Bot kelas Ibrahim (photo: MMEA)
PUTRAJAYA – Sambutan Hari Kebangsaan ke-68 hari ini mencatat sejarah tersendiri apabila Agensi Penguatkuasaan Maritim Malaysia (Maritim Malaysia) buat julung kali mempamerkan Bot Kelas Ibrahim yang menjadi simbol sokongan Yang di-Pertuan Agong terhadap keselamatan maritim negara.
Ketua Pengarah Maritim Malaysia, Laksamana Maritim Datuk Haji Mohd Rosli bin Abdullah memaklumkan, bot yang dikurniakan Seri Paduka Baginda Sultan Ibrahim dibina khas oleh Royal Boat Hangar Johor dan telah diserahkan kepada Maritim Malaysia pada 6 Mac lalu.
Tegas beliau, penyerahan itu melambangkan iltizam Seri Paduka Baginda dalam memperkukuh kawalan perairan negara sekaligus meletakkan kepercayaan penuh kepada Agensi ini dalam menjaga keselamatan perairan negara.
Kelajuan maksimum 56 knot
“Bot sepanjang 12.6 meter dengan lebar 3.5 meter ini diperbuat daripada aluminium marin berkualiti tinggi serta dipacu tiga enjin Mercury OBM (Outboard Motor) berkuasa 300 kuasa kuda setiap satu.”
“Ia mampu mencapai kelajuan maksimum 56 knot, dan kelajuan pelayaran optimum ialah 40 knot menjadikannya antara bot pemintas berkelajuan tinggi yang dimiliki Maritim Malaysia,” katanya lagi.
Beliau berkata demikian ketika ditemui selepas hadir pada Majlis Sambutan Hari Kebangsaan Ke-68 di Dataran Putrajaya, pagi tadi.
Bot kelas Ibrahim (photo: Utusan Sarawak)
Sambutan Hari Kebangsaan diserikan dengan keberangkatan Yang di-Pertuan Agong dan Raja Permaisuri Agong, serta dihadiri YAB Perdana Menteri Datuk Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim dan dua Timbalan Perdana Menteri, Datuk Seri Dr Ahmad Zahid bin Hamidi dan Datuk Seri Fadillah bin Yusof.
Mengulas lanjut mengenai bot berkenaan, Datuk Haji Mohd Rosli menjelaskan, bot tersebut dipinjamkan tanpa kos selama lima tahun dan bot berkenaan telah diserahkan kepada Maritim Negeri Johor untuk memperkukuh rondaan dan operasi penguatkuasaan di perairan strategik negeri tersebut.
Selain Bot Kelas Ibrahim, Maritim Malaysia turut menampilkan pasukan elit Rescue Swimmer (Perenang Penyelamat) yang berperanan melaksanakan misi menyelamat di laut dalam keadaan ekstrem. Setakat ini, pasukan itu mempunyai kekuatan 11 anggota operasi dan 12 lagi dalam latihan.
Dalam pada itu, Datuk Haji Mohd Rosli memaklumkan jenayah maritim termasuk penyeludupan manusia, pencerobohan nelayan asing dan penyeludupan dadah menunjukkan trend penurunan.
“Perairan negara kita berada pada tahap aman dan terkawal. Walaupun ada insiden berlaku, jumlahnya semakin berkurangan hasil kerjasama erat Maritim Malaysia dengan Pasukan Polis Marin serta Tentera Laut Diraja Malaysia,” ujar beliau lagi.
Terdahulu, kontinjen Maritim Malaysia dengan 327 pegawai dan anggota dari Maritim Negeri, Pasukan Tindakan Khas dan Penyelamat (STAR Team), Penerbang Maritim Malaysia, Akademi Maritim Sultan Ahmad Shah (AMSAS) lengkap dengan enam jenis pakaian rasmi telah bersama-sama mengikuti perbarisan pada sambutan tersebut.
Selain itu, turut serta Pasukan Pancaragam Maritim Malaysia terdiri dari 40 anggota di samping beberapa buah aset lain turut diperagakan seperti Bot PERKASA 36, Bot BENTENG 2, Air Boat 03, Mobile Surveillance Unit (MSU) serta Helikopter Dauphin AS365 N3.
(APMM)
ðī️ 1. Entrenched Role of Middlemen
BalasHapus• Defense contracts are frequently brokered by agents or intermediaries, many of whom are retired military officers or politically connected individuals.
• These middlemen often act as gatekeepers between the Ministry of Defence and foreign suppliers, adding layers of cost and complexity.
• According to analysts, this system is deeply entrenched and has become an “open secret” in Malaysia’s defense ecosystem.
Impact: Prices are inflated, procurement timelines are extended, and transparency is compromised.
ð§ą 2. Opaque Tendering and Limited Competition
• Fewer than one-third of major defense contracts are awarded through open competition.
• Most deals are conducted via single-source or limited tenders, which favor firms with insider access or political leverage.
• This environment allows deal structuring to be influenced by non-technical considerations, including patronage and lobbying.
Impact: Merit-based selection is sidelined, and cost-effectiveness suffers.
ð️ 3. Politically Connected Firms Dominate
• Many defense contractors have ex-military figures on their boards, giving them privileged access to decision-makers.
• These firms often win contracts despite offering older platforms or substandard equipment—as seen in the attempted purchase of 30-year-old Black Hawk helicopters, which Malaysia’s King publicly condemned as “flying coffins”2.
• The King also rebuked “agents” and “salesmen” in the Ministry of Defence, warning that inflated middleman pricing would render the defense budget perpetually insufficient.
Impact: Public funds are wasted, and the armed forces receive outdated or unsuitable equipment.
ð 4. Consequences for Readiness and Reform
• Inflated costs mean fewer assets can be acquired, and maintenance budgets are squeezed.
• The lack of transparency erodes public trust and makes it difficult for oversight bodies like the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) to hold officials accountable.
• While the King’s intervention led to the cancellation of the Black Hawk deal, systemic reform remains elusive.
