===================
    2024 RASIO DEBT 84,3% DARI GDP
    The Finance Ministry stated that the aggregate national household DEBT stood at RM1.53 trillion between 2018 and 2023.
    In aggregate, it said the household DEBT for 2022 was RM1.45 trillion, followed by RM1.38 trillion (2021,) RM1.32 trillion (2020), RM1.25 trillion (2019) and RM1.19 trillion (2018).
    “The ratio of household DEBT to gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2023 also slightly increased to 84.3% compared with 82% in 2018,” it said.
    ===================
    MALONDESH's combat equipment has several weaknesses, including:
    • Ageing equipment: The MALONDESH military's equipment is aging due to small procurement budgets over the past 25 years.
    • Lack of modern assets: The MALONDESH Armed Forces (MAF) lacks modern military assets, which puts them at risk from both internal and external threats.
    • Russian-made weapons: MALONDESH has been struggling to keep its Russian-made Su-30MKM ground-attack aircraft operational. The country is also wary of Russian-made weapons due to sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine.
    • Local production: The MAF is reluctant to use locally produced products. Local companies have produced prototypes of pistols and rifles, but none have materialized.
    • Procurement system: The MALONDESH procurement system needs reform.
    Political interference and corruption: Political interference and corruption are undermining combat readiness
    ===================
    NGPVs > LCS > OPV > LMS= FFBNW OMPONG MISKIN

    BalasHapus
  34. Indonesia Shopping PPA Paolo Thaon de Revel class 2 unit dengan skema Pinjaman Luar Negeri...Hasil Akhir: Nyata, Riil, dan Operasional


    Malondesh shopping 6 unit LCS Gowind class dengan skema Pinjaman Luar Negeri dan Dalam Negeri...Hasil Akhir: Tidak Ada 1 unit pun yang Selesai 100 % dan Operasional sejak 14 Tahun lalu First Steel Cutting.


    Ngerti KAAN bedanya, right???


    Netizen Indonesia tertawa terbahak-bahak dong

    WKWKWKWK
    HAHAHAHA

    BalasHapus
  35. Langkah cerdas pasang rudal di Indonesia, daripada nunggu 2 tahun di Itali. Ntah jadinya pasang rudal apa, masih sesuai kontrak atau ganti rudal gak masalah.

    BalasHapus
  36. GEMPUR BELI KAPAL DULU BARU EJEK2...

    BalasHapus
  37. KAPAL NYA MASIH TUWIR2 DAN KEDAH DAN KERIS CLASS MASIH OMPONG EJEK2 ...GAK TAHU DIRI ....MISKIN SEMBANG.... BODOH...TAK TAHU MALU πŸ‡²πŸ‡ΎπŸ€‘πŸ€‘πŸ€‘

    BalasHapus
  38. Indonesia Shopping PPA Paolo Thaon de Revel class 2 unit dengan skema Pinjaman Luar Negeri...Hasil Akhir: Nyata, Riil, dan Operasional


    Malondesh shopping 6 unit LCS Gowind class dengan skema Pinjaman Luar Negeri dan Dalam Negeri...Hasil Akhir: Tidak Ada 1 unit pun yang Selesai 100 % dan Operasional sejak 14 Tahun lalu First Steel Cutting.


    Ngerti KAAN bedanya, right???


    Netizen Indonesia tertawa terbahak-bahak dong

    WKWKWKWK
    HAHAHAHA

    BalasHapus
  39. ✨️KRI BRAWIJAYA 320
    ✅️PPA-MPCS
    Aset PremiumπŸ€‘Full Wepon VLS readiπŸš€
    Telah sampai di tanah air hore haha!πŸ‘πŸ₯³πŸ‘
    ⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️
    https://youtube.com/shorts/7cq-B0xKsOg?si=RmIiVUlHuPTh2EcY


    warganyet kl semakin iri dengki, KEFANASAANπŸ”₯
    Aset Baruw kita bertambah terusz tiada henti haha!πŸ¦ΎπŸ€‘πŸ¦Ύ

    BalasHapus
  40. Kashiyan warganyet aset selaluw KALAH LAGIIIIII haha!πŸ˜πŸ˜†πŸ˜

    ○Frigat kita punyak TRIO AH140, PPA, ISTIF
    ○Jet Tempur kita punyak TRIO RAFALE, BORAMAE, KAAN

    jangan tanya Heli ATAK, MERAD, SPH apalagi rudal Balistik macam KHAN...mana punyak negri🎰kasino genting, bajet kecil bibir tebel..pembual halu haha!πŸ€₯πŸ˜‹πŸ€₯

    emang uda
    BEDA LEVEL, BEDA KASTA...kl uda gak dianggap haha!πŸ”₯☠️πŸ”₯

    BalasHapus
  41. target SHOPPING kita Umazing haha!πŸ€—πŸ‘πŸ€—
    ✅️36 frigat
    ✅️4 destro
    ⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️⬇️
    https://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2024/05/ksal-tni-al-berupaya-rampungkan-renstra.html?m=1
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    target seblah 15-5 sekumpulan poster kapal FRIGAT TUA OBSELIT alias Rongsokan haha!πŸ˜‹πŸ˜πŸ˜‹

    BalasHapus