ð Summary Table: How Middlemen & Opaque Deals Inflate Costs
Mechanism Description Consequence
Middlemen Agents with insider access broker deals Inflated prices, longer timelines
Limited tendering Few contracts awarded via open competition Reduced transparency, poor value
Politically connected firms Ex-military or political figures dominate contractor space Patronage, outdated equipment
Lack of oversight Weak enforcement and redacted audits Mismanagement persists
ðī️ 1. Entrenched Role of Middlemen
BalasHapus• Defense contracts are frequently brokered by agents or intermediaries, many of whom are retired military officers or politically connected individuals.
• These middlemen often act as gatekeepers between the Ministry of Defence and foreign suppliers, adding layers of cost and complexity.
• According to analysts, this system is deeply entrenched and has become an “open secret” in Malaysia’s defense ecosystem.
Impact: Prices are inflated, procurement timelines are extended, and transparency is compromised.
ð§ą 2. Opaque Tendering and Limited Competition
• Fewer than one-third of major defense contracts are awarded through open competition.
• Most deals are conducted via single-source or limited tenders, which favor firms with insider access or political leverage.
• This environment allows deal structuring to be influenced by non-technical considerations, including patronage and lobbying.
Impact: Merit-based selection is sidelined, and cost-effectiveness suffers.
ð️ 3. Politically Connected Firms Dominate
• Many defense contractors have ex-military figures on their boards, giving them privileged access to decision-makers.
• These firms often win contracts despite offering older platforms or substandard equipment—as seen in the attempted purchase of 30-year-old Black Hawk helicopters, which Malaysia’s King publicly condemned as “flying coffins”2.
• The King also rebuked “agents” and “salesmen” in the Ministry of Defence, warning that inflated middleman pricing would render the defense budget perpetually insufficient.
Impact: Public funds are wasted, and the armed forces receive outdated or unsuitable equipment.
ð 4. Consequences for Readiness and Reform
• Inflated costs mean fewer assets can be acquired, and maintenance budgets are squeezed.
• The lack of transparency erodes public trust and makes it difficult for oversight bodies like the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) to hold officials accountable.
• While the King’s intervention led to the cancellation of the Black Hawk deal, systemic reform remains elusive.
ð Summary Table: How Middlemen & Opaque Deals Inflate Costs
Mechanism Description Consequence
Middlemen Agents with insider access broker deals Inflated prices, longer timelines
Limited tendering Few contracts awarded via open competition Reduced transparency, poor value
Politically connected firms Ex-military or political figures dominate contractor space Patronage, outdated equipment
Lack of oversight Weak enforcement and redacted audits Mismanagement persists
ð 1. Accelerated Modernization by Neighbors
BalasHapus• Singapore maintains one of the most technologically advanced militaries in Southeast Asia, with investments in F-15SG fighters, submarines, and integrated air defense systems.
• Indonesia has ramped up procurement of Rafale jets, frigates, and drones, aiming for a more balanced tri-service force.
• Vietnam has focused on asymmetric capabilities, acquiring Kilo-class submarines, coastal missile systems, and modernizing its air defense.
• Philippines is deepening defense ties with the US, Japan, and Australia, acquiring BrahMos missiles and upgrading its naval fleet.
Result: Malaysia risks falling behind in both conventional and hybrid warfare capabilities2.
ð 2. Malaysia’s Budget Bottleneck
• Malaysia’s defense budget has stagnated at RM15–18 billion annually, with 60–70% spent on salaries and maintenance, leaving little for modernization.
• Major projects like the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program have been plagued by delays and scandals, further eroding trust and capability.
Result: While neighbors invest in future-ready systems, Malaysia struggles to maintain legacy platforms.
ð 3. Strategic Exposure in the South China Sea
• China’s coast guard and maritime militia have repeatedly entered Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), testing its maritime sovereignty.
• Malaysia’s aging naval fleet—28 of 34 vessels are over 40 years old—limits its ability to respond effectively.
Result: Malaysia’s deterrence posture is weakened, especially in contested maritime zones.
ð§ 4. Diplomatic vs. Hard Power Approach
• Malaysia has traditionally relied on quiet diplomacy and ASEAN mechanisms to manage regional tensions.
• However, the geopolitical landscape is shifting toward hard power signaling, with countries like the Philippines and Vietnam adopting more assertive defense postures.
Result: Malaysia’s soft approach is increasingly outpaced by neighbors who combine diplomacy with credible military strength.
ð Summary Table: Malaysia vs. Regional Peers
Country Modernization Focus Strategic Advantage Over Malaysia
Singapore High-tech platforms, integrated C4ISR Superior air/naval integration
Indonesia Balanced tri-service upgrades Larger force, expanding reach
Vietnam Asymmetric coastal defense Strong deterrence in South China Sea
Philippines Allied-backed modernization Rapid capability growth, joint exercises
Malaysia Aging inventory, budget constraints Limited deterrence, slow procurement
Kasihan...ðððĪĢðĪĢðĪŠðð§ðĐððĪ
BalasHapusSudahlah kecil comel, ompong pula..
BalasHapusðððĪĢðĪĢðĪŠðð§ðĐððĪ
Serius laah min...ðððĪĢðĪŠðð§ðĐð
BalasHapusItu kapal BOAT PANCING IKAN TONGKOL dan CUMI-CUMI Malondesh, right?
BalasHapusKasihan.. Bot pengangkut SAYURAN hasil pinjaman... Wkwkwkwkw
BalasHapusMana f18 GAGAL TOTAL ya... Wkwkwkwðððð
Kasihan.. Bot pengangkut SAYURAN MALON itu pun hasil pinjaman... Wkwkwkwkw
BalasHapusMana f18 GAGAL TOTAL ya... Wkwkwkwðððð
Kasihan.. Bot pengangkut SAYURAN MALON itu pun hasil pinjaman... Wkwkwkwkw
BalasHapusMana f18 GAGAL TOTAL ya... Wkwkwkwðððð
Kasihan.. Bot pengangkut SAYURAN MALON itu pun hasil pinjaman... Wkwkwkwkw
BalasHapusMana f18 GAGAL TOTAL ya... Wkwkwkwðððð
Kasihan.. Bot pengangkut SAYURAN MALON itu pun hasil pinjaman... Wkwkwkwkw
BalasHapusMana f18 GAGAL TOTAL ya... Wkwkwkwðððð
Hasil Sedekah YDA ....kasihan Maritim Malaydesh....
BalasHapusðŦ 1. No Long-Range Strike Systems
BalasHapus• Malaysia does not possess ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or standoff precision-guided munitions.
• Its air force lacks platforms capable of launching deep-strike missions. The Su-30MKM fighters have range and payload potential, but Malaysia has not equipped them with long-range strike munitions like Kh-59 or BrahMos.
• Naval assets are similarly limited—no ship-launched cruise missiles or land-attack capabilities exist.
Impact: Malaysia cannot credibly threaten retaliation against adversaries beyond its borders, reducing its strategic leverage.
ðĄ️ 2. Deterrence by Denial, Not Punishment
• Malaysia’s defense doctrine emphasizes “concentric deterrence”, focusing on denial rather than punishment.
• This means the strategy is built around preventing aggression, not retaliating against it.
• While this suits peacetime stability, it’s increasingly inadequate in a region where China, Vietnam, and the Philippines are investing in deterrence-by-punishment capabilities.
Impact: Malaysia lacks escalation control and cannot impose costs on adversaries, weakening its deterrent posture.
ðļ 3. Budget Priorities Undermine Capability Development
• Over 60–70% of Malaysia’s defense budget goes to salaries, maintenance, and operations.
• This leaves minimal room for R&D, procurement of advanced weapons, or strategic force development.
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal and delays have further eroded trust and diverted resources from strategic programs.
Impact: Malaysia is stuck in a cycle of maintaining legacy systems rather than investing in future capabilities.
ð 4. No Indigenous Missile or Strategic Weapons Program
• Unlike regional peers such as Indonesia (which is co-developing missiles with Turkey) or Vietnam (which fields Russian cruise missiles), Malaysia has no domestic missile development program.
• It also lacks partnerships for co-production or licensed manufacturing of strategic weapons.
Impact: Total dependence on foreign suppliers; no autonomy in strategic force planning.
ð Summary Table: Strategic Strike & Deterrence Weaknesses
Weakness Description Strategic Impact
No long-range strike systems No cruise, ballistic, or standoff weapons Cannot retaliate or shape adversary behavior
Denial-based doctrine Focus on defense, not punishment Weak deterrence posture
Budget constraints Most funds go to salaries and maintenance No room for strategic force development
No indigenous capability No missile R&D or co-production High dependency, low autonomy
ð° 1. Budget Composition: Operational vs Development
BalasHapus• In 2025, Malaysia allocated RM21.2 billion to the Ministry of Defence.
o Operational Expenditure (OPEX): RM13.36 billion (~63%) — covers salaries, pensions, allowances, and day-to-day operations.
o Development Expenditure (DE): RM7.49 billion (~37%) — intended for asset acquisition, infrastructure, and modernization.
Impact: The bulk of funding goes to sustaining the status quo, not building future capabilities.
ðĨ 2. Personnel Costs Dominate Spending
• Salaries, pensions, and welfare programs for active-duty personnel and veterans consume over half of OPEX.
• Initiatives like RKAT housing repairs, pension adjustments, and cost-of-living allowances are important for morale but crowd out capital investment.
• Malaysia’s armed forces have a relatively large administrative footprint compared to its combat strength.
Impact: High fixed costs reduce flexibility for strategic procurement or force restructuring.
ð§ 3. Maintenance Over Modernization
• RM5.8 billion in 2025 was earmarked for maintenance, repair, and acquisition of military assets.
• However, most of this goes to keeping aging platforms operational, not acquiring new ones.
• Example: The Royal Malaysian Navy spends heavily on maintaining ships that are 30–40 years old, with minimal upgrades.
Impact: Funds are spent on patching legacy systems rather than leapfrogging to modern technologies.
ð 4. Low R&D and Capability Investment
• Malaysia allocates negligible funding to defense R&D, indigenous production, or strategic systems (e.g. missiles, cyber, ISR).
• Unlike peers such as Indonesia or Vietnam, Malaysia has no major co-development programs or defense industrial offsets.
Impact: Malaysia remains dependent on foreign suppliers and lacks autonomy in capability planning.
ð Summary Table: Budget Allocation Weaknesses
Category Description Strategic Impact
Operational Expenditure RM13.36B for salaries, pensions, and operations Limits modernization and flexibility
Personnel Costs High welfare and admin spending Crowds out combat capability investment
Maintenance Focus RM5.8B for upkeep of aging assets Sustains outdated platforms
Low R&D Investment Minimal funding for innovation or strategic systems No indigenous capability development
ð 1. Ambitious Policy Documents with Limited Follow-Through
BalasHapus• Malondesh’s first Defence White Paper (DWP), launched in 2019, laid out a 10-year roadmap for force modernization, defense industry reform, and multi-domain readiness.
• It proposed initiatives like:
o A revised National Military Strategy
o A Defence Capacity Plan
o A National Defence Industry Policy
• However, by 2021–2025, many of these remained in draft form or unimplemented, with only partial progress on cyber and air surveillance capabilities.
Impact: Strategic clarity exists, but execution lags, creating a credibility gap between policy and reality.
ð°️ 2. Stalled Programs and Missed Timelines
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program is the most glaring example:
o RM9 billion allocated for six ships
o None delivered as of 2025
o Delays linked to mismanagement, redacted audits, and political interference
• Other programs like the Ground-Based Air Defence (GBAD) system and High Mobility Armoured Vehicles (HMAV) remain unfunded or stuck in approval stages.
Impact: Operational capability suffers, and the military continues to rely on aging platforms.
ð️ 3. Political Instability and Policy Discontinuity
• Malondesh experienced multiple changes in government between 2020 and 2022, disrupting defense planning cycles.
• Each administration brought new priorities, causing re-scoping, delays, or abandonment of existing programs.
• Even when policies are reaffirmed, bureaucratic inertia and fragmented oversight slow implementation.
Impact: Defense reform lacks continuity, and long-term planning is undermined.
ð§ą 4. Weak Institutional Mechanisms for Execution
• There’s no centralized authority to monitor and enforce defense policy implementation.
• Oversight is split between MINDEF, the Ministry of Finance, and political leadership, leading to diffused accountability.
• Audit findings are often delayed or redacted, and recommendations go unenforced.
Impact: Programs stall without consequence, and systemic inefficiencies persist.
ð Summary Table: Why Policy Execution Is Weak
Problem Area Description Strategic Impact
Overambitious planning Policies exceed institutional capacity Unrealistic timelines, stalled delivery
Political volatility Frequent leadership changes disrupt continuity Re-scoping and abandonment of programs
Fragmented oversight No unified implementation body Poor accountability and follow-through
Audit suppression Delayed or redacted findings Mismanagement goes unchecked
ð§ Strategic Consequences
• Malondesh’s defense posture remains reactive and maintenance-heavy, not transformation-driven.
• The credibility of future policy documents is weakened unless backed by institutional reform and budget discipline.
• Regional peers like Indonesia and Vietnam are executing modernization plans more consistently, widening the capability gap.
Oh peringatan hari malaya ya ....
BalasHapusPantas rakyat Sabah dan Serawak tidak antusias meyambutnya
ðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢ
Manakala INDIANESIA.... Makin parah dengan PEMBAKARAN & PENJARAHAN dimana mana..... ðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢ
BalasHapusð§ą 1. Fragmented and Underdeveloped Defense Industry
Hapus• Malondesh defense industry is overseen by the Malondeshn Defence Industry Council (MDIC), established in 1999 and later expanded into MIDES.
• Despite having six strategic sectors (Aerospace, Maritime, Weaponry, Automotive, ICT, Common-user Equipment), the ecosystem lacks:
o A clear, enforceable blueprint
o Robust infrastructure
o Skilled manpower
• Many local firms are assemblers or subcontractors, not full-spectrum developers. For example, Malondesh still assembles M4 carbines under license, while Indonesia and Singapore produce their own rifles (SS1 and SAR-21 respectively).
Impact: Malondesh cannot independently design, produce, or sustain core military systems.
ð§ 2. Minimal R&D and Technology Investment
• Indigenous R&D in areas like combat management systems (CMS), sensors, and autonomous platforms is nascent and underfunded.
• Studies show that Malondesh lacks structured tendering policies and technology readiness frameworks to support local innovation.
• AI, cyber warfare, and surveillance systems are still in early-stage development, with no operational deployment.
Impact: Malondesh falls behind in emerging tech domains critical to modern warfare.
ð 3. Dependence on Foreign OEMs for Strategic Systems
• Malondesh imports nearly all major platforms:
o Aircraft: Su-30MKM (Russia), FA-50 (South Korea), Hawk (UK)
o Naval systems: ScorpÃĻne submarines (France), LCS (French-German design)
o Missiles: Starstreak (UK), MICA (France), Exocet (France)
• There are no indigenous missile programs, no local radar production, and no domestic armored vehicle design.
Impact: Strategic vulnerability in times of embargo, conflict, or supply chain disruption.
ð 4. Policy Gaps and Execution Failures
• Malondesh has published defense blueprints and industrial strategies, but implementation is weak due to:
o Budget constraints
o Lack of political continuity
o Limited private-sector incentives
• Even promising initiatives like the 15-to-5 naval transformation plan have stalled due to procurement scandals and delivery failures.
Impact: Indigenous capability remains aspirational, not operational.
ð Summary Table: Weaknesses in Indigenous Capability Development
Dimension Description Strategic Impact
Industrial base Fragmented, lacks full-spectrum development No self-reliance in core systems
R&D investment Minimal funding, weak frameworks Falls behind in emerging technologies
Foreign dependency Imports all major platforms and weapons Vulnerable to external shocks
Policy execution Strong on paper, weak in practice Stalled programs and missed timelines
ð§ Strategic Consequences
• Malondesh cannot scale or sustain its military without foreign support.
• It lacks the ability to customize systems to local needs, export defense products, or build strategic depth.
• In contrast, countries like Indonesia (Pindad, PT PAL), Vietnam (Z111 Factory), and Singapore (ST Engineering) have made significant strides in indigenous capability
ð§ą 1. Fragmented and Underdeveloped Defense Industry
Hapus• Malondesh defense industry is overseen by the Malondeshn Defence Industry Council (MDIC), established in 1999 and later expanded into MIDES.
• Despite having six strategic sectors (Aerospace, Maritime, Weaponry, Automotive, ICT, Common-user Equipment), the ecosystem lacks:
o A clear, enforceable blueprint
o Robust infrastructure
o Skilled manpower
• Many local firms are assemblers or subcontractors, not full-spectrum developers. For example, Malondesh still assembles M4 carbines under license, while Indonesia and Singapore produce their own rifles (SS1 and SAR-21 respectively).
Impact: Malondesh cannot independently design, produce, or sustain core military systems.
ð§ 2. Minimal R&D and Technology Investment
• Indigenous R&D in areas like combat management systems (CMS), sensors, and autonomous platforms is nascent and underfunded.
• Studies show that Malondesh lacks structured tendering policies and technology readiness frameworks to support local innovation.
• AI, cyber warfare, and surveillance systems are still in early-stage development, with no operational deployment.
Impact: Malondesh falls behind in emerging tech domains critical to modern warfare.
ð 3. Dependence on Foreign OEMs for Strategic Systems
• Malondesh imports nearly all major platforms:
o Aircraft: Su-30MKM (Russia), FA-50 (South Korea), Hawk (UK)
o Naval systems: ScorpÃĻne submarines (France), LCS (French-German design)
o Missiles: Starstreak (UK), MICA (France), Exocet (France)
• There are no indigenous missile programs, no local radar production, and no domestic armored vehicle design.
Impact: Strategic vulnerability in times of embargo, conflict, or supply chain disruption.
ð 4. Policy Gaps and Execution Failures
• Malondesh has published defense blueprints and industrial strategies, but implementation is weak due to:
o Budget constraints
o Lack of political continuity
o Limited private-sector incentives
• Even promising initiatives like the 15-to-5 naval transformation plan have stalled due to procurement scandals and delivery failures.
Impact: Indigenous capability remains aspirational, not operational.
ð Summary Table: Weaknesses in Indigenous Capability Development
Dimension Description Strategic Impact
Industrial base Fragmented, lacks full-spectrum development No self-reliance in core systems
R&D investment Minimal funding, weak frameworks Falls behind in emerging technologies
Foreign dependency Imports all major platforms and weapons Vulnerable to external shocks
Policy execution Strong on paper, weak in practice Stalled programs and missed timelines
ð§ Strategic Consequences
• Malondesh cannot scale or sustain its military without foreign support.
• It lacks the ability to customize systems to local needs, export defense products, or build strategic depth.
• In contrast, countries like Indonesia (Pindad, PT PAL), Vietnam (Z111 Factory), and Singapore (ST Engineering) have made significant strides in indigenous capability
ð 1. Ambitious Policy Documents with Limited Follow-Through
Hapus• Malondesh’s first Defence White Paper (DWP), launched in 2019, laid out a 10-year roadmap for force modernization, defense industry reform, and multi-domain readiness.
• It proposed initiatives like:
o A revised National Military Strategy
o A Defence Capacity Plan
o A National Defence Industry Policy
• However, by 2021–2025, many of these remained in draft form or unimplemented, with only partial progress on cyber and air surveillance capabilities.
Impact: Strategic clarity exists, but execution lags, creating a credibility gap between policy and reality.
ð°️ 2. Stalled Programs and Missed Timelines
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program is the most glaring example:
o RM9 billion allocated for six ships
o None delivered as of 2025
o Delays linked to mismanagement, redacted audits, and political interference
• Other programs like the Ground-Based Air Defence (GBAD) system and High Mobility Armoured Vehicles (HMAV) remain unfunded or stuck in approval stages.
Impact: Operational capability suffers, and the military continues to rely on aging platforms.
ð️ 3. Political Instability and Policy Discontinuity
• Malondesh experienced multiple changes in government between 2020 and 2022, disrupting defense planning cycles.
• Each administration brought new priorities, causing re-scoping, delays, or abandonment of existing programs.
• Even when policies are reaffirmed, bureaucratic inertia and fragmented oversight slow implementation.
Impact: Defense reform lacks continuity, and long-term planning is undermined.
ð§ą 4. Weak Institutional Mechanisms for Execution
• There’s no centralized authority to monitor and enforce defense policy implementation.
• Oversight is split between MINDEF, the Ministry of Finance, and political leadership, leading to diffused accountability.
• Audit findings are often delayed or redacted, and recommendations go unenforced.
Impact: Programs stall without consequence, and systemic inefficiencies persist.
ð Summary Table: Why Policy Execution Is Weak
Problem Area Description Strategic Impact
Overambitious planning Policies exceed institutional capacity Unrealistic timelines, stalled delivery
Political volatility Frequent leadership changes disrupt continuity Re-scoping and abandonment of programs
Fragmented oversight No unified implementation body Poor accountability and follow-through
Audit suppression Delayed or redacted findings Mismanagement goes unchecked
ð§ Strategic Consequences
• Malondesh’s defense posture remains reactive and maintenance-heavy, not transformation-driven.
• The credibility of future policy documents is weakened unless backed by institutional reform and budget discipline.
• Regional peers like Indonesia and Vietnam are executing modernization plans more consistently, widening the capability gap.
Hanya mampu GELAK..... ðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢ
BalasHapusEkonom Prediksi Kerugian Ekonomi Akibat Demo Sentuh Rp9 Triliun
https://www.bola.net/news/ekonom-prediksi-kerugian-ekonomi-akibat-demo-sentuh-rp9-triliun-4a9f74.html
ð§ 1. MAINTENANCE BURDEN: AGING ASSETS, FRAGMENTED SUPPORT
Hapus⚙️ Structural Drivers
• Asset Age: As of late 2024, 171 military platforms across the Army, Navy, and Air Force have exceeded 30 years of service life. This includes:
o 108 Army vehicles and artillery systems
o 29 RMAF aircraft (e.g., F-5E, Hawk 208)
o 34 RMN vessels, including Fast Attack Craft over 40 years old
• Obsolescence: Many platforms are no longer supported by OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers), making spare parts scarce and costly.
ðļ Economic Strain
• Maintenance consumes over 50% of the defense budget’s operational expenditure (OPEX), leaving limited room for modernization.
• Even with recent efforts to localize MRO (Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul) for fighter jets like the F/A-18, cost savings (~20%) are offset by the scale of aging fleets.
ð§Đ Outsourcing Challenges
• Malaysia has long outsourced support functions to private firms to reduce costs.
• However, lack of centralized oversight, inconsistent quality control, and limited technical depth in local vendors have led to delays and suboptimal readiness.
ðĄ 2. Poor Interoperability: Platform Diversity, Command Silos
ð ️ Platform Fragmentation
• Malaysia’s military operates a highly diverse inventory sourced from:
o Western suppliers (US, UK, France)
o Eastern bloc (Russia, China)
o Regional partners (South Korea, Turkey)
• This results in incompatible communication systems, data links, and logistics chains. For example:
o Russian-made Su-30MKM fighters cannot seamlessly integrate with NATO-standard AWACS or datalink systems.
o Naval platforms lack unified combat management systems across classes.
ð§ Command & Control Gaps
• Joint operations are hindered by service-specific doctrines and siloed command structures.
• The absence of a Joint Operations Command with real-time data fusion limits Malaysia’s ability to conduct multi-domain operations.
𧊠Training & Simulation Deficiencies
• Lack of integrated simulation environments means personnel are trained on platform-specific systems, not joint mission profiles.
• Exercises like MALBATT and CARAT show progress, but interoperability remains tactical, not strategic.
ð Summary Table: Maintenance vs. Interoperability Weaknesses
Dimension Maintenance Burden Poor Interoperability
Root Cause Aging assets, fragmented procurement Diverse suppliers, siloed doctrines
Budgetary Impact High OPEX, low modernization headroom Redundant systems, inefficient upgrades
Operational Impact Low readiness, frequent downtime Limited joint ops, weak situational awareness
Reform Challenges Weak vendor oversight, slow MRO localization No unified C4ISR architecture
ð° 1. Budget Composition Skewed Toward Salaries and Maintenance
Hapus• In 2024, Malondesh allocated RM19.73 billion (~USD 4.16 billion) for defense.
o RM8.2 billion (~41.5%) went to salaries and allowances.
o RM5.8 billion was earmarked for maintenance and asset upkeep.
• That leaves less than RM6 billion for all other needs—including procurement, R&D, and infrastructure.
Impact: The lion’s share of the budget sustains personnel and legacy systems, leaving little for new combat capabilities.
ðĶ 2. Procurement Budget Includes Legacy Payments
• The RM5.71 billion procurement allocation in 2024 isn’t entirely for new systems. It includes:
o Scheduled payments for previously signed contracts (e.g. FA-50 jets from South Korea, A400M upgrades).
o Progressive payments for delayed projects like the Maharaja Lela-class Littoral Combat Ships.
o Small-scale purchases (e.g. small arms, radios, support vehicles).
Impact: The actual discretionary funding for new combat platforms is far lower than it appears on paper.
ð 3. Currency Depreciation Erodes Purchasing Power
• Malondesh sources most of its advanced systems from foreign OEMs (e.g. France, UK, South Korea).
• The depreciation of the ringgit against major currencies means that even modest increases in nominal budget do not translate into real gains.
Impact: Malondesh pays more for the same equipment, reducing the volume and quality of new acquisitions.
ð§ą 4. No Multi-Year Strategic Investment Framework
• Unlike Singapore or South Korea, Malondesh lacks a ring-fenced capital investment stream for defense.
• Each year’s procurement is subject to political negotiation and fiscal trade-offs, with no guaranteed continuity.
• This discourages long-term programs like missile development, drone fleets, or integrated air defense systems.
Impact: Strategic programs are fragmented, delayed, or abandoned mid-cycle.
ð Summary Table: Why Funding for New Combat Systems Is Thin
Factor Description Strategic Impact
Budget skew 60–70% spent on salaries and maintenance Minimal room for new acquisitions
Legacy obligations Procurement includes old contracts and delayed projects New systems get crowded out
Currency depreciation Ringgit weakens against USD/EUR Reduces real purchasing power
No strategic investment model No multi-year capital planning Limits continuity and ambition
ðļ 1. Budget Breakdown: Overweight on Operational Costs
Hapus• In 2024, Malondesh allocated RM19.73 billion (~USD 4.16 billion) for defense.
o Salaries and allowances alone accounted for RM8.2 billion (~41.5%).
o Maintenance and asset upkeep received RM5.8 billion in 2025.
• That leaves less than RM6 billion for all other needs—including procurement, R&D, infrastructure, and strategic programs.
Impact: The budget is heavily skewed toward sustaining the current force rather than building future capabilities.
ð§ą 2. Procurement Funding Is Thin and Fragmented
• The RM5.71 billion allocated for procurement in 2024 includes:
o Scheduled payments for existing contracts (e.g. FA-50 jets, A400M upgrades, LCS ships)
o Small-scale purchases like communication gear, vehicles, and small arms
• Due to ringgit depreciation and reliance on foreign suppliers, real purchasing power is eroded.
Impact: Malondesh struggles to fund new combat systems, let alone strategic platforms like missiles, drones, or ISR networks.
𧰠3. Maintenance of Aging Assets Is Costly and Inefficient
• Much of the RM5.8 billion maintenance budget goes to keeping legacy platforms operational, some over 30–40 years old.
• Example: The Navy’s Condor APCs and older patrol vessels require frequent repairs, yet offer limited tactical value.
Impact: High sunk costs in outdated systems reduce the ability to invest in transformative technologies.
ð§ 4. No Dedicated Strategic Investment Stream
• Malondesh lacks a multi-year capital investment framework for defense.
• Unlike Singapore or South Korea, there’s no ring-fenced funding for:
o Missile development
o Cyber warfare
o Space-based surveillance
o Indigenous defense R&D
Impact: Strategic programs are ad hoc, underfunded, and vulnerable to political shifts.
ð Summary Table: How Budget Crowds Out Combat Capability
Category Allocation (2024–2025) Strategic Impact
Salaries & Allowances RM8.2B (~41.5%) Limits flexibility for modernization
Maintenance & Upkeep RM5.8B Sustains aging platforms, not upgrades
Procurement (net new) RM5.71B (incl. legacy contracts) Thin funding for new combat systems
R&D / Strategic Programs Negligible No indigenous capability development
Makin parah....... HANCUR
BalasHapusUPDATE Masjid Al Jabbar Tegalsari Surabaya Ludes Dibakar Massa
https://mataraman.tribunnews.com/news/60330/update-masjid-al-jabbar-tegalsari-surabaya-ludes-dibakar-massa
ð§ 1. MAINTENANCE BURDEN: AGING ASSETS, FRAGMENTED SUPPORT
Hapus⚙️ Structural Drivers
• Asset Age: As of late 2024, 171 military platforms across the Army, Navy, and Air Force have exceeded 30 years of service life. This includes:
o 108 Army vehicles and artillery systems
o 29 RMAF aircraft (e.g., F-5E, Hawk 208)
o 34 RMN vessels, including Fast Attack Craft over 40 years old
• Obsolescence: Many platforms are no longer supported by OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers), making spare parts scarce and costly.
ðļ Economic Strain
• Maintenance consumes over 50% of the defense budget’s operational expenditure (OPEX), leaving limited room for modernization.
• Even with recent efforts to localize MRO (Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul) for fighter jets like the F/A-18, cost savings (~20%) are offset by the scale of aging fleets.
ð§Đ Outsourcing Challenges
• Malaysia has long outsourced support functions to private firms to reduce costs.
• However, lack of centralized oversight, inconsistent quality control, and limited technical depth in local vendors have led to delays and suboptimal readiness.
ðĄ 2. Poor Interoperability: Platform Diversity, Command Silos
ð ️ Platform Fragmentation
• Malaysia’s military operates a highly diverse inventory sourced from:
o Western suppliers (US, UK, France)
o Eastern bloc (Russia, China)
o Regional partners (South Korea, Turkey)
• This results in incompatible communication systems, data links, and logistics chains. For example:
o Russian-made Su-30MKM fighters cannot seamlessly integrate with NATO-standard AWACS or datalink systems.
o Naval platforms lack unified combat management systems across classes.
ð§ Command & Control Gaps
• Joint operations are hindered by service-specific doctrines and siloed command structures.
• The absence of a Joint Operations Command with real-time data fusion limits Malaysia’s ability to conduct multi-domain operations.
𧊠Training & Simulation Deficiencies
• Lack of integrated simulation environments means personnel are trained on platform-specific systems, not joint mission profiles.
• Exercises like MALBATT and CARAT show progress, but interoperability remains tactical, not strategic.
ð Summary Table: Maintenance vs. Interoperability Weaknesses
Dimension Maintenance Burden Poor Interoperability
Root Cause Aging assets, fragmented procurement Diverse suppliers, siloed doctrines
Budgetary Impact High OPEX, low modernization headroom Redundant systems, inefficient upgrades
Operational Impact Low readiness, frequent downtime Limited joint ops, weak situational awareness
Reform Challenges Weak vendor oversight, slow MRO localization No unified C4ISR architecture
ð° 1. Budget Composition: Operational vs Development
Hapus• In 2025, Malondesh allocated RM21.2 billion to the Ministry of Defence.
o Operational Expenditure (OPEX): RM13.36 billion (~63%) — covers salaries, pensions, allowances, and day-to-day operations.
o Development Expenditure (DE): RM7.49 billion (~37%) — intended for asset acquisition, infrastructure, and modernization.
Impact: The bulk of funding goes to sustaining the status quo, not building future capabilities.
ðĨ 2. Personnel Costs Dominate Spending
• Salaries, pensions, and welfare programs for active-duty personnel and veterans consume over half of OPEX.
• Initiatives like RKAT housing repairs, pension adjustments, and cost-of-living allowances are important for morale but crowd out capital investment.
• Malondesh armed forces have a relatively large administrative footprint compared to its combat strength.
Impact: High fixed costs reduce flexibility for strategic procurement or force restructuring.
ð§ 3. Maintenance Over Modernization
• RM5.8 billion in 2025 was earmarked for maintenance, repair, and acquisition of military assets.
• However, most of this goes to keeping aging platforms operational, not acquiring new ones.
• Example: The Royal Malondeshn Navy spends heavily on maintaining ships that are 30–40 years old, with minimal upgrades.
Impact: Funds are spent on patching legacy systems rather than leapfrogging to modern technologies.
ð 4. Low R&D and Capability Investment
• Malondesh allocates negligible funding to defense R&D, indigenous production, or strategic systems (e.g. missiles, cyber, ISR).
• Unlike peers such as Indonesia or Vietnam, Malondesh has no major co-development programs or defense industrial offsets.
Impact: Malondesh remains dependent on foreign suppliers and lacks autonomy in capability planning.
ð Summary Table: Budget Allocation Weaknesses
Category Description Strategic Impact
Operational Expenditure RM13.36B for salaries, pensions, and operations Limits modernization and flexibility
Personnel Costs High welfare and admin spending Crowds out combat capability investment
Maintenance Focus RM5.8B for upkeep of aging assets Sustains outdated platforms
Low R&D Investment Minimal funding for innovation or strategic systems No indigenous capability development
ðŦ 1. No Long-Range Strike Systems
Hapus• Malondesh does not possess ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or standoff precision-guided munitions.
• Its air force lacks platforms capable of launching deep-strike missions. The Su-30MKM fighters have range and payload potential, but Malondesh has not equipped them with long-range strike munitions like Kh-59 or BrahMos.
• Naval assets are similarly limited—no ship-launched cruise missiles or land-attack capabilities exist.
Impact: Malondesh cannot credibly threaten retaliation against adversaries beyond its borders, reducing its strategic leverage.
ðĄ️ 2. Deterrence by Denial, Not Punishment
• Malondesh defense doctrine emphasizes “concentric deterrence”, focusing on denial rather than punishment.
• This means the strategy is built around preventing aggression, not retaliating against it.
• While this suits peacetime stability, it’s increasingly inadequate in a region where China, Vietnam, and the Philippines are investing in deterrence-by-punishment capabilities.
Impact: Malondesh lacks escalation control and cannot impose costs on adversaries, weakening its deterrent posture.
ðļ 3. Budget Priorities Undermine Capability Development
• Over 60–70% of Malondesh defense budget goes to salaries, maintenance, and operations.
• This leaves minimal room for R&D, procurement of advanced weapons, or strategic force development.
• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) scandal and delays have further eroded trust and diverted resources from strategic programs.
Impact: Malondesh is stuck in a cycle of maintaining legacy systems rather than investing in future capabilities.
ð 4. No Indigenous Missile or Strategic Weapons Program
• Unlike regional peers such as Indonesia (which is co-developing missiles with Turkey) or Vietnam (which fields Russian cruise missiles), Malondesh has no domestic missile development program.
• It also lacks partnerships for co-production or licensed manufacturing of strategic weapons.
Impact: Total dependence on foreign suppliers; no autonomy in strategic force planning.
ð Summary Table: Strategic Strike & Deterrence Weaknesses
Weakness Description Strategic Impact
No long-range strike systems No cruise, ballistic, or standoff weapons Cannot retaliate or shape adversary behavior
Denial-based doctrine Focus on defense, not punishment Weak deterrence posture
Budget constraints Most funds go to salaries and maintenance No room for strategic force development
No indigenous capability No missile R&D or co-production High dependency, low autonomy
MAKIN PARAH ..... HANCUR
BalasHapusUTANG MALON SUDAH BERGUNUNG2
ðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢ
ð§ 1. Fragmented and Underdeveloped MRO Infrastructure
BalasHapus• Malondesh defense MRO sector is technically shallow, with most local firms focused on commercial aviation, not military-grade systems.
• Despite having over 200 aerospace companies, only a handful are equipped to handle complex military platforms like fighter jets, naval combat systems, or armored vehicles.
• The defense MRO ecosystem lacks dedicated facilities for:
o Engine overhauls (especially for Su-30MKM and Hawk aircraft)
o Combat system integration
o Naval propulsion and sensor maintenance
Impact: Military platforms face long downtimes and must rely on foreign OEMs for critical servicing.
ð§ą 2. Slow Localization and Limited Technical Depth
• Malondesh has made partial progress in localizing MRO for platforms like the F/A-18D Hornet, but most high-end servicing still requires foreign technical assistance.
• There is no national MRO roadmap aligned with defense modernization goals, unlike countries like Turkey or South Korea that have built robust domestic ecosystems through tech transfer and industrial offsets.
• Local firms lack access to classified schematics, proprietary software, and advanced diagnostic tools needed for full-spectrum support.
Impact: Strategic dependence persists, and Malondesh cannot sustain its fleet autonomously during crises or embargoes.
ðĩ️ 3. Weak Vendor Oversight and Governance
• The 2025 Auditor-General’s Report flagged major lapses in vendor management:
o RM162.75 million in late penalties were not collected
o RM1.42 million in fines were never imposed for delayed maintenance
• Contracts are often awarded to politically connected firms without rigorous performance benchmarks or technical vetting.
• Oversight is fragmented across MINDEF, the Ministry of Finance, and service branches, leading to diffused accountability.
Impact: Maintenance quality is inconsistent, costs are inflated, and readiness suffers.
ð 4. Obsolete Platforms and Spare Part Bottlenecks
• Malondesh inventory includes 171 platforms over 30 years old, many of which require parts that are:
o No longer manufactured
o Sourced from defunct suppliers
o Incompatible with newer systems
• RM384.5 million was lost due to 1.62 million unused spare parts that no longer matched operational needs.
Impact: Maintenance becomes reactive and inefficient, with high sunk costs and low operational returns.
ð Summary Table: MRO Asset Weaknesses in Malondeshn Military
Weakness Area Description Strategic Impact
Infrastructure gaps Few facilities for military-grade MRO Long downtimes, foreign dependency
Slow localization Limited tech transfer, no unified roadmap No autonomy in fleet sustainment
Vendor oversight Poor contract enforcement, inflated costs Inconsistent quality, low accountability
Spare part obsolescence Aging platforms, mismatched inventory Budget waste, reduced readiness
ð§ Strategic Consequences
• Malondesh ability to sustain combat operations over time is compromised.
• Without robust MRO capabilities, even newly acquired platforms (e.g. FA-50 jets, LCS ships) risk becoming high-cost liabilities.
• Regional peers like Indonesia and Singapore are investing in integrated MRO hubs, giving them a long-term readiness advantage.
NGERI UTANG MALON SANGAT MENGGUNUNG ðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢ
BalasHapusSetiap penduduk MALON mempunyai UTANG rata2 RM 47.000
Setiap penduduk MALON dibebani UTANG KERAJAAN sekitar RM 37.000
NGERI ...
ðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢ
Pada akhir kuartal pertama 2025 (Maret 2025), total utang rumah tangga Malaysia adalah RM 1,65 triliun atau setara 84,3% dari PDB, sedangkan utang pemerintah persekutuan mencapai RM 1,3 triliun pada akhir Juni 2025, naik dari RM 1,25 triliun pada akhir 2024. Utang pemerintah terhadap PDB diperkirakan akan mencapai 69% pada akhir 2025.
MAKIN PARAH UTANG MALON GUYS
HapusðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢ
MAKIN PARAH UTANG MALON GUYS
HapusðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢ
HANYA MAMPU GELAK ....... ðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢ
BalasHapusTERNYATA UTANG PER PENDUDUK MALON CAPAI RM 47.000
KEHANCURAN DARI DALAM MAKIN PARAH... ðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢ
BalasHapusBUBAR 2030 MAKIN NYATA... ððŧððŧðĪĢðĪĢ
Iya MALON BUBAR 2030 AKIBAT UTANG MENGGUNUNG
HapusAda Malondesh TANTRUM KEPANASAN sambil Loncat Loncat kesana kemari karena Tidak Terima Rakyat INDONESIA melakukan Demonstrasi sebagai wujud Perjuangan Rakyat....
BalasHapusNetizen Indonesia tertawa terbahak-bahak dong
WKWKWKWK
Gedung DPRD dan Kantor Wali Kota Pekalongan Dibakar Massa saat Demo
BalasHapushttps://m.youtube.com/watch?v=HTgZvksUREg&pp=ygVDR2VkdW5nIERQUkQgZGFuIEthbnRvciBXYWxpIEtvdGEgUGVrYWxvbmdhbiBEaWJha2FyIE1hc3NhIHNhYXQgRGVtbw%3D%3D
UTANG SEMAKIN MENGGUNUNG GUYS ..... ðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢðĪĢ
BalasHapusMALON BUBAR SEMAKIN NYATA .....ððð
Demo Jakarta Chaos! Massa Saling Serang dengan Aparat di Mako Brimob hingga DPR
BalasHapushttps://m.youtube.com/watch?v=kO42jP1aahk&pp=ygUKS3Vhc2FpIGRwcg%3D%3D
UTANGMU SISA BERAPA PUR?
